



Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Database

07 June 2010 Board of Governors Meeting

7 June 2010 Meeting: GOV/OR.1271; GOV/OR.1273; GOV/OR.1274	
	Safeguards
Verification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 2) (Egypt), speaking on behalf of NAM, emphasized that the Agency was the sole competent authority for verification of compliance with obligations under safeguards agreements, and remained the most appropriate multilateral forum for addressing nuclear verification and safeguards issues. • (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 4) Efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament should be made by the international community in parallel to efforts aimed at non-proliferation, in that connection, he and drew attention to objective C.2 of the Agency’s Medium Term Strategy 2006–2011 (GOV/2005/8): to contribute as appropriate to effective verification of nuclear arms control and reduction agreements, including nuclear disarmament. • (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 6) All members of the Agency should respect its Statute and nothing should be done to undermine the Agency’s authority in that regard. Any undue pressure on or interference in the Agency’s activities, in particular its verification process, which could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility, should be avoided. • (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 11) NAM welcomed the greater detail provided in the report on the verification activities carried out in each Member State, as well as the breakdown by State of the cost of safeguards implementation. It hoped that those features would be retained in future reports. It also called for future reports to group States according to the type of safeguards agreement being implemented when presenting State-by- State costs. • (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 12) Safeguards had to be not only effective but also efficient, and NAM felt that much remained to be done to improve efficiency, in particular with respect to integrated safeguards which absorbed a large share of the costs of verification activities for certain Member States despite a reduction in inspection effort. • (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 13) NAM requested clarification regarding the expected date for implementing the new “consistent, complex and robust methodology” for cost estimates referred to in the report, and information on any obstacles that might hinder its implementation. Pending implementation of the new methodology, in its next report the Secretariat should provide a detailed analysis of the raw data it provided to Member States to avoid any misinterpretation, and it should ascertain the absolute costs and relative efficiency of all safeguards measures being implemented. • (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 14) State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear material [SSACs] were fundamental to the effective and

	<p>efficient implementation of safeguards and NAM appreciated the actions taken by the Secretariat during 2009 to assist Member States in establishing and strengthening their SSACs, and called for such activities to be continued.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 15) NAM renewed its call on the Agency to assist interested Member States, particularly developing countries, in developing capabilities to analyse environmental samples. Such efforts could contribute to increasing the Agency’s analytical capabilities, expanding the network of analytical laboratories and enhancing efficiency in sample analysis. • (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 197) The Agency was the sole competent authority for the verification of the respective safeguards obligations of Member States and there should be no undue pressure on or interference in the Agency’s activities, especially its verification process, which would jeopardize the efficiency and credibility of the organization. • (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 201) NAM strongly believed that all safeguards and verification issues, including those related to Iran, should be resolved within the framework of the Agency based on sound technical and legal grounds. The Agency should continue its work to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue within its mandate under its Statute. • (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 204) Noting that the Director General had stated once again that the Agency had been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, NAM encouraged Iran to continue cooperating with the Agency to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the country, in accordance with international law. • (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 205) NAM noted with concern the possible implications of the continued departure from standard verification language in the summary in the Director General’s report, which stated that “Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities”, and it sought further clarification from the Agency on that matter, given that the Safeguards Implementation Report for 2009 contained in document GOV/2010/25 stated that “while the Agency was able to conclude for Iran that all declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities, verification of the correctness and completeness of Iran’s declarations remained ongoing” • (GOV/OR.1273 – Para 82) Member States should avoid any undue pressure on or interference in the Agency’s activities, especially in its verification process, which would jeopardize its efficiency and credibility.
<p>General Views on Safeguards</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 3) While NAM was fully aware of the importance of nuclear safeguards, it opposed any attempts to reverse the order of priorities of the Agency by giving primacy to safeguards considerations while restricting the organization’s promotional role. • (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 5) A clear distinction had to be made between the legal obligations of Member States under their safeguards agreements and their voluntary undertakings, to ensure that the latter were not turned into the former. • (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 7) Member States that had concerns regarding the implementation of safeguards agreements by other Member States should

direct those concerns, along with any supporting evidence, to the Agency, so that it could consider and investigate the matter, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with the Statute.

- (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 9) NAM continued to be concerned by recurring leaks of confidential safeguards information which, in the absence of adequate corrective measures by the Agency, called into question the credibility of its system for protecting such information. It requested a comprehensive progress report by the Director General at the meetings of the Board in September 2010 that would fully address its concerns regarding the protection of confidential safeguards information.
- (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 10) Given the sensitivity of safeguards activities, NAM requested that no cost-free experts be assigned to or employed by the Department of Safeguards.
- (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 11) NAM welcomed the greater detail provided in the report on the verification activities carried out in each Member State, as well as the breakdown by State of the cost of safeguards implementation. It hoped that those features would be retained in future reports. It also called for future reports to group States according to the type of safeguards agreement being implemented when presenting State-by-State costs.
- (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 12) Safeguards had to be not only effective but also efficient, and NAM felt that much remained to be done to improve efficiency, in particular with respect to integrated safeguards which absorbed a large share of the costs of verification activities for certain Member States despite a reduction in inspection effort.
- (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 13) NAM requested clarification regarding the expected date for implementing the new “consistent, complex and robust methodology” for cost estimates referred to in the report, and information on any obstacles that might hinder its implementation. Pending implementation of the new methodology, in its next report the Secretariat should provide a detailed analysis of the raw data it provided to Member States to avoid any misinterpretation, and it should ascertain the absolute costs and relative efficiency of all safeguards measures being implemented.
- (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 14) State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear material [SSACs] were fundamental to the effective and efficient implementation of safeguards and NAM appreciated the actions taken by the Secretariat during 2009 to assist Member States in establishing and strengthening their SSACs, and called for such activities to be continued.
- (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 197) The Agency was the sole competent authority for the verification of the respective safeguards obligations of Member States and there should be no undue pressure on or interference in the Agency’s activities, especially its verification process, which would jeopardize the efficiency and credibility of the organization.
- (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 198) A fundamental distinction must be drawn between the legal obligations of States under their respective safeguards agreements and confidence-building measures undertaken voluntarily which did not constitute a legal safeguards obligation.
- (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 201) NAM strongly believed that all safeguards

	<p>and verification issues, including those related to Iran, should be resolved within the framework of the Agency based on sound technical and legal grounds. The Agency should continue its work to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue within its mandate under its Statute.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1273 – Para 81) A clear distinction had to be drawn between Member States’ legal obligations under their respective safeguards agreements and their voluntary undertakings, in order to ensure that such undertakings were not turned into legal safeguards obligations.
Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 8) The Safeguards Implementation Report [SIR] reflected the Secretariat’s assessment of safeguards implementation in Member States. It could be designed and prepared in a manner that allowed the views of concerned Member States to be reflected, making it more factual, balanced and comprehensive.
Iran	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 211) With respect to the statement in the report that “the period of notice provided by Iran regarding the related changes made to PFEP was insufficient for the Agency to adjust the existing safeguards procedures before Iran started to feed the material into PFEP”, NAM noted that, as of 15 May 2010, the Agency had been implementing a revised safeguards approach to account for the new and significant development in the design and operation of the PFEP. NAM continued to encourage Iran to provide design information on its nuclear facilities in accordance with its full-scope safeguards agreement with the Agency. • (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 213) Taking into account the aforementioned recent developments, as well as previous reports on implementation of the work plan contained in document INFCIRC/711, NAM continued to look forward to safeguards implementation in Iran being conducted in a routine manner.
Syria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1273 – Para 74) (Egypt), speaking on behalf of NAM, said that it was essential not to lose sight of the manner in which the issue under discussion had initially been brought to the attention of the Agency. As had been recognized in the Director General’s report to the Board in November 2008 (GOV/2008/60), the Agency had been severely hampered in discharging its responsibilities under Syria’s safeguards agreement by the unilateral use of force by Israel and by the late provision of information by some Member States concerning the building at the Dair Alzour site. NAM found it regrettable that the Board had not expressed itself clearly in that regard. • (GOV/OR.1273 – Para 79) NAM welcomed Syria’s resolve to continue cooperating with the Agency. During the conduct of safeguards activities, the country should provide access to information, activities and locations in accordance with the letter of its comprehensive safeguards agreement. NAM encouraged Syria and the Secretariat to continue cooperating with a view to resolving any remaining issues relating to information, activities and locations in accordance with the provisions of that agreement.
Technical and Procedural issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 15) NAM renewed its call on the Agency to assist interested Member States, particularly developing countries, in developing capabilities to analyse environmental samples. Such efforts could contribute to increasing the Agency’s analytical capabilities, expanding the network of analytical laboratories and enhancing efficiency in sample analysis.

	Disarmament
Nonproliferation and Disarmament	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 4) Efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament should be made by the international community in parallel to efforts aimed at non-proliferation, in that connection, he and drew attention to objective C.2 of the Agency’s Medium Term Strategy 2006–2011 (GOV/2005/8): to contribute as appropriate to effective verification of nuclear arms control and reduction agreements, including nuclear disarmament.
	Nonproliferation
Nonproliferation and Disarmament	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 4) Efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament should be made by the international community in parallel to efforts aimed at non-proliferation, in that connection, he and drew attention to objective C.2 of the Agency’s Medium Term Strategy 2006–2011 (GOV/2005/8): to contribute as appropriate to effective verification of nuclear arms control and reduction agreements, including nuclear disarmament.
	Country Specific
Iran	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 195) (Egypt), speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated NAM’s principled positions regarding the issue in question. • (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 196) All States had the basic and inalienable right to develop, research, produce and use atomic energy for peaceful purposes, without any discrimination and in conformity with their respective legal obligations. Therefore, nothing should be interpreted in such a way as to inhibit or restrict the right of States to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes. States’ choices and decisions, including those of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and fuel cycle policies must be respected. • (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 201) NAM strongly believed that all safeguards and verification issues, including those related to Iran, should be resolved within the framework of the Agency based on sound technical and legal grounds. The Agency should continue its work to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue within its mandate under its Statute. • (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 202) NAM stressed that peaceful diplomacy and dialogue, and substantive negotiations amongst the parties concerned without preconditions, must remain the means whereby a comprehensive and lasting solution to the Iranian nuclear issue was found. • (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 203) In that context, NAM welcomed the Joint Declaration made by Iran, Turkey and Brazil on 17 May 2010 which was contained in the Attachment to document GOV/INF/2010/9. • (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 204) Noting that the Director General had stated once again that the Agency had been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, NAM encouraged Iran to continue cooperating with the Agency to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the country, in accordance with international law. • (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 205) NAM noted with concern the possible implications of the continued departure from standard verification language in the summary in the Director General’s report, which stated that “Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities”, and it sought further clarification from the Agency on that matter, given that the Safeguards Implementation Report for 2009

contained in document GOV/2010/25 stated that “while the Agency was able to conclude for Iran that all declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities, verification of the correctness and completeness of Iran’s declarations remained ongoing”

- (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 206) NAM welcomed the continued cooperation between the Agency and Iran, noting in particular the following.
- (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 207) Nuclear material production activities, particularly those related to enrichment, continued to remain under Agency containment and surveillance and, to date, environmental samples taken at the FEP in Natanz and the PFEP indicated that those plants were operating as declared. Since the preceding report, the Agency had successfully conducted three unannounced inspections, a total of 38 such inspections having been conducted at the FEP since March 2007.
- (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 208) The Agency had confirmed that the FFEP conformed to the design information provided by Iran and was at an advanced stage of construction, although no centrifuges had been introduced into the facility. Since October 2009, the Agency had been conducting, on average, one design information verification at the FFEP per month. Environmental samples taken at the FFEP up to 16 February 2010 had not indicated the presence of enriched uranium.
- (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 209) The Agency had continued to monitor the use and construction of hot cells at the relevant nuclear facilities in Iran, and there had been no indications of ongoing reprocessing-related activities at those facilities.
- (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 210) Iran had allowed the Agency access to the IR-40 heavy water reactor at Arak to carry out a design information verification, and the Agency had verified that construction of the facility was ongoing. The Agency had also carried out a design information verification at the FMP, confirming that no new process equipment had been installed at the facility and that no new assemblies, rods or pellets had been produced there since May 2009.
- (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 211) With respect to the statement in the report that “the period of notice provided by Iran regarding the related changes made to PFEP was insufficient for the Agency to adjust the existing safeguards procedures before Iran started to feed the material into PFEP”, NAM noted that, as of 15 May 2010, the Agency had been implementing a revised safeguards approach to account for the new and significant development in the design and operation of the PFEP. NAM continued to encourage Iran to provide design information on its nuclear facilities in accordance with its full-scope safeguards agreement with the Agency.
- (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 212) Recalling that the Director General had previously reported that the Agency had limited means to authenticate independently the documentation that formed the basis of the alleged studies, and that the constraints placed by some Member States on making the information available to Iran were making it more difficult for the Agency to conduct detailed discussions with Iran on that matter, he noted that NAM fully supported the Director General’s previous requests that those Member States which had provided the Secretariat with information related to the alleged studies allow the Agency to provide all related documents to Iran.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 213) Taking into account the aforementioned recent developments, as well as previous reports on implementation of the work plan contained in document INFCIRC/711, NAM continued to look forward to safeguards implementation in Iran being conducted in a routine manner. • (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 214) Finally, diplomacy and dialogue were the only way to achieve a long-term solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and NAM encouraged all Member States to contribute to that aim.
Syria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1273 – Para 74) (Egypt), speaking on behalf of NAM, said that it was essential not to lose sight of the manner in which the issue under discussion had initially been brought to the attention of the Agency. As had been recognized in the Director General’s report to the Board in November 2008 (GOV/2008/60), the Agency had been severely hampered in discharging its responsibilities under Syria’s safeguards agreement by the unilateral use of force by Israel and by the late provision of information by some Member States concerning the building at the Dair Alzour site. NAM found it regrettable that the Board had not expressed itself clearly in that regard. • (GOV/OR.1273 – Para 75) The Final Declaration adopted by the Summit of Heads of State and Government of NAM held in Egypt in July 2009 had stated that the Heads of State and Government underscored the Movement’s principled position concerning non-use or threat of use of force against the territorial integrity of any State, condemned the Israeli attack against a Syrian facility on 6 September 2007, which constituted a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, and welcomed Syria’s cooperation with the Agency in that regard. • (GOV/OR.1273 – Para 76) Contrary to the assertion in paragraph 1 of the report contained in document GOV/2010/29 that it covered developments since the preceding report, Part A on the Dair Alzour site included many references to events that had transpired previously. He [Mr Fawzy of Egypt] sought clarification from the Secretariat on the rationale behind issuing a report that contained no new information on the Dair Alzour site. • (GOV/OR.1273 – Para 77) NAM noted Syria’s assertion that the destroyed facility on the Dair Alzour site was a non-nuclear military installation and that it had provided all the information it possessed in connection with the Agency’s questions concerning the site. NAM further noted the Agency’s request that Syria provide prompt access to all relevant information, given the possible degradation of information. It sought clarification from the Secretariat on that matter. • (GOV/OR.1273 – Para 78) Future reports by the Director General on the issue should assess the impact of Israel’s bombing of the Dair Alzour site, and that country’s lack of cooperation, on the Agency’s ability to resolve all related outstanding issues, and broader aspects related to the future of the Agency’s safeguards regime. They should also examine the possible reasons for the absence of satellite imagery of the Dair Alzour site for a period of six weeks following its destruction by Israel. • (GOV/OR.1273 – Para 79) NAM welcomed Syria’s resolve to continue cooperating with the Agency. During the conduct of safeguards activities, the country should provide access to information, activities and locations

	<p>in accordance with the letter of its comprehensive safeguards agreement. NAM encouraged Syria and the Secretariat to continue cooperating with a view to resolving any remaining issues relating to information, activities and locations in accordance with the provisions of that agreement.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1273 – Para 80) NAM welcomed Syria’s cooperation in providing information related to the miniature neutron source reactor and access to its facilities. It looked forward to the results of the Agency’s assessment and analysis with a view to bringing the issue to closure. • (GOV/OR.1273 – Para 83) NAM supported the Director General’s call to States, including Israel, which might possess information relevant to the Agency’s verification activities, to make such information available to the Agency. • (GOV/OR.1273 – Para 84) Finally, NAM called on Israel to cooperate fully with the Agency in providing it with comprehensive information on the nature of the materials used in its attack on the Dair Alzour site.
Israel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1273 – Para 74) (Egypt), speaking on behalf of NAM, said that it was essential not to lose sight of the manner in which the issue under discussion had initially been brought to the attention of the Agency. As had been recognized in the Director General’s report to the Board in November 2008 (GOV/2008/60), the Agency had been severely hampered in discharging its responsibilities under Syria’s safeguards agreement by the unilateral use of force by Israel and by the late provision of information by some Member States concerning the building at the Dair Alzour site. NAM found it regrettable that the Board had not expressed itself clearly in that regard. • (GOV/OR.1273 – Para 75) The Final Declaration adopted by the Summit of Heads of State and Government of NAM held in Egypt in July 2009 had stated that the Heads of State and Government underscored the Movement’s principled position concerning non-use or threat of use of force against the territorial integrity of any State, condemned the Israeli attack against a Syrian facility on 6 September 2007, which constituted a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, and welcomed Syria’s cooperation with the Agency in that regard. • (GOV/OR.1273 – Para 78) Future reports by the Director General on the issue should assess the impact of Israel’s bombing of the Dair Alzour site, and that country’s lack of cooperation, on the Agency’s ability to resolve all related outstanding issues, and broader aspects related to the future of the Agency’s safeguards regime. They should also examine the possible reasons for the absence of satellite imagery of the Dair Alzour site for a period of six weeks following its destruction by Israel. • (GOV/OR.1273 – Para 83) NAM supported the Director General’s call to States, including Israel, which might possess information relevant to the Agency’s verification activities, to make such information available to the Agency. • (GOV/OR.1274 – Para 2) (Egypt), speaking on behalf of the Vienna Chapter of the Non-Aligned Movement, said that NAM took note of the remarks made by the Director General on the agenda item in his opening statement and wished to reiterate its positions of principle on the matter. NAM strongly believed that stability could not be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities were maintained,

	<p>particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allowed one party to threaten its neighbours, and the region. NAM welcomed the fact that its Member States party to the NPT had concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency in fulfillment of their obligation as non-nuclear-weapon States under Article III.1 of the Treaty; all NAM Member States in the Middle East had done so.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1274 – Para 4) NAM noted with concern that a selective approach to the issue of nuclear capabilities in the Middle East undermined the viability of the IAEA safeguards regime. It had also resulted in the continued and dangerous presence of unsafeguarded Israeli nuclear facilities and activities, notwithstanding the repeated calls on Israel to subject them to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and the conclusion by all other States in the region of comprehensive safeguards agreements. NAM was greatly concerned about the dire consequences for international security of Israel’s acquisition of a nuclear capability, which posed a serious and continuing threat to the security of its neighbours and other States, and the continuing development whereby Israeli scientists were provided access to the nuclear facilities of one nuclear-weapon State. All Member States should cooperate to reverse that unacceptable situation. NAM encouraged the active participation of all Member States in achieving the universality of comprehensive IAEA safeguards in the region; implementing resolution GC(53)/RES/17 was a first step towards that end. • (GOV/OR.1274 – Para 5) Nine months following the adoption of that resolution, the time had come for concrete action to be taken regarding its implementation. NAM looked forward to the Director General’s active and strong involvement in that effort and anticipated comprehensive reporting on his part to the Board and subsequently the General Conference. Such reports would not only reflect the views of Member States on the matter but would also (a) disclose all information available to the Secretariat and Member States on the nature and scope of Israeli nuclear facilities and activities that would be included in any comprehensive safeguards agreement concluded with Israel, including information pertaining to previous nuclear transfers to it, and (b) outline how the Agency viewed the way forward by, inter alia, identifying all necessary measures to be undertaken by the concerned parties. NAM was fully committed to cooperating with the Director General and supporting his efforts in implementing resolution GC(53)/RES/17. It was NAM’s expectation that all other IAEA Member States would do the same. • (GOV/OR.1274 – Para 6) NAM noted with concern that the records of the 2009 IAEA General Conference indicated Israel’s apparent determination not to cooperate with the resolution in any way.² In that connection, NAM reiterated its call for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in nuclear-related scientific or technological fields to Israel.
	Peaceful Uses
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 196) All States had the basic and inalienable right to develop, research, produce and use atomic energy for peaceful purposes, without any discrimination and in conformity with their

	<p>respective legal obligations. Therefore, nothing should be interpreted in such a way as to inhibit or restrict the right of States to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes. States' choices and decisions, including those of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and fuel cycle policies must be respected.</p>
<p>Assurance of Supply/ Multilateral Approach to Nuclear Fuel Supply</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1274 – Para 107) (Algeria)*, speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and NAM, said that the two groups wished to reiterate the views and concerns they had expressed at the June 2009, November 2009 and March 2010 sessions of the Board on the issue of nuclear fuel supply assurances. For instance, the technical, legal and economic aspects of the issue, as well as the underlying political dimensions, should be thoroughly addressed so that any proposal that eventually emerged complied fully with the Statute and took into account the legal obligations of Member States and the principle of non-discrimination. • (GOV/OR.1274 – Para 108) The groups reiterated that any further consideration of the issue of nuclear fuel supply assurances must be based on a coherent and comprehensive conceptual framework that adequately addressed the views and concerns of all Member States. They were convinced that further consideration of individual proposals on the matter must be preceded by consensual agreement by the General Conference on a conceptual framework that outlined the specific political, technical, economic and legal parameters. If the Agency was to establish a mechanism for the assurance of nuclear fuel supply, it must first agree on common principles and objectives which would then apply automatically to all the different proposals. • (GOV/OR.1274 – Para 109) The groups again recommended that, subject to the provisions of the Statute, any decision on individual proposals should be taken by consensus in the General Conference so that the views and concerns of all Member States could be taken into account. As no progress had been made towards addressing the concerns of the two groups, they considered that it was premature to submit individual proposals to the Board. • (GOV/OR.1274 – Para 110) The groups noted that detailed and comprehensive discussions of all aspects of the issue had not taken place prior to the non-consensual decision taken by the Board in November 2009 to authorize the Director General to conclude an agreement on the establishment of a reserve of LEU₆. They hoped that such a situation could be avoided in the future. • (GOV/OR.1274 – Para 111) The groups were disappointed that their joint proposal to form an open-ended working group in which the concept could be discussed in a structured manner before individual proposals were considered in the Board had not been accepted by some Member States, including the proponents of the various proposals.
	<p>NWFZ</p>
<p>Middle East NWFZ</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 199) The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would be a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and NAM supported the establishment of such a zone in accordance with relevant General Assembly and United Nations Security Council resolutions. • (GOV/OR.1274 – Para 3) NAM considered that the establishment of a

	<p>nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would be a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and reiterated its support for the establishment of such a zone in accordance with relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.</p>
	<p>Security Assurances</p>
<p>Attack or Threat of Attack Against Peaceful Nuclear Facilities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1271 – Para 200) NAM reaffirmed the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities, and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities — whether operational or under construction — posed a serious danger to human beings and the environment and constituted a grave violation of international law, the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and of the Agency’s regulations. There was a need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks, or threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.