



Thematic Summary of the Working Papers Submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties of the 5th Review Cycle of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1995 Review and Extension Conference

Disarmament

<p>Verification</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 11) A Treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices would be a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation provided that such a treaty is non-discriminatory, effectively verifiable and universally applicable, thus constituting a part of the comprehensive efforts to ban nuclear weapons and lead to their destruction.</p>
<p>Disarmament and Development</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 6) In this context, the Conference calls upon States parties to refrain, in their international relations, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources.</p>
<p>Nuclear-Weapon States Obligations</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 1) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was conceived as an instrument to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As part of this endeavor, States Parties which are Nuclear-Weapon States undertook “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control” and, at the same time, to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 2) During the negotiations of the NPT, the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (NNWSs), particularly the developing countries, sought a fair balance in the Treaty between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the NWSs and NNWSs which could successfully serve the interests of all States Parties. This position was endorsed by resolution 2028 (XX) of the UN General Assembly. However, this was not fully realized at the time. Today, more than two decades later, the imbalances between the obligations and responsibilities have grown. There is a stalemate in negotiations aimed at redressing those imbalances, including negotiations in the NPT Review Conferences as well as the Conference on Disarmament.</p>

(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 5) The cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament as a whole, continue to be the main objectives of the Treaty. The NWSs should reaffirm their commitment to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 6) A time-bound framework and a target date for the total elimination and the efforts by the NWSs to carry forward the process of de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons will create a strong political thrust towards international efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. A statement by the Russian Federation and the United States indicating the bilateral measures they will take in the future in order to reduce their nuclear arsenals beyond the levels envisaged in the START I and II agreements, would also be a welcome initiative, together with an indication of the steps that China, France and the United Kingdom would be willing to take in light of the reductions referred to above.

(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 8) Furthermore, deployment of nuclear weapons by NWSs on foreign territories, particularly in NNWSs territories, should be prohibited as it negates the objectives of a nuclear-weapons-free zones. All States that have deployed nuclear weapons outside their boundaries should withdraw all those weapons back to their own territories.

(NPT/CONF.1995/15, Para 2) In contrast to the treaties mentioned above which are of a permanent nature, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the only multilateral instrument of its kind, entered into force in March 1970 for an initial period of 25 years. The transitional nature of the NPT makes it unique among disarmament treaties. It reflects the intention of the parties to ensure the fulfilment of the purposes set out in the preamble and the effective implementation of its provisions, especially those contained in article VI. To achieve this, the NPT provides not only for the possibility of periodic review conferences (art. VIII (3)) but, more importantly, for a conference to be convened 25 years after its entry into force “to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties” (art. X (2)).

(NPT/CONF.1995/19, Para 2) Such an exercise calls for a careful examination and realistic assessment of the obligations and responsibilities undertaken by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. The extent to which these objectives have been met constitutes an essential element for a decision on the length of the extension.

(NPT/CONF.1995/19, Para 4) As has been consistently demanded by the Movement of Non-aligned States and also stipulated in the document for the third session of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.1995/PC.III/13) submitted by Indonesia on behalf of the

group of non-aligned and other States, the following measures are essential to the strengthening as well as to the full realization and effective implementation of the objectives of the Treaty: (a) Immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race, leading to nuclear disarmament and the attainment of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control; (b) An immediate conclusion and implementation of a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty; (c) A legally binding commitment by nuclear-weapon States on no-first use and non-use of nuclear weapons; (d) A non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; (e) A programme of action for significant reduction of nuclear weapons, leading to total elimination of such weapons and their delivery vehicles within a time-bound framework; (f) A legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional and comprehensive security assurances, both positive and negative, to non-nuclear-weapon States; (g) Facilitating the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and full adherence by all nuclear-weapon States to the instruments relating to such zones; (h) Full and unimpeded access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes for all the States parties without discrimination; (i) Application of comprehensive and strengthened IAEA safeguards to all nuclear activities and facilities; (j) All efforts must be made for ensuring the universality of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 1) The Conference reviews the implementation of each aspect of article VI, and of the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs and stresses the need to intensify the effort to achieve, at the earliest possible date, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament; it urges the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 2) The Conference notes with regret that the provisions of article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty have not been completely fulfilled since the Treaty came into force. In this regard, the Conference stresses the need for the cessation of the nuclear arms race at the earliest possible date and to take effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament. The Conference urges the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 3) The Conference recalls that under the provisions of article VI each of the parties undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith: (a) On effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament; (b) On a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 7) The Conference notes that a number of significant changes have occurred since the 1990 Review Conference and that a process of gradual transformation of military structures is now under way. The Conference expresses the hope that these developments will lead to an effective halt of the nuclear arms

race between the two major nuclear Powers in quantitative terms and that this trend will encourage further efforts in nuclear disarmament negotiations towards the achievement of the objectives of article VI.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 9) The Conference recalls the annual appeals made in United Nations General Assembly resolutions since 1981 calling for a moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In this respect, the Conference notes the moratorium assumed by the four nuclear-weapon States and urges all the nuclear-weapon States to observe it.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 13) The Conference examines the existing situation in the light of the undertaking assumed by the parties in article VI to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. The Conference is pleased to note that during the last few years there have been encouraging developments, namely, that the United States of America and the Russian Federation have concluded the Treaty between the United States and the USSR on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), which eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons, and the Treaties on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I and START II Treaties), which will further reduce a significant number of the nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles which they have excessively accumulated during the cold war period.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 16) The Conference calls for the intensification of negotiations towards further reduction and elimination of all types of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery, with the earliest participation of all nuclear-weapon States. The Conference believes that all the nuclear-weapon States should commit themselves to a definite, time-bound programme of action for the continued reduction of nuclear weapons, leading to their total elimination. The Conference calls on the Conference on Disarmament to begin deliberating on the programme of action as soon as possible. The Conference firmly believes that such a programme of action will effectively contribute to the early realization of the objectives of article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 17) In reviewing progress towards a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, the Conference takes note of a number of developments in the areas of chemical weapons, conventional force reductions and confidence and security-building measures. The Conference however regrets the lack of progress towards the realization of the treaty itself. The Conference, therefore, calls for an intensified effort to bring about greater confidence and the reduction of armaments in all areas in pursuit of the objectives set out in the twelfth preambular paragraph and in article VI of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 18) With respect to article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs, the Conference

observes that much remains to be done before the objectives and aspirations of the Treaty are attained. The Conference notes that in some areas there has been progress in the past five years but in other significant areas there has been no progress. The Conference reaffirms the commitment of all parties to the implementation of article VI and calls upon the parties to achieve fully the objectives of the article. The Conference agrees that the achievement of the following measures at an early date is essential to the strengthening as well as the full realization and effective implementation of article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty: (a) Immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race leading to nuclear disarmament and the attainment of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control; (b) Immediate conclusion and implementation of a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty; (c) A legally-binding commitment by nuclear-weapon States on no-first use and non-use of nuclear weapons; (d) A non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices; (e) A programme of action for significant reduction of nuclear weapons leading to the total elimination of such weapons and their delivery vehicles within a time-bound framework; (f) A legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional and comprehensive security assurances, both positive and negative, to non-nuclear-weapon States; (g) Facilitating the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and full adherence by nuclear-weapon States to the instruments relating to such zones.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.9, Para 1) The Conference reaffirms that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty and the regime of non-proliferation in all its aspects has a vital role in promoting international peace and security. The Conference therefore welcomes the accession of more parties to the Treaty, especially the remaining nuclear-weapon States, since the last Review Conference, and urges all States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it without delay. The Conference remains convinced that full compliance of all parties and universal adherence to the Treaty are the best way to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.9, Para 3) The Conference reiterates and reaffirms the convictions expressed in the first to third preambular paragraphs. The Conference welcomes the positive developments in the international situation since the last Review Conference, especially in the East-West context and the relations between the Russian Federation and the United States of America. In this regard, the Conference takes note of the role of the INF and the START process which will result in the reduction in nuclear arsenals of the Russian Federation and the United States. The Conference urges China, France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to join the process. The Conference remains convinced that proliferation of nuclear weapons both horizontally and vertically would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war.

	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.9, Para 4) The Conference agrees that the strict observance of the terms of articles I and II remains central to achieving the shared objectives of preventing under any circumstances further proliferation of nuclear weapons and preserving the Treaty's vital contribution to peace and security.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.9, Para 5) The Conference takes note of the declarations of nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty that they had fulfilled their obligations under article I. The Conference underlines the need for nuclear-weapon States to remain in compliance with the letter and the spirit of article I. The Conference further reiterates that prohibition of transfer of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices includes transfers between nuclear-weapon States.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.9, Para 6) The Conference further takes note of the declarations that non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had fulfilled their obligations under article II. However, the Conference remains concerned about the ability of certain States not parties to the Treaty to obtain nuclear materials, technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons. Such transfers seriously place doubt on those responsible for supplying such material and technology to those non-parties. The Conference underlines the vital need for all parties to the Treaty to comply scrupulously and unreservedly with their obligations.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Arms Races</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 1) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was conceived as an instrument to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As part of this endeavor, States Parties which are Nuclear-Weapon States undertook “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control” and, at the same time, to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 5) The cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament as a whole, continue to be the main objectives of the Treaty. The NWSs should reaffirm their commitment to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/19, Para 4) As has been consistently demanded by the Movement of Non-aligned States and also stipulated in the document for the third session of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.1995/PC.III/13) submitted by Indonesia on behalf of the group of non-aligned and other States, the following measures are essential to the strengthening as well as to the full realization and effective implementation of the objectives of the Treaty: (a) Immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race, leading to nuclear disarmament and the attainment of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control; (b) An immediate conclusion and implementation of a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable</p>

comprehensive test-ban treaty; (c) A legally binding commitment by nuclear-weapon States on no-first use and non-use of nuclear weapons; (d) A non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; (e) A programme of action for significant reduction of nuclear weapons, leading to total elimination of such weapons and their delivery vehicles within a time-bound framework; (f) A legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional and comprehensive security assurances, both positive and negative, to non-nuclear-weapon States; (g) Facilitating the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and full adherence by all nuclear-weapon States to the instruments relating to such zones; (h) Full and unimpeded access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes for all the States parties without discrimination; (i) Application of comprehensive and strengthened IAEA safeguards to all nuclear activities and facilities; (j) All efforts must be made for ensuring the universality of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 1) The Conference reviews the implementation of each aspect of article VI, and of the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs and stresses the need to intensify the effort to achieve, at the earliest possible date, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament; it urges the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 2) The Conference notes with regret that the provisions of article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty have not been completely fulfilled since the Treaty came into force. In this regard, the Conference stresses the need for the cessation of the nuclear arms race at the earliest possible date and to take effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament. The Conference urges the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 3) The Conference recalls that under the provisions of article VI each of the parties undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith: (a) On effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament; (b) On a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 7) The Conference notes that a number of significant changes have occurred since the 1990 Review Conference and that a process of gradual transformation of military structures is now under way. The Conference expresses the hope that these developments will lead to an effective halt of the nuclear arms race between the two major nuclear Powers in quantitative terms and that this trend will encourage further efforts in nuclear disarmament negotiations towards the achievement of the objectives of article VI.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 8) The Conference expresses the view that the conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear-weapon tests is one of the most important measures to halt the nuclear arms race. The

Conference reaffirms the determination expressed in the preamble of the 1963 partial test-ban treaty, and reiterated in the tenth preambular paragraph of the non-proliferation Treaty, to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 13) The Conference examines the existing situation in the light of the undertaking assumed by the parties in article VI to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. The Conference is pleased to note that during the last few years there have been encouraging developments, namely, that the United States of America and the Russian Federation have concluded the Treaty between the United States and the USSR on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), which eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons, and the Treaties on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I and START II Treaties), which will further reduce a significant number of the nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles which they have excessively accumulated during the cold war period.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 15) The Conference regrets the continuing lack of progress on relevant items of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular those relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear war including all related matters, the convention on the production and stockpiling of weapon-grade fissile materials, the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons, the cessation of the production of their delivery vehicles, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the establishment of an effective internationally negotiated legally binding instrument on security assurances.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 18) With respect to article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs, the Conference observes that much remains to be done before the objectives and aspirations of the Treaty are attained. The Conference notes that in some areas there has been progress in the past five years but in other significant areas there has been no progress. The Conference reaffirms the commitment of all parties to the implementation of article VI and calls upon the parties to achieve fully the objectives of the article. The Conference agrees that the achievement of the following measures at an early date is essential to the strengthening as well as the full realization and effective implementation of article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty: (a) Immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race leading to nuclear disarmament and the attainment of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control; (b) Immediate conclusion and implementation of a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty; (c) A legally-binding commitment by nuclear-weapon States on no-first use and non-use of nuclear weapons; (d) A non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices; (e) A programme of action for significant

	<p>reduction of nuclear weapons leading to the total elimination of such weapons and their delivery vehicles within a time-bound framework; (f) A legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional and comprehensive security assurances, both positive and negative, to non-nuclear-weapon States; (g) Facilitating the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and full adherence by nuclear-weapon States to the instruments relating to such zones.</p>
<p>Bilateral Disarmament</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 6) A time-bound framework and a target date for the total elimination and the efforts by the NWSs to carry forward the process of de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons will create a strong political thrust towards international efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. A statement by the Russian Federation and the United States indicating the bilateral measures they will take in the future in order to reduce their nuclear arsenals beyond the levels envisaged in the START I and II agreements, would also be a welcome initiative, together with an indication of the steps that China, France and the United Kingdom would be willing to take in light of the reductions referred to above.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 13) The Conference examines the existing situation in the light of the undertaking assumed by the parties in article VI to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. The Conference is pleased to note that during the last few years there have been encouraging developments, namely, that the United States of America and the Russian Federation have concluded the Treaty between the United States and the USSR on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), which eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons, and the Treaties on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I and START II Treaties), which will further reduce a significant number of the nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles which they have excessively accumulated during the cold war period.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.9, Para 3) The Conference reiterates and reaffirms the convictions expressed in the first to third preambular paragraphs. The Conference welcomes the positive developments in the international situation since the last Review Conference, especially in the East-West context and the relations between the Russian Federation and the United States of America. In this regard, the Conference takes note of the role of the INF and the START process which will result in the reduction in nuclear arsenals of the Russian Federation and the United States. The Conference urges China, France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to join the process. The Conference remains convinced that proliferation of nuclear weapons both horizontally and vertically would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war.</p>

<p style="text-align: center;">Disarmament and Nonproliferation</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 3) The Non-Aligned Countries value the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a key instrument to channel international efforts to halt vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Notwithstanding the important role of the Treaty in the maintenance of international security, it should be recognized that the Treaty has fundamental shortcomings that have become the bone of contention between NWSs and NNWSs Parties to the NPT ever since it came into being, thus eroding the perceived value of the Treaty.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 11) A Treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices would be a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation provided that such a treaty is non-discriminatory, effectively verifiable and universally applicable, thus constituting a part of the comprehensive efforts to ban nuclear weapons and lead to their destruction.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.9, Para 1) The Conference reaffirms that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty and the regime of non-proliferation in all its aspects has a vital role in promoting international peace and security. The Conference therefore welcomes the accession of more parties to the Treaty, especially the remaining nuclear-weapon States, since the last Review Conference, and urges all States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it without delay. The Conference remains convinced that full compliance of all parties and universal adherence to the Treaty are the best way to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.9, Para 3) The Conference reiterates and reaffirms the convictions expressed in the first to third preambular paragraphs. The Conference welcomes the positive developments in the international situation since the last Review Conference, especially in the East-West context and the relations between the Russian Federation and the United States of America. In this regard, the Conference takes note of the role of the INF and the START process which will result in the reduction in nuclear arsenals of the Russian Federation and the United States. The Conference urges China, France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to join the process. The Conference remains convinced that proliferation of nuclear weapons both horizontally and vertically would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Disarmament and the Environment</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 10) The Conference also stresses the important contribution that a treaty banning all nuclear-weapon tests would make towards strengthening and extending the international barriers against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and that it would contribute greatly to the elimination of the grave threat to the environment and human health represented by continued nuclear testing. The Conference further stresses that adherence to such a treaty by all States would contribute substantially to the full achievement of the non-proliferation objective.</p>

<p style="text-align: center;">Modernization and Development of Nuclear Weapons</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.9, Para 7) The Conference affirms the determination to stop the spread of nuclear explosive capabilities, and hence the ability to develop and produce nuclear weapons in a non-discriminatory manner and without hampering legitimate peaceful nuclear activities and programmes of States parties to the Treaty.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">NAM Involvement and Contributions</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/19, Para 4) As has been consistently demanded by the Movement of Non-aligned States and also stipulated in the document for the third session of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.1995/PC.III/13) submitted by Indonesia on behalf of the group of non-aligned and other States, the following measures are essential to the strengthening as well as to the full realization and effective implementation of the objectives of the Treaty: (a) Immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race, leading to nuclear disarmament and the attainment of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control; (b) An immediate conclusion and implementation of a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty; (c) A legally binding commitment by nuclear-weapon States on no-first use and non-use of nuclear weapons; (d) A non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; (e) A programme of action for significant reduction of nuclear weapons, leading to total elimination of such weapons and their delivery vehicles within a time-bound framework; (f) A legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional and comprehensive security assurances, both positive and negative, to non-nuclear-weapon States; (g) Facilitating the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and full adherence by all nuclear-weapon States to the instruments relating to such zones; (h) Full and unimpeded access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes for all the States parties without discrimination; (i) Application of comprehensive and strengthened IAEA safeguards to all nuclear activities and facilities; (j) All efforts must be made for ensuring the universality of the Treaty.</p>
<p>United Nations Fora</p>	
<p style="text-align: center;">UN General Assembly</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 2) During the negotiations of the NPT, the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (NNWSs), particularly the developing countries, sought a fair balance in the Treaty between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the NWSs and NNWSs which could successfully serve the interests of all States Parties. This position was endorsed by resolution 2028 (XX) of the UN General Assembly. However, this was not fully realized at the time. Today, more than two decades later, the imbalances between the obligations and responsibilities have grown. There is a stalemate in negotiations aimed at redressing those imbalances, including negotiations in the NPT Review Conferences as well as the Conference on Disarmament.</p>

	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/15, Para 1) The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles in all its aspects is an issue of the highest priority in the field of disarmament and international security as envisaged in the final document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session on disarmament in 1978. The establishment of a genuine, truly universal and non-discriminatory nuclear non-proliferation regime will enhance the prospects of a better and more secure world free of nuclear weapons. Regional arrangements such as the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga, the nearly completed instrument for Africa and others identified by the Final Document, particularly the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, constitute important steps towards the attainment of a nuclear-weapon-free planet.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 9) The Conference recalls the annual appeals made in United Nations General Assembly resolutions since 1981 calling for a moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In this respect, the Conference notes the moratorium assumed by the four nuclear-weapon States and urges all the nuclear-weapon States to observe it.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">SSOD</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/15, Para 1) The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles in all its aspects is an issue of the highest priority in the field of disarmament and international security as envisaged in the final document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session on disarmament in 1978. The establishment of a genuine, truly universal and non-discriminatory nuclear non-proliferation regime will enhance the prospects of a better and more secure world free of nuclear weapons. Regional arrangements such as the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga, the nearly completed instrument for Africa and others identified by the Final Document, particularly the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, constitute important steps towards the attainment of a nuclear-weapon-free planet.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Test Ban and CTBT</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 9) The conclusion of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) remains one of the highest priority objectives of the international community and the fundamental pillar of an effective and comprehensive non-proliferation regime. All efforts towards the achievement of this objective, including the PTBT Amendment Conference, should be pursued. While the decision by the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc Committee with a negotiating mandate is welcome, a target date must be set to conclude the negotiations on a CTBT prior to the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. The conclusion of a CTBT would decisively benefit the outcome of the said Conference. Pending the conclusion of</p>

such a Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should suspend all nuclear testing.

(NPT/CONF.1995/19, Para 4) As has been consistently demanded by the Movement of Non-aligned States and also stipulated in the document for the third session of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.1995/PC.III/13) submitted by Indonesia on behalf of the group of non-aligned and other States, the following measures are essential to the strengthening as well as to the full realization and effective implementation of the objectives of the Treaty: (a) Immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race, leading to nuclear disarmament and the attainment of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control; (b) An immediate conclusion and implementation of a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty; (c) A legally binding commitment by nuclear-weapon States on no-first use and non-use of nuclear weapons; (d) A non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; (e) A programme of action for significant reduction of nuclear weapons, leading to total elimination of such weapons and their delivery vehicles within a time-bound framework; (f) A legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional and comprehensive security assurances, both positive and negative, to non-nuclear-weapon States; (g) Facilitating the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and full adherence by all nuclear-weapon States to the instruments relating to such zones; (h) Full and unimpeded access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes for all the States parties without discrimination; (i) Application of comprehensive and strengthened IAEA safeguards to all nuclear activities and facilities; (j) All efforts must be made for ensuring the universality of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 4) The Conference further recalls the determination expressed by the parties to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (the partial test-ban treaty) in its preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to that end.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 8) The Conference expresses the view that the conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear-weapon tests is one of the most important measures to halt the nuclear arms race. The Conference reaffirms the determination expressed in the preamble of the 1963 partial test-ban treaty, and reiterated in the tenth preambular paragraph of the non-proliferation Treaty, to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 9) The Conference recalls the annual appeals made in United Nations General Assembly resolutions since 1981 calling for a moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In this respect, the Conference notes the moratorium assumed by the four nuclear-weapon States and urges all the nuclear-weapon States to observe it.

	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 10) The Conference also stresses the important contribution that a treaty banning all nuclear-weapon tests would make towards strengthening and extending the international barriers against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and that it would contribute greatly to the elimination of the grave threat to the environment and human health represented by continued nuclear testing. The Conference further stresses that adherence to such a treaty by all States would contribute substantially to the full achievement of the non-proliferation objective.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 11) The Conference notes with satisfaction that the Conference on Disarmament has reactivated its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban with a mandate to negotiate intensively a comprehensive test-ban treaty which should ban all nuclear-weapon tests in all environments, using whatever techniques, for all time. The Conference emphasizes the critical importance of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban completing its work by the end of the year 1995.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 18) With respect to article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs, the Conference observes that much remains to be done before the objectives and aspirations of the Treaty are attained. The Conference notes that in some areas there has been progress in the past five years but in other significant areas there has been no progress. The Conference reaffirms the commitment of all parties to the implementation of article VI and calls upon the parties to achieve fully the objectives of the article. The Conference agrees that the achievement of the following measures at an early date is essential to the strengthening as well as the full realization and effective implementation of article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty: (a) Immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race leading to nuclear disarmament and the attainment of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control; (b) Immediate conclusion and implementation of a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty; (c) A legally-binding commitment by nuclear-weapon States on no-first use and non-use of nuclear weapons; (d) A non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices; (e) A programme of action for significant reduction of nuclear weapons leading to the total elimination of such weapons and their delivery vehicles within a time-bound framework; (f) A legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional and comprehensive security assurances, both positive and negative, to non-nuclear-weapon States; (g) Facilitating the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and full adherence by nuclear-weapon States to the instruments relating to such zones.</p>
<p>Conference on Disarmament</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 2) During the negotiations of the NPT, the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (NNWSs), particularly the developing countries, sought a fair balance in the Treaty between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the NWSs and NNWSs which could</p>

successfully serve the interests of all States Parties. This position was endorsed by resolution 2028 (XX) of the UN General Assembly. However, this was not fully realized at the time. Today, more than two decades later, the imbalances between the obligations and responsibilities have grown. There is a stalemate in negotiations aimed at redressing those imbalances, including negotiations in the NPT Review Conferences as well as the Conference on Disarmament.

(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 9) The conclusion of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) remains one of the highest priority objectives of the international community and the fundamental pillar of an effective and comprehensive non-proliferation regime. All efforts towards the achievement of this objective, including the PTBT Amendment Conference, should be pursued. While the decision by the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc Committee with a negotiating mandate is welcome, a target date must be set to conclude the negotiations on a CTBT prior to the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. The conclusion of a CTBT would decisively benefit the outcome of the said Conference. Pending the conclusion of such a Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should suspend all nuclear testing.

(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 10) Pending the total and complete elimination of nuclear weapons, unconditional security assurances to the NNWSs has been regarded as one of the major concerns. In the context of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations, it is the primary right of States Parties to the NPT to be assured of non use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear Weapons States Parties should agree to a legally binding instrument on this issue before the 1995 Conference. The CD should intensify negotiations with a view to concluding an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapons States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 11) The Conference notes with satisfaction that the Conference on Disarmament has reactivated its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban with a mandate to negotiate intensively a comprehensive test-ban treaty which should ban all nuclear-weapon tests in all environments, using whatever techniques, for all time. The Conference emphasizes the critical importance of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban completing its work by the end of the year 1995.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 15) The Conference regrets the continuing lack of progress on relevant items of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular those relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear war including all related matters, the convention on the production and stockpiling of weapon-grade fissile materials, the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons, the cessation of the production of their delivery vehicles, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the establishment of an effective internationally negotiated legally binding instrument on security assurances.

	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 16) The Conference calls for the intensification of negotiations towards further reduction and elimination of all types of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery, with the earliest participation of all nuclear-weapon States. The Conference believes that all the nuclear-weapon States should commit themselves to a definite, time-bound programme of action for the continued reduction of nuclear weapons, leading to their total elimination. The Conference calls on the Conference on Disarmament to begin deliberating on the programme of action as soon as possible. The Conference firmly believes that such a programme of action will effectively contribute to the early realization of the objectives of article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.10, Para 6) The conclusion of an international instrument providing for such arrangements would strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States parties, and offer an additional incentive to non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty to adhere to the Treaty. The Conference notes that consultations and negotiations on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons have been under way in the Conference on Disarmament for over 15 years. The Conference agrees that a conference should be convened at an early date to work on a protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties.</p>
<p>International Atomic Energy Agency</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 13) The inalienable right of all States Parties to develop the peaceful use of nuclear energy for economic and social development must be reaffirmed by all nuclear and advanced non-nuclear States Parties. It is also essential that free and unimpeded access to technology be guaranteed, without exception, for all States Parties to the Treaty who have concluded relevant safeguards agreements with the IAEA.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/19, Para 4) As has been consistently demanded by the Movement of Non-aligned States and also stipulated in the document for the third session of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.1995/PC.III/13) submitted by Indonesia on behalf of the group of non-aligned and other States, the following measures are essential to the strengthening as well as to the full realization and effective implementation of the objectives of the Treaty: (a) Immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race, leading to nuclear disarmament and the attainment of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control; (b) An immediate conclusion and implementation of a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty; (c) A legally binding commitment by nuclear-weapon States on no-first use and non-use of nuclear weapons; (d) A non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; (e) A programme of action for</p>

significant reduction of nuclear weapons, leading to total elimination of such weapons and their delivery vehicles within a time-bound framework; (f) A legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional and comprehensive security assurances, both positive and negative, to non-nuclear-weapon States; (g) Facilitating the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and full adherence by all nuclear-weapon States to the instruments relating to such zones; (h) Full and unimpeded access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes for all the States parties without discrimination; (i) Application of comprehensive and strengthened IAEA safeguards to all nuclear activities and facilities; (j) All efforts must be made for ensuring the universality of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.9, Para 8) The Conference expresses great and serious concerns about the nuclear-weapon capabilities of Israel. In this connection, the Conference calls for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel. The Conference also calls upon Israel to accede to the Treaty and place all of its nuclear facilities under full-scope IARA safeguards. In this respect, the Conference also calls on all other States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it and to subject whatever nuclear facilities they may have to the full-scope safeguards of IAEA.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.18, Para 1) The Conference reaffirms that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards provide assurance that States are complying with their undertakings and assist States in demonstrating their compliance. IAEA safeguards should therefore play a key role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.18, Para 2) The Conference commends IAEA for its efforts in implementing the safeguards regime and expresses its support for the ongoing process of strengthening and improving the effectiveness of that regime in programme 93 + 2. It emphasizes in that regard that the process should be objective and non-discriminatory.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.18, Para 3) The Conference considers that unsafeguarded and ambiguous nuclear activities in some States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons pose serious proliferation dangers and increase the threat perceptions of States parties to the Treaty. The Conference in that respect calls upon all States not parties to the Treaty with significant nuclear programmes to submit all their nuclear activities, both current and future, to the IAEA full-scope safeguards regime. The Conference considers further that the application of IAEA full-scope safeguards is an effective confidence-building measure, particularly in volatile and conflict-ridden regions.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.18, Para 4) The Conference considers the application of IAEA full-scope safeguards a condition of supply of nuclear materials and technology. States shall refrain from extending

assistance in the nuclear field to States not parties to the Treaty who have not submitted their nuclear activities to the IAEA full-scope safeguards.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 7) The Conference expresses its regret that there exist restrictions and constraints imposed on developing non-nuclear-weapon States regarding full access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Unilaterally enforced restrictive measures, beyond safeguards required under the Treaty, must not be used to prevent peaceful development, especially in the nuclear area, and should be removed. It is also essential that free and unimpeded access to peaceful nuclear technology be guaranteed, without exception, for all States parties to the Treaty who have concluded relevant safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 8) The Conference notes with appreciation the positive steps taken by South Africa by abandoning its nuclear weapons programme and acceding to the Treaty. The Conference still expresses great and serious concern about the nuclear capabilities of the threshold States and stresses that the development of such capabilities would undermine the credibility and stability of the Treaty regime. In this context, the Conference demands all States to suspend any cooperation that would contribute to the nuclear programmes of these States, and demands the threshold States to accede to the Treaty, to subject all their nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards and to pledge not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 10) The Conference notes that the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply has been able to consider ways and means in which supplies of nuclear materials, equipment and technology and fuel cycle services can be assured on a more predictable and longer-term basis in accordance with mutually acceptable considerations of non-proliferation, and, in that context, was able to identify a number of emerging industrial States in the field of nuclear technology. On the other hand, the Conference regrets, that the Committee on Assurances of Supply has not succeeded in reaching agreement on a set of principles for international cooperation. The Conference acknowledges the need for setting up United Nations mechanisms to provide a forum for parties to the Treaty to discuss regularly the implementation of article IV of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 12) The Conference notes that IAEA plays an important role in assisting developing States in the development of nuclear power and encourages IAEA to continue to include the required components identified in the study in its programme of work. It also recommends that IAEA continue to provide upon request assistance in securing financing from outside sources for nuclear power projects in developing countries.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 13) The Conference commends the role and activities of IAEA in the field of technical

	<p>cooperation for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, for the benefit of developing countries in particular. The Conference strongly urges donor countries to facilitate access to peaceful uses of nuclear technology to States parties to the Treaty through the Technical Cooperation Fund of IAEA, calls upon all parties to honour their commitments and negotiate, in good faith, the target for the Technical Cooperation Fund, and, finally, calls upon parties to consider adequate and predictable resources, and which should be complemented by sufficient relevant manpower.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 14) The Conference welcomes the voluntary offer by a number of nuclear-weapon States to put their nuclear facilities to international verification, and requests that the inherent costs resulting from these additional safeguards activities should not be at the expense of other IAEA major programmes, such as nuclear power, fuel cycle and radioactive waste management; applications for peaceful uses of nuclear technology for health, agriculture and industry; and nuclear safety and radiation protection. In this context, the Conference notes the intention of IAEA to establish a standing advisory group on technical cooperation.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 15) The Conference especially recognizes the importance of the work of IAEA in the areas of radiological protection and nuclear safety, and urges States parties to the Treaty which have not yet done so, to become signatories to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which was adopted in 1994 with a view to creating an appropriate safety culture.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 17) The Conference expresses the hope that the effective implementation of the IAEA Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste will enhance the protection of all States from the dumping of radioactive waste pending the negotiation of an international convention on the management of such wastes with a view of convening a diplomatic conference in 1996.</p>
<p>UN Security Council</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.10, Para 4) Pending the elimination of all nuclear weapons, the Conference believes that the best security assurance is an effective, unconditional, comprehensive, internationally negotiated and legally binding instrument. In this connection, the Conference believes that Security Council resolution 984 (1995) should have included language committing the nuclear-weapon States to take action, in the event of a threat of use of nuclear weapons, to suppress that threat.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.10, Para 5) The Conference welcomes the declaration on negative security assurance issued by the five nuclear-weapon States prior to the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 984 (1995). However, the Conference believes that resolution 984 (1995) and the five declarations are only the first step towards providing non-nuclear-weapon States with the kind of assurances to which they are entitled, namely, an internationally</p>

	negotiated, legally binding instrument where all the nuclear-weapon States are obligated to the same provisions and the same conditions.
Chemical and Biological Weapons	
Chemical Weapons	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 17) In reviewing progress towards a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, the Conference takes note of a number of developments in the areas of chemical weapons, conventional force reductions and confidence and security-building measures. The Conference however regrets the lack of progress towards the realization of the treaty itself. The Conference, therefore, calls for an intensified effort to bring about greater confidence and the reduction of armaments in all areas in pursuit of the objectives set out in the twelfth preambular paragraph and in article VI of the Treaty.</p>
Outer Space	
International Cooperation on Outer Space	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 15) The Conference regrets the continuing lack of progress on relevant items of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular those relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear war including all related matters, the convention on the production and stockpiling of weapon-grade fissile materials, the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons, the cessation of the production of their delivery vehicles, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the establishment of an effective internationally negotiated legally binding instrument on security assurances.</p>
Nonproliferation	
Nonproliferation and Peaceful Uses	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 12) There continues to exist unjustified restrictions and constraints imposed on developing NNWSs regarding full access to nuclear technology for peacefully purposes. Unilaterally enforced restrictive measures, beyond safeguards required under the Treaty, must not be used to prevent peaceful development, especially in the nuclear area, and should be removed.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.9, Para 2) The Conference also reaffirms its determination to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.</p>

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.9, Para 7) The Conference affirms the determination to stop the spread of nuclear explosive capabilities, and hence the ability to develop and produce nuclear weapons in a non-discriminatory manner and without hampering legitimate peaceful nuclear activities and programmes of States parties to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.18, Para 1) The Conference reaffirms that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards provide assurance that States are complying with their undertakings and assist States in demonstrating their compliance. IAEA safeguards should therefore play a key role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.18, Para 3) The Conference considers that unsafeguarded and ambiguous nuclear activities in some States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons pose serious proliferation dangers and increase the threat perceptions of States parties to the Treaty. The Conference in that respect calls upon all States not parties to the Treaty with significant nuclear programmes to submit all their nuclear activities, both current and future, to the IAEA full-scope safeguards regime. The Conference considers further that the application of IAEA full-scope safeguards is an effective confidence-building measure, particularly in volatile and conflict-ridden regions.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.18, Para 4) The Conference considers the application of IAEA full-scope safeguards a condition of supply of nuclear materials and technology. States shall refrain from extending assistance in the nuclear field to States not parties to the Treaty who have not submitted their nuclear activities to the IAEA full-scope safeguards.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.18, Para 13) The Conference notes the importance and complementary nature of non-discriminatory guidelines agreed by all States parties in the field of transfer of nuclear materials, equipment and technology to ensure that such transfers are not diverted to nuclear-weapon purposes and do not impede the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.18, Para 14) To that end, the Conference decides to establish an ad hoc committee to formulate criteria and procedures governing the transfers of nuclear material, equipment and technology to non-nuclear-weapon States and to agree on an export control trigger list, as well as to elaborate specific measures to ensure the nuclear supply to non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty for peaceful purposes. The first meeting of the Committee will be convened at ... in ... 1995.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 2) The Conference reconfirms the significance of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic development and its important role in accelerating the growth of developing countries. This can greatly contribute to progress

in general and to the elimination of technological and economic gaps between the developed and developing countries.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 3) The Conference stresses that within the framework of article IV, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, all parties to the Treaty have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, services and scientific and technological information and to contribute, alone or in cooperation with other States, to the further development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. To this end, it is indispensable to ensure that the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, including the latest achievements, is not unduly hindered, particularly for the benefit of developing countries.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 4) The Conference confirms that each country's choice and decision in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international agreements and contracts on cooperation for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 5) The Conference expresses concern that the implementation of the seventh preambular paragraph and of article IV of the Treaty fell short of the needs of a number of countries to implement programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while for other countries there have been no significant constraints in the development of their programmes, and regrets that other countries not parties to the Treaty were able to benefit from cooperation with other States parties to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 7) The Conference expresses its regret that there exist restrictions and constraints imposed on developing non-nuclear-weapon States regarding full access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Unilaterally enforced restrictive measures, beyond safeguards required under the Treaty, must not be used to prevent peaceful development, especially in the nuclear area, and should be removed. It is also essential that free and unimpeded access to peaceful nuclear technology be guaranteed, without exception, for all States parties to the Treaty who have concluded relevant safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 9) The Conference reaffirms the responsibility of nuclear supplier States parties to the Treaty to promote the legitimate needs for nuclear energy of all the States parties to the Treaty, with preferential treatment rendered to developing States parties, by allowing the latter to participate in the fullest possible transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and scientific and technological information with a view to achieving the largest benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 10) The Conference notes that the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply has been able to

	<p>consider ways and means in which supplies of nuclear materials, equipment and technology and fuel cycle services can be assured on a more predictable and longer-term basis in accordance with mutually acceptable considerations of non-proliferation, and, in that context, was able to identify a number of emerging industrial States in the field of nuclear technology. On the other hand, the Conference regrets, that the Committee on Assurances of Supply has not succeeded in reaching agreement on a set of principles for international cooperation. The Conference acknowledges the need for setting up United Nations mechanisms to provide a forum for parties to the Treaty to discuss regularly the implementation of article IV of the Treaty.</p>
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<p>Peaceful Uses</p>	
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<p>Access to Nuclear Technology</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 13) The inalienable right of all States Parties to develop the peaceful use of nuclear energy for economic and social development must be reaffirmed by all nuclear and advanced non-nuclear States Parties. It is also essential that free and unimpeded access to technology be guaranteed, without exception, for all States Parties to the Treaty who have concluded relevant safeguards agreements with the IAEA.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/19, Para 4) As has been consistently demanded by the Movement of Non-aligned States and also stipulated in the document for the third session of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.1995/PC.III/13) submitted by Indonesia on behalf of the group of non-aligned and other States, the following measures are essential to the strengthening as well as to the full realization and effective implementation of the objectives of the Treaty: (a) Immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race, leading to nuclear disarmament and the attainment of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control; (b) An immediate conclusion and implementation of a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty; (c) A legally binding commitment by nuclear-weapon States on no-first use and non-use of nuclear weapons; (d) A non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; (e) A programme of action for significant reduction of nuclear weapons, leading to total elimination of such weapons and their delivery vehicles within a time-bound framework; (f) A legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional and comprehensive security assurances, both positive and negative, to non-nuclear-weapon States; (g) Facilitating the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and full adherence by all nuclear-weapon States to the instruments relating to such zones; (h) Full and unimpeded access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes for all the States parties without discrimination; (i) Application of comprehensive and strengthened IAEA safeguards to all nuclear activities and facilities; (j) All efforts must be made for ensuring the universality of the Treaty.</p>
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(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.9, Para 6) The Conference further takes note of the declarations that non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had fulfilled their obligations under article II. However, the Conference remains concerned about the ability of certain States not parties to the Treaty to obtain nuclear materials, technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons. Such transfers seriously place doubt on those responsible for supplying such material and technology to those non-parties. The Conference underlines the vital need for all parties to the Treaty to comply scrupulously and unreservedly with their obligations.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.9, Para 8) The Conference expresses great and serious concerns about the nuclear-weapon capabilities of Israel. In this connection, the Conference calls for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel. The Conference also calls upon Israel to accede to the Treaty and place all of its nuclear facilities under full-scope IARA safeguards. In this respect, the Conference also calls on all other States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it and to subject whatever nuclear facilities they may have to the full-scope safeguards of IAEA.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.18, Para 4) The Conference considers the application of IAEA full-scope safeguards a condition of supply of nuclear materials and technology. States shall refrain from extending assistance in the nuclear field to States not parties to the Treaty who have not submitted their nuclear activities to the IAEA full-scope safeguards.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.18, Para 5) The Conference reaffirms the need to promote further the transfer of technology and technical cooperation for the peaceful application of nuclear energy to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, and in that regard also reaffirms the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.18, Para 12) The Conference urges all States parties to ensure that their nuclear exports do not in any way assist non-nuclear-weapon States not party to the Treaty to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.18, Para 13) The Conference notes the importance and complementary nature of non-discriminatory guidelines agreed by all States parties in the field of transfer of nuclear materials, equipment and technology to ensure that such transfers are not diverted to nuclear-weapon purposes and do not impede the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.18, Para 14) To that end, the Conference decides to establish an ad hoc committee to formulate criteria and procedures governing the transfers of nuclear material, equipment and technology to non-nuclear-weapon States and to agree

on an export control trigger list, as well as to elaborate specific measures to ensure the nuclear supply to non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty for peaceful purposes. The first meeting of the Committee will be convened at ... in ... 1995.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 3) The Conference stresses that within the framework of article IV, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, all parties to the Treaty have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, services and scientific and technological information and to contribute, alone or in cooperation with other States, to the further development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. To this end, it is indispensable to ensure that the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, including the latest achievements, is not unduly hindered, particularly for the benefit of developing countries.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 6) The Conference notes with concern that instead of facilitating the fullest exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, and particularly developing countries, as called for in the Treaty, some States parties to the Treaty continue to cooperate and give assistance in the nuclear field to States not parties to the Treaty, which are known to have acquired the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 7) The Conference expresses its regret that there exist restrictions and constraints imposed on developing non-nuclear-weapon States regarding full access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Unilaterally enforced restrictive measures, beyond safeguards required under the Treaty, must not be used to prevent peaceful development, especially in the nuclear area, and should be removed. It is also essential that free and unimpeded access to peaceful nuclear technology be guaranteed, without exception, for all States parties to the Treaty who have concluded relevant safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 9) The Conference reaffirms the responsibility of nuclear supplier States parties to the Treaty to promote the legitimate needs for nuclear energy of all the States parties to the Treaty, with preferential treatment rendered to developing States parties, by allowing the latter to participate in the fullest possible transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and scientific and technological information with a view to achieving the largest benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 10) The Conference notes that the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply has been able to consider ways and means in which supplies of nuclear materials, equipment and technology and fuel cycle services can be assured on a more predictable and longer-term basis in accordance with mutually acceptable considerations of non-proliferation, and, in that context, was

	<p>able to identify a number of emerging industrial States in the field of nuclear technology. On the other hand, the Conference regrets, that the Committee on Assurances of Supply has not succeeded in reaching agreement on a set of principles for international cooperation. The Conference acknowledges the need for setting up United Nations mechanisms to provide a forum for parties to the Treaty to discuss regularly the implementation of article IV of the Treaty.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 11) The Conference underlines the need to enhance technical cooperation between developing countries, taking into account the needs of the least developed countries.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 13) The Conference commends the role and activities of IAEA in the field of technical cooperation for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, for the benefit of developing countries in particular. The Conference strongly urges donor countries to facilitate access to peaceful uses of nuclear technology to States parties to the Treaty through the Technical Cooperation Fund of IAEA, calls upon all parties to honour their commitments and negotiate, in good faith, the target for the Technical Cooperation Fund, and, finally, calls upon parties to consider adequate and predictable resources, and which should be complemented by sufficient relevant manpower.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 14) The Conference welcomes the voluntary offer by a number of nuclear-weapon States to put their nuclear facilities to international verification, and requests that the inherent costs resulting from these additional safeguards activities should not be at the expense of other IAEA major programmes, such as nuclear power, fuel cycle and radioactive waste management; applications for peaceful uses of nuclear technology for health, agriculture and industry; and nuclear safety and radiation protection. In this context, the Conference notes the intention of IAEA to establish a standing advisory group on technical cooperation.</p>
<p>Attack or Threat of Attack Against Peaceful Nuclear Facilities</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 16) The Conference reaffirms that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities would entail highly dangerous political, economic and environmental implications. The Conference believes that the parties bear a solemn responsibility towards the establishment of comprehensive and universal norms and standards specifically prohibiting attacks, or threats of attack, against all peaceful nuclear facilities.</p>
<p>Inalienable Right Through NPT</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 13) The inalienable right of all States Parties to develop the peaceful use of nuclear energy for economic and social development must be reaffirmed by all nuclear and advanced non-nuclear States Parties. It is also essential that free and unimpeded access to technology be guaranteed, without exception, for all States</p>

	<p>Parties to the Treaty who have concluded relevant safeguards agreements with the IAEA.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.18, Para 5) The Conference reaffirms the need to promote further the transfer of technology and technical cooperation for the peaceful application of nuclear energy to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, and in that regard also reaffirms the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 1) The Conference reiterates that in accordance with article IV, paragraph 1, of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, all States parties to the Treaty have the inalienable right to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs.</p>
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NWFZs	
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Contributions to Disarmament	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 8) Furthermore, deployment of nuclear weapons by NWSs on foreign territories, particularly in NNWSs territories, should be prohibited as it negates the objectives of a nuclear-weapons-free zones. All States that have deployed nuclear weapons outside their boundaries should withdraw all those weapons back to their own territories.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/15, Para 1) The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles in all its aspects is an issue of the highest priority in the field of disarmament and international security as envisaged in the final document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session on disarmament in 1978. The establishment of a genuine, truly universal and non-discriminatory nuclear non-proliferation regime will enhance the prospects of a better and more secure world free of nuclear weapons. Regional arrangements such as the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga, the nearly completed instrument for Africa and others identified by the Final Document, particularly the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, constitute important steps towards the attainment of a nuclear-weapon-free planet.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/19, Para 4) As has been consistently demanded by the Movement of Non-aligned States and also stipulated in the document for the third session of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.1995/PC.III/13) submitted by Indonesia on behalf of the group of non-aligned and other States, the following measures are essential to the strengthening as well as to the full realization and effective implementation of the objectives of the Treaty: (a) Immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race, leading to nuclear disarmament and the attainment of general and complete disarmament under strict and</p>
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effective international control; (b) An immediate conclusion and implementation of a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty; (c) A legally binding commitment by nuclear-weapon States on no-first use and non-use of nuclear weapons; (d) A non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; (e) A programme of action for significant reduction of nuclear weapons, leading to total elimination of such weapons and their delivery vehicles within a time-bound framework; (f) A legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional and comprehensive security assurances, both positive and negative, to non-nuclear-weapon States; (g) Facilitating the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and full adherence by all nuclear-weapon States to the instruments relating to such zones; (h) Full and unimpeded access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes for all the States parties without discrimination; (i) Application of comprehensive and strengthened IAEA safeguards to all nuclear activities and facilities; (j) All efforts must be made for ensuring the universality of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 18) With respect to article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs, the Conference observes that much remains to be done before the objectives and aspirations of the Treaty are attained. The Conference notes that in some areas there has been progress in the past five years but in other significant areas there has been no progress. The Conference reaffirms the commitment of all parties to the implementation of article VI and calls upon the parties to achieve fully the objectives of the article. The Conference agrees that the achievement of the following measures at an early date is essential to the strengthening as well as the full realization and effective implementation of article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty: (a) Immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race leading to nuclear disarmament and the attainment of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control; (b) Immediate conclusion and implementation of a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty; (c) A legally-binding commitment by nuclear-weapon States on no-first use and non-use of nuclear weapons; (d) A non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices; (e) A programme of action for significant reduction of nuclear weapons leading to the total elimination of such weapons and their delivery vehicles within a time-bound framework; (f) A legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional and comprehensive security assurances, both positive and negative, to non-nuclear-weapon States; (g) Facilitating the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and full adherence by nuclear-weapon States to the instruments relating to such zones.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.18, Para 6) The Conference considers that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, constitutes an important disarmament measure and therefore that the process of establishing such zones in different parts

	<p>of the world should be encouraged, with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account.</p>
<p>Contributions to Nonproliferation</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 8) Furthermore, deployment of nuclear weapons by NWSs on foreign territories, particularly in NNWSs territories, should be prohibited as it negates the objectives of a nuclear-weapons-free zones. All States that have deployed nuclear weapons outside their boundaries should withdraw all those weapons back to their own territories.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/15, Para 1) The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles in all its aspects is an issue of the highest priority in the field of disarmament and international security as envisaged in the final document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session on disarmament in 1978. The establishment of a genuine, truly universal and non-discriminatory nuclear non-proliferation regime will enhance the prospects of a better and more secure world free of nuclear weapons. Regional arrangements such as the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga, the nearly completed instrument for Africa and others identified by the Final Document, particularly the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, constitute important steps towards the attainment of a nuclear-weapon-free planet.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/19, Para 4) As has been consistently demanded by the Movement of Non-aligned States and also stipulated in the document for the third session of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.1995/PC.III/13) submitted by Indonesia on behalf of the group of non-aligned and other States, the following measures are essential to the strengthening as well as to the full realization and effective implementation of the objectives of the Treaty: (a) Immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race, leading to nuclear disarmament and the attainment of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control; (b) An immediate conclusion and implementation of a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty; (c) A legally binding commitment by nuclear-weapon States on no-first use and non-use of nuclear weapons; (d) A non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; (e) A programme of action for significant reduction of nuclear weapons, leading to total elimination of such weapons and their delivery vehicles within a time-bound framework; (f) A legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional and comprehensive security assurances, both positive and negative, to non-nuclear-weapon States; (g) Facilitating the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and full adherence by all nuclear-weapon States to the instruments relating to such zones; (h) Full and unimpeded access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes for all the States parties without discrimination; (i) Application of comprehensive and</p>

	<p>strengthened IAEA safeguards to all nuclear activities and facilities; (j) All efforts must be made for ensuring the universality of the Treaty.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 18) With respect to article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs, the Conference observes that much remains to be done before the objectives and aspirations of the Treaty are attained. The Conference notes that in some areas there has been progress in the past five years but in other significant areas there has been no progress. The Conference reaffirms the commitment of all parties to the implementation of article VI and calls upon the parties to achieve fully the objectives of the article. The Conference agrees that the achievement of the following measures at an early date is essential to the strengthening as well as the full realization and effective implementation of article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty: (a) Immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race leading to nuclear disarmament and the attainment of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control; (b) Immediate conclusion and implementation of a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty; (c) A legally-binding commitment by nuclear-weapon States on no-first use and non-use of nuclear weapons; (d) A non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices; (e) A programme of action for significant reduction of nuclear weapons leading to the total elimination of such weapons and their delivery vehicles within a time-bound framework; (f) A legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional and comprehensive security assurances, both positive and negative, to non-nuclear-weapon States; (g) Facilitating the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and full adherence by nuclear-weapon States to the instruments relating to such zones.</p>
<p>Treaty of Tlatelolco</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/15, Para 1) The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles in all its aspects is an issue of the highest priority in the field of disarmament and international security as envisaged in the final document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session on disarmament in 1978. The establishment of a genuine, truly universal and non-discriminatory nuclear non-proliferation regime will enhance the prospects of a better and more secure world free of nuclear weapons. Regional arrangements such as the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga, the nearly completed instrument for Africa and others identified by the Final Document, particularly the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, constitute important steps towards the attainment of a nuclear-weapon-free planet.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.18, Para 9) The Conference welcomes the progress achieved in strengthening the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of</p>

	<p>Tlatelolco). It urges nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so to sign the relevant protocols of the Treaty of Rarotonga.</p>
<p>Treaty of Pelindaba</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 7) NWSs should abide and adhere to those international instruments that have established nuclear-weapons-free zones, and to support the initiatives taken by a State or State Parties with a view to establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, particularly in the regions of the Middle-East and Africa.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/15, Para 1) The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles in all its aspects is an issue of the highest priority in the field of disarmament and international security as envisaged in the final document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session on disarmament in 1978. The establishment of a genuine, truly universal and non-discriminatory nuclear non-proliferation regime will enhance the prospects of a better and more secure world free of nuclear weapons. Regional arrangements such as the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga, the nearly completed instrument for Africa and others identified by the Final Document, particularly the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, constitute important steps towards the attainment of a nuclear-weapon-free planet.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.18, Para 10) The Conference also welcomes the current progress towards concluding a draft treaty on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone and expresses its full support for that endeavour.</p>
<p>Treaty of Rarotonga</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/15, Para 1) The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles in all its aspects is an issue of the highest priority in the field of disarmament and international security as envisaged in the final document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session on disarmament in 1978. The establishment of a genuine, truly universal and non-discriminatory nuclear non-proliferation regime will enhance the prospects of a better and more secure world free of nuclear weapons. Regional arrangements such as the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga, the nearly completed instrument for Africa and others identified by the Final Document, particularly the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, constitute important steps towards the attainment of a nuclear-weapon-free planet.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.18, Para 9) The Conference welcomes the progress achieved in strengthening the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of</p>

	<p>Tlatelolco). It urges nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so to sign the relevant protocols of the Treaty of Rarotonga.</p>
<p>Middle East WMDFZ</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 7) NWSs should abide and adhere to those international instruments that have established nuclear-weapons-free zones, and to support the initiatives taken by a State or State Parties with a view to establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, particularly in the regions of the Middle-East and Africa.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/15, Para 1) The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles in all its aspects is an issue of the highest priority in the field of disarmament and international security as envisaged in the final document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session on disarmament in 1978. The establishment of a genuine, truly universal and non-discriminatory nuclear non-proliferation regime will enhance the prospects of a better and more secure world free of nuclear weapons. Regional arrangements such as the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga, the nearly completed instrument for Africa and others identified by the Final Document, particularly the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, constitute important steps towards the attainment of a nuclear-weapon-free planet.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.18, Para 11) The Conference expresses its full support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East, and calls upon the parties concerned in that region to take the necessary steps to attain that objective as a matter of high priority. It calls upon all States parties to encourage the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other parts of the world and calls upon countries in the region concerned to take the necessary steps to attain that objective as a matter of high priority.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Security Assurances</p>	
<p>Nuclear-Weapon States Role</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 10) Pending the total and complete elimination of nuclear weapons, unconditional security assurances to the NNWSs has been regarded as one of the major concerns. In the context of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations, it is the primary right of States Parties to the NPT to be assured of non use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear Weapons States Parties should agree to a legally binding instrument on this issue before the 1995 Conference. The CD should intensify negotiations with a view to concluding an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapons States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.</p>

(NPT/CONF.1995/19, Para 4) As has been consistently demanded by the Movement of Non-aligned States and also stipulated in the document for the third session of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.1995/PC.III/13) submitted by Indonesia on behalf of the group of non-aligned and other States, the following measures are essential to the strengthening as well as to the full realization and effective implementation of the objectives of the Treaty: (a) Immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race, leading to nuclear disarmament and the attainment of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control; (b) An immediate conclusion and implementation of a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty; (c) A legally binding commitment by nuclear-weapon States on no-first use and non-use of nuclear weapons; (d) A non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; (e) A programme of action for significant reduction of nuclear weapons, leading to total elimination of such weapons and their delivery vehicles within a time-bound framework; (f) A legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional and comprehensive security assurances, both positive and negative, to non-nuclear-weapon States; (g) Facilitating the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and full adherence by all nuclear-weapon States to the instruments relating to such zones; (h) Full and unimpeded access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes for all the States parties without discrimination; (i) Application of comprehensive and strengthened IAEA safeguards to all nuclear activities and facilities; (j) All efforts must be made for ensuring the universality of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 18) With respect to article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs, the Conference observes that much remains to be done before the objectives and aspirations of the Treaty are attained. The Conference notes that in some areas there has been progress in the past five years but in other significant areas there has been no progress. The Conference reaffirms the commitment of all parties to the implementation of article VI and calls upon the parties to achieve fully the objectives of the article. The Conference agrees that the achievement of the following measures at an early date is essential to the strengthening as well as the full realization and effective implementation of article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty: (a) Immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race leading to nuclear disarmament and the attainment of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control; (b) Immediate conclusion and implementation of a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty; (c) A legally-binding commitment by nuclear-weapon States on no-first use and non-use of nuclear weapons; (d) A non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices; (e) A programme of action for significant reduction of nuclear weapons leading to the total elimination of such weapons and their delivery vehicles within a time-bound framework; (f) A legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional and comprehensive security assurances, both positive and negative, to non-

	<p>nuclear-weapon States; (g) Facilitating the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and full adherence by nuclear-weapon States to the instruments relating to such zones.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.10, Para 2) The Conference reiterates also its conviction that, in the interest of promoting the objectives of the Treaty, including the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, all States, both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, should refrain, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, from the threat or the use of force in relations between States, involving either nuclear or non-nuclear weapons.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.10, Para 4) Pending the elimination of all nuclear weapons, the Conference believes that the best security assurance is an effective, unconditional, comprehensive, internationally negotiated and legally binding instrument. In this connection, the Conference believes that Security Council resolution 984 (1995) should have included language committing the nuclear-weapon States to take action, in the event of a threat of use of nuclear weapons, to suppress that threat.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.10, Para 5) The Conference welcomes the declaration on negative security assurance issued by the five nuclear-weapon States prior to the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 984 (1995). However, the Conference believes that resolution 984 (1995) and the five declarations are only the first step towards providing non-nuclear-weapon States with the kind of assurances to which they are entitled, namely, an internationally negotiated, legally binding instrument where all the nuclear-weapon States are obligated to the same provisions and the same conditions.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.18, Para 8) The Conference recognizes that for the maximum effectiveness of any treaty arrangements for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone the cooperation of the nuclear-weapon states is necessary. In that connection, the nuclear-weapon States are invited to assist the efforts of states to create nuclear-weapon-free zones, and to enter into a binding undertaking to respect strictly the status of such a zone and to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Legally-Binding International Convention or Instrument</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 10) Pending the total and complete elimination of nuclear weapons, unconditional security assurances to the NNWSs has been regarded as one of the major concerns. In the context of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations, it is the primary right of States Parties to the NPT to be assured of non use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear Weapons States Parties should agree to a legally binding instrument on this issue before the 1995 Conference. The CD should intensify negotiations with a view to concluding an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapons States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.</p>

(NPT/CONF.1995/19, Para 4) As has been consistently demanded by the Movement of Non-aligned States and also stipulated in the document for the third session of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.1995/PC.III/13) submitted by Indonesia on behalf of the group of non-aligned and other States, the following measures are essential to the strengthening as well as to the full realization and effective implementation of the objectives of the Treaty: (a) Immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race, leading to nuclear disarmament and the attainment of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control; (b) An immediate conclusion and implementation of a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty; (c) A legally binding commitment by nuclear-weapon States on no-first use and non-use of nuclear weapons; (d) A non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; (e) A programme of action for significant reduction of nuclear weapons, leading to total elimination of such weapons and their delivery vehicles within a time-bound framework; (f) A legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional and comprehensive security assurances, both positive and negative, to non-nuclear-weapon States; (g) Facilitating the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and full adherence by all nuclear-weapon States to the instruments relating to such zones; (h) Full and unimpeded access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes for all the States parties without discrimination; (i) Application of comprehensive and strengthened IAEA safeguards to all nuclear activities and facilities; (j) All efforts must be made for ensuring the universality of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 15) The Conference regrets the continuing lack of progress on relevant items of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular those relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear war including all related matters, the convention on the production and stockpiling of weapon-grade fissile materials, the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons, the cessation of the production of their delivery vehicles, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the establishment of an effective internationally negotiated legally binding instrument on security assurances.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 18) With respect to article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs, the Conference observes that much remains to be done before the objectives and aspirations of the Treaty are attained. The Conference notes that in some areas there has been progress in the past five years but in other significant areas there has been no progress. The Conference reaffirms the commitment of all parties to the implementation of article VI and calls upon the parties to achieve fully the objectives of the article. The Conference agrees that the achievement of the following measures at an early date is essential to the strengthening as well as the full realization and effective implementation of article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty: (a) Immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race leading to nuclear disarmament and the

	<p>attainment of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control; (b) Immediate conclusion and implementation of a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty; (c) A legally-binding commitment by nuclear-weapon States on no-first use and non-use of nuclear weapons; (d) A non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices; (e) A programme of action for significant reduction of nuclear weapons leading to the total elimination of such weapons and their delivery vehicles within a time-bound framework; (f) A legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional and comprehensive security assurances, both positive and negative, to non-nuclear-weapon States; (g) Facilitating the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and full adherence by nuclear-weapon States to the instruments relating to such zones.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.10, Para 4) Pending the elimination of all nuclear weapons, the Conference believes that the best security assurance is an effective, unconditional, comprehensive, internationally negotiated and legally binding instrument. In this connection, the Conference believes that Security Council resolution 984 (1995) should have included language committing the nuclear-weapon States to take action, in the event of a threat of use of nuclear weapons, to suppress that threat.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.10, Para 5) The Conference welcomes the declaration on negative security assurance issued by the five nuclear-weapon States prior to the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 984 (1995). However, the Conference believes that resolution 984 (1995) and the five declarations are only the first step towards providing non-nuclear-weapon States with the kind of assurances to which they are entitled, namely, an internationally negotiated, legally binding instrument where all the nuclear-weapon States are obligated to the same provisions and the same conditions.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.10, Para 6) The conclusion of an international instrument providing for such arrangements would strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States parties, and offer an additional incentive to non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty to adhere to the Treaty. The Conference notes that consultations and negotiations on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons have been under way in the Conference on Disarmament for over 15 years. The Conference agrees that a conference should be convened at an early date to work on a protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties.</p>
<p>NWFZs and Security Assurances</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.10, Para 8) The Conference also holds the view that one of the effective means to assure non-nuclear-weapon States in a legally binding form against the use or threat of use of</p>

	<p>nuclear weapons is through the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones which encompass the integrality of the countries in such zones.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.18, Para 8) The Conference recognizes that for the maximum effectiveness of any treaty arrangements for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone the cooperation of the nuclear-weapon states is necessary. In that connection, the nuclear-weapon States are invited to assist the efforts of states to create nuclear-weapon-free zones, and to enter into a binding undertaking to respect strictly the status of such a zone and to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.</p>
<p>Security Assurances and the NPT</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 10) Pending the total and complete elimination of nuclear weapons, unconditional security assurances to the NNWSs has been regarded as one of the major concerns. In the context of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations, it is the primary right of States Parties to the NPT to be assured of non use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear Weapons States Parties should agree to a legally binding instrument on this issue before the 1995 Conference. The CD should intensify negotiations with a view to concluding an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapons States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/19, Para 4) As has been consistently demanded by the Movement of Non-aligned States and also stipulated in the document for the third session of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.1995/PC.III/13) submitted by Indonesia on behalf of the group of non-aligned and other States, the following measures are essential to the strengthening as well as to the full realization and effective implementation of the objectives of the Treaty: (a) Immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race, leading to nuclear disarmament and the attainment of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control; (b) An immediate conclusion and implementation of a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty; (c) A legally binding commitment by nuclear-weapon States on no-first use and non-use of nuclear weapons; (d) A non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; (e) A programme of action for significant reduction of nuclear weapons, leading to total elimination of such weapons and their delivery vehicles within a time-bound framework; (f) A legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional and comprehensive security assurances, both positive and negative, to non-nuclear-weapon States; (g) Facilitating the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and full adherence by all nuclear-weapon States to the instruments relating to such zones; (h) Full and unimpeded access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes for all the States parties without discrimination; (i) Application of comprehensive and strengthened IAEA safeguards to all nuclear activities and facilities; (j) All efforts must be made for ensuring the universality of the Treaty.</p>

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 18) With respect to article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs, the Conference observes that much remains to be done before the objectives and aspirations of the Treaty are attained. The Conference notes that in some areas there has been progress in the past five years but in other significant areas there has been no progress. The Conference reaffirms the commitment of all parties to the implementation of article VI and calls upon the parties to achieve fully the objectives of the article. The Conference agrees that the achievement of the following measures at an early date is essential to the strengthening as well as the full realization and effective implementation of article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty: (a) Immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race leading to nuclear disarmament and the attainment of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control; (b) Immediate conclusion and implementation of a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty; (c) A legally-binding commitment by nuclear-weapon States on no-first use and non-use of nuclear weapons; (d) A non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices; (e) A programme of action for significant reduction of nuclear weapons leading to the total elimination of such weapons and their delivery vehicles within a time-bound framework; (f) A legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional and comprehensive security assurances, both positive and negative, to non-nuclear-weapon States; (g) Facilitating the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and full adherence by nuclear-weapon States to the instruments relating to such zones.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.10, Para 1) The Conference considers that the most effective guarantee against the possible use of nuclear weapons and the danger of nuclear war is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of this goal, the Conference recognizes that different approaches may be required to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.10, Para 2) The Conference reiterates also its conviction that, in the interest of promoting the objectives of the Treaty, including the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, all States, both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, should refrain, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, from the threat or the use of force in relations between States, involving either nuclear or non-nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.10, Para 3) The Conference underlines again the importance of adherence to the Treaty by non-nuclear-weapon States as the best means of reassuring one another of their renunciation of nuclear weapons and as one of the effective means of strengthening their mutual security.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.10, Para 4) Pending the elimination of all nuclear weapons, the Conference believes that the best security assurance is an effective, unconditional, comprehensive, internationally negotiated and legally binding instrument. In this connection, the Conference believes that Security Council resolution 984 (1995) should have included language committing the nuclear-weapon States to take action, in the event of a threat of use of nuclear weapons, to suppress that threat.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.10, Para 5) The Conference welcomes the declaration on negative security assurance issued by the five nuclear-weapon States prior to the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 984 (1995). However, the Conference believes that resolution 984 (1995) and the five declarations are only the first step towards providing non-nuclear-weapon States with the kind of assurances to which they are entitled, namely, an internationally negotiated, legally binding instrument where all the nuclear-weapon States are obligated to the same provisions and the same conditions.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.10, Para 6) The conclusion of an international instrument providing for such arrangements would strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States parties, and offer an additional incentive to non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty to adhere to the Treaty. The Conference notes that consultations and negotiations on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons have been under way in the Conference on Disarmament for over 15 years. The Conference agrees that a conference should be convened at an early date to work on a protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.10, Para 7) The Conference believes that appropriate measures may also be needed to provide protection for non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty from nuclear threats that emanate from the ambiguous policy of certain States not parties to the Treaty which possess significant unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and might have acquired nuclear-weapon capability.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.10, Para 8) The Conference also holds the view that one of the effective means to assure non-nuclear-weapon States in a legally binding form against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is through the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones which encompass the integrity of the countries in such zones.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.18, Para 8) The Conference recognizes that for the maximum effectiveness of any treaty arrangements for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone the cooperation of the nuclear-weapon states is necessary. In that connection, the nuclear-weapon States are invited to assist the efforts of states to create nuclear-weapon-free zones, and to enter into a binding undertaking to respect strictly the status of such a zone and to

	refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.
Country Specific	
United States	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 6) A time-bound framework and a target date for the total elimination and the efforts by the NWSs to carry forward the process of de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons will create a strong political thrust towards international efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. A statement by the Russian Federation and the United States indicating the bilateral measures they will take in the future in order to reduce their nuclear arsenals beyond the levels envisaged in the START I and II agreements, would also be a welcome initiative, together with an indication of the steps that China, France and the United Kingdom would be willing to take in light of the reductions referred to above.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 13) The Conference examines the existing situation in the light of the undertaking assumed by the parties in article VI to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. The Conference is pleased to note that during the last few years there have been encouraging developments, namely, that the United States of America and the Russian Federation have concluded the Treaty between the United States and the USSR on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), which eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons, and the Treaties on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I and START II Treaties), which will further reduce a significant number of the nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles which they have excessively accumulated during the cold war period.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.9, Para 3) The Conference reiterates and reaffirms the convictions expressed in the first to third preambular paragraphs. The Conference welcomes the positive developments in the international situation since the last Review Conference, especially in the East-West context and the relations between the Russian Federation and the United States of America. In this regard, the Conference takes note of the role of the INF and the START process which will result in the reduction in nuclear arsenals of the Russian Federation and the United States. The Conference urges China, France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to join the process. The Conference remains convinced that proliferation of nuclear weapons both horizontally and vertically would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war.</p>
Russia	(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 6) A time-bound framework and a target date for the total elimination and the efforts by the NWSs to carry

	<p>forward the process of de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons will create a strong political thrust towards international efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. A statement by the Russian Federation and the United States indicating the bilateral measures they will take in the future in order to reduce their nuclear arsenals beyond the levels envisaged in the START I and II agreements, would also be a welcome initiative, together with an indication of the steps that China, France and the United Kingdom would be willing to take in light of the reductions referred to above.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 13) The Conference examines the existing situation in the light of the undertaking assumed by the parties in article VI to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. The Conference is pleased to note that during the last few years there have been encouraging developments, namely, that the United States of America and the Russian Federation have concluded the Treaty between the United States and the USSR on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), which eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons, and the Treaties on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I and START II Treaties), which will further reduce a significant number of the nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles which they have excessively accumulated during the cold war period.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.9, Para 3) The Conference reiterates and reaffirms the convictions expressed in the first to third preambular paragraphs. The Conference welcomes the positive developments in the international situation since the last Review Conference, especially in the East-West context and the relations between the Russian Federation and the United States of America. In this regard, the Conference takes note of the role of the INF and the START process which will result in the reduction in nuclear arsenals of the Russian Federation and the United States. The Conference urges China, France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to join the process. The Conference remains convinced that proliferation of nuclear weapons both horizontally and vertically would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">United Kingdom</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 6) A time-bound framework and a target date for the total elimination and the efforts by the NWSs to carry forward the process of de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons will create a strong political thrust towards international efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. A statement by the Russian Federation and the United States indicating the bilateral measures they will take in the future in order to reduce their nuclear arsenals beyond the levels envisaged in the START I and II agreements, would also be a welcome initiative, together with an indication of the steps that China, France and the United Kingdom would be willing to take in light of the reductions referred to above.</p>

	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.9, Para 3) The Conference reiterates and reaffirms the convictions expressed in the first to third preambular paragraphs. The Conference welcomes the positive developments in the international situation since the last Review Conference, especially in the East-West context and the relations between the Russian Federation and the United States of America. In this regard, the Conference takes note of the role of the INF and the START process which will result in the reduction in nuclear arsenals of the Russian Federation and the United States. The Conference urges China, France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to join the process. The Conference remains convinced that proliferation of nuclear weapons both horizontally and vertically would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war.</p>
<p>France</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 6) A time-bound framework and a target date for the total elimination and the efforts by the NWSs to carry forward the process of de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons will create a strong political thrust towards international efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. A statement by the Russian Federation and the United States indicating the bilateral measures they will take in the future in order to reduce their nuclear arsenals beyond the levels envisaged in the START I and II agreements, would also be a welcome initiative, together with an indication of the steps that China, France and the United Kingdom would be willing to take in light of the reductions referred to above.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.9, Para 3) The Conference reiterates and reaffirms the convictions expressed in the first to third preambular paragraphs. The Conference welcomes the positive developments in the international situation since the last Review Conference, especially in the East-West context and the relations between the Russian Federation and the United States of America. In this regard, the Conference takes note of the role of the INF and the START process which will result in the reduction in nuclear arsenals of the Russian Federation and the United States. The Conference urges China, France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to join the process. The Conference remains convinced that proliferation of nuclear weapons both horizontally and vertically would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war.</p>
<p>China</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 6) A time-bound framework and a target date for the total elimination and the efforts by the NWSs to carry forward the process of de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons will create a strong political thrust towards international efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. A statement by the Russian Federation and the United States indicating the bilateral measures they will take in the future in order to reduce their nuclear arsenals beyond the levels envisaged in the START I and II agreements, would also be</p>

	<p>a welcome initiative, together with an indication of the steps that China, France and the United Kingdom would be willing to take in light of the reductions referred to above.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.9, Para 3) The Conference reiterates and reaffirms the convictions expressed in the first to third preambular paragraphs. The Conference welcomes the positive developments in the international situation since the last Review Conference, especially in the East-West context and the relations between the Russian Federation and the United States of America. In this regard, the Conference takes note of the role of the INF and the START process which will result in the reduction in nuclear arsenals of the Russian Federation and the United States. The Conference urges China, France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to join the process. The Conference remains convinced that proliferation of nuclear weapons both horizontally and vertically would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Israel</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.9, Para 8) The Conference expresses great and serious concerns about the nuclear-weapon capabilities of Israel. In this connection, the Conference calls for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel. The Conference also calls upon Israel to accede to the Treaty and place all of its nuclear facilities under full-scope IARA safeguards. In this respect, the Conference also calls on all other States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it and to subject whatever nuclear facilities they may have to the full-scope safeguards of IAEA.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.10, Para 7) The Conference believes that appropriate measures may also be needed to provide protection for non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty from nuclear threats that emanate from the ambiguous policy of certain States not parties to the Treaty which possess significant unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and might have acquired nuclear-weapon capability.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.18, Para 3) The Conference considers that unsafeguarded and ambiguous nuclear activities in some States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons pose serious proliferation dangers and increase the threat perceptions of States parties to the Treaty. The Conference in that respect calls upon all States not parties to the Treaty with significant nuclear programmes to submit all their nuclear activities, both current and future, to the IAEA full-scope safeguards regime. The Conference considers further that the application of IAEA full-scope safeguards is an effective confidence-building measure, particularly in volatile and conflict-ridden regions.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.18, Para 4) The Conference considers the application of IAEA full-scope safeguards a condition of supply of</p>

	<p>nuclear materials and technology. States shall refrain from extending assistance in the nuclear field to States not parties to the Treaty who have not submitted their nuclear activities to the IAEA full-scope safeguards.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 6) The Conference notes with concern that instead of facilitating the fullest exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, and particularly developing countries, as called for in the Treaty, some States parties to the Treaty continue to cooperate and give assistance in the nuclear field to States not parties to the Treaty, which are known to have acquired the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 8) The Conference notes with appreciation the positive steps taken by South Africa by abandoning its nuclear weapons programme and acceding to the Treaty. The Conference still expresses great and serious concern about the nuclear capabilities of the threshold States and stresses that the development of such capabilities would undermine the credibility and stability of the Treaty regime. In this context, the Conference demands all States to suspend any cooperation that would contribute to the nuclear programmes of these States, and demands the threshold States to accede to the Treaty, to subject all their nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards and to pledge not to manufacture of acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">South Africa</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 8) The Conference notes with appreciation the positive steps taken by South Africa by abandoning its nuclear weapons programme and acceding to the Treaty. The Conference still expresses great and serious concern about the nuclear capabilities of the threshold States and stresses that the development of such capabilities would undermine the credibility and stability of the Treaty regime. In this context, the Conference demands all States to suspend any cooperation that would contribute to the nuclear programmes of these States, and demands the threshold States to accede to the Treaty, to subject all their nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards and to pledge not to manufacture of acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</p>
<p>Non-Proliferation Treaty Related</p>	
<p style="text-align: center;">Disarmament Through the NPT</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 1) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was conceived as an instrument to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As part of this endeavor, States Parties which are Nuclear-Weapon States undertook “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and</p>

effective international control” and, at the same time, to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 2) During the negotiations of the NPT, the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (NNWSs), particularly the developing countries, sought a fair balance in the Treaty between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the NWSs and NNWSs which could successfully serve the interests of all States Parties. This position was endorsed by resolution 2028 (XX) of the UN General Assembly. However, this was not fully realized at the time. Today, more than two decades later, the imbalances between the obligations and responsibilities have grown. There is a stalemate in negotiations aimed at redressing those imbalances, including negotiations in the NPT Review Conferences as well as the Conference on Disarmament.

(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 3) The Non-Aligned Countries value the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a key instrument to channel international efforts to halt vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Notwithstanding the important role of the Treaty in the maintenance of international security, it should be recognized that the Treaty has fundamental shortcomings that have become the bone of contention between NWSs and NNWSs Parties to the NPT ever since it came into being, thus eroding the perceived value of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 5) The cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament as a whole, continue to be the main objectives of the Treaty. The NWSs should reaffirm their commitment to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.1995/15, Para 2) In contrast to the treaties mentioned above which are of a permanent nature, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the only multilateral instrument of its kind, entered into force in March 1970 for an initial period of 25 years. The transitional nature of the NPT makes it unique among disarmament treaties. It reflects the intention of the parties to ensure the fulfilment of the purposes set out in the preamble and the effective implementation of its provisions, especially those contained in article VI. To achieve this, the NPT provides not only for the possibility of periodic review conferences (art. VIII (3)) but, more importantly, for a conference to be convened 25 years after its entry into force “to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties” (art. X (2)).

(NPT/CONF.1995/15, Para 7) In seeking to preserve and strengthen the NPT, its parties should examine together the implementation of the Treaty’s provisions and discuss how best to ensure the realization of its fundamental purposes – the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and their ultimate elimination. And this will not be achieved through procedural debates or interminable and lengthy legal arguments. To

reduce the 1995 Conference to a series of legal wrangles would only serve to undermine the Treaty itself.

(NPT/CONF.1995/19, Para 1) The non-aligned and other States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons consider the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty as a significant and unique opportunity to review in depth the performance of the Treaty during the past 25 years and to strengthen its regime in all its aspects in pursuit of the objectives of totally eliminating nuclear weapons, promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy and achieving universal adherence to the Treaty, thereby enhancing international peace and security.

(NPT/CONF.1995/19, Para 2) Such an exercise calls for a careful examination and realistic assessment of the obligations and responsibilities undertaken by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. The extent to which these objectives have been met constitutes an essential element for a decision on the length of the extension.

(NPT/CONF.1995/19, Para 4) As has been consistently demanded by the Movement of Non-aligned States and also stipulated in the document for the third session of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.1995/PC.III/13) submitted by Indonesia on behalf of the group of non-aligned and other States, the following measures are essential to the strengthening as well as to the full realization and effective implementation of the objectives of the Treaty: (a) Immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race, leading to nuclear disarmament and the attainment of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control; (b) An immediate conclusion and implementation of a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty; (c) A legally binding commitment by nuclear-weapon States on no-first use and non-use of nuclear weapons; (d) A non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; (e) A programme of action for significant reduction of nuclear weapons, leading to total elimination of such weapons and their delivery vehicles within a time-bound framework; (f) A legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional and comprehensive security assurances, both positive and negative, to non-nuclear-weapon States; (g) Facilitating the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and full adherence by all nuclear-weapon States to the instruments relating to such zones; (h) Full and unimpeded access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes for all the States parties without discrimination; (i) Application of comprehensive and strengthened IAEA safeguards to all nuclear activities and facilities; (j) All efforts must be made for ensuring the universality of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 1) The Conference reviews the implementation of each aspect of article VI, and of the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs and stresses the need to intensify the effort to achieve, at the earliest possible date, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures in the direction of nuclear

disarmament; it urges the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 2) The Conference notes with regret that the provisions of article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty have not been completely fulfilled since the Treaty came into force. In this regard, the Conference stresses the need for the cessation of the nuclear arms race at the earliest possible date and to take effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament. The Conference urges the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 3) The Conference recalls that under the provisions of article VI each of the parties undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith: (a) On effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament; (b) On a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 5) The Conference expresses the desire to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States and to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 7) The Conference notes that a number of significant changes have occurred since the 1990 Review Conference and that a process of gradual transformation of military structures is now under way. The Conference expresses the hope that these developments will lead to an effective halt of the nuclear arms race between the two major nuclear Powers in quantitative terms and that this trend will encourage further efforts in nuclear disarmament negotiations towards the achievement of the objectives of article VI.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 12) The Conference further calls for the establishment of a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. The Conference expresses the belief that such a convention would make an important contribution towards nuclear disarmament.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 13) The Conference examines the existing situation in the light of the undertaking assumed by the parties in article VI to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. The Conference is pleased to note that during the last few years there have been encouraging developments, namely, that the United States of America and the Russian Federation have concluded the Treaty between the United States and the USSR on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range

Missiles (INF Treaty), which eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons, and the Treaties on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I and START II Treaties), which will further reduce a significant number of the nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles which they have excessively accumulated during the cold war period.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 14) The fact remains that the number of nuclear weapons currently existing is more than the number of nuclear weapons at the time when NPT came into force. Accordingly, the Conference considers that it is timely for the States parties to negotiate a treaty which will ban nuclear weapons forever.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 15) The Conference regrets the continuing lack of progress on relevant items of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular those relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear war including all related matters, the convention on the production and stockpiling of weapon-grade fissile materials, the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons, the cessation of the production of their delivery vehicles, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the establishment of an effective internationally negotiated legally binding instrument on security assurances.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 16) The Conference calls for the intensification of negotiations towards further reduction and elimination of all types of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery, with the earliest participation of all nuclear-weapon States. The Conference believes that all the nuclear-weapon States should commit themselves to a definite, time-bound programme of action for the continued reduction of nuclear weapons, leading to their total elimination. The Conference calls on the Conference on Disarmament to begin deliberating on the programme of action as soon as possible. The Conference firmly believes that such a programme of action will effectively contribute to the early realization of the objectives of article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 17) In reviewing progress towards a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, the Conference takes note of a number of developments in the areas of chemical weapons, conventional force reductions and confidence and security-building measures. The Conference however regrets the lack of progress towards the realization of the treaty itself. The Conference, therefore, calls for an intensified effort to bring about greater confidence and the reduction of armaments in all areas in pursuit of the objectives set out in the twelfth preambular paragraph and in article VI of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 18) With respect to article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs, the Conference observes that much remains to be done before the objectives and aspirations of the Treaty are attained. The Conference notes that in some areas there has been progress in the past five years but in other

	<p>significant areas there has been no progress. The Conference reaffirms the commitment of all parties to the implementation of article VI and calls upon the parties to achieve fully the objectives of the article. The Conference agrees that the achievement of the following measures at an early date is essential to the strengthening as well as the full realization and effective implementation of article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty: (a) Immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race leading to nuclear disarmament and the attainment of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control; (b) Immediate conclusion and implementation of a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty; (c) A legally-binding commitment by nuclear-weapon States on no-first use and non-use of nuclear weapons; (d) A non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices; (e) A programme of action for significant reduction of nuclear weapons leading to the total elimination of such weapons and their delivery vehicles within a time-bound framework; (f) A legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional and comprehensive security assurances, both positive and negative, to non-nuclear-weapon States; (g) Facilitating the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and full adherence by nuclear-weapon States to the instruments relating to such zones.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.18, Para 7) The Conference expresses its belief that concrete measures of nuclear disarmament would contribute significantly to creating favourable conditions for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.</p>
<p>1995 Review and Extension of the NPT</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 4) The preparations for the NPT Conference in 1995 provide an exceptional opportunity towards the realization of the objectives enshrined in the Treaty. Substantive progress on the following areas will contribute to the successful outcome of the review and extension Conference of the NPT:</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 9) The conclusion of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) remains one of the highest priority objectives of the international community and the fundamental pillar of an effective and comprehensive non-proliferation regime. All efforts towards the achievement of this objective, including the PTBT Amendment Conference, should be pursued. While the decision by the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc Committee with a negotiating mandate is welcome, a target date must be set to conclude the negotiations on a CTBT prior to the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. The conclusion of a CTBT would decisively benefit the outcome of the said Conference. Pending the conclusion of such a Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should suspend all nuclear testing.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 10) Pending the total and complete elimination of nuclear weapons, unconditional security assurances to the NNWSs has been regarded as one of the major concerns. In the</p>

context of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations, it is the primary right of States Parties to the NPT to be assured of non use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear Weapons States Parties should agree to a legally binding instrument on this issue before the 1995 Conference. The CD should intensify negotiations with a view to concluding an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapons States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.1995/15, Para 2) In contrast to the treaties mentioned above which are of a permanent nature, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the only multilateral instrument of its kind, entered into force in March 1970 for an initial period of 25 years. The transitional nature of the NPT makes it unique among disarmament treaties. It reflects the intention of the parties to ensure the fulfilment of the purposes set out in the preamble and the effective implementation of its provisions, especially those contained in article VI. To achieve this, the NPT provides not only for the possibility of periodic review conferences (art. VIII (3)) but, more importantly, for a conference to be convened 25 years after its entry into force “to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties” (art. X (2)).

(NPT/CONF.1995/15, Para 3) The provisions of article X (2) have been the object of several different and even conflicting interpretations. The present working paper has been prepared as a contribution to the discussion on this subject in the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

(NPT/CONF.1995/15, Para 4) The contents of article X (2) make it clear that the parties are not asked to decide whether or not to extend the NPT but simply for how long. There are three extension options available to them: (a) indefinite; (b) an additional fixed period; or (c) additional fixed periods. Article X (2) further provides that the decision on these options “shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty”. At first glance, therefore, the choice Parties must make appears rather straightforward. One simply musters a majority of NPT parties in favour of one of the options and the case is closed.

(NPT/CONF.1995/15, Para 5) The history of the NPT negotiations and of its four review conferences reveals, however, the great importance its parties attach not only to the effective implementation of its provisions, but to any and all decisions relating to the Treaty itself. This is borne out by the agreements reached on the convening of the review conferences and their decision-making process as contained in the rules of procedure. Over the past 20 years the rules of procedure of the review conferences did not preclude the possibility of voting. The rule of consensus has however been applied to all aspects, procedural and substantive alike, regarding the NPT.

(NPT/CONF.1995/15, Para 6) It would thus appear that if the Parties have in the past insisted on the rule of consensus they would also wish to apply it when deciding on the extension of the NPT. This should be the point of departure of the extension decision process, while not precluding the possibility of voting.

(NPT/CONF.1995/15, Para 7) In seeking to preserve and strengthen the NPT, its parties should examine together the implementation of the Treaty's provisions and discuss how best to ensure the realization of its fundamental purposes – the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and their ultimate elimination. And this will not be achieved through procedural debates or interminable and lengthy legal arguments. To reduce the 1995 Conference to a series of legal wrangles would only serve to undermine the Treaty itself.

(NPT/CONF.1995/15, Para 8) In order that the 1995 Conference result in a strengthened and effectively verifiable NPT regime, its parties should be convinced that its provisions will be fully realized and implemented and that it continues to serve their national security interests and the universal adherence is ultimately ensured. The attainment of this goal is the principal purpose of the conference. Anything less will be most unsatisfactory.

(NPT/CONF.1995/19, Para 1) The non-aligned and other States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons consider the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty as a significant and unique opportunity to review in depth the performance of the Treaty during the past 25 years and to strengthen its regime in all its aspects in pursuit of the objectives of totally eliminating nuclear weapons, promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy and achieving universal adherence to the Treaty, thereby enhancing international peace and security.

(NPT/CONF.1995/19, Para 2) Such an exercise calls for a careful examination and realistic assessment of the obligations and responsibilities undertaken by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. The extent to which these objectives have been met constitutes an essential element for a decision on the length of the extension.

(NPT/CONF.1995/19, Para 3) As already agreed, the review of the operation of the Treaty must precede the decision on its extension. Based on article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, the review process should assess and determine the extent to which the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty have been so far realized, so as to chart a future course of action for their full realization in the earliest time possible. Accordingly, the review process should be based on a balanced approach and should serve to identify the specific objectives to be achieved in the coming years with a view to enhancing the operation of and full compliance with the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.1995/19, Para 4) As has been consistently demanded by the Movement of Non-aligned States and also stipulated in the

	<p>document for the third session of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.1995/PC.III/13) submitted by Indonesia on behalf of the group of non-aligned and other States, the following measures are essential to the strengthening as well as to the full realization and effective implementation of the objectives of the Treaty: (a) Immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race, leading to nuclear disarmament and the attainment of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control; (b) An immediate conclusion and implementation of a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty; (c) A legally binding commitment by nuclear-weapon States on no-first use and non-use of nuclear weapons; (d) A non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; (e) A programme of action for significant reduction of nuclear weapons, leading to total elimination of such weapons and their delivery vehicles within a time-bound framework; (f) A legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional and comprehensive security assurances, both positive and negative, to non-nuclear-weapon States; (g) Facilitating the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and full adherence by all nuclear-weapon States to the instruments relating to such zones; (h) Full and unimpeded access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes for all the States parties without discrimination; (i) Application of comprehensive and strengthened IAEA safeguards to all nuclear activities and facilities; (j) All efforts must be made for ensuring the universality of the Treaty.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/19, Para 5) Any decision to be taken in accordance with article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty should be based on the proper review of the operation of the Treaty, which should ensure the realization of the purposes of the preamble and provisions of the Treaty and lead to its universality in the near future. For this reason, that decision should faithfully reflect the spirit and the letter of article X, paragraph 2, and be characterized by: (a) Consensus, in the interest of strengthening the Treaty; (b) Recognition of the legitimate concerns of all States parties; (c) Compatibility with the Treaty's stated objectives; (d) An effective period review by the States parties for continued and close scrutiny to ensure full implementation of the Treaty leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>Access to Technology and Technology Transfer</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 13) The inalienable right of all States Parties to develop the peaceful use of nuclear energy for economic and social development must be reaffirmed by all nuclear and advanced non-nuclear States Parties. It is also essential that free and unimpeded access to technology be guaranteed, without exception, for all States Parties to the Treaty who have concluded relevant safeguards agreements with the IAEA.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/19, Para 4) As has been consistently demanded by the Movement of Non-aligned States and also stipulated in the document for the third session of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.1995/PC.III/13) submitted by Indonesia on behalf of the group of non-aligned and other States, the following measures are</p>

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(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.9, Para 6) The Conference further takes note of the declarations that non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had fulfilled their obligations under article II. However, the Conference remains concerned about the ability of certain States not parties to the Treaty to obtain nuclear materials, technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons. Such transfers seriously place doubt on those responsible for supplying such material and technology to those non-parties. The Conference underlines the vital need for all parties to the Treaty to comply scrupulously and unreservedly with their obligations.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.9, Para 8) The Conference expresses great and serious concerns about the nuclear-weapon capabilities of Israel. In this connection, the Conference calls for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel. The Conference also calls upon Israel to accede to the Treaty and place all of its nuclear facilities under full-scope IARA safeguards. In this respect, the Conference also calls on all other States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it and to subject whatever nuclear facilities they may have to the full-scope safeguards of IAEA.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.18, Para 4) The Conference considers the application of IAEA full-scope safeguards a condition of supply of nuclear materials and technology. States shall refrain from extending assistance in the nuclear field to States not parties to the Treaty who have not submitted their nuclear activities to the IAEA full-scope safeguards.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.18, Para 5) The Conference reaffirms the need to promote further the transfer of technology and technical cooperation for the peaceful application of nuclear energy to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, and in that regard also reaffirms the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.18, Para 12) The Conference urges all States parties to ensure that their nuclear exports do not in any way assist non-nuclear-weapon States not party to the Treaty to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.18, Para 13) The Conference notes the importance and complementary nature of non-discriminatory guidelines agreed by all States parties in the field of transfer of nuclear materials, equipment and technology to ensure that such transfers are not diverted to nuclear-weapon purposes and do not impede the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.18, Para 14) To that end, the Conference decides to establish an ad hoc committee to formulate criteria and procedures governing the transfers of nuclear material, equipment and technology to non-nuclear-weapon States and to agree on an export control trigger list, as well as to elaborate specific measures to ensure the nuclear supply to non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty for peaceful purposes. The first meeting of the Committee will be convened at ... in ... 1995.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 3) The Conference stresses that within the framework of article IV, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, all parties to the Treaty have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, services and scientific and technological information and to contribute, alone or in cooperation with other States, to the further development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. To this end, it is indispensable to ensure that the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, including the latest achievements, is not unduly hindered, particularly for the benefit of developing countries.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 6) The Conference notes with concern that instead of facilitating the fullest exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, and particularly developing countries, as called for in the Treaty, some States parties to the Treaty continue to cooperate and give assistance in the nuclear field to States not parties to the Treaty, which are known to have acquired the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 7) The Conference expresses its regret that there exist restrictions and constraints imposed on developing non-nuclear-weapon States regarding full access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Unilaterally enforced restrictive measures, beyond safeguards required under the Treaty, must not be

	<p>used to prevent peaceful development, especially in the nuclear area, and should be removed. It is also essential that free and unimpeded access to peaceful nuclear technology be guaranteed, without exception, for all States parties to the Treaty who have concluded relevant safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 9) The Conference reaffirms the responsibility of nuclear supplier States parties to the Treaty to promote the legitimate needs for nuclear energy of all the States parties to the Treaty, with preferential treatment rendered to developing States parties, by allowing the latter to participate in the fullest possible transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and scientific and technological information with a view to achieving the largest benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 10) The Conference notes that the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply has been able to consider ways and means in which supplies of nuclear materials, equipment and technology and fuel cycle services can be assured on a more predictable and longer-term basis in accordance with mutually acceptable considerations of non-proliferation, and, in that context, was able to identify a number of emerging industrial States in the field of nuclear technology. On the other hand, the Conference regrets, that the Committee on Assurances of Supply has not succeeded in reaching agreement on a set of principles for international cooperation. The Conference acknowledges the need for setting up United Nations mechanisms to provide a forum for parties to the Treaty to discuss regularly the implementation of article IV of the Treaty.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 13) The Conference commends the role and activities of IAEA in the field of technical cooperation for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, for the benefit of developing countries in particular. The Conference strongly urges donor countries to facilitate access to peaceful uses of nuclear technology to States parties to the Treaty through the Technical Cooperation Fund of IAEA, calls upon all parties to honour their commitments and negotiate, in good faith, the target for the Technical Cooperation Fund, and, finally, calls upon parties to consider adequate and predictable resources, and which should be complemented by sufficient relevant manpower.</p>
<p>Nuclear Safety and Security</p>	
<p>IAEA and Safety and Security</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 14) The Conference welcomes the voluntary offer by a number of nuclear-weapon States to put their nuclear facilities to international verification, and requests that the inherent costs resulting from these additional safeguards activities should not be at the expense of other IAEA major programmes, such as</p>

	<p>nuclear power, fuel cycle and radioactive waste management; applications for peaceful uses of nuclear technology for health, agriculture and industry; and nuclear safety and radiation protection. In this context, the Conference notes the intention of IAEA to establish a standing advisory group on technical cooperation.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 15) The Conference especially recognizes the importance of the work of IAEA in the areas of radiological protection and nuclear safety, and urges States parties to the Treaty which have not yet done so, to become signatories to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which was adopted in 1994 with a view to creating an appropriate safety culture.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 17) The Conference expresses the hope that the effective implementation of the IAEA Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste will enhance the protection of all States from the dumping of radioactive waste pending the negotiation of an international convention on the management of such wastes with a view of convening a diplomatic conference in 1996.</p>
<p>Individual State Responsibilities</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5, Para 15) The Conference especially recognizes the importance of the work of IAEA in the areas of radiological protection and nuclear safety, and urges States parties to the Treaty which have not yet done so, to become signatories to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which was adopted in 1994 with a view to creating an appropriate safety culture.</p>