



## Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Database

### 02 December 2010 Board of Governors Meeting

2 December 2010 Meeting: GOV/OR.1287; GOV/OR.1288; GOV/OR.1289	
	Country Specific
Iran	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• (GOV/OR.1287 – Para 11) Cuba, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated the Movement’s principled positions on the matter. All States had a basic and inalienable right to development, research, production and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, without any discrimination and in conformity with their respective legal obligations. Therefore, nothing should be interpreted in such a way as to inhibit or restrict the right of States to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes. States’ choices and decisions, including those of Iran, in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and fuel cycle policies must be respected. The Agency was the sole competent authority for the verification of the respective safeguards obligations of Member States and there should be no undue pressure on or interference in the Agency’s activities, especially its verification process, which would jeopardize the efficiency and credibility of the organization. A fundamental distinction must be drawn between the legal obligations of States under their respective safeguards agreements and confidence-building measures undertaken voluntarily which did not constitute a legal safeguards obligation. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would be a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and NAM supported the establishment of such a zone in accordance with relevant United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. NAM reaffirmed the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities, and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities — whether operational or under construction — posed a serious danger to human beings and the environment and constituted a grave violation of international law, the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and of Agency regulations. There was a need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks or threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. NAM strongly believed that all safeguards and verification issues, including those related to Iran, should be resolved within the framework of the Agency based on sound technical and legal grounds. The Agency should continue its work to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue within its mandate under its Statute. Lastly, NAM stressed that peaceful diplomacy and dialogue, and substantive negotiations among the parties concerned without preconditions, must remain the means whereby a comprehensive and lasting solution to the Iranian nuclear issue was found.</li><li>• (GOV/OR.1287 – Para 12) Turning to the Director General’s report contained in document GOV/2010/62, she [Ms Goicochea Estenoz of Cuba] noted that the Agency continued to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. NAM encouraged Iran to continue cooperating with the Agency to provide credible assurances regarding the</li></ul>

absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in accordance with international law.

- (GOV/OR.1287 – Para 13) NAM noted the explanation provided by the Secretariat in response to its concern about the possible implications of the continued departure from standard verification language in the summary of the Director General’s report when stating that Iran had not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran was in peaceful activities. It sought further clarification from the Director General on that matter, given that the Safeguards Implementation Report for 2009 contained in document GOV/2010/25 stated that, while the Agency was able to conclude for Iran that all declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities, verification of the correctness and completeness of Iran’s declarations remained ongoing. NAM also requested the Secretariat to continue to refrain from including extensive technical details pertaining to sensitive proprietary information in the Director General’s report.
- (GOV/OR.1287 – Para 14) NAM welcomed the continued cooperation between the Agency and Iran as described in the report. Nuclear material production activities, particularly those related to enrichment, remained under Agency containment and surveillance and, thus far, the FEP in Natanz and PFEP had been operating as declared. The Agency had confirmed that the FFEP corresponded with the design information provided by Iran and that the facility was at an advanced stage of construction, although no centrifuges had been introduced into it. The results of the environmental samples taken at the FFEP up to 16 February 2010 did not indicate the presence of enriched uranium. The Agency had continued to monitor the use and construction of hot cells at the relevant nuclear facilities in Iran and there had been no indication of ongoing reprocessing-related activities at those facilities. Iran had provided the Agency with access to the IR-40 heavy water reactor at Arak, allowing it to carry out a design information verification. The Agency had verified that construction of the facility was ongoing, with the civil construction of the buildings almost complete and some major equipment installed. The Agency had also carried out an inspection and a design information verification at the FMP and had confirmed that Iran had not yet started to install equipment for fuel fabrication for the Tehran research reactor. The Agency had confirmed that the core loading at the Bushehr nuclear power plant was complete and had verified all fuel assemblies in the reactor core. Containment and surveillance measures were in place to maintain continuity of knowledge until the core was closed and sealed.
- (GOV/OR.1287 – Para 15) NAM noted the standing requests by the Secretariat for further information regarding the design, and scheduling of the construction of new nuclear facilities, and it encouraged Iran to provide such information in accordance with its safeguards agreement.
- (GOV/OR.1287 – Para 16) NAM noted that, although most of the actions identified in the work plan agreed between Iran and the Agency in 2007 (INFCIRC/711) had been completed, there remained one issue to be addressed. In that regard, NAM fully supported the requests of the Director General to those Member States that had provided information related to the alleged studies to allow the Agency to provide all related

	<p>documents to Iran. The Director General had previously reported that the Agency had limited means to authenticate independently the documentation that formed the basis of the alleged studies and that the constraints placed by some Member States on the availability of information to Iran were making it more difficult for the Agency to conduct detailed discussions with Iran on the matter.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1287 – Para 17) Taking into account recent developments and the progress in implementing the work plan, NAM looked forward to safeguards implementation in Iran being conducted in a routine manner. Diplomacy and dialogue were the only means of finding a long-term solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and NAM encouraged all Member States to contribute positively to that end.</li> </ul>
Syria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1288 – Para 6) Cuba, speaking on behalf of the Vienna Chapter of NAM, said that, in considering the issue under discussion, it was essential not to lose sight of the manner in which it had initially been brought to the attention of the Agency. As had been recognized in the Director General’s report to the November 2008 meetings of the Board (GOV/2008/60), the Agency had been severely hampered in discharging its responsibilities under Syria’s safeguards agreement by the unilateral use of force by Israel and by the late provision of information by some Member States concerning the building at the Dair Alzour site. Bearing in mind the serious consequences of such acts, NAM regretted the fact that the Board had not expressed itself clearly in that regard and that the Director General continued to not address those matters in his reports.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1288 – Para 7) NAM recalled the position expressed in the final declaration adopted at the Summit of NAM Heads of State and Government held in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, in July 2009, in which they had underscored NAM’s principled position concerning non-use or threat of use of force against the territorial integrity of any State, condemning the Israeli attack against a Syrian facility on 6 September 2007 which constituted a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, and welcoming Syria’s cooperation with the Agency in that regard.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1288 – Para 8) Part A of the Director General’s report continued to include many references to events that had occurred prior to his preceding report. NAM continued to request clarification from the Secretariat on the rationale behind issuing a report that contained no new information on the Dair Alzour site.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1288 – Para 9) NAM noted that Syria had maintained that the destroyed facility at the Dair Alzour site was a non-nuclear military installation. It also noted Syria’s statement that it had provided all the information it had regarding the questions raised by the Agency concerning the Dair Alzour site.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1288 – Para 10) NAM recalled its previous requests that future reports by the Director General on the issue should contain the Agency’s assessment of the implications of Israel’s bombing of the Dair Alzour site, and its lack of cooperation, on the Agency’s ability to resolve all related outstanding issues, as well as the broader aspects of the future of the Agency’s safeguards regime, and its assessment of the reasons that might explain the absence of satellite imagery from the Dair Alzour site for a period of six weeks following its destruction by Israel. The continued</li> </ul>

	<p>absence of a comprehensive Agency assessment in that regard had not helped NAM member States to distinguish myth from reality regarding the Dair Alzour site. Consequently, NAM requested that future formal reports by the Director General on the item contain such an assessment. It regretted the fact that the current report did not address NAM's previous formal requests regarding the Dair Alzour site, and once again requested clarification on the matter.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1288 – Para 11) NAM welcomed Syria's resolve to continue cooperating with the Agency and, in that regard, it stressed that, during the conduct of safeguards activities, access to information, activities and locations must be provided in accordance with the letter of the comprehensive safeguards agreement concluded between the Agency and Syria. NAM encouraged Syria and the Secretariat to continue cooperating with a view to resolving any remaining issues related to information, activities and locations that were in accordance with the provisions of Syria's comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1288 – Para 12) NAM welcomed Syria's continued cooperation in providing further information on the issue related to the miniature neutron source reactor and access to its facilities. In that connection, it welcomed the reaffirmation by Syria of its commitment to resolve all outstanding issues within the scope of its safeguards agreement, and looked forward to those issues being brought to closure. A clear distinction had to be made between legal obligations of Member States under their respective safeguards agreements and their voluntary undertakings, in order to ensure that such voluntary undertakings were not turned into legal safeguards obligations.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1288 – Para 13) NAM stressed again that all Member States should avoid any undue pressure on or interference in the Agency's activities, especially in its verification process, which would jeopardize the efficiency and credibility of the Agency. It supported the Director General's previous call on other States, including Israel, which might possess information relevant to the Agency's verification activities, to make such information available to the Agency. It also called on Israel to cooperate fully with the Agency and provide it with comprehensive information on the nature of the materials it had used in its attack on the Dair Alzour site.</li> </ul>
Israel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1288 – Para 6) Cuba, speaking on behalf of the Vienna Chapter of NAM, said that, in considering the issue under discussion, it was essential not to lose sight of the manner in which it had initially been brought to the attention of the Agency. As had been recognized in the Director General's report to the November 2008 meetings of the Board (GOV/2008/60), the Agency had been severely hampered in discharging its responsibilities under Syria's safeguards agreement by the unilateral use of force by Israel and by the late provision of information by some Member States concerning the building at the Dair Alzour site. Bearing in mind the serious consequences of such acts, NAM regretted the fact that the Board had not expressed itself clearly in that regard and that the Director General continued to not address those matters in his reports.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1288 – Para 7) NAM recalled the position expressed in the final declaration adopted at the Summit of NAM Heads of State and</li> </ul>

	<p>Government held in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, in July 2009, in which they had underscored NAM's principled position concerning non-use or threat of use of force against the territorial integrity of any State, condemning the Israeli attack against a Syrian facility on 6 September 2007 which constituted a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, and welcoming Syria's cooperation with the Agency in that regard.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1288 – Para 10) NAM recalled its previous requests that future reports by the Director General on the issue should contain the Agency's assessment of the implications of Israel's bombing of the Dair Alzour site, and its lack of cooperation, on the Agency's ability to resolve all related outstanding issues, as well as the broader aspects of the future of the Agency's safeguards regime, and its assessment of the reasons that might explain the absence of satellite imagery from the Dair Alzour site for a period of six weeks following its destruction by Israel. The continued absence of a comprehensive Agency assessment in that regard had not helped NAM member States to distinguish myth from reality regarding the Dair Alzour site. Consequently, NAM requested that future formal reports by the Director General on the item contain such an assessment. It regretted the fact that the current report did not address NAM's previous formal requests regarding the Dair Alzour site, and once again requested clarification on the matter.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1288 – Para 13) NAM stressed again that all Member States should avoid any undue pressure on or interference in the Agency's activities, especially in its verification process, which would jeopardize the efficiency and credibility of the Agency. It supported the Director General's previous call on other States, including Israel, which might possess information relevant to the Agency's verification activities, to make such information available to the Agency. It also called on Israel to cooperate fully with the Agency and provide it with comprehensive information on the nature of the materials it had used in its attack on the Dair Alzour site.</li> </ul>
	<b>Peaceful Uses</b>
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1287 – Para 11) Cuba, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated the Movement's principled positions on the matter. All States had a basic and inalienable right to development, research, production and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, without any discrimination and in conformity with their respective legal obligations. Therefore, nothing should be interpreted in such a way as to inhibit or restrict the right of States to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes. States' choices and decisions, including those of Iran, in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and fuel cycle policies must be respected.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1289 – Para 74) Concerns related to nuclear proliferation must not in any way restrict the inalienable right of all States to develop all aspects of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes and to pursue national nuclear fuel capabilities, including enrichment.</li> </ul>
Assurance of Supply/ Multilateral Approach to Nuclear Fuel Supply	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1289 – Para 73) South Africa, speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and NAM, said that there was a need to address thoroughly the technical, legal and economic aspects associated with the issue, as well as its underlying political dimensions, so as to ensure that any proposal that emerged was in full accordance with the Agency's Statute and took into</li> </ul>

account the respective legal obligations of Member States and the principle of non-discrimination. The multi-faceted aspects of assurance of supply required a meticulous discussion in an open-ended format. Those aspects, whose merit remained to be fully assessed, had a direct impact on the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and needed to be subject to in-depth consideration by the Agency with a view to arriving at a consensus.

- (GOV/OR.1289 – Para 74) Concerns related to nuclear proliferation must not in any way restrict the inalienable right of all States to develop all aspects of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes and to pursue national nuclear fuel capabilities, including enrichment.
- (GOV/OR.1289 – Para 75) Any further consideration of assurance of supply had to be based on an agreement among Agency members, and on a coherent and comprehensive conceptual framework outlining the specific political, technical, economic and legal parameters that adequately addressed the views and concerns of all Member States and applied to all the proposals. That would help avoid any confrontation that would divide members of the Agency and the Board and hamper the credibility of the Agency and its policy-making organs. Since many questions raised on the issue had not received a satisfactory response, any proposal tabled in the Board should only be considered after extensive efforts had been made towards reaching a consensus. While any Member State had the right to make any proposal or table any resolution, attempts should be made to avoid polarizing or politicizing the Agency. Any proposal on assurance of supply should be based on objective eligibility criteria and should be in accordance with the Statute, taking into account the principle of non-discrimination and the respective legal obligations of Member States. Any Board decision which would have an impact on all Member States should take into consideration the interests of those States and should not merely be donor driven. Member States that made voluntary financial contributions to any proposal related to assurance of supply should not have any influence on the decision-making process in that regard. Financial contributions made by non-governmental sources should be subject to close consultation with all Member States. In the event those contributions were approved, no external influence should be placed on the Agency's work as a result, since that would jeopardize its independence, credibility and integrity.
- (GOV/OR.1289 – Para 76) Although the proposal contained in document GOV/2010/67 stated that all costs relating to the LEU bank would be funded exclusively through extrabudgetary resources, a full study should be conducted on the long-term financial implications for the Agency's resources — including staff costs — in the event of a shortfall in funds for the bank's operation, and on the measures to ensure that such funding was sufficient, assured, predictable and unconditional. Fuel supply could only be assured if there was an established mechanism to ensure fabrication of fuel from the LEU supplied through the bank. All possible model agreements between the suppliers, hosts, Agency and requesting States should have been made available before the adoption of any proposal, with a view to providing full information on all the permutations of bilateral and multilateral transactions.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1289 – Para 77) The Group of 77 and NAM would have welcomed fuller discussions on: guarantees that delivery of the fuel to the requesting State would not be hampered by denials or delays of shipments and liability for compensation in cases where delivery was disrupted or delayed; the budgetary implications of applying safeguards to the material stored at the bank; the extent of control exercised by the Agency over the terms of agreement between the supplier State and host State regarding conditions of supply; and the criteria for the selection of the host State or States.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1289 – Para 78. The consultations that were still under way regarding the framework for conducting further discussions on the issue needed to be transparent and inclusive. An open-ended working group was the best forum for conducting such discussions.</li> </ul>
	<b>Safeguards</b>
General Views on Safeguards	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1289 – Para 230) The group recalled the Director General’s opening statement to the September 2010 session of the Board, in which he had rightly pointed out that those issues were very complicated and required time for in-depth consideration. During that session of the Board, NAM had requested that the Director General present a comprehensive progress report to the Board at its current, December, session that would fully address the group’s concerns regarding the protection of safeguards confidential information by the Agency. In that regard, NAM noted with appreciation the Secretariat’s circulation of document 2010/Note 47 providing more specific information on the use of cost-free experts in 2009. NAM also welcomed the Director General’s intention to present a progress report on the Agency’s information security regime in time for the current session of the Board. However, given that the Secretariat had circulated document 2010/Note 60 on information security at the Agency only the previous week, NAM requested the inclusion of an agenda item to discuss the matter at the Board meetings in March 2011, when the issue of cost-free experts could also be discussed.</li> </ul>
Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1287 – Para 11) Cuba, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated the Movement’s principled positions on the matter.... A fundamental distinction must be drawn between the legal obligations of States under their respective safeguards agreements and confidence-building measures undertaken voluntarily which did not constitute a legal safeguards obligation.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1287 – Para 15) NAM noted the standing requests by the Secretariat for further information regarding the design, and scheduling of the construction of new nuclear facilities, and it encouraged Iran to provide such information in accordance with its safeguards agreement.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1288 – Para 6) Cuba, speaking on behalf of the Vienna Chapter of NAM, said that, in considering the issue under discussion, it was essential not to lose sight of the manner in which it had initially been brought to the attention of the Agency. As had been recognized in the Director General’s report to the November 2008 meetings of the Board (GOV/2008/60), the Agency had been severely hampered in discharging its responsibilities under Syria’s safeguards agreement by the unilateral use of force by Israel and by the late provision of information by some Member States concerning the building at the Dair Alzour site. Bearing in</li> </ul>

	<p>mind the serious consequences of such acts, NAM regretted the fact that the Board had not expressed itself clearly in that regard and that the Director General continued to not address those matters in his reports.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1288 – Para 11) NAM welcomed Syria’s resolve to continue cooperating with the Agency and, in that regard, it stressed that, during the conduct of safeguards activities, access to information, activities and locations must be provided in accordance with the letter of the comprehensive safeguards agreement concluded between the Agency and Syria. NAM encouraged Syria and the Secretariat to continue cooperating with a view to resolving any remaining issues related to information, activities and locations that were in accordance with the provisions of Syria’s comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1288 – Para 12) NAM welcomed Syria’s continued cooperation in providing further information on the issue related to the miniature neutron source reactor and access to its facilities. In that connection, it welcomed the reaffirmation by Syria of its commitment to resolve all outstanding issues within the scope of its safeguards agreement, and looked forward to those issues being brought to closure. A clear distinction had to be made between legal obligations of Member States under their respective safeguards agreements and their voluntary undertakings, in order to ensure that such voluntary undertakings were not turned into legal safeguards obligations.</li> </ul>
Verification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1287 – Para 11) Cuba, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated the Movement’s principled positions on the matter.... The Agency was the sole competent authority for the verification of the respective safeguards obligations of Member States and there should be no undue pressure on or interference in the Agency’s activities, especially its verification process, which would jeopardize the efficiency and credibility of the organization. ...NAM strongly believed that all safeguards and verification issues, including those related to Iran, should be resolved within the framework of the Agency based on sound technical and legal grounds.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1287 – Para 12) Turning to the Director General’s report contained in document GOV/2010/62, she [Ms Goicochea Estenoz of Cuba] noted that the Agency continued to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. NAM encouraged Iran to continue cooperating with the Agency to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in accordance with international law.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1287 – Para 14) NAM welcomed the continued cooperation between the Agency and Iran as described in the report. Nuclear material production activities, particularly those related to enrichment, remained under Agency containment and surveillance and, thus far, the FEP in Natanz and PFEP had been operating as declared. The Agency had confirmed that the FFEP corresponded with the design information provided by Iran and that the facility was at an advanced stage of construction, although no centrifuges had been introduced into it. The results of the environmental samples taken at the FFEP up to 16 February 2010 did not indicate the presence of enriched uranium. The Agency had continued to monitor the use and construction of hot cells at the relevant</li> </ul>



	<p>nuclear facilities in Iran and there had been no indication of ongoing reprocessing-related activities at those facilities. Iran had provided the Agency with access to the IR-40 heavy water reactor at Arak, allowing it to carry out a design information verification. The Agency had verified that construction of the facility was ongoing, with the civil construction of the buildings almost complete and some major equipment installed. The Agency had also carried out an inspection and a design information verification at the FMP and had confirmed that Iran had not yet started to install equipment for fuel fabrication for the Tehran research reactor. The Agency had confirmed that the core loading at the Bushehr nuclear power plant was complete and had verified all fuel assemblies in the reactor core. Containment and surveillance measures were in place to maintain continuity of knowledge until the core was closed and sealed.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1288 – Para 13) NAM stressed again that all Member States should avoid any undue pressure on or interference in the Agency’s activities, especially in its verification process, which would jeopardize the efficiency and credibility of the Agency. It supported the Director General’s previous call on other States, including Israel, which might possess information relevant to the Agency’s verification activities, to make such information available to the Agency. It also called on Israel to cooperate fully with the Agency and provide it with comprehensive information on the nature of the materials it had used in its attack on the Dair Alzour site.</li> </ul>
Safeguard Implementation Report (SIR)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1287 – Para 13) NAM noted the explanation provided by the Secretariat in response to its concern about the possible implications of the continued departure from standard verification language in the summary of the Director General’s report when stating that Iran had not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran was in peaceful activities. It sought further clarification from the Director General on that matter, given that the Safeguards Implementation Report for 2009 contained in document GOV/2010/25 stated that, while the Agency was able to conclude for Iran that all declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities, verification of the correctness and completeness of Iran’s declarations remained ongoing. NAM also requested the Secretariat to continue to refrain from including extensive technical details pertaining to sensitive proprietary information in the Director General’s report.</li> </ul>
Iran	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1287 – Para 11) Cuba, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated the Movement’s principled positions on the matter.... NAM strongly believed that all safeguards and verification issues, including those related to Iran, should be resolved within the framework of the Agency based on sound technical and legal grounds.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1287 – Para 12) Turning to the Director General’s report contained in document GOV/2010/62, she [Ms Goicochea Estenoz of Cuba] noted that the Agency continued to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. NAM encouraged Iran to continue cooperating with the Agency to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in accordance with international law.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1287 – Para 14) NAM welcomed the continued cooperation</li> </ul>

	<p>between the Agency and Iran as described in the report. Nuclear material production activities, particularly those related to enrichment, remained under Agency containment and surveillance and, thus far, the FEP in Natanz and PFEP had been operating as declared. The Agency had confirmed that the FFEP corresponded with the design information provided by Iran and that the facility was at an advanced stage of construction, although no centrifuges had been introduced into it. The results of the environmental samples taken at the FFEP up to 16 February 2010 did not indicate the presence of enriched uranium. The Agency had continued to monitor the use and construction of hot cells at the relevant nuclear facilities in Iran and there had been no indication of ongoing reprocessing-related activities at those facilities. Iran had provided the Agency with access to the IR-40 heavy water reactor at Arak, allowing it to carry out a design information verification. The Agency had verified that construction of the facility was ongoing, with the civil construction of the buildings almost complete and some major equipment installed. The Agency had also carried out an inspection and a design information verification at the FMP and had confirmed that Iran had not yet started to install equipment for fuel fabrication for the Tehran research reactor. The Agency had confirmed that the core loading at the Bushehr nuclear power plant was complete and had verified all fuel assemblies in the reactor core. Containment and surveillance measures were in place to maintain continuity of knowledge until the core was closed and sealed.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1287 – Para 17) Taking into account recent developments and the progress in implementing the work plan, NAM looked forward to safeguards implementation in Iran being conducted in a routine manner. Diplomacy and dialogue were the only means of finding a long-term solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and NAM encouraged all Member States to contribute positively to that end.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1289 – Para 229) Islamic Republic of Iran, speaking on behalf of the Vienna Chapter of NAM, said that the group remained concerned by recurring leaks of safeguards confidential information, including the possibility of leaks by staff leaving the Agency, which in the absence of adequate corrective measures called into question the credibility of the Agency’s regime for ensuring the protection of safeguards confidential information.</li> </ul>
	<b>NWFZ</b>
Middle East NWFZ	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1287 – Para 11) Cuba, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated the Movement’s principled positions on the matter ....The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would be a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and NAM supported the establishment of such a zone in accordance with relevant United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.</li> </ul>
	<b>Security Assurances</b>
Attack or Threat of Attack Against Peaceful Nuclear Facilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1287 – Para 11) Cuba, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated the Movement’s principled positions on the matter ....NAM reaffirmed the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities, and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities — whether operational or under construction — posed a serious danger to human beings and the environment and constituted a grave violation of international law, the</li> </ul>

	<p>principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and of Agency regulations. There was a need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks or threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.</p>
	<p><b>United Nations Fora</b></p>
<p>IAEA: Programme and Budget</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1289 – Para 76) Although the proposal contained in document GOV/2010/67 stated that all costs relating to the LEU bank would be funded exclusively through extrabudgetary resources, a full study should be conducted on the long-term financial implications for the Agency’s resources — including staff costs — in the event of a shortfall in funds for the bank’s operation, and on the measures to ensure that such funding was sufficient, assured, predictable and unconditional. Fuel supply could only be assured if there was an established mechanism to ensure fabrication of fuel from the LEU supplied through the bank. All possible model agreements between the suppliers, hosts, Agency and requesting States should have been made available before the adoption of any proposal, with a view to providing full information on all the permutations of bilateral and multilateral transactions.</li> </ul>