



## Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Database

### 13 September 2010 Board of Governors Meeting

13 September 2010 Meeting: GOV/OR.1280; GOV/OR.1281; GOV/OR.1282; GOV/OR.1283	
	Country Specific
Iran	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• (GOV/OR.1280 – Para 42) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated NAM's principled positions on the issue. All States had a basic and inalienable right to development, research, production and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, without any discrimination and in conformity with their respective legal obligations. Therefore, nothing should be interpreted in such a way as to inhibit or restrict the right of States to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes. States' choices and decisions, including those of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and fuel cycle policies must be respected. The Agency was the sole competent authority for the verification of the respective safeguards obligations of Member States and there should be no undue pressure on or interference in the Agency's activities, especially its verification process, which would jeopardize the efficiency and credibility of the organization. A fundamental distinction must be drawn between the legal obligations of States under their respective safeguards agreements and confidence-building measures undertaken voluntarily which did not constitute a legal safeguards obligation. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would be a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and NAM supported the establishment of such a zone in accordance with relevant United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. NAM reaffirmed the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities, and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities — whether operational or under construction — posed a serious danger to human beings and the environment and constituted a grave violation of international law, the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and of Agency regulations. There was a need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks or threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. NAM strongly believed that all safeguards and verification issues, including those related to Iran, should be resolved within the framework of the Agency based on sound technical and legal grounds. The Agency should continue its work to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue within its mandate under its Statute. Lastly, NAM stressed that peaceful diplomacy and dialogue, and substantive negotiations among the parties concerned without preconditions, must remain the means whereby a comprehensive and lasting solution to the Iranian nuclear issue was found.</li><li>• (GOV/OR.1280 – Para 43) Noting that the Director General had stated once again that the Agency had been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, NAM encouraged Iran to continue cooperating with the Agency to provide credible assurances</li></ul>

regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the country in accordance with international law.

- (GOV/OR.1280 – Para 44) NAM noted with concern the possible implications of the continued departure from standard verification language in the summary in the Director General’s report, which stated that “Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities”, and it had sought further clarification from the Agency on that matter, given that the Safeguards Implementation Report for 2009 contained in document GOV/2010/25 stated that “while the Agency was able to conclude for Iran that all declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities, verification of the correctness and completeness of Iran’s declarations remained ongoing”. NAM regretted that no further clarification had been received to date. It further noted with concern the inclusion of extensive technical details pertaining to sensitive proprietary information in the report of the Director General and requested the Secretariat to refrain from including such sensitive information.
- (GOV/OR.1280 – Para 45) NAM welcomed the continued cooperation between the Agency and Iran, noting in particular the following. Nuclear material production activities, particularly those related to enrichment, continued to remain under Agency containment and surveillance and, to date, the results of the large number of environmental samples taken at the FEP and the PFEP indicated that those plants were operating as declared, except for one sample from the FEP. Iran had provided a possible explanation for that sample that was not inconsistent with the Agency’s findings, along with supporting information. The Agency had confirmed that the FFEP corresponded with the design information provided by Iran and was at an advanced stage of construction, although no centrifuges had been introduced into the facility. Since October 2009, the Agency had been conducting, on average, one design information verification at the FFEP per month. The results of the environmental samples taken at the FFEP up to 16 February 2010 had not indicated the presence of enriched uranium. The Agency had continued to monitor the use and construction of hot cells at the relevant nuclear facilities in Iran and there had been no indications of ongoing reprocessing-related activities at those facilities. Iran had allowed the Agency access to the IR-40 heavy water reactor at Arak, at which time the Agency had been able to carry out a design information verification. The Agency had verified that construction of the facility was ongoing, the civil construction of the buildings being almost complete and some major equipment having been installed. The Agency had also carried out a physical inventory verification and a design information verification at the FMP, confirming that no new process equipment had been installed at the facility and that no new assemblies, rods or pellets had been produced there since May 2009.
- (GOV/OR.1280 – Para 46) NAM noted that the report of the Director General also stated that “the Agency also requested that, if a decision to construct new nuclear facilities had been taken by Iran, Iran provide further information regarding the design and scheduling of the construction of the facilities”. NAM noted with appreciation that the

	<p>report stated that “Iran reiterated that it was continuing to cooperate with the Agency ‘in accordance with its Safeguards Agreement’”, and it continued to encourage Iran to provide design information regarding its nuclear facilities in accordance with its full-scope safeguards agreement with the Agency.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1280 – Para 47) NAM noted with concern that, while Iran’s safeguards agreement did permit it to object to the designation of Agency inspectors, the Secretariat had rejected the basis on which Iran had sought to justify its objection to the designation of two inspectors who had recently conducted inspections in the country. NAM recalled that, according to their respective safeguards agreements, Member States were not required to justify their decisions in that regard.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1280 – Para 48) NAM fully supported the previous requests of the Director General to those Member States that had provided the Secretariat with information related to the ‘alleged studies’ to allow the Agency to provide all related documents to Iran. NAM reiterated its concern over the creation of obstacles in that regard which hindered the Agency’s verification process, recalling that the Director General had previously reported that the Agency had limited means to authenticate independently the documentation that formed the basis of the alleged studies, and that the constraints placed by some Member States on the availability of information to Iran were making it more difficult for the Agency to conduct detailed discussions with Iran on the matter.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1280 – Para 49) Taking into account the aforementioned recent developments, as well as previous reports on implementation of the work plan contained in INFCIRC/711, NAM continued to look forward to safeguards implementation in Iran being conducted in a routine manner.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1280 – Para 50) Diplomacy and dialogue were the only way to achieve a long-term solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and NAM encouraged all Member States to contribute to that aim.</li> </ul>
Syria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1281 – Para 97)(Egypt), speaking on behalf of NAM, said that it was essential not to lose sight of the manner in which the issue of Syria had initially been brought to the Agency’s attention. The Agency had been severely hampered in discharging its responsibilities under Syria’s safeguards agreement by the unilateral use of force by Israel and by the late provision of information by some Member States concerning the building at the Dair Alzour site. NAM regretted that the Board had not expressed itself clearly in that regard.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1281 – Para 98) The Final Declaration adopted by the Summit of Heads of State and Government of NAM held in Egypt in July 2009 had stated that the Heads of State and Government underscored the Movement’s principled position concerning non-use or threat of use of force against the territorial integrity of any State, condemned the Israeli attack against a Syrian facility on 6 September 2007, which constituted a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and welcomed Syria’s cooperation with the Agency in that regard.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1281 – Para 99) NAM noted that section A of document GOV/2010/47 continued to include many references to events that had transpired prior to the preceding report and requested clarification from the Secretariat on the rationale behind issuing a report that contained no</li> </ul>

new information on the Dair Alzour site.

- (GOV/OR.1281 – Para 100) NAM also noted that Syria had maintained that the destroyed facility on the Dair Alzour site was a non-nuclear military installation and that it had provided all the information it possessed regarding the questions raised by the Agency concerning that site. NAM, further noting the Agency’s request that Syria provide prompt access to all relevant information, asked for clarification from the Secretariat on that matter.
- (GOV/OR.1281 – Para 101) NAM recalled its prior requests that reports by the Director General on the Syrian issue should contain the Agency’s assessment on how Israel’s bombing of the Dair Alzour site, and its lack of cooperation, might affect the Agency’s ability to resolve the related outstanding issues and broader aspects of the future of the Agency’s safeguards regime, and on how the absence of satellite imagery of the Dair Alzour site for a period of six weeks following its destruction might be explained.
- (GOV/OR.1281 – Para 102) It was regrettable that the Director General’s report did not address those prior requests, thereby falling well short of addressing the deep concerns expressed by more than two-thirds of the Agency’s members. NAM therefore requested that the Director General issue an addendum to his report that fully addressed those concerns.
- (GOV/OR.1281 – Para 103) NAM welcomed Syria’s resolve to continue cooperating with the Agency. During the conduct of safeguards activities, access to information, activities and locations had to be provided in accordance with the comprehensive safeguards agreement concluded between the Agency and Syria. NAM encouraged Syria and the Secretariat to continue cooperating with a view to resolving any remaining issues related to information, activities and locations that came under the provisions of Syria’s comprehensive safeguards agreement. The Movement welcomed the recent development of Syria’s cooperation in providing further information on the issue related to the MNSR and access to its facilities. In that regard, it welcomed the agreement reached between Syria and the Agency on a plan of action for addressing outstanding issues concerning the MNSR and looked forward to bringing those issues to closure.
- (GOV/OR.1281 – Para 106) NAM supported the Director General’s call on States, including Israel, which might possess information relevant to the Agency’s verification activities, to make such information available to the Agency. In addition, it called on Israel to cooperate fully with the Agency in providing it with comprehensive information on the nature of the materials used by Israel in its attack on the Dair Alzour site.
- (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 18) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, said that the views he had expressed on behalf of NAM during the Board’s previous meeting had reflected the views of the majority of the Agency’s Member States.
- (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 19) The request made by NAM during that meeting for additional information had not been politically motivated; it had been motivated by a desire that the Agency’s Member States have a comprehensive report on the issue now under consideration in the Board — one addressing very legitimate concerns that NAM had repeatedly

	<p>raised.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 20) NAM considered that, without the requested additional information, the report contained in document GOV/2010/47 was incomplete and should therefore not be derestricted.</li> </ul>
Israel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1281 – Para 97)(Egypt), speaking on behalf of NAM, said that it was essential not to lose sight of the manner in which the issue of Syria had initially been brought to the Agency’s attention. The Agency had been severely hampered in discharging its responsibilities under Syria’s safeguards agreement by the unilateral use of force by Israel and by the late provision of information by some Member States concerning the building at the Dair Alzour site. NAM regretted that the Board had not expressed itself clearly in that regard.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1281 – Para 98) The Final Declaration adopted by the Summit of Heads of State and Government of NAM held in Egypt in July 2009 had stated that the Heads of State and Government underscored the Movement’s principled position concerning non-use or threat of use of force against the territorial integrity of any State, condemned the Israeli attack against a Syrian facility on 6 September 2007, which constituted a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and welcomed Syria’s cooperation with the Agency in that regard.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1281 – Para 101) NAM recalled its prior requests that reports by the Director General on the Syrian issue should contain the Agency’s assessment on how Israel’s bombing of the Dair Alzour site, and its lack of cooperation, might affect the Agency’s ability to resolve the related outstanding issues and broader aspects of the future of the Agency’s safeguards regime, and on how the absence of satellite imagery of the Dair Alzour site for a period of six weeks following its destruction might be explained.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1281 – Para 106) NAM supported the Director General’s call on States, including Israel, which might possess information relevant to the Agency’s verification activities, to make such information available to the Agency. In addition, it called on Israel to cooperate fully with the Agency in providing it with comprehensive information on the nature of the materials used by Israel in its attack on the Dair Alzour site.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 174) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, said that stability could not be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities were maintained, particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allowed one party to threaten its neighbours and the region as a whole.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 176) The establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East would be a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament, and NAM continued to advocate the establishment of such a zone in accordance with relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 177) A selective approach to the issue of nuclear capabilities in the Middle East was undermining the viability of the Agency’s safeguards regime. Also, it had resulted in the continuing dangerous presence of unsafeguarded Israeli nuclear facilities and activities, notwithstanding the repeated calls on Israel to subject those facilities and activities to comprehensive safeguards of the Agency and</li> </ul>

	<p>the fact that all other States in the region had concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 178) NAM was gravely concerned about the dire consequences for international security of: the acquisition of a nuclear capability by Israel, which posed a serious threat to the security of its neighbours and of other States; and the continuing provision to Israeli scientists of access to the nuclear facilities of one of the nuclear-weapon States.</li><li>• (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 179) All Member States should cooperate in reversing what was an unacceptable situation and achieving the universality of comprehensive Agency safeguards in the Middle East region. Implementing resolution GC(53)/RES/17, entitled “Israeli nuclear capabilities”, was a first step towards that end. Accordingly, NAM had looked forward to the Director General’s strong involvement in the implementation of that resolution, expecting comprehensive reporting by the Director General to the Board, and subsequently to the General Conference, that would reflect the views of Member States, and: (a) disclose all information available to the Secretariat and Member States on the nature and scope of the Israeli nuclear facilities and activities that would be covered by any comprehensive safeguards agreement concluded with Israel, including information pertaining to previous nuclear transfers to Israel; and (b) outline how the Agency viewed the way forward, identifying all necessary measures to be undertaken by the parties concerned.</li><li>• (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 180) NAM had been fully committed to cooperating with the Director General and supporting his efforts in implementing resolution GC(53)/RES/17, and it had expected all other Member States to be equally committed.</li><li>• (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 181) It was regrettable that, almost a year since the adoption of resolution GC(53)/RES/17, the Secretariat was not in a position to provide the Board and the General Conference with a list of all the nuclear facilities that could be subject to safeguards pursuant to a comprehensive safeguards agreement in the event that Israel concluded such an agreement with the Agency. The Secretariat should provide further clarification regarding its efforts, if any, to seek information for inclusion in such a list from Member States and the responses it had received from Member States.</li><li>• (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 182) It was regrettable that the Secretariat was also not in a position to provide information that could be relevant to Israel’s nuclear capabilities beyond what was included in section C of the Director General’s report and in the Director General’s annual SIRs [Safeguards Implementation Report]. The Secretariat should provide further clarification regarding its efforts, if any, to seek such information from Member States and the responses it had received from Member States.</li><li>• (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 183) It was disappointing that the report of the Director General did not address NAM’s formal requests that he outline how the Agency viewed the way forward, and that the report therefore fell well short of addressing the deep concerns expressed by more than two thirds of the membership of the Agency. NAM was now requesting the</li></ul>
--	--

	<p>Director General to issue an addendum to his report that fully addressed its concerns.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 184) NAM regretted Israel’s continued insistence that the issue of Agency safeguards could not be addressed in isolation from the regional peace process; there was no automatic sequence which linked the application of comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East to the prior conclusion of a peace settlement — the former would contribute to the latter.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 185) It was a matter of great concern to NAM that the official records of the 2009 session of the General Conference and the letter from Israel’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs attached to the Director General’s report indicated an apparent determination on the part of Israel not to cooperate in any way in the implementation of resolution GC(53)/RES/17. In that connection, NAM continued to want a complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material, facilities, resources and devices and of the provision of assistance in the nuclear-related scientific and technological fields to Israel.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 186) In his letter attached to the Director General’s report, Israel’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that Israel valued the non-proliferation regime, acknowledged its importance and had over the years demonstrated a responsible policy of restraint in the nuclear domain. Regrettably, official documents of the Agency were testimony to the contrary. For example, in various resolutions regarding South Africa’s nuclear capabilities adopted by it prior to 1994, the General Conference had recalled General Assembly resolutions dealing with relations between Israel and South Africa in which the General Assembly had, inter alia, strongly condemned the extensive collaboration between Israel and the then racist regime of South Africa, especially in the military and nuclear fields, in defiance of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1283 – Para 59) (Egypt), speaking on behalf of NAM, recalled his request earlier in the day for the Director General to issue an addendum to his report that fully addressed NAM’s concerns in relation to the issue of Israeli nuclear capabilities. NAM did not question anyone’s right to determine the extent to which the reports presented to the Board did or did not meet their expectations; others should abstain from questioning NAM’s right to do so. A statement delivered subsequently, expressing opposition to such an addendum, had clearly implied that NAM’s request undermined the Secretariat’s independence. That implication was baseless. A request for the Director General’s reports to address all issues of interest to members, in the manner that he deemed appropriate, could not be construed as an infringement upon the Secretariat’s independence.</li> </ul>
	<b>Peaceful Uses</b>
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1280 – Para 42) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated NAM’s principled positions on the issue. All States had a basic and inalienable right to development, research, production and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, without any discrimination and in conformity with their respective legal obligations. Therefore, nothing</li> </ul>

	<p>should be interpreted in such a way as to inhibit or restrict the right of States to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes. States' choices and decisions, including those of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and fuel cycle policies must be respected.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1283 – Para 156) The Group of 77 and NAM reiterated that concerns related to nuclear proliferation must not in any way restrict the inalienable right of all States to develop all aspects of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, especially given its relevance for the sustainable socio-economic development of developing countries.</li> </ul>
<p>Assurance of Supply/ Multilateral Approach to Nuclear Fuel Supply</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1283 – Para 154) (Algeria)*, speaking on behalf of both the Group of 77 and NAM, reiterated the views and concerns they had expressed at previous meetings of the Board on the issue of nuclear fuel supply assurance. The technical, legal and economic aspects of the issue, as well as the underlying political dimensions, should be thoroughly addressed so that any proposal that eventually emerged complied fully with the Statute and took into account the legal obligations of Member States and the principle of non-discrimination.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1283 – Para 155) In March 2010 at the technical briefing on document 2010/Note1, a number of critical issues had been raised by Member States, including by proponents of other mechanisms related to assurance of supply. Those issues, and others raised by the Group of 77 and NAM at the June 2009 meetings of the Board, had yet to be thoroughly addressed.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1283 – Para 156) The Group of 77 and NAM reiterated that concerns related to nuclear proliferation must not in any way restrict the inalienable right of all States to develop all aspects of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, especially given its relevance for the sustainable socio-economic development of developing countries.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1283 – Para 157) The Group of 77 and NAM reiterated that any further consideration of the issue of nuclear fuel supply assurance had to be based on a coherent and comprehensive conceptual framework that adequately addressed the views and concerns of all Member States. They remained convinced that further consideration of individual proposals on the matter had to be preceded by consensual agreement by the General Conference on a conceptual framework that outlined the specific political, technical, economic and legal parameters. If the Agency was to establish a mechanism for the assurance of nuclear fuel supply, it had first to agree on common principles and objectives which would then apply automatically to all the different proposals.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1283 – Para 158) The Group of 77 and NAM again recommended that, subject to the provisions of the Statute, any decision on individual proposals should be taken by consensus by the General Conference so that the views and concerns of all Member States could be taken into account. As no progress had been made towards addressing their concerns, the Group of 77 and NAM considered that it was premature to submit individual proposals to the Board.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1283 – Para 159) The Group of 77 and NAM noted that detailed and comprehensive discussions of all aspects of the issue had not taken place prior to the non-consensual decision taken by the Board in</li> </ul>



	<p>November 2009 to authorize the Director General to conclude an agreement on the establishment of a reserve of LEU. They hoped that such a situation could be avoided in the future.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1283 – Para 160) Finally, in view of the fact that consultations were still ongoing on an appropriate framework for conducting further discussions on the issue, the Group of 77 and NAM reiterated that transparent and inclusive deliberations were required to formulate an acceptable framework for assurance of nuclear fuel supply. They continued to believe that an open-ended working group would be the best forum for conducting such discussions and requested the Chairman to continue his efforts towards achieving consensus in that regard.</li> </ul>
	<b>Safeguards</b>
<p>General Views on Safeguards</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1280 – Para 42) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated NAM’s principled positions on the issue....A fundamental distinction must be drawn between the legal obligations of States under their respective safeguards agreements and confidence-building measures undertaken voluntarily which did not constitute a legal safeguards obligation.... NAM strongly believed that all safeguards and verification issues, including those related to Iran, should be resolved within the framework of the Agency based on sound technical and legal grounds.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1283 – Para 165) (Egypt), speaking on behalf of NAM, drew attention to the Agency’s responsibility to protect safeguards confidential information. NAM remained concerned by recurrent leaks of such information, including the possibility of leaks by staff leaving the Agency, which, in the absence of adequate corrective measures, called into question the credibility of its regime for protecting confidentiality. NAM took note of the Director General’s remark in his introductory statement that such issues were very complicated and required in-depth consideration.<sup>5</sup></li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1283 – Para 166) NAM recalled that, at the meetings of the Board in June 2010, it had requested a comprehensive progress report by the Director General that fully addressed NAM’s concerns on the confidentiality issue. NAM had reiterated that request in a letter conveyed to the Director General on 15 July 2010. NAM took note with appreciation that the Director General intended to present such a progress report at the meetings of the Board in December 2010.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1280 – Para 49) Taking into account the aforementioned recent developments, as well as previous reports on implementation of the work plan contained in INFCIRC/711, NAM continued to look forward to safeguards implementation in Iran being conducted in a routine manner.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 87) NAM regretted Israel’s continued insistence that the issue of Agency safeguards could not be addressed in isolation from the regional peace process; there was no automatic sequence which linked the application of comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East to the prior conclusion of a peace settlement — the former would contribute to the latter.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 88) NAM also regretted the fact that the Director General had not been able to make further progress in fulfilling his mandate, pursuant to resolution GC(53)/RES/16, regarding the application of comprehensive Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities</li> </ul>

	<p>in the Middle East.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 89) All Member States should cooperate in reversing what was an unacceptable situation and achieving, as first priority, the universality of comprehensive Agency safeguards in the Middle East region.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 90) NAM had noted that the Director General would “continue with his consultations in accordance with his mandate regarding the early application of comprehensive Agency safeguards on all nuclear activities in the Middle East region.” It welcomed the Director General’s efforts to encourage the development and consideration of relevant new ideas and approaches that could help move his mandate forward, and it hoped that the Director General would brief Member States regularly on such efforts.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 184) NAM regretted Israel’s continued insistence that the issue of Agency safeguards could not be addressed in isolation from the regional peace process; there was no automatic sequence which linked the application of comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East to the prior conclusion of a peace settlement — the former would contribute to the latter.</li> </ul>
<p>Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1280 – Para 46) NAM noted that the report of the Director General also stated that “the Agency also requested that, if a decision to construct new nuclear facilities had been taken by Iran, Iran provide further information regarding the design and scheduling of the construction of the facilities”. NAM noted with appreciation that the report stated that “Iran reiterated that it was continuing to cooperate with the Agency ‘in accordance with its Safeguards Agreement’”, and it continued to encourage Iran to provide design information regarding its nuclear facilities in accordance with its full-scope safeguards agreement with the Agency.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1281 – Para 97)( Egypt), speaking on behalf of NAM, said that it was essential not to lose sight of the manner in which the issue of Syria had initially been brought to the Agency’s attention. The Agency had been severely hampered in discharging its responsibilities under Syria’s safeguards agreement by the unilateral use of force by Israel and by the late provision of information by some Member States concerning the building at the Dair Alzour site. NAM regretted that the Board had not expressed itself clearly in that regard.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1281 – Para 103) NAM welcomed Syria’s resolve to continue cooperating with the Agency. During the conduct of safeguards activities, access to information, activities and locations had to be provided in accordance with the comprehensive safeguards agreement concluded between the Agency and Syria. NAM encouraged Syria and the Secretariat to continue cooperating with a view to resolving any remaining issues related to information, activities and locations that came under the provisions of Syria’s comprehensive safeguards agreement. The Movement welcomed the recent development of Syria’s cooperation in providing further information on the issue related to the MNSR and access to its facilities. In that regard, it welcomed the agreement reached between Syria and the Agency on a plan of action for addressing outstanding issues concerning the MNSR and looked forward to bringing</li> </ul>

	<p>those issues to closure.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1281 – Para 104) NAM reaffirmed that a clear distinction had to be made between the legal obligations of Member States under their respective safeguards agreements and their voluntary undertakings.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 86) NAM welcomed the fact that its member countries parties to the NPT were concluding comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency in fulfilment of their obligations under paragraph 1 of Article III of the NPT, as non-nuclear-weapon States. All States of the Middle East region except for Israel were parties to the NPT and had undertaken to accept comprehensive Agency safeguards.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 175) NAM welcomed the fact that its member countries parties to the NPT were concluding comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency in fulfilment of their obligation under paragraph 1 of Article III of the NPT, as non-nuclear-weapon States. All of its member countries in the Middle East had concluded such agreements.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 179) All Member States should cooperate in reversing what was an unacceptable situation and achieving the universality of comprehensive Agency safeguards in the Middle East region. Implementing resolution GC(53)/RES/17, entitled “Israeli nuclear capabilities”, was a first step towards that end. Accordingly, NAM had looked forward to the Director General’s strong involvement in the implementation of that resolution, expecting comprehensive reporting by the Director General to the Board, and subsequently to the General Conference, that would reflect the views of Member States, and: (a) disclose all information available to the Secretariat and Member States on the nature and scope of the Israeli nuclear facilities and activities that would be covered by any comprehensive safeguards agreement concluded with Israel, including information pertaining to previous nuclear transfers to Israel; and (b) outline how the Agency viewed the way forward, identifying all necessary measures to be undertaken by the parties concerned.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 181) It was regrettable that, almost a year since the adoption of resolution GC(53)/RES/17, the Secretariat was not in a position to provide the Board and the General Conference with a list of all the nuclear facilities that could be subject to safeguards pursuant to a comprehensive safeguards agreement in the event that Israel concluded such an agreement with the Agency. The Secretariat should provide further clarification regarding its efforts, if any, to seek information for inclusion in such a list from Member States and the responses it had received from Member States.</li> </ul>
Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 182) It was regrettable that the Secretariat was also not in a position to provide information that could be relevant to Israel’s nuclear capabilities beyond what was included in section C of the Director General’s report and in the Director General’s annual SIRs [Safeguards Implementation Report]. The Secretariat should provide further clarification regarding its efforts, if any, to seek such information from Member States and the responses it had received from Member States.</li> </ul>
Verification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1280 – Para 42) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated</li> </ul>

NAM's principled positions on the issue....The Agency was the sole competent authority for the verification of the respective safeguards obligations of Member States and there should be no undue pressure on or interference in the Agency's activities, especially its verification process, which would jeopardize the efficiency and credibility of the organization..... NAM strongly believed that all safeguards and verification issues, including those related to Iran, should be resolved within the framework of the Agency based on sound technical and legal grounds.

- (GOV/OR.1280 – Para 43) Noting that the Director General had stated once again that the Agency had been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, NAM encouraged Iran to continue cooperating with the Agency to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the country in accordance with international law.
- (GOV/OR.1280 – Para 44) NAM noted with concern the possible implications of the continued departure from standard verification language in the summary in the Director General's report, which stated that "Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities", and it had sought further clarification from the Agency on that matter, given that the Safeguards Implementation Report for 2009 contained in document GOV/2010/25 stated that "while the Agency was able to conclude for Iran that all declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities, verification of the correctness and completeness of Iran's declarations remained ongoing". NAM regretted that no further clarification had been received to date. It further noted with concern the inclusion of extensive technical details pertaining to sensitive proprietary information in the report of the Director General and requested the Secretariat to refrain from including such sensitive information.
- (GOV/OR.1280 – Para 45) NAM welcomed the continued cooperation between the Agency and Iran, noting in particular the following. Nuclear material production activities, particularly those related to enrichment, continued to remain under Agency containment and surveillance and, to date, the results of the large number of environmental samples taken at the FEP and the PFEP indicated that those plants were operating as declared, except for one sample from the FEP. Iran had provided a possible explanation for that sample that was not inconsistent with the Agency's findings, along with supporting information. The Agency had confirmed that the FFEP corresponded with the design information provided by Iran and was at an advanced stage of construction, although no centrifuges had been introduced into the facility. Since October 2009, the Agency had been conducting, on average, one design information verification at the FFEP per month. The results of the environmental samples taken at the FFEP up to 16 February 2010 had not indicated the presence of enriched uranium. The Agency had continued to monitor the use and construction of hot cells at the relevant nuclear facilities in Iran and there had been no indications of ongoing reprocessing-related activities at those facilities. Iran had allowed the Agency access to the IR-40 heavy water reactor at Arak, at which time the Agency had been able

	<p>to carry out a design information verification. The Agency had verified that construction of the facility was ongoing, the civil construction of the buildings being almost complete and some major equipment having been installed. The Agency had also carried out a physical inventory verification and a design information verification at the FMP, confirming that no new process equipment had been installed at the facility and that no new assemblies, rods or pellets had been produced there since May 2009.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1280 – Para 48) NAM fully supported the previous requests of the Director General to those Member States that had provided the Secretariat with information related to the ‘alleged studies’ to allow the Agency to provide all related documents to Iran. NAM reiterated its concern over the creation of obstacles in that regard which hindered the Agency’s verification process, recalling that the Director General had previously reported that the Agency had limited means to authenticate independently the documentation that formed the basis of the alleged studies, and that the constraints placed by some Member States on the availability of information to Iran were making it more difficult for the Agency to conduct detailed discussions with Iran on the matter.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1281 – Para 105) Member States should avoid applying any undue pressure or interfering in the Agency’s activities, especially in its verification process, which would jeopardize the efficiency and credibility of the Agency.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1281 – Para 106) NAM supported the Director General’s call on States, including Israel, which might possess information relevant to the Agency’s verification activities, to make such information available to the Agency. In addition, it called on Israel to cooperate fully with the Agency in providing it with comprehensive information on the nature of the materials used by Israel in its attack on the Dair Alzour site.</li> </ul>
Iran	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1280 – Para 42) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated NAM’s principled positions on the issue....A fundamental distinction must be drawn between the legal obligations of States under their respective safeguards agreements and confidence-building measures undertaken voluntarily which did not constitute a legal safeguards obligation.... NAM strongly believed that all safeguards and verification issues, including those related to Iran, should be resolved within the framework of the Agency based on sound technical and legal grounds.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1280 – Para 43) Noting that the Director General had stated once again that the Agency had been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, NAM encouraged Iran to continue cooperating with the Agency to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the country in accordance with international law.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1280 – Para 44) NAM noted with concern the possible implications of the continued departure from standard verification language in the summary in the Director General’s report, which stated that “Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities”, and it had sought further clarification from the Agency on that matter, given that the Safeguards Implementation Report for 2009</li> </ul>

contained in document GOV/2010/25 stated that “while the Agency was able to conclude for Iran that all declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities, verification of the correctness and completeness of Iran’s declarations remained ongoing”. NAM regretted that no further clarification had been received to date. It further noted with concern the inclusion of extensive technical details pertaining to sensitive proprietary information in the report of the Director General and requested the Secretariat to refrain from including such sensitive information.

- (GOV/OR.1280 – Para 45) NAM welcomed the continued cooperation between the Agency and Iran, noting in particular the following. Nuclear material production activities, particularly those related to enrichment, continued to remain under Agency containment and surveillance and, to date, the results of the large number of environmental samples taken at the FEP and the PFEP indicated that those plants were operating as declared, except for one sample from the FEP. Iran had provided a possible explanation for that sample that was not inconsistent with the Agency’s findings, along with supporting information. The Agency had confirmed that the FFEP corresponded with the design information provided by Iran and was at an advanced stage of construction, although no centrifuges had been introduced into the facility. Since October 2009, the Agency had been conducting, on average, one design information verification at the FFEP per month. The results of the environmental samples taken at the FFEP up to 16 February 2010 had not indicated the presence of enriched uranium. The Agency had continued to monitor the use and construction of hot cells at the relevant nuclear facilities in Iran and there had been no indications of ongoing reprocessing-related activities at those facilities. Iran had allowed the Agency access to the IR-40 heavy water reactor at Arak, at which time the Agency had been able to carry out a design information verification. The Agency had verified that construction of the facility was ongoing, the civil construction of the buildings being almost complete and some major equipment having been installed. The Agency had also carried out a physical inventory verification and a design information verification at the FMP, confirming that no new process equipment had been installed at the facility and that no new assemblies, rods or pellets had been produced there since May 2009.
- (GOV/OR.1280 – Para 46) NAM noted that the report of the Director General also stated that “the Agency also requested that, if a decision to construct new nuclear facilities had been taken by Iran, Iran provide further information regarding the design and scheduling of the construction of the facilities”. NAM noted with appreciation that the report stated that “Iran reiterated that it was continuing to cooperate with the Agency ‘in accordance with its Safeguards Agreement’”, and it continued to encourage Iran to provide design information regarding its nuclear facilities in accordance with its full-scope safeguards agreement with the Agency.
- (GOV/OR.1280 – Para 48) NAM fully supported the previous requests of the Director General to those Member States that had provided the Secretariat with information related to the ‘alleged studies’ to allow the Agency to provide all related documents to Iran. NAM reiterated its

	<p>concern over the creation of obstacles in that regard which hindered the Agency's verification process, recalling that the Director General had previously reported that the Agency had limited means to authenticate independently the documentation that formed the basis of the alleged studies, and that the constraints placed by some Member States on the availability of information to Iran were making it more difficult for the Agency to conduct detailed discussions with Iran on the matter.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1280 – Para 49) Taking into account the aforementioned recent developments, as well as previous reports on implementation of the work plan contained in INFCIRC/711, NAM continued to look forward to safeguards implementation in Iran being conducted in a routine manner.</li> </ul>
Syria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1281 – Para 97)(Egypt), speaking on behalf of NAM, said that it was essential not to lose sight of the manner in which the issue of Syria had initially been brought to the Agency's attention. The Agency had been severely hampered in discharging its responsibilities under Syria's safeguards agreement by the unilateral use of force by Israel and by the late provision of information by some Member States concerning the building at the Dair Alzour site. NAM regretted that the Board had not expressed itself clearly in that regard.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1281 – Para 103) NAM welcomed Syria's resolve to continue cooperating with the Agency. During the conduct of safeguards activities, access to information, activities and locations had to be provided in accordance with the comprehensive safeguards agreement concluded between the Agency and Syria. NAM encouraged Syria and the Secretariat to continue cooperating with a view to resolving any remaining issues related to information, activities and locations that came under the provisions of Syria's comprehensive safeguards agreement. The Movement welcomed the recent development of Syria's cooperation in providing further information on the issue related to the MNSR and access to its facilities. In that regard, it welcomed the agreement reached between Syria and the Agency on a plan of action for addressing outstanding issues concerning the MNSR and looked forward to bringing those issues to closure.</li> </ul>
Israel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1281 – Para 106) NAM supported the Director General's call on States, including Israel, which might possess information relevant to the Agency's verification activities, to make such information available to the Agency. In addition, it called on Israel to cooperate fully with the Agency in providing it with comprehensive information on the nature of the materials used by Israel in its attack on the Dair Alzour site.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 86) NAM welcomed the fact that its member countries parties to the NPT were concluding comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency in fulfilment of their obligations under paragraph 1 of Article III of the NPT, as non-nuclear-weapon States. All States of the Middle East region except for Israel were parties to the NPT and had undertaken to accept comprehensive Agency safeguards.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 87) NAM regretted Israel's continued insistence that the issue of Agency safeguards could not be addressed in isolation from the regional peace process; there was no automatic sequence which linked the application of comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East to the prior conclusion of a peace settlement</li> </ul>

	<p>— the former would contribute to the latter.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 179) All Member States should cooperate in reversing what was an unacceptable situation and achieving the universality of comprehensive Agency safeguards in the Middle East region. Implementing resolution GC(53)/RES/17, entitled “Israeli nuclear capabilities”, was a first step towards that end. Accordingly, NAM had looked forward to the Director General’s strong involvement in the implementation of that resolution, expecting comprehensive reporting by the Director General to the Board, and subsequently to the General Conference, that would reflect the views of Member States, and: (a) disclose all information available to the Secretariat and Member States on the nature and scope of the Israeli nuclear facilities and activities that would be covered by any comprehensive safeguards agreement concluded with Israel, including information pertaining to previous nuclear transfers to Israel; and (b) outline how the Agency viewed the way forward, identifying all necessary measures to be undertaken by the parties concerned.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 181) It was regrettable that, almost a year since the adoption of resolution GC(53)/RES/17, the Secretariat was not in a position to provide the Board and the General Conference with a list of all the nuclear facilities that could be subject to safeguards pursuant to a comprehensive safeguards agreement in the event that Israel concluded such an agreement with the Agency. The Secretariat should provide further clarification regarding its efforts, if any, to seek information for inclusion in such a list from Member States and the responses it had received from Member States.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 184) NAM regretted Israel’s continued insistence that the issue of Agency safeguards could not be addressed in isolation from the regional peace process; there was no automatic sequence which linked the application of comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East to the prior conclusion of a peace settlement — the former would contribute to the latter.</li> </ul>
	<b>NWFZ</b>
Middle East NWFZ	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1280 – Para 42) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated NAM’s principled positions on the issue....The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would be a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and NAM supported the establishment of such a zone in accordance with relevant United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. (GOV/OR.1280 – Para 42) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated NAM’s principled positions on the issue.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 85) (Egypt), speaking on behalf of NAM, said that stability could not be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities were maintained, particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allowed one party to threaten its neighbours and the region as a whole. The establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East would be a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament, and NAM continued to advocate the establishment of such a zone in accordance with relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. The effective and efficient application of</li> </ul>



	<p>Agency safeguards in the Middle East promoted greater confidence among States in that region, and achieving the universality of comprehensive Agency safeguards in the Middle East region would be the first practical step towards that end and was a necessary step towards the establishment of an NWFZ there.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 91) The NAM member countries parties to the NPT welcomed the fact that the 2010 NPT Review Conference had “endorsed the practical step that the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the co-sponsors of the [resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference], in consultation with the States of the region, will convene a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region, and with the full support and engagement of the nuclear-weapon States.” NAM had noted that the 2012 conference would take the 1995 resolution as its terms of reference.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 92) NAM greatly appreciated the Director General’s recent efforts to develop an agenda and modalities that would help to ensure “a successful forum on the relevance of the experience of existing NWFZs, including confidence-building and verification measures, for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.” For the forum to be successful, its agenda should reflect the consensus within the international community on the importance of establishing a NWFZ in the Middle East. Accordingly, NAM would like the Director General to continue consultations with Member States of the Middle East region in an effort to achieve a consensus, by convergence of views, on the agenda and modalities of the forum.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 93) NAM was fully committed to cooperating with the Director General and supporting his efforts in implementing resolution GC(53)/RES/16. It was NAM’s expectation that all Agency Member States would cooperate with him and support his efforts.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1282 – Para 176) The establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East would be a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament, and NAM continued to advocate the establishment of such a zone in accordance with relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.</li> </ul>
	<b>Security Assurances</b>
<p>Attack or Threat of Attack Against Peaceful Nuclear Facilities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1280 – Para 42) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated NAM’s principled positions on the issue. NAM reaffirmed the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities, and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities — whether operational or under construction — posed a serious danger to human beings and the environment and constituted a grave violation of international law, the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and of Agency regulations. There was a need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks or threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1281 – Para 98) The Final Declaration adopted by the Summit of Heads of State and Government of NAM held in Egypt in July 2009</li> </ul>

	<p>had stated that the Heads of State and Government underscored the Movement's principled position concerning non-use or threat of use of force against the territorial integrity of any State, condemned the Israeli attack against a Syrian facility on 6 September 2007, which constituted a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and welcomed Syria's cooperation with the Agency in that regard.</p>
--	--