



Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Database

06 June 2011 Board of Governors Meeting

6 June 2011 Meeting: GOV/OR.1302;	
Safeguards	
General Views on Safeguards	<ul style="list-style-type: none">(GOV/OR.1302 – Para 90) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated NAM's principled positions on safeguards. The IAEA was the sole competent authority for verifying compliance with obligations under Member States' safeguards agreements and remained the most appropriate multilateral forum for addressing nuclear verification and safeguards issues. While NAM was fully aware of the importance of nuclear safeguards, it opposed any attempts that aimed to reverse the order of priorities of the Agency by giving primacy to safeguards considerations in a manner that led to restriction of the organization's promotional role. While recognizing that the purpose of safeguards activities was to verify the peaceful uses of nuclear material and guard against nuclear proliferation, NAM emphasized that the international community should make simultaneous efforts to achieve both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. A clear distinction needed to be made between the legal obligations of Member States under their respective safeguards agreements and their voluntary undertakings, in order to ensure that the latter were not transformed into legal safeguards obligations. All Member States should respect the Agency's Statute. Nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the Agency in that regard. Any undue pressure or interference in the Agency's activities, especially its verification process, which could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility, should be avoided. Member States that had concerns regarding the implementation of safeguards agreements by other Member States should direct those concerns to the Agency along with supporting evidence and information so that the organization could consider them, investigate them, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its Statute.
Verification	<ul style="list-style-type: none">(GOV/OR.1302 – Para 90) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated NAM's principled positions on safeguards. The IAEA was the sole competent authority for verifying compliance with obligations under Member States' safeguards agreements and remained the most appropriate multilateral forum for addressing nuclear verification and safeguards issues. While NAM was fully aware of the importance of nuclear safeguards, it opposed any attempts that aimed to reverse the order of priorities of the Agency by giving primacy to safeguards considerations in a manner that led to restriction of the organization's promotional role. While recognizing that the purpose of safeguards activities was to verify the peaceful uses of nuclear material and guard against nuclear proliferation, NAM emphasized that the international community should make simultaneous efforts to achieve both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. A clear distinction needed to be made between the legal obligations of Member States under their

respective safeguards agreements and their voluntary undertakings, in order to ensure that the latter were not transformed into legal safeguards obligations. All Member States should respect the Agency's Statute. Nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the Agency in that regard. Any undue pressure or interference in the Agency's activities, especially its verification process, which could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility, should be avoided. Member States that had concerns regarding the implementation of safeguards agreements by other Member States should direct those concerns to the Agency along with supporting evidence and information so that the organization could consider them, investigate them, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its Statute. NAM attached great importance to the SIR, which annually summarized the results of the Agency's verification activities. NAM underscored the fact that the Safeguards Implementation Report [SIR] presented the Secretariat's assessment of implementation of safeguards agreements in Member States. The SIR should be designed and prepared in a manner that would allow the views of the Member States concerned to be reflected, in order to have a more factual, balanced and comprehensive report. Bearing in mind the need to protect safeguards confidential information, and the main responsibility the Agency bore in that regard, leakage of such information should be prevented by the Agency and, should it occur, the organization should take adequate corrective measures.

- (GOV/OR.1302 – Para 91) One of the objectives of the Medium Term Strategy 2012–2017 was to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of Agency safeguards and other verification activities, and specifically that the Agency must remain ready to provide the international community with objective and independent verification of States' safeguards obligations, and assist, in accordance with its Statute, with verification tasks under nuclear disarmament or arms control agreements that it might be requested to carry out by the States party to such agreements.
- (GOV/OR.1302 – Para 93) NAM commended the efforts made by the Secretariat to present more details on the Agency verification activities carried out in each Member State, and to prepare a breakdown of the cost of safeguards implementation on a State-by-State basis. It called upon the Secretariat to continue to do so in future reports. It reiterated its request that future SIRs group States according to the type of safeguards agreement being implemented, as was the case when the SIR presented other statistics related to verification activities in Member States, such as the amount of significant quantities of nuclear material and the frequency of inspection visits. Given the ongoing budgetary constraints, it was imperative for the safeguards system to become not only effective, but also efficient. While there had been several attempts to strengthen the safeguards system and improve its effectiveness, much remained to be done, particularly in the area of integrated safeguards which continued to absorb a major share of the cost of verification activities attributed to specific Member States, despite a significant reduction in inspection efforts in the field.
- (GOV/OR.1302 – Para 94) NAM shared the view expressed in the SIR

	<p>that SSACs were fundamental to the effective and efficient implementation of safeguards and it noted with appreciation the actions taken by the Secretariat during 2010 to assist Member States in establishing and strengthening their State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material [SSACs]. The Secretariat should continue its efforts in that regard.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1302 – Para 95). Given the ongoing difficulties faced by the Secretariat in analysing environmental samples, NAM called upon the Agency once again to assist interested Member States, particularly developing countries, to develop capabilities in those technologies. That capacity-building measure might contribute to expanding the Agency’s analytical capabilities and increase the number of qualified laboratories in the network of analytical laboratories, making for more efficient analysis of environmental samples.
Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1302 – Para 90) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated NAM’s principled positions on safeguards.... NAM attached great importance to the SIR, which annually summarized the results of the Agency’s verification activities. NAM underscored the fact that the Safeguards Implementation Report [SIR] presented the Secretariat’s assessment of implementation of safeguards agreements in Member States. The SIR should be designed and prepared in a manner that would allow the views of the Member States concerned to be reflected, in order to have a more factual, balanced and comprehensive report. Bearing in mind the need to protect safeguards confidential information, and the main responsibility the Agency bore in that regard, leakage of such information should be prevented by the Agency and, should it occur, the organization should take adequate corrective measures. • (GOV/OR.1302 – Para 93) NAM commended the efforts made by the Secretariat to present more details on the Agency verification activities carried out in each Member State, and to prepare a breakdown of the cost of safeguards implementation on a State-by-State basis. It called upon the Secretariat to continue to do so in future reports. It reiterated its request that future SIRs group States according to the type of safeguards agreement being implemented, as was the case when the SIR presented other statistics related to verification activities in Member States, such as the amount of significant quantities of nuclear material and the frequency of inspection visits. Given the ongoing budgetary constraints, it was imperative for the safeguards system to become not only effective, but also efficient. While there had been several attempts to strengthen the safeguards system and improve its effectiveness, much remained to be done, particularly in the area of integrated safeguards which continued to absorb a major share of the cost of verification activities attributed to specific Member States, despite a significant reduction in inspection efforts in the field. • (GOV/OR.1302 – Para 94) NAM shared the view expressed in the SIR that SSACs were fundamental to the effective and efficient implementation of safeguards and it noted with appreciation the actions taken by the Secretariat during 2010 to assist Member States in establishing and strengthening their State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material [SSACs]. The Secretariat should continue its

	efforts in that regard.
Technical and Procedural Issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (GOV/OR.1302 – Para 95). Given the ongoing difficulties faced by the Secretariat in analysing environmental samples, NAM called upon the Agency once again to assist interested Member States, particularly developing countries, to develop capabilities in those technologies. That capacity-building measure might contribute to expanding the Agency's analytical capabilities and increase the number of qualified laboratories in the network of analytical laboratories, making for more efficient analysis of environmental samples.
Nonproliferation	
Nonproliferation and Disarmament	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (GOV/OR.1302 – Para 90) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated NAM's principled positions on safeguards.... While NAM was fully aware of the importance of nuclear safeguards, it opposed any attempts that aimed to reverse the order of priorities of the Agency by giving primacy to safeguards considerations in a manner that led to restriction of the organization's promotional role. While recognizing that the purpose of safeguards activities was to verify the peaceful uses of nuclear material and guard against nuclear proliferation, NAM emphasized that the international community should make simultaneous efforts to achieve both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.
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United Nations Fora	
IAEA: Programme and Budget	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (GOV/OR.1302 – Para 92) NAM remained concerned by recurring leaks of safeguards confidential information which, in the absence of adequate corrective measures by the Agency, called into question the credibility of its regime for the protection of such information. It recalled that the Board had previously requested the Director General to continue to review and update the established procedures for the protection of safeguards confidential information and to inform the Board periodically on the implementation of the regime for the protection of such information. NAM noted the seriousness with which the Agency took the issue of

	<p>information security and recalled the statement by the Secretariat in document 2010/Note 60 that the Agency was determined to minimize the risk of such occurrences, and its statement in document 2010/Note 47 that, regardless of the category of employment, all individuals employed by the Agency, including all cost-free experts, were required to conclude confidentiality undertakings upon commencing work with the Agency, and that access to safeguards confidential information was limited to staff members and only those cost-free experts who were employed under a Type A arrangement. NAM encouraged continued implementation of such measures.</p>
<p>IAEA: Protection of Confidential Information</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1302 – Para 92) NAM remained concerned by recurring leaks of safeguards confidential information which, in the absence of adequate corrective measures by the Agency, called into question the credibility of its regime for the protection of such information. It recalled that the Board had previously requested the Director General to continue to review and update the established procedures for the protection of safeguards confidential information and to inform the Board periodically on the implementation of the regime for the protection of such information. NAM noted the seriousness with which the Agency took the issue of information security and recalled the statement by the Secretariat in document 2010/Note 60 that the Agency was determined to minimize the risk of such occurrences, and its statement in document 2010/Note 47 that, regardless of the category of employment, all individuals employed by the Agency, including all cost-free experts, were required to conclude confidentiality undertakings upon commencing work with the Agency, and that access to safeguards confidential information was limited to staff members and only those cost-free experts who were employed under a Type A arrangement. NAM encouraged continued implementation of such measures.