



Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Database

26 November 2009 Board of Governors Meeting

26 November 2009 Meeting: GOV/OR.1256; GOV/OR.1257; GOV/OR.1258	
	Peaceful Uses
Assurance of Supply/ Multilateral Approach to Nuclear Fuel Supply	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1256 – Para 75) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, said that, if the Agency was to establish any mechanism for assurance of fuel supply, it must first agree on a conceptual framework outlining the terms and conditions that would apply to all individual proposals. NAM stressed the political and security implications of the proposals put forward and the need for caution and adequate consultations before any decision was taken, which should be by consensus.
	Country Specific
Iran	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV.OR/1257 – Para 72) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, reaffirmed the Movement’s confidence in the professionalism and impartiality of the Director General and the Secretariat and proceeded to reiterate its principled position on the Iranian nuclear issue. • (GOV.OR/1257 – Para 73) In his latest report, the Director General had stated once again that the Agency had been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. • (GOV.OR/1257 – Para 74) NAM welcomed the continued cooperation between the Agency and Iran as elaborated in the Director General’s latest report and, in that regard, took note that activities to produce nuclear material, particularly those related to enrichment, continued to remain under the Agency’s containment and surveillance and the results of the environmental samples taken at the FEP in Natanz and the PFEP indicated that they had been operating as declared. Since the Director General’s previous report, the Agency had successfully conducted two unannounced inspections. A total of 31 unannounced inspections had been conducted at Natanz since March 2007. • (GOV.OR/1257 – Para 75) NAM also took note that the Agency had confirmed that the FFEP corresponded with the design information provided by Iran and that the facility was at an advanced stage of construction, although no centrifuges had been introduced to the facility. The Agency had continued to monitor the use and construction of hot cells at the relevant nuclear facilities in Iran and there had been no indications of ongoing reprocessing related activities at those facilities. • (GOV.OR/1257 – Para 76) Furthermore, the Agency had finalized its assessment of the results of the physical inventory verification carried out at the FMP in August 2009 and had concluded that the inventory of nuclear material at the FMP, as declared by Iran, was consistent with those results. Iran had provided the Agency with access to the IR-40 heavy water reactor at Arak, at which time the Agency had been able to carry out a design information verification. The Agency had verified that

	<p>the construction of the facility was ongoing.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV.OR/1257 – Para 77) NAM encouraged Iran to continue to provide design information regarding its nuclear facilities in accordance with its full-scope safeguards agreement with the Agency. • (GOV.OR/1257 – Para 78) NAM fully supported the Director General’s repeated requests to those Member States that had provided the Secretariat with information related to the alleged studies to allow the Agency to provide all related documents to Iran. NAM expressed once again its concerns about the creation of obstacles in that regard, which hindered the Agency’s verification process. The Agency had limited means to authenticate independently the documentation that formed the basis of the alleged studies, and the constraints placed by some Member States on the availability of information to Iran were making it more difficult for the Agency to conduct detailed discussions with Iran on the matter. • (GOV.OR/1257 – Para 79) Taking into account recent developments, as well as previous reports by the Director General on the implementation of the work plan circulated in document INFCIRC/711, NAM still looked forward to safeguards implementation in Iran being conducted in a routine manner. • (GOV.OR/1257 – Para 80) NAM reiterated its principled position that diplomacy and dialogue were the only way to find a long term solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and encouraged all Member States to contribute positively to that goal.
Syria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1258 – Para 104) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated the view that, in considering the issue under discussion, it was essential not to lose sight of the manner in which it had initially been brought to the attention of the Agency. As was recognized in the Director General’s report to the November 2008 meetings of the Board, the Agency had been severely hampered in discharging its responsibilities under Syria’s safeguards agreement by the unilateral use of force by Israel and by the late provision of information by some Member States concerning the building at the Dair Alzour site. It was regrettable that the Board had not expressed itself clearly in that regard. • (GOV/OR.1258 – Para 105) NAM recalled the position expressed in the final document adopted at the summit of NAM Heads of State and Government held in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, in July 2009: “‘The Heads of State and Government <i>underscored</i> the Movement’s principled position concerning non-use or threat of use of force against the territorial integrity of any State. In this regard, they <i>condemned</i> the Israeli attack against a Syrian facility on September 6, 2007, which constitutes a flagrant violation of the UN Charter, and <i>welcomed</i> Syria’s cooperation with the IAEA in this regard.” • (GOV/OR.1258 – Para 106) NAM noted Syria’s claim that the destroyed facility on the Dair Alzour site was a non-nuclear military installation. It also noted Syria’s statement that it had provided all the information it possessed regarding the questions raised by the Agency concerning the site. • (GOV/OR.1258 – Para 107) NAM also welcomed Syria’s stated resolve to continue cooperating with the Agency. It stressed that, during the

	<p>conduct of safeguards activities, access to information, activities and locations must be provided in accordance with the letter of Syria's comprehensive safeguards agreement. It encouraged Syria and the Agency to continue cooperating with a view to resolving any remaining issues in that regard. NAM also welcomed and encouraged the ongoing cooperation between Syria and the Agency regarding the implementation of safeguards at the miniature neutron source reactor.</p>
Israel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1258 – Para 104) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated the view that, in considering the issue under discussion, it was essential not to lose sight of the manner in which it had initially been brought to the attention of the Agency. As was recognized in the Director General's report to the November 2008 meetings of the Board, the Agency had been severely hampered in discharging its responsibilities under Syria's safeguards agreement by the unilateral use of force by Israel and by the late provision of information by some Member States concerning the building at the Dair Alzour site. It was regrettable that the Board had not expressed itself clearly in that regard. • (GOV/OR.1258 – Para 109) NAM also supported the Director General's request to other Member States, including Israel, which might possess information of relevance to the Agency's verification activities to make such information available to the Agency.
Safeguards	
Iran	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV.OR/1257 – Para 76) Furthermore, the Agency had finalized its assessment of the results of the physical inventory verification carried out at the FMP in August 2009 and had concluded that the inventory of nuclear material at the FMP, as declared by Iran, was consistent with those results. Iran had provided the Agency with access to the IR-40 heavy water reactor at Arak, at which time the Agency had been able to carry out a design information verification. The Agency had verified that the construction of the facility was ongoing. • (GOV.OR/1257 – Para 77) NAM encouraged Iran to continue to provide design information regarding its nuclear facilities in accordance with its full-scope safeguards agreement with the Agency. • (GOV.OR/1257 – Para 79) Taking into account recent developments, as well as previous reports by the Director General on the implementation of the work plan circulated in document INFCIRC/711, NAM still looked forward to safeguards implementation in Iran being conducted in a routine manner.
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Verification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV.OR/1257 – Para 76) Furthermore, the Agency had finalized its assessment of the results of the physical inventory verification carried out at the FMP in August 2009 and had concluded that the inventory of nuclear material at the FMP, as declared by Iran, was consistent with those results. Iran had provided the Agency with access to the IR-40 heavy water reactor at Arak, at which time the Agency had been able to carry out a design information verification. The Agency had verified that the construction of the facility was ongoing. • (GOV/OR.1258 – Para 108) NAM reiterated its full confidence in the Agency's professionalism and impartiality and stressed once again that all Member States should avoid exerting undue pressure on or interfering in the Agency's activities, especially its verification activities, since such action could jeopardize the Agency's efficiency and credibility. • (GOV/OR.1258 – Para 109) NAM also supported the Director General's request to other Member States, including Israel, which might possess information of relevance to the Agency's verification activities to make such information available to the Agency.
Security Assurances	
Attack or Threat of Attack Against Peaceful Nuclear Facilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1258 – Para 105) NAM recalled the position expressed in the final document adopted at the summit of NAM Heads of State and Government held in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, in July 2009: “The Heads of State and Government <i>underscored</i> the Movement's principled position concerning non-use or threat of use of force against the territorial integrity of any State. In this regard, they <i>condemned</i> the Israeli attack against a Syrian facility on September 6, 2007, which constitutes a flagrant violation of the UN Charter, and <i>welcomed</i> Syria's cooperation with the IAEA in this regard.”