



Thematic Summary of the Working Papers Submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties of the 9th Review Cycle of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2012 Preparatory Committee

Disarmament

Nuclear Weapon Convention

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 11) The Group expresses deep concern at the continued lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, which could undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty. The Group also deeply regrets the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. The negotiation of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame, including a nuclear weapons convention, is necessary and should begin without further delay. In that regard, the Group reiterates its call to establish, as soon as possible and as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, and recalls action 6 of the action plan, in which all States agreed that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 29) The Group notes with concern the lack of agreement on a number of its key priorities, including beginning negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention, and expresses its determination to continue collective efforts in pursuing the realization of those priorities in the 2015 review process of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A2) To achieve the total elimination of their nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States need to implement the unequivocal undertaking agreed upon in 2000. The 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI should be fully implemented in accordance with the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility. The nuclear-weapon States should be urged to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of their nuclear weapons within a specified time framework, including a nuclear weapons convention. It should also be recalled that there is a unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice regarding the obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A3) The Non-Aligned Movement proposes a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame that includes the following concrete steps and measures, as a basis for consideration by the Review Conference. The list of measures in each phase is indicative rather than exhaustive, and the order in which they are mentioned does not necessarily reflect their priority. Nevertheless, it should be understood that, in any nuclear disarmament programme, all steps and measures are inextricably linked.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:

- (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference;
- (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on: (i) the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites; (ii) measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development;
- (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies;
- (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention);
- (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones;
- (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives;
- (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively;
- (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A5) Full implementation by the nuclear-weapon States of their disarmament obligations and commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including those agreed at the 2000 Review Conference; acceleration of the negotiation process, in accordance with article VI, and implementation of the 13 practical steps.

	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A6) Conclusion of negotiations on further reductions of nuclear arsenals (START).</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A7) Moratorium on the production of fissile materials, pending conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A8) Placement of nuclear fissile material transferred from military to peaceful uses by nuclear-weapon States under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A9) Formal declaration of the decade 2010-2020 as the “Decade for nuclear disarmament” and realization of its objectives.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A10) Entry into force of the treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons and the establishment of a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance, including such measures as the: (a) Separation of nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles; (b) Placement of nuclear warheads in secure storage under international supervision, pending the removal of special nuclear materials from those warheads; (c) Transfer of nuclear materials, including fissile materials and delivery vehicles, to “peaceful purposes”.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A11) Preparation, under international auspices, of an inventory of nuclear arsenals, including fissile materials, nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A12) Progressive and balanced reduction of missiles intended for carrying nuclear warheads.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A13) Recommendation by the 2020 Review Conference to declare 2020 as the “Decade for the total elimination of nuclear weapons”.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A14) Full implementation of the treaty to eliminate all nuclear weapons and of its verification regime through the: (a) Elimination of all nuclear weapons; (b) Conversion of all facilities for the production of nuclear weapons to “peaceful purposes”; (c) Placement of nuclear facilities under safeguards, on a universal basis.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Verification</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 2) While underlining the significance of achieving the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly calls for immediate and unconditional cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests and the closure of all nuclear-weapon test sites. In this regard, the Group is of the firm view that all States parties that have not yet done so shall close and dismantle, as soon as feasible and</p>

in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner, any remaining sites for nuclear-test explosions and their associated infrastructure, and prohibit completely nuclear weapons research and development, and also refrain from conducting nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, nuclear-weapon test explosions in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapons system, which would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that positive decisions by the nuclear-weapon States would have the desired impact on facilitating the progress towards entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Early ratification of this Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States would pave the way and encourage the remaining required countries, especially those with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the Treaty. The failure of one major nuclear-weapon State to ratify the Treaty, and by not supporting the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization through rejection of one of the main elements of the Treaty's verification regime, is undermining this important instrument against nuclear testing.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls on all States not parties to the Treaty to accede, without any further delay and any preconditions and as non-nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group proposes that the nuclear-weapon States undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to providing baseline data for future disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not parties to the Treaty, without exception.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the statutory role of IAEA on nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the Agency's capability to verify nuclear disarmament agreements.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes the need to achieve worldwide application of the comprehensive safeguards system and calls on all nuclear-weapon States and all States not parties to the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope

safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under the Treaty with a view to providing baseline data for future disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the statutory role of IAEA on nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the Agency's capability to verify nuclear disarmament agreements.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly believes that, in implementing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, those States shall undertake further efforts to verifiably reduce and eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, as well as their nuclear weapon-related materials, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. In this regard, the Group supports furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide nuclear disarmament and the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives devices.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)), which, by its action 16, stipulates that the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to commit to declare, as appropriate, to IAEA all fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes and to place such material as soon as practicable under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes. The Group calls on the Conference to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the fulfilment of these commitments through the establishment of a mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the action, which should be made mandatory for the nuclear-weapon States.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further recalls action 17, which stipulates that, in the context of action 16, all States are encouraged to support the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements,

within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military purposes. The Group urges the Conference to examine such legally binding verification arrangements and the means to make them operational, in the aim of ensuring the realization of that objective.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for the establishment by the Review Conference of a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreement.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 13) The Group remains concerned by the continued inability of the Conference to resume its negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, including all practical measures to eliminate in an irreversible manner the past production and existing stockpiles of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. In this context, the Conference is urged to agree on a programme of work that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 17) The Group also stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status are no substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons, and accordingly calls upon the Russian Federation and the United States to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability to such cuts and to further reduce their nuclear arsenals, both warheads and delivery systems, thus contributing to the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations and facilitating the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest date. The Group also recalls the commitment by the Russian Federation and the United States under action 4 of the action plan to the full implementation of New START and strongly urges them to adopt all required measures to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A10) Entry into force of the treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons and the establishment of a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance, including such measures as the: (a) Separation of nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles; (b) Placement of nuclear warheads in secure storage under international supervision, pending the removal of special nuclear materials from those warheads; (c) Transfer of nuclear materials, including fissile materials and delivery vehicles, to “peaceful purposes”.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A14) Full implementation of the treaty to eliminate all nuclear weapons and of its verification regime through the: (a) Elimination of all nuclear weapons; (b) Conversion of

	<p>all facilities for the production of nuclear weapons to “peaceful purposes”; (c) Placement of nuclear facilities under safeguards, on a universal basis.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Disarmament and Development</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)), which, by its action 16, stipulates that the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to commit to declare, as appropriate, to IAEA all fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes and to place such material as soon as practicable under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes. The Group calls on the Conference to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the fulfilment of these commitments through the establishment of a mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the action, which should be made mandatory for the nuclear-weapon States.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A8) Placement of nuclear fissile material transferred from military to peaceful uses by nuclear-weapon States under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A10) Entry into force of the treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons and the establishment of a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance, including such measures as the: (a) Separation of nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles; (b) Placement of nuclear warheads in secure storage under international supervision, pending the removal of special nuclear materials from those warheads; (c) Transfer of nuclear materials, including fissile materials and delivery vehicles, to “peaceful purposes”.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A14) Full implementation of the treaty to eliminate all nuclear weapons and of its verification regime through the: (a) Elimination of all nuclear weapons; (b) Conversion of all facilities for the production of nuclear weapons to “peaceful purposes”; (c) Placement of nuclear facilities under safeguards, on a universal basis.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Nuclear-Weapon States Obligations</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.22, Para 3) In the context of the above-mentioned tasks and mandates, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for: (a) An agreement on the provisional agenda of the Preparatory Committee and 2015 Review Conference, which would include “Preparatory work for the review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII (3) of the Treaty, in particular, consideration of principles, objectives and ways to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality,</p>

including specific matters of substance related to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference”, as well as the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty; (b) Recalling that the 2000 Final Document states clearly that “each session of the Preparatory Committee should consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and the Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences”, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that this Preparatory Committee should deal with all the procedural issues necessary to take its work forward as well as with matters of substance as was decided at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Conferences; (c) To this end, the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on nuclear disarmament so as to ensure that there is a proper accounting in the reports by the States of their progress in achieving nuclear disarmament. In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty wishes to recall that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference (see NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I-IV)) called for regular reports within the framework of the Treaty’s strengthened review process by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”. The Group recalls the stipulation of section B on “Disarmament of nuclear weapons”, contained in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that: “The nuclear-weapon States are called upon to report the undertakings [under that section] to the Preparatory Committee at 2014 (see NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)). The 2015 Review Conference will take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of article VI.” In this connection, the Group expects that the States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, should submit reports to each Preparatory Committee session, including this one, unless otherwise decided by the Review Conference. In the view of the Group, the reports on article VI should cover issues and principles addressed by the 13 practical steps and undertakings under section B on “Disarmament of nuclear weapons”, in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference and should include specific and complete information on each of these steps and follow-on actions. These reports should also address, inter alia, current policies and intentions, as well as developments in these areas; (d) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also believes that the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on the Middle East by devoting sufficient time within the indicative timetable and the full opportunity for all speakers to thereby engage in a substantive debate. The Group further recalls that the 2000 Review Conference, in its Final Document, requested all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, to report through the United Nations Secretariat to the President of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, as well as the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in

advance of the Conference, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. The Group expects that all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, would submit reports in this regard as agreed in the 2000 Final Document; (e) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the stipulation of the 2010 Review Conference that “The Conference reaffirms that all States Parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and the States in the region, should continue to report on steps taken to implement the 1995 Resolution, through the United Nations Secretariat, to the President of the 2015 Review Conference, as well as to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of that Conference” and that “The facilitator will report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings”. The Group accordingly emphasizes the importance of and calls for submitting required reports by all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, as well as the facilitator of the 2012 Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, to the current and upcoming meetings of the Preparatory Committee and the 2015 Review Conference. The Group wishes to refer to its working paper on the topic “Regional issues: Middle East” which stipulates its substantive position in this regard; (f) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for an agreement to establish subsidiary bodies to the relevant Main Committees of the 2015 Review Conference to deliberate on issues related to nuclear disarmament, in particular the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons as well as the undertakings under section B on “Disarmament of nuclear weapons”, in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference; on the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the practical steps on the Middle East, in particular implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, contained in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference; and a legally binding international instrument on unconditional security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group emphasizes the need for the Preparatory Committee meetings to continue to allocate specific time for deliberations on nuclear disarmament, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and security assurances; (g) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty furthermore calls on the Preparatory Committee and the 2015 Review Conference to: (a) Consider the further strengthening or enhancement of the review process of the Treaty; (b) Further strengthen or enhance the regular reporting mechanism provided for in accordance with the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference; (c) Consider the steps and other actions that could be taken to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education, with particular reference to the Treaty; (d) Support participation of non-governmental organizations in the Preparatory Committee and 2015 Review Conference meetings.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.23, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that, in successive conferences of heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries and the ministerial conferences of the Non-Aligned Movement, it has been reiterated that improvements in existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, as envisaged in the Nuclear Posture Review of the United States of America, contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient unilateral statements made by each of the nuclear-weapon States. They have further reaffirmed that these improvements and the development of new types of such weapons violate the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the only way to rid the world of the threat or use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination. In this regard, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a practical step on the road to nuclear disarmament and, therefore, cannot substitute for the objective of complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls and reaffirms once again the commitment of all States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to ending all nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions and thereby constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group expresses grave concern at the development of new types of nuclear weapons, which may result in the resumption of tests and a lowering of the nuclear threshold. Accordingly the Group strongly calls on the nuclear-weapon States to put an immediate end to such activities and refrain from any other action that would defeat the object, and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, pending its entry into force.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that the improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient statements on security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States and violate their commitments undertaken at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by all the nuclear-weapon States, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Group reiterates that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the

continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to nuclear disarmament, would be essential.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, not only because they are among the 44 States listed in annex 2 to the Treaty, but also because, on account of their position, they are expected to lead in making the ban on tests a reality. It will be possible to determine the success of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty only when it has been signed and ratified, in particular by the five nuclear-weapon States and those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. The Group is of the firm belief that the early achievement of the goal of the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, through accession of the only non-parties to this instrument, would be essential to achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that positive decisions by the nuclear-weapon States would have the desired impact on facilitating the progress towards entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Early ratification of this Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States would pave the way and encourage the remaining required countries, especially those with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the Treaty. The failure of one major nuclear-weapon State to ratify the Treaty, and by not supporting the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization through rejection of one of the main elements of the Treaty's verification regime, is undermining this important instrument against nuclear testing.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation, thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear devices, as well as nuclear weapons based on new physical principles. The nuclear-weapon States stated at that time that the only steps to be followed would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons, which would not involve nuclear explosions. In that regard, the Group calls upon those States to continue to refrain from conducting nuclear-test explosions for the modernization, development or further improvement of nuclear weapons. The Group wishes to re-emphasize the principles of the non-proliferation regime, both vertically and horizontally.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores the importance of the five nuclear-weapon States maintaining their voluntary moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions since the opening for signature of the

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. However, the Group believes that moratoriums do not take the place of the signing, ratification and entry into force of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the modernization or development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the assurances given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, States should refrain from any actions contrary to its objectives and purpose. In this context, the Group is seriously concerned by the decision of a nuclear-weapon State to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear testing to 18 months as a setback to the 2000 Review Conference agreements. It is the view of the Group that such decisions undermine the validity of the commitment to declared moratoriums as well as the commitments under the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has been envisaged as the first of 13 practical steps leading to nuclear disarmament. The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty also remains a cause for concern.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls on all States not parties to the Treaty to accede, without any further delay and any preconditions and as non-nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group proposes that the nuclear-weapon States undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to providing baseline data for future disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not parties to the Treaty, without exception.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes the need to achieve worldwide application of the comprehensive safeguards system and calls on all nuclear-weapon States and all States not parties to the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under the Treaty with a view to providing baseline data for future disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear

energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly believes that, in implementing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, those States shall undertake further efforts to verifiably reduce and eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, as well as their nuclear weapon-related materials, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. In this regard, the Group supports furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide nuclear disarmament and the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives devices.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)), which, by its action 16, stipulates that the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to commit to declare, as appropriate, to IAEA all fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes and to place such material as soon as practicable under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes. The Group calls on the Conference to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the fulfilment of these commitments through the establishment of a mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the action, which should be made mandatory for the nuclear-weapon States.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further recalls action 17, which stipulates that, in the context of action 16, all States are encouraged to support the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military purposes. The Group urges the Conference to examine such legally binding verification arrangements and the means to make them operational, in the aim of ensuring the realization of that objective.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for the establishment by the Review Conference of a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreement.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be a contribution towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The Group is, however, of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is not a substitute for the legal obligations of and unequivocal undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 5) The Group reiterates that, in the context of the nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is essential that the nuclear-weapon States provide unconditional, non-discriminatory and specific legal assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the zone concerned. In this regard, the Group strongly calls for the withdrawal of any related reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of such treaties. The Group further calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations with a view to achieving the objectives of the treaties to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and their protocols.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 6) The Group reiterates its strong call for the full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking given by the nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, which was also reaffirmed by the 2010 Review Conference. That undertaking should be demonstrated without further delay through an accelerated process of negotiations and the full implementation of the 13 practical steps to advance systematically and progressively towards a nuclear-weapon-free world as agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference, and in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference, which reaffirmed the continued validity of that undertaking.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 7) The Group recalls that, in pursuit of the full, effective and urgent implementation of article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, and building upon the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, the 2010 Review Conference agreed on an action plan on nuclear disarmament that includes concrete steps for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the Group strongly calls for the prompt and full implementation of that action plan.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 8) The Group recalls that, in implementing their unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the nuclear-weapon States have committed themselves to undertaking further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-

deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. In this regard, the Group calls for full compliance by the nuclear-weapon States with such undertakings.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 9) In this connection, the Group emphasizes in particular the prime importance of and the urgent need for full and prompt implementation of the commitments by the nuclear-weapon States under action 5 of the action plan. In this context, the Group further recalls that the nuclear-weapon States committed themselves to accelerating concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, inter alia, by: (a) rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons; (b) addressing the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process; (c) further diminishing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies; (d) discussing policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons; (e) considering the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security; (f) reducing the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and (g) further enhancing transparency and increasing mutual confidence.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 10) Moreover, the Group calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to submit comprehensive substantive reports about their undertakings under action 5 of the action plan to the Preparatory Committee in 2014, in order to enable the 2015 Review Conference to take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of article VI of the Treaty in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 11) The Group expresses deep concern at the continued lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, which could undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty. The Group also deeply regrets the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. The negotiation of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame, including a nuclear weapons convention, is necessary and should begin without further delay. In that regard, the Group reiterates its call to establish, as soon as possible and as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, and recalls action 6 of the action plan, in which all States agreed that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 15) The Group remains deeply concerned by the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons, some reports of bilateral and unilateral

reductions notwithstanding. Any such reductions are undermined by the modernization of nuclear weapons, their delivery systems and related infrastructure by the nuclear-weapon States. To comply with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, and with their commitments under the 13 practical steps and the 2010 action plan, the nuclear-weapon States must immediately cease their plans to further invest in modernizing, upgrading, refurbishing or extending the lives of their nuclear weapons and related facilities. The Group is also concerned by the existence and continued deployment of tens of thousands of such weapons, the exact number of which remains unconfirmed owing to the lack of transparency in various nuclear weapons programmes.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 16) In this connection, the Group, while noting the conclusion and entry into force of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START), confirms the validity of its position delivered at the time of the adoption of General Assembly resolution 65/61 on bilateral reductions of strategic nuclear arms and the new framework for strategic relations. The Group further expresses concern that domestic commitments to nuclear weapon modernization in exchange for ratification of this treaty undermine the minimal reductions agreed upon therein.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 17) The Group also stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status are no substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons, and accordingly calls upon the Russian Federation and the United States to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability to such cuts and to further reduce their nuclear arsenals, both warheads and delivery systems, thus contributing to the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations and facilitating the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest date. The Group also recalls the commitment by the Russian Federation and the United States under action 4 of the action plan to the full implementation of New START and strongly urges them to adopt all required measures to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 19) The Group also believes that the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes and the lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies further undermine disarmament commitments.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 20) The Group underlines the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 28) The Group reiterates its call for the establishment, as a matter of priority, in Main Committee I of a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament mandated to focus on the issue of fulfilment of the obligations under article VI of the Treaty and on further practical measures required to achieve progress in that regard.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A1) Although there have been some positive signals and developments in the area of nuclear disarmament, the world is still faced with unresolved challenges. The recent statements by some nuclear-weapon States about their intention to pursue actions in achieving a world free of nuclear weapons are positive. However, urgent and concrete actions by the nuclear-weapon States in accordance with their multilaterally agreed commitments to achieve general and complete disarmament remain essential. Unless the role of nuclear weapons in the context of security is delegitimized and existing nuclear doctrines are abandoned, there will always be a threat of a nuclear arms race and an escalation of nuclear threats. The total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A2) To achieve the total elimination of their nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States need to implement the unequivocal undertaking agreed upon in 2000. The 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI should be fully implemented in accordance with the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility. The nuclear-weapon States should be urged to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of their nuclear weapons within a specified time framework, including a nuclear weapons convention. It should also be recalled that there is a unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice regarding the obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:

- (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference;
- (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on: (i) the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites; (ii) measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development;
- (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies;
- (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear

weapons; (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention); (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones; (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A5) Full implementation by the nuclear-weapon States of their disarmament obligations and commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including those agreed at the 2000 Review Conference; acceleration of the negotiation process, in accordance with article VI, and implementation of the 13 practical steps.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A6) Conclusion of negotiations on further reductions of nuclear arsenals (START).

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be a contribution towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. However, the Group is of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones does not substitute legal obligations and unequivocal undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The Group further welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and, in this regard, strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further recalls that the 2010 Review Conference, by taking note of the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, recalled the reaffirmation by the 2000 Review Conference of the importance of Israel’s accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The Conference also reaffirmed the urgency and importance of achieving universality of the Treaty and called on all States in the Middle East

that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States so as to achieve its universality at an early date.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that the nuclear-weapon States, in conformity with their legal obligations under article I of the Treaty, shall solemnly undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly to Israel, and further undertake not, in any way, to assist, encourage or induce Israel to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices under any circumstances whatsoever.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines that the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on the Middle East by devoting sufficient time within the indicative timetable and giving all speakers the full opportunity to thereby engage in a substantive debate. The Group further recalls that the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences stipulated that all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, should report through the Secretariat to the President of the Review Conference, as well as the Chairs of its Preparatory Committee meetings, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such a zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. The Group further recalls that the 2010 Review Conference requested the facilitator to report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 16) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty accordingly emphasizes the importance of submitting required reports by all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, as well as the facilitator of the 2012 conference. It is essential that the successive sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference conduct substantive discussions on the above-mentioned reports and evaluate the fulfilment of the commitments on the Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, as contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted by consensus at the 2010 Review Conference.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 21) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States, in particular the obligations and commitments of the three depositary States of the Treaty that co-sponsored the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, to implement the Resolution. Moreover, the Group considers the implementation of the practical steps adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Middle East as a collective responsibility, since the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference clearly stipulated that the States parties renew their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at its prompt

	<p>implementation, and also underlined the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Arms Races</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 18) The Group believes that the abrogation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group remains concerned that the deployment of national and strategic missile defence systems could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 66/27, the Group emphasizes the urgent need to begin substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A1) Although there have been some positive signals and developments in the area of nuclear disarmament, the world is still faced with unresolved challenges. The recent statements by some nuclear-weapon States about their intention to pursue actions in achieving a world free of nuclear weapons are positive. However, urgent and concrete actions by the nuclear-weapon States in accordance with their multilaterally agreed commitments to achieve general and complete disarmament remain essential. Unless the role of nuclear weapons in the context of security is delegitimized and existing nuclear doctrines are abandoned, there will always be a threat of a nuclear arms race and an escalation of nuclear threats. The total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Bilateral Disarmament</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly believes that, in implementing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, those States shall undertake further efforts to verifiably reduce and eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, as well as their nuclear weapon-related materials, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. In this regard, the Group supports furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide nuclear disarmament and the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives devices.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for the establishment by the Review Conference of a standing committee to monitor and verify the</p>

nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreement.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 8) The Group recalls that, in implementing their unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the nuclear-weapon States have committed themselves to undertaking further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. In this regard, the Group calls for full compliance by the nuclear-weapon States with such undertakings.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 15) The Group remains deeply concerned by the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons, some reports of bilateral and unilateral reductions notwithstanding. Any such reductions are undermined by the modernization of nuclear weapons, their delivery systems and related infrastructure by the nuclear-weapon States. To comply with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, and with their commitments under the 13 practical steps and the 2010 action plan, the nuclear-weapon States must immediately cease their plans to further invest in modernizing, upgrading, refurbishing or extending the lives of their nuclear weapons and related facilities. The Group is also concerned by the existence and continued deployment of tens of thousands of such weapons, the exact number of which remains unconfirmed owing to the lack of transparency in various nuclear weapons programmes.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 16) In this connection, the Group, while noting the conclusion and entry into force of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START), confirms the validity of its position delivered at the time of the adoption of General Assembly resolution 65/61 on bilateral reductions of strategic nuclear arms and the new framework for strategic relations. The Group further expresses concern that domestic commitments to nuclear weapon modernization in exchange for ratification of this treaty undermine the minimal reductions agreed upon therein.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 18) The Group believes that the abrogation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group remains concerned that the deployment of national and strategic missile defence systems could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 66/27, the Group emphasizes the urgent need to begin substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:</p> <p>(a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference; (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on: (i) the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites; (ii) measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development; (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies; (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention); (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones; (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A6) Conclusion of negotiations on further reductions of nuclear arsenals (START).</p>
<p>Disarmament and Nonproliferation</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.22, Para 3) In the context of the above-mentioned tasks and mandates, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for: (a) An agreement on the provisional agenda of the Preparatory Committee and 2015 Review Conference, which would include “Preparatory work for the review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII (3) of the Treaty, in particular, consideration of principles, objectives and ways to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, including specific matters of substance related to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference”, as well as the “Conclusions and recommendations for</p>

follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty; (b) Recalling that the 2000 Final Document states clearly that “each session of the Preparatory Committee should consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and the Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences”, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that this Preparatory Committee should deal with all the procedural issues necessary to take its work forward as well as with matters of substance as was decided at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Conferences; (c) To this end, the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on nuclear disarmament so as to ensure that there is a proper accounting in the reports by the States of their progress in achieving nuclear disarmament. In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty wishes to recall that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference (see NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I-IV)) called for regular reports within the framework of the Treaty’s strengthened review process by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”. The Group recalls the stipulation of section B on “Disarmament of nuclear weapons”, contained in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that: “The nuclear-weapon States are called upon to report the undertakings [under that section] to the Preparatory Committee at 2014 (see NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)). The 2015 Review Conference will take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of article VI.” In this connection, the Group expects that the States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, should submit reports to each Preparatory Committee session, including this one, unless otherwise decided by the Review Conference. In the view of the Group, the reports on article VI should cover issues and principles addressed by the 13 practical steps and undertakings under section B on “Disarmament of nuclear weapons”, in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference and should include specific and complete information on each of these steps and follow-on actions. These reports should also address, inter alia, current policies and intentions, as well as developments in these areas; (d) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also believes that the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on the Middle East by devoting sufficient time within the indicative timetable and the full opportunity for all speakers to thereby engage in a substantive debate. The Group further recalls that the 2000 Review Conference, in its Final Document, requested all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, to report through the United Nations Secretariat to the President of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, as well as the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of the Conference, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. The Group expects that all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the nuclear-

weapon States, would submit reports in this regard as agreed in the 2000 Final Document; (e) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the stipulation of the 2010 Review Conference that “The Conference reaffirms that all States Parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and the States in the region, should continue to report on steps taken to implement the 1995 Resolution, through the United Nations Secretariat, to the President of the 2015 Review Conference, as well as to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of that Conference” and that “The facilitator will report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings”. The Group accordingly emphasizes the importance of and calls for submitting required reports by all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, as well as the facilitator of the 2012 Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, to the current and upcoming meetings of the Preparatory Committee and the 2015 Review Conference. The Group wishes to refer to its working paper on the topic “Regional issues: Middle East” which stipulates its substantive position in this regard; (f) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for an agreement to establish subsidiary bodies to the relevant Main Committees of the 2015 Review Conference to deliberate on issues related to nuclear disarmament, in particular the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons as well as the undertakings under section B on “Disarmament of nuclear weapons”, in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference; on the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the practical steps on the Middle East, in particular implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, contained in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference; and a legally binding international instrument on unconditional security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group emphasizes the need for the Preparatory Committee meetings to continue to allocate specific time for deliberations on nuclear disarmament, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and security assurances; (g) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty furthermore calls on the Preparatory Committee and the 2015 Review Conference to: (a) Consider the further strengthening or enhancement of the review process of the Treaty; (b) Further strengthen or enhance the regular reporting mechanism provided for in accordance with the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference; (c) Consider the steps and other actions that could be taken to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education, with particular reference to the Treaty; (d) Support participation of non-governmental organizations in the Preparatory Committee and 2015 Review Conference meetings.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.23, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-

weapon States of their nuclear arsenals and considers, in that regard, that any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 21) In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores the strong call by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that all States parties shall ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated particularly in its articles I, II and III, and with the decision on the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, not only because they are among the 44 States listed in annex 2 to the Treaty, but also because, on account of their position, they are expected to lead in making the ban on tests a reality. It will be possible to determine the success of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty only when it has been signed and ratified, in particular by the five nuclear-weapon States and those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. The Group is of the firm belief that the early achievement of the goal of the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, through accession of the only non-parties to this instrument, would be essential to achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation, thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear devices, as well as nuclear weapons based on new physical principles. The nuclear-weapon States stated at that time that the only steps to be followed would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons, which would not involve nuclear explosions. In that regard, the Group calls upon those States to continue to refrain from conducting nuclear-test explosions for the modernization, development or further improvement of nuclear weapons. The Group wishes to re-emphasize the principles of the non-proliferation regime, both vertically and horizontally.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emphasizes that the Treaty is an essential foundation for the

pursuit of nuclear disarmament and a key instrument in the efforts to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 2) The Group reaffirms the Non-Aligned Movement's principled positions on nuclear disarmament, which remains its highest priority, and on the related issue of nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects, and stresses that it is important that efforts aiming at nuclear non-proliferation be parallel to simultaneous efforts aiming at nuclear disarmament. The Group emphasizes its concern at the threat to humanity posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and of their possible use or threat of use. The Group also reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against their use or threat of use.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 7) The Group recalls that, in pursuit of the full, effective and urgent implementation of article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", and building upon the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, the 2010 Review Conference agreed on an action plan on nuclear disarmament that includes concrete steps for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the Group strongly calls for the prompt and full implementation of that action plan.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 9) In this connection, the Group emphasizes in particular the prime importance of and the urgent need for full and prompt implementation of the commitments by the nuclear-weapon States under action 5 of the action plan. In this context, the Group further recalls that the nuclear-weapon States committed themselves to accelerating concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, inter alia, by: (a) rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons; (b) addressing the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process; (c) further diminishing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies; (d) discussing policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons; (e) considering the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security; (f) reducing the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and (g) further enhancing transparency and increasing mutual confidence.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 13) The Group remains concerned by the continued inability of the Conference to resume its negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, including all practical measures to eliminate in an irreversible manner the past production and existing stockpiles of fissile materials for nuclear

	<p>weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. In this context, the Conference is urged to agree on a programme of work that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 14) The Group reconfirms that negotiations on a fissile material treaty should be conducted on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (see CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein (known as the “Shannon mandate”), taking into account nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, in addition to all related issues, including the past production and existing stockpiles of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Group expresses concern over the attempts to limit the scope of the negotiations on a fissile material treaty as contained in the Shannon mandate, which was endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences. In this regard, the Group recognizes that non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have already agreed to a legally binding commitment not to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 22) The Group emphasizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals and, in that regard, considers that any such assumption is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Disarmament and the Environment</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the need for increased attention to the problems of safety and contamination related to the discontinuation of nuclear operations formerly associated with nuclear-weapons programmes, including where appropriate, the safe resettlement of any displaced human populations and the restoration of economic productivity to affected areas. In this regard, the Group acknowledges the existence of a special responsibility towards the affected people and areas, including those in the former United Nations Trust Territories who have been adversely affected as a result of the nuclear-weapon tests conducted in the past.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">International Humanitarian Law and ICJ</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 20) The Group underlines the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 25) In this regard, the Group recalls the advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 of the International Court of</p>

	<p>Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons that there is in neither customary nor conventional international law any specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons and that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 26) Accordingly, the Group is of the view that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States must seriously refrain, under any circumstances, from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. In the view of the Group, any such use or threat of use would be in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular international humanitarian law. The Group further believes that the mere possession of nuclear weapons is inconsistent with the principles of international humanitarian law. In this regard, the Group strongly calls upon all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to exclude completely the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from their military doctrines.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A2) To achieve the total elimination of their nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States need to implement the unequivocal undertaking agreed upon in 2000. The 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI should be fully implemented in accordance with the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility. The nuclear-weapon States should be urged to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of their nuclear weapons within a specified time framework, including a nuclear weapons convention. It should also be recalled that there is a unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice regarding the obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Modernization and Development of Nuclear Weapons</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.23, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that, in successive conferences of heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries and the ministerial conferences of the Non-Aligned Movement, it has been reiterated that improvements in existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, as envisaged in the Nuclear Posture Review of the United States of America, contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient unilateral statements made by each of the nuclear-weapon States. They have further reaffirmed that these improvements and the development of new types of such weapons violate the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.</p>

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 2) While underlining the significance of achieving the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly calls for immediate and unconditional cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests and the closure of all nuclear-weapon test sites. In this regard, the Group is of the firm view that all States parties that have not yet done so shall close and dismantle, as soon as feasible and in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner, any remaining sites for nuclear-test explosions and their associated infrastructure, and prohibit completely nuclear weapons research and development, and also refrain from conducting nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, nuclear-weapon test explosions in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapons system, which would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls and reaffirms once again the commitment of all States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to ending all nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions and thereby constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group expresses grave concern at the development of new types of nuclear weapons, which may result in the resumption of tests and a lowering of the nuclear threshold. Accordingly the Group strongly calls on the nuclear-weapon States to put an immediate end to such activities and refrain from any other action that would defeat the object, and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, pending its entry into force.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that the improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient statements on security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States and violate their commitments undertaken at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty welcomes the signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by 183 States and its ratification by 157 States. In this context, the ratification by Guatemala, Guinea and Indonesia is welcomed. The Group, in accordance with its long-standing and principled position in favour of the total elimination of all forms of nuclear weapons, supports the objectives of the Treaty, which is intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all nuclear-test explosions, and to stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons in order to pave the way towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-

weapon States at the time of the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation, thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear devices, as well as nuclear weapons based on new physical principles. The nuclear-weapon States stated at that time that the only steps to be followed would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons, which would not involve nuclear explosions. In that regard, the Group calls upon those States to continue to refrain from conducting nuclear-test explosions for the modernization, development or further improvement of nuclear weapons. The Group wishes to re-emphasize the principles of the non-proliferation regime, both vertically and horizontally.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the modernization or development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the assurances given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, States should refrain from any actions contrary to its objectives and purpose. In this context, the Group is seriously concerned by the decision of a nuclear-weapon State to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear testing to 18 months as a setback to the 2000 Review Conference agreements. It is the view of the Group that such decisions undermine the validity of the commitment to declared moratoriums as well as the commitments under the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has been envisaged as the first of 13 practical steps leading to nuclear disarmament. The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty also remains a cause for concern.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 15) The Group remains deeply concerned by the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons, some reports of bilateral and unilateral reductions notwithstanding. Any such reductions are undermined by the modernization of nuclear weapons, their delivery systems and related infrastructure by the nuclear-weapon States. To comply with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, and with their commitments under the 13 practical steps and the 2010 action plan, the nuclear-weapon States must immediately cease their plans to further invest in modernizing, upgrading, refurbishing or extending the lives of their nuclear weapons and related facilities. The Group is also concerned by the existence and continued deployment of tens of thousands of such weapons, the exact number of which remains unconfirmed owing to the lack of transparency in various nuclear weapons programmes.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 16) In this connection, the Group, while noting the conclusion and entry into force of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on

Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START), confirms the validity of its position delivered at the time of the adoption of General Assembly resolution 65/61 on bilateral reductions of strategic nuclear arms and the new framework for strategic relations. The Group further expresses concern that domestic commitments to nuclear weapon modernization in exchange for ratification of this treaty undermine the minimal reductions agreed upon therein.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 18) The Group believes that the abrogation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group remains concerned that the deployment of national and strategic missile defence systems could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 66/27, the Group emphasizes the urgent need to begin substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 19) The Group also believes that the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes and the lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies further undermine disarmament commitments.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:

- (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference;
- (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on:
 - (i) the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites;
 - (ii) measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development;
- (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies;
- (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention);
- (g) Full implementation of the Treaties

	<p>of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones; (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further expresses great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by Israel, which pose a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States, and condemns Israel for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals. The Group also reaffirms that stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are maintained, particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allows one party to threaten its neighbours and the region, and constitutes a threat to international peace and security.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Missiles</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 18) The Group believes that the abrogation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group remains concerned that the deployment of national and strategic missile defence systems could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 66/27, the Group emphasizes the urgent need to begin substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">NAM Involvement and Contributions</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.22, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reiterates its commitment to article VIII (3) of the Treaty, as well as the consensus reached at the 2000 Review Conference on improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process of the Treaty, including the stipulation (see NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Vol. I, Part I)) that: “The States Parties, recalling paragraph 4 of Decision 1 of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, agreed that the purpose of the first two sessions of the Preparatory Committee would be to ‘consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality’. To this end, each session of the Preparatory Committee should consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and</p>

Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences, including developments affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty.”

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.22, Para 3) In the context of the above-mentioned tasks and mandates, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for: (a) An agreement on the provisional agenda of the Preparatory Committee and 2015 Review Conference, which would include “Preparatory work for the review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII (3) of the Treaty, in particular, consideration of principles, objectives and ways to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, including specific matters of substance related to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference”, as well as the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty; (b) Recalling that the 2000 Final Document states clearly that “each session of the Preparatory Committee should consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and the Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences”, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that this Preparatory Committee should deal with all the procedural issues necessary to take its work forward as well as with matters of substance as was decided at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Conferences; (c) To this end, the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on nuclear disarmament so as to ensure that there is a proper accounting in the reports by the States of their progress in achieving nuclear disarmament. In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty wishes to recall that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference (see NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I-IV)) called for regular reports within the framework of the Treaty’s strengthened review process by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”. The Group recalls the stipulation of section B on “Disarmament of nuclear weapons”, contained in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that: “The nuclear-weapon States are called upon to report the undertakings [under that section] to the Preparatory Committee at 2014 (see NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)). The 2015 Review Conference will take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of article VI.” In this connection, the Group expects that the States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, should submit reports to each Preparatory Committee session, including this one, unless otherwise decided by the Review Conference. In the view of the Group, the reports on article VI should cover issues and principles addressed by the 13 practical steps and undertakings under section B on “Disarmament of nuclear weapons”, in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference and should include specific and complete information on

each of these steps and follow-on actions. These reports should also address, inter alia, current policies and intentions, as well as developments in these areas; (d) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also believes that the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on the Middle East by devoting sufficient time within the indicative timetable and the full opportunity for all speakers to thereby engage in a substantive debate. The Group further recalls that the 2000 Review Conference, in its Final Document, requested all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, to report through the United Nations Secretariat to the President of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, as well as the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of the Conference, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. The Group expects that all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, would submit reports in this regard as agreed in the 2000 Final Document; (e) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the stipulation of the 2010 Review Conference that “The Conference reaffirms that all States Parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and the States in the region, should continue to report on steps taken to implement the 1995 Resolution, through the United Nations Secretariat, to the President of the 2015 Review Conference, as well as to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of that Conference” and that “The facilitator will report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings”. The Group accordingly emphasizes the importance of and calls for submitting required reports by all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, as well as the facilitator of the 2012 Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, to the current and upcoming meetings of the Preparatory Committee and the 2015 Review Conference. The Group wishes to refer to its working paper on the topic “Regional issues: Middle East” which stipulates its substantive position in this regard; (f) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for an agreement to establish subsidiary bodies to the relevant Main Committees of the 2015 Review Conference to deliberate on issues related to nuclear disarmament, in particular the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons as well as the undertakings under section B on “Disarmament of nuclear weapons”, in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference; on the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the practical steps on the Middle East, in particular implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, contained in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference; and a legally binding international instrument on unconditional security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group emphasizes the need for the Preparatory

Committee meetings to continue to allocate specific time for deliberations on nuclear disarmament, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and security assurances; (g) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty furthermore calls on the Preparatory Committee and the 2015 Review Conference to: (a) Consider the further strengthening or enhancement of the review process of the Treaty; (b) Further strengthen or enhance the regular reporting mechanism provided for in accordance with the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference; (c) Consider the steps and other actions that could be taken to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education, with particular reference to the Treaty; (d) Support participation of non-governmental organizations in the Preparatory Committee and 2015 Review Conference meetings.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.23, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that, in successive conferences of heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries and the ministerial conferences of the Non-Aligned Movement, it has been reiterated that improvements in existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, as envisaged in the Nuclear Posture Review of the United States of America, contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient unilateral statements made by each of the nuclear-weapon States. They have further reaffirmed that these improvements and the development of new types of such weapons violate the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.23, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses concern over the lack of agreement on a number of its key priorities, including, inter alia, to commence negotiations on a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on irrevocable and non-discriminatory negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, and expresses its determination to continue its collective efforts in pursuing the realization of the aforementioned priority in the 2015 review process of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty welcomes the signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by 183 States and its ratification by 157 States. In this context, the ratification by Guatemala, Guinea and Indonesia is welcomed. The Group, in accordance with its long-standing and principled position in favour of the total elimination of all forms of nuclear weapons, supports the objectives of the Treaty, which is intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all nuclear-test explosions, and to stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons in order to pave the way towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls on all States not parties to the Treaty to accede, without any further delay and any preconditions and as non-

nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group proposes that the nuclear-weapon States undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to providing baseline data for future disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not parties to the Treaty, without exception.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes the need to achieve worldwide application of the comprehensive safeguards system and calls on all nuclear-weapon States and all States not parties to the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under the Treaty with a view to providing baseline data for future disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for the establishment by the Review Conference of a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreement.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 10) The Group, while noting with satisfaction the convening of the Second Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, which was held in New York on 30 April 2010, calls upon the States parties and signatories to those treaties to put in place further forms of cooperation among themselves, their treaty agencies and other interested States.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 2) The Group reaffirms the Non-Aligned Movement's principled positions on nuclear disarmament, which remains its highest priority, and on the related issue of nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects, and stresses that it is important that efforts aiming at nuclear non-proliferation be parallel to simultaneous efforts aiming at nuclear disarmament. The Group emphasizes its concern at the threat to humanity posed by the continued

existence of nuclear weapons and of their possible use or threat of use. The Group also reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against their use or threat of use.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 11) The Group expresses deep concern at the continued lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, which could undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty. The Group also deeply regrets the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. The negotiation of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame, including a nuclear weapons convention, is necessary and should begin without further delay. In that regard, the Group reiterates its call to establish, as soon as possible and as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, and recalls action 6 of the action plan, in which all States agreed that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 12) In this context, the Group again calls upon the Conference to agree on a balanced and comprehensive programme of work. In this regard, the Group expresses its appreciation to the representative of Algeria, under whose presidency the Conference adopted (although did not implement) decision CD/1864, and to those representatives of member and observer States of the Non-Aligned Movement who subsequently served as President of the Conference, including, mostly recently, the representative of Egypt, for his tireless efforts and for presenting a draft decision on a programme of work for the 2012 session (see CD/1933/Rev.1).

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 14) The Group reconfirms that negotiations on a fissile material treaty should be conducted on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (see CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein (known as the “Shannon mandate”), taking into account nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, in addition to all related issues, including the past production and existing stockpiles of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Group expresses concern over the attempts to limit the scope of the negotiations on a fissile material treaty as contained in the Shannon mandate, which was endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences. In this regard, the Group recognizes that non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have already agreed to a legally binding commitment not to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 16) In this connection, the Group, while noting the conclusion and entry into force of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic

Offensive Arms (New START), confirms the validity of its position delivered at the time of the adoption of General Assembly resolution 65/61 on bilateral reductions of strategic nuclear arms and the new framework for strategic relations. The Group further expresses concern that domestic commitments to nuclear weapon modernization in exchange for ratification of this treaty undermine the minimal reductions agreed upon therein.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 21) The Group, while recalling the statement on the total elimination of nuclear weapons adopted by the sixteenth Ministerial Conference and Commemorative Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Bali, Indonesia, from 23 to 27 May 2011, reiterates its firm commitment to working to convene a high-level international conference to identify ways and means of eliminating nuclear weapons, at the earliest possible date, with the objective of an agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time, to prohibit their development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use, and to provide for their destruction.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 27) The Group reaffirms the validity of its working paper on the elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons submitted to the 2010 Review Conference (see NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, reproduced in the annex to the present working paper). The Group is determined to integrate this plan of action into the outcome document of the 2015 review process of the Treaty, and strongly calls for this to be done. In this regard, the Group calls for the speedy and full implementation by the nuclear-weapon States of all the measures contained in the plan of action in accordance with the proposed timeline and at a pace that makes up for the time elapsed.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 28) The Group reiterates its call for the establishment, as a matter of priority, in Main Committee I of a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament mandated to focus on the issue of fulfilment of the obligations under article VI of the Treaty and on further practical measures required to achieve progress in that regard.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 29) The Group notes with concern the lack of agreement on a number of its key priorities, including beginning negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention, and expresses its determination to continue collective efforts in pursuing the realization of those priorities in the 2015 review process of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A3) The Non-Aligned Movement proposes a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame that includes the following concrete steps and measures, as a basis for consideration by the Review Conference. The list of measures in each phase is indicative rather than exhaustive, and the order in which they are mentioned does not necessarily reflect their priority. Nevertheless, it should be understood

that, in any nuclear disarmament programme, all steps and measures are inextricably linked.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:

- (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference;
- (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on:
 - (i) the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites;
 - (ii) measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development;
- (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies;
- (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention);
- (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones;
- (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives;
- (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively;
- (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A5) Full implementation by the nuclear-weapon States of their disarmament obligations and commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including those agreed at the 2000 Review Conference; acceleration of the negotiation process, in accordance with article VI, and implementation of the 13 practical steps.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A6) Conclusion of negotiations on further reductions of nuclear arsenals (START).

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A7) Moratorium on the production of fissile materials, pending conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A8) Placement of nuclear fissile material transferred from military to peaceful uses by nuclear-weapon States under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A9) Formal declaration of the decade 2010-2020 as the “Decade for nuclear disarmament” and realization of its objectives.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A10) Entry into force of the treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons and the establishment of a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance, including such measures as the: (a) Separation of nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles; (b) Placement of nuclear warheads in secure storage under international supervision, pending the removal of special nuclear materials from those warheads; (c) Transfer of nuclear materials, including fissile materials and delivery vehicles, to “peaceful purposes”.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A11) Preparation, under international auspices, of an inventory of nuclear arsenals, including fissile materials, nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A12) Progressive and balanced reduction of missiles intended for carrying nuclear warheads.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A13) Recommendation by the 2020 Review Conference to declare 2020 as the “Decade for the total elimination of nuclear weapons”.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A14) Full implementation of the treaty to eliminate all nuclear weapons and of its verification regime through the: (a) Elimination of all nuclear weapons; (b) Conversion of all facilities for the production of nuclear weapons to “peaceful purposes”; (c) Placement of nuclear facilities under safeguards, on a universal basis.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 5) In this context, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty welcomes the adoption by consensus of a detailed plan of action on the Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference and urges the Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, to convene and exert utmost efforts in ensuring the success of a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. While recalling that the 2010 Review Conference emphasized the importance of a process leading to full implementation of the objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, the Group stresses the importance of the full implementation of the plan of action and the active and constructive

	<p>engagement by all parties concerned to allow for the success of the 2012 conference in leading to the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty remains gravely concerned by the statement made by the then Prime Minister of Israel on 11 December 2006, in which he publicly admitted the possession of nuclear weapons by Israel. In this regard, the Group reaffirms the continued validity of the statement of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement on this subject as contained in document NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/19.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, in conformity with the Treaty, hereby declares its commitment to the effective prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms once again its determination to extend fullest cooperation and to exert utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 17) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty requests the establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the 2015 Review Conference to assess the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and reaffirmed by the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, as well as the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 18) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the establishment of a standing committee comprising members of the Bureau of the 2015 Review Conference to follow up intersessionally on the implementation of the recommendations by the Review Conference concerning Israel's prompt accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, and to report to the 2020 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee.</p>
United Nations Fora	
UN General Assembly	(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 7) The Group urges States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-

	<p>free zones in regions where they do not exist in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (see A/S-10/4) and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. In this context, the Group considers that the further institutionalization of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status would be an important step towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 16) In this connection, the Group, while noting the conclusion and entry into force of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START), confirms the validity of its position delivered at the time of the adoption of General Assembly resolution 65/61 on bilateral reductions of strategic nuclear arms and the new framework for strategic relations. The Group further expresses concern that domestic commitments to nuclear weapon modernization in exchange for ratification of this treaty undermine the minimal reductions agreed upon therein.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 18) The Group believes that the abrogation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group remains concerned that the deployment of national and strategic missile defence systems could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 66/27, the Group emphasizes the urgent need to begin substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 22) While reaffirming the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty is of the view that the 2012 conference should lead, without further delay, to the universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East and the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">SSOD</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 7) The Group urges States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (see A/S-10/4) and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. In this context, the Group</p>

	<p>considers that the further institutionalization of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status would be an important step towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.</p>
<p>Test Ban and CTBT</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.23, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that, in successive conferences of heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries and the ministerial conferences of the Non-Aligned Movement, it has been reiterated that improvements in existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, as envisaged in the Nuclear Posture Review of the United States of America, contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient unilateral statements made by each of the nuclear-weapon States. They have further reaffirmed that these improvements and the development of new types of such weapons violate the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the only way to rid the world of the threat or use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination. In this regard, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a practical step on the road to nuclear disarmament and, therefore, cannot substitute for the objective of complete elimination of nuclear weapons.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 2) While underlining the significance of achieving the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly calls for immediate and unconditional cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests and the closure of all nuclear-weapon test sites. In this regard, the Group is of the firm view that all States parties that have not yet done so shall close and dismantle, as soon as feasible and in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner, any remaining sites for nuclear-test explosions and their associated infrastructure, and prohibit completely nuclear weapons research and development, and also refrain from conducting nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, nuclear-weapon test explosions in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapons system, which would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls and reaffirms once again the commitment of all States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to ending all nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions and thereby constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group expresses grave concern at the development of new types of nuclear weapons, which may result in the resumption of tests and a lowering of the nuclear threshold. Accordingly the Group strongly calls</p>

on the nuclear-weapon States to put an immediate end to such activities and refrain from any other action that would defeat the object, and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, pending its entry into force.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that the improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient statements on security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States and violate their commitments undertaken at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty welcomes the signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by 183 States and its ratification by 157 States. In this context, the ratification by Guatemala, Guinea and Indonesia is welcomed. The Group, in accordance with its long-standing and principled position in favour of the total elimination of all forms of nuclear weapons, supports the objectives of the Treaty, which is intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all nuclear-test explosions, and to stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons in order to pave the way towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by all the nuclear-weapon States, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Group reiterates that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to nuclear disarmament, would be essential.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, not only because they are among the 44 States listed in annex 2 to the Treaty, but also because, on account of their position, they are expected to lead in making the ban on tests a reality. It will be possible to determine the success of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty only when it has been signed and ratified, in particular by the five nuclear-weapon States and those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. The Group is of the firm belief that the early achievement of the goal of the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, through accession of the only non-parties to this instrument, would be essential to achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that positive decisions by the

nuclear-weapon States would have the desired impact on facilitating the progress towards entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Early ratification of this Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States would pave the way and encourage the remaining required countries, especially those with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the Treaty. The failure of one major nuclear-weapon State to ratify the Treaty, and by not supporting the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization through rejection of one of the main elements of the Treaty's verification regime, is undermining this important instrument against nuclear testing.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation, thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear devices, as well as nuclear weapons based on new physical principles. The nuclear-weapon States stated at that time that the only steps to be followed would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons, which would not involve nuclear explosions. In that regard, the Group calls upon those States to continue to refrain from conducting nuclear-test explosions for the modernization, development or further improvement of nuclear weapons. The Group wishes to re-emphasize the principles of the non-proliferation regime, both vertically and horizontally.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores the importance of the five nuclear-weapon States maintaining their voluntary moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions since the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. However, the Group believes that moratoriums do not take the place of the signing, ratification and entry into force of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the modernization or development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the assurances given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, States should refrain from any actions contrary to its objectives and purpose. In this context, the Group is seriously concerned by the decision of a nuclear-weapon State to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear testing to 18 months as a setback to the 2000 Review Conference agreements. It is the view of the Group that such decisions undermine the validity of the commitment to declared moratoriums as well as the commitments under the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has been envisaged as the first of 13 practical steps leading to nuclear disarmament. The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the

	<p>Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty also remains a cause for concern.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:</p> <p>(a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference; (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on: (i) the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites; (ii) measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development; (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies; (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention); (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones; (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.</p>
<p>Conference on Disarmament</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.23, Para 6) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while noting the lack of progress since the establishment in 1998 of an ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate universal, unconditional and legally binding security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, expresses concern that despite long-standing requests by non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive such legally binding assurances, no tangible progress has been achieved in this regard. In this connection, the Group calls for the commencement, without any further delay, of the negotiation for a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on irrevocable and non-discriminatory negative security assurances, believing that</p>

such assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty would fulfil the undertaking to the States that have voluntarily given up the nuclear-weapons option by becoming parties to the Treaty. The Group further believes that legally binding security assurances within the context of the Treaty would provide an essential benefit to the States parties to the Treaty and to the credibility of the Treaty regime. The Group also is of the view that pending the conclusion of unconditional and multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances for all non-nuclear-weapon States, all nuclear-weapon States shall fully respect their existing commitments with regard to security assurances and shall extend these to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 11) The Group expresses deep concern at the continued lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, which could undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty. The Group also deeply regrets the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. The negotiation of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame, including a nuclear weapons convention, is necessary and should begin without further delay. In that regard, the Group reiterates its call to establish, as soon as possible and as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, and recalls action 6 of the action plan, in which all States agreed that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 12) In this context, the Group again calls upon the Conference to agree on a balanced and comprehensive programme of work. In this regard, the Group expresses its appreciation to the representative of Algeria, under whose presidency the Conference adopted (although did not implement) decision CD/1864, and to those representatives of member and observer States of the Non-Aligned Movement who subsequently served as President of the Conference, including, mostly recently, the representative of Egypt, for his tireless efforts and for presenting a draft decision on a programme of work for the 2012 session (see CD/1933/Rev.1).

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 13) The Group remains concerned by the continued inability of the Conference to resume its negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, including all practical measures to eliminate in an irreversible manner the past production and existing stockpiles of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. In this context, the Conference is urged to agree on a programme of work that includes

	<p>the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 14) The Group reconfirms that negotiations on a fissile material treaty should be conducted on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (see CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein (known as the “Shannon mandate”), taking into account nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, in addition to all related issues, including the past production and existing stockpiles of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Group expresses concern over the attempts to limit the scope of the negotiations on a fissile material treaty as contained in the Shannon mandate, which was endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences. In this regard, the Group recognizes that non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have already agreed to a legally binding commitment not to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 18) The Group believes that the abrogation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group remains concerned that the deployment of national and strategic missile defence systems could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 66/27, the Group emphasizes the urgent need to begin substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">UN Disarmament Commission</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 7) The Group urges States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (see A/S-10/4) and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. In this context, the Group considers that the further institutionalization of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status would be an important step towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">International Atomic Energy Agency</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also stipulates the right of member States to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes and to promote socio-economic development by way of technical cooperation and the production of electrical power, with due consideration for the needs of developing countries. To ensure the realization of these goals, all States</p>

parties, particularly developed States, shall extend their assistance, as requested by States parties that are States members of IAEA, in the provision of nuclear equipment, material, technology and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes, with a view to achieving the maximum benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities for peaceful purposes.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 5) In this connection, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recognizes the major and important role of IAEA in assisting States parties, particularly developing States, in planning for and using nuclear science and technology. The Group stresses the importance of nuclear knowledge-sharing and the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries to sustain and further enhance their scientific and technological capabilities, thereby also contributing to their socio-economic development. Moreover, the Group underlines that the activities of IAEA in the field of technical cooperation, nuclear power and non-power applications contribute in an important way to meeting energy needs, improving human health, including the application of nuclear technology in cancer therapy, combating poverty, protecting the environment, developing agriculture, managing the use of water resources and optimizing industrial processes, and that these activities, as well as bilateral and other multilateral cooperation, contribute to achieving the objectives set forth in article IV of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, as the main vehicle for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, should continue to be formulated and implemented in accordance with the statute of IAEA and the agreed guiding principles as contained in INFCIRC/267, as well as the decisions of IAEA policymaking organs. The Group reiterates that the current guidelines and criteria for the selection of technical cooperation projects are robust and effective, and that no additional criteria should be imposed for fulfilling the above-mentioned objectives.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that, in 2005, IAEA and its then-Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei, were awarded the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize, and reiterates the importance it attaches to the impartiality, professionalism and integrity of the Agency. While expressing its full confidence in that impartiality and professionalism, the Group strongly rejects any attempts by any State to politicize the work of the Agency, including its technical cooperation programme, in violation of its statute, as well as any pressure or interference in its activities that could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility. In this connection, the Group also expresses its rejection of any attempts by any State party to use the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme as a tool for political purposes, which would be in violation of the statute of the Agency. The Group reaffirms that choices and decisions of each State party to the Treaty in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for such uses and its fuel-cycle policies.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including proposals for assurance of supply in response to the needs of interested States, shall fully take into account all technical, legal, political and economic complexities surrounding these issues and be conducted through wide, integral, comprehensive and transparent multilateral consultations and negotiations. The multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle should be economically viable, sustainable, non-discriminatory, predictable and transparent under the auspices of IAEA and any other regional and multilateral forums. The Group also stresses that any decision on proposals regarding multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle shall be made by consensus, taking into account the interests of all member States, with the participation of all IAEA member States, and any proposal from IAEA must be consistent with its statute, without prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty, if they so decide, to develop a full national fuel cycle, according to its article IV.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its deep concern about the continued imposition and/or maintaining of limitations and restrictions on exports to developing countries of nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes, despite such limitations and restrictions being inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty. In this regard, the Group stresses that the technical cooperation and assistance provided by IAEA in meeting the needs of its member States for material, equipment and technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall not be subject to any political, economic, military or other conditions incompatible with the provisions of its statute. The Group therefore strongly calls for the immediate removal of any such restrictions or limitations. In the view of the Group, transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with the Treaty shall be supported and pursued in good faith without discrimination. The elimination of constraints that are inconsistent with the requirements of the Treaty would ensure that article IV of the Treaty is fully implemented with regard to facilitating the transfer of nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes among the States parties.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology, equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their sensitivity, and only stipulates that such technology, equipment and material must be subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards. The Group firmly believes that fostering the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by providing a framework of confidence and cooperation within which those uses can take place, is one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. Moreover, the Group emphasizes that cooperation to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world is the core objective enshrined in the

statute of IAEA. Accordingly, the Group strongly encourages all States parties to actively cooperate, among themselves and through IAEA, in the peaceful uses and applications of nuclear energy, including through international technical cooperation.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. The Group further emphasizes that non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access by developing countries to material, equipment or technology for peaceful purposes, which such countries require for their continued development. Furthermore, such arrangements must pursue and implement, without exception, the condition of adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for the supply to or cooperation with States not party to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 16) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores that IAEA, under its statutory obligations, pursues the goals of technical cooperation in peaceful applications of nuclear energy as one of the three pillars of its activities. In order to meet such goals, as enshrined in the statute of IAEA and in the Treaty, IAEA has to maintain a balance between technical cooperation and other activities. The Group believes that all States parties to the Treaty that are States members of IAEA have to ensure that the Technical Cooperation Programme remains firm and sustainable through sufficient, assured and predictable financial and human resources. In this regard, the efficacy of the Programme can best be achieved by ensuring its formulation and strategies are in strict accordance with the needs and the requests of developing countries.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 17) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty affirms the need to strengthen the radiological safety and protection systems at facilities utilizing radioactive materials and at radioactive waste management facilities, including the safe transportation of these materials. The Group reaffirms the need to strengthen existing international regulations relating to the safety and security of transportation of such materials. While reiterating the need to take necessary measures to prevent any dumping of nuclear or radioactive wastes, the Group calls for the effective implementation of the Code of Practice on the IAEA International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste as a means of enhancing the protection of all States from the dumping of radioactive wastes on their territories.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 18) The Group recognizes that the primary responsibility for nuclear safety rests with individual States. The Group reaffirms the central role of IAEA in nuclear safety-related matters, including through the establishment of nuclear safety standards. The Group stresses that IAEA must retain centrality in this field, owing to its mandated functions and long-standing expertise. The

Group stresses that any possible review of nuclear safety standards at the global level must be carried out within IAEA in an inclusive, gradual and transparent manner, with the guidance and participation of and in consultation with all member States, and shall incorporate the views of all member States. The Group also calls for the implementation of the Nuclear Safety Action Plan endorsed by the General Conference of IAEA in September 2011.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 20) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented without exception through the strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not party to the Treaty. In the view of the Group, new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 22) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty once again reaffirms the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities, operational or under construction, poses a great danger to human beings and the environment and constitutes a grave violation of international law, the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and the regulations of IAEA. In this regard, the Group recognizes the need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks or the threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Moreover, the Group strongly calls upon all States, in accordance with the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from attacks or the threat of attacks on nuclear facilities, operational or under construction, devoted to peaceful purposes.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 24) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while stressing the importance of safeguards and the significance of maintaining the principles of confidentiality regarding safeguards, underlines the vital responsibility of IAEA in this regard. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on the nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidents of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime, for its protection, needs to be highly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons expresses its strong concern at the growing resort to unilateralism and unilaterally imposed prescriptions and, in this

context, strongly underlines and affirms that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues. In this regard, the Group underlines that the multilateral mechanism established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the most appropriate way to address verification and safeguards issues. At the same time, the Group emphasizes that the work of the Agency with regard to safeguards and verification has to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of its statute and safeguards agreements.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the IAEA safeguards system and urges all States that have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible, in order to achieve the universality of the comprehensive safeguards. At the 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, this was considered as a main objective in order to consolidate and enhance the verification system for the non-proliferation regime. However, in the view of the Group, additional measures related to the safeguards shall not affect the rights of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, which are already committed to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and have renounced the nuclear-weapon option. The Group also expresses its strong rejection of attempts by any member State to use the technical cooperation programme of IAEA as a tool for political purposes in violation of its statute.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty are a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls on all States not parties to the Treaty to accede, without any further delay and any preconditions and as non-nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group proposes that the nuclear-weapon States undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to providing baseline data for future disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not parties to the Treaty, without exception.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty confirms that all States parties to the Treaty shall refrain from the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to States not parties to the Treaty unless they are placed under the comprehensive IAEA safeguards. In this connection, the Group confirms that the obligation under article III of the Treaty to verify the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty fully recognizes the role of IAEA as an independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization that serves as the sole competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance by States parties with their safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III (1) of the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that it is fundamental to make a clear distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures and that such voluntary undertakings shall not be turned into legal safeguards obligations. In this regard, the Group also emphasizes that IAEA shall ensure avoiding any ultra vires acts that jeopardize its integrity and credibility. The Group urges States parties to the Treaty to maintain and strengthen the technical character of IAEA consistent with its statute.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 8) With respect to safeguards, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the differentiated nature of the financial obligations undertaken by States members of IAEA should be recognized and respected by the Agency in its work.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while stressing the importance of safeguards and the significance of maintaining the principles of confidentiality regarding safeguards, underlines the vital responsibility of IAEA in this regard. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidents of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime for its protection needs to be highly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 10) In this context, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the implementation of IAEA resolution GC(54)/RES/11 on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system and application of the Model Additional Protocol, adopted by the Agency's General Conference at its fifty-fourth session, in which the General Conference, "Stressing the importance of maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the Agency's statute and safeguards agreements", acknowledged "the concerns expressed by the Director General on the need to protect safeguards confidential information within the secretariat and his announcement of additional measures to protect such information" and accordingly urged the Director General "to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of safeguards confidential information", and requested that he "continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of safeguards confidential information".

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the importance that the reporting of IAEA on the implementation of safeguards should continue to be factual and technically based and reflect appropriate reference to the relevant provisions of safeguards agreements.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the need to strictly observe the provisions of the IAEA statute, including its article 12 which contains an outline of the mandate of the Agency in verifying compliance with safeguards agreements and in particular that any non-compliance has first to be reported by the Agency's inspectors.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the statutory role of IAEA on nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the Agency's capability to verify nuclear disarmament agreements.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern over certain unilateral politically motivated attempts to hamper the exercise of the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes, in this regard, that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be in a manner designed to comply with article IV of the Treaty and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and

equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the sole competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance by States parties with their safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfilment of their Treaty obligations, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while supporting the verification activities of IAEA, underlines the importance of strict observance of the IAEA statute and relevant comprehensive safeguards agreements, in conducting verification activities.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 5) In this connection, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while stressing the importance of safeguards and the significance of maintaining the principles of confidentiality regarding safeguards, underlines the vital responsibility of IAEA in this regard. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidents of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime, for its protection, needs to be highly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that IAEA is the sole competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance by States parties with their safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III (1) of the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that all States members of IAEA shall strictly observe its statute and nothing should be done to undermine its authority. Furthermore, the Group calls upon all States to avoid any pressure or interference in the Agency's activities, especially its verification process, which could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes the need to achieve worldwide application of the comprehensive safeguards system and calls on all nuclear-weapon States and all States not parties to the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group

calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under the Treaty with a view to providing baseline data for future disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the statutory role of IAEA on nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the Agency's capability to verify nuclear disarmament agreements.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly believes that, in implementing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, those States shall undertake further efforts to verifiably reduce and eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, as well as their nuclear weapon-related materials, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. In this regard, the Group supports furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide nuclear disarmament and the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives devices.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)), which, by its action 16, stipulates that the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to commit to declare, as appropriate, to IAEA all fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes and to place such material as soon as practicable under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes. The Group calls on the Conference to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the fulfilment of these commitments through the establishment of a mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the action, which should be made mandatory for the nuclear-weapon States.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further recalls action 17, which stipulates that, in the context of action 16, all States are encouraged to support the

development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military purposes. The Group urges the Conference to examine such legally binding verification arrangements and the means to make them operational, in the aim of ensuring the realization of that objective.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A8) Placement of nuclear fissile material transferred from military to peaceful uses by nuclear-weapon States under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which reaffirmed the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty. The Group recalls that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further recalls that the 2010 Review Conference, by taking note of the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, recalled the reaffirmation by the 2000 Review Conference of the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The Conference also reaffirmed the urgency and importance of achieving universality of the Treaty and called on all States in the Middle East that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States so as to achieve its universality at an early date.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern that no progress has been achieved with regard to Israel's accession to the Treaty, and placing all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, and over the delay in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, all of which are objectives and priorities that were stressed in Review Conferences of the Treaty in 1995, 2000 and 2010.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty demands that Israel, the only country in the region that has neither joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons nor declared its intention to do so, renounce possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the Treaty without any precondition or further delay as a non-nuclear-weapon State, place promptly all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and conduct

	<p>all its nuclear-related activities in full conformity with the non-proliferation regime, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty, in particular in the Middle East.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, in conformity with the Treaty, hereby declares its commitment to the effective prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 18) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the establishment of a standing committee comprising members of the Bureau of the 2015 Review Conference to follow up intersessionally on the implementation of the recommendations by the Review Conference concerning Israel's prompt accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, and to report to the 2020 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee.</p>
<p>UN Security Council</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty demands that Israel, the only country in the region that has neither joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons nor declared its intention to do so, renounce possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the Treaty without any precondition or further delay as a non-nuclear-weapon State, place promptly all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and conduct all its nuclear-related activities in full conformity with the non-proliferation regime, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty, in particular in the Middle East.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 22) While reaffirming the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty is of the view that the 2012 conference should lead, without further delay, to the universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East and the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Outer Space</p>	
<p>International Cooperation on Outer Space</p>	

	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 18) The Group believes that the abrogation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group remains concerned that the deployment of national and strategic missile defence systems could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 66/27, the Group emphasizes the urgent need to begin substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.</p>
<p>International Treaty on Outer Space</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 18) The Group believes that the abrogation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group remains concerned that the deployment of national and strategic missile defence systems could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 66/27, the Group emphasizes the urgent need to begin substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.</p>
<p>Missile Defense Systems</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 18) The Group believes that the abrogation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group remains concerned that the deployment of national and strategic missile defence systems could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 66/27, the Group emphasizes the urgent need to begin substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.</p>
<p>Nonproliferation</p>	
<p>Proliferation-Sensitive Information Safeguards</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 24) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while stressing the importance of safeguards and the significance of maintaining the principles of confidentiality regarding safeguards, underlines the vital responsibility of IAEA in this regard. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on the nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidents of leaks</p>

	<p>of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime, for its protection, needs to be highly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while stressing the importance of safeguards and the significance of maintaining the principles of confidentiality regarding safeguards, underlines the vital responsibility of IAEA in this regard. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidents of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime for its protection needs to be highly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 10) In this context, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the implementation of IAEA resolution GC(54)/RES/11 on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system and application of the Model Additional Protocol, adopted by the Agency’s General Conference at its fifty-fourth session, in which the General Conference, “Stressing the importance of maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the Agency’s statute and safeguards agreements”, acknowledged “the concerns expressed by the Director General on the need to protect safeguards confidential information within the secretariat and his announcement of additional measures to protect such information” and accordingly urged the Director General “to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of safeguards confidential information”, and requested that he “continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of safeguards confidential information”.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 5) In this connection, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while stressing the importance of safeguards and the significance of maintaining the principles of confidentiality regarding safeguards, underlines the vital responsibility of IAEA in this regard. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidents of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime, for its protection, needs to be highly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency.</p>
<p>Nonproliferation and Noncompliance</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the need to strictly observe the</p>

	<p>provisions of the IAEA statute, including its article 12 which contains an outline of the mandate of the Agency in verifying compliance with safeguards agreements and in particular that any non-compliance has first to be reported by the Agency’s inspectors.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Nonproliferation and Peaceful Uses</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emphasizes once more that promoting international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the realization of the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the Treaty, as stipulated in its article IV, constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. The Group strongly calls upon all States parties to the Treaty to fully respect this inalienable right and underscores that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting this right.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty firmly believes that the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of article IV of the Treaty plays a crucial role in achieving the object and purpose of the Treaty. In this regard, the Group also firmly believes that any measure aiming at hampering, fully or partly, the fullest exercise of these inalienable rights, would seriously jeopardize the delicate balance between rights and obligations of States parties, in contravention with the Treaty’s object and purpose and would widen the gap between developed and developing countries in this field.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including proposals for assurance of supply in response to the needs of interested States, shall fully take into account all technical, legal, political and economic complexities surrounding these issues and be conducted through wide, integral, comprehensive and transparent multilateral consultations and negotiations. The multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle should be economically viable, sustainable, non-discriminatory, predictable and transparent under the auspices of IAEA and any other regional and multilateral forums. The Group also stresses that any decision on proposals regarding multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle shall be made by consensus, taking into account the interests of all member States, with the participation of all IAEA member States, and any proposal from IAEA must be consistent with its statute, without prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty, if they so decide, to develop a full national fuel cycle, according to its article IV.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its deep concern about the continued imposition and/or maintaining of limitations and restrictions on exports to developing countries of nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes, despite such limitations and</p>

restrictions being inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty. In this regard, the Group stresses that the technical cooperation and assistance provided by IAEA in meeting the needs of its member States for material, equipment and technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall not be subject to any political, economic, military or other conditions incompatible with the provisions of its statute. The Group therefore strongly calls for the immediate removal of any such restrictions or limitations. In the view of the Group, transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with the Treaty shall be supported and pursued in good faith without discrimination. The elimination of constraints that are inconsistent with the requirements of the Treaty would ensure that article IV of the Treaty is fully implemented with regard to facilitating the transfer of nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes among the States parties.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology, equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their sensitivity, and only stipulates that such technology, equipment and material must be subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards. The Group firmly believes that fostering the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by providing a framework of confidence and cooperation within which those uses can take place, is one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. Moreover, the Group emphasizes that cooperation to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world is the core objective enshrined in the statute of IAEA. Accordingly, the Group strongly encourages all States parties to actively cooperate, among themselves and through IAEA, in the peaceful uses and applications of nuclear energy, including through international technical cooperation.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. The Group further emphasizes that non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access by developing countries to material, equipment or technology for peaceful purposes, which such countries require for their continued development. Furthermore, such arrangements must pursue and implement, without exception, the condition of adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for the supply to or cooperation with States not party to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty remains deeply concerned about the ability of certain States not party to the Treaty to obtain, in particular from nuclear-weapon States, nuclear materials, technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons. The Group strongly calls for the enforcement, without exception or further delay, of the total and

complete prohibition, as stipulated in the Treaty, of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 19) The Group emphasizes that measures and initiatives aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and nuclear security must not be used as a pretext or lever to violate, deny or restrict the inalienable right of developing countries to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 20) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented without exception through the strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not party to the Treaty. In the view of the Group, new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 21) In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores the strong call by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that all States parties shall ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated particularly in its articles I, II and III, and with the decision on the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 23) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern over certain unilateral, politically motivated attempts to hamper the exercise of the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes, in this regard, that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons expresses its strong concern at the growing resort to unilateralism and unilaterally imposed prescriptions and, in this context, strongly underlines and affirms that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues. In this regard, the Group underlines that the multilateral mechanism established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the most appropriate way to address verification and safeguards issues. At the same time, the Group emphasizes that the work of the Agency with regard to safeguards and verification has to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of its statute and safeguards agreements.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the IAEA safeguards system and urges all States that have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible, in order to achieve the universality of the comprehensive safeguards. At the 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, this was considered as a main objective in order to consolidate and enhance the verification system for the non-proliferation regime. However, in the view of the Group, additional measures related to the safeguards shall not affect the rights of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, which are already committed to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and have renounced the nuclear-weapon option. The Group also expresses its strong rejection of attempts by any member State to use the technical cooperation programme of IAEA as a tool for political purposes in violation of its statute.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty are a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty confirms that all States parties to the Treaty shall refrain from the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to States not parties to the Treaty unless they are placed under the comprehensive IAEA safeguards. In this connection, the Group confirms that the obligation under article III of the Treaty to verify the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and

technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty fully recognizes the role of IAEA as an independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization that serves as the sole competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance by States parties with their safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III (1) of the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that it is fundamental to make a clear distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures and that such voluntary undertakings shall not be turned into legal safeguards obligations. In this regard, the Group also emphasizes that IAEA shall ensure avoiding any ultra vires acts that jeopardize its integrity and credibility. The Group urges States parties to the Treaty to maintain and strengthen the technical character of IAEA consistent with its statute.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern over certain unilateral politically motivated attempts to hamper the exercise of the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes, in this regard, that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be in a manner designed to comply with article IV of the Treaty and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that, under article III (1) of the Treaty, each non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under the Treaty with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 2) In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also reaffirms the importance of and calls for strict observance of article III (3) of the Treaty, by which the required safeguards shall be implemented in a manner

designed to comply with article IV of the Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the preamble of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the sole competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance by States parties with their safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfilment of their Treaty obligations, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while supporting the verification activities of IAEA, underlines the importance of strict observance of the IAEA statute and relevant comprehensive safeguards agreements, in conducting verification activities.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that IAEA is the sole competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance by States parties with their safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III (1) of the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes the need to achieve worldwide application of the comprehensive safeguards system and calls on all nuclear-weapon States and all States not parties to the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under the Treaty with a view to providing baseline data for future disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, mindful of the importance of article III in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes, reiterates that

	<p>obligations under that article provide credible assurances for States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to other States parties that comply with comprehensive safeguards agreements.</p>
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<p>Peaceful Uses</p>	
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<p>Access to Nuclear Technology</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms the importance of the right of States parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and their right to cooperation among themselves, in particular in the technological field, in contributing alone or with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also stipulates the right of member States to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes and to promote socio-economic development by way of technical cooperation and the production of electrical power, with due consideration for the needs of developing countries. To ensure the realization of these goals, all States parties, particularly developed States, shall extend their assistance, as requested by States parties that are States members of IAEA, in the provision of nuclear equipment, material, technology and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes, with a view to achieving the maximum benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities for peaceful purposes.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 5) In this connection, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recognizes the major and important role of IAEA in assisting States parties, particularly developing States, in planning for and using nuclear science and technology. The Group stresses the importance of nuclear knowledge-sharing and the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries to sustain and further enhance their scientific and technological capabilities, thereby also contributing to their socio-economic development. Moreover, the Group underlines that the activities of IAEA in the field of technical cooperation, nuclear power and non-power applications contribute in an important way to meeting energy needs, improving human health, including the application of nuclear technology in cancer therapy, combating poverty, protecting the environment, developing agriculture, managing the use of water resources and optimizing industrial processes, and that these activities,</p>
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as well as bilateral and other multilateral cooperation, contribute to achieving the objectives set forth in article IV of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, as the main vehicle for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, should continue to be formulated and implemented in accordance with the statute of IAEA and the agreed guiding principles as contained in INFCIRC/267, as well as the decisions of IAEA policymaking organs. The Group reiterates that the current guidelines and criteria for the selection of technical cooperation projects are robust and effective, and that no additional criteria should be imposed for fulfilling the above-mentioned objectives.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that, in 2005, IAEA and its then-Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei, were awarded the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize, and reiterates the importance it attaches to the impartiality, professionalism and integrity of the Agency. While expressing its full confidence in that impartiality and professionalism, the Group strongly rejects any attempts by any State to politicize the work of the Agency, including its technical cooperation programme, in violation of its statute, as well as any pressure or interference in its activities that could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility. In this connection, the Group also expresses its rejection of any attempts by any State party to use the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme as a tool for political purposes, which would be in violation of the statute of the Agency. The Group reaffirms that choices and decisions of each State party to the Treaty in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for such uses and its fuel-cycle policies.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 8) In this regard, while recognizing that a diverse portfolio of energy sources will be needed to allow access to sustainable energy and electricity resources in all regions of the world, and that States parties may pursue different ways to achieve their energy security and climate protection goals, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty once again acknowledges and reaffirms that each State party to the Treaty has the sovereign right to define its national energy policies, including fuel-cycle policies, in accordance with its national requirements and its rights and obligations under the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including proposals for assurance of supply in response to the needs of interested States, shall fully take into account all technical, legal, political and economic complexities surrounding these issues and be conducted through wide, integral, comprehensive and transparent multilateral consultations and negotiations. The multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle should be economically viable, sustainable, non-discriminatory, predictable and transparent under the auspices of IAEA and any other regional and

multilateral forums. The Group also stresses that any decision on proposals regarding multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle shall be made by consensus, taking into account the interests of all member States, with the participation of all IAEA member States, and any proposal from IAEA must be consistent with its statute, without prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty, if they so decide, to develop a full national fuel cycle, according to its article IV.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines that all the parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate and have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this regard, the Group stresses particularly the obligation of developed countries to promote the legitimate need of the developing countries to nuclear energy by fully respecting this right with a view to achieving the widest benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the contribution that uses of nuclear energy can make to progress in general and to helping overcome the technological and economic disparities between developed and developing States parties to the Treaty in particular. The Group firmly believes that, as a fundamental principle, in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment shall be given to the non-nuclear-weapons States parties to the Treaty, particularly taking into account the needs of developing countries.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its deep concern about the continued imposition and/or maintaining of limitations and restrictions on exports to developing countries of nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes, despite such limitations and restrictions being inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty. In this regard, the Group stresses that the technical cooperation and assistance provided by IAEA in meeting the needs of its member States for material, equipment and technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall not be subject to any political, economic, military or other conditions incompatible with the provisions of its statute. The Group therefore strongly calls for the immediate removal of any such restrictions or limitations. In the view of the Group, transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with the Treaty shall be supported and pursued in good faith without discrimination. The elimination of constraints that are inconsistent with the requirements of the Treaty would ensure that article IV of the Treaty is fully implemented with regard to facilitating the transfer of nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes among the States parties.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology, equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their sensitivity, and only stipulates that such technology, equipment and material must be subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards. The Group firmly believes that fostering the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by providing a framework of confidence and cooperation within which those uses can take place, is one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. Moreover, the Group emphasizes that cooperation to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world is the core objective enshrined in the statute of IAEA. Accordingly, the Group strongly encourages all States parties to actively cooperate, among themselves and through IAEA, in the peaceful uses and applications of nuclear energy, including through international technical cooperation.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. The Group further emphasizes that non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access by developing countries to material, equipment or technology for peaceful purposes, which such countries require for their continued development. Furthermore, such arrangements must pursue and implement, without exception, the condition of adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for the supply to or cooperation with States not party to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty remains deeply concerned about the ability of certain States not party to the Treaty to obtain, in particular from nuclear-weapon States, nuclear materials, technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons. The Group strongly calls for the enforcement, without exception or further delay, of the total and complete prohibition, as stipulated in the Treaty, of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 16) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores that IAEA, under its statutory obligations, pursues the goals of technical cooperation in peaceful applications of nuclear energy as one of the three pillars of its activities. In order to meet such goals, as enshrined in the statute of IAEA and in the Treaty, IAEA has to maintain a balance between technical cooperation and other activities. The Group believes that all States parties to the Treaty that are States members of IAEA have to ensure that the Technical Cooperation Programme remains firm and sustainable through sufficient, assured and predictable financial and human resources. In this regard, the efficacy of the Programme can best

be achieved by ensuring its formulation and strategies are in strict accordance with the needs and the requests of developing countries.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 20) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented without exception through the strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not party to the Treaty. In the view of the Group, new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 21) In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores the strong call by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that all States parties shall ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated particularly in its articles I, II and III, and with the decision on the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 23) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern over certain unilateral, politically motivated attempts to hamper the exercise of the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes, in this regard, that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the IAEA safeguards system and urges all States that have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible, in order to achieve the universality of the comprehensive safeguards. At the 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, this was considered as a main objective in order to consolidate and enhance the verification system for the non-proliferation regime. However, in the view of the Group, additional measures related to the safeguards

shall not affect the rights of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, which are already committed to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and have renounced the nuclear-weapon option. The Group also expresses its strong rejection of attempts by any member State to use the technical cooperation programme of IAEA as a tool for political purposes in violation of its statute.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty are a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls on all States not parties to the Treaty to accede, without any further delay and any preconditions and as non-nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group proposes that the nuclear-weapon States undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to providing baseline data for future disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not parties to the Treaty, without exception.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty confirms that all States parties to the Treaty shall refrain from the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to States not parties to the Treaty unless they are placed under the comprehensive IAEA safeguards. In this connection, the Group confirms that the obligation under article III of the Treaty to verify the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern over certain unilateral politically motivated attempts to hamper the exercise of the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes, in this

regard, that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be in a manner designed to comply with article IV of the Treaty and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 2) In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also reaffirms the importance of and calls for strict observance of article III (3) of the Treaty, by which the required safeguards shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of the Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the preamble of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the sole competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance by States parties with their safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfilment of their Treaty obligations, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes the need to achieve worldwide application of the comprehensive safeguards system and calls on all nuclear-weapon States and all States not parties to the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under the Treaty with a view to providing baseline data for future disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.

	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, mindful of the importance of article III in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes, reiterates that obligations under that article provide credible assurances for States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to other States parties that comply with comprehensive safeguards agreements.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that the nuclear-weapon States, in conformity with their legal obligations under article I of the Treaty, shall solemnly undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly to Israel, and further undertake not, in any way, to assist, encourage or induce Israel to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices under any circumstances whatsoever.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, in conformity with the Treaty, hereby declares its commitment to the effective prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer, by any State, of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear-related scientific or technological fields to Israel. In this regard, the Group expresses its serious concern over Israeli scientists' continued access to the nuclear facilities of one nuclear-weapon State, which has potentially serious negative implications on the security of the region as well as the reliability of the global non-proliferation regime.</p>
<p align="center">Attack or Threat of Attack Against Peaceful Nuclear Facilities</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 22) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty once again reaffirms the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities, operational or under construction, poses a great danger to human beings and the environment and constitutes a grave violation of international law, the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and the regulations of IAEA. In this regard, the Group recognizes the need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks or the threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.</p>

	<p>Moreover, the Group strongly calls upon all States, in accordance with the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from attacks or the threat of attacks on nuclear facilities, operational or under construction, devoted to peaceful purposes.</p>
<p>UN and IAEA Authority</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also stipulates the right of member States to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes and to promote socio-economic development by way of technical cooperation and the production of electrical power, with due consideration for the needs of developing countries. To ensure the realization of these goals, all States parties, particularly developed States, shall extend their assistance, as requested by States parties that are States members of IAEA, in the provision of nuclear equipment, material, technology and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes, with a view to achieving the maximum benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities for peaceful purposes.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 5) In this connection, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recognizes the major and important role of IAEA in assisting States parties, particularly developing States, in planning for and using nuclear science and technology. The Group stresses the importance of nuclear knowledge-sharing and the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries to sustain and further enhance their scientific and technological capabilities, thereby also contributing to their socio-economic development. Moreover, the Group underlines that the activities of IAEA in the field of technical cooperation, nuclear power and non-power applications contribute in an important way to meeting energy needs, improving human health, including the application of nuclear technology in cancer therapy, combating poverty, protecting the environment, developing agriculture, managing the use of water resources and optimizing industrial processes, and that these activities, as well as bilateral and other multilateral cooperation, contribute to achieving the objectives set forth in article IV of the Treaty.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, as the main vehicle for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, should continue to be formulated and implemented in accordance with the statute of IAEA and the agreed guiding principles as contained in INFCIRC/267, as well as the decisions of IAEA policymaking organs. The Group reiterates that the current guidelines and criteria for the selection of technical cooperation projects are robust and effective, and that no additional criteria should be imposed for fulfilling the above-mentioned objectives.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that, in 2005, IAEA and its then-Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei, were awarded the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize, and reiterates the importance it attaches to the impartiality,</p>

professionalism and integrity of the Agency. While expressing its full confidence in that impartiality and professionalism, the Group strongly rejects any attempts by any State to politicize the work of the Agency, including its technical cooperation programme, in violation of its statute, as well as any pressure or interference in its activities that could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility. In this connection, the Group also expresses its rejection of any attempts by any State party to use the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme as a tool for political purposes, which would be in violation of the statute of the Agency. The Group reaffirms that choices and decisions of each State party to the Treaty in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for such uses and its fuel-cycle policies.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including proposals for assurance of supply in response to the needs of interested States, shall fully take into account all technical, legal, political and economic complexities surrounding these issues and be conducted through wide, integral, comprehensive and transparent multilateral consultations and negotiations. The multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle should be economically viable, sustainable, non-discriminatory, predictable and transparent under the auspices of IAEA and any other regional and multilateral forums. The Group also stresses that any decision on proposals regarding multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle shall be made by consensus, taking into account the interests of all member States, with the participation of all IAEA member States, and any proposal from IAEA must be consistent with its statute, without prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty, if they so decide, to develop a full national fuel cycle, according to its article IV.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its deep concern about the continued imposition and/or maintaining of limitations and restrictions on exports to developing countries of nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes, despite such limitations and restrictions being inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty. In this regard, the Group stresses that the technical cooperation and assistance provided by IAEA in meeting the needs of its member States for material, equipment and technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall not be subject to any political, economic, military or other conditions incompatible with the provisions of its statute. The Group therefore strongly calls for the immediate removal of any such restrictions or limitations. In the view of the Group, transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with the Treaty shall be supported and pursued in good faith without discrimination. The elimination of constraints that are inconsistent with the requirements of the Treaty would ensure that article IV of the Treaty is fully implemented with regard to facilitating the transfer of nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes among the States parties.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology, equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their sensitivity, and only stipulates that such technology, equipment and material must be subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards. The Group firmly believes that fostering the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by providing a framework of confidence and cooperation within which those uses can take place, is one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. Moreover, the Group emphasizes that cooperation to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world is the core objective enshrined in the statute of IAEA. Accordingly, the Group strongly encourages all States parties to actively cooperate, among themselves and through IAEA, in the peaceful uses and applications of nuclear energy, including through international technical cooperation.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. The Group further emphasizes that non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access by developing countries to material, equipment or technology for peaceful purposes, which such countries require for their continued development. Furthermore, such arrangements must pursue and implement, without exception, the condition of adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for the supply to or cooperation with States not party to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 16) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores that IAEA, under its statutory obligations, pursues the goals of technical cooperation in peaceful applications of nuclear energy as one of the three pillars of its activities. In order to meet such goals, as enshrined in the statute of IAEA and in the Treaty, IAEA has to maintain a balance between technical cooperation and other activities. The Group believes that all States parties to the Treaty that are States members of IAEA have to ensure that the Technical Cooperation Programme remains firm and sustainable through sufficient, assured and predictable financial and human resources. In this regard, the efficacy of the Programme can best be achieved by ensuring its formulation and strategies are in strict accordance with the needs and the requests of developing countries.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 20) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented without exception through the strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not party to the Treaty. In the view of the Group, new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material

or equipment or material designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 22) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty once again reaffirms the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities, operational or under construction, poses a great danger to human beings and the environment and constitutes a grave violation of international law, the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and the regulations of IAEA. In this regard, the Group recognizes the need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks or the threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Moreover, the Group strongly calls upon all States, in accordance with the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from attacks or the threat of attacks on nuclear facilities, operational or under construction, devoted to peaceful purposes.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 23) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern over certain unilateral, politically motivated attempts to hamper the exercise of the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes, in this regard, that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 24) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while stressing the importance of safeguards and the significance of maintaining the principles of confidentiality regarding safeguards, underlines the vital responsibility of IAEA in this regard. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on the nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidents of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime, for its protection, needs to be highly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons expresses its strong concern at the growing resort to unilateralism and unilaterally imposed prescriptions and, in this context, strongly underlines and affirms that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues. In this regard, the Group underlines that the multilateral mechanism established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the most appropriate way to address verification and safeguards issues. At the same time, the Group emphasizes that the work of the Agency with regard to safeguards and verification has to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of its statute and safeguards agreements.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty are a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls on all States not parties to the Treaty to accede, without any further delay and any preconditions and as non-nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group proposes that the nuclear-weapon States undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to providing baseline data for future disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not parties to the Treaty, without exception.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty confirms that all States parties to the Treaty shall refrain from the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to States not parties to the Treaty unless they are placed under the comprehensive IAEA safeguards. In this connection, the Group confirms that the obligation under article III of the Treaty to verify the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty fully recognizes the role of IAEA as an independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization that serves as the sole competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance by States parties with their safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III (1) of the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that it is fundamental to make a clear distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures and that such voluntary undertakings shall not be turned into legal safeguards obligations. In this regard, the Group also emphasizes that IAEA shall ensure avoiding any ultra vires acts that jeopardize its integrity and credibility. The Group urges States parties to the Treaty to maintain and strengthen the technical character of IAEA consistent with its statute.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while stressing the importance of safeguards and the significance of maintaining the principles of confidentiality regarding safeguards, underlines the vital responsibility of IAEA in this regard. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidents of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime for its protection needs to be highly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the need to strictly observe the provisions of the IAEA statute, including its article 12 which contains an outline of the mandate of the Agency in verifying compliance with safeguards agreements and in particular that any non-compliance has first to be reported by the Agency's inspectors.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern over certain unilateral politically motivated attempts to hamper the exercise of the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes, in this regard, that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be in a manner designed to comply with article IV of the Treaty and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the

parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the sole competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance by States parties with their safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfilment of their Treaty obligations, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while supporting the verification activities of IAEA, underlines the importance of strict observance of the IAEA statute and relevant comprehensive safeguards agreements, in conducting verification activities.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 5) In this connection, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while stressing the importance of safeguards and the significance of maintaining the principles of confidentiality regarding safeguards, underlines the vital responsibility of IAEA in this regard. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidents of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime, for its protection, needs to be highly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that IAEA is the sole competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance by States parties with their safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III (1) of the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that all States members of IAEA shall strictly observe its statute and nothing should be done to undermine its authority. Furthermore, the Group calls upon all States to avoid any pressure or interference in the Agency's activities, especially its verification process, which could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes the need to achieve worldwide application of the comprehensive safeguards system and calls on all

	<p>nuclear-weapon States and all States not parties to the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under the Treaty with a view to providing baseline data for future disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Inalienable Right Through NPT</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emphasizes once more that promoting international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the realization of the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the Treaty, as stipulated in its article IV, constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. The Group strongly calls upon all States parties to the Treaty to fully respect this inalienable right and underscores that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting this right.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty firmly believes that the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of article IV of the Treaty plays a crucial role in achieving the object and purpose of the Treaty. In this regard, the Group also firmly believes that any measure aiming at hampering, fully or partly, the fullest exercise of these inalienable rights, would seriously jeopardize the delicate balance between rights and obligations of States parties, in contravention with the Treaty's object and purpose and would widen the gap between developed and developing countries in this field.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including proposals for assurance of supply in response to the needs of interested States, shall fully take into account all technical, legal, political and economic complexities surrounding these issues and be conducted through wide, integral, comprehensive and transparent multilateral consultations and negotiations. The multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle should be economically viable, sustainable, non-discriminatory, predictable and transparent under the auspices of IAEA and any other regional and multilateral forums. The Group also stresses that any decision on proposals regarding multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle shall be made by consensus, taking into account the interests of all member States, with the participation of all IAEA member States, and</p>

any proposal from IAEA must be consistent with its statute, without prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty, if they so decide, to develop a full national fuel cycle, according to its article IV.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 19) The Group emphasizes that measures and initiatives aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and nuclear security must not be used as a pretext or lever to violate, deny or restrict the inalienable right of developing countries to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 23) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern over certain unilateral, politically motivated attempts to hamper the exercise of the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes, in this regard, that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 25) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty is determined to propose, during the 2015 Review Process of the Treaty, measures to protect fully the inalienable rights of all States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern over certain unilateral politically motivated attempts to hamper the exercise of the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes, in this regard, that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be in a manner designed to comply with article IV of the Treaty and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes.

NWFZs

Contributions to Disarmament

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be a contribution towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The Group is, however, of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is not a substitute for the legal obligations of and unequivocal undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 2) The Group welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones worldwide and calls for cooperation and broad consultation in order for the States of the regions concerned to freely arrive at such agreements. In this regard, the Group continues to consider the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), Bangkok (Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone), Pelindaba (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty) and Semipalatinsk (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia) to be a positive step and important measure towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 7) The Group urges States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (see A/S-10/4) and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. In this context, the Group considers that the further institutionalization of Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status would be an important step towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 9) The Group stresses the importance of the signature and ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga and Semipalatinsk in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the territories of the States parties to those treaties, as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence

	<p>of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be a contribution towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. However, the Group is of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones does not substitute legal obligations and unequivocal undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The Group further welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and, in this regard, strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Contributions to Nonproliferation</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be a contribution towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The Group is, however, of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is not a substitute for the legal obligations of and unequivocal undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 2) The Group welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones worldwide and calls for cooperation and broad consultation in order for the States of the regions concerned to freely arrive at such agreements. In this regard, the Group continues to consider the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), Bangkok (Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone), Pelindaba (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty) and Semipalatinsk (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia) to be a positive step and important measure towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 7) The Group urges States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (see A/S-10/4) and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. In this context, the Group considers that the further institutionalization of Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status would be an important step towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 9) The Group stresses the importance of the signature and ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga and Semipalatinsk in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the territories of the States parties to those treaties, as</p>

	<p>envisaged in article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be a contribution towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. However, the Group is of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weaponfree zones does not substitute legal obligations and unequivocal undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The Group further welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and, in this regard, strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.</p>
<p>Treaty of Tlatelolco</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 2) The Group welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones worldwide and calls for cooperation and broad consultation in order for the States of the regions concerned to freely arrive at such agreements. In this regard, the Group continues to consider the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), Bangkok (Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone), Pelindaba (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty) and Semipalatinsk (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia) to be a positive step and important measure towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 6) The Group emphasizes the need to strengthen the integrity of the statute of denuclearization provided for in the Treaty of Tlatelolco by reviewing the declarations that were formulated by the nuclear-weapon States parties to additional protocols I and II for possible withdrawal or modification.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference; (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on: (i) the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites; (ii) measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development; (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their

	<p>military and security policies; (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention); (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones; (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.</p>
<p>Treaty of Pelindaba</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 2) The Group welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones worldwide and calls for cooperation and broad consultation in order for the States of the regions concerned to freely arrive at such agreements. In this regard, the Group continues to consider the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), Bangkok (Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone), Pelindaba (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty) and Semipalatinsk (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia) to be a positive step and important measure towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 4) The Group welcomes the entry into force of the Semipalatinsk and Pelindaba treaties on 21 March 2009 and 15 July 2009, respectively, and considers the establishment of these zones to be an effective contribution towards strengthening regional and global peace and security.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 9) The Group stresses the importance of the signature and ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga and Semipalatinsk in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the territories of the States parties to those treaties, as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:</p>

	<p>(a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference; (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on: (i) the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites; (ii) measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development; (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies; (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention); (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones; (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.</p>
<p>Treaty of Bangkok</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 2) The Group welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones worldwide and calls for cooperation and broad consultation in order for the States of the regions concerned to freely arrive at such agreements. In this regard, the Group continues to consider the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), Bangkok (Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone), Pelindaba (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty) and Semipalatinsk (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia) to be a positive step and important measure towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 8) The Group welcomes the conclusion of the consultations between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the nuclear-weapon States on the Protocol to the</p>

	<p>Bangkok Treaty and urges the nuclear-weapon States to become parties to the Protocol as soon as possible. The Group looks forward to the signing of the Protocol by the five nuclear-weapon States in July 2012.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:</p> <p>(a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference; (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on: (i) the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites; (ii) measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development; (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies; (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention); (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones; (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.</p>
<p>Treaty of Rarotonga</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 2) The Group welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones worldwide and calls for cooperation and broad consultation in order for the States of the regions concerned to freely arrive at such agreements. In this regard, the Group continues to consider the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), Bangkok (Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone), Pelindaba (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty) and Semipalatinsk (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia) to be a positive step and important</p>

	<p>measure towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 9) The Group stresses the importance of the signature and ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga and Semipalatinsk in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the territories of the States parties to those treaties, as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference; (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on: (i) the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites; (ii) measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development; (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies; (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention); (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones; (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.
<p>Treaty of Semipalatinsk</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 2) The Group welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones worldwide and calls for cooperation and broad consultation in order for the States of the regions concerned to freely arrive at such agreements. In this regard,</p>

the Group continues to consider the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), Bangkok (Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone), Pelindaba (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty) and Semipalatinsk (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia) to be a positive step and important measure towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 4) The Group welcomes the entry into force of the Semipalatinsk and Pelindaba treaties on 21 March 2009 and 15 July 2009, respectively, and considers the establishment of these zones to be an effective contribution towards strengthening regional and global peace and security.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 9) The Group stresses the importance of the signature and ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga and Semipalatinsk in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the territories of the States parties to those treaties, as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:

- (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference;
- (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on: (i) the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites; (ii) measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development;
- (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies;
- (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention);
- (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones;
- (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in

	<p>the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.</p>
<p>Mongolia as a NWFZ</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 7) The Group urges States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (see A/S-10/4) and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. In this context, the Group considers that the further institutionalization of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status would be an important step towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:</p> <p>(a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference; (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on: (i) the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites; (ii) measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development; (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies; (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention); (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones; (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral</p>

	<p>mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.</p>
<p>Middle East WMDFZ</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.22, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reiterates its commitment to article VIII (3) of the Treaty, as well as the consensus reached at the 2000 Review Conference on improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process of the Treaty, including the stipulation (see NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Vol. I, Part I)) that: “The States Parties, recalling paragraph 4 of Decision 1 of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, agreed that the purpose of the first two sessions of the Preparatory Committee would be to ‘consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality’. To this end, each session of the Preparatory Committee should consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences, including developments affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty.”</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.22, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference is mandated and tasked, in fulfilment of the 1995 and 2000 decisions on the strengthened review process, to undertake the following: (a) Consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2 as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences, including developments affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty; (b) At its third and, as appropriate, fourth session, the Preparatory Committee, taking into account the deliberations and results of its previous sessions, should make every effort to produce a consensus report containing recommendations to the Review Conference; (c) The States parties agreed that the procedural arrangements for the Review Conference should be finalized at the previous session of the Preparatory Committee; (d) As legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the Preparatory Committee should make recommendations to the 2015 Review Conference on this issue; (e) The establishment of such subsidiary bodies would be recommended by the Preparatory Committee for each Review Conference in relation to the specific objectives of the Review Conference.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.22, Para 3) In the context of the above-mentioned tasks and mandates, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for: (a) An agreement on the provisional agenda of the Preparatory Committee and 2015 Review Conference, which would include “Preparatory work for the review of the operation</p>

of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII (3) of the Treaty, in particular, consideration of principles, objectives and ways to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, including specific matters of substance related to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference”, as well as the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty; (b) Recalling that the 2000 Final Document states clearly that “each session of the Preparatory Committee should consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and the Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences”, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that this Preparatory Committee should deal with all the procedural issues necessary to take its work forward as well as with matters of substance as was decided at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Conferences; (c) To this end, the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on nuclear disarmament so as to ensure that there is a proper accounting in the reports by the States of their progress in achieving nuclear disarmament. In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty wishes to recall that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference (see NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I-IV)) called for regular reports within the framework of the Treaty’s strengthened review process by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”. The Group recalls the stipulation of section B on “Disarmament of nuclear weapons”, contained in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that: “The nuclear-weapon States are called upon to report the undertakings [under that section] to the Preparatory Committee at 2014 (see NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)). The 2015 Review Conference will take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of article VI.” In this connection, the Group expects that the States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, should submit reports to each Preparatory Committee session, including this one, unless otherwise decided by the Review Conference. In the view of the Group, the reports on article VI should cover issues and principles addressed by the 13 practical steps and undertakings under section B on “Disarmament of nuclear weapons”, in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference and should include specific and complete information on each of these steps and follow-on actions. These reports should also address, inter alia, current policies and intentions, as well as developments in these areas; (d) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also believes that the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on the Middle East by devoting sufficient time within the indicative timetable and the full opportunity for all speakers to thereby engage in a substantive debate. The Group further recalls that the 2000 Review Conference, in its Final Document, requested all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States,

to report through the United Nations Secretariat to the President of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, as well as the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of the Conference, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. The Group expects that all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, would submit reports in this regard as agreed in the 2000 Final Document; (e) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the stipulation of the 2010 Review Conference that “The Conference reaffirms that all States Parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and the States in the region, should continue to report on steps taken to implement the 1995 Resolution, through the United Nations Secretariat, to the President of the 2015 Review Conference, as well as to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of that Conference” and that “The facilitator will report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings”. The Group accordingly emphasizes the importance of and calls for submitting required reports by all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, as well as the facilitator of the 2012 Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, to the current and upcoming meetings of the Preparatory Committee and the 2015 Review Conference. The Group wishes to refer to its working paper on the topic “Regional issues: Middle East” which stipulates its substantive position in this regard; (f) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for an agreement to establish subsidiary bodies to the relevant Main Committees of the 2015 Review Conference to deliberate on issues related to nuclear disarmament, in particular the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons as well as the undertakings under section B on “Disarmament of nuclear weapons”, in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference; on the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the practical steps on the Middle East, in particular implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, contained in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference; and a legally binding international instrument on unconditional security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group emphasizes the need for the Preparatory Committee meetings to continue to allocate specific time for deliberations on nuclear disarmament, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and security assurances; (g) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty furthermore calls on the Preparatory Committee and the 2015 Review Conference to: (a) Consider the further strengthening or enhancement of the review process of the Treaty; (b) Further strengthen or enhance the regular reporting mechanism provided for in accordance with the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference; (c) Consider the steps and other actions that could be taken to promote disarmament

and non-proliferation education, with particular reference to the Treaty;
(d) Support participation of non-governmental organizations in the Preparatory Committee and 2015 Review Conference meetings.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 3) In this regard, the Group strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and calls for the full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, which is an integral and essential part of the package of decisions reached without a vote that enabled the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995. In the Group's view, the resolution remains valid until its objectives are achieved.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:
(a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference; (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on: (i) the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites; (ii) measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development; (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies; (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (f) An international conference at "the earliest possible date" to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention); (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones; (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of

States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be a contribution towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. However, the Group is of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weaponfree zones does not substitute legal obligations and unequivocal undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The Group further welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and, in this regard, strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which reaffirmed the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty. The Group recalls that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines furthermore that the 2010 Review Conference also reaffirmed the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recalled the affirmation of its goals and objectives by the 2000 Review Conference. The Conference also stressed that the Resolution remains valid until the goals and objectives are achieved, and that the Resolution is an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995. The Group recalls also that at the Conference, States parties renewed their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at its prompt implementation.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further recalls that the 2010 Review Conference, by taking note of the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, recalled the reaffirmation by the 2000 Review Conference of the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The Conference also reaffirmed the urgency and importance of achieving universality of the Treaty and called on all States in the Middle East that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States so as to achieve its universality at an early date.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 5) In this context, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty welcomes the adoption by consensus of a detailed plan of action on the Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East contained

in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference and urges the Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, to convene and exert utmost efforts in ensuring the success of a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. While recalling that the 2010 Review Conference emphasized the importance of a process leading to full implementation of the objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, the Group stresses the importance of the full implementation of the plan of action and the active and constructive engagement by all parties concerned to allow for the success of the 2012 conference in leading to the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses deep concern over the delay in the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. While welcoming the appointment of a facilitator, Mr. Jaakko Laajava, and the designation of a host Government, Finland, for the 2012 conference, to be attended by all States of the Middle East on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, the Group calls on the facilitator to accelerate consultations with all capitals in the region and to exert maximum efforts with a view to convening the conference at the earliest possible date in 2012.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern that no progress has been achieved with regard to Israel's accession to the Treaty, and placing all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, and over the delay in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, all of which are objectives and priorities that were stressed in Review Conferences of the Treaty in 1995, 2000 and 2010.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms once again its determination to extend fullest cooperation and to exert utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines that the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on the Middle East by devoting sufficient time within the indicative timetable and giving all speakers the full opportunity to thereby engage in a substantive debate. The Group further recalls that the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences stipulated that all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, should report through the Secretariat to the President of the Review Conference, as well as the Chairs of its Preparatory Committee meetings, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement

of such a zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. The Group further recalls that the 2010 Review Conference requested the facilitator to report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 16) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty accordingly emphasizes the importance of submitting required reports by all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, as well as the facilitator of the 2012 conference. It is essential that the successive sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference conduct substantive discussions on the above-mentioned reports and evaluate the fulfilment of the commitments on the Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, as contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted by consensus at the 2010 Review Conference.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 17) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty requests the establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the 2015 Review Conference to assess the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and reaffirmed by the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, as well as the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 19) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that, as clearly stipulated by the 2010 Review Conference, the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction shall be convened in the year 2012, and that any delay will seriously jeopardize the overall implementation of the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions and will represent a major setback in this regard. The Group underscores that the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and the convening of a successful 2012 conference are integral and essential parts of the implementation of the consensus conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 20) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes the mandated responsibility of the Secretary-General and the commitments and special responsibility of the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution regarding the convening of the 2012 conference, and accordingly calls upon them to accelerate their efforts to ensure the convening of a successful conference in the year 2012. Furthermore, the Group calls upon the facilitator to exert maximum efforts for more intensive and regular consultations and coordination with all States of the region on all aspects of the 2012 conference, starting well in advance of its convening.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 21) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States, in particular the obligations and commitments

	<p>of the three depositary States of the Treaty that co-sponsored the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, to implement the Resolution. Moreover, the Group considers the implementation of the practical steps adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Middle East as a collective responsibility, since the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference clearly stipulated that the States parties renew their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at its prompt implementation, and also underlined the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 22) While reaffirming the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty is of the view that the 2012 conference should lead, without further delay, to the universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East and the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.</p>
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Security Assurances	
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<p>Nuclear-Weapon States Role</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.22, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference is mandated and tasked, in fulfilment of the 1995 and 2000 decisions on the strengthened review process, to undertake the following: (a) Consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2 as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences, including developments affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty; (b) At its third and, as appropriate, fourth session, the Preparatory Committee, taking into account the deliberations and results of its previous sessions, should make every effort to produce a consensus report containing recommendations to the Review Conference; (c) The States parties agreed that the procedural arrangements for the Review Conference should be finalized at the previous session of the Preparatory Committee; (d) As legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the Preparatory Committee should make recommendations to the 2015 Review Conference on this issue; (e) The establishment of such subsidiary bodies would be recommended by the Preparatory Committee for each Review Conference in relation to the specific objectives of the Review Conference.</p>
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(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.23, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and accordingly believes that the 2015 Review Conference of the Treaty should also substantially focus on this issue as a matter of priority. The Group recalls that the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty reaffirmed and recognized the legitimate interest of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances from the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Group is of the firm belief that receiving such security assurances is a legitimate right and in the security interest of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.23, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that it is the legitimate right of all States parties to the Treaty that have given up the nuclear-weapon option to receive effective and unconditional legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In this regard, while noting the unilateral statements by each of the nuclear-weapon States, in which they give very limited, conditional and insufficient “security assurances” against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, the Group expresses its concern over the continued insufficiency of such assurances.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.23, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Accordingly, the Group is of the view that pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as the only absolute guarantee against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States shall refrain from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. The Group reiterates that efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority and should be materialized without further delay.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.23, Para 6) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while noting the lack of progress since the establishment in 1998 of an ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate universal, unconditional and legally binding security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, expresses concern that despite long-standing requests by non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive such legally binding assurances, no tangible progress has been achieved in this regard. In this connection, the Group calls for the

commencement, without any further delay, of the negotiation for a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on irrevocable and non-discriminatory negative security assurances, believing that such assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty would fulfil the undertaking to the States that have voluntarily given up the nuclear-weapons option by becoming parties to the Treaty. The Group further believes that legally binding security assurances within the context of the Treaty would provide an essential benefit to the States parties to the Treaty and to the credibility of the Treaty regime. The Group also is of the view that pending the conclusion of unconditional and multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances for all non-nuclear-weapon States, all nuclear-weapon States shall fully respect their existing commitments with regard to security assurances and shall extend these to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.23, Para 7) In keeping with the above-mentioned position and in accordance with the decision at the 2000 Review Conference, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances for further work to consider legally binding negative security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that the improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient statements on security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States and violate their commitments undertaken at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 5) The Group reiterates that, in the context of the nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is essential that the nuclear-weapon States provide unconditional, non-discriminatory and specific legal assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the zone concerned. In this regard, the Group strongly calls for the withdrawal of any related reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of such treaties. The Group further calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations with a view to achieving the objectives of the treaties to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and their protocols.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 3) The Group remains deeply concerned by strategic defence doctrines of the nuclear-weapon States that set out the rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the recent posture review by one of the nuclear-weapon States to consider expanding the circumstances in which these weapons could be used.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 4) The Group also remains deeply concerned at the strategic concept for the defence and security

	<p>of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which justifies the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and maintains unjustifiable concepts of international security based on promoting and developing military alliances and nuclear deterrence policies.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 23) The Group further reaffirms that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty should be effectively assured by the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons through the urgent conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 24) The Group reaffirms that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 25) In this regard, the Group recalls the advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons that there is in neither customary nor conventional international law any specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons and that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 26) Accordingly, the Group is of the view that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States must seriously refrain, under any circumstances, from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. In the view of the Group, any such use or threat of use would be in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular international humanitarian law. The Group further believes that the mere possession of nuclear weapons is inconsistent with the principles of international humanitarian law. In this regard, the Group strongly calls upon all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to exclude completely the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from their military doctrines.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Legally-Binding International Convention or Instrument</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.22, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference is mandated and tasked, in fulfilment of the 1995 and 2000 decisions on the strengthened review process, to undertake the following: (a) Consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2 as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences, including developments affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty; (b) At its third and,</p>

as appropriate, fourth session, the Preparatory Committee, taking into account the deliberations and results of its previous sessions, should make every effort to produce a consensus report containing recommendations to the Review Conference; (c) The States parties agreed that the procedural arrangements for the Review Conference should be finalized at the previous session of the Preparatory Committee; (d) As legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the Preparatory Committee should make recommendations to the 2015 Review Conference on this issue; (e) The establishment of such subsidiary bodies would be recommended by the Preparatory Committee for each Review Conference in relation to the specific objectives of the Review Conference.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.22, Para 3) In the context of the above-mentioned tasks and mandates, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for: (a) An agreement on the provisional agenda of the Preparatory Committee and 2015 Review Conference, which would include “Preparatory work for the review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII (3) of the Treaty, in particular, consideration of principles, objectives and ways to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, including specific matters of substance related to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference”, as well as the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty; (b) Recalling that the 2000 Final Document states clearly that “each session of the Preparatory Committee should consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and the Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences”, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that this Preparatory Committee should deal with all the procedural issues necessary to take its work forward as well as with matters of substance as was decided at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Conferences; (c) To this end, the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on nuclear disarmament so as to ensure that there is a proper accounting in the reports by the States of their progress in achieving nuclear disarmament. In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty wishes to recall that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference (see NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I-IV)) called for regular reports within the framework of the Treaty’s strengthened review process by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”. The Group recalls the stipulation of section B on “Disarmament of nuclear weapons”, contained in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that: “The nuclear-weapon States are called upon to report the undertakings [under that section] to the Preparatory Committee at 2014 (see

NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)). The 2015 Review Conference will take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of article VI.” In this connection, the Group expects that the States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, should submit reports to each Preparatory Committee session, including this one, unless otherwise decided by the Review Conference. In the view of the Group, the reports on article VI should cover issues and principles addressed by the 13 practical steps and undertakings under section B on “Disarmament of nuclear weapons”, in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference and should include specific and complete information on each of these steps and follow-on actions. These reports should also address, inter alia, current policies and intentions, as well as developments in these areas; (d) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also believes that the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on the Middle East by devoting sufficient time within the indicative timetable and the full opportunity for all speakers to thereby engage in a substantive debate. The Group further recalls that the 2000 Review Conference, in its Final Document, requested all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, to report through the United Nations Secretariat to the President of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, as well as the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of the Conference, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. The Group expects that all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, would submit reports in this regard as agreed in the 2000 Final Document; (e) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the stipulation of the 2010 Review Conference that “The Conference reaffirms that all States Parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and the States in the region, should continue to report on steps taken to implement the 1995 Resolution, through the United Nations Secretariat, to the President of the 2015 Review Conference, as well as to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of that Conference” and that “The facilitator will report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings”. The Group accordingly emphasizes the importance of and calls for submitting required reports by all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, as well as the facilitator of the 2012 Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, to the current and upcoming meetings of the Preparatory Committee and the 2015 Review Conference. The Group wishes to refer to its working paper on the topic “Regional issues: Middle East” which stipulates its substantive position in this regard; (f) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for an agreement to establish subsidiary bodies to the relevant Main Committees of the 2015 Review Conference to deliberate on issues related to nuclear disarmament, in particular the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons as well as the undertakings under section B on

“Disarmament of nuclear weapons”, in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference; on the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the practical steps on the Middle East, in particular implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, contained in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference; and a legally binding international instrument on unconditional security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group emphasizes the need for the Preparatory Committee meetings to continue to allocate specific time for deliberations on nuclear disarmament, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and security assurances; (g) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty furthermore calls on the Preparatory Committee and the 2015 Review Conference to: (a) Consider the further strengthening or enhancement of the review process of the Treaty; (b) Further strengthen or enhance the regular reporting mechanism provided for in accordance with the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference; (c) Consider the steps and other actions that could be taken to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education, with particular reference to the Treaty; (d) Support participation of non-governmental organizations in the Preparatory Committee and 2015 Review Conference meetings.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.23, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and accordingly believes that the 2015 Review Conference of the Treaty should also substantially focus on this issue as a matter of priority. The Group recalls that the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty reaffirmed and recognized the legitimate interest of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances from the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Group is of the firm belief that receiving such security assurances is a legitimate right and in the security interest of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.23, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that it is the legitimate right of all States parties to the Treaty that have given up the nuclear-weapon option to receive effective and unconditional legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In this regard, while noting the unilateral statements by each of the nuclear-weapon States, in which they give very limited, conditional and insufficient “security assurances” against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, the Group expresses its concern over the continued insufficiency of such assurances.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.23, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that, in accordance with the

Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Accordingly, the Group is of the view that pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as the only absolute guarantee against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States shall refrain from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. The Group reiterates that efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority and should be materialized without further delay.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.23, Para 6) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while noting the lack of progress since the establishment in 1998 of an ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate universal, unconditional and legally binding security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, expresses concern that despite long-standing requests by non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive such legally binding assurances, no tangible progress has been achieved in this regard. In this connection, the Group calls for the commencement, without any further delay, of the negotiation for a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on irrevocable and non-discriminatory negative security assurances, believing that such assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty would fulfil the undertaking to the States that have voluntarily given up the nuclear-weapons option by becoming parties to the Treaty. The Group further believes that legally binding security assurances within the context of the Treaty would provide an essential benefit to the States parties to the Treaty and to the credibility of the Treaty regime. The Group also is of the view that pending the conclusion of unconditional and multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances for all non-nuclear-weapon States, all nuclear-weapon States shall fully respect their existing commitments with regard to security assurances and shall extend these to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.23, Para 7) In keeping with the above-mentioned position and in accordance with the decision at the 2000 Review Conference, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances for further work to consider legally binding negative security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.23, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses concern over the lack of agreement on a number of its key priorities, including, inter alia, to commence negotiations on a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on irrevocable and non-discriminatory negative

	<p>security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, and expresses its determination to continue its collective efforts in pursuing the realization of the aforementioned priority in the 2015 review process of the Treaty</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 23) The Group further reaffirms that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty should be effectively assured by the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons through the urgent conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of: (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference; (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on: (i) the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites; (ii) measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development; (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies; (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention); (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones; (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.</p>
<p>NWFZs and Security Assurances</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 5) The Group reiterates that, in the context of the nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is essential that the nuclear-weapon States provide unconditional, non-discriminatory and</p>

	<p>specific legal assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the zone concerned. In this regard, the Group strongly calls for the withdrawal of any related reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of such treaties. The Group further calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations with a view to achieving the objectives of the treaties to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and their protocols.</p>
<p align="center">Security Assurances and the NPT</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.22, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference is mandated and tasked, in fulfilment of the 1995 and 2000 decisions on the strengthened review process, to undertake the following: (a) Consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2 as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences, including developments affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty; (b) At its third and, as appropriate, fourth session, the Preparatory Committee, taking into account the deliberations and results of its previous sessions, should make every effort to produce a consensus report containing recommendations to the Review Conference; (c) The States parties agreed that the procedural arrangements for the Review Conference should be finalized at the previous session of the Preparatory Committee; (d) As legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the Preparatory Committee should make recommendations to the 2015 Review Conference on this issue; (e) The establishment of such subsidiary bodies would be recommended by the Preparatory Committee for each Review Conference in relation to the specific objectives of the Review Conference.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.22, Para 3) In the context of the above-mentioned tasks and mandates, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for: (a) An agreement on the provisional agenda of the Preparatory Committee and 2015 Review Conference, which would include “Preparatory work for the review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII (3) of the Treaty, in particular, consideration of principles, objectives and ways to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, including specific matters of substance related to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference”, as well as the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty; (b) Recalling that the 2000 Final Document states clearly that “each session of the Preparatory Committee should consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and the Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences”, the</p>

Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that this Preparatory Committee should deal with all the procedural issues necessary to take its work forward as well as with matters of substance as was decided at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Conferences; (c) To this end, the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on nuclear disarmament so as to ensure that there is a proper accounting in the reports by the States of their progress in achieving nuclear disarmament. In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty wishes to recall that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference (see NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I-IV)) called for regular reports within the framework of the Treaty's strengthened review process by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament". The Group recalls the stipulation of section B on "Disarmament of nuclear weapons", contained in the "Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions" of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that: "The nuclear-weapon States are called upon to report the undertakings [under that section] to the Preparatory Committee at 2014 (see NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)). The 2015 Review Conference will take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of article VI." In this connection, the Group expects that the States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, should submit reports to each Preparatory Committee session, including this one, unless otherwise decided by the Review Conference. In the view of the Group, the reports on article VI should cover issues and principles addressed by the 13 practical steps and undertakings under section B on "Disarmament of nuclear weapons", in the "Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions" of the 2010 Review Conference and should include specific and complete information on each of these steps and follow-on actions. These reports should also address, inter alia, current policies and intentions, as well as developments in these areas; (d) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also believes that the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on the Middle East by devoting sufficient time within the indicative timetable and the full opportunity for all speakers to thereby engage in a substantive debate. The Group further recalls that the 2000 Review Conference, in its Final Document, requested all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, to report through the United Nations Secretariat to the President of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, as well as the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of the Conference, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. The Group expects that all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, would submit reports in this regard as agreed in the 2000 Final Document; (e) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the stipulation of the 2010 Review Conference that "The Conference reaffirms that all States Parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and the States in the region, should continue to report on steps taken to implement the 1995

Resolution, through the United Nations Secretariat, to the President of the 2015 Review Conference, as well as to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of that Conference” and that “The facilitator will report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings”. The Group accordingly emphasizes the importance of and calls for submitting required reports by all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, as well as the facilitator of the 2012 Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, to the current and upcoming meetings of the Preparatory Committee and the 2015 Review Conference. The Group wishes to refer to its working paper on the topic “Regional issues: Middle East” which stipulates its substantive position in this regard; (f) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for an agreement to establish subsidiary bodies to the relevant Main Committees of the 2015 Review Conference to deliberate on issues related to nuclear disarmament, in particular the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons as well as the undertakings under section B on “Disarmament of nuclear weapons”, in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference; on the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the practical steps on the Middle East, in particular implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, contained in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference; and a legally binding international instrument on unconditional security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group emphasizes the need for the Preparatory Committee meetings to continue to allocate specific time for deliberations on nuclear disarmament, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and security assurances; (g) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty furthermore calls on the Preparatory Committee and the 2015 Review Conference to: (a) Consider the further strengthening or enhancement of the review process of the Treaty; (b) Further strengthen or enhance the regular reporting mechanism provided for in accordance with the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference; (c) Consider the steps and other actions that could be taken to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education, with particular reference to the Treaty; (d) Support participation of non-governmental organizations in the Preparatory Committee and 2015 Review Conference meetings.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.23, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and accordingly believes that the 2015 Review Conference of the Treaty should also substantially focus on this issue as a matter of priority. The Group recalls that the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty reaffirmed and recognized the legitimate interest of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty in receiving unequivocal

and legally binding security assurances from the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Group is of the firm belief that receiving such security assurances is a legitimate right and in the security interest of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.23, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that it is the legitimate right of all States parties to the Treaty that have given up the nuclear-weapon option to receive effective and unconditional legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In this regard, while noting the unilateral statements by each of the nuclear-weapon States, in which they give very limited, conditional and insufficient “security assurances” against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, the Group expresses its concern over the continued insufficiency of such assurances.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.23, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Accordingly, the Group is of the view that pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as the only absolute guarantee against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States shall refrain from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. The Group reiterates that efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority and should be materialized without further delay.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.23, Para 6) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while noting the lack of progress since the establishment in 1998 of an ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate universal, unconditional and legally binding security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, expresses concern that despite long-standing requests by non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive such legally binding assurances, no tangible progress has been achieved in this regard. In this connection, the Group calls for the commencement, without any further delay, of the negotiation for a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on irrevocable and non-discriminatory negative security assurances, believing that such assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty would fulfil the undertaking to the States that have voluntarily given up the nuclear-weapons option by becoming parties to the Treaty. The Group further believes that legally binding security assurances within the context of the Treaty would provide an essential benefit to the States parties to the Treaty and to the credibility of the Treaty regime. The Group also is of the view that pending the conclusion of unconditional

and multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances for all non-nuclear-weapon States, all nuclear-weapon States shall fully respect their existing commitments with regard to security assurances and shall extend these to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.23, Para 7) In keeping with the above-mentioned position and in accordance with the decision at the 2000 Review Conference, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances for further work to consider legally binding negative security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.23, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses concern over the lack of agreement on a number of its key priorities, including, inter alia, to commence negotiations on a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on irrevocable and non-discriminatory negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, and expresses its determination to continue its collective efforts in pursuing the realization of the aforementioned priority in the 2015 review process of the Treaty

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 23) The Group further reaffirms that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty should be effectively assured by the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons through the urgent conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 26) Accordingly, the Group is of the view that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States must seriously refrain, under any circumstances, from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. In the view of the Group, any such use or threat of use would be in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular international humanitarian law. The Group further believes that the mere possession of nuclear weapons is inconsistent with the principles of international humanitarian law. In this regard, the Group strongly calls upon all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to exclude completely the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from their military doctrines.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:
(a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference; (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on: (i) the

	<p>cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites; (ii) measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development; (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies; (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention); (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones; (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.</p>
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<p>Country Specific</p>	
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<p>United States</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.23, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that, in successive conferences of heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries and the ministerial conferences of the Non-Aligned Movement, it has been reiterated that improvements in existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, as envisaged in the Nuclear Posture Review of the United States of America, contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient unilateral statements made by each of the nuclear-weapon States. They have further reaffirmed that these improvements and the development of new types of such weapons violate the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 16) In this connection, the Group, while noting the conclusion and entry into force of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic</p>
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	<p>Offensive Arms (New START), confirms the validity of its position delivered at the time of the adoption of General Assembly resolution 65/61 on bilateral reductions of strategic nuclear arms and the new framework for strategic relations. The Group further expresses concern that domestic commitments to nuclear weapon modernization in exchange for ratification of this treaty undermine the minimal reductions agreed upon therein.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 17) The Group also stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status are no substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons, and accordingly calls upon the Russian Federation and the United States to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability to such cuts and to further reduce their nuclear arsenals, both warheads and delivery systems, thus contributing to the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations and facilitating the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest date. The Group also recalls the commitment by the Russian Federation and the United States under action 4 of the action plan to the full implementation of New START and strongly urges them to adopt all required measures to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 18) The Group believes that the abrogation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group remains concerned that the deployment of national and strategic missile defence systems could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 66/27, the Group emphasizes the urgent need to begin substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Russia</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 16) In this connection, the Group, while noting the conclusion and entry into force of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START), confirms the validity of its position delivered at the time of the adoption of General Assembly resolution 65/61 on bilateral reductions of strategic nuclear arms and the new framework for strategic relations. The Group further expresses concern that domestic commitments to nuclear weapon modernization in exchange for ratification of this treaty undermine the minimal reductions agreed upon therein.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 17) The Group also stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status are no substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons, and accordingly calls upon the Russian Federation and the</p>

	<p>United States to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability to such cuts and to further reduce their nuclear arsenals, both warheads and delivery systems, thus contributing to the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations and facilitating the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest date. The Group also recalls the commitment by the Russian Federation and the United States under action 4 of the action plan to the full implementation of New START and strongly urges them to adopt all required measures to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Israel</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which reaffirmed the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty. The Group recalls that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel’s accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further recalls that the 2010 Review Conference, by taking note of the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, recalled the reaffirmation by the 2000 Review Conference of the importance of Israel’s accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The Conference also reaffirmed the urgency and importance of achieving universality of the Treaty and called on all States in the Middle East that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States so as to achieve its universality at an early date.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern that no progress has been achieved with regard to Israel’s accession to the Treaty, and placing all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, and over the delay in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, all of which are objectives and priorities that were stressed in Review Conferences of the Treaty in 1995, 2000 and 2010.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty remains gravely concerned by the statement made by the then Prime Minister of Israel on 11 December 2006, in which he publicly admitted the possession of nuclear weapons by Israel. In this regard, the Group reaffirms the continued validity of the statement of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement on this subject as contained in document NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/19.</p>

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further expresses great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by Israel, which pose a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States, and condemns Israel for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals. The Group also reaffirms that stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are maintained, particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allows one party to threaten its neighbours and the region, and constitutes a threat to international peace and security.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty demands that Israel, the only country in the region that has neither joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons nor declared its intention to do so, renounce possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the Treaty without any precondition or further delay as a non-nuclear-weapon State, place promptly all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and conduct all its nuclear-related activities in full conformity with the non-proliferation regime, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty, in particular in the Middle East.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that the nuclear-weapon States, in conformity with their legal obligations under article I of the Treaty, shall solemnly undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly to Israel, and further undertake not, in any way, to assist, encourage or induce Israel to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices under any circumstances whatsoever.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, in conformity with the Treaty, hereby declares its commitment to the effective prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer, by any State, of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear-related scientific or technological fields to Israel. In this regard, the Group expresses its serious concern over Israeli scientists' continued access to the nuclear facilities of one nuclear-weapon State, which has potentially serious negative implications on the security of the region as well as the reliability of the global non-proliferation regime.

	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 18) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the establishment of a standing committee comprising members of the Bureau of the 2015 Review Conference to follow up intersessionally on the implementation of the recommendations by the Review Conference concerning Israel’s prompt accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, and to report to the 2020 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee.</p>
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<p>Non-Proliferation Treaty Related</p>	
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<p>Disarmament Through the NPT</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.22, Para 3) In the context of the above-mentioned tasks and mandates, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for: (a) An agreement on the provisional agenda of the Preparatory Committee and 2015 Review Conference, which would include “Preparatory work for the review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII (3) of the Treaty, in particular, consideration of principles, objectives and ways to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, including specific matters of substance related to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference”, as well as the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty; (b) Recalling that the 2000 Final Document states clearly that “each session of the Preparatory Committee should consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and the Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences”, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that this Preparatory Committee should deal with all the procedural issues necessary to take its work forward as well as with matters of substance as was decided at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Conferences; (c) To this end, the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on nuclear disarmament so as to ensure that there is a proper accounting in the reports by the States of their progress in achieving nuclear disarmament. In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty wishes to recall that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference (see NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I-IV)) called for regular reports within the framework of the Treaty’s strengthened review process by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”. The Group recalls the stipulation of section B on “Disarmament of nuclear weapons”, contained in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that: “The nuclear-weapon States are called upon to report the undertakings [under that section] to the Preparatory Committee at 2014 (see</p>
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NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)). The 2015 Review Conference will take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of article VI.” In this connection, the Group expects that the States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, should submit reports to each Preparatory Committee session, including this one, unless otherwise decided by the Review Conference. In the view of the Group, the reports on article VI should cover issues and principles addressed by the 13 practical steps and undertakings under section B on “Disarmament of nuclear weapons”, in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference and should include specific and complete information on each of these steps and follow-on actions. These reports should also address, inter alia, current policies and intentions, as well as developments in these areas; (d) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also believes that the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on the Middle East by devoting sufficient time within the indicative timetable and the full opportunity for all speakers to thereby engage in a substantive debate. The Group further recalls that the 2000 Review Conference, in its Final Document, requested all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, to report through the United Nations Secretariat to the President of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, as well as the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of the Conference, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. The Group expects that all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, would submit reports in this regard as agreed in the 2000 Final Document; (e) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the stipulation of the 2010 Review Conference that “The Conference reaffirms that all States Parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and the States in the region, should continue to report on steps taken to implement the 1995 Resolution, through the United Nations Secretariat, to the President of the 2015 Review Conference, as well as to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of that Conference” and that “The facilitator will report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings”. The Group accordingly emphasizes the importance of and calls for submitting required reports by all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, as well as the facilitator of the 2012 Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, to the current and upcoming meetings of the Preparatory Committee and the 2015 Review Conference. The Group wishes to refer to its working paper on the topic “Regional issues: Middle East” which stipulates its substantive position in this regard; (f) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for an agreement to establish subsidiary bodies to the relevant Main Committees of the 2015 Review Conference to deliberate on issues related to nuclear disarmament, in particular the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons as well as the undertakings under section B on

“Disarmament of nuclear weapons”, in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference; on the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the practical steps on the Middle East, in particular implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, contained in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference; and a legally binding international instrument on unconditional security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group emphasizes the need for the Preparatory Committee meetings to continue to allocate specific time for deliberations on nuclear disarmament, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and security assurances; (g) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty furthermore calls on the Preparatory Committee and the 2015 Review Conference to: (a) Consider the further strengthening or enhancement of the review process of the Treaty; (b) Further strengthen or enhance the regular reporting mechanism provided for in accordance with the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference; (c) Consider the steps and other actions that could be taken to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education, with particular reference to the Treaty; (d) Support participation of non-governmental organizations in the Preparatory Committee and 2015 Review Conference meetings.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.23, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals and considers, in that regard, that any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 21) In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores the strong call by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that all States parties shall ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated particularly in its articles I, II and III, and with the decision on the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the only way to rid the world of the threat or use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination. In this regard, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a practical step on the road to nuclear disarmament and, therefore, cannot substitute for the objective of complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by all the nuclear-weapon States, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Group reiterates that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to nuclear disarmament, would be essential.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, not only because they are among the 44 States listed in annex 2 to the Treaty, but also because, on account of their position, they are expected to lead in making the ban on tests a reality. It will be possible to determine the success of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty only when it has been signed and ratified, in particular by the five nuclear-weapon States and those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. The Group is of the firm belief that the early achievement of the goal of the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, through accession of the only non-parties to this instrument, would be essential to achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation, thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear devices, as well as nuclear weapons based on new physical principles. The nuclear-weapon States stated at that time that the only steps to be followed would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons, which would not involve nuclear explosions. In that regard, the Group calls upon those States to continue to refrain from conducting nuclear-test explosions for the modernization, development or further improvement of nuclear weapons. The Group wishes to re-emphasize the principles of the non-proliferation regime, both vertically and horizontally.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the modernization or development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the assurances given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, States should refrain from any actions contrary to its objectives and purpose. In this context, the Group is seriously concerned by the decision of a nuclear-weapon State to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear testing to 18 months as a setback to the 2000 Review Conference agreements. It is the view of

the Group that such decisions undermine the validity of the commitment to declared moratoriums as well as the commitments under the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has been envisaged as the first of 13 practical steps leading to nuclear disarmament. The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty also remains a cause for concern.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons expresses its strong concern at the growing resort to unilateralism and unilaterally imposed prescriptions and, in this context, strongly underlines and affirms that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues. In this regard, the Group underlines that the multilateral mechanism established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the most appropriate way to address verification and safeguards issues. At the same time, the Group emphasizes that the work of the Agency with regard to safeguards and verification has to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of its statute and safeguards agreements.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls on all States not parties to the Treaty to accede, without any further delay and any preconditions and as non-nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group proposes that the nuclear-weapon States undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to providing baseline data for future disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not parties to the Treaty, without exception.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly believes that, in implementing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, those States shall undertake further efforts to verifiably reduce and eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, as well as their nuclear weapon-related materials, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. In this regard, the Group supports furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide nuclear disarmament and the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the

irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives devices.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)), which, by its action 16, stipulates that the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to commit to declare, as appropriate, to IAEA all fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes and to place such material as soon as practicable under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes. The Group calls on the Conference to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the fulfilment of these commitments through the establishment of a mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the action, which should be made mandatory for the nuclear-weapon States.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further recalls action 17, which stipulates that, in the context of action 16, all States are encouraged to support the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military purposes. The Group urges the Conference to examine such legally binding verification arrangements and the means to make them operational, in the aim of ensuring the realization of that objective.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for the establishment by the Review Conference of a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreement.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be a contribution towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The Group is, however, of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is not a substitute for the legal obligations of and unequivocal undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 2) The Group welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones worldwide and calls for cooperation and broad consultation in order for the States of the regions concerned to freely arrive at such agreements. In this regard, the Group continues to consider the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), Rarotonga (South

Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), Bangkok (Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone), Pelindaba (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty) and Semipalatinsk (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia) to be a positive step and important measure towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 3) In this regard, the Group strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and calls for the full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, which is an integral and essential part of the package of decisions reached without a vote that enabled the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995. In the Group's view, the resolution remains valid until its objectives are achieved.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emphasizes that the Treaty is an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and a key instrument in the efforts to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 5) The Group underlines that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 6) The Group reiterates its strong call for the full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking given by the nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, which was also reaffirmed by the 2010 Review Conference. That undertaking should be demonstrated without further delay through an accelerated process of negotiations and the full implementation of the 13 practical steps to advance systematically and progressively towards a nuclear-weapon-free world as agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference, and in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference, which reaffirmed the continued validity of that undertaking.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 7) The Group recalls that, in pursuit of the full, effective and urgent implementation of article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", and building upon the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, the 2010 Review Conference agreed on an action plan on nuclear disarmament that includes concrete steps for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the Group strongly calls for the prompt and full implementation of that action plan.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 8) The Group recalls that, in implementing their unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the nuclear-weapon States have committed themselves to undertaking further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. In this regard, the Group calls for full compliance by the nuclear-weapon States with such undertakings.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 9) In this connection, the Group emphasizes in particular the prime importance of and the urgent need for full and prompt implementation of the commitments by the nuclear-weapon States under action 5 of the action plan. In this context, the Group further recalls that the nuclear-weapon States committed themselves to accelerating concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, inter alia, by: (a) rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons; (b) addressing the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process; (c) further diminishing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies; (d) discussing policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons; (e) considering the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security; (f) reducing the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and (g) further enhancing transparency and increasing mutual confidence.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 10) Moreover, the Group calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to submit comprehensive substantive reports about their undertakings under action 5 of the action plan to the Preparatory Committee in 2014, in order to enable the 2015 Review Conference to take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of article VI of the Treaty in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 11) The Group expresses deep concern at the continued lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, which could undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty. The Group also deeply regrets the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. The negotiation of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame, including a nuclear weapons convention, is necessary and should begin without further delay. In that regard, the Group reiterates its call to establish, as soon as possible and as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, and recalls action 6 of the action plan, in which all States agreed that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear

disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 14) The Group reconfirms that negotiations on a fissile material treaty should be conducted on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (see CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein (known as the “Shannon mandate”), taking into account nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, in addition to all related issues, including the past production and existing stockpiles of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Group expresses concern over the attempts to limit the scope of the negotiations on a fissile material treaty as contained in the Shannon mandate, which was endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences. In this regard, the Group recognizes that non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have already agreed to a legally binding commitment not to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 15) The Group remains deeply concerned by the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons, some reports of bilateral and unilateral reductions notwithstanding. Any such reductions are undermined by the modernization of nuclear weapons, their delivery systems and related infrastructure by the nuclear-weapon States. To comply with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, and with their commitments under the 13 practical steps and the 2010 action plan, the nuclear-weapon States must immediately cease their plans to further invest in modernizing, upgrading, refurbishing or extending the lives of their nuclear weapons and related facilities. The Group is also concerned by the existence and continued deployment of tens of thousands of such weapons, the exact number of which remains unconfirmed owing to the lack of transparency in various nuclear weapons programmes.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 16) In this connection, the Group, while noting the conclusion and entry into force of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START), confirms the validity of its position delivered at the time of the adoption of General Assembly resolution 65/61 on bilateral reductions of strategic nuclear arms and the new framework for strategic relations. The Group further expresses concern that domestic commitments to nuclear weapon modernization in exchange for ratification of this treaty undermine the minimal reductions agreed upon therein.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 17) The Group also stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status are no substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons, and accordingly calls upon the Russian Federation and the United States to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability to such cuts and to further reduce their nuclear arsenals,

both warheads and delivery systems, thus contributing to the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations and facilitating the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest date. The Group also recalls the commitment by the Russian Federation and the United States under action 4 of the action plan to the full implementation of New START and strongly urges them to adopt all required measures to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 19) The Group also believes that the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes and the lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies further undermine disarmament commitments.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 22) The Group emphasizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals and, in that regard, considers that any such assumption is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 27) The Group reaffirms the validity of its working paper on the elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons submitted to the 2010 Review Conference (see NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, reproduced in the annex to the present working paper). The Group is determined to integrate this plan of action into the outcome document of the 2015 review process of the Treaty, and strongly calls for this to be done. In this regard, the Group calls for the speedy and full implementation by the nuclear-weapon States of all the measures contained in the plan of action in accordance with the proposed timeline and at a pace that makes up for the time elapsed.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 28) The Group reiterates its call for the establishment, as a matter of priority, in Main Committee I of a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament mandated to focus on the issue of fulfilment of the obligations under article VI of the Treaty and on further practical measures required to achieve progress in that regard.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 29) The Group notes with concern the lack of agreement on a number of its key priorities, including beginning negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention, and expresses its determination to continue collective efforts in pursuing the realization of those priorities in the 2015 review process of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A1) Although there have been some positive signals and developments in the area of nuclear disarmament, the world is still faced with unresolved challenges. The recent statements by some nuclear-weapon States about their intention

to pursue actions in achieving a world free of nuclear weapons are positive. However, urgent and concrete actions by the nuclear-weapon States in accordance with their multilaterally agreed commitments to achieve general and complete disarmament remain essential. Unless the role of nuclear weapons in the context of security is delegitimized and existing nuclear doctrines are abandoned, there will always be a threat of a nuclear arms race and an escalation of nuclear threats. The total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A2) To achieve the total elimination of their nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States need to implement the unequivocal undertaking agreed upon in 2000. The 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI should be fully implemented in accordance with the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility. The nuclear-weapon States should be urged to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of their nuclear weapons within a specified time framework, including a nuclear weapons convention. It should also be recalled that there is a unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice regarding the obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A3) The Non-Aligned Movement proposes a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame that includes the following concrete steps and measures, as a basis for consideration by the Review Conference. The list of measures in each phase is indicative rather than exhaustive, and the order in which they are mentioned does not necessarily reflect their priority. Nevertheless, it should be understood that, in any nuclear disarmament programme, all steps and measures are inextricably linked.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:

- (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference;
- (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on:
 - (i) the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites;
 - (ii) measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development;
- (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies;
- (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear

weapons; (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention); (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones; (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A5) Full implementation by the nuclear-weapon States of their disarmament obligations and commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including those agreed at the 2000 Review Conference; acceleration of the negotiation process, in accordance with article VI, and implementation of the 13 practical steps.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A6) Conclusion of negotiations on further reductions of nuclear arsenals (START).

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A7) Moratorium on the production of fissile materials, pending conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A8) Placement of nuclear fissile material transferred from military to peaceful uses by nuclear-weapon States under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A9) Formal declaration of the decade 2010-2020 as the “Decade for nuclear disarmament” and realization of its objectives.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A10) Entry into force of the treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons and the establishment of a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance, including such measures as the: (a) Separation of nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles; (b) Placement of nuclear warheads in secure storage under international supervision, pending the removal of special nuclear materials from those warheads; (c) Transfer of nuclear materials, including fissile materials and delivery vehicles, to “peaceful purposes”.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A11) Preparation, under international auspices, of an inventory of nuclear arsenals, including fissile materials, nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A12) Progressive and balanced reduction of missiles intended for carrying nuclear warheads.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A13) Recommendation by the 2020 Review Conference to declare 2020 as the “Decade for the total elimination of nuclear weapons”.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A14) Full implementation of the treaty to eliminate all nuclear weapons and of its verification regime through the: (a) Elimination of all nuclear weapons; (b) Conversion of all facilities for the production of nuclear weapons to “peaceful purposes”; (c) Placement of nuclear facilities under safeguards, on a universal basis.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be a contribution towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. However, the Group is of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones does not substitute legal obligations and unequivocal undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The Group further welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and, in this regard, strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern that no progress has been achieved with regard to Israel’s accession to the Treaty, and placing all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, and over the delay in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, all of which are objectives and priorities that were stressed in Review Conferences of the Treaty in 1995, 2000 and 2010.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines that the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on the Middle East by devoting sufficient time within the indicative timetable and giving all speakers the full opportunity to thereby engage in a substantive debate. The Group further recalls that the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences stipulated that all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, should report through the Secretariat to the President of the Review Conference, as well as the Chairs of its Preparatory Committee meetings, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such a zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the

1995 Resolution on the Middle East. The Group further recalls that the 2010 Review Conference requested the facilitator to report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 16) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty accordingly emphasizes the importance of submitting required reports by all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, as well as the facilitator of the 2012 conference. It is essential that the successive sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference conduct substantive discussions on the above-mentioned reports and evaluate the fulfilment of the commitments on the Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, as contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted by consensus at the 2010 Review Conference.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 17) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty requests the establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the 2015 Review Conference to assess the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and reaffirmed by the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, as well as the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 19) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that, as clearly stipulated by the 2010 Review Conference, the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction shall be convened in the year 2012, and that any delay will seriously jeopardize the overall implementation of the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions and will represent a major setback in this regard. The Group underscores that the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and the convening of a successful 2012 conference are integral and essential parts of the implementation of the consensus conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 21) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States, in particular the obligations and commitments of the three depositary States of the Treaty that co-sponsored the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, to implement the Resolution. Moreover, the Group considers the implementation of the practical steps adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Middle East as a collective responsibility, since the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference clearly stipulated that the States parties renew their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at its prompt implementation, and also underlined the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 22) While reaffirming the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty is of the view that the 2012 conference should lead, without further delay, to the universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East and the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.</p>
<p>1995 Review and Extension of the NPT</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.22, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reiterates its commitment to article VIII (3) of the Treaty, as well as the consensus reached at the 2000 Review Conference on improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process of the Treaty, including the stipulation (see NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Vol. I, Part I)) that: “The States Parties, recalling paragraph 4 of Decision 1 of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, agreed that the purpose of the first two sessions of the Preparatory Committee would be to ‘consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality’. To this end, each session of the Preparatory Committee should consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences, including developments affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty.”</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.22, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference is mandated and tasked, in fulfilment of the 1995 and 2000 decisions on the strengthened review process, to undertake the following: (a) Consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2 as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences, including developments affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty; (b) At its third and, as appropriate, fourth session, the Preparatory Committee, taking into account the deliberations and results of its previous sessions, should make every effort to produce a consensus report containing recommendations to the Review Conference; (c) The States parties agreed that the procedural arrangements for the Review Conference should be finalized at the previous session of the Preparatory Committee; (d) As legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the Preparatory Committee should make recommendations to the 2015 Review Conference on this issue; (e) The establishment of such subsidiary bodies would be recommended by the Preparatory Committee for each Review</p>

Conference in relation to the specific objectives of the Review Conference.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.22, Para 3) In the context of the above-mentioned tasks and mandates, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for: (a) An agreement on the provisional agenda of the Preparatory Committee and 2015 Review Conference, which would include “Preparatory work for the review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII (3) of the Treaty, in particular, consideration of principles, objectives and ways to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, including specific matters of substance related to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference”, as well as the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty; (b) Recalling that the 2000 Final Document states clearly that “each session of the Preparatory Committee should consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and the Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences”, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that this Preparatory Committee should deal with all the procedural issues necessary to take its work forward as well as with matters of substance as was decided at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Conferences; (c) To this end, the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on nuclear disarmament so as to ensure that there is a proper accounting in the reports by the States of their progress in achieving nuclear disarmament. In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty wishes to recall that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference (see NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I-IV)) called for regular reports within the framework of the Treaty’s strengthened review process by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”. The Group recalls the stipulation of section B on “Disarmament of nuclear weapons”, contained in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that: “The nuclear-weapon States are called upon to report the undertakings [under that section] to the Preparatory Committee at 2014 (see NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)). The 2015 Review Conference will take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of article VI.” In this connection, the Group expects that the States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, should submit reports to each Preparatory Committee session, including this one, unless otherwise decided by the Review Conference. In the view of the Group, the reports on article VI should cover issues and principles addressed by the 13 practical steps and undertakings under section B on “Disarmament of nuclear weapons”, in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference and should include specific and complete information on each of these steps and follow-on actions. These reports should also address, inter alia, current policies and intentions, as well as

developments in these areas; (d) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also believes that the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on the Middle East by devoting sufficient time within the indicative timetable and the full opportunity for all speakers to thereby engage in a substantive debate. The Group further recalls that the 2000 Review Conference, in its Final Document, requested all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, to report through the United Nations Secretariat to the President of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, as well as the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of the Conference, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. The Group expects that all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, would submit reports in this regard as agreed in the 2000 Final Document; (e) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the stipulation of the 2010 Review Conference that “The Conference reaffirms that all States Parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and the States in the region, should continue to report on steps taken to implement the 1995 Resolution, through the United Nations Secretariat, to the President of the 2015 Review Conference, as well as to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of that Conference” and that “The facilitator will report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings”. The Group accordingly emphasizes the importance of and calls for submitting required reports by all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, as well as the facilitator of the 2012 Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, to the current and upcoming meetings of the Preparatory Committee and the 2015 Review Conference. The Group wishes to refer to its working paper on the topic “Regional issues: Middle East” which stipulates its substantive position in this regard; (f) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for an agreement to establish subsidiary bodies to the relevant Main Committees of the 2015 Review Conference to deliberate on issues related to nuclear disarmament, in particular the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons as well as the undertakings under section B on “Disarmament of nuclear weapons”, in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference; on the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the practical steps on the Middle East, in particular implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, contained in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference; and a legally binding international instrument on unconditional security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group emphasizes the need for the Preparatory Committee meetings to continue to allocate specific time for deliberations on nuclear disarmament, the peaceful uses of nuclear

energy, the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and security assurances; (g) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty furthermore calls on the Preparatory Committee and the 2015 Review Conference to: (a) Consider the further strengthening or enhancement of the review process of the Treaty; (b) Further strengthen or enhance the regular reporting mechanism provided for in accordance with the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference; (c) Consider the steps and other actions that could be taken to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education, with particular reference to the Treaty; (d) Support participation of non-governmental organizations in the Preparatory Committee and 2015 Review Conference meetings.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.23, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals and considers, in that regard, that any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 21) In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores the strong call by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that all States parties shall ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated particularly in its articles I, II and III, and with the decision on the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 3) In this regard, the Group strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and calls for the full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, which is an integral and essential part of the package of decisions reached without a vote that enabled the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995. In the Group's view, the resolution remains valid until its objectives are achieved.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 7) The Group recalls that, in pursuit of the full, effective and urgent implementation of article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", and building upon the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, the 2010 Review Conference agreed on an action plan on nuclear disarmament that includes concrete steps for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the Group strongly calls for the prompt and full implementation of that action plan.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 14) The Group reconfirms that negotiations on a fissile material treaty should be conducted on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (see CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein (known as the “Shannon mandate”), taking into account nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, in addition to all related issues, including the past production and existing stockpiles of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Group expresses concern over the attempts to limit the scope of the negotiations on a fissile material treaty as contained in the Shannon mandate, which was endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences. In this regard, the Group recognizes that non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have already agreed to a legally binding commitment not to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 22) The Group emphasizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals and, in that regard, considers that any such assumption is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:

- (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference;
- (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on: (i) the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites; (ii) measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development;
- (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies;
- (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention);
- (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones;
- (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in

the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which reaffirmed the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty. The Group recalls that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines furthermore that the 2010 Review Conference also reaffirmed the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recalled the affirmation of its goals and objectives by the 2000 Review Conference. The Conference also stressed that the Resolution remains valid until the goals and objectives are achieved, and that the Resolution is an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995. The Group recalls also that at the Conference, States parties renewed their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at its prompt implementation.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further recalls that the 2010 Review Conference, by taking note of the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, recalled the reaffirmation by the 2000 Review Conference of the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The Conference also reaffirmed the urgency and importance of achieving universality of the Treaty and called on all States in the Middle East that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States so as to achieve its universality at an early date.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 5) In this context, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty welcomes the adoption by consensus of a detailed plan of action on the Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference and urges the Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the

region, to convene and exert utmost efforts in ensuring the success of a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. While recalling that the 2010 Review Conference emphasized the importance of a process leading to full implementation of the objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, the Group stresses the importance of the full implementation of the plan of action and the active and constructive engagement by all parties concerned to allow for the success of the 2012 conference in leading to the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses deep concern over the delay in the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. While welcoming the appointment of a facilitator, Mr. Jaakko Laajava, and the designation of a host Government, Finland, for the 2012 conference, to be attended by all States of the Middle East on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, the Group calls on the facilitator to accelerate consultations with all capitals in the region and to exert maximum efforts with a view to convening the conference at the earliest possible date in 2012.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern that no progress has been achieved with regard to Israel's accession to the Treaty, and placing all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, and over the delay in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, all of which are objectives and priorities that were stressed in Review Conferences of the Treaty in 1995, 2000 and 2010.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines that the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on the Middle East by devoting sufficient time within the indicative timetable and giving all speakers the full opportunity to thereby engage in a substantive debate. The Group further recalls that the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences stipulated that all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, should report through the Secretariat to the President of the Review Conference, as well as the Chairs of its Preparatory Committee meetings, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such a zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. The Group further recalls that the 2010 Review Conference requested the facilitator to report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 16) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty accordingly emphasizes the importance of submitting required reports by all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, as well as the

facilitator of the 2012 conference. It is essential that the successive sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference conduct substantive discussions on the above-mentioned reports and evaluate the fulfilment of the commitments on the Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, as contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted by consensus at the 2010 Review Conference.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 17) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty requests the establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the 2015 Review Conference to assess the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and reaffirmed by the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, as well as the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 19) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that, as clearly stipulated by the 2010 Review Conference, the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction shall be convened in the year 2012, and that any delay will seriously jeopardize the overall implementation of the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions and will represent a major setback in this regard. The Group underscores that the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and the convening of a successful 2012 conference are integral and essential parts of the implementation of the consensus conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 20) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes the mandated responsibility of the Secretary-General and the commitments and special responsibility of the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution regarding the convening of the 2012 conference, and accordingly calls upon them to accelerate their efforts to ensure the convening of a successful conference in the year 2012. Furthermore, the Group calls upon the facilitator to exert maximum efforts for more intensive and regular consultations and coordination with all States of the region on all aspects of the 2012 conference, starting well in advance of its convening.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 21) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States, in particular the obligations and commitments of the three depositary States of the Treaty that co-sponsored the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, to implement the Resolution. Moreover, the Group considers the implementation of the practical steps adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Middle East as a collective responsibility, since the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference clearly stipulated that the States parties renew their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at its prompt implementation, and also underlined the reaffirmation at the 2010

	<p>Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.</p>
<p>Access to Technology and Technology Transfer</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emphasizes once more that promoting international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the realization of the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the Treaty, as stipulated in its article IV, constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. The Group strongly calls upon all States parties to the Treaty to fully respect this inalienable right and underscores that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting this right.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms the importance of the right of States parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and their right to cooperation among themselves, in particular in the technological field, in contributing alone or with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty firmly believes that the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of article IV of the Treaty plays a crucial role in achieving the object and purpose of the Treaty. In this regard, the Group also firmly believes that any measure aiming at hampering, fully or partly, the fullest exercise of these inalienable rights, would seriously jeopardize the delicate balance between rights and obligations of States parties, in contravention with the Treaty’s object and purpose and would widen the gap between developed and developing countries in this field.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also stipulates the right of member States to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes and to promote socio-economic development by way of technical cooperation and the production of electrical power, with due consideration for the needs of developing countries. To ensure the realization of these goals, all States parties, particularly developed States, shall extend their assistance, as requested by States parties that are States members of IAEA, in the provision of nuclear equipment, material, technology and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes, with a view to achieving the maximum benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities for peaceful purposes.</p>

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 5) In this connection, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recognizes the major and important role of IAEA in assisting States parties, particularly developing States, in planning for and using nuclear science and technology. The Group stresses the importance of nuclear knowledge-sharing and the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries to sustain and further enhance their scientific and technological capabilities, thereby also contributing to their socio-economic development. Moreover, the Group underlines that the activities of IAEA in the field of technical cooperation, nuclear power and non-power applications contribute in an important way to meeting energy needs, improving human health, including the application of nuclear technology in cancer therapy, combating poverty, protecting the environment, developing agriculture, managing the use of water resources and optimizing industrial processes, and that these activities, as well as bilateral and other multilateral cooperation, contribute to achieving the objectives set forth in article IV of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, as the main vehicle for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, should continue to be formulated and implemented in accordance with the statute of IAEA and the agreed guiding principles as contained in INFCIRC/267, as well as the decisions of IAEA policymaking organs. The Group reiterates that the current guidelines and criteria for the selection of technical cooperation projects are robust and effective, and that no additional criteria should be imposed for fulfilling the above-mentioned objectives.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that, in 2005, IAEA and its then-Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei, were awarded the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize, and reiterates the importance it attaches to the impartiality, professionalism and integrity of the Agency. While expressing its full confidence in that impartiality and professionalism, the Group strongly rejects any attempts by any State to politicize the work of the Agency, including its technical cooperation programme, in violation of its statute, as well as any pressure or interference in its activities that could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility. In this connection, the Group also expresses its rejection of any attempts by any State party to use the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme as a tool for political purposes, which would be in violation of the statute of the Agency. The Group reaffirms that choices and decisions of each State party to the Treaty in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for such uses and its fuel-cycle policies.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 8) In this regard, while recognizing that a diverse portfolio of energy sources will be needed to allow access to sustainable energy and electricity resources in all regions of the world, and that States parties may pursue different ways to achieve their energy security and climate protection goals, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty once again acknowledges

and reaffirms that each State party to the Treaty has the sovereign right to define its national energy policies, including fuel-cycle policies, in accordance with its national requirements and its rights and obligations under the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including proposals for assurance of supply in response to the needs of interested States, shall fully take into account all technical, legal, political and economic complexities surrounding these issues and be conducted through wide, integral, comprehensive and transparent multilateral consultations and negotiations. The multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle should be economically viable, sustainable, non-discriminatory, predictable and transparent under the auspices of IAEA and any other regional and multilateral forums. The Group also stresses that any decision on proposals regarding multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle shall be made by consensus, taking into account the interests of all member States, with the participation of all IAEA member States, and any proposal from IAEA must be consistent with its statute, without prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty, if they so decide, to develop a full national fuel cycle, according to its article IV.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines that all the parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate and have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this regard, the Group stresses particularly the obligation of developed countries to promote the legitimate need of the developing countries to nuclear energy by fully respecting this right with a view to achieving the widest benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the contribution that uses of nuclear energy can make to progress in general and to helping overcome the technological and economic disparities between developed and developing States parties to the Treaty in particular. The Group firmly believes that, as a fundamental principle, in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment shall be given to the non-nuclear-weapons States parties to the Treaty, particularly taking into account the needs of developing countries.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its deep concern about the continued imposition and/or maintaining of limitations and restrictions on exports to developing countries of nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes, despite such limitations and restrictions being inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty. In this regard, the Group stresses that the technical cooperation and assistance

provided by IAEA in meeting the needs of its member States for material, equipment and technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall not be subject to any political, economic, military or other conditions incompatible with the provisions of its statute. The Group therefore strongly calls for the immediate removal of any such restrictions or limitations. In the view of the Group, transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with the Treaty shall be supported and pursued in good faith without discrimination. The elimination of constraints that are inconsistent with the requirements of the Treaty would ensure that article IV of the Treaty is fully implemented with regard to facilitating the transfer of nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes among the States parties.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology, equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their sensitivity, and only stipulates that such technology, equipment and material must be subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards. The Group firmly believes that fostering the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by providing a framework of confidence and cooperation within which those uses can take place, is one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. Moreover, the Group emphasizes that cooperation to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world is the core objective enshrined in the statute of IAEA. Accordingly, the Group strongly encourages all States parties to actively cooperate, among themselves and through IAEA, in the peaceful uses and applications of nuclear energy, including through international technical cooperation.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. The Group further emphasizes that non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access by developing countries to material, equipment or technology for peaceful purposes, which such countries require for their continued development. Furthermore, such arrangements must pursue and implement, without exception, the condition of adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for the supply to or cooperation with States not party to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty remains deeply concerned about the ability of certain States not party to the Treaty to obtain, in particular from nuclear-weapon States, nuclear materials, technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons. The Group strongly calls for the enforcement, without exception or further delay, of the total and complete prohibition, as stipulated in the Treaty, of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities,

resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 16) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores that IAEA, under its statutory obligations, pursues the goals of technical cooperation in peaceful applications of nuclear energy as one of the three pillars of its activities. In order to meet such goals, as enshrined in the statute of IAEA and in the Treaty, IAEA has to maintain a balance between technical cooperation and other activities. The Group believes that all States parties to the Treaty that are States members of IAEA have to ensure that the Technical Cooperation Programme remains firm and sustainable through sufficient, assured and predictable financial and human resources. In this regard, the efficacy of the Programme can best be achieved by ensuring its formulation and strategies are in strict accordance with the needs and the requests of developing countries.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 20) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented without exception through the strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not party to the Treaty. In the view of the Group, new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 21) In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores the strong call by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that all States parties shall ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated particularly in its articles I, II and III, and with the decision on the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 23) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern over certain unilateral, politically motivated attempts to hamper the exercise of the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes, in this regard, that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the

parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the IAEA safeguards system and urges all States that have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible, in order to achieve the universality of the comprehensive safeguards. At the 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, this was considered as a main objective in order to consolidate and enhance the verification system for the non-proliferation regime. However, in the view of the Group, additional measures related to the safeguards shall not affect the rights of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, which are already committed to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and have renounced the nuclear-weapon option. The Group also expresses its strong rejection of attempts by any member State to use the technical cooperation programme of IAEA as a tool for political purposes in violation of its statute.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty are a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls on all States not parties to the Treaty to accede, without any further delay and any preconditions and as non-nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group proposes that the nuclear-weapon States undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to providing baseline data for future disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not parties to the Treaty, without exception.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty confirms that all States parties to the Treaty shall refrain from the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to States not parties to the Treaty unless they are placed under the comprehensive IAEA safeguards. In this connection, the Group confirms that the obligation under article III of the Treaty to verify the

peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern over certain unilateral politically motivated attempts to hamper the exercise of the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes, in this regard, that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be in a manner designed to comply with article IV of the Treaty and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 2) In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also reaffirms the importance of and calls for strict observance of article III (3) of the Treaty, by which the required safeguards shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of the Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the preamble of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes the need to achieve worldwide application of the comprehensive safeguards system and calls on all nuclear-weapon States and all States not parties to the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under the Treaty with a view to providing baseline data for future disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear

	<p>scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, mindful of the importance of article III in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes, reiterates that obligations under that article provide credible assurances for States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to other States parties that comply with comprehensive safeguards agreements.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that the nuclear-weapon States, in conformity with their legal obligations under article I of the Treaty, shall solemnly undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly to Israel, and further undertake not, in any way, to assist, encourage or induce Israel to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices under any circumstances whatsoever.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, in conformity with the Treaty, hereby declares its commitment to the effective prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer, by any State, of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear-related scientific or technological fields to Israel. In this regard, the Group expresses its serious concern over Israeli scientists' continued access to the nuclear facilities of one nuclear-weapon State, which has potentially serious negative implications on the security of the region as well as the reliability of the global non-proliferation regime.</p>
<p>2000 and 2010 Action Plans</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.22, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reiterates its commitment to article VIII (3) of the Treaty, as well as the consensus reached at the 2000 Review Conference on improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process of the Treaty, including the stipulation (see NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Vol. I, Part I)) that: "The States Parties, recalling paragraph 4 of Decision 1 of the</p>

1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, agreed that the purpose of the first two sessions of the Preparatory Committee would be to ‘consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality’. To this end, each session of the Preparatory Committee should consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences, including developments affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty.”

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.22, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference is mandated and tasked, in fulfilment of the 1995 and 2000 decisions on the strengthened review process, to undertake the following: (a) Consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2 as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences, including developments affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty; (b) At its third and, as appropriate, fourth session, the Preparatory Committee, taking into account the deliberations and results of its previous sessions, should make every effort to produce a consensus report containing recommendations to the Review Conference; (c) The States parties agreed that the procedural arrangements for the Review Conference should be finalized at the previous session of the Preparatory Committee; (d) As legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the Preparatory Committee should make recommendations to the 2015 Review Conference on this issue; (e) The establishment of such subsidiary bodies would be recommended by the Preparatory Committee for each Review Conference in relation to the specific objectives of the Review Conference.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.22, Para 3) In the context of the above-mentioned tasks and mandates, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for: (a) An agreement on the provisional agenda of the Preparatory Committee and 2015 Review Conference, which would include “Preparatory work for the review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII (3) of the Treaty, in particular, consideration of principles, objectives and ways to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, including specific matters of substance related to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference”, as well as the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty; (b) Recalling that the 2000 Final Document states clearly that “each session of the Preparatory Committee should consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and the Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted

in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences”, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that this Preparatory Committee should deal with all the procedural issues necessary to take its work forward as well as with matters of substance as was decided at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Conferences; (c) To this end, the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on nuclear disarmament so as to ensure that there is a proper accounting in the reports by the States of their progress in achieving nuclear disarmament. In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty wishes to recall that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference (see NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I-IV)) called for regular reports within the framework of the Treaty’s strengthened review process by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”. The Group recalls the stipulation of section B on “Disarmament of nuclear weapons”, contained in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that: “The nuclear-weapon States are called upon to report the undertakings [under that section] to the Preparatory Committee at 2014 (see NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)). The 2015 Review Conference will take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of article VI.” In this connection, the Group expects that the States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, should submit reports to each Preparatory Committee session, including this one, unless otherwise decided by the Review Conference. In the view of the Group, the reports on article VI should cover issues and principles addressed by the 13 practical steps and undertakings under section B on “Disarmament of nuclear weapons”, in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference and should include specific and complete information on each of these steps and follow-on actions. These reports should also address, inter alia, current policies and intentions, as well as developments in these areas; (d) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also believes that the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on the Middle East by devoting sufficient time within the indicative timetable and the full opportunity for all speakers to thereby engage in a substantive debate. The Group further recalls that the 2000 Review Conference, in its Final Document, requested all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, to report through the United Nations Secretariat to the President of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, as well as the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of the Conference, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. The Group expects that all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, would submit reports in this regard as agreed in the 2000 Final Document; (e) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the stipulation of the 2010 Review Conference that “The Conference reaffirms that all States Parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and the States in the

region, should continue to report on steps taken to implement the 1995 Resolution, through the United Nations Secretariat, to the President of the 2015 Review Conference, as well as to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of that Conference” and that “The facilitator will report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings”. The Group accordingly emphasizes the importance of and calls for submitting required reports by all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, as well as the facilitator of the 2012 Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, to the current and upcoming meetings of the Preparatory Committee and the 2015 Review Conference. The Group wishes to refer to its working paper on the topic “Regional issues: Middle East” which stipulates its substantive position in this regard; (f) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for an agreement to establish subsidiary bodies to the relevant Main Committees of the 2015 Review Conference to deliberate on issues related to nuclear disarmament, in particular the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons as well as the undertakings under section B on “Disarmament of nuclear weapons”, in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference; on the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the practical steps on the Middle East, in particular implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, contained in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference; and a legally binding international instrument on unconditional security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group emphasizes the need for the Preparatory Committee meetings to continue to allocate specific time for deliberations on nuclear disarmament, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and security assurances; (g) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty furthermore calls on the Preparatory Committee and the 2015 Review Conference to: (a) Consider the further strengthening or enhancement of the review process of the Treaty; (b) Further strengthen or enhance the regular reporting mechanism provided for in accordance with the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference; (c) Consider the steps and other actions that could be taken to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education, with particular reference to the Treaty; (d) Support participation of non-governmental organizations in the Preparatory Committee and 2015 Review Conference meetings.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.22, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the review of the operation of the Treaty in the framework of the Review Conferences and, in this context, emphasizes that the inclusion of the review part of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference as an opinion of the President of the Conference and not as a consensus language should not be considered as a precedent to be followed in the future, without prejudice to the prerogatives of the Review Conference.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.23, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and accordingly believes that the 2015 Review Conference of the Treaty should also substantially focus on this issue as a matter of priority. The Group recalls that the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty reaffirmed and recognized the legitimate interest of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances from the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Group is of the firm belief that receiving such security assurances is a legitimate right and in the security interest of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.23, Para 7) In keeping with the above-mentioned position and in accordance with the decision at the 2000 Review Conference, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances for further work to consider legally binding negative security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 21) In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores the strong call by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that all States parties shall ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated particularly in its articles I, II and III, and with the decision on the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the modernization or development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the assurances given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, States should refrain from any actions contrary to its objectives and purpose. In this context, the Group is seriously concerned by the decision of a nuclear-weapon State to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear testing to 18 months as a setback to the 2000 Review Conference agreements. It is the view of the Group that such decisions undermine the validity of the commitment to declared moratoriums as well as the commitments under the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has been envisaged as the first of 13 practical steps leading to nuclear disarmament. The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty also remains a cause for concern.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the IAEA safeguards system and urges all States that have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible, in order to achieve the universality of the comprehensive safeguards. At the 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, this was considered as a main objective in order to consolidate and enhance the verification system for the non-proliferation regime. However, in the view of the Group, additional measures related to the safeguards shall not affect the rights of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, which are already committed to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and have renounced the nuclear-weapon option. The Group also expresses its strong rejection of attempts by any member State to use the technical cooperation programme of IAEA as a tool for political purposes in violation of its statute.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)), which, by its action 16, stipulates that the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to commit to declare, as appropriate, to IAEA all fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes and to place such material as soon as practicable under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes. The Group calls on the Conference to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the fulfilment of these commitments through the establishment of a mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the action, which should be made mandatory for the nuclear-weapon States.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further recalls action 17, which stipulates that, in the context of action 16, all States are encouraged to support the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military purposes. The Group urges the Conference to examine such legally binding verification arrangements and the means to make them operational, in the aim of ensuring the realization of that objective.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 6) The Group reiterates its strong call for the full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking given by the nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, which was also reaffirmed by the 2010 Review Conference. That undertaking should be demonstrated without further delay through an accelerated process of negotiations and the full

implementation of the 13 practical steps to advance systematically and progressively towards a nuclear-weapon-free world as agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference, and in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference, which reaffirmed the continued validity of that undertaking.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 7) The Group recalls that, in pursuit of the full, effective and urgent implementation of article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, and building upon the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, the 2010 Review Conference agreed on an action plan on nuclear disarmament that includes concrete steps for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the Group strongly calls for the prompt and full implementation of that action plan.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 9) In this connection, the Group emphasizes in particular the prime importance of and the urgent need for full and prompt implementation of the commitments by the nuclear-weapon States under action 5 of the action plan. In this context, the Group further recalls that the nuclear-weapon States committed themselves to accelerating concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, inter alia, by: (a) rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons; (b) addressing the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process; (c) further diminishing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies; (d) discussing policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons; (e) considering the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security; (f) reducing the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and (g) further enhancing transparency and increasing mutual confidence.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 10) Moreover, the Group calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to submit comprehensive substantive reports about their undertakings under action 5 of the action plan to the Preparatory Committee in 2014, in order to enable the 2015 Review Conference to take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of article VI of the Treaty in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 11) The Group expresses deep concern at the continued lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, which could undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty. The Group also deeply regrets the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. The negotiation of a phased programme for the complete

elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame, including a nuclear weapons convention, is necessary and should begin without further delay. In that regard, the Group reiterates its call to establish, as soon as possible and as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, and recalls action 6 of the action plan, in which all States agreed that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 14) The Group reconfirms that negotiations on a fissile material treaty should be conducted on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (see CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein (known as the “Shannon mandate”), taking into account nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, in addition to all related issues, including the past production and existing stockpiles of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Group expresses concern over the attempts to limit the scope of the negotiations on a fissile material treaty as contained in the Shannon mandate, which was endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences. In this regard, the Group recognizes that non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have already agreed to a legally binding commitment not to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 15) The Group remains deeply concerned by the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons, some reports of bilateral and unilateral reductions notwithstanding. Any such reductions are undermined by the modernization of nuclear weapons, their delivery systems and related infrastructure by the nuclear-weapon States. To comply with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, and with their commitments under the 13 practical steps and the 2010 action plan, the nuclear-weapon States must immediately cease their plans to further invest in modernizing, upgrading, refurbishing or extending the lives of their nuclear weapons and related facilities. The Group is also concerned by the existence and continued deployment of tens of thousands of such weapons, the exact number of which remains unconfirmed owing to the lack of transparency in various nuclear weapons programmes.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 17) The Group also stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status are no substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons, and accordingly calls upon the Russian Federation and the United States to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability to such cuts and to further reduce their nuclear arsenals, both warheads and delivery systems, thus contributing to the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations and facilitating the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest date. The Group also recalls the commitment by the Russian Federation and the United States under action 4 of the action plan to the full implementation of New

START and strongly urges them to adopt all required measures to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 27) The Group reaffirms the validity of its working paper on the elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons submitted to the 2010 Review Conference (see NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, reproduced in the annex to the present working paper). The Group is determined to integrate this plan of action into the outcome document of the 2015 review process of the Treaty, and strongly calls for this to be done. In this regard, the Group calls for the speedy and full implementation by the nuclear-weapon States of all the measures contained in the plan of action in accordance with the proposed timeline and at a pace that makes up for the time elapsed.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A2) To achieve the total elimination of their nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States need to implement the unequivocal undertaking agreed upon in 2000. The 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI should be fully implemented in accordance with the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility. The nuclear-weapon States should be urged to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of their nuclear weapons within a specified time framework, including a nuclear weapons convention. It should also be recalled that there is a unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice regarding the obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:

- (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference;
- (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on:
 - (i) the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites;
 - (ii) measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development;
- (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies;
- (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time

frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention); (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones; (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A5) Full implementation by the nuclear-weapon States of their disarmament obligations and commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including those agreed at the 2000 Review Conference; acceleration of the negotiation process, in accordance with article VI, and implementation of the 13 practical steps.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which reaffirmed the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty. The Group recalls that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines furthermore that the 2010 Review Conference also reaffirmed the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recalled the affirmation of its goals and objectives by the 2000 Review Conference. The Conference also stressed that the Resolution remains valid until the goals and objectives are achieved, and that the Resolution is an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995. The Group recalls also that at the Conference, States parties renewed their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at its prompt implementation.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further recalls that the 2010 Review Conference, by taking note of the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, recalled the reaffirmation by the 2000 Review Conference of the

importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The Conference also reaffirmed the urgency and importance of achieving universality of the Treaty and called on all States in the Middle East that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States so as to achieve its universality at an early date.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 5) In this context, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty welcomes the adoption by consensus of a detailed plan of action on the Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference and urges the Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, to convene and exert utmost efforts in ensuring the success of a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. While recalling that the 2010 Review Conference emphasized the importance of a process leading to full implementation of the objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, the Group stresses the importance of the full implementation of the plan of action and the active and constructive engagement by all parties concerned to allow for the success of the 2012 conference in leading to the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern that no progress has been achieved with regard to Israel's accession to the Treaty, and placing all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, and over the delay in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, all of which are objectives and priorities that were stressed in Review Conferences of the Treaty in 1995, 2000 and 2010.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines that the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on the Middle East by devoting sufficient time within the indicative timetable and giving all speakers the full opportunity to thereby engage in a substantive debate. The Group further recalls that the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences stipulated that all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, should report through the Secretariat to the President of the Review Conference, as well as the Chairs of its Preparatory Committee meetings, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such a zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. The Group further recalls that the 2010 Review Conference requested the facilitator to report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 16) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty accordingly emphasizes the importance of

submitting required reports by all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, as well as the facilitator of the 2012 conference. It is essential that the successive sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference conduct substantive discussions on the above-mentioned reports and evaluate the fulfilment of the commitments on the Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, as contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted by consensus at the 2010 Review Conference.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 17) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty requests the establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the 2015 Review Conference to assess the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and reaffirmed by the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, as well as the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 19) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that, as clearly stipulated by the 2010 Review Conference, the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction shall be convened in the year 2012, and that any delay will seriously jeopardize the overall implementation of the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions and will represent a major setback in this regard. The Group underscores that the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and the convening of a successful 2012 conference are integral and essential parts of the implementation of the consensus conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.52, Para 21) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States, in particular the obligations and commitments of the three depositary States of the Treaty that co-sponsored the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, to implement the Resolution. Moreover, the Group considers the implementation of the practical steps adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Middle East as a collective responsibility, since the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference clearly stipulated that the States parties renew their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at its prompt implementation, and also underlined the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

Nuclear Safety and Security

<p style="text-align: center;">IAEA and Safety and Security</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 17) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty affirms the need to strengthen the radiological safety and protection systems at facilities utilizing radioactive materials and at radioactive waste management facilities, including the safe transportation of these materials. The Group reaffirms the need to strengthen existing international regulations relating to the safety and security of transportation of such materials. While reiterating the need to take necessary measures to prevent any dumping of nuclear or radioactive wastes, the Group calls for the effective implementation of the Code of Practice on the IAEA International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste as a means of enhancing the protection of all States from the dumping of radioactive wastes on their territories.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 18) The Group recognizes that the primary responsibility for nuclear safety rests with individual States. The Group reaffirms the central role of IAEA in nuclear safety-related matters, including through the establishment of nuclear safety standards. The Group stresses that IAEA must retain centrality in this field, owing to its mandated functions and long-standing expertise. The Group stresses that any possible review of nuclear safety standards at the global level must be carried out within IAEA in an inclusive, gradual and transparent manner, with the guidance and participation of and in consultation with all member States, and shall incorporate the views of all member States. The Group also calls for the implementation of the Nuclear Safety Action Plan endorsed by the General Conference of IAEA in September 2011.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Individual State Responsibilities</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 18) The Group recognizes that the primary responsibility for nuclear safety rests with individual States. The Group reaffirms the central role of IAEA in nuclear safety-related matters, including through the establishment of nuclear safety standards. The Group stresses that IAEA must retain centrality in this field, owing to its mandated functions and long-standing expertise. The Group stresses that any possible review of nuclear safety standards at the global level must be carried out within IAEA in an inclusive, gradual and transparent manner, with the guidance and participation of and in consultation with all member States, and shall incorporate the views of all member States. The Group also calls for the implementation of the Nuclear Safety Action Plan endorsed by the General Conference of IAEA in September 2011.</p>