



## Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Database

### 02 March 2009 Board of Governors Meeting

2 March 2009 Meeting: GOV/OR.1230; GOV/OR.1231; GOV/OR.1233	
Safeguards	
Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1230 – Para 77) Cuba, speaking on behalf of NAM, said that the full implementation of preambular paragraph (t) and operative paragraph 10, relating to protection of safeguards confidential information, and of operative paragraph 26, relating to the provision of objective technically and factually based reports to the Board and the General Conference on the implementation of safeguards, of General Conference resolution GC(52)/RES/13, on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system and application of the Model Additional Protocol, was essential for enhancing mutual confidence among Member States and between Member States and the Secretariat. NAM took note of the decision of the Republic of Djibouti to conclude an NPT safeguards agreement as well as an additional protocol to that agreement. It also took note of the fact that the United Arab Emirates had decided to conclude an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement with the Agency, and that the Government of India had decided to conclude a protocol additional to its agreement with the Agency for the application of safeguards to civilian nuclear facilities.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1231 – Para 106) Cuba, speaking on behalf of NAM, said that when considering the implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic, it was essential to take into account the way it had first been brought to the Agency’s attention. As acknowledged in the Director General’s report to the Board in November 2008 (GOV/2008/60), the Agency had been severely hampered in discharging its responsibilities under Syria’s NPT safeguards agreement by the unilateral use of force by Israel and by the late provision of information by some Member States concerning the building at the Dair Alzour site. NAM’s position on the issue was as included in the Final Declaration adopted at its 15th Ministerial Meeting held in Tehran from 27 to 30 July 2008:</li> </ul>
Iran	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1230 – Para 144) Cuba, speaking on behalf of the Vienna Chapter of NAM, said that NAM’s position of principle regarding the issue in question was reflected in the following statement adopted at the Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Tehran from 27 to 30 July 2008:  “‘The Ministers reiterated their principled positions on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation reflected in the Final Document of the Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Putrajaya, Malaysia, 27–30 May 2006 and the 14th Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement held in Havana, Cuba, 11–16 September 2006. The Ministers</li> </ul>

	<p>also reiterated the Movement’s principled position on the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear issue as reflected in the NAM Ministerial Statement adopted in Putrajaya on 30 May 2006 and NAM Heads of State or Government Statement adopted in Havana on 16 September 2006. They considered the positive developments in the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran as reflected in the reports of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).</p> <p>“The Ministers recognized the IAEA as the sole competent authority for verification of the respective safeguards obligations of Member States and stressed that there should be no undue pressure or interference in the Agency’s activities, especially its verification process, which would jeopardize the efficiency and credibility of the Agency.</p> <p>“The Ministers welcomed the continuing cooperation being extended by the Islamic Republic of Iran to the IAEA including those voluntary CBMs undertaken with a view to resolving all remaining issues, including those as reflected in the latest report of the Director General of the IAEA on 26 May 2008. They welcomed the fact that the IAEA has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran as reflected in the Agency’s reports since November 2003 and further noted the assessment of the IAEA Director General in Safeguard Implementation Report (SIR) 2006 that all nuclear material declared by Iran had been accounted for and remains in peaceful activities. They noted at the same time, that the process for drawing a conclusion with regard to the absence of undeclared material and activities in Iran is an ongoing and time consuming process. In this regard, the Ministers further welcomed the modality agreement reached between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA on 21 August 2007 leading to the resolution of the six outstanding issues as a significant step forward towards promoting confidence and a peaceful resolution of the issue. The Ministers took note of the Document INFCIRC/711 in which the Agency and Iran agreed that after the implementation of the Work Plan and the agreed modalities for resolving the outstanding issues, the implementation of safeguards in Iran will be conducted in a routine manner.</p> <p>“The Ministers emphasized the fundamental distinction between the legal obligations of states to their respective safeguards agreements and any confidence building measures voluntarily undertaken to resolve difficult issues, and believed that such voluntary undertakings are not legal safeguards obligations.</p> <p>“The Ministers strongly believed that all safeguards and verification issues, including those of Iran, should be resolved within the IAEA framework, and be based on technical and legal grounds. They further emphasized that the Agency should continue its work to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue within its mandate under the Statute of the IAEA.</p>
Verification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1230 – Para 144) Cuba, speaking on behalf of the Vienna Chapter of NAM, said that NAM’s position of principle regarding the issue in question was reflected in the following statement adopted at the Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Tehran from 27 to 30 July 2008:  “‘The Ministers recognized the IAEA as the sole competent authority for verification of the respective safeguards obligations of Member States and </li> </ul>

	<p>stressed that there should be no undue pressure or interference in the Agency's activities, especially its verification process, which would jeopardize the efficiency and credibility of the Agency.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1230 – Para 145) In his latest report, the Director General had once again stated that the Agency had been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. The Agency had also not found indications of ongoing reprocessing activities at those facilities which were being monitored by the Agency in Iran. Furthermore, the nuclear material at the Fuel Enrichment Plant and at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant remained under Agency containment and surveillance and the fuel assemblies imported from the Russian Federation for use at the Bushehr nuclear power plant remained under Agency seals. The report also indicated that the Fuel Enrichment Plant and the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant had been operating as declared.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1230 – Para 146) NAM noted with satisfaction that, since March 2007, 21 unannounced inspections had been conducted at the Fuel Enrichment Plant, reflecting the degree of cooperation extended by Iran, and the fact that there had been no impediments to conducting those inspections. It also took note that the Agency had finalized its assessment of the results of the physical inventory verification carried out at the Fuel Enrichment Plant from 24 to 26 November 2008 and had concluded that the physical inventory as declared by Iran was consistent with the results of the physical inventory verification.</li> </ul>
Israel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1230 – Para 144) Cuba, speaking on behalf of the Vienna Chapter of NAM, said that NAM's position of principle regarding the issue in question was reflected in the following statement adopted at the Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Tehran from 27 to 30 July 2008:          "The Ministers considered the establishment of nuclear-weapons-free-zones (NWFZs) as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and reiterated the support for the establishment in the Middle East of a nuclear weapons free zone in accordance with relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. Pending the establishment of such a zone, they demanded Israel to accede unconditionally to the NPT without delay and place promptly all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards in accordance with Security Council Resolution 487 (1981).</li> </ul>
Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1230 – Para 144) Cuba, speaking on behalf of the Vienna Chapter of NAM, said that NAM's position of principle regarding the issue in question was reflected in the following statement adopted at the Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Tehran from 27 to 30 July 2008:          "The Ministers welcomed the continuing cooperation being extended by the Islamic Republic of Iran to the IAEA including those voluntary CBMs undertaken with a view to resolving all remaining issues, including those as reflected in the latest report of the Director General of the IAEA on 26 May 2008. They welcomed the fact that the IAEA has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran as reflected in the Agency's reports since November 2003 and further noted the assessment of the IAEA Director General in Safeguard Implementation Report (SIR)</li> </ul>

	<p>2006 that all nuclear material declared by Iran had been accounted for and remains in peaceful activities. They noted at the same time, that the process for drawing a conclusion with regard to the absence of undeclared material and activities in Iran is an ongoing and time consuming process. In this regard, the Ministers further welcomed the modality agreement reached between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA on 21 August 2007 leading to the resolution of the six outstanding issues as a significant step forward towards promoting confidence and a peaceful resolution of the issue. The Ministers took note of the Document INFCIRC/711 in which the Agency and Iran agreed that after the implementation of the Work Plan and the agreed modalities for resolving the outstanding issues, the implementation of safeguards in Iran will be conducted in a routine manner.</p>
General Views on Safeguards	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1230 – Para 144) Cuba, speaking on behalf of the Vienna Chapter of NAM, said that NAM’s position of principle regarding the issue in question was reflected in the following statement adopted at the Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Tehran from 27 to 30 July 2008: “The Ministers emphasized the fundamental distinction between the legal obligations of states to their respective safeguards agreements and any confidence building measures voluntarily undertaken to resolve difficult issues, and believed that such voluntary undertakings are not legal safeguards obligations.</li> </ul>
Syria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1231 – Para 107) Syria had reiterated its statement that the destroyed facility, and the current facility, were military installations, and that it had provided information in response to some of the questions raised by the Secretariat. NAM noted that that information was now being assessed by the Secretariat. The Secretariat should refrain from requesting Member States to provide information or to take measures that went beyond their safeguards obligations.</li> </ul>
<b>Country Specific</b>	
Iran	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1230 – Para 144) Cuba, speaking on behalf of the Vienna Chapter of NAM, said that NAM’s position of principle regarding the issue in question was reflected in the following statement adopted at the Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Tehran from 27 to 30 July 2008: “The Ministers reiterated their principled positions on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation reflected in the Final Document of the Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Putrajaya, Malaysia, 27–30 May 2006 and the 14th Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement held in Havana, Cuba, 11–16 September 2006. The Ministers also reiterated the Movement’s principled position on the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear issue as reflected in the NAM Ministerial Statement adopted in Putrajaya on 30 May 2006 and NAM Heads of State or Government Statement adopted in Havana on 16 September 2006. They considered the positive developments in the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran as reflected in the reports of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).</li> </ul>

“The Ministers reaffirmed the basic and inalienable right of all states to develop research, production and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, without any discrimination and in conformity with their respective legal obligations. Therefore, nothing should be interpreted in a way as inhibiting or restricting the right of states to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes. They furthermore reaffirmed that States’ choices and decisions, including those of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear technology and its fuel cycle policies must be respected.

“The Ministers recognized the IAEA as the sole competent authority for verification of the respective safeguards obligations of Member States and stressed that there should be no undue pressure or interference in the Agency’s activities, especially its verification process, which would jeopardize the efficiency and credibility of the Agency.

“The Ministers welcomed the continuing cooperation being extended by the Islamic Republic of Iran to the IAEA including those voluntary CBMs undertaken with a view to resolving all remaining issues, including those as reflected in the latest report of the Director General of the IAEA on 26 May 2008. They welcomed the fact that the IAEA has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran as reflected in the Agency’s reports since November 2003 and further noted the assessment of the IAEA Director General in Safeguard Implementation Report (SIR) 2006 that all nuclear material declared by Iran had been accounted for and remains in peaceful activities. They noted at the same time, that the process for drawing a conclusion with regard to the absence of undeclared material and activities in Iran is an ongoing and time consuming process. In this regard, the Ministers further welcomed the modality agreement reached between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA on 21 August 2007 leading to the resolution of the six outstanding issues as a significant step forward towards promoting confidence and a peaceful resolution of the issue. The Ministers took note of the Document INFCIRC/711 in which the Agency and Iran agreed that after the implementation of the Work Plan and the agreed modalities for resolving the outstanding issues, the implementation of safeguards in Iran will be conducted in a routine manner.

“The Ministers emphasized the fundamental distinction between the legal obligations of states to their respective safeguards agreements and any confidence building measures voluntarily undertaken to resolve difficult issues, and believed that such voluntary undertakings are not legal safeguards obligations.

“The Ministers considered the establishment of nuclear-weapons-free-zones (NWFZs) as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and reiterated the support for the establishment in the Middle East of a nuclear weapons free zone in accordance with relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. Pending the establishment of such a zone, they demanded Israel to accede unconditionally to the NPT without delay and place promptly all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards in accordance with Security Council Resolution 487 (1981).

“The Ministers reaffirmed the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities —

operational or under construction — poses a great danger to human beings and the environment, and constitutes a grave violation of international law, principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and regulations of the IAEA. They recognized the need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks, or threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

“The Ministers strongly believed that all safeguards and verification issues, including those of Iran, should be resolved within the IAEA framework, and be based on technical and legal grounds. They further emphasized that the Agency should continue its work to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue within its mandate under the Statute of the IAEA.

“The Ministers stressed that diplomacy and dialogue through peaceful means must continue to find a comprehensive and long term solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. They expressed their conviction that the only way to resolve the issue is to pursue substantive negotiations without any preconditions among all relevant parties. In this regard, the Ministers welcomed Iran’s willingness to commence negotiations on various regional and global issues, including nuclear issues with NAM member States, particularly those of the region. The Ministers further welcomed the talks between Iran and the six countries held in Geneva in July 2008.”

- (GOV/OR.1230 – Para 145) In his latest report, the Director General had once again stated that the Agency had been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. The Agency had also not found indications of ongoing reprocessing activities at those facilities which were being monitored by the Agency in Iran. Furthermore, the nuclear material at the Fuel Enrichment Plant and at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant remained under Agency containment and surveillance and the fuel assemblies imported from the Russian Federation for use at the Bushehr nuclear power plant remained under Agency seals. The report also indicated that the Fuel Enrichment Plant and the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant had been operating as declared.
- (GOV/OR.1230 – Para 146) NAM noted with satisfaction that, since March 2007, 21 unannounced inspections had been conducted at the Fuel Enrichment Plant, reflecting the degree of cooperation extended by Iran, and the fact that there had been no impediments to conducting those inspections. It also took note that the Agency had finalized its assessment of the results of the physical inventory verification carried out at the Fuel Enrichment Plant from 24 to 26 November 2008 and had concluded that the physical inventory as declared by Iran was consistent with the results of the physical inventory verification.
- (GOV/OR.1230 – Para 147) NAM fully supported the request by the Director General that those Member States that had provided the Secretariat with information related to the alleged studies should agree to the Agency providing copies to Iran. It expressed concern at the creation of obstacles in that regard which hindered the Agency’s verification process.
- (GOV/OR.1230 – Para 148) Given the recent developments and the previous reports of the Director General on the implementation of the work plan, NAM looked forward to safeguards implementation in Iran

	<p>being conducted in a routine manner. It reiterated its principled position that diplomacy and dialogue were the only way to achieve a long-term solution of the Iranian nuclear issue and it encouraged all Member States to contribute positively to that effect. It also expected all parties concerned to avoid undue pressure which put at risk the ongoing constructive process.</p>
<p>Syria</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1231 – Para 106) Cuba, speaking on behalf of NAM, said that when considering the implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic, it was essential to take into account the way it had first been brought to the Agency’s attention. As acknowledged in the Director General’s report to the Board in November 2008 (GOV/2008/60), the Agency had been severely hampered in discharging its responsibilities under Syria’s NPT safeguards agreement by the unilateral use of force by Israel and by the late provision of information by some Member States concerning the building at the Dair Alzour site. NAM’s position on the issue was as included in the Final Declaration adopted at its 15th Ministerial Meeting held in Tehran from 27 to 30 July 2008:  “The Ministers underscored the Movement’s principled position concerning non use or threat of use of force against the territorial integrity of any State. In this regard, they condemned the Israeli attack against a facility in the territory of Syria on 6th of September 2007, which constitutes a flagrant violation of the UN Charter. The Ministers welcomed Syria’s cooperation with the IAEA in this regard.”</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1231 – Para 107) Syria had reiterated its statement that the destroyed facility, and the current facility, were military installations, and that it had provided information in response to some of the questions raised by the Secretariat. NAM noted that that information was now being assessed by the Secretariat. The Secretariat should refrain from requesting Member States to provide information or to take measures that went beyond their safeguards obligations.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1231 – Para 108) In view of the importance of observing confidentiality measures to protect sensitive information regarding Member States and their national security, she expressed NAM’s serious concern about the recurring leaks of sensitive information to the media, even before the official reports of the Secretariat were circulated to Member States. Unless the Board decided otherwise, the Secretariat’s reports to the Board, especially those related to safeguards, had a confidential character. Accordingly, the Secretariat could not inform the media or comment on any information contained in such reports. It was regrettable that the Secretariat’s interaction with the media had led to an avoidable misunderstanding on the issue of graphite particles at the Dair Alzour site, an aspect that had not even been covered in the report in the first place. The Secretariat should take stricter measures to avoid such situations, which mitigated against a political environment conducive to the solution of those sensitive issues.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1231 – Para 109) Finally, NAM reiterated its full confidence in the Agency’s professionalism and impartiality and again urged Member States to avoid placing undue pressure on the Agency or interfering in its activities, especially the verification process, since such action would</li> </ul>

	jeopardize the Agency's efficiency and credibility.
Israel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(GOV/OR.1231 – Para 106) Cuba, speaking on behalf of NAM, said that when considering the implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic, it was essential to take into account the way it had first been brought to the Agency's attention. As acknowledged in the Director General's report to the Board in November 2008 (GOV/2008/60), the Agency had been severely hampered in discharging its responsibilities under Syria's NPT safeguards agreement by the unilateral use of force by Israel and by the late provision of information by some Member States concerning the building at the Dair Alzour site. NAM's position on the issue was as included in the Final Declaration adopted at its 15th Ministerial Meeting held in Tehran from 27 to 30 July 2008:  "The Ministers underscored the Movement's principled position concerning non use or threat of use of force against the territorial integrity of any State. In this regard, they condemned the Israeli attack against a facility in the territory of Syria on 6th of September 2007, which constitutes a flagrant violation of the UN Charter. The Ministers welcomed Syria's cooperation with the IAEA in this regard."</li> </ul>
<b>United Nations Fora</b>	
Matters on UN and IAEA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(GOV/OR.1233 – Para 19) Cuba, speaking on behalf of NAM, said that NAM attached the greatest importance to any matter related to the strengthening of the United Nations system, including the IAEA. NAM considered that the issue of term limits for the Director General of the Agency was one that was of interest for the entire membership of the Agency, so any decision in that regard should be taken by the General Conference. Since General Assembly resolution A/RES/51/241 addressed the strengthening of the United Nations system from a broad perspective, any discussion of term limits for the Director General of the Agency should take place in the same spirit and cover a more comprehensive context, including other very important aspects addressed in the resolution. Discussions on term limits should be taken up within the context of the deliberations on the future of the Agency, and any decision on the matter should be separate from the current process of election of the next Director General.</li> </ul>
<b>Peaceful Uses</b>	
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(GOV/OR.1230 – Para 144) Cuba, speaking on behalf of the Vienna Chapter of NAM, said that NAM's position of principle regarding the issue in question was reflected in the following statement adopted at the Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Tehran from 27 to 30 July 2008:  "The Ministers reaffirmed the basic and inalienable right of all states to develop research, production and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, without any discrimination and in conformity with their respective legal obligations. Therefore, nothing should be interpreted in a way as inhibiting or restricting the right of states to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes. They furthermore reaffirmed that States' choices and decisions, including those of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear technology and its fuel cycle policies must be respected."</li> </ul>



	<p>(GOV/OR.1233 – Para 57) Concerns about nuclear proliferation should not in any way restrict the inalienable right of States to develop all aspects of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes. The Group reiterated its firm rejection of any attempt to discourage peaceful nuclear activities on the grounds of their alleged sensitivity. Any decision on the issue should be taken by consensus.”</p>
Assurance of Supply/ Multilateral Approach to Nuclear Fuel Supply	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1233 – Para 58) Cuba, speaking on behalf of NAM, endorsed the statement made by the representative of Argentina on behalf of the Group of 77 and China: “(GOV/OR.1233 – Para 56) Argentina, speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and China and referring to the proposals relating to assurances of supply of nuclear fuel, stressed the need for a cautious approach with a view to addressing thoroughly the associated technical, legal, financial and economic aspects, as well as possible political dimensions. The Group continued to believe that it was premature for the subject to be considered before the various unresolved aspects and concerns had been adequately examined. Given the financial and administrative challenges facing the Agency, it was necessary to proceed with extreme caution before further burdens were imposed on Member States as a result of the activities that might be carried out in connection with those initiatives.</li> </ul>
<b>NWFZ</b>	
Middle East NWFZ	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1230 – Para 144) Cuba, speaking on behalf of the Vienna Chapter of NAM, said that NAM’s position of principle regarding the issue in question was reflected in the following statement adopted at the Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Tehran from 27 to 30 July 2008: “The Ministers considered the establishment of nuclear-weapons-free-zones (NWFZs) as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and reiterated the support for the establishment in the Middle East of a nuclear weapons free zone in accordance with relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. Pending the establishment of such a zone, they demanded Israel to accede unconditionally to the NPT without delay and place promptly all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards in accordance with Security Council Resolution 487 (1981).</li> </ul>
Israel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1230 – Para 144) Cuba, speaking on behalf of the Vienna Chapter of NAM, said that NAM’s position of principle regarding the issue in question was reflected in the following statement adopted at the Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Tehran from 27 to 30 July 2008: “The Ministers considered the establishment of nuclear-weapons-free-zones (NWFZs) as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and reiterated the support for the establishment in the Middle East of a nuclear weapons free zone in accordance with relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. Pending the establishment of such a zone, they demanded Israel to accede unconditionally to the NPT without delay and place promptly all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards in accordance with Security Council Resolution 487 (1981).</li> </ul>
<b>Security Assurances</b>	

<p>Attack or Threat of Attack Against Peaceful Nuclear Facilities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1230 – Para 144) Cuba, speaking on behalf of the Vienna Chapter of NAM, said that NAM’s position of principle regarding the issue in question was reflected in the following statement adopted at the Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Tehran from 27 to 30 July 2008:  “The Ministers reaffirmed the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities — operational or under construction — poses a great danger to human beings and the environment, and constitutes a grave violation of international law, principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and regulations of the IAEA. They recognized the need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks, or threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. </li> </ul>
<p><b>Institutional Issues</b></p>	
<p>Syria</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1231 – Para 108) In view of the importance of observing confidentiality measures to protect sensitive information regarding Member States and their national security, she expressed NAM’s serious concern about the recurring leaks of sensitive information to the media, even before the official reports of the Secretariat were circulated to Member States. Unless the Board decided otherwise, the Secretariat’s reports to the Board, especially those related to safeguards, had a confidential character. Accordingly, the Secretariat could not inform the media or comment on any information contained in such reports. It was regrettable that the Secretariat’s interaction with the media had led to an avoidable misunderstanding on the issue of graphite particles at the Dair Alzour site, an aspect that had not even been covered in the report in the first place. The Secretariat should take stricter measures to avoid such situations, which mitigated against a political environment conducive to the solution of those sensitive issues.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1231 – Para 109) Finally, NAM reiterated its full confidence in the Agency’s professionalism and impartiality and again urged Member States to avoid placing undue pressure on the Agency or interfering in its activities, especially the verification process, since such action would jeopardize the Agency’s efficiency and credibility.</li> </ul>