



Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Database

01 March 2010 Board of Governors Meeting

| 1 March 2010 Meeting: GOV/OR.1264; GOV/OR.1265; GOV/OR.1266; GOV/OR.1267 | |
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| United Nations Fora | |
| Matters on UN and IAEA | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1264 – Para 96) Algeria, speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and China and NAM, expressed appreciation for the outstanding and dedicated efforts of the two Chairpersons [Ms Kauppi of Finland and Mr Vallim Guerreiro of Brazil] and the support provided by the Secretariat. • (GOV/OR.1264 – Para 97) The report [from document GOV/2010/17] had been compiled in a balanced and professional manner. [Ms Feroukhi of Algeria] noted that it was the exclusive responsibility of the Chairpersons and reflected their personal views on the discussions held. The Group of 77 and China and NAM were particularly pleased with the attention given in the report to technical cooperation and its financing. The balanced approach taken by the Chairpersons underscored the Agency's primary role in accelerating and enlarging the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. |
| Peaceful Uses | |
| Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1265 – Para 87) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, reaffirmed the basic and inalienable right of all States to the development, research, production and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, without any discrimination and in conformity with their respective legal obligations. Nothing should be interpreted in such a way as to inhibit or restrict that right. States' choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear technology and the fuel cycle — including those of the Islamic Republic of Iran — must be respected. |
| Iran | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1265 – Para 87) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, reaffirmed the basic and inalienable right of all States to the development, research, production and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, without any discrimination and in conformity with their respective legal obligations. Nothing should be interpreted in such a way as to inhibit or restrict that right. States' choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear technology and the fuel cycle — including those of the Islamic Republic of Iran — must be respected. |
| Assurance of Supply/ Multilateral Approach to Nuclear Fuel Supply | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1267 – Para 108) Algeria, speaking on behalf of the Group of 77, and supported by Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, emphasized the need for caution while addressing thoroughly the associated technical, legal and economic aspects concerning assurances of supply, as well as the underlying political dimensions. Any proposal that eventually emerged should be in full accordance with the Agency's Statute and take into account the respective legal obligations of Member States and the principle of non-discrimination. Any further consideration of the issue of nuclear fuel supply assurances must be based on a coherent and |

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| | <p>comprehensive conceptual framework that adequately addressed the views and concerns of all Member States.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1267 – Para 109) The Group was convinced that consideration of individual proposals must be preceded by consensual agreement on the conceptual framework, outlining the specific political, technical, economic and legal parameters. If the Agency were to establish a mechanism for assurance of nuclear fuel supply, it must first agree on common principles and objectives that should then apply automatically to all the different proposals. In that regard, the Group proposed the formation of an open-ended working group where the concept could be thoroughly discussed before consideration by the Board of any individual proposals. • (GOV/OR.1267 – Para 110) The Group recommended that, subject to the provisions of the Statute, any decision on such proposals be approved by consensus by the General Conference so that the views and concerns of all Member States were taken into account. Since there had been no progress in addressing the Group’s concerns on the matter, it was still premature to consider individual proposals at the present juncture. It was regrettable that detailed and comprehensive discussions on all aspects of the issue had not taken place before the non-consensual decision adopted at the 2009 November Board to authorize the Director General to conclude an agreement to establish a reserve of LEU. The Group hoped that such a situation could be avoided in the future. She [Ms Feroukhi of Algeria] underlined that further transparent and inclusive deliberations were required in order to formulate an acceptable framework for assurances of nuclear fuel supply. |
| | NWFZ |
| Middle East NWFZ | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1265 – Para 90) NAM considered the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and reiterated its support for the establishment of such a zone in accordance with relevant United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. |
| | Security Assurances |
| Attack or Threat of Attack Against Nuclear Facilities | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1265 – Para 91) NAM reaffirmed the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities. Any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities, whether operational or under construction, posed a serious danger to human beings and the environment and constituted a grave violation of international law, the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and Agency regulations. NAM recognized the need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks or threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. |
| | Country Specific |
| Iran | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1265 – Para 87) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, reaffirmed the basic and inalienable right of all States to the development, research, production and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, without any discrimination and in conformity with their respective legal obligations. Nothing should be interpreted in such a way as to inhibit or restrict that right. States’ choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear technology and the fuel cycle — including those of the |

Islamic Republic of Iran — must be respected.

- (GOV/OR.1265 – Para 92) All safeguards and verification issues, including those related to Iran, should be resolved within the framework of the Agency and on sound technical and legal grounds. The Agency should continue its work to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue within its mandate and in accordance with its Statute. A comprehensive and lasting solution to the Iranian nuclear issue could only be found through peaceful diplomacy and negotiations without any preconditions among the parties concerned.
- (GOV/OR.1265 – Para 93) The latest report of the Director General included many references to events that had transpired prior to the preceding report (GOV/2009/74) and it failed to mention the responses provided to the Agency by Iran on several issues. The Director General had stated once again that the Agency had been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran.
- (GOV/OR.1265 – Para 94) NAM encouraged Iran to intensify its cooperation with the Agency in order to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, within the scope of the Agency’s mandate.
- (GOV/OR.1265 – Para 95) NAM noted with concern the possible implications of a departure from standard verification language in paragraph 46 of the report where it was stated that “Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities”, and it sought clarification from the Agency in that regard.
- (GOV/OR.1265 – Para 96) NAM welcomed the continued cooperation between the Agency and Iran, as indicated in the latest report, and it noted in that regard: (a) that the activities relating to the production of nuclear material, in particular those related to enrichment, remained under Agency containment and surveillance and that, to date, the results of the environmental samples taken at the FEP in Natanz and the PFEP indicated that the plants had been operating as declared; also that, since the preceding report, the Agency had successfully conducted 4 unannounced inspections, and a total of 35 unannounced inspections had been conducted at the FEP since March 2007; (b) that the Agency had confirmed that the FFEP corresponded with the design information provided by Iran, and that the facility was at an advanced stage of construction, although no centrifuges had been introduced into the facility; also that, since the preceding report, the Agency had conducted 4 design information verifications, and a total of 5 design information verifications had been conducted at the FFEP since October 2009; (c) that the Agency had continued to monitor the use and construction of hot cells at the relevant nuclear facilities in Iran, and there had been no indications of ongoing reprocessing-related activities at those facilities; and (d) that the Agency had finalized its assessment of the results of the physical inventory verification carried out at Fuel Manufacturing Plant in August 2009 and had concluded that the inventory of nuclear material at that plant, as declared by Iran, was consistent with those results; also that Iran had provided the Agency with access to the IR-40 heavy water reactor at Arak, at which time the Agency had been able to carry out a design

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| | <p>information verification, and the Agency had verified that construction of the facility was ongoing.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1265 – Para 97) The report of the Director General stated that the period of notice provided by Iran regarding changes made to PFEP had been insufficient for the Agency to adjust the existing safeguards procedures before Iran started to feed material into the PFEP. NAM encouraged Iran to provide design information on its nuclear facilities in accordance with its full-scope safeguards agreement. • (GOV/OR.1265 – Para 98) NAM fully supported the previous requests made by the Director General to those Member States that had provided the Secretariat with information related to alleged studies to agree that the Agency provide all related documents to Iran. It once again expressed its concerns about the creation of obstacles in that regard which hindered the Agency’s verification process. The Director General had previously reported that the Agency had limited means to authenticate independently the documentation relating to the alleged studies and that the constraints placed by some Member States on making information available to Iran were making it more difficult for the Agency to conduct detailed discussions with Iran. • (GOV/OR.1265 – Para 99) In view of the aforementioned recent developments, as well as previous reports on the implementation of the work plan, NAM looked forward to safeguards implementation in Iran being conducted in a routine manner. NAM reiterated its principled position that diplomacy and dialogue were the only way of finding a long-term solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and it encouraged all Member States to contribute positively to that end. |
| Syria | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1266 – Para 158) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated that it was essential not to lose sight of the manner in which the issue under consideration had been brought to the attention of the Agency. As had been recognized in the Director General’s report to the Board in November 2008, contained in document GOV/2008/60, the Agency had been severely hampered in discharging its responsibilities under Syria’s NPT safeguards agreement by the unilateral use of force by Israel and by the late provision of information by some Member States concerning the building at the Dair Alzour site. NAM regretted that the Board had not expressed itself clearly in that regard. • (GOV/OR.1266 – Para 159) The final declaration adopted at the summit of NAM Heads of State and Government held in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, in July 2009 had stated the following: “‘The Heads of State and Government <i>underscored</i> the Movement’s principled position concerning non-use or threat of use of force against the territorial integrity of any State. In this regard, they <i>condemned</i> the Israeli attack against a Syrian facility on September 6, 2007, which constitutes a flagrant violation of the UN Charter and <i>welcomed</i> Syria’s cooperation with the IAEA in this regard.” • (GOV/OR.1266 – Para 160) NAM noted from the Director General’s latest report that Syria had maintained that the destroyed facility at the Dair Alzour site was a non-nuclear military installation. NAM also noted Syria’s statement that it had provided all the information it had regarding the questions raised by the Agency concerning the Dair Alzour site. |

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| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1266 – Para 161) NAM welcomed Syria’s resolve to continue cooperating with the Agency, as testified to by Syria’s letters to the Agency. NAM stressed that, during the conduct of safeguards activities, access to information, activities and locations had to be provided in accordance with the letter of the comprehensive safeguards agreement between the Agency and Syria. • (GOV/OR.1266 – Para 162) NAM encouraged Syria and the Secretariat to continue cooperating with a view to resolving any remaining issues relating to information, activities and locations that were in accordance with the provisions of Syria’s comprehensive safeguards agreement. • (GOV/OR.1266 – Para 163) NAM welcomed and encouraged the ongoing cooperation between Syria and the Agency with regard to the routine implementation of comprehensive safeguards at the miniature neutron source reactor. • (GOV/OR.1266 – Para 164) NAM emphasized the fundamental distinction between the legal obligations of States in accordance with their respective safeguards agreements and those measures undertaken voluntarily which did not constitute legal safeguards obligations. |
| Israel | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1266 – Para 158) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated that it was essential not to lose sight of the manner in which the issue under consideration had been brought to the attention of the Agency. As had been recognized in the Director General’s report to the Board in November 2008, contained in document GOV/2008/60, the Agency had been severely hampered in discharging its responsibilities under Syria’s NPT safeguards agreement by the unilateral use of force by Israel and by the late provision of information by some Member States concerning the building at the Dair Alzour site. NAM regretted that the Board had not expressed itself clearly in that regard. • (GOV/OR.1266 – Para 159) The final declaration adopted at the summit of NAM Heads of State and Government held in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, in July 2009 had stated the following: • “The Heads of State and Government <i>underscored</i> the Movement’s principled position concerning non-use or threat of use of force against the territorial integrity of any State. In this regard, they <i>condemned</i> the Israeli attack against a Syrian facility on September 6, 2007, which constitutes a flagrant violation of the UN Charter and <i>welcomed</i> Syria’s cooperation with the IAEA in this regard.” |
| | Safeguards |
| General Views on Safeguards | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1265 – Para 89) NAM emphasized the fundamental distinction between the legal obligations of States under their respective safeguards agreements and confidence-building measures undertaken voluntarily, which did not constitute a legal safeguards obligation. |
| Verification | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1265 – Para 88) The Agency was the sole authority competent to verify the safeguards obligations of Member States. There should be no undue pressure on or interference in the Agency’s verification activities, in particular its verification process, which would jeopardize the organization’s efficiency and credibility. • (GOV/OR.1265 – Para 92) All safeguards and verification issues, including those related to Iran, should be resolved within the framework of the Agency and on sound technical and legal grounds. The Agency |

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| | <p>should continue its work to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue within its mandate and in accordance with its Statute. A comprehensive and lasting solution to the Iranian nuclear issue could only be found through peaceful diplomacy and negotiations without any preconditions among the parties concerned.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1265 – Para 93) The latest report of the Director General included many references to events that had transpired prior to the preceding report (GOV/2009/74) and it failed to mention the responses provided to the Agency by Iran on several issues. The Director General had stated once again that the Agency had been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. • (GOV/OR.1265 – Para 96) NAM welcomed the continued cooperation between the Agency and Iran, as indicated in the latest report, and it noted in that regard:...and (d) that the Agency had finalized its assessment of the results of the physical inventory verification carried out at Fuel Manufacturing Plant in August 2009 and had concluded that the inventory of nuclear material at that plant, as declared by Iran, was consistent with those results; also that Iran had provided the Agency with access to the IR-40 heavy water reactor at Arak, at which time the Agency had been able to carry out a design information verification, and the Agency had verified that construction of the facility was ongoing. • (GOV/OR.1265 – Para 98) NAM fully supported the previous requests made by the Director General to those Members States that had provided the Secretariat with information related to alleged studies to agree that the Agency provide all related documents to Iran. It once again expressed its concerns about the creation of obstacles in that regard which hindered the Agency’s verification process. The Director General had previously reported that the Agency had limited means to authenticate independently the documentation relating to the alleged studies and that the constraints placed by some Member States on making information available to Iran were making it more difficult for the Agency to conduct detailed discussions with Iran. • (GOV/OR.1266 – Para 165) NAM stressed once again that all Member States should avoid any undue pressure on or interference in the Agency’s activities, especially the verification process, which would jeopardize the Agency’s efficiency and credibility. • (GOV/OR.1266 – Para 166) NAM supported the Director General’s call on other States, including Israel, to make all information they might possess that was relevant to the Agency’s verification available to the organization. |
| Iran | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1265 – Para 97) The report of the Director General stated that the period of notice provided by Iran regarding changes made to PFEP had been insufficient for the Agency to adjust the existing safeguards procedures before Iran started to feed material into the PFEP. NAM encouraged Iran to provide design information on its nuclear facilities in accordance with its full-scope safeguards agreement. • (GOV/OR.1265 – Para 98) NAM fully supported the previous requests made by the Director General to those Members States that had provided the Secretariat with information related to alleged studies to agree that the Agency provide all related documents to Iran. It once again expressed its |

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| Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1266 – Para 161) NAM welcomed Syria's resolve to continue cooperating with the Agency, as testified to by Syria's letters to the Agency. NAM stressed that, during the conduct of safeguards activities, access to information, activities and locations had to be provided in accordance with the letter of the comprehensive safeguards agreement between the Agency and Syria. • (GOV/OR.1266 – Para 162) NAM encouraged Syria and the Secretariat to continue cooperating with a view to resolving any remaining issues relating to information, activities and locations that were in accordance with the provisions of Syria's comprehensive safeguards agreement. • (GOV/OR.1266 – Para 163) NAM welcomed and encouraged the ongoing cooperation between Syria and the Agency with regard to the routine implementation of comprehensive safeguards at the miniature neutron source reactor. • (GOV/OR.1266 – Para 164) NAM emphasized the fundamental distinction between the legal obligations of States in accordance with their respective safeguards agreements and those measures undertaken voluntarily which did not constitute legal safeguards obligations. |

