



**Thematic Summary of the Working Papers Submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties of the 7<sup>th</sup> Review Cycle of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2002 Preparatory Committee**

**Disarmament**

**Nuclear Weapon Convention**

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 11) In this regard, allow us to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the 2000 Review Conference: (a) We remain concerned at the slow progress towards disarmament; (b) Although some progress has been made in bilateral and unilateral reductions, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpiles still amount to many thousands; (c) There is to date no evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons; (d) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the Nuclear Weapon States to consider expanding the circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be used and the countries that they could be used against; (e) We are also concerned by the recent developments that threaten the principle of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other arms control and reduction measures; (f) The possible consequences of the decision by one of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) to withdraw from the Treaty bring new challenges to strategic stability and to the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 56/23, we emphasize the urgent need for commencement of substantive work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The NAM States Parties to the NPT believe that the implementation of a national missile defense system could trigger an arms race and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons; (g) The lack of progress in the entry into force of the CTBT. In this regard, we call upon all States, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, whose ratification is a prerequisite for the entry into force of the CTBT, to continue their efforts to ensure the early entry into force of the Treaty. We reiterate our belief that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the Nuclear Weapon States, to nuclear disarmament would be essential; (h) The continued inflexible postures of some of the Nuclear Weapon States that continue to prevent the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified

	<p>framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention, and in this regard reiterate our call for the establishment as soon as possible and as the highest priority of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. In this context, we underline once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. We regret that no progress has been made in the fulfilment of this obligation despite the lapse of five years; (i) The continued inability of the Conference of Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives; and (j) The lack of progress in diminishing the role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.</p> <p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 13)</b> Furthermore, we are concerned that no progress has been achieved towards the realization of the United Nations Millennium Declaration in which Heads of State and Government resolved to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways and means of eliminating nuclear dangers. We again call for an international conference, at the earliest possible date, with the objective of arriving at an agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time to eliminate all nuclear weapons, to prohibit their development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use, and to provide for their destruction. We are also deeply concerned about the progressive erosion of multilateralism and emphasize the importance of collective international efforts to enhance and maintain international peace and security.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Verification</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 11)</b> In this regard, allow us to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the 2000 Review Conference: (a) We remain concerned at the slow progress towards disarmament; (b) Although some progress has been made in bilateral and unilateral reductions, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpiles still amount to many thousands; (c) There is to date no evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons; (d) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the Nuclear Weapon States to consider expanding the circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be used and the countries that they could be used against; (e) We are also concerned by the recent developments</p>

	<p>that threaten the principle of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other arms control and reduction measures; (f) The possible consequences of the decision by one of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) to withdraw from the Treaty bring new challenges to strategic stability and to the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 56/23, we emphasize the urgent need for commencement of substantive work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The NAM States Parties to the NPT believe that the implementation of a national missile defense system could trigger an arms race and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons; (g) The lack of progress in the entry into force of the CTBT. In this regard, we call upon all States, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, whose ratification is a prerequisite for the entry into force of the CTBT, to continue their efforts to ensure the early entry into force of the Treaty. We reiterate our belief that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the Nuclear Weapon States, to nuclear disarmament would be essential; (h) The continued inflexible postures of some of the Nuclear Weapon States that continue to prevent the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention, and in this regard reiterate our call for the establishment as soon as possible and as the highest priority of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. In this context, we underline once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. We regret that no progress has been made in the fulfilment of this obligation despite the lapse of five years; (i) The continued inability of the Conference of Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives; and (j) The lack of progress in diminishing the role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.</p>
<p><b>Nuclear-Weapon States Obligations</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 3)</b> We remain firmly convinced that the NPT is a key instrument in the effort to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context, we recall that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference calls on the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on these issues. All of the States Parties to the NPT should</p>

work towards a fair balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the Nuclear Weapon States and Non-Nuclear-Weapon States with a view to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

**(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 7)** We reiterate our long-standing principled position for the total elimination of all nuclear testing and, in this regard, wish to stress the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by all the Nuclear Weapon States which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. We note that 165 States have signed the Treaty and 90 States have ratified it thus far.

**(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 10)** The NAM States Parties to the NPT reiterate their call for the full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking given by the Nuclear Weapons States at the 2000 Review Conference to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament. We expect that this undertaking be demonstrated without delay through an accelerated process of negotiations and through the full implementation of the 13 practical steps to advance systematically and progressively towards a nuclear-weapon-free world as agreed to in 2000. Despite the expectation by the international community that the successful outcome of the 2000 Review Conference would lead to the fulfillment of the unequivocal undertaking given by the Nuclear Weapon States as well as the full implementation of the 13 practical steps, very little progress has, however, been made to this effect.

**(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 11)** In this regard, allow us to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the 2000 Review Conference: (a) We remain concerned at the slow progress towards disarmament; (b) Although some progress has been made in bilateral and unilateral reductions, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpiles still amount to many thousands; (c) There is to date no evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons; (d) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the Nuclear Weapon States to consider expanding the circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be used and the countries that they could be used against; (e) We are also concerned by the recent developments that threaten the principle of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other arms control and reduction measures; (f) The possible consequences of the decision by one of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) to withdraw from the Treaty bring new challenges to strategic stability and to the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 56/23, we emphasize the urgent need for commencement of substantive work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The NAM States Parties to the NPT believe that the implementation of a national missile defense system

could trigger an arms race and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons; (g) The lack of progress in the entry into force of the CTBT. In this regard, we call upon all States, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, whose ratification is a prerequisite for the entry into force of the CTBT, to continue their efforts to ensure the early entry into force of the Treaty. We reiterate our belief that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the Nuclear Weapon States, to nuclear disarmament would be essential; (h) The continued inflexible postures of some of the Nuclear Weapon States that continue to prevent the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention, and in this regard reiterate our call for the establishment as soon as possible and as the highest priority of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. In this context, we underline once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. We regret that no progress has been made in the fulfilment of this obligation despite the lapse of five years; (i) The continued inability of the Conference of Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives; and (j) The lack of progress in diminishing the role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.

**(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 15)** To this end, the Prepcom should substantially focus on nuclear disarmament so as to ensure that there is a proper accounting in the reports by the States of their progress in achieving nuclear disarmament. In this regard, we wish to recall that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference called for regular reports within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process by all States Parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.” The NAM States Parties to the NPT expect that the States Parties, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, should submit reports to each PrepCom session, including this one. We expect that the reports on Article VI should cover issues and principles addressed by the 13 steps and should include specific and complete information on each of these steps. These reports should also address, inter alia, current policies and intentions, as well as developments in these areas.

	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 16)</b> The NAM States Parties to the NPT also believe that the PrepCom should also substantially focus on the Middle East, and further recalls that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference called on all States Parties to the Treaty, particularly the Nuclear Weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, to report through the United Nations Secretariat to the President of the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of the Conference, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. The NAM States Parties to the NPT expect that all States Parties to the Treaty, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, should submit reports in this regard as agreed in the 2000 Final Document.</p> <p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 17)</b> The NAM States Parties to the NPT further recall that specific time was made available at the 2000 Review Conference and during its preparatory process for the discussion on and consideration of proposals on the provisions in Article VI of the NPT and in paragraphs 3 and 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,” dealing with nuclear disarmament, as well as on the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. In this context, we reaffirm the importance of establishing at the 2005 Review Conference a subsidiary body to Main Committee I to deliberate on practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons, as well as a subsidiary body to Main Committee II to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT. In this regard, we furthermore underline and emphasize the need for Preparatory Committee meetings—and also at this particular meeting—to include in their programmes of work, allocations of specific time for deliberations on nuclear disarmament and on the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Arms Races</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 11)</b> In this regard, allow us to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the 2000 Review Conference: (a) We remain concerned at the slow progress towards disarmament; (b) Although some progress has been made in bilateral and unilateral reductions, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpiles still amount to many thousands; (c) There is to date no evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons; (d) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the Nuclear Weapon States to consider expanding the circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be used and the countries that they could be used against; (e) We are also concerned by the recent developments</p>

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<p><b>Bilateral Disarmament</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 11)</b> In this regard, allow us to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the 2000 Review Conference: (a) We remain concerned at the slow progress towards disarmament; (b) Although some progress has been made in bilateral and unilateral reductions, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpiles still amount to many thousands;</p>

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**Disarmament and  
Nonproliferation**

**(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 3)** We remain firmly convinced that the NPT is a key instrument in the effort to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context, we recall that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference calls on the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on these issues. All of the States Parties to the NPT should work towards a fair balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the Nuclear Weapon States and Non-Nuclear-Weapon States with a view to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

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<p style="text-align: center;"><b>International Humanitarian Law and ICJ</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 11)</b> In this regard, allow us to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the 2000 Review Conference: (a) We remain concerned at the slow progress towards disarmament; (b) Although some progress has been made in bilateral and unilateral reductions, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpiles still amount to many thousands; (c) There is to date no evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons; (d) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the Nuclear Weapon States to consider expanding the circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be used and the countries that they could be used against; (e) We are also concerned by the recent developments that threaten the principle of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other arms control and reduction measures; (f) The possible consequences of the decision by one of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) to withdraw from the Treaty bring new challenges to strategic stability and to the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 56/23, we emphasize the urgent need for commencement of substantive work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The NAM States Parties to the NPT believe that the implementation of a national missile defense system could trigger an arms race and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons; (g) The lack of progress in the entry into force of the CTBT. In this regard, we call upon all States, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, whose ratification is a prerequisite for the entry into force of the CTBT, to continue their efforts to ensure the early entry into force of the Treaty. We reiterate our belief that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the Nuclear Weapon States, to nuclear disarmament would be essential; (h) The continued inflexible postures of some of the Nuclear Weapon States that continue to prevent the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention, and in this regard reiterate our call for the establishment as soon as possible and as the highest priority of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. In this context, we underline once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under</p>

	<p>strict and effective international control. We regret that no progress has been made in the fulfilment of this obligation despite the lapse of five years; (i) The continued inability of the Conference of Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives; and (j) The lack of progress in diminishing the role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Missiles</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 11)</b> In this regard, allow us to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the 2000 Review Conference: (a) We remain concerned at the slow progress towards disarmament; (b) Although some progress has been made in bilateral and unilateral reductions, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpiles still amount to many thousands; (c) There is to date no evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons; (d) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the Nuclear Weapon States to consider expanding the circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be used and the countries that they could be used against; (e) We are also concerned by the recent developments that threaten the principle of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other arms control and reduction measures; (f) The possible consequences of the decision by one of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) to withdraw from the Treaty bring new challenges to strategic stability and to the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 56/23, we emphasize the urgent need for commencement of substantive work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The NAM States Parties to the NPT believe that the implementation of a national missile defense system could trigger an arms race and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons; (g) The lack of progress in the entry into force of the CTBT. In this regard, we call upon all States, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, whose ratification is a prerequisite for the entry into force of the CTBT, to continue their efforts to ensure the early entry into force of the Treaty. We reiterate our belief that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the Nuclear Weapon States, to nuclear disarmament would be essential; (h) The continued inflexible postures of some of the Nuclear Weapon States that continue to prevent the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified</p>

	<p>framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention, and in this regard reiterate our call for the establishment as soon as possible and as the highest priority of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. In this context, we underline once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. We regret that no progress has been made in the fulfilment of this obligation despite the lapse of five years; (i) The continued inability of the Conference of Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives; and (j) The lack of progress in diminishing the role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>NAM Involvement and Contributions</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 2)</b> In accordance with the Movement’s long-standing and principled positions on nuclear disarmament, the NAM States Parties to the NPT remain fully committed to their obligations and commitments under the Treaty and the agreements reached at both the 1995 and 2000 NPT Conferences. In this regard, I wish to recall the comprehensive working paper submitted by the Movement during the 2000 Review Conference contained in document NPT/CONF.2000/18.</p> <p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 5)</b> The NAM States Parties to the NPT wish to re-emphasize the urgency and the important of achieving the universality of the Treaty, particularly by the accession to the Treaty at the earliest possible date of those States possessing nuclear capabilities, and resolve to make determined efforts to achieve this goal. We reiterate our support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and to this end, we reaffirm the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus and Security Council resolutions 487 (1981) and 687 (1991). We call upon all parties concerned to take urgent and practical steps towards the establishment of such a zone and, pending its establishment to call on Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the NPT, nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, to accede to the NPT without delay, to place promptly all its nuclear facilities under IAEA Safeguards and to conduct its nuclear related activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime. We recall that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel’s accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA Safeguards, in</p>

realizing the goal of the universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.

**(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 11)** In this regard, allow us to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the 2000 Review Conference: (a) We remain concerned at the slow progress towards disarmament; (b) Although some progress has been made in bilateral and unilateral reductions, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpiles still amount to many thousands; (c) There is to date no evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons; (d) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the Nuclear Weapon States to consider expanding the circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be used and the countries that they could be used against; (e) We are also concerned by the recent developments that threaten the principle of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other arms control and reduction measures; (f) The possible consequences of the decision by one of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) to withdraw from the Treaty bring new challenges to strategic stability and to the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 56/23, we emphasize the urgent need for commencement of substantive work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The NAM States Parties to the NPT believe that the implementation of a national missile defense system could trigger an arms race and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons; (g) The lack of progress in the entry into force of the CTBT. In this regard, we call upon all States, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, whose ratification is a prerequisite for the entry into force of the CTBT, to continue their efforts to ensure the early entry into force of the Treaty. We reiterate our belief that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the Nuclear Weapon States, to nuclear disarmament would be essential; (h) The continued inflexible postures of some of the Nuclear Weapon States that continue to prevent the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention, and in this regard reiterate our call for the establishment as soon as possible and as the highest priority of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. In this context, we underline once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. We regret that no progress has been made in the fulfilment of this obligation despite the lapse of five years; (i) The continued inability of the Conference of Disarmament to

resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives; and (j) The lack of progress in diminishing the role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.

**(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 13)** Furthermore, we are concerned that no progress has been achieved towards the realization of the United Nations Millennium Declaration in which Heads of State and Government resolved to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways and means of eliminating nuclear dangers. We again call for an international conference, at the earliest possible date, with the objective of arriving at an agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time to eliminate all nuclear weapons, to prohibit their development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use, and to provide for their destruction. We are also deeply concerned about the progressive erosion of multilateralism and emphasize the importance of collective international efforts to enhance and maintain international peace and security.

**(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 17)** The NAM States Parties to the NPT further recall that specific time was made available at the 2000 Review Conference and during its preparatory process for the discussion on and consideration of proposals on the provisions in Article VI of the NPT and in paragraphs 3 and 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,” dealing with nuclear disarmament, as well as on the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. In this context, we reaffirm the importance of establishing at the 2005 Review Conference a subsidiary body to Main Committee I to deliberate on practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons, as well as a subsidiary body to Main Committee II to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT. In this regard, we furthermore underline and emphasize the need for Preparatory Committee meetings—and also at this particular meeting—to include in their programmes of work, allocations of specific time for deliberations on nuclear disarmament and on the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

**(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 18)** In concluding, the Non-Aligned Movement wishes to reiterate its position, that the Review

	<p>Conference, as well as the third/final PrepCom for that Conference, be chaired by representatives drawn from the Movement.</p> <p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 19)</b> Finally, we would like to request that this statement be circulated by the Secretariat as a working paper of the Preparatory Committee.</p>
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<p><b>UN General Assembly</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 4)</b> We reiterate our conviction that pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, efforts for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally-binding instrument on security assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority. The Non-Aligned Movement continues to consider the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) created by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament. We welcome the efforts aimed at establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and call for cooperation and broad consultation in order to achieve agreements freely arrived at between the States of the region concerned. We reiterate that in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is essential that Nuclear Weapon States should provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the same. We urge States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-1) and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. In this context, we reiterate our support for Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status and consider that the institutionalization of that status would be an important measure towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.</p> <p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 5)</b> The NAM States Parties to the NPT wish to re-emphasize the urgency and the important of achieving the universality of the Treaty, particularly by the accession to the Treaty at the earliest possible date of those States possessing nuclear capabilities, and resolve to make determined efforts to achieve this goal. We reiterate our support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and to this end, we reaffirm the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus and Security Council resolutions 487 (1981) and 687 (1991). We call upon all parties concerned to take urgent and practical steps towards the establishment of such a zone and, pending its establishment</p>
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to call on Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the NPT, nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, to accede to the NPT without delay, to place promptly all its nuclear facilities under IAEA Safeguards and to conduct its nuclear related activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime. We recall that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA Safeguards, in realizing the goal of the universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.

**(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 11)** In this regard, allow us to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the 2000 Review Conference: (a) We remain concerned at the slow progress towards disarmament; (b) Although some progress has been made in bilateral and unilateral reductions, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpiles still amount to many thousands; (c) There is to date no evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons; (d) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the Nuclear Weapon States to consider expanding the circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be used and the countries that they could be used against; (e) We are also concerned by the recent developments that threaten the principle of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other arms control and reduction measures; (f) The possible consequences of the decision by one of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) to withdraw from the Treaty bring new challenges to strategic stability and to the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 56/23, we emphasize the urgent need for commencement of substantive work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The NAM States Parties to the NPT believe that the implementation of a national missile defense system could trigger an arms race and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons; (g) The lack of progress in the entry into force of the CTBT. In this regard, we call upon all States, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, whose ratification is a prerequisite for the entry into force of the CTBT, to continue their efforts to ensure the early entry into force of the Treaty. We reiterate our belief that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the Nuclear Weapon States, to nuclear disarmament would be essential; (h) The continued inflexible postures of some of the Nuclear Weapon States that continue to prevent the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention, and in this regard reiterate our call for the establishment as soon as possible

	<p>and as the highest priority of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. In this context, we underline once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. We regret that no progress has been made in the fulfilment of this obligation despite the lapse of five years; (i) The continued inability of the Conference of Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives; and (j) The lack of progress in diminishing the role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.</p> <p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 12)</b> We reiterate once again our support for the convening of the Fourth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament. We continue to call for further steps leading to the Convening of the Fourth Special Session with the participation of all Member States of the United Nations as well as the need for SSOD-IV to review and assess the implementation of SSOD-I, while reaffirming its principles and priorities.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>SSOD</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 4)</b> We reiterate our conviction that pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, efforts for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally-binding instrument on security assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority. The Non-Aligned Movement continues to consider the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) created by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament. We welcome the efforts aimed at establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and call for cooperation and broad consultation in order to achieve agreements freely arrived at between the States of the region concerned. We reiterate that in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is essential that Nuclear Weapon States should provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the same. We urge States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-1) and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. In this context, we reiterate our support for Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status and consider that the institutionalization of that status would</p>

	<p>be an important measure towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.</p> <p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 12)</b> We reiterate once again our support for the convening of the Fourth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament. We continue to call for further steps leading to the Convening of the Fourth Special Session with the participation of all Member States of the United Nations as well as the need for SSOD-IV to review and assess the implementation of SSOD-I, while reaffirming its principles and priorities.</p>
<p><b>Test Ban and CTBT</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 7)</b> We reiterate our long-standing principled position for the total elimination of all nuclear testing and, in this regard, wish to stress the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by all the Nuclear Weapon States which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. We note that 165 States have signed the Treaty and 90 States have ratified it thus far.</p> <p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 11)</b> In this regard, allow us to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the 2000 Review Conference: (a) We remain concerned at the slow progress towards disarmament; (b) Although some progress has been made in bilateral and unilateral reductions, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpiles still amount to many thousands; (c) There is to date no evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons; (d) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the Nuclear Weapon States to consider expanding the circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be used and the countries that they could be used against; (e) We are also concerned by the recent developments that threaten the principle of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other arms control and reduction measures; (f) The possible consequences of the decision by one of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) to withdraw from the Treaty bring new challenges to strategic stability and to the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 56/23, we emphasize the urgent need for commencement of substantive work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The NAM States Parties to the NPT believe that the implementation of a national missile defense system could trigger an arms race and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons; (g) The lack of progress in the entry into force of the CTBT. In this regard, we call upon all States, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, whose ratification is a prerequisite for the entry into force of the CTBT, to continue their efforts to ensure the early entry into force of the Treaty. We reiterate our belief that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be</p>

	<p>fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the Nuclear Weapon States, to nuclear disarmament would be essential; (h) The continued inflexible postures of some of the Nuclear Weapon States that continue to prevent the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention, and in this regard reiterate our call for the establishment as soon as possible and as the highest priority of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. In this context, we underline once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. We regret that no progress has been made in the fulfilment of this obligation despite the lapse of five years; (i) The continued inability of the Conference of Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives; and (j) The lack of progress in diminishing the role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Conference on Disarmament</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 11)</b> In this regard, allow us to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the 2000 Review Conference: (a) We remain concerned at the slow progress towards disarmament; (b) Although some progress has been made in bilateral and unilateral reductions, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpiles still amount to many thousands; (c) There is to date no evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons; (d) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the Nuclear Weapon States to consider expanding the circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be used and the countries that they could be used against; (e) We are also concerned by the recent developments that threaten the principle of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other arms control and reduction measures; (f) The possible consequences of the decision by one of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) to withdraw from the Treaty bring new challenges to strategic stability and to the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 56/23, we emphasize the urgent need for commencement of substantive work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The NAM States Parties to the NPT believe that the implementation of a national missile defense system</p>

	<p>could trigger an arms race and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons; (g) The lack of progress in the entry into force of the CTBT. In this regard, we call upon all States, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, whose ratification is a prerequisite for the entry into force of the CTBT, to continue their efforts to ensure the early entry into force of the Treaty. We reiterate our belief that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the Nuclear Weapon States, to nuclear disarmament would be essential; (h) The continued inflexible postures of some of the Nuclear Weapon States that continue to prevent the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention, and in this regard reiterate our call for the establishment as soon as possible and as the highest priority of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. In this context, we underline once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. We regret that no progress has been made in the fulfilment of this obligation despite the lapse of five years; (i) The continued inability of the Conference of Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives; and (j) The lack of progress in diminishing the role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>UN Disarmament Commission</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 4)</b> We reiterate our conviction that pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, efforts for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally-binding instrument on security assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority. The Non-Aligned Movement continues to consider the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) created by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament. We welcome the efforts aimed at establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and call for cooperation and broad consultation in order to achieve agreements freely arrived at between the States of the region concerned. We reiterate that in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is essential that Nuclear Weapon States should provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the same. We urge States to conclude agreements with a view to</p>

	<p>establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-1) and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. In this context, we reiterate our support for Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status and consider that the institutionalization of that status would be an important measure towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.</p>
<p><b>International Atomic Energy Agency</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 5)</b> The NAM States Parties to the NPT wish to re-emphasize the urgency and the important of achieving the universality of the Treaty, particularly by the accession to the Treaty at the earliest possible date of those States possessing nuclear capabilities, and resolve to make determined efforts to achieve this goal. We reiterate our support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and to this end, we reaffirm the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus and Security Council resolutions 487 (1981) and 687 (1991). We call upon all parties concerned to take urgent and practical steps towards the establishment of such a zone and, pending its establishment to call on Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the NPT, nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, to accede to the NPT without delay, to place promptly all its nuclear facilities under IAEA Safeguards and to conduct its nuclear related activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime. We recall that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA Safeguards, in realizing the goal of the universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.</p> <p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 6)</b> We also recall that the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference urged the two nuclear capable States in South Asia to accede to the Treaty as Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and to place all their nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA Safeguards.</p> <p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 8)</b> The NAM States Parties to the NPT reaffirm the importance of achieving the universal application of the Agency's Safeguards system and urge all States which have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible. This has been considered by the 2000 Review Conference, as one main objective, to consolidate and enhance the verification system for the non-proliferation Regime. We stress, in this regard, the importance of the IAEA's Safeguards system, including comprehensive safeguards agreements and also the Model additional Protocols. However, we do not desire to see international efforts</p>

	<p>towards achieving universality of comprehensive safeguards wither in favour of pursuing additional measures and restrictions on non-nuclear-weapon States, which are already committed to non-proliferation norms, and which have renounced the nuclear-weapons option.</p>
<p><b>UN Security Council</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 5)</b> The NAM States Parties to the NPT wish to re-emphasize the urgency and the important of achieving the universality of the Treaty, particularly by the accession to the Treaty at the earliest possible date of those States possessing nuclear capabilities, and resolve to make determined efforts to achieve this goal. We reiterate our support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and to this end, we reaffirm the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus and Security Council resolutions 487 (1981) and 687 (1991). We call upon all parties concerned to take urgent and practical steps towards the establishment of such a zone and, pending its establishment to call on Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the NPT, nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, to accede to the NPT without delay, to place promptly all its nuclear facilities under IAEA Safeguards and to conduct its nuclear related activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime. We recall that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel’s accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA Safeguards, in realizing the goal of the universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Outer Space</b></p>	
<p><b>International Cooperation on Outer Space</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 11)</b> In this regard, allow us to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the 2000 Review Conference: (a) We remain concerned at the slow progress towards disarmament; (b) Although some progress has been made in bilateral and unilateral reductions, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpiles still amount to many thousands; (c) There is to date no evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons; (d) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the Nuclear Weapon States to consider expanding the circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be used and the countries that they could be used against; (e) We are also concerned by the recent developments that threaten the principle of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other arms control and reduction measures; (f) The possible consequences of the decision by one of the States Parties to the Treaty</p>

	<p>on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) to withdraw from the Treaty bring new challenges to strategic stability and to the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 56/23, we emphasize the urgent need for commencement of substantive work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The NAM States Parties to the NPT believe that the implementation of a national missile defense system could trigger an arms race and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons; (g) The lack of progress in the entry into force of the CTBT. In this regard, we call upon all States, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, whose ratification is a prerequisite for the entry into force of the CTBT, to continue their efforts to ensure the early entry into force of the Treaty. We reiterate our belief that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the Nuclear Weapon States, to nuclear disarmament would be essential; (h) The continued inflexible postures of some of the Nuclear Weapon States that continue to prevent the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention, and in this regard reiterate our call for the establishment as soon as possible and as the highest priority of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. In this context, we underline once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. We regret that no progress has been made in the fulfilment of this obligation despite the lapse of five years; (i) The continued inability of the Conference of Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives; and (j) The lack of progress in diminishing the role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.</p>
<p><b>International Treaty on Outer Space</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 11)</b> In this regard, allow us to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the 2000 Review Conference: (a) We remain concerned at the slow progress towards disarmament; (b) Although some progress has been made in bilateral and unilateral reductions, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpiles still amount to many thousands; (c) There is to date no evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons; (d) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, as</p>



	<p>demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the Nuclear Weapon States to consider expanding the circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be used and the countries that they could be used against; (e) We are also concerned by the recent developments that threaten the principle of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other arms control and reduction measures; (f) The possible consequences of the decision by one of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) to withdraw from the Treaty bring new challenges to strategic stability and to the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 56/23, we emphasize the urgent need for commencement of substantive work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The NAM States Parties to the NPT believe that the implementation of a national missile defense system could trigger an arms race and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons; (g) The lack of progress in the entry into force of the CTBT. In this regard, we call upon all States, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, whose ratification is a prerequisite for the entry into force of the CTBT, to continue their efforts to ensure the early entry into force of the Treaty. We reiterate our belief that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the Nuclear Weapon States, to nuclear disarmament would be essential; (h) The continued inflexible postures of some of the Nuclear Weapon States that continue to prevent the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention, and in this regard reiterate our call for the establishment as soon as possible and as the highest priority of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. In this context, we underline once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. We regret that no progress has been made in the fulfilment of this obligation despite the lapse of five years; (i) The continued inability of the Conference of Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives; and (j) The lack of progress in diminishing the role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.</p>
<p><b>Missile Defense Systems</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 11)</b> In this regard, allow us to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the</p>

2000 Review Conference: (a) We remain concerned at the slow progress towards disarmament; (b) Although some progress has been made in bilateral and unilateral reductions, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpiles still amount to many thousands; (c) There is to date no evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons; (d) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the Nuclear Weapon States to consider expanding the circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be used and the countries that they could be used against; (e) We are also concerned by the recent developments that threaten the principle of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other arms control and reduction measures; (f) The possible consequences of the decision by one of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) to withdraw from the Treaty bring new challenges to strategic stability and to the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 56/23, we emphasize the urgent need for commencement of substantive work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The NAM States Parties to the NPT believe that the implementation of a national missile defense system could trigger an arms race and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons; (g) The lack of progress in the entry into force of the CTBT. In this regard, we call upon all States, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, whose ratification is a prerequisite for the entry into force of the CTBT, to continue their efforts to ensure the early entry into force of the Treaty. We reiterate our belief that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the Nuclear Weapon States, to nuclear disarmament would be essential; (h) The continued inflexible postures of some of the Nuclear Weapon States that continue to prevent the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention, and in this regard reiterate our call for the establishment as soon as possible and as the highest priority of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. In this context, we underline once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. We regret that no progress has been made in the fulfilment of this obligation despite the lapse of five years; (i) The continued inability of the Conference of Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives; and (j) The lack of progress in diminishing the role for

	<p>nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.</p>
<p><b>Nonproliferation</b></p>	
<p><b>Nonproliferation and Peaceful Uses</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 8)</b> The NAM States Parties to the NPT reaffirm the importance of achieving the universal application of the Agency’s Safeguards system and urge all States which have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible. This has been considered by the 2000 Review Conference, as one main objective, to consolidate and enhance the verification system for the non-proliferation Regime. We stress, in this regard, the importance of the IAEA’s Safeguards system, including comprehensive safeguards agreements and also the Model additional Protocols. However, we do not desire to see international efforts towards achieving universality of comprehensive safeguards wither in favour of pursuing additional measures and restrictions on non-nuclear-weapon States, which are already committed to non-proliferation norms, and which have renounced the nuclear-weapons option.</p>
<p><b>Peaceful Uses</b></p>	
<p><b>Access to Nuclear Technology</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 9)</b> In this regard, we recall that the NPT fosters the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by providing a framework of confidence and cooperation within which those uses can take place. It is in this context that we reaffirm the inalienable right of the States Parties to the NPT to engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, and that free and unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to all States Parties be fully ensured.</p>
<p><b>Inalienable Right Through NPT</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 9)</b> In this regard, we recall that the NPT fosters the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by providing a framework of confidence and cooperation within which those uses can take place. It is in this context that we reaffirm the inalienable right of the States Parties to the NPT to engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, and that free and unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to all States Parties be fully ensured.</p>
<p><b>NWFZs</b></p>	

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Contributions to Disarmament</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 4)</b> We reiterate our conviction that pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, efforts for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally-binding instrument on security assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority. The Non-Aligned Movement continues to consider the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) created by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament. We welcome the efforts aimed at establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and call for cooperation and broad consultation in order to achieve agreements freely arrived at between the States of the region concerned. We reiterate that in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is essential that Nuclear Weapon States should provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the same. We urge States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-1) and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. In this context, we reiterate our support for Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status and consider that the institutionalization of that status would be an important measure towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Contributions to Nonproliferation</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 4)</b> We reiterate our conviction that pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, efforts for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally-binding instrument on security assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority. The Non-Aligned Movement continues to consider the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) created by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament. We welcome the efforts aimed at establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and call for cooperation and broad consultation in order to achieve agreements freely arrived at between the States of the region concerned. We reiterate that in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is essential that Nuclear Weapon States should provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the same. We urge States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-1) and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. In</p>

	<p>this context, we reiterate our support for Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status and consider that the institutionalization of that status would be an important measure towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.</p>
<p><b>Treaty of Tlatelolco</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 4)</b> We reiterate our conviction that pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, efforts for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally-binding instrument on security assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority. The Non-Aligned Movement continues to consider the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) created by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament. We welcome the efforts aimed at establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and call for cooperation and broad consultation in order to achieve agreements freely arrived at between the States of the region concerned. We reiterate that in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is essential that Nuclear Weapon States should provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the same. We urge States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-1) and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. In this context, we reiterate our support for Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status and consider that the institutionalization of that status would be an important measure towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.</p>
<p><b>Treaty of Pelindaba</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 4)</b> We reiterate our conviction that pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, efforts for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally-binding instrument on security assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority. The Non-Aligned Movement continues to consider the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) created by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament. We welcome the efforts aimed at establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and call for cooperation and broad consultation in order to achieve agreements freely arrived at between the States of the region concerned. We reiterate that in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is essential that Nuclear Weapon States should provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the same. We urge States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do</p>

	<p>not exist in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-1) and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. In this context, we reiterate our support for Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status and consider that the institutionalization of that status would be an important measure towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.</p>
<p><b>Treaty of Bangkok</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 4)</b> We reiterate our conviction that pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, efforts for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally-binding instrument on security assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority. The Non-Aligned Movement continues to consider the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) created by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament. We welcome the efforts aimed at establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and call for cooperation and broad consultation in order to achieve agreements freely arrived at between the States of the region concerned. We reiterate that in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is essential that Nuclear Weapon States should provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the same. We urge States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-1) and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. In this context, we reiterate our support for Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status and consider that the institutionalization of that status would be an important measure towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.</p>
<p><b>Treaty of Rarotonga</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 4)</b> We reiterate our conviction that pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, efforts for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally-binding instrument on security assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority. The Non-Aligned Movement continues to consider the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) created by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament. We welcome the efforts aimed at establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and call for cooperation and broad consultation in order to achieve agreements freely arrived at between the States of the region concerned. We reiterate that in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is essential</p>

	<p>that Nuclear Weapon States should provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the same. We urge States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-1) and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. In this context, we reiterate our support for Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status and consider that the institutionalization of that status would be an important measure towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.</p>
<p><b>Mongolia as a NWFZ</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 4)</b> We reiterate our conviction that pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, efforts for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally-binding instrument on security assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority. The Non-Aligned Movement continues to consider the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) created by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament. We welcome the efforts aimed at establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and call for cooperation and broad consultation in order to achieve agreements freely arrived at between the States of the region concerned. We reiterate that in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is essential that Nuclear Weapon States should provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the same. We urge States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-1) and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. In this context, we reiterate our support for Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status and consider that the institutionalization of that status would be an important measure towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.</p>
<p><b>Middle East WMDFZ</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 5)</b> The NAM States Parties to the NPT wish to re-emphasize the urgency and the important of achieving the universality of the Treaty, particularly by the accession to the Treaty at the earliest possible date of those States possessing nuclear capabilities, and resolve to make determined efforts to achieve this goal. We reiterate our support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and to this end, we reaffirm the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in</p>

accordance with the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus and Security Council resolutions 487 (1981) and 687 (1991). We call upon all parties concerned to take urgent and practical steps towards the establishment of such a zone and, pending its establishment to call on Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the NPT, nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, to accede to the NPT without delay, to place promptly all its nuclear facilities under IAEA Safeguards and to conduct its nuclear related activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime. We recall that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA Safeguards, in realizing the goal of the universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.

**(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 14)** The NAM States Parties to the NPT believe that this PrepCom should deal with all procedural issues necessary to take its work forward as well as with matters of substance as was decided at the 1995 and 2000 Conferences. We recall that the Final Document states clearly that “each session of the Preparatory Committee should consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and the Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences”.

**(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 16)** The NAM States Parties to the NPT also believe that the PrepCom should also substantially focus on the Middle East, and further recalls that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference called on all States Parties to the Treaty, particularly the Nuclear Weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, to report through the United Nations Secretariat to the President of the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of the Conference, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. The NAM States Parties to the NPT expect that all States Parties to the Treaty, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, should submit reports in this regard as agreed in the 2000 Final Document.

**(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 17)** The NAM States Parties to the NPT further recall that specific time was made available at the 2000 Review Conference and during its preparatory process for the discussion on and consideration of proposals on the provisions in Article VI of the NPT and in paragraphs 3 and 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,” dealing with nuclear disarmament, as well as on the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. In this context, we reaffirm the importance of establishing at the 2005 Review Conference a subsidiary body to Main



	<p>Committee I to deliberate on practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons, as well as a subsidiary body to Main Committee II to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT. In this regard, we furthermore underline and emphasize the need for Preparatory Committee meetings—and also at this particular meeting—to include in their programmes of work, allocations of specific time for deliberations on nuclear disarmament and on the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.</p>
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<p><b>Security Assurances</b></p>	
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<p><b>Nuclear-Weapon States Role</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 4)</b> We reiterate our conviction that pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, efforts for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally-binding instrument on security assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority. The Non-Aligned Movement continues to consider the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) created by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament. We welcome the efforts aimed at establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and call for cooperation and broad consultation in order to achieve agreements freely arrived at between the States of the region concerned. We reiterate that in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is essential that Nuclear Weapon States should provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the same. We urge States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-1) and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. In this context, we reiterate our support for Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status and consider that the institutionalization of that status would be an important measure towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.</p> <p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 11)</b> In this regard, allow us to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the 2000 Review Conference: (a) We remain concerned at the slow progress towards disarmament; (b) Although some progress has been made in bilateral and unilateral reductions, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpiles still amount to many thousands; (c) There is to date no evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons; (d) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, as</p>
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demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the Nuclear Weapon States to consider expanding the circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be used and the countries that they could be used against; (e) We are also concerned by the recent developments that threaten the principle of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other arms control and reduction measures; (f) The possible consequences of the decision by one of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) to withdraw from the Treaty bring new challenges to strategic stability and to the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 56/23, we emphasize the urgent need for commencement of substantive work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The NAM States Parties to the NPT believe that the implementation of a national missile defense system could trigger an arms race and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons; (g) The lack of progress in the entry into force of the CTBT. In this regard, we call upon all States, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, whose ratification is a prerequisite for the entry into force of the CTBT, to continue their efforts to ensure the early entry into force of the Treaty. We reiterate our belief that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the Nuclear Weapon States, to nuclear disarmament would be essential; (h) The continued inflexible postures of some of the Nuclear Weapon States that continue to prevent the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention, and in this regard reiterate our call for the establishment as soon as possible and as the highest priority of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. In this context, we underline once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. We regret that no progress has been made in the fulfilment of this obligation despite the lapse of five years; (i) The continued inability of the Conference of Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives; and (j) The lack of progress in diminishing the role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Legally-Binding International Convention or Instrument</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 4)</b> We reiterate our conviction that pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, efforts for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally-binding instrument on security assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority. The Non-Aligned Movement continues to consider the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) created by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament. We welcome the efforts aimed at establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and call for cooperation and broad consultation in order to achieve agreements freely arrived at between the States of the region concerned. We reiterate that in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is essential that Nuclear Weapon States should provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the same. We urge States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-1) and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. In this context, we reiterate our support for Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status and consider that the institutionalization of that status would be an important measure towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>NWFZs and Security Assurances</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 4)</b> We reiterate our conviction that pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, efforts for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally-binding instrument on security assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority. The Non-Aligned Movement continues to consider the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) created by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament. We welcome the efforts aimed at establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and call for cooperation and broad consultation in order to achieve agreements freely arrived at between the States of the region concerned. We reiterate that in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is essential that Nuclear Weapon States should provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the same. We urge States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-1) and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. In this context, we reiterate our support for Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status and consider that the institutionalization of that status would</p>

	<p>be an important measure towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.</p>
<p><b>Security Assurances and the NPT</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 4)</b> We reiterate our conviction that pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, efforts for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally-binding instrument on security assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority. The Non-Aligned Movement continues to consider the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) created by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament. We welcome the efforts aimed at establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and call for cooperation and broad consultation in order to achieve agreements freely arrived at between the States of the region concerned. We reiterate that in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is essential that Nuclear Weapon States should provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the same. We urge States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-1) and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. In this context, we reiterate our support for Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status and consider that the institutionalization of that status would be an important measure towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Country Specific</b></p>	
<p><b>Israel</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 5)</b> The NAM States Parties to the NPT wish to re-emphasize the urgency and the important of achieving the universality of the Treaty, particularly by the accession to the Treaty at the earliest possible date of those States possessing nuclear capabilities, and resolve to make determined efforts to achieve this goal. We reiterate our support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and to this end, we reaffirm the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus and Security Council resolutions 487 (1981) and 687 (1991). We call upon all parties concerned to take urgent and practical steps towards the establishment of such a zone and, pending its establishment to call on Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the NPT, nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, to accede to the NPT without delay, to place promptly</p>

	<p>all its nuclear facilities under IAEA Safeguards and to conduct its nuclear related activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime. We recall that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA Safeguards, in realizing the goal of the universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.</p>
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<p><b>Non-Proliferation Treaty Related</b></p>	
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<p><b>Disarmament Through the NPT</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 3)</b> We remain firmly convinced that the NPT is a key instrument in the effort to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context, we recall that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference calls on the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on these issues. All of the States Parties to the NPT should work towards a fair balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the Nuclear Weapon States and Non-Nuclear-Weapon States with a view to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.</p> <p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 4)</b> We reiterate our conviction that pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, efforts for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally-binding instrument on security assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority. The Non-Aligned Movement continues to consider the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) created by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament. We welcome the efforts aimed at establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and call for cooperation and broad consultation in order to achieve agreements freely arrived at between the States of the region concerned. We reiterate that in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is essential that Nuclear Weapon States should provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the same. We urge States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-1) and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. In this context, we reiterate our support for Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status and consider that the institutionalization of that status would be an important measure towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.</p>
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**(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 5)** The NAM States Parties to the NPT wish to re-emphasize the urgency and the important of achieving the universality of the Treaty, particularly by the accession to the Treaty at the earliest possible date of those States possessing nuclear capabilities, and resolve to make determined efforts to achieve this goal. We reiterate our support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and to this end, we reaffirm the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus and Security Council resolutions 487 (1981) and 687 (1991). We call upon all parties concerned to take urgent and practical steps towards the establishment of such a zone and, pending its establishment to call on Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the NPT, nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, to accede to the NPT without delay, to place promptly all its nuclear facilities under IAEA Safeguards and to conduct its nuclear related activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime. We recall that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA Safeguards, in realizing the goal of the universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.

**(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 6)** We also recall that the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference urged the two nuclear capable States in South Asia to accede to the Treaty as Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and to place all their nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA Safeguards.

**(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 10)** The NAM States Parties to the NPT reiterate their call for the full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking given by the Nuclear Weapons States at the 2000 Review Conference to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament. We expect that this undertaking be demonstrated without delay through an accelerated process of negotiations and through the full implementation of the 13 practical steps to advance systematically and progressively towards a nuclear-weapon-free world as agreed to in 2000. Despite the expectation by the international community that the successful outcome of the 2000 Review Conference would lead to the fulfillment of the unequivocal undertaking given by the Nuclear Weapon States as well as the full implementation of the 13 practical steps, very little progress has, however, been made to this effect.

**(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 14)** The NAM States Parties to the NPT believe that this PrepCom should deal with all procedural issues necessary to take its work forward as well as with matters of substance as was decided at the 1995 and 2000 Conferences. We recall that the Final Document states clearly that "each session of the Preparatory Committee should consider specific matters of substance

	<p>relating to the implementation of the Treaty and the Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences”.</p> <p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 15)</b> To this end, the Prepcom should substantially focus on nuclear disarmament so as to ensure that there is a proper accounting in the reports by the States of their progress in achieving nuclear disarmament. In this regard, we wish to recall that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference called for regular reports within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process by all States Parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.” The NAM States Parties to the NPT expect that the States Parties, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, should submit reports to each PrepCom session, including this one. We expect that the reports on Article VI should cover issues and principles addressed by the 13 steps and should include specific and complete information on each of these steps. These reports should also address, inter alia, current policies and intentions, as well as developments in these areas.</p> <p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 17)</b> The NAM States Parties to the NPT further recall that specific time was made available at the 2000 Review Conference and during its preparatory process for the discussion on and consideration of proposals on the provisions in Article VI of the NPT and in paragraphs 3 and 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,” dealing with nuclear disarmament, as well as on the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. In this context, we reaffirm the importance of establishing at the 2005 Review Conference a subsidiary body to Main Committee I to deliberate on practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons, as well as a subsidiary body to Main Committee II to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT. In this regard, we furthermore underline and emphasize the need for Preparatory Committee meetings—and also at this particular meeting—to include in their programmes of work, allocations of specific time for deliberations on nuclear disarmament and on the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.</p>
<p align="center"><b>1995 Review and Extension of the NPT</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 1)</b> In fulfillment of the 1995 and 2000 decisions on the strengthened review process, in particular paragraphs 4 and 5, the States Parties to the NPT that have convened here today are tasked to: (a) Reflect on the progress made in the full realization of the objectives of the Treaty as well as the commitments and undertakings given at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference; and, to (b) Make the procedural arrangements for the Review Conference.</p>

**(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 2)** In accordance with the Movement's long-standing and principled positions on nuclear disarmament, the NAM States Parties to the NPT remain fully committed to their obligations and commitments under the Treaty and the agreements reached at both the 1995 and 2000 NPT Conferences. In this regard, I wish to recall the comprehensive working paper submitted by the Movement during the 2000 Review Conference contained in document NPT/CONF.2000/18.

**(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 14)** The NAM States Parties to the NPT believe that this PrepCom should deal with all procedural issues necessary to take its work forward as well as with matters of substance as was decided at the 1995 and 2000 Conferences. We recall that the Final Document states clearly that "each session of the Preparatory Committee should consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and the Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences".

**(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 15)** To this end, the Prepcom should substantially focus on nuclear disarmament so as to ensure that there is a proper accounting in the reports by the States of their progress in achieving nuclear disarmament. In this regard, we wish to recall that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference called for regular reports within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process by all States Parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament." The NAM States Parties to the NPT expect that the States Parties, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, should submit reports to each PrepCom session, including this one. We expect that the reports on Article VI should cover issues and principles addressed by the 13 steps and should include specific and complete information on each of these steps. These reports should also address, inter alia, current policies and intentions, as well as developments in these areas.

**(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 16)** The NAM States Parties to the NPT also believe that the PrepCom should also substantially focus on the Middle East, and further recalls that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference called on all States Parties to the Treaty, particularly the Nuclear Weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, to report through the United Nations Secretariat to the President of the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of the Conference, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. The NAM States Parties to the NPT expect that all States Parties to the



	<p>Treaty, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, should submit reports in this regard as agreed in the 2000 Final Document.</p> <p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 17)</b> The NAM States Parties to the NPT further recall that specific time was made available at the 2000 Review Conference and during its preparatory process for the discussion on and consideration of proposals on the provisions in Article VI of the NPT and in paragraphs 3 and 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,” dealing with nuclear disarmament, as well as on the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. In this context, we reaffirm the importance of establishing at the 2005 Review Conference a subsidiary body to Main Committee I to deliberate on practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons, as well as a subsidiary body to Main Committee II to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT. In this regard, we furthermore underline and emphasize the need for Preparatory Committee meetings—and also at this particular meeting—to include in their programmes of work, allocations of specific time for deliberations on nuclear disarmament and on the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.</p>
<p><b>Access to Technology and Technology Transfer</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 9)</b> In this regard, we recall that the NPT fosters the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by providing a framework of confidence and cooperation within which those uses can take place. It is in this context that we reaffirm the inalienable right of the States Parties to the NPT to engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, and that free and unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to all States Parties be fully ensured.</p>
<p><b>2000 and 2010 Action Plans</b></p>	<p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 1)</b> In fulfillment of the 1995 and 2000 decisions on the strengthened review process, in particular paragraphs 4 and 5, the States Parties to the NPT that have convened here today are tasked to: (a) Reflect on the progress made in the full realization of the objectives of the Treaty as well as the commitments and undertakings given at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference; and, to (b) Make the procedural arrangements for the Review Conference.</p> <p><b>(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 2)</b> In accordance with the Movement’s long-standing and principled positions on nuclear disarmament, the NAM States Parties to the NPT remain fully committed to their obligations and commitments under the Treaty and the agreements reached at both the 1995 and 2000 NPT Conferences.</p>

In this regard, I wish to recall the comprehensive working paper submitted by the Movement during the 2000 Review Conference contained in document NPT/CONF.2000/18.

**(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 3)** We remain firmly convinced that the NPT is a key instrument in the effort to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context, we recall that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference calls on the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on these issues. All of the States Parties to the NPT should work towards a fair balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the Nuclear Weapon States and Non-Nuclear-Weapon States with a view to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

**(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 5)** The NAM States Parties to the NPT wish to re-emphasize the urgency and the importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty, particularly by the accession to the Treaty at the earliest possible date of those States possessing nuclear capabilities, and resolve to make determined efforts to achieve this goal. We reiterate our support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and to this end, we reaffirm the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus and Security Council resolutions 487 (1981) and 687 (1991). We call upon all parties concerned to take urgent and practical steps towards the establishment of such a zone and, pending its establishment to call on Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the NPT, nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, to accede to the NPT without delay, to place promptly all its nuclear facilities under IAEA Safeguards and to conduct its nuclear related activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime. We recall that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA Safeguards, in realizing the goal of the universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.

**(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 6)** We also recall that the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference urged the two nuclear capable States in South Asia to accede to the Treaty as Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and to place all their nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA Safeguards.

**(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 8)** The NAM States Parties to the NPT reaffirm the importance of achieving the universal application of the Agency's Safeguards system and urge all States which have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible. This has been considered by the 2000 Review Conference, as one main objective, to consolidate and enhance the verification

system for the non-proliferation Regime. We stress, in this regard, the importance of the IAEA's Safeguards system, including comprehensive safeguards agreements and also the Model additional Protocols. However, we do not desire to see international efforts towards achieving universality of comprehensive safeguards wither in favour of pursuing additional measures and restrictions on non-nuclear-weapon States, which are already committed to non-proliferation norms, and which have renounced the nuclear-weapons option.

**(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 10)** The NAM States Parties to the NPT reiterate their call for the full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking given by the Nuclear Weapons States at the 2000 Review Conference to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament. We expect that this undertaking be demonstrated without delay through an accelerated process of negotiations and through the full implementation of the 13 practical steps to advance systematically and progressively towards a nuclear-weapon-free world as agreed to in 2000. Despite the expectation by the international community that the successful outcome of the 2000 Review Conference would lead to the fulfillment of the unequivocal undertaking given by the Nuclear Weapon States as well as the full implementation of the 13 practical steps, very little progress has, however, been made to this effect.

**(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 11)** In this regard, allow us to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the 2000 Review Conference: (a) We remain concerned at the slow progress towards disarmament; (b) Although some progress has been made in bilateral and unilateral reductions, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpiles still amount to many thousands; (c) There is to date no evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons; (d) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the Nuclear Weapon States to consider expanding the circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be used and the countries that they could be used against; (e) We are also concerned by the recent developments that threaten the principle of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other arms control and reduction measures; (f) The possible consequences of the decision by one of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) to withdraw from the Treaty bring new challenges to strategic stability and to the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 56/23, we emphasize the urgent need for commencement of substantive work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The NAM States Parties to the NPT believe that the implementation of a national missile defense system could trigger an arms race and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons; (g) The lack of progress in the entry into force of the CTBT. In this regard, we call upon all States, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, whose

ratification is a prerequisite for the entry into force of the CTBT, to continue their efforts to ensure the early entry into force of the Treaty. We reiterate our belief that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the Nuclear Weapon States, to nuclear disarmament would be essential; (h) The continued inflexible postures of some of the Nuclear Weapon States that continue to prevent the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention, and in this regard reiterate our call for the establishment as soon as possible and as the highest priority of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. In this context, we underline once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. We regret that no progress has been made in the fulfilment of this obligation despite the lapse of five years; (i) The continued inability of the Conference of Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives; and (j) The lack of progress in diminishing the role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.

**(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 14)** The NAM States Parties to the NPT believe that this PrepCom should deal with all procedural issues necessary to take its work forward as well as with matters of substance as was decided at the 1995 and 2000 Conferences. We recall that the Final Document states clearly that “each session of the Preparatory Committee should consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and the Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences”.

**(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 15)** To this end, the Prepcom should substantially focus on nuclear disarmament so as to ensure that there is a proper accounting in the reports by the States of their progress in achieving nuclear disarmament. In this regard, we wish to recall that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference called for regular reports within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process by all States Parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.” The NAM States Parties to the NPT expect that the States Parties, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, should submit reports to each PrepCom session, including this

one. We expect that the reports on Article VI should cover issues and principles addressed by the 13 steps and should include specific and complete information on each of these steps. These reports should also address, inter alia, current policies and intentions, as well as developments in these areas.

**(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 16)** The NAM States Parties to the NPT also believe that the PrepCom should also substantially focus on the Middle East, and further recalls that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference called on all States Parties to the Treaty, particularly the Nuclear Weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, to report through the United Nations Secretariat to the President of the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of the Conference, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. The NAM States Parties to the NPT expect that all States Parties to the Treaty, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, should submit reports in this regard as agreed in the 2000 Final Document.

**(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 17)** The NAM States Parties to the NPT further recall that specific time was made available at the 2000 Review Conference and during its preparatory process for the discussion on and consideration of proposals on the provisions in Article VI of the NPT and in paragraphs 3 and 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,” dealing with nuclear disarmament, as well as on the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. In this context, we reaffirm the importance of establishing at the 2005 Review Conference a subsidiary body to Main Committee I to deliberate on practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons, as well as a subsidiary body to Main Committee II to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT. In this regard, we furthermore underline and emphasize the need for Preparatory Committee meetings—and also at this particular meeting—to include in their programmes of work, allocations of specific time for deliberations on nuclear disarmament and on the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.