



Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Database

07 March 2011 Board of Governors Meeting

7 March 2011 Meeting: GOV/OR.1294; GOV/OR.1295; GOV/OR.1296	
	Country Specific
Iran	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• (GOV/OR.1294 – Para 1) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated NAM's principled positions on the issue. All States had a basic and inalienable right to the development, research, production and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, without any discrimination and in conformity with their respective legal obligations. Therefore, nothing should be interpreted in such a way as to inhibit or restrict the right of States to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes. States' choices and decisions, including those of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear technology and fuel cycle policies must be respected...NAM strongly believed that all safeguards and verification issues, including those related to Iran, should be resolved within the framework of the Agency based on sound technical and legal grounds. The Agency should continue its work to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue within its mandate under its Statute. Lastly, NAM stressed that peaceful diplomacy and dialogue, and substantive negotiations among the parties concerned without any preconditions, must remain the means whereby a comprehensive and lasting solution to the Iranian nuclear issue was found.• (GOV/OR.1294 – Para 2) NAM noted that the Director General had stated once again that the Agency had been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran at nuclear facilities and LOFs [locations outside facilities] where nuclear material was customarily used as declared by Iran under its safeguards agreement.• (GOV/OR.1294 – Para 3) NAM welcomed the clear distinction made by the Director General between obligations emanating from Iran's safeguards agreement and other requests by the Security Council. In that regard, NAM noted that the Director General had stated in his report that Iran was not implementing a number of its obligations emanating from relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions. The Director General had previously reported Iran's assertion that some of the Agency's requests had no legal basis since they did not fall within Iran's safeguards agreement, an assertion it had elaborated on in INFCIRC/810. NAM encouraged Iran to enhance its cooperation with the Agency to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the country in accordance with international law.• (GOV/OR.1294 – Para 4) NAM encouraged the Secretariat to continue to refrain from including extensive technical details pertaining to sensitive proprietary information in the report of the Director General.• (GOV/OR.1294 – Para 5) NAM welcomed the continued cooperation between the Agency and Iran, noting in particular the following. Under its safeguards agreement, Iran had declared to the Agency 16 nuclear facilities and 9 LOFs and the Agency continued to verify the non-

diversion of declared nuclear material at those facilities. Activities relating to production of nuclear material, in particular those related to enrichment, remained under Agency containment and surveillance and, to date, the FEP and PFEP had been operating as declared. The Agency had confirmed that the FFEP corresponded with the design information provided by Iran and that the facility was at an advanced stage of construction, although no centrifuges had been introduced into it. The results of the environmental samples taken at the FFEP up to February 2010 had not indicated the presence of enriched uranium. The Agency had continued to monitor the use and construction of hot cells at the relevant nuclear facilities in Iran and had confirmed that Iran had not been conducting reprocessing activities at any facilities declared under its safeguards agreement. Iran had given the Agency access to the IR-40 heavy water reactor at Arak, at which time the Agency had been able to carry out a design information verification. The Agency had verified that, although construction of the facility was ongoing, no significant changes had occurred since the Director General's preceding report. According to Iran, operation of the IR-40 reactor was planned to commence by the end of 2013. The Agency had also carried out an inspection and a design information verification at the FMP, and had confirmed that Iran had not yet started to install equipment for fuel fabrication for the Tehran research reactor. The Agency had verified the nuclear material present at the Bushehr nuclear power plant and had agreed with Iran on the necessary safeguards measures to unload fuel assemblies from the core.

- (GOV/OR.1294 – Para 6) NAM noted the standing requests by the Secretariat for further information regarding the design, and scheduling of the construction of new nuclear facilities, and it continued to encourage Iran to provide design information regarding its nuclear facilities in accordance with its full-scope safeguards agreement with the Agency.
- (GOV/OR.1294 – Para 7) NAM noted that the report addressed the status of the work plan contained in INFCIRC/711, indicating that, as Iran had been informed previously, although most of the actions identified in the 2007 work plan agreed between Iran and the Agency had been completed, there remained issues that still needed to be addressed. The report mentioned only one issue — the requirement that Iran provide the Agency with its assessment of the documentation related to the alleged studies to which the Agency had given Iran access. Hence, NAM requested clarification regarding what other issues were outstanding from that work plan and encouraged the prompt resolution of that issue by Iran and the Agency in accordance with the work plan.
- (GOV/OR.1294 – Para 8) NAM fully supported the previous requests by the Director General to those Member States that had provided the Secretariat with information related to the alleged studies to allow the Agency to provide all related documents to Iran. NAM reiterated its concern over the creation of obstacles in that regard which hindered the Agency's verification process, recalling that the Director General had previously reported that the Agency had limited means to authenticate independently the documentation that formed the basis of the alleged studies, and that the constraints placed by some Member States on the availability of information to Iran were making it more difficult for the

	<p>Agency to conduct detailed discussions with Iran on that matter.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1294 – Para 9) Taking into account the aforementioned recent developments, as well as previous reports on implementation of the work plan, NAM continued to look forward to safeguards implementation in Iran being conducted in a routine manner. It looked upon the invitation extended by Iran to the Chairman of NAM to visit nuclear sites in Arak and Natanz in January 2011 to receive updated information about Iran’s nuclear programme as a positive step.
Syria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1295 – Para 1) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, said that it was essential not to lose sight of the manner in which the issue of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic had initially been brought to the Agency’s attention. As noted in the Director General’s report to the November 2008 Board, the Agency had been severely hampered in discharging its responsibilities under Syria’s safeguards agreement by the unilateral use of force by Israel and by the late provision of information by some Member States concerning the building at the Dair Alzour site. Bearing in mind the serious consequences of such acts, NAM regretted that the Board had not expressed itself clearly in that regard and that the Director General had still not addressed those matters in his reports. • (GOV/OR.1295 – Para 2) NAM recalled the final declaration adopted at the summit of NAM Heads of State and Government held in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt in July 2009, in which the Heads of State and Government had underscored NAM’s principled position concerning non-use or threat of use of force against the territorial integrity of any State. They had condemned the Israeli attack against a Syrian facility on 6 September 2007, which constituted a flagrant violation of the UN Charter, and had welcomed Syria’s cooperation with the Agency in that regard. • (GOV/OR.1295 – Para 3) Part A of the Director General’s latest report continued to include many references to events that had transpired prior to the preceding report. NAM requested clarification from the Secretariat on the rationale behind issuing a report that contained no new information on the Dair Alzour site. • (GOV/OR.1295 – Para 4) While the Director General had stated that the Agency had been unable to confirm Syria’s statements regarding the non-nuclear nature of the destroyed building, NAM also noted Syria’s statement that it had provided all the information it had regarding the questions raised by the Agency concerning the Dair Alzour site. • (GOV/OR.1295 – Para 5) NAM reiterated its previous requests that future reports by the Director General on the issue should contain the Agency’s assessment of: the implications of Israel’s bombing of the Dair Alzour site and its lack of cooperation for the Agency’s ability to resolve all related outstanding issues, as well as the broader aspects of the future of the safeguards regime; and the reasons that might explain the absence of satellite imagery of the Dair Alzour site for a period of six weeks following its destruction by Israel. The continued absence of such assessment had not helped distinguish between the myth and the reality of the Dair Alzour site. NAM sought clarification as to why the Director General’s report did not address its previous requests regarding the Dair Alzour site.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1295 – Para 6) NAM was pleased that Syria had provided further information on its MNSR and allowed access to its facilities, and that it had authorized the Agency’s proposed visit to the Homs phosphoric acid purification plant. It looked forward to all outstanding MNSR issues being brought to a close. • (GOV/OR.1295 – Para 7) NAM welcomed Syria’s intention to continue cooperating with the Agency and, in particular, the letter from the Foreign Minister stating that Syria would continue to work with the Agency to resolve all outstanding technical issues in accordance with its commitments under the Agency’s Statute, the NPT and its safeguards agreement. That letter, together with Syria’s approval of the Agency’s proposed visit to Homs, represented positive steps forward. • (GOV/OR.1295 – Para 8) NAM stressed that access to information, activities and locations during safeguards activities must be provided strictly in accordance with Syria’s comprehensive safeguards agreement. • (GOV/OR.1295 – Para 9) NAM encouraged Syria and the Secretariat to continue cooperating with a view to resolving any remaining issues relating to information, activities and locations. It was important to make a clear distinction between the legal obligations of Member States under their safeguards agreements and their voluntary undertakings, which must not be transformed into legal safeguards obligations. • (GOV/OR.1295 – Para 11) NAM supported the Director General’s call on States, including Israel, which might possess information relevant to the Agency’s investigation to make it available. Further, it urged Israel to cooperate fully with the Agency in providing it with comprehensive information on the nature of the materials used in its attack on the Dair Alzour site.
Israel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1295 – Para 1) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, said that it was essential not to lose sight of the manner in which the issue of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic had initially been brought to the Agency’s attention. As noted in the Director General’s report to the November 2008 Board, the Agency had been severely hampered in discharging its responsibilities under Syria’s safeguards agreement by the unilateral use of force by Israel and by the late provision of information by some Member States concerning the building at the Dair Alzour site. Bearing in mind the serious consequences of such acts, NAM regretted that the Board had not expressed itself clearly in that regard and that the Director General had still not addressed those matters in his reports. • (GOV/OR.1295 – Para 2) NAM recalled the final declaration adopted at the summit of NAM Heads of State and Government held in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt in July 2009, in which the Heads of State and Government had underscored NAM’s principled position concerning non-use or threat of use of force against the territorial integrity of any State. They had condemned the Israeli attack against a Syrian facility on 6 September 2007, which constituted a flagrant violation of the UN Charter, and had welcomed Syria’s cooperation with the Agency in that regard. • (GOV/OR.1295 – Para 5) NAM reiterated its previous requests that future reports by the Director General on the issue should contain the Agency’s assessment of: the implications of Israel’s bombing of the Dair Alzour

	<p>site and its lack of cooperation for the Agency’s ability to resolve all related outstanding issues, as well as the broader aspects of the future of the safeguards regime; and the reasons that might explain the absence of satellite imagery of the Dair Alzour site for a period of six weeks following its destruction by Israel. The continued absence of such assessment had not helped distinguish between the myth and the reality of the Dair Alzour site. NAM sought clarification as to why the Director General’s report did not address its previous requests regarding the Dair Alzour site.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1295 – Para 11) NAM supported the Director General’s call on States, including Israel, which might possess information relevant to the Agency’s investigation to make it available. Further, it urged Israel to cooperate fully with the Agency in providing it with comprehensive information on the nature of the materials used in its attack on the Dair Alzour site.
Peaceful Uses	
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1294 – Para 1) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated NAM’s principled positions on the issue. All States had a basic and inalienable right to the development, research, production and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, without any discrimination and in conformity with their respective legal obligations. Therefore, nothing should be interpreted in such a way as to inhibit or restrict the right of States to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes. States’ choices and decisions, including those of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear technology and fuel cycle policies must be respected.
Assurance of Supply/ Multilateral Approach to Nuclear Fuel Supply	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1295 – Para 162) Islamic Republic of Iran, speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and NAM, reiterated the views and concerns expressed in previous meetings of the Board in 2009 and 2010 on the issue under discussion. There was a need to address thoroughly the technical, legal, economic and political aspects of the matter in order to ensure that any proposal that emerged was in full accordance with the Statute and took into account the legal obligations of Member States and the principle of non-discrimination. • (GOV/OR.1295 – Para 163) The multifaceted nature of the issue required meticulous discussion in an open-ended format since it had a direct impact on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, making in-depth consideration by the entire membership of the Agency desirable with a view to arriving at a consensus. • (GOV/OR.1295 – Para 164) Proliferation concerns must not be allowed to restrict the inalienable right of all States to develop all aspects of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, as laid down in the Statute, and in particular the right to pursue national nuclear fuel capabilities, including enrichment. • (GOV/OR.1295 – Para 165) Any further consideration of assurance of supply must be based on an agreement among the Agency’s membership on a coherent and comprehensive conceptual framework outlining the specific political, technical, economic and legal parameters, adequately addressing the views and concerns of all Member States and applying to all the various proposals. That would help avoid confrontation and

	<p>division in the Agency's membership and the Board which would impact negatively on the credibility of the Agency.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1295 – Para 166) Many questions raised by the Group of 77 and NAM had not yet been satisfactorily addressed, so any proposal should be considered only after extensive efforts to reach consensus. While any Member State had the right to put forward a proposal or resolution, it should avoid polarizing or politicizing the Agency. Furthermore, any proposal should be based on objective eligibility criteria. Any decision by the Board would have an impact on all Member States and should take into consideration the interest of those States. It should not be merely donor-driven and should not allow external influence on the Agency's work that would jeopardize its independence, credibility and integrity. • (GOV/OR.1295 – Para 167) With regard to the specific proposal before the Board, the Group of 77 and NAM would have preferred that there be a full discussion of the following aspects: the legal and technical necessity of the Agency being a co-signatory to the agreement; the content of the obligations imposed in the agreement on the supplier and recipient States; the nature of and justification for the eligibility criteria laid down for recipient States; the conditions under which the supplier could revoke or suspend the proposed export license; the possible implications of the proposal for the right of States to pursue national nuclear fuel capabilities, including enrichment; and the potential costs for the Agency. • (GOV/OR.1295 – Para 168) In conclusion, he noted that consultations were still ongoing on the appropriate framework for further discussions of the issue. The Group of 77 and NAM continued to believe that an open-ended working group was the best forum and requested the Chairman to continue his efforts to achieve consensus in that regard.
Iran	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1295 – Para 162) Islamic Republic of Iran, speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and NAM, reiterated the views and concerns expressed in previous meetings of the Board in 2009 and 2010 on the issue under discussion. There was a need to address thoroughly the technical, legal, economic and political aspects of the matter in order to ensure that any proposal that emerged was in full accordance with the Statute and took into account the legal obligations of Member States and the principle of non-discrimination.
Safeguards	
General Views on Safeguards	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1294 – Para 1) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated NAM's principled positions on the issue.... A fundamental distinction must be drawn between the legal obligations of States in accordance with their respective safeguards agreements and confidence-building measures undertaken voluntarily which did not constitute a legal safeguards obligation.
Safeguard Agreements and Additional Protocols	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1295 – Para 1) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, said that it was essential not to lose sight of the manner in which the issue of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic had initially been brought to the Agency's attention. As noted in the Director General's report to the November 2008 Board, the Agency had been severely hampered in discharging its responsibilities under Syria's safeguards agreement by the unilateral use of force by Israel and by the late provision

	<p>of information by some Member States concerning the building at the Dair Alzour site. Bearing in mind the serious consequences of such acts, NAM regretted that the Board had not expressed itself clearly in that regard and that the Director General had still not addressed those matters in his reports.</p>
Verification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1294 – Para 1) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated NAM’s principled positions on the issue.... The Agency was the sole competent authority for the verification of the respective safeguards obligations of Member States and there should be no undue pressure on or interference in the Agency’s activities, especially its verification process, which would jeopardize the efficiency and credibility of the organization. • (GOV/OR.1294 – Para 2) NAM noted that the Director General had stated once again that the Agency had been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran at nuclear facilities and LOFs [locations outside facilities] where nuclear material was customarily used as declared by Iran under its safeguards agreement. • (GOV/OR.1295 – Para 10) All Member States must avoid undue pressure or interference in the Agency’s activities, especially in the verification process, as that would jeopardize its efficiency and credibility.
Iran	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1294 – Para 1) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated NAM’s principled positions on the issue.... NAM strongly believed that all safeguards and verification issues, including those related to Iran, should be resolved within the framework of the Agency based on sound technical and legal grounds. The Agency should continue its work to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue within its mandate under its Statute. • (GOV/OR.1294 – Para 2) NAM noted that the Director General had stated once again that the Agency had been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran at nuclear facilities and LOFs [locations outside facilities] where nuclear material was customarily used as declared by Iran under its safeguards agreement. • (GOV/OR.1294 – Para 3) NAM welcomed the clear distinction made by the Director General between obligations emanating from Iran’s safeguards agreement and other requests by the Security Council. In that regard, NAM noted that the Director General had stated in his report that Iran was not implementing a number of its obligations emanating from relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions. The Director General had previously reported Iran’s assertion that some of the Agency’s requests had no legal basis since they did not fall within Iran’s safeguards agreement, an assertion it had elaborated on in INFCIRC/810. NAM encouraged Iran to enhance its cooperation with the Agency to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the country in accordance with international law. • (GOV/OR.1294 – Para 5) NAM welcomed the continued cooperation between the Agency and Iran, noting in particular the following. Under its safeguards agreement, Iran had declared to the Agency 16 nuclear facilities and 9 LOFs and the Agency continued to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at those facilities. Activities relating to production of nuclear material, in particular those related to enrichment, remained under Agency containment and surveillance and, to date, the FEP and PFEP had been operating as declared. The Agency had

	<p>confirmed that the FFEP corresponded with the design information provided by Iran and that the facility was at an advanced stage of construction, although no centrifuges had been introduced into it. The results of the environmental samples taken at the FFEP up to February 2010 had not indicated the presence of enriched uranium. The Agency had continued to monitor the use and construction of hot cells at the relevant nuclear facilities in Iran and had confirmed that Iran had not been conducting reprocessing activities at any facilities declared under its safeguards agreement. Iran had given the Agency access to the IR-40 heavy water reactor at Arak, at which time the Agency had been able to carry out a design information verification. The Agency had verified that, although construction of the facility was ongoing, no significant changes had occurred since the Director General's preceding report. According to Iran, operation of the IR-40 reactor was planned to commence by the end of 2013. The Agency had also carried out an inspection and a design information verification at the FMP, and had confirmed that Iran had not yet started to install equipment for fuel fabrication for the Tehran research reactor. The Agency had verified the nuclear material present at the Bushehr nuclear power plant and had agreed with Iran on the necessary safeguards measures to unload fuel assemblies from the core.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1294 – Para 6) NAM noted the standing requests by the Secretariat for further information regarding the design, and scheduling of the construction of new nuclear facilities, and it continued to encourage Iran to provide design information regarding its nuclear facilities in accordance with its full-scope safeguards agreement with the Agency. • (GOV/OR.1294 – Para 8) NAM fully supported the previous requests by the Director General to those Member States that had provided the Secretariat with information related to the alleged studies to allow the Agency to provide all related documents to Iran. NAM reiterated its concern over the creation of obstacles in that regard which hindered the Agency's verification process, recalling that the Director General had previously reported that the Agency had limited means to authenticate independently the documentation that formed the basis of the alleged studies, and that the constraints placed by some Member States on the availability of information to Iran were making it more difficult for the Agency to conduct detailed discussions with Iran on that matter. • (GOV/OR.1294 – Para 9) Taking into account the aforementioned recent developments, as well as previous reports on implementation of the work plan, NAM continued to look forward to safeguards implementation in Iran being conducted in a routine manner. It looked upon the invitation extended by Iran to the Chairman of NAM to visit nuclear sites in Arak and Natanz in January 2011 to receive updated information about Iran's nuclear programme as a positive step.
<p>Syria</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1295 – Para 1) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, said that it was essential not to lose sight of the manner in which the issue of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic had initially been brought to the Agency's attention. As noted in the Director General's report to the November 2008 Board, the Agency had been severely hampered in discharging its responsibilities under Syria's safeguards agreement by the unilateral use of force by Israel and by the late provision

	<p>of information by some Member States concerning the building at the Dair Alzour site. Bearing in mind the serious consequences of such acts, NAM regretted that the Board had not expressed itself clearly in that regard and that the Director General had still not addressed those matters in his reports.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1295 – Para 7) NAM welcomed Syria’s intention to continue cooperating with the Agency and, in particular, the letter from the Foreign Minister stating that Syria would continue to work with the Agency to resolve all outstanding technical issues in accordance with its commitments under the Agency’s Statute, the NPT and its safeguards agreement. That letter, together with Syria’s approval of the Agency’s proposed visit to Homs, represented positive steps forward. • (GOV/OR.1295 – Para 8) NAM stressed that access to information, activities and locations during safeguards activities must be provided strictly in accordance with Syria’s comprehensive safeguards agreement. • (GOV/OR.1295 – Para 9) NAM encouraged Syria and the Secretariat to continue cooperating with a view to resolving any remaining issues relating to information, activities and locations. It was important to make a clear distinction between the legal obligations of Member States under their safeguards agreements and their voluntary undertakings, which must not be transformed into legal safeguards obligations.
	NWFZ
Middle East NWFZ	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1294 – Para 1) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated NAM’s principled positions on the issue.... The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would be a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and NAM supported the establishment of such a zone in accordance with relevant United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.
	Security Assurances
Attack or Threat of Attack Against Peaceful Nuclear Facilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1294 – Para 1) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated NAM’s principled positions on the issue.... NAM reaffirmed the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities, and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities — whether operational or under construction — posed a serious danger to human beings and the environment and constituted a grave violation of international law, the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and Agency regulations. There was a need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks or threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
	United Nations Fora
IAEA: Protection of Confidential Information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1296 – Para 96) Islamic Republic of Iran, speaking on behalf of the G-77 and NAM, recalled the views expressed by NAM at the December 2010 meetings of the Board.³ • (GOV/OR.1296 – Para 97) The Group had taken note of document 2010/Note 60 and of the information provided by the Director General that the Secretariat had continued to raise staff awareness of the vital importance of respecting confidentiality, that nearly 2000 Agency staff and contractors had passed the mandatory information security test and that the Secretariat continued to follow international best practices in all aspects of information security.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• (GOV/OR.1296 – Para 98) However, the Group was concerned about the implications of possible violations of the Agency’s regulations on information security, including the possibility of leaks of restricted material, for instance, by staff leaving the Agency. The G-77 and NAM therefore requested the Secretariat to keep the Member States informed on measures taken to continually improve the protection of confidential information in the Agency.
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