

| <b>Work Paper Summaries</b><br><b>of First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2012 NPT Review Conference,</b><br><b>Vienna,</b><br><b>30 April – 11 May 2012</b> |   |
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| <b>NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.23:</b><br><b>Security Assurance</b>  |   |
| <b>Total elimination of nuclear weapons</b>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1): [The Group] reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and accordingly believes that the 2015 Review Conference of the Treaty should also substantially focus on this issue as a matter of priority.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5): ...the Group is of the view that pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as the only absolute guarantee against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States shall refrain from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.</li> </ul>  |
| <b>Principles and objective of NPT</b>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 4): [The Group] ...considers, in that regard, that any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.</li> </ul>  |
| <b>UN Charter</b>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 5): [The Group] reaffirms that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>General views on security assurance</b>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1): The Group recalls that the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty reaffirmed and recognized the legitimate interest of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances from the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 1): The Group is of the firm belief that receiving such security assurances is a legitimate right and in the security interest of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) [The Group] stresses that it is the legitimate right of all States parties to the Treaty that have given up the nuclear weapon option to receive effective and unconditional legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5): ...the Group is of the view that pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as the only absolute guarantee against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States shall refrain from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6): The Group further believes that legally binding security assurances within the context of the Treaty would provide an essential benefit to the States parties to the Treaty and to the credibility of the Treaty regime.</li> </ul> |
| <b>Negotiations for a legally binding instrument on security assurance</b>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 5): The Group reiterates that efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority and should be materialized without further delay.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6): [The Group] while noting the lack of progress since the establishment in 1998 of an ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate universal, unconditional and legally binding security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty,</li> </ul>  |

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|   | <p>expresses concern that despite long-standing requests by non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive such legally binding assurances, no tangible progress has been achieved in this regard.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 6): ...the Group calls for the commencement, without any further delay, of the negotiation for a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on irrevocable and non-discriminatory negative security assurances, believing that such assurances to the non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Treaty would fulfill the undertaking to the States that have voluntarily given up the nuclear-weapons option by becoming parties to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6): The Group also is of the view that pending the conclusion of unconditional and multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances for all non-nuclear-weapon States, all nuclear-weapon States shall fully respect their existing commitments with regard to security assurances and shall extend these to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7): ...in accordance with the decision at the 2000 Review Conference, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances for further work to consider legally binding negative security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 8): The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses concern over the lack of agreement on a number of its key priorities, including, inter alia, to commence negotiations on a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on irrevocable and non-discriminatory negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Treaty, and expresses its determination to continue its collective efforts in pursuing the realization of the aforementioned priority in the 2015 review process of the Treaty.</li> </ul> |
| <p><b>Unilateral declarations on security assurance</b></p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2): ...while noting the unilateral statements by each of the nuclear-weapon States, in which they give very limited, conditional and insufficient “security assurances” against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, the Group expresses its concern over the continued insufficiency of such assurances.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 3): [The Group] recalls that, in successive conferences of heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries and the ministerial conferences of the Non-Aligned Movement, it has been reiterated that improvements in existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, as envisaged in the Nuclear Posture Review of the United States of America, contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient unilateral statements made by each of the nuclear-weapon States.</li> </ul>  |
| <p><b>Role of NWS</b></p>                                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 6): The Group also is of the view that pending the conclusion of unconditional and multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances for all non-nuclear-weapon States, all nuclear-weapon States shall fully respect their existing commitments with regard to security assurances and shall extend these to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7): ...in accordance with the decision at the 2000 Review Conference, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances for further work to consider legally binding negative security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.</li> </ul>  |
| <p><b>Nuclear doctrine</b></p>                              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3): [The Group] recalls that, in successive conferences of heads</li> </ul>   |

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|                                  | <p>of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries and the ministerial conferences of the Non-Aligned Movement, it has been reiterated that improvements in existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, as envisaged in the Nuclear Posture Review of the United States of America, contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient unilateral statements made by each of the nuclear-weapon States.</p>  |
| <b>Nuclear modernization</b>     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3): [The Group] recalls that, in successive conferences of heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries and the ministerial conferences of the Non-Aligned Movement, it has been reiterated that improvements in existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, as envisaged in the Nuclear Posture Review of the United States of America, contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient unilateral statements made by each of the nuclear-weapon States.</li> <li>• (Page 1-2, para 3): [The Group] reaffirmed that these improvements and the development of new types of such weapons violate the commitments undertaken by the nuclear weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.</li> </ul> |
| <b>CTBT</b>                      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1-2, para 3): [The Group] reaffirmed that these improvements and the development of new types of such weapons violate the commitments undertaken by the nuclear weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>Conference on Disarmament</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 6): [The Group] while noting the lack of progress since the establishment in 1998 of an ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate universal, unconditional and legally binding security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, expresses concern that despite long-standing requests by non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive such legally binding assurances, no tangible progress has been achieved in this regard.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>1995 Extension</b>            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 4): [The Group] emphasizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals and considers, in that regard, that any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.</li> </ul>  |
| <b>2000 Review Conference</b>    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 7): ...in accordance with the decision at the 2000 Review Conference, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances for further work to consider legally binding negative security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>2010 Review Conference</b>    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1): The Group recalls that the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty reaffirmed and recognized the legitimate interest of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances from the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>•</li> </ul>  |
| <b>2015 Review Conference</b>    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1): [The Group] reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and accordingly believes that the 2015 Review Conference of the Treaty should also substantially focus on this issue as a matter of priority.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 8): The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty</li> </ul>   |

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|   | <p>expresses concern over the lack of agreement on a number of its key priorities, including, inter alia, to commence negotiations on a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on irrevocable and non-discriminatory negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Treaty, and expresses its determination to continue its collective efforts in pursuing the realization of the aforementioned priority in the 2015 review process of the Treaty.</p>   |
| <p><b>NAM Summit</b></p>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3): [The Group] recalls that, in successive conferences of heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries and the ministerial conferences of the Non-Aligned Movement, it has been reiterated that improvements in existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, as envisaged in the Nuclear Posture Review of the United States of America, contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient unilateral statements made by each of the nuclear-weapon States.</li> <li>•</li> </ul>  |
| <p><b>NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24</b><br/> <b>Inalienable right to develop research, production and uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes</b></p> |  |
| <p><b>General views on Peaceful purposes</b></p>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1): The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emphasizes once more that promoting international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the realization of the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the Treaty, as stipulated in its article IV, constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 1): The Group strongly calls upon all States parties to the Treaty to fully respect this inalienable right and underscores that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting this right.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 3): The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty firmly believes that the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of article IV of the Treaty plays a crucial role in achieving the object and purpose of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 3): [The Group] firmly believes that any measure aiming at hampering, fully or partly, the fullest exercise of these inalienable rights, would seriously jeopardize the delicate balance between rights and obligations of States parties, in contravention with the Treaty's object and purpose...</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7): The Group reaffirms that choices and decisions of each State party to the Treaty in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for such uses and its fuel-cycle policies.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 8): ...the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty once again acknowledges and reaffirms that each State party to the Treaty has the sovereign right to define its national energy policies, including fuel-cycle policies, in accordance with its national requirements and its rights and obligations under the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 10): The Group... underlines that all the parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate and have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.</li> <li>• (Page 3, Para 11): The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the contribution that uses of nuclear energy can make to progress in general and to helping overcome the technological and economic disparities between developed and developing States parties to the Treaty in</li> </ul> |

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|   | <p>particular.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, Para 11): The Group firmly believes that, as a fundamental principle, in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment shall be given to the non-nuclear weapons States parties to the Treaty, particularly taking into account the needs of developing countries.</li> <li>• (Page 3-4, para 12): In the view of the Group, transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with the Treaty shall be supported and pursued in good faith without discrimination.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 13): The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology, equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their sensitivity, and only stipulates that such technology, equipment and material must be subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 19): The Group emphasizes that measures and initiatives aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and nuclear security must not be used as a pretext or lever to violate, deny or restrict the inalienable right of developing countries to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.</li> <li>• (Page 6, para 23): The Group...expresses its serious concern over certain unilateral, politically motivated attempts to hamper the exercise of the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes, in this regard, that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end.</li> </ul>  |
| <p><b>Access to exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information</b></p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2): The Group...reaffirms the importance of the right of States parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and their right to cooperation among themselves, in particular in the technological field, in contributing alone or with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.</li> <li>• (Page 1-2, para 4): To ensure the realization of these goals, all States parties, particularly developed States, shall extend their assistance, as requested by States parties that are States members of IAEA, in the provision of nuclear equipment, material, technology and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes...</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5): The Group stresses the importance of nuclear knowledge-sharing and the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries to sustain and further enhance their scientific and technological capabilities, thereby also contributing to their socio-economic development.<br/><b>(TRANSFER)</b></li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6): [The Group] stresses that the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, as the main vehicle for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, should continue to be formulated and implemented in accordance with the statute of IAEA and the agreed guiding principles as contained in INFCIRC/267, as well as the decisions of IAEA policymaking organs. <b>(TRANSFER)</b></li> <li>• (Page 3, para 10): The Group...underlines that all the parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate and have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.</li> <li>• (Page 3-4, para 12): The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its deep concern about the continued imposition and/or</li> </ul> |

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|  | <p>maintaining of limitations and restrictions on exports to developing countries of nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes, despite such limitations and restrictions being inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3-4, para 12): ...the Group stresses that the technical cooperation and assistance provided by IAEA in meeting the needs of its member States for material, equipment and technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall not be subject to any political, economic, military or other conditions incompatible with the provisions of its statute. The Group therefore strongly calls for the immediate removal of any such restrictions or limitations.</li> <li>• (Page 3-4, para 12): In the view of the Group, transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with the Treaty shall be supported and pursued in good faith without discrimination.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 13): The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology, equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their sensitivity, and only stipulates that such technology, equipment and material must be subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 14): The Group further emphasizes that non-proliferation control arrangements...do not impose restrictions on access by developing countries to material, equipment or technology for peaceful purposes, which such countries require for their continued development</li> </ul>   |
| <p><b>Principles and objectives of the NPT</b></p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1): The Group...emphasizes once more that promoting international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the realization of the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the Treaty, as stipulated in its article IV, constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 3): The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty firmly believes that the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of article IV of the Treaty plays a crucial role in achieving the object and purpose of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 3): [The Group] firmly believes that any measure aiming at hampering, fully or partly, the fullest exercise of these inalienable rights, would seriously jeopardize the delicate balance between rights and obligations of States parties, in contravention with the Treaty's object and purpose...</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 13): The Group firmly believes that fostering the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by providing a framework of confidence and cooperation within which those uses can take place, is one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 15): The Group strongly calls for the enforcement, without exception or further delay, of the total and complete prohibition, as stipulated in the Treaty, of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 16): The Group...underscores that IAEA, under its statutory obligations, pursues the goals of technical cooperation in peaceful applications of nuclear energy as one of the three pillars of its activities.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 21): ...the Group...underscores the strong call by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that all States parties shall ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are</li> </ul> |

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|                   | <p>in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated particularly in its articles I, II and III, and with the decision on the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 6, para 23): In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes.</li> </ul>  |
| <b>Article IV</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1): The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emphasizes once more that promoting international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the realization of the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the Treaty, as stipulated in its article IV, constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 3): The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty firmly believes that the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of article IV of the Treaty plays a crucial role in achieving the object and purpose of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5): ...the Group underlines that the activities of IAEA in the field of technical cooperation, nuclear power and non-power applications contribute in an important way to meeting energy needs, improving human health...and that these activities, as well as bilateral and other multilateral cooperation, contribute to achieving the objectives set forth in article IV of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 9): The Group also stresses that any decision on proposals regarding multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle shall be made by consensus, taking into account the interests of all member States, with the participation of all IAEA member States, and any proposal from IAEA must be consistent with its statute, without prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty, if they so decide, to develop a full national fuel cycle, according to its article IV.</li> </ul> |
| <b>IAEA</b>       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1-2, para 4): The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also stipulates the right of member States to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes and to promote socio-economic development by way of technical cooperation and the production of electrical power, with due consideration for the needs of developing countries.</li> <li>• (Page 1-2, para 4): To ensure the realization of these goals, all States parties, particularly developed States, shall extend their assistance, as requested by States parties that are States members of IAEA, in the provision of nuclear equipment, material, technology and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes...</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5): [The Group] recognizes the major and important role of IAEA in assisting States parties, particularly developing States, in planning for and using nuclear science and technology.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5): ...the Group underlines that the activities of IAEA in the field of technical cooperation, nuclear power and non-power applications contribute in an important way to meeting energy needs...and that these activities, as well as bilateral and other multilateral cooperation, contribute</li> </ul>  |

to achieving the objectives set forth in article IV of the Treaty.

- (Page 2, para 6): [The Group] stresses that the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, as the main vehicle for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, should continue to be formulated and implemented in accordance with the statute of IAEA and the agreed guiding principles as contained in INFCIRC/267, as well as the decisions of IAEA policymaking organs.
- (Page 2, para 6): The Group reiterates that the current guidelines and criteria for the selection of technical cooperation projects are robust and effective, and that no additional criteria should be imposed for fulfilling the above-mentioned objectives. **[SAFEGUARDS?]**
- (Page 2, para 7): ...the Group strongly rejects any attempts by any State to politicize the work of the Agency, including its technical cooperation programme, in violation of its statute, as well as any pressure or interference in its activities that could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility.
- (Page 2, para 7): ...the Group also expresses its rejection of any attempts by any State party to use the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme as a tool for political purposes, which would be in violation of the statute of the Agency.
- (Page 3, para 9): The multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle should be economically viable, sustainable, non-discriminatory, predictable and transparent under the auspices of IAEA and any other regional and multilateral forums.
- (Page 3, para 9): The Group also stresses that any decision on proposals regarding multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle shall be made by consensus, taking into account the interests of all member States, with the participation of all IAEA member States, and any proposal from IAEA must be consistent with its statute, without prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty, if they so decide, to develop a full national fuel cycle, according to its article IV.
- (Page 3-4, para 12): ...the Group stresses that the technical cooperation and assistance provided by IAEA in meeting the needs of its member States for material, equipment and technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall not be subject to any political, economic, military or other conditions incompatible with the provisions of its statute. The Group therefore strongly calls for the immediate removal of any such restrictions or limitations.
- (Page 4, para 13): The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology, equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their sensitivity, and only stipulates that such technology, equipment and material must be subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards. **[SAFEGUARDS]**
- (Page 4, para 13): ...the Group emphasizes that cooperation to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world is the core objective enshrined in the statute of IAEA.
- (Page 4, para 13): Accordingly, the Group strongly encourages all States parties to actively cooperate, among themselves and through IAEA, in the peaceful uses and applications of nuclear energy, including through international technical cooperation.
- (Page 4, para 14): Furthermore, such arrangements must pursue and implement, without exception, the condition of adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for the supply to or cooperation with States not party to the Treaty.
- (Page 4, para 16): The Group...underscores that IAEA, under its statutory obligations, pursues the goals of technical cooperation in peaceful applications of nuclear energy as one of the three pillars of its activities.
- (Page 4, para 16): The Group believes that all States parties to the Treaty that



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|  | <p>are States members of IAEA have to ensure that the Technical Cooperation Programme remains firm and sustainable through sufficient, assured and predictable financial and human resources.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 5, para 17): ...the Group calls for the effective implementation of the Code of Practice on the IAEA International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste as a means of enhancing the protection of all States from the dumping of radioactive wastes on their territories.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para18): The Group reaffirms the central role of IAEA in nuclear safety-related matters, including through the establishment of nuclear safety standards.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para18): The Group stresses that any possible review of nuclear safety standards at the global level must be carried out within IAEA in an inclusive, gradual and transparent manner, with the guidance and participation of and in consultation with all member States, and shall incorporate the views of all member States.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para18): The Group also calls for the implementation of the Nuclear Safety Action Plan endorsed by the General Conference of IAEA in September 2011.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 20): The Group...emphasizes that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented without exception through the strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not party to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 6, para 24): The Group...while stressing the importance of safeguards and the significance of maintaining the principles of confidentiality regarding safeguards, underlines the vital responsibility of IAEA in this regard.</li> <li>• (Page 6, para 24): In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency.</li> </ul> |
| <p><b>Cooperation and assistance</b></p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2): [The Group reaffirms] ...their right to cooperation among themselves, in particular in the technological field, in contributing alone or with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes...</li> <li>• (Page 1-2, para 4): To ensure the realization of these goals, all States parties, particularly developed States, shall extend their assistance, as requested by States parties that are States members of IAEA, in the provision of nuclear equipment, material, technology and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes...</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5): ...the Group underlines that the activities of IAEA in the field of technical cooperation, nuclear power and non-power applications contribute in an important way to meeting energy needs, improving human health, including the application of nuclear technology in cancer therapy, combating poverty, protecting the environment, developing agriculture, managing the use of water resources and optimizing industrial processes, and that these activities, as well as bilateral and other multilateral cooperation, contribute to achieving the objectives set forth in article IV of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6): [The Group] stresses that the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, as the main vehicle for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, should continue to be formulated and implemented in accordance with the statute of IAEA and the agreed guiding principles as contained in INFCIRC/267, as well as the decisions of IAEA policymaking organs.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6): The Group reiterates that the current guidelines and criteria for the selection of technical cooperation projects are robust and effective, and that no additional criteria should be imposed for fulfilling the above-</li> </ul>  |

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|   | <p>mentioned objectives.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3-4, para 12): ...the Group stresses that the technical cooperation and assistance provided by IAEA in meeting the needs of its member States for material, equipment and technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall not be subject to any political, economic, military or other conditions incompatible with the provisions of its statute. The Group therefore strongly calls for the immediate removal of any such restrictions or limitations.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 13): The Group firmly believes that fostering the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by providing a framework of confidence and cooperation within which those uses can take place, is one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 13): ...the Group emphasizes that cooperation to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world is the core objective enshrined in the statute of IAEA.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 13): Accordingly, the Group strongly encourages all States parties to actively cooperate, among themselves and through IAEA, in the peaceful uses and applications of nuclear energy, including through international technical cooperation.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 16): The Group believes that all States parties to the Treaty that are States members of IAEA have to ensure that the Technical Cooperation Programme remains firm and sustainable through sufficient, assured and predictable financial and human resources.</li> </ul>  |
| <p><b>Consideration for developing States</b></p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2): [The Group reaffirms] ...their right to cooperation among themselves, in particular in the technological field, in contributing alone or with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 3): [The Group] firmly believes that any measure aiming at hampering, fully or partly, the fullest exercise of these inalienable rights, would seriously jeopardize the delicate balance between rights and obligations of States parties, in contravention with the Treaty's object and purpose and would widen the gap between developed and developing countries in this field.</li> <li>• (Page 1-2, para 4): The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also stipulates the right of member States to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes and to promote socio-economic development by way of technical cooperation and the production of electrical power, with due consideration for the needs of developing countries.</li> <li>• (Page 1-2, para 4): To ensure the realization of these goals, all States parties, particularly developed States, shall extend their assistance, as requested by States parties that are States members of IAEA, in the provision of nuclear equipment, material, technology and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes, with a view to achieving the maximum benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities for peaceful purposes.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5): [The Group] recognizes the major and important role of IAEA in assisting States parties, particularly developing States, in planning for and using nuclear science and technology.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5): The Group stresses the importance of nuclear knowledge-sharing and the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries to sustain and further enhance their scientific and technological capabilities, thereby also contributing to their socio-economic development.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 10): In this regard, the Group stresses particularly the obligation of developed countries to promote the legitimate need of the developing countries to nuclear energy by fully respecting this right with a</li> </ul> |

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|   | <p>view to achieving the widest benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, Para 11): The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the contribution that uses of nuclear energy can make to progress in general and to helping overcome the technological and economic disparities between developed and developing States parties to the Treaty in particular.</li> <li>• (Page 3, Para 11): The Group firmly believes that, as a fundamental principle, in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment shall be given to the non-nuclear weapons States parties to the Treaty, particularly taking into account the needs of developing countries.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 14): The Group further emphasizes that non-proliferation control arrangements...do not impose restrictions on access by developing countries to material, equipment or technology for peaceful purposes, which such countries require for their continued development.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 16): The Group believes that all States parties to the Treaty that are States members of IAEA have to ensure that the Technical Cooperation Programme remains firm and sustainable...In this regard, the efficacy of the Programme can best be achieved by ensuring its formulation and strategies are in strict accordance with the needs and the requests of developing countries.</li> </ul> |
| <p><b>Multilateral approach to nuclear fuel cycle</b></p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 9): The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including proposals for assurance of supply in response to the needs of interested States, shall fully take into account all technical, legal, political and economic complexities surrounding these issues and be conducted through wide, integral, comprehensive and transparent multilateral consultations and negotiations.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 9): The multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle should be economically viable, sustainable, non-discriminatory, predictable and transparent under the auspices of IAEA and any other regional and multilateral forums.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 9): The Group also stresses that any decision on proposals regarding multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle shall be made by consensus, taking into account the interests of all member States, with the participation of all IAEA member States, and any proposal from IAEA must be consistent with its statute, without prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty, if they so decide, to develop a full national fuel cycle, according to its article IV.</li> </ul>   |
| <p><b>Non-proliferation related matters</b></p>           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, para 14): The Group...emphasizes that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 14): The Group further emphasizes that non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access by developing countries to material, equipment or technology for peaceful purposes, which such countries require for their continued development.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 14): Furthermore, such arrangements must pursue and implement, without exception, the condition of adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for the supply to or cooperation with States not party to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 15): The Group...remains deeply concerned about the ability of certain States not party to the Treaty to obtain, in particular from nuclear-weapon States, nuclear materials, technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons. <b>Access of information and material for non NPT State</b></li> </ul>  |

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|                          | <p><b>Parties</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, para 15): The Group strongly calls for the enforcement, without exception or further delay, of the total and complete prohibition, as stipulated in the Treaty, of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty. <b>[Access of information and material for non NPT State Parties]</b></li> <li>• (Page 5, para 20): The Group...emphasizes that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented without exception through the strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not party to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 21): ...the Group...underscores the strong call by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that all States parties shall ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated particularly in its articles I, II and III, and with the decision on the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty.</li> </ul>  |
| <p><b>Safeguards</b></p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, para 14): The Group further emphasizes that non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access by developing countries to material, equipment or technology for peaceful purposes, which such countries require for their continued development.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 14): Furthermore, such arrangements must pursue and implement, without exception, the condition of adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for the supply to or cooperation with States not party to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 20): The Group...emphasizes that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented without exception through the strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not party to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 20): In the view of the Group, new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of IAEA full scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</li> <li>• (Page 6, para 23): The Group...expresses its serious concern over certain unilateral, politically motivated attempts to hamper the exercise of the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes, in this regard, that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end.</li> <li>• (Page 6, para 23): In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes.</li> </ul> |

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|   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 6, para 24): The Group...while stressing the importance of safeguards and the significance of maintaining the principles of confidentiality regarding safeguards, underlines the vital responsibility of IAEA in this regard.</li> <li>• (Page 6, para 24): In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>Nuclear safety and security</b>                                    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 5, para 17): The Group...affirms the need to strengthen the radiological safety and protection systems at facilities utilizing radioactive materials and at radioactive waste management facilities, including the safe transportation of these materials.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 17): The Group reaffirms the need to strengthen existing international regulations relating to the safety and security of transportation of such materials.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 17): ...the Group calls for the effective implementation of the Code of Practice on the IAEA International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste as a means of enhancing the protection of all States from the dumping of radioactive wastes on their territories.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para18): The Group recognizes that the primary responsibility for nuclear safety rests with individual States.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para18): The Group reaffirms the central role of IAEA in nuclear safety-related matters, including through the establishment of nuclear safety standards.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para18): The Group stresses that any possible review of nuclear safety standards at the global level must be carried out within IAEA in an inclusive, gradual and transparent manner, with the guidance and participation of and in consultation with all member States, and shall incorporate the views of all member States.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para18): The Group also calls for the implementation of the Nuclear Safety Action Plan endorsed by the General Conference of IAEA in September 2011.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 19): The Group emphasizes that measures and initiatives aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and nuclear security must not be used as a pretext or lever to violate, deny or restrict the inalienable right of developing countries to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.</li> </ul> |
| <b>Attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 6, para 22): The Group...once again reaffirms the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities, operational or under construction, poses a great danger to human beings and the environment and constitutes a grave violation of international law, the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and the regulations of IAEA.</li> <li>• (Page 6, para 22): ...the Group recognizes the need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks or the threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.</li> <li>• (Page 6, para 22): ... the Group strongly calls upon all States, in accordance with the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from attacks or the threat of attacks on nuclear facilities, operational or under construction, devoted to peaceful purposes.</li> </ul>  |
| <b>2015 Review Conference</b>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 6, para 25): The Group...is determined to propose, during the 2015 Review Process of the Treaty, measures to protect fully the inalienable rights of all States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.</li> </ul>  |
| <b>2010 Review Conference</b>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 5, para 21): ...the Group...underscores the strong call by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that all States parties shall ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of</li> </ul>  |

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|   | nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty...  |
| <b>1995 Extension</b>                                 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(Page 5, para 21): ...the Group...underscores the strong call by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that all States parties shall ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated particularly in its articles I, II and III, and with the decision on the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>Procedural matters</b>                             | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(Page 3, para 9): The Group also stresses that any decision on proposals regarding multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle shall be made by consensus, taking into account the interests of all member States, with the participation of all IAEA member States, and any proposal from IAEA must be consistent with its statute...</li> </ul>   |
| <b>NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25<br/>Nuclear Testing</b>   |  |
| <b>Total elimination of nuclear weapons</b>           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(Page 1., para 1): The Group...reaffirms that the only way to rid the world of the threat or use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination.</li> <li>(Page 1, para 1): ...the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a practical step on the road to nuclear disarmament and, therefore, cannot substitute for the objective of complete elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>(Page 2, para 5): The Group, in accordance with its long-standing and principled position in favour of the total elimination of all forms of nuclear weapons, supports the objectives of the Treaty, which is intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all nuclear-test explosions, and to stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons in order to pave the way towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> </ul>  |
| <b>Nuclear disarmament</b><br>(integrate with above?) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(Page 2, para 6): The Group...stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty, including by all the nuclear-weapon States, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament.</li> <li>(Page 2, para 6): The Group reiterates that if the objectives of the Treaty [CTBT] were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to nuclear disarmament, would be essential.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>General views on nuclear testing</b>               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(Page 1, para 2): ...the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly calls for immediate and unconditional cessation of all nuclear weapon tests and the closure of all nuclear-weapon test sites.</li> <li>(Page 1, para 2): ...the Group is of the firm view that all States parties that have not yet done so shall close and dismantle, as soon as feasible and in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner, any remaining sites for nuclear-test explosions and their associated infrastructure, and prohibit completely nuclear weapons research and development, and also refrain from conducting nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, nuclear-weapon test explosions in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapons system, which would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.</li> <li>(Page 1, para 3): The Group...recalls and reaffirms once again the commitment of all States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to ending all nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions and thereby constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>(Page 2, para 5): The Group, in accordance with its long-standing and</li> </ul> |

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|                    | <p>principled position in favour of the total elimination of all forms of nuclear weapons, supports the objectives of the Treaty, which is intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all nuclear-test explosions, and to stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons in order to pave the way towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 7): The Group is of the firm belief that the early achievement of the goal of the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, through accession of the only non-parties to this instrument, would be essential to achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 2-3, para 9): In that regard, the Group calls upon those States to continue to refrain from conducting nuclear-test explosions for the modernization, development or further improvement of nuclear weapons. The Group wishes to re-emphasize the principles of the non-proliferation regime, both vertically and horizontally.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 10): The Group...underscores the importance of the five nuclear-weapon States maintaining their voluntary moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions since the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. However, the Group believes that moratoriums do not take the place of the signing, ratification and entry into force of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 12): The Group...underlines the need for increased attention to the problems of safety and contamination related to the discontinuation of nuclear operations formerly associated with nuclear-weapons programmes, including where appropriate, the safe resettlement of any displaced human populations and the restoration of economic productivity to affected areas.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 12): In this regard, the Group acknowledges the existence of a special responsibility towards the affected people and areas, including those in the former United Nations Trust Territories who have been adversely affected as a result of the nuclear-weapon tests conducted in the past.</li> </ul> |
| <p><b>CTBT</b></p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1): ...the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a practical step on the road to nuclear disarmament and, therefore, cannot substitute for the objective of complete elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 2): While underlining the significance of achieving the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly calls for immediate and unconditional cessation of all nuclear weapon tests and the closure of all nuclear-weapon test sites.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 2): In this regard, the Group is of the firm view that all States parties that have not yet done so shall close and dismantle, as soon as feasible and in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner, any remaining sites for nuclear-test explosions and their associated infrastructure, and prohibit completely nuclear weapons research and development, and also refrain from conducting nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, nuclear-weapon test explosions in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapons system, which would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 3): ...the Group strongly calls on the nuclear-weapon States to put an immediate end to such activities and refrain from any other action that would defeat the object, and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, pending its entry into force.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 4): The Group...stresses that the improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient statements on security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States and</li> </ul>   |

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|                           | <p>violate their commitments undertaken at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 5): The Group, in accordance with its long-standing and principled position in favour of the total elimination of all forms of nuclear weapons, supports the objectives of the Treaty, which is intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all nuclear-test explosions, and to stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons in order to pave the way towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6): The Group...stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty, including by all the nuclear-weapon States, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6): The Group reiterates that if the objectives of the Treaty [CTBT] were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to nuclear disarmament, would be essential.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7): The Group...believes that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, not only because they are among the 44 States listed in annex 2 to the Treaty, but also because, on account of their position, they are expected to lead in making the ban on tests a reality.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8): The Group...reaffirms that positive decisions by the nuclear-weapon States would have the desired impact on facilitating the progress towards entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8): The failure of one major nuclear weapon State to ratify the Treaty, and by not supporting the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization through rejection of one of the main elements of the Treaty's verification regime, is undermining this important instrument against nuclear testing.</li> <li>• (Page 2-3, para 9): The Group...recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation, thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear devices, as well as nuclear weapons based on new physical principles.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 11): The Group...emphasizes that the modernization or development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the assurances given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons.</li> </ul> |
| <p><b>Role of NWS</b></p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3): The Group...recalls and reaffirms once again the commitment of all States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to ending all nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions...</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 3): ...the Group strongly calls on the nuclear-weapon States to put an immediate end to such activities and refrain from any other action that would defeat the object, and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, pending its entry into force.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6): The Group reiterates that if the objectives of the Treaty [CTBT] were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to nuclear disarmament, would be essential.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7): The Group...believes that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, not only because they are among</li> </ul>  |



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|                                     | <p>the 44 States listed in annex 2 to the Treaty, but also because, on account of their position, they are expected to lead in making the ban on tests a reality.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 8): The Group...reaffirms that positive decisions by the nuclear-weapon States would have the desired impact on facilitating the progress towards entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8): The failure of one major nuclear weapon State to ratify the Treaty, and by not supporting the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization through rejection of one of the main elements of the Treaty's verification regime, is undermining this important instrument against nuclear testing.</li> <li>• (Page 2-3, para 9): The Group...recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation, thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear devices, as well as nuclear weapons based on new physical principles.</li> <li>• (Page 2-3, para 9): In that regard, the Group calls upon those States to continue to refrain from conducting nuclear-test explosions for the modernization, development or further improvement of nuclear weapons. The Group wishes to re-emphasize the principles of the non-proliferation regime, both vertically and horizontally.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 10): The Group...underscores the importance of the five nuclear-weapon States maintaining their voluntary moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions since the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. However, the Group believes that moratoriums do not take the place of the signing, ratification and entry into force of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 11): The Group...emphasizes that the modernization or development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the assurances given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons.</li> </ul> |
| <p><b>Nuclear modernization</b></p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3): The Group...recalls and reaffirms once again the commitment of all States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to ending all nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions and thereby constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 3): ...the Group expresses grave concern at the development of new types of nuclear weapons, which may result in the resumption of tests and a lowering of the nuclear threshold.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 4): The Group...stresses that the improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient statements on security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States...</li> <li>• (Page 2-3, para 9): The Group...recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation, thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear devices, as well as nuclear weapons based on new physical principles.</li> <li>• (Page 2-3, para 9): In that regard, the Group calls upon those States to continue to refrain from conducting nuclear-test explosions for the modernization, development or further improvement of nuclear weapons.</li> </ul>  |

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|  | <p>The Group wishes to re-emphasize the principles of the non-proliferation regime, both vertically and horizontally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 11): The Group...emphasizes that the modernization or development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the assurances given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>Voluntary moratoriums on nuclear-weapon testing</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 10): The Group...underscores the importance of the five nuclear-weapon States maintaining their voluntary moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions since the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. However, the Group believes that moratoriums do not take the place of the signing, ratification and entry into force of the Treaty.</li> </ul>  |
| <b>Security assurance</b>                              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 4): The Group...stresses that the improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient statements on security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States and violate their commitments undertaken at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>Annex 2 States</b>                                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 7): The Group...believes that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, not only because they are among the 44 States listed in annex 2 to the Treaty, but also because, on account of their position, they are expected to lead in making the ban on tests a reality.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>2000 Review Conference (13 steps)</b>               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 11): ...the Group is seriously concerned by the decision of a nuclear-weapon State to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear testing to 18 months as a setback to the 2000 Review Conference agreements.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 11): It is the view of the Group that such decisions undermine the validity of the commitment to declared moratoriums as well as the commitments under the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has been envisaged as the first of 13 practical steps leading to nuclear disarmament.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28</b>                        |  |
| <b>Nuclear-weapon-free zones</b>                       |  |
| <b>General views on NWFZ</b>                           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1): The Group...recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be a contribution towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 1): The Group is...of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is not a substitute for the legal obligations of and unequivocal undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 2): The Group welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones worldwide and calls for cooperation and broad consultation in order for the States of the regions concerned to freely arrive at such agreements</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 2): The Group continues to consider the nuclear-weapon-free zones created...to be a positive step and important measure towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7): The Group urges States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not...</li> </ul> |

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| <b>NWFZ in Middle East</b>            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3): The Group strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear weapon- free zone in the Middle East...</li> </ul>   |
| <b>1995 Resolution on Middle East</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3): The Group strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear weapon- free zone in the Middle East and calls for the full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East</li> </ul>  |
| <b>Treaty of Semipalatinsk</b>        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 4): The Group welcomes the entry into force of the Semipalatinsk and Pelindaba treaties on 21 March 2009 and 15 July 2009...and considers establishment of these zones to be an effective contribution towards strengthening regional and global peace and security</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 9): The Group stresses the importance of the signature and ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga and Semipalatinsk in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the territories of the States parties to those treaties, as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</li> </ul> |
| <b>Treaty of Pelindaba</b>            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 4): The Group welcomes the entry into force of the Semipalatinsk and Pelindaba treaties on 21 March 2009 and 15 July 2009...and considers establishment of these zones to be an effective contribution towards strengthening regional and global peace and security</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 9): The Group stresses the importance of the signature and ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga and Semipalatinsk in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the territories of the States parties to those treaties, as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</li> </ul> |
| <b>Treaty of Tlatelolco</b>           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 6): The Group emphasizes the need to strengthen the integrity of the statute of denuclearization provided for in the Treaty of Tlatelolco by reviewing the declarations that were formulated by the nuclear-weapon States parties to additional protocols I and II for possible withdrawal or modification.</li> </ul>  |
| <b>Treaty of Bangkok</b>              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 8): The Group welcomes the conclusion of the consultations between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the nuclear-weapon States on the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty and urges the nuclear-weapon States to become parties to the Protocol as soon as possible. The Group looks forward to the signing of the Protocol by the five nuclear-weapon States in July 2012</li> </ul>   |
| <b>Treaty of Rarotonga</b>            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 9): The Group stresses the importance of the signature and ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga and Semipalatinsk in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the territories of the States parties to those treaties, as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</li> </ul>  |
| <b>NWFZ in Mongolia</b>               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 7): The Group considers that the further institutionalization of Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status would be an important step towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 10): The Group, while noting with satisfaction the convening of the Second Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear- Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia...calls upon the States parties and signatories to those treaties to put in place further forms of cooperation among themselves, their treaty agencies and other interested States.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>NWS role</b>                       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 5): The Group reiterates that, in the context of the nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is essential that the nuclear-weapon States provide unconditional, non-discriminatory and specific legal assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the zone concerned.</li> </ul>  |

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|   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Page 2, para 5): the Group strongly calls for the withdrawal of any related reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of such treaties. The Group further calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations with a view to achieving the objectives of the treaties to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and their protocols.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6): The Group emphasizes the need to strengthen the integrity of the statute of denuclearization provided for in the Treaty of Tlatelolco by reviewing the declarations that were formulated by the nuclear-weapon States parties to additional protocols I and II for possible withdrawal or modification.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8): The Group welcomes the conclusion of the consultations between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the nuclear-weapon States on the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty and urges the nuclear-weapon States to become parties to the Protocol as soon as possible. The Group looks forward to the signing of the Protocol by the five nuclear-weapon States in July 2012.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 9): The Group stresses the importance of the signature and ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga and Semipalatinsk in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the territories of the States parties to those treaties, as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</li> </ul> |
| <b>Security assurances</b>                                      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 5): The Group reiterates that, in the context of the nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is essential that the nuclear-weapon States provide unconditional, non-discriminatory and specific legal assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the zone concerned.</li> </ul>  |
| <b>Cooperation and assistance</b>                               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 10): The Group, while noting with satisfaction the convening of the Second Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear- Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia...calls upon the States parties and signatories to those treaties to put in place further forms of cooperation among themselves, their treaty agencies and other interested States.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52<br/>Regional Issue: Middle East</b> |  |
| <b>General views on regional issues</b>                         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1): The Group...reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be a contribution towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 9): The Group also reaffirms that stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are maintained, particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allows one party to threaten its neighbours and the region, and constitutes a threat to international peace and security.</li> </ul>  |
| <b>General views on Nuclear Weapon Free Zone</b>                | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1): ...the Group is of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon free zones does not substitute legal obligations and unequivocal undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 1): The Group further welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and, in this regard, strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.</li> </ul>  |
| <b>NWS Role</b>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1): ...the Group is of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon free zones does not substitute legal obligations and unequivocal undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States for the total</li> </ul>   |

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|  | <p>elimination of nuclear weapons.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 11): The Group...reaffirms that the nuclear-weapon States, in conformity with their legal obligations under article I of the Treaty, shall solemnly undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly to Israel, and further undertake not, in any way, to assist, encourage or induce Israel to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices under any circumstances whatsoever.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 13): ...the Group expresses its serious concern over Israeli scientists' continued access to the nuclear facilities of one nuclear-weapon State...</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 21): The Group...stresses the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States, in particular the obligations and commitments of the three depositary States of the Treaty that co-sponsored the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, to implement the Resolution.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 21): [The Group]... underlined the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.</li> </ul>   |
| <p><b>Total elimination of nuclear weapons</b></p>     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1): The Group...reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be a contribution towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 1): ...the Group is of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon free zones does not substitute legal obligations and unequivocal undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> </ul>  |
| <p><b>General views on NWFZ in the Middle East</b></p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1): The Group further welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and, in this regard, strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 14): The Group...reaffirms once again its determination to extend fullest cooperation and to exert utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 19): The Group underscores that the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and the convening of a successful 2012 conference are integral and essential parts of the implementation of the consensus conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 21): the Group considers the implementation of the practical steps adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Middle East as a collective responsibility, since the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference clearly stipulated that the States parties renew their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at its prompt implementation...</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 22): While reaffirming the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty is of the view that the 2012 conference should lead, without further delay, to the universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East and the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.</li> </ul> |

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| <p><b>1995 Resolution on Middle East</b></p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2): The Group...stresses the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which reaffirmed the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 3): The Group...underlines furthermore that the 2010 Review Conference also reaffirmed the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recalled the affirmation of its goals and objectives by the 2000 Review Conference.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 3): The Group recalls also that at the [2010] Conference, States parties renewed their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at its [1995 Resolution] prompt implementation.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6): The Group...expresses deep concern over the delay in the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.</li> <li>• Page 5, para 21: [The Group]... underlined the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.</li> </ul>   |
| <p><b>Israel</b></p>                         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2): The Group recalls that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 4). The Group...further recalls that the 2010 Review Conference, by taking note of the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, recalled the reaffirmation by the 2000 Review Conference of the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7): The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern that no progress has been achieved with regard to Israel's accession to the Treaty, and placing all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, and over the delay in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, all of which are objectives and priorities that were stressed in Review Conferences of the Treaty in 1995, 2000 and 2010.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8): The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty remains gravely concerned by the statement made by the then Prime Minister of Israel on 11 December 2006, in which he publicly admitted the possession of nuclear weapons by Israel. In this regard, the Group reaffirms the continued validity of the statement of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement on this subject as contained in document NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/19.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 9): The Group...further expresses great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by Israel, which pose a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States, and condemns Israel for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 10): The Group...demands that Israel, the only country in the region that has neither joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons nor declared its intention to do so, renounce possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the Treaty without any precondition or further delay as a non-nuclear-weapon State, place promptly all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and conduct all its nuclear-related activities in full conformity with the non-proliferation regime, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty, in particular in the Middle East.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 11): The Group...reaffirms that the nuclear-weapon States, in</li> </ul> |

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|                                      | <p>conformity with their legal obligations under article I of the Treaty, shall solemnly undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly to Israel, and further undertake not, in any way, to assist, encourage or induce Israel to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices under any circumstances whatsoever.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 12): The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, in conformity with the Treaty, hereby declares its commitment to the effective prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 13): The Group...also calls for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer, by any State, of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear-related scientific or technological fields to Israel. In this regard, the Group expresses its serious concern over Israeli scientists' continued access to the nuclear facilities of one nuclear-weapon State...</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 18): The Group...calls for the establishment of a standing committee comprising members of the Bureau of the 2015 Review Conference to follow up intersessionally on the implementation of the recommendations by the Review Conference concerning Israel's prompt accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, and to report to the 2020 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee.</li> </ul> |
| <b>Universality</b>                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2): The Group...stresses the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which reaffirmed the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 2): The Group recalls that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty...in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 4): The Conference also reaffirmed the urgency and importance of achieving universality of the Treaty and called on all States in the Middle East that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States so as to achieve its universality at an early date.</li> </ul>  |
| <b>Review Cycle and ME issues</b>    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3): The Group...underlines furthermore that the 2010 Review Conference also reaffirmed the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recalled the affirmation of its goals and objectives by the 2000 Review Conference.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 15): The Group...underlines that the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on the Middle East by devoting sufficient time within the indicative timetable and giving all speakers the full opportunity to thereby engage in a substantive debate.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 16): It is essential that the successive sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference conduct substantive discussions on the above-mentioned reports and evaluate the fulfilment of the commitments on the Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, as contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted by consensus at the 2010 Review Conference.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>2012 Conference on NWFZ in ME</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 5): ...the Group...urges the Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, to convene and exert utmost efforts in ensuring the success of a</li> </ul>   |

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|   | <p>conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 5): While recalling that the 2010 Review Conference emphasized the importance of a process leading to full implementation of the objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, the Group stresses the importance of the full implementation of the plan of action and the active and constructive engagement by all parties concerned to allow for the success of the 2012 conference in leading to the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6): While welcoming the appointment of a facilitator, Mr. Jaakko Laajava, and the designation of a host Government, Finland, for the 2012 conference, to be attended by all States of the Middle East on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, the Group calls on the facilitator to accelerate consultations with all capitals in the region and to exert maximum efforts with a view to convening the conference at the earliest possible date in 2012.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 19): The Group...stresses that, as clearly stipulated by the 2010 Review Conference, the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction shall be convened in the year 2012, and that any delay will seriously jeopardize the overall implementation of the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions and will represent a major setback in this regard.</li> <li>• (Page 4-5, para 20): The Group...emphasizes the mandated responsibility of the Secretary-General and the commitments and special responsibility of the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution regarding the convening of the 2012 conference, and accordingly calls upon them to accelerate their efforts to ensure the convening of a successful conference in the year 2012. Furthermore, the Group calls upon the facilitator to exert maximum efforts for more intensive and regular consultations and coordination with all States of the region on all aspects of the 2012 conference, starting well in advance of its convening.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 22): While reaffirming the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty is of the view that the 2012 conference should lead, without further delay, to the universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East and the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.</li> </ul> |
| <p><b>Monitoring progress on the implementation of 1995 ME resolution</b></p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, para 15): The Group further recalls that the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences stipulated that all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, should report through the Secretariat to the President of the Review Conference, as well as the Chairs of its Preparatory Committee meetings, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such a zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. The Group further recalls that the 2010 Review Conference requested the facilitator to report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 16): The Group...emphasizes the importance of submitting required reports by all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, as well as the facilitator of the 2012 conference.</li> </ul>  |



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|   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, para 17): ...the Group...requests the establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the 2015 Review Conference to assess the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and reaffirmed by the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, as well as the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 18): The Group...calls for the establishment of a standing committee comprising members of the Bureau of the 2015 Review Conference to follow up intersessionally on the implementation of the recommendations by the Review Conference concerning Israel’s prompt accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, and to report to the 2020 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee.</li> </ul>  |
| <b>NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36<br/>Nuclear Disarmament</b> |  |
| <b>General views on Disarmament</b>                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1): The Group...emphasizes that the Treaty is an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and a key instrument in the efforts to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 2): The Group reaffirms the Non-Aligned Movement’s principled positions on nuclear disarmament, which remains its highest priority, and on the related issue of nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects, and stresses that it is important that efforts aiming at nuclear non-proliferation be parallel to simultaneous efforts aiming at nuclear disarmament.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) The Group emphasizes its concern at the threat to humanity posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and of their possible use or threat of use.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7): The Group recalls that, in pursuit of the full, effective and urgent implementation of article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, and building upon the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, the 2010 Review Conference agreed on an action plan on nuclear disarmament that includes concrete steps for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the Group strongly calls for the prompt and full implementation of that action plan.</li> <li>• (Page 2-3, para 11): The Group expresses deep concern at the continued lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, which could undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 22): The Group emphasizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals and, in that regard, considers that any such assumption is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.</li> </ul> |
| <b>Modernization of nuclear weapons</b>                 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3-4, para 15): ...reductions are undermined by the modernization of nuclear weapons, their delivery systems and related infrastructure by the nuclear-weapon States. To comply with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, and with their commitments under the 13 practical steps and the 2010 action plan, the nuclear-weapon States must immediately cease their plans to further invest in modernizing, upgrading, refurbishing or extending the lives of their nuclear weapons and related facilities.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 19): The Group also believes that the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, the development of advanced</li> </ul>  |

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|  | <p>new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes and the lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies further undermine disarmament commitments.</p>  |
| <p><b>Role of NWS</b></p>                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3): The Group remains deeply concerned by strategic defence doctrines of the nuclear-weapon States that set out the rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the recent posture review by one of the nuclear-weapon States to consider expanding the circumstances in which these weapons could be used.</li> <li>• (Page 1-2, para 6): The Group reiterates its strong call for the full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking given by the nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, which was also reaffirmed by the 2010 Review Conference.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8): The Group recalls that, in implementing their unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the nuclear-weapon States have committed themselves to undertaking further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. In this regard, the Group calls for full compliance by the nuclear-weapon States with such undertakings.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 9): ...the Group emphasizes in particular the prime importance of and the urgent need for full and prompt implementation of the commitments by the nuclear-weapon States under action 5 of the action plan. In this context, the Group further recalls that the nuclear-weapon States committed themselves to accelerating concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament...</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 10): ...the Group calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to submit comprehensive substantive reports about their undertakings under action 5 of the action plan to the Preparatory Committee in 2014...</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 11): The Group also deeply regrets the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament.</li> <li>• (Page 3-4, para 15): To comply with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, and with their commitments under the 13 practical steps and the 2010 action plan, the nuclear-weapon States must immediately cease their plans to further invest in modernizing, upgrading, refurbishing or extending the lives of their nuclear weapons and related facilities.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 26): ...the Group strongly calls upon all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to exclude completely the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from their military doctrines.</li> <li>• (Page 5-6, para 27): ...the Group calls for the speedy and full implementation by the nuclear-weapon States of all the measures contained in the plan of action [NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47] in accordance with the proposed timeline and at a pace that makes up for the time elapsed.</li> </ul> |
| <p><b>Reduction agreements (START)</b></p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, para 16): ...the Group, while noting the conclusion and entry into force of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START), confirms the validity of its position delivered at the time of the adoption of General Assembly resolution 65/61 on bilateral reductions of strategic nuclear arms and the new framework for strategic relations.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 16): The Group further expresses concern that domestic commitments to nuclear weapon modernization in exchange for ratification</li> </ul>  |

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|  | <p>of this treaty undermine the minimal reductions agreed upon therein.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, para 17): The Group also stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status are no substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons, and accordingly calls upon the Russian Federation and the United States to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability to such cuts and to further reduce their nuclear arsenals, both warheads and delivery systems...</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 17): The Group also recalls the commitment by the Russian Federation and the United States under action 4 of the action plan to the full implementation of New START and strongly urges them to adopt all required measures to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> </ul>   |
| <p><b>Nuclear weapons convention</b></p>           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 11): The negotiation of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame, including a nuclear weapons convention, is necessary and should begin without further delay. In that regard, the Group reiterates its call to establish, as soon as possible and as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, and recalls action 6 of the action plan, in which all States agreed that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.</li> <li>• (Page 4-5, para 21): The Group...reiterates its firm commitment to working to convene a high-level international conference to identify ways and means of eliminating nuclear weapons, at the earliest possible date, with the objective of an agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time, to prohibit their development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use, and to provide for their destruction.</li> <li>• (Page 6, para 29): The Group notes with concern the lack of agreement on a number of its key priorities, including beginning negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention, and expresses its determination to continue collective efforts in pursuing the realization of those priorities in the 2015 review process of the Treaty.</li> </ul>   |
| <p><b>Total elimination of nuclear weapons</b></p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2): The Group also reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against their use or threat of use.</li> <li>• (Page 1-2, para 6): The Group reiterates its strong call for the full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking given by the nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, which was also reaffirmed by the 2010 Review Conference.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8): The Group recalls that, in implementing their unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the nuclear-weapon States have committed themselves to undertaking further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 15): The Group remains deeply concerned by the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons, some reports of bilateral and unilateral reductions notwithstanding.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 17): The Group also stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status are no substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons, and accordingly calls upon the Russian Federation and the United States to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability...thus contributing to the</li> </ul> |

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|  | <p>fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations and facilitating the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest date.</p>  |
| <b>Transparency, irreversibility and verifiability</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3-4, para 15): The Group is also concerned by the existence and continued deployment of tens of thousands of such weapons, the exact number of which remains unconfirmed owing to the lack of transparency in various nuclear weapons programmes.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 17): ...[The Group]...calls upon the Russian Federation and the United States to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability to such cuts and to further reduce their nuclear arsenals, both warheads and delivery systems, thus contributing to the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations and facilitating the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest date.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>Missiles and delivery systems</b>                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, para 18): The Group believes that the abrogation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group remains concerned that the deployment of national and strategic missile defence systems could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>Nonproliferation and disarmament</b>                | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1): The Group...emphasizes that the Treaty is an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and a key instrument in the efforts to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 2): The Group reaffirms the Non-Aligned Movement's principled positions on nuclear disarmament, which remains its highest priority, and on the related issue of nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects, and stresses that it is important that efforts aiming at nuclear non-proliferation be parallel to simultaneous efforts aiming at nuclear disarmament.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 22): The Group emphasizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals and, in that regard, considers that any such assumption is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>International law</b>                               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, para 20): The Group underlines the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.</li> <li>• (page 5, para 25): the Group recalls the advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 of the International Court of Justice on the <i>Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons</i> that there is in neither customary nor conventional international law any specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons and that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 26): In the view of the Group, any such use or threat of use [of nuclear weapons] would be in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular international humanitarian law.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 26): The Group further believes that the mere possession of nuclear weapons is inconsistent with the principles of international humanitarian law.</li> </ul> |
| <b>Nuclear doctrine</b>                                | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3): The Group remains deeply concerned by strategic defence doctrines of the nuclear-weapon States that set out the rationales for the use</li> </ul>  |

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|  | <p>of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the recent posture review by one of the nuclear-weapon States to consider expanding the circumstances in which these weapons could be used.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 4): The Group also remains deeply concerned at the strategic concept for the defence and security of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which justifies the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and maintains unjustifiable concepts of international security based on promoting and developing military alliances and nuclear deterrence policies.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 19): The Group also believes that the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes and the lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies further undermine disarmament commitments.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 26): the Group strongly calls upon all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to exclude completely the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from their military doctrines.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>Security assurances</b>                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 5, para 23): The Group further reaffirms that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty should be effectively assured by the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons through the urgent conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 25): the Group recalls the advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 of the International Court of Justice on the <i>Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons</i> that there is in neither customary nor conventional international law any specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons and that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 26): ...the Group is of the view that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States must seriously refrain, under any circumstances, from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 26): the Group strongly calls upon all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to exclude completely the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from their military doctrines.</li> </ul> |
| <b>NATO</b>                                    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 4): The Group also remains deeply concerned at the strategic concept for the defence and security of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which justifies the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and maintains unjustifiable concepts of international security based on promoting and developing military alliances and nuclear deterrence policies.</li> </ul>  |
| <b>Nuclear disarmament and multilateralism</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 5): The Group underlines that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues.</li> <li>• (Page 4-5, para 21): The Group...reiterates its firm commitment to working to convene a high-level international conference to identify ways and means of eliminating nuclear weapons, at the earliest possible date, with the objective of an agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time, to prohibit their development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling,</li> </ul>   |

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|  | transfer, use or threat of use, and to provide for their destruction.   |
| <b>2010 Action plan and disarmament</b>      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 9): The Group emphasizes in particular the prime importance of and the urgent need for full and prompt implementation of the commitments by the nuclear-weapon States under action 5 of the action plan.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 10): ...the Group calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to submit comprehensive substantive reports about their undertakings under action 5 of the action plan to the Preparatory Committee in 2014, in order to enable the 2015 Review Conference to take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of article VI of the Treaty in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 17): The Group also recalls the commitment by the Russian Federation and the United States under action 4 of the action plan to the full implementation of New START and strongly urges them to adopt all required measures to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 27): The Group reaffirms the validity of its working paper on the elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons submitted to the 2010 Review Conference. The Group is determined to integrate this plan of action into the outcome document of the 2015 review process of the Treaty, and strongly calls for this to be done.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>CD and nuclear disarmament</b>            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 11): The Group also deeply regrets the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 11): ...the Group reiterates its call to establish, as soon as possible and as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, and recalls action 6 of the action plan, in which all States agreed that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 12): The Group expresses its appreciation to the representative of Algeria, under whose presidency the Conference adopted (although did not implement) decision CD/1864, and to those representatives of member and observer States of the Non-Aligned Movement who subsequently served as President of the Conference, including, mostly recently, the representative of Egypt, for his tireless efforts and for presenting a draft decision on a programme of work for the 2012 session (see CD/1933/Rev.1).</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 13): The Group remains concerned by the continued inability of the Conference to resume its negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, including all practical measures to eliminate in an irreversible manner the past production and existing stockpiles of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. In this context, the Conference is urged to agree on a programme of work that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 18): In accordance with General Assembly resolution 66/27, the Group emphasizes the urgent need to begin substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.</li> </ul> |
| <b>Negotiations on fissile materials ban</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 13): The Group remains concerned by the continued inability of the Conference to resume its negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the</li> </ul>   |

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|  | <p>production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, including all practical measures to eliminate in an irreversible manner the past production and existing stockpiles of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 14): The Group reconfirms that negotiations on a fissile material treaty should be conducted on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (see CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein (known as the “Shannon mandate”)...in addition to all related issues, including the past production and existing stockpiles of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 14): The Group expresses concern over the attempts to limit the scope of the negotiations on a fissile material treaty as contained in the Shannon mandate...</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 14): the Group recognizes that non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have already agreed to a legally binding commitment not to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</li> </ul> |
| <b>Arms race in Outer space</b>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, para 18): The Group believes that the abrogation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 18): In accordance with General Assembly resolution 66/27, the Group emphasizes the urgent need to begin substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>Procedural matters in NPT Review Cycle</b>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 6, para 28): The Group reiterates its call for the establishment, as a matter of priority, in Main Committee I of a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament mandated to focus on the issue of fulfilment of the obligations under article VI of the Treaty and on further practical measures required to achieve progress in that regard.</li> </ul>  |
| <b>NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.22</b><br><b>Procedural and other arrangements for the effective and successful outcome of the Preparatory Committee and 2015 Review Conference</b> |   |
| <b>General views in strengthening review process</b>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1): The Group...reiterates its commitment to article VIII (3) of the Treaty, as well as the consensus reached at the 2000 Review Conference on improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 3, f): ...the Group emphasizes the need for the Preparatory Committee meetings to continue to allocate specific time for deliberations on nuclear disarmament, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and security assurances...</li> </ul>   |
| <b>Security assurance</b>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 2, d): As legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the Preparatory Committee should make recommendations to the 2015 Review Conference on this issue.</li> </ul>  |
| <b>Reporting</b>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Page 2, para 3, c): To this end, the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on nuclear disarmament so as to ensure that there is a proper accounting in the reports by the States of their progress in achieving nuclear disarmament.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 3, c): the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty wishes to recall that the Final Document of the 2000 Review</li> </ul>   |

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|   | <p>Conference... called for regular reports within the framework of the Treaty's strengthened review process by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament".</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 3, c): ...the Group expects that the States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, should submit reports to each Preparatory Committee session, including this one, unless otherwise decided by the Review Conference.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 3, c): In the view of the Group, the reports on article VI should cover issues and principles addressed by the 13 practical steps and undertakings under section B on "Disarmament of nuclear weapons", in the "Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions" of the 2010 Review Conference and should include specific and complete information on each of these steps and follow-on actions.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 3, d): The Group expects that all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, would submit reports in this regard as agreed in the 2000 Final Document</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 3, e): The Group accordingly emphasizes the importance of and calls for submitting required reports by all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, as well as the facilitator of the 2012 Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, to the current and upcoming meetings of the Preparatory Committee and the 2015 Review Conference.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 3, g, b): [The Group calls to] Further strengthen or enhance the regular reporting mechanism provided for in accordance with the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference</li> </ul> |
| <b>1995 Resolution and ME</b>                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 3, d): The Group... believes that the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on the Middle East by devoting sufficient time within the indicative timetable and the full opportunity for all speakers to thereby engage in a substantive debate.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>Subsidiary bodies on nuclear disarmament</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 3, f): The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for an agreement to establish subsidiary bodies to the relevant Main Committees of the 2015 Review Conference to deliberate on issues related to nuclear disarmament...</li> </ul>  |
| <b>Education</b>                                | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, para 3, g, c): [The Group calls to] Consider the steps and other actions that could be taken to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education, with particular reference to the Treaty</li> </ul>  |
| <b>NGO</b>                                      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, para 3, g, d): [The Group calls to] Support participation of non-governmental organizations in the Preparatory Committee and 2015 Review Conference meetings.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>Review of 2010 NPT Final Document</b>        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, para 4): The Group... emphasizes that the inclusion of the review part of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference as an opinion of the President of the Conference and not as a consensus language should not be considered as a precedent to be followed in the future, without prejudice to the prerogatives of the Review Conference.</li> </ul>   |