



## Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Database

### 12 September 2011 Board of Governors Meeting

12 September 2011 Meeting: GOV/OR.1310; GOV/OR.1311	
	Country Specific
Iran	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• (GOV/OR.1310 – Para 91) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated NAM's principled positions on the matter. NAM reaffirmed the basic and inalienable right of all States to the development, research, production and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, without any discrimination and in conformity with their respective legal obligations. Therefore, nothing should be interpreted in such a way as to inhibit or restrict the right of States to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes. States' choices and decisions, including those of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear technology and fuel cycle policies must be respected. NAM recognized the Agency as the sole competent authority for verification of the respective safeguards obligations of Member States and stressed that there should be no undue pressure on or interference in the Agency's activities, especially its verification process, which would jeopardize the efficiency and credibility of the Agency. NAM emphasized the fundamental distinction between the legal obligations of States in accordance with their respective safeguards agreements and any confidence-building measures undertaken voluntarily that did not constitute a legal safeguards obligation. NAM considered the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and reiterated its support for the establishment of such a zone in accordance with relevant United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. NAM reaffirmed the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities, and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities — whether operational or under construction — posed a serious danger to human beings and the environment and constituted a grave violation of international law, the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and Agency regulations. NAM recognized the need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks or threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. NAM strongly believed that all safeguards and verification issues, including those related to Iran, should be resolved within the framework of the Agency on sound technical and legal grounds. NAM further emphasized that the Agency should continue its work to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue within its mandate under its Statute. NAM stressed that diplomacy and dialogue through peaceful means, as well as substantive negotiations without any preconditions among the concerned parties, must remain the means whereby a comprehensive and lasting solution to the Iranian nuclear issue was found.</li><li>• (GOV/OR.1310 – Para 92) NAM took note that the Director General had stated once again that the Agency had been able to continue to verify the</li></ul>

non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran at nuclear facilities and locations outside facilities where nuclear material was customarily used, as declared by Iran under its safeguards agreement.

- (GOV/OR.1310 – Para 93) NAM welcomed the clear distinction made by the Director General between obligations emanating from Iran's safeguards agreement and other requests by the Security Council. It noted that the Director General had stated in his report that Iran was not implementing a number of its obligations emanating from relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions. It recalled that the Director General had previously reported Iran's assertion that some of the Agency's requests had no legal basis since they did not fall under Iran's safeguards agreement, an assertion elaborated upon by Iran in document INFCIRC/810. NAM encouraged Iran to enhance its cooperation with the Agency in order to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the country in accordance with international law.
- (GOV/OR.1310 – Para 94) NAM encouraged the Secretariat to continue to refrain from including in the report of the Director General extensive technical details pertaining to sensitive proprietary information.
- (GOV/OR.1310 – Para 95) NAM welcomed the continued cooperation between the Agency and Iran, as elaborated upon in the latest report of the Director General, and noted in that regard that: (a) Iran had declared to the Agency under its safeguards agreement 15 nuclear facilities and 9 locations outside facilities and the Agency continued to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at those facilities and locations outside facilities; (b) the nuclear material production activities, in particular those related to enrichment, remained under Agency containment and surveillance and, to date, the FEP in Natanz and the PFEP had been operating as declared; (c) the Agency had confirmed that the FFEP corresponded to the design information provided by Iran, that the facility was at an advanced stage of construction, that Iran and the Agency had agreed on a safeguards approach for the FFEP and that Iran had installed one of the cascades designated in the design information questionnaire for the production of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 20% in <sup>235</sup>U, and the results of the environmental samples taken at the FFEP up to 29 December 2010 had not indicated the presence of enriched uranium; (d) the Agency had continued to monitor the use and construction of hot cells at the relevant nuclear facilities in Iran and had confirmed that Iran was not conducting reprocessing activities in any of the facilities declared under its safeguards agreement; (e) Iran had provided the Agency with access to the IR-40 heavy water reactor at Arak, at which time the Agency had been able to carry out a design information verification and the Agency had verified that construction of the facility was ongoing, and that the coolant heat exchangers had been delivered to the site, and, according to Iran, operation of the IR-40 reactor was planned to commence by the end of 2013; and (f) the Agency had also carried out an inspection and a design information verification at the FMP and had confirmed that Iran had not yet started to install equipment for fuel fabrication for the Tehran research reactor.
- (GOV/OR.1310 – Para 96) NAM noted the standing requests by the

	<p>Secretariat for further information regarding the design, and scheduling of the construction of new nuclear facilities and it continued to encourage Iran to provide design information regarding its nuclear facilities in accordance with its full-scope safeguards agreement with the Agency.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1310 – Para 97) The report of the Director General referred to possible activities involving military-related organizations for which clarifications remained necessary in some areas of concern to the Agency. NAM encouraged the prompt resolution of that issue by Iran and the Agency in accordance with the work plan contained in INFCIRC/711.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1310 – Para 98) The Director General had mentioned in his report that he had reiterated to Iran his position regarding the need to take steps towards full implementation of its safeguards agreement and its other relevant obligations in order to establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. NAM noted with appreciation that Iran had responded by extending an invitation to the Deputy Director General for Safeguards to visit its nuclear facilities, and that the question of possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programme had been discussed during that visit. NAM welcomed that invitation and the fact that, as a confidence-building measure, Iran had allowed the Agency to visit an installation where R&amp;D [Research and Development] on advanced centrifuges was taking place, had granted access to extensive information on its current and future R&amp;D work on advanced centrifuges and, for the first time since 2005, had allowed the Agency to visit the Heavy Water Production Plant, at which time the Agency had observed that the plant was operating. NAM welcomed the continuation of that positive dialogue and cooperation between Iran and the Agency.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1310 – Para 99) NAM fully supported the previous requests made by the Director General to those Members States that had provided the Secretariat with information related to the alleged studies to agree that the Agency make all related documents available to Iran. It reiterated its concerns regarding the creation of obstacles in that regard which hindered the Agency’s verification process. It also recalled that the Director General had previously reported that the Agency had limited means to authenticate independently the documentation that formed the basis of the alleged studies and that the constraints placed by some Member States on making information available to Iran were making it more difficult for the Agency to conduct detailed discussions with Iran on the matter.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1310 – Para 100) Bearing in mind the aforementioned recent developments, as well as previous reports by the Director General on implementation of the work plan, NAM looked forward to safeguards implementation in Iran being conducted in a routine manner.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1310 – Para 101) NAM reiterated its principled position that diplomacy and dialogue were the only way to achieve a long-term solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and it encouraged all Member States to contribute positively to that goal.</li> </ul>
Syria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1311 – Para 104) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated the view that, in considering the issue under discussion, it was essential not to lose sight of the manner in which it had initially been brought to the attention of the Agency. NAM recalled the position</li> </ul>

	<p>expressed in that regard in the final declaration adopted by the Summit of NAM Heads of State and Government held in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, in July 2009:</p> <p>“The Heads of State and Government underscored the Movement’s principled position concerning non-use or threat of use of force against the territorial integrity of any State. In this regard, they condemned the Israeli attack against a Syrian facility on September 6, 2007, which constitutes a flagrant violation of the UN Charter and welcomed Syria’s cooperation with the IAEA in this regard.”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1311 – Para 105) As was recognized in the Director General’s report to the November 2008 meetings of the Board (GOV/2008/60), the Agency had been severely hampered in discharging its responsibilities under Syria’s NPT safeguards agreement by the unilateral use of force by Israel and by the late provision of information by some Member States concerning the building at the Dair Alzour site. NAM deeply regretted the fact that the Board had not expressed itself clearly on that issue, given the serious consequences of such acts.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1311 – Para 106) NAM welcomed Syria’s resolve to continue cooperating with the Agency and, in particular, it welcomed the letter from the Director General of the Atomic Energy Commission of Syria, dated 24 August 2011, in which Syria had reiterated its readiness to cooperate fully with the Agency to resolve all outstanding issues related to the Dair Alzour site in accordance with its commitments under the Agency’s Statute, the NPT and its safeguards agreement, and to agree on an action plan in that regard.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1311 – Para 107) NAM stressed that, during the conduct of safeguards activities, access to information, activities and locations must be provided in accordance with the letter of Syria’s comprehensive safeguards agreement and it encouraged Syria and the Secretariat to continue cooperating with a view to resolving any remaining issues.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1311 – Para 108) NAM reaffirmed that a clear distinction must be made between Member States’ legal obligations under their respective safeguards agreements and their voluntary undertakings.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1311 – Para 109) All Member States should avoid any undue pressure on or interference in the Agency’s activities, especially its verification process, which would jeopardize the efficiency and credibility of the Agency. In that connection, NAM supported the Director General’s previous call on other States, including Israel, that might possess information relevant to the Agency’s verification to make such information available to the Agency, and to authorize the Agency to share it with Syria.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1311 – Para 110) NAM also called on Israel to cooperate fully with the Agency by providing it with comprehensive information on the nature of the materials it had used in its attack on the Dair Alzour site.</li> </ul>
Israel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1311 – Para 104) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated the view that, in considering the issue under discussion, it was essential not to lose sight of the manner in which it had initially been brought to the attention of the Agency. NAM recalled the position expressed in that regard in the final declaration adopted by the Summit of NAM Heads of State and Government held in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, in</li> </ul>

	<p>July 2009:          “The Heads of State and Government underscored the Movement’s principled position concerning non-use or threat of use of force against the territorial integrity of any State. In this regard, they condemned the Israeli attack against a Syrian facility on September 6, 2007, which constitutes a flagrant violation of the UN Charter and welcomed Syria’s cooperation with the IAEA in this regard.”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1311 – Para 105) As was recognized in the Director General’s report to the November 2008 meetings of the Board (GOV/2008/60), the Agency had been severely hampered in discharging its responsibilities under Syria’s NPT safeguards agreement by the unilateral use of force by Israel and by the late provision of information by some Member States concerning the building at the Dair Alzour site. NAM deeply regretted the fact that the Board had not expressed itself clearly on that issue, given the serious consequences of such acts.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1311 – Para 109) All Member States should avoid any undue pressure on or interference in the Agency’s activities, especially its verification process, which would jeopardize the efficiency and credibility of the Agency. In that connection, NAM supported the Director General’s previous call on other States, including Israel, that might possess information relevant to the Agency’s verification to make such information available to the Agency, and to authorize the Agency to share it with Syria.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1311 – Para 110) NAM also called on Israel to cooperate fully with the Agency by providing it with comprehensive information on the nature of the materials it had used in its attack on the Dair Alzour site.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1311 – Para 162) NAM welcomed the fact that its member States which were party to the NPT concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency, in fulfilment of their obligation under Article III.(1) of the Treaty, as non-nuclear-weapon States. It noted that all States in the Middle East region except Israel were party to the NPT and had undertaken to accept Agency comprehensive safeguards.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1311 – Para 163) NAM regretted Israel’s continued insistence that Agency safeguards could not be addressed in isolation from the regional peace process. It emphasized that there was no automatic link between the application of comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East and the prior conclusion of a peace settlement, and that the former would contribute to the latter.</li> </ul>
	<b>NWFZ</b>
Middle East NWFZ	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1310 – Para 91) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated NAM’s principled positions on the matter.... NAM considered the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and reiterated its support for the establishment of such a zone in accordance with relevant United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1311 – Para 160) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, thanked the Director General for his report contained in document GOV/2011/55.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1311 – Para 161) NAM’s principled position on the matter was as follows. NAM strongly believed that stability could not be achieved in</li> </ul>

a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities were maintained, particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allowed one party to threaten its neighbours and the region. NAM considered the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and it reiterated its support for the establishment of such a zone in accordance with relevant United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. NAM was convinced that the effective and efficient application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East promoted greater confidence among States in the region. Accordingly, NAM considered that achieving universality of Agency comprehensive safeguards in the Middle East was the first practical step towards that end and a necessary step towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone [NWFZ] in the region.

- (GOV/OR.1311 – Para 162) NAM welcomed the fact that its member States which were party to the NPT concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency, in fulfilment of their obligation under Article III.(1) of the Treaty, as non-nuclear-weapon States. It noted that all States in the Middle East region except Israel were party to the NPT and had undertaken to accept Agency comprehensive safeguards.
- (GOV/OR.1311 – Para 163) NAM regretted Israel's continued insistence that Agency safeguards could not be addressed in isolation from the regional peace process. It emphasized that there was no automatic link between the application of comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East and the prior conclusion of a peace settlement, and that the former would contribute to the latter.
- (GOV/OR.1311 – Para 164) NAM also noted with regret that the Director General had not been able to make further progress in fulfilling his mandate pursuant to resolution GC(54)/RES/13 regarding the application of Agency comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East.
- (GOV/OR.1311 – Para 165) NAM emphasized that all Member States should cooperate to reverse that unacceptable situation. It encouraged the active participation of all Member States in achieving universality of Agency comprehensive safeguards in the Middle East. In that context, it requested that, when promoting Agency safeguards in the Middle East, priority be accorded to achieving universality of Agency comprehensive safeguards in the region.
- (GOV/OR.1311 – Para 166) NAM also noted that the Director General would continue with his consultations in accordance with his mandate regarding the early application of Agency comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East. It welcomed the Director General's efforts to encourage the development and consideration of relevant new ideas and approaches that could help to move his mandate forward, and requested that he continue to brief Member States regularly on such efforts.
- (GOV/OR.1311 – Para 167) NAM States party to the NPT welcomed the endorsement by the 2010 NPT Review Conference of the practical step that the United Nations Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and

	<p>Extension Conference, in consultation with States in the region, would convene a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region and with the full support and engagement of the nuclear-weapon States. NAM noted that the 2012 conference should take as its terms of reference the 1995 resolution.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1311 – Para 168) NAM took note with appreciation of the recent efforts of the Director General to develop an agenda and modalities which would help ensure a successful forum on the relevance of the experience of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones — including confidence-building and verification measures —for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. It also took note that the Director General had mentioned in his report that those efforts had been welcomed by many Member States and that he had written to all Member States inviting them to take part in the forum to be held on 21–22 November 2011 at Agency Headquarters in Vienna. NAM stressed that, for the forum to be successful, its agenda should reflect the consensus within the international community on the importance of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Accordingly, NAM requested that the Director General continue consultations with all Member States on arrangements that would be conducive to the forum making a constructive contribution to the objective of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1311 – Para 169) NAM was fully committed to cooperating with the Director General and to supporting his efforts in implementing resolution GC(54)/RES/13. It was NAM’s expectation that all other Agency Member States would do the same.</li> </ul>
1995 Resolution on the Middle East	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1311 – Para 167) NAM States party to the NPT welcomed the endorsement by the 2010 NPT Review Conference of the practical step that the United Nations Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, in consultation with States in the region, would convene a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region and with the full support and engagement of the nuclear-weapon States. NAM noted that the 2012 conference should take as its terms of reference the 1995 resolution.</li> </ul>
Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1311 – Para 161) NAM’s principled position on the matter was as follows. NAM strongly believed that stability could not be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities were maintained, particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allowed one party to threaten its neighbours and the region. NAM considered the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and it reiterated its support for the establishment of such a zone in accordance with relevant United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. NAM was convinced that the effective and efficient application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East promoted</li> </ul>

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	<b>Peaceful Uses</b>
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1310 – Para 91) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated NAM’s principled positions on the matter. NAM reaffirmed the basic and inalienable right of all States to the development, research, production and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, without any discrimination and in conformity with their respective legal obligations. Therefore, nothing should be interpreted in such a way as to inhibit or restrict the right of States to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes. States’ choices and decisions, including those of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear technology and fuel cycle policies must be respected.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1310 – Para 98) The Director General had mentioned in his report that he had reiterated to Iran his position regarding the need to take steps towards full implementation of its safeguards agreement and its other relevant obligations in order to establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. NAM noted with appreciation that Iran had responded by extending an invitation to the Deputy Director General for Safeguards to visit its nuclear facilities, and that the question of possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programme had been discussed during that visit. NAM welcomed that invitation and the fact that, as a confidence-building measure, Iran had allowed the Agency to visit an installation where R&amp;D [Research and Development] on advanced centrifuges was taking place, had granted access to extensive information on its current and future R&amp;D work on advanced centrifuges and, for the first time since 2005, had allowed the</li> </ul>



	<p>Agency to visit the Heavy Water Production Plant, at which time the Agency had observed that the plant was operating. NAM welcomed the continuation of that positive dialogue and cooperation between Iran and the Agency.</p>
	<p><b>Safeguards</b></p>
<p>Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1310 – Para 91) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated NAM’s principled positions on the matter....NAM recognized the Agency as the sole competent authority for verification of the respective safeguards obligations of Member States and stressed that there should be no undue pressure on or interference in the Agency’s activities, especially its verification process, which would jeopardize the efficiency and credibility of the Agency. NAM emphasized the fundamental distinction between the legal obligations of States in accordance with their respective safeguards agreements and any confidence-building measures undertaken voluntarily that did not constitute a legal safeguards obligation.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1310 – Para 92) NAM took note that the Director General had stated once again that the Agency had been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran at nuclear facilities and locations outside facilities where nuclear material was customarily used, as declared by Iran under its safeguards agreement.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1310 – Para 96) NAM noted the standing requests by the Secretariat for further information regarding the design, and scheduling of the construction of new nuclear facilities and it continued to encourage Iran to provide design information regarding its nuclear facilities in accordance with its full-scope safeguards agreement with the Agency.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1310 – Para 98) The Director General had mentioned in his report that he had reiterated to Iran his position regarding the need to take steps towards full implementation of its safeguards agreement and its other relevant obligations in order to establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. NAM noted with appreciation that Iran had responded by extending an invitation to the Deputy Director General for Safeguards to visit its nuclear facilities, and that the question of possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programme had been discussed during that visit. NAM welcomed that invitation and the fact that, as a confidence-building measure, Iran had allowed the Agency to visit an installation where R&amp;D [Research and Development] on advanced centrifuges was taking place, had granted access to extensive information on its current and future R&amp;D work on advanced centrifuges and, for the first time since 2005, had allowed the Agency to visit the Heavy Water Production Plant, at which time the Agency had observed that the plant was operating. NAM welcomed the continuation of that positive dialogue and cooperation between Iran and the Agency.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1311 – Para 105) As was recognized in the Director General’s report to the November 2008 meetings of the Board (GOV/2008/60), the Agency had been severely hampered in discharging its responsibilities under Syria’s NPT safeguards agreement by the unilateral use of force by Israel and by the late provision of information by some Member States concerning the building at the Dair Alzour site. NAM deeply regretted the fact that the Board had not expressed itself clearly on that issue, given the</li> </ul>

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- (GOV/OR.1310 – Para 92) NAM took note that the Director General had stated once again that the Agency had been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran at nuclear facilities and locations outside facilities where nuclear material was customarily used, as declared by Iran under its safeguards agreement.
- (GOV/OR.1310 – Para 95) NAM welcomed the continued cooperation between the Agency and Iran, as elaborated upon in the latest report of the Director General, and noted in that regard that: (a) Iran had declared to the Agency under its safeguards agreement 15 nuclear facilities and 9 locations outside facilities and the Agency continued to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at those facilities and locations outside facilities; (b) the nuclear material production activities, in particular those related to enrichment, remained under Agency containment and surveillance and, to date, the FEP in Natanz and the PFEP had been operating as declared; (c) the Agency had confirmed that the FFEP corresponded to the design information provided by Iran, that the facility was at an advanced stage of construction, that Iran and the Agency had agreed on a safeguards approach for the FFEP and that Iran had installed one of the cascades designated in the design information questionnaire for the production of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 20% in <sup>235</sup>U, and the results of the environmental samples taken at the FFEP up to 29 December 2010 had not indicated the presence of enriched uranium; (d) the Agency had continued to monitor the use and construction of hot cells at the relevant nuclear facilities in Iran and had confirmed that Iran was not conducting reprocessing activities in any of the facilities declared under its safeguards agreement; (e) Iran had provided the Agency with access to the IR-40 heavy water reactor at Arak, at which time the Agency had been able to carry out a design information verification and the Agency had verified that construction of the facility was ongoing, and that the coolant heat exchangers had been delivered to the site, and, according to Iran, operation of the IR-40 reactor was planned to commence by the end of 2013; and (f) the Agency had also carried out an inspection and a design information verification at the FMP and had confirmed that Iran had not yet started to install equipment for fuel fabrication for the Tehran research reactor.
- (GOV/OR.1310 – Para 99) NAM fully supported the previous requests made by the Director General to those Member States that had provided the Secretariat with information related to the alleged studies to agree that

	<p>the Agency make all related documents available to Iran. It reiterated its concerns regarding the creation of obstacles in that regard which hindered the Agency's verification process. It also recalled that the Director General had previously reported that the Agency had limited means to authenticate independently the documentation that formed the basis of the alleged studies and that the constraints placed by some Member States on making information available to Iran were making it more difficult for the Agency to conduct detailed discussions with Iran on the matter.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1311 – Para 109) All Member States should avoid any undue pressure on or interference in the Agency's activities, especially its verification process, which would jeopardize the efficiency and credibility of the Agency. In that connection, NAM supported the Director General's previous call on other States, including Israel, that might possess information relevant to the Agency's verification to make such information available to the Agency, and to authorize the Agency to share it with Syria.</li> </ul>
<b>Security Assurances</b>	
<p>Attack or Threat of Attack Against Peaceful Nuclear Facilities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1310 – Para 91) Egypt, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated NAM's principled positions on the matter...NAM reaffirmed the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities, and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities — whether operational or under construction — posed a serious danger to human beings and the environment and constituted a grave violation of international law, the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and Agency regulations. NAM recognized the need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks or threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.</li> </ul>
<b>United Nations Fora</b>	
<p>IAEA: Protection of Confidential Information</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1310 – Para 94) NAM encouraged the Secretariat to continue to refrain from including in the report of the Director General extensive technical details pertaining to sensitive proprietary information.</li> </ul>