



Thematic Summary of the Working Papers Submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties of the 9th Review Cycle of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2013 Preparatory Committee

Disarmament

Nuclear Weapon Convention

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses deep concern at the continued lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, which could undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty. The Group also deeply regrets the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. The negotiations of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame, including a nuclear weapons convention, is necessary and should commence without any further delay. In that regard, the Group reiterates its call to establish, as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament and recalls action 6 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament, through which all States have agreed that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 29) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty notes with concern the lack of agreement on a number of its key priorities, including, inter alia, to begin negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention, and expresses its determination to continue collective efforts in pursuing the realization of its aforementioned priority in the 2015 review process of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A2) To achieve the total elimination of their nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States need to implement the unequivocal undertaking agreed upon in 2000. The 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI should be fully implemented in accordance with the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility. The nuclear-weapon States should be urged to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of their nuclear weapons within a specified time framework, including a nuclear weapons convention. It should also be recalled that there is a unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice regarding the obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A3) The Non-Aligned Movement proposes a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame that includes the following concrete steps and measures, as a basis for consideration by the Review Conference. The list of measures in each phase is indicative rather than exhaustive, and the order in which they are mentioned does not necessarily reflect their priority. Nevertheless, it should be understood that, in any nuclear disarmament programme, all steps and measures are inextricably linked.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:

- (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference;
- (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on:
 - (i) The cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites;
 - (ii) Measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development;
- (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies;
- (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention);
- (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones;
- (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives;
- (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively;
- (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A5) Full implementation by the nuclear-weapon States of their disarmament obligations and commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including those agreed at the 2000 Review Conference; acceleration of the negotiation

	<p>process, in accordance with article VI; and implementation of the 13 practical steps.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A6) Conclusion of negotiations on further reductions of nuclear arsenals (START).</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A7) Moratorium on the production of fissile materials, pending conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A8) Placement of nuclear fissile material transferred from military to peaceful uses by nuclear-weapon States under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A9) Formal declaration of the decade 2010-2020 as the “Decade for nuclear disarmament” and realization of its objectives.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A10) Entry into force of the treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons and the establishment of a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance, including such measures as the: (a) Separation of nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles; (b) Placement of nuclear warheads in secure storage under international supervision, pending the removal of special nuclear materials from those warheads; (c) Transfer of nuclear materials, including fissile materials and delivery vehicles, to “peaceful purposes”.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A11) Preparation, under international auspices, of an inventory of nuclear arsenals, including fissile materials, nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A12) Progressive and balanced reduction of missiles intended for carrying nuclear warheads.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A13) Recommendation by the 2020 Review Conference to declare 2020 as the “Decade for the total elimination of nuclear weapons”.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A14) Full implementation of the treaty to eliminate all nuclear weapons and of its verification regime through the: (a) Elimination of all nuclear weapons; (b) Conversion of all facilities for the production of nuclear weapons to “peaceful purposes”; (c) Placement of nuclear facilities under safeguards, on a universal basis.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Verification</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty remains concerned by the continued inability of the Conference on Disarmament to resume its negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile</p>

materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, including all practical measures to eliminate in an irreversible manner the past production and existing stockpiles of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. In this context, the Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 17) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons and, accordingly, calls on the United States of America and the Russian Federation to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability to such cuts, to further reduce their nuclear arsenals, both warheads and delivery systems, thus contributing to the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations and facilitating the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest date. The Group also recalls the commitment by the Russian Federation and the United States of America under action 4 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament for the full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and strongly urges them to adopt all required measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A2) To achieve the total elimination of their nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States need to implement the unequivocal undertaking agreed upon in 2000. The 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI should be fully implemented in accordance with the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility. The nuclear-weapon States should be urged to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of their nuclear weapons within a specified time framework, including a nuclear weapons convention. It should also be recalled that there is a unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice regarding the obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:
(a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference; (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on: (i) The cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites; (ii) Measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development; (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies; (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention); (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones; (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A10) Entry into force of the treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons and the establishment of a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance, including such measures as the: (a) Separation of nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles; (b) Placement of nuclear warheads in secure storage under international supervision, pending the removal of special nuclear materials from those warheads; (c) Transfer of nuclear materials, including fissile materials and delivery vehicles, to “peaceful purposes”.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A14) Full implementation of the treaty to eliminate all nuclear weapons and of its verification regime through the: (a) Elimination of all nuclear weapons; (b) Conversion of all facilities for the production of nuclear weapons to “peaceful purposes”; (c) Placement of nuclear facilities under safeguards, on a universal basis.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.17, Para 2) While underlining the significance of achieving the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly calls for immediate and unconditional cessation of all nuclear weapon tests and the closure of all nuclear weapon test sites. In this regard, the Group is of the firm view that all States parties that have not yet done so should close and dismantle, as soon as feasible and in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner, any remaining sites for nuclear test explosions and their associated infrastructure, and

prohibit completely nuclear weapons research and development, and also refrain from conducting nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, or nuclear weapon test explosions in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapons system, which would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.17, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that positive decisions by the nuclear-weapon States would have the desired impact on facilitating the progress towards entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Early ratification of this Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States would pave the way and encourage the remaining required countries, especially those with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the Treaty. The failure of one major nuclear-weapon State to ratify the Treaty, and its not supporting the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization through rejection of one of the main elements of the Treaty's verification regime, is undermining this important instrument against nuclear testing.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons expresses its strong concern at the growing resort to unilateralism and unilaterally imposed prescriptions and, in this context, strongly underlines and affirms that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues. In this regard, the Group underlines that the multilateral mechanism established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the most appropriate way to address verification and safeguards issues. At the same time, the Group emphasizes that the work of the Agency with regard to safeguards and verification has to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of its statute and safeguards agreements.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls on all States not parties to the Treaty to accede, without any further delay and any preconditions and as non-nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group also calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under this Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the statutory role of IAEA in nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the capability of the Agency to verify nuclear disarmament agreements.

	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes the need to achieve worldwide application of the comprehensive safeguards system and calls upon all nuclear-weapon States and all States not parties to the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under the Treaty.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the statutory role of IAEA on nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the Agency's capability of verifying nuclear disarmament agreements.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly believes that the nuclear-weapon States, in implementing their unequivocal undertaking to totally eliminate their nuclear arsenals, should undertake further efforts, in a transparent, irreversible and internationally verifiable manner, to eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, as well as their nuclear weapon-related materials, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. Furthermore, the Group calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to dismantle or convert for peaceful uses facilities and related equipment for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 12) In this regard, the Group supports furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide nuclear disarmament and the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Group further urges the Conference to examine such legally binding verification arrangements and the means of making them operational, with the aim of ensuring the realization of that objective.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for the establishment by the Review Conference of a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreement by the nuclear-weapon States.</p>
<p>Disarmament and Development</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A10) Entry into force of the treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons and the establishment of a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance, including such measures as the: (a) Separation of nuclear</p>

	<p>warheads from their delivery vehicles; (b) Placement of nuclear warheads in secure storage under international supervision, pending the removal of special nuclear materials from those warheads; (c) Transfer of nuclear materials, including fissile materials and delivery vehicles, to “peaceful purposes”.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A14) Full implementation of the treaty to eliminate all nuclear weapons and of its verification regime through the: (a) Elimination of all nuclear weapons; (b) Conversion of all facilities for the production of nuclear weapons to “peaceful purposes”; (c) Placement of nuclear facilities under safeguards, on a universal basis.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly believes that the nuclear-weapon States, in implementing their unequivocal undertaking to totally eliminate their nuclear arsenals, should undertake further efforts, in a transparent, irreversible and internationally verifiable manner, to eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, as well as their nuclear weapon-related materials, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. Furthermore, the Group calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to dismantle or convert for peaceful uses facilities and related equipment for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls action 16 of the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty and urges the nuclear-weapon States to commit to declaring to IAEA all weapon-grade fissile material and to place such material, as soon as practicable, under the supervision of IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes. The Group calls upon the Conference to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the fulfilment of these commitments through the establishment of an international mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the action, which should be made mandatory for the nuclear-weapon States.</p>
<p>Nuclear-Weapon States Obligations</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reiterates its strong call for the full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking given by the nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 Review Conference to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, which has also been reaffirmed by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty. That undertaking should be demonstrated without further delay through an accelerated process of negotiations and through the full implementation of the 13 practical steps to advance systematically and progressively towards a nuclear-weapon-free world as agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference, as well as in the conclusions and</p>

recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference, which reaffirmed the continued validity of that undertaking.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that, in pursuit of the full, effective and urgent implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, and building upon the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, the 2010 Review Conference agreed on an action plan on nuclear disarmament that includes concrete steps for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the Group strongly calls for prompt and full implementation of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that in implementing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the nuclear-weapon States have committed to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. In this regard, the Group calls for full compliance of the nuclear-weapon States with such undertakings.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 9) In this connection, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes in particular the prime importance of and the urgent need for full and prompt implementation of the commitments by the nuclear-weapon States under action 5 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament. In this context, the Group further recalls that the nuclear-weapon States committed to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, inter alia, through (a) rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons; (b) addressing the question of all nuclear weapons, regardless of their type or their location, as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process; (c) further diminishing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies; (d) discussing policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons; (e) considering the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security; (f) reducing the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and (g) further enhancing transparency and increase mutual confidence.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 10) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to submit a comprehensive substantive report about their

undertakings under action 5 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament to the Preparatory Committee in 2014, in order to enable the 2015 Review Conference to take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of article VI of the Treaty in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses deep concern at the continued lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, which could undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty. The Group also deeply regrets the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. The negotiations of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame, including a nuclear weapons convention, is necessary and should commence without any further delay. In that regard, the Group reiterates its call to establish, as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament and recalls action 6 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament, through which all States have agreed that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty remains deeply concerned by the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons, despite some reports of bilateral and unilateral reductions. Any such reductions are undermined by the modernization of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and related infrastructure by the nuclear-weapon States. In order to comply with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, as well as with their commitments under the 13 practical steps and 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament, the nuclear-weapon States must immediately cease their plans to further invest in modernizing, upgrading, refurbishing or extending the lives of their nuclear weapons and related facilities. The Group is also concerned about the existence and continued deployment of tens of thousands of such weapons, whose exact number remains unconfirmed, owing to the lack of transparency in various nuclear weapons programmes.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 17) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons and, accordingly, calls on the United States of America and the Russian Federation to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability to such cuts, to further reduce their nuclear arsenals, both warheads and delivery systems, thus contributing to the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations and facilitating the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest date. The Group also recalls the commitment by the Russian Federation and the United States of

America under action 4 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament for the full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and strongly urges them to adopt all required measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 19) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also believes that the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes and the lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies further undermine disarmament commitments.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 20) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 28) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reiterates its call for the establishment, as a matter of priority, of a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament in Main Committee I, mandated to focus on the issue of fulfilment of the obligations under article VI of the Treaty and on further practical measures required to achieve progress in that regard.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A1) Although there have been some positive signals and developments in the area of nuclear disarmament, the world is still faced with unresolved challenges. The recent statements by some nuclear-weapon States about their intention to pursue actions in achieving a world free of nuclear weapons are positive. However, urgent and concrete actions by the nuclear-weapon States in accordance with their multilaterally agreed commitments to achieve general and complete disarmament remain essential. Unless the role of nuclear weapons in the context of security is delegitimized and existing nuclear doctrines are abandoned, there will always be a threat of a nuclear arms race and an escalation of nuclear threats. The total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A2) To achieve the total elimination of their nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States need to implement the unequivocal undertaking agreed upon in 2000. The 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI should be fully implemented in accordance with the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility. The nuclear-weapon States should be urged to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of their nuclear weapons within a specified time framework, including a nuclear weapons

convention. It should also be recalled that there is a unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice regarding the obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:

- (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference;
- (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on:
 - (i) The cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites;
 - (ii) Measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development;
- (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies;
- (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention);
- (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones;
- (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives;
- (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively;
- (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A5) Full implementation by the nuclear-weapon States of their disarmament obligations and commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including those agreed at the 2000 Review Conference; acceleration of the negotiation process, in accordance with article VI; and implementation of the 13 practical steps.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A6) Conclusion of negotiations on further reductions of nuclear arsenals (START).

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that, at successive conferences of Heads of State or Government of the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries and ministerial conferences of the Movement, it has been reiterated that improvements in existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, as envisaged in the Nuclear Posture Review of the United States of America, contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient unilateral statements made by each of the nuclear-weapon States. It has further been reaffirmed that these improvements and the development of new types of such weapons violate the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.17, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls and reaffirms once again the commitment of all States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to ending all nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions and thereby constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group expresses grave concern at the nuclear weapon test explosions in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapons systems as well as the development of new types of nuclear weapons, which may result in the resumption of tests and a lowering of the nuclear threshold. Accordingly the Group strongly calls on the nuclear-weapon States to put an immediate end to such activities and refrain from any other action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, pending its entry into force.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.17, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that the improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient statements on negative security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States and violate their commitments undertaken at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.17, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by all the nuclear-weapon States, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Group reiterates that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States Signatories, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to nuclear disarmament, would be essential.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.17, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, not only because they are among the 44 States listed in annex 2 to the Treaty, but also because,

on account of their position, they are expected to lead in making the ban on tests a reality. It will be possible to determine the success of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty only when it has been signed and ratified, in particular by the five nuclear-weapon States and those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. The Group is of the firm belief that the early achievement of the goal of the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, through accession of the only non-parties to this instrument, would be essential to achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.17, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that positive decisions by the nuclear-weapon States would have the desired impact on facilitating the progress towards entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Early ratification of this Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States would pave the way and encourage the remaining required countries, especially those with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the Treaty. The failure of one major nuclear-weapon State to ratify the Treaty, and its not supporting the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization through rejection of one of the main elements of the Treaty's verification regime, is undermining this important instrument against nuclear testing.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.17, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation, thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear devices, as well as nuclear weapons based on new physical principles. The nuclear-weapon States stated at that time that the only steps to be followed would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons, which would not involve nuclear explosions. In that regard, the Group calls upon those States to continue to refrain from conducting any type of nuclear tests for the modernization, development or further improvement of nuclear weapons. The Group wishes to re-emphasize the principles of the non-proliferation regime, both vertically and horizontally.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.17, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores the importance of the five nuclear-weapon States maintaining and observing their unilateral moratoriums on nuclear weapon tests since the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. However, the Group believes that those moratoriums do not substitute the entry into force of the Treaty and its ratification.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.17, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the modernization or development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the assurances given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the

conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, States should refrain from any actions contrary to its objectives and purpose. In this context, the Group is seriously concerned by the decision of a nuclear-weapon State to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear testing to 18 months as a setback to the 2000 Review Conference agreements. It is the view of the Group that such decisions undermine the validity of the commitment to declared moratoriums as well as the commitments under the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has been envisaged as the first of 13 practical steps leading to nuclear disarmament. The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty also remains a cause for concern.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls on all States not parties to the Treaty to accede, without any further delay and any preconditions and as non-nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group also calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under this Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 5) In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such agreement would be concluded with the aim to: (a) Ensure full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; (b) Provide baseline data regarding fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and prevent further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (c) Strictly observe the prohibition of transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, the object and the purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, materials and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not parties to the Treaty, without exception.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes the need to achieve worldwide application of the comprehensive safeguards system and calls upon all nuclear-weapon States and all States not parties to the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 8) In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of: (a) Ensuring full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; (b) Providing baseline data regarding the fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (c) Strictly observing the prohibition of transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, object and purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly believes that the nuclear-weapon States, in implementing their unequivocal undertaking to totally eliminate their nuclear arsenals, should undertake further efforts, in a transparent, irreversible and internationally verifiable manner, to eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, as well as their nuclear weapon-related materials, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. Furthermore, the Group calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to dismantle or convert for peaceful uses facilities and related equipment for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls action 16 of the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty and urges the nuclear-weapon States to commit to declaring to IAEA all weapon-grade fissile material and to place such material, as soon as practicable, under the supervision of IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes. The Group calls upon the Conference to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the fulfilment of these commitments through the establishment of an international mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the action, which should be made mandatory for the nuclear-weapon States.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for the establishment by the Review Conference of a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreement by the nuclear-weapon States.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group

considers to be an important step towards strengthening nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regimes. The Group is, therefore, of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is not a substitute for nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group underlines the importance of the early fulfilment of the legal obligations of and unequivocal undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate all their nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be a contribution towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. However, the Group is of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones does not substitute legal obligations and unequivocal undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The Group further welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and, in this regard, strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further recalls that the 2010 Review Conference, by taking note of the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, recalled the reaffirmation by the 2000 Review Conference of the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The Conference also reaffirmed the urgency and importance of achieving universality of the Treaty and called on all States in the Middle East that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States so as to achieve its universality at an early date.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that the nuclear-weapon States, in conformity with their legal obligations under article I of the Treaty, shall solemnly undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly to Israel, and further undertake not, in any way, to assist, encourage or induce Israel to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices under any circumstances whatsoever.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines that the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on the Middle East by devoting sufficient time within the indicative timetable and giving all speakers the full opportunity to thereby engage in a substantive debate. The Group further recalls that the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences

	<p>stipulated that all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, should report through the Secretariat to the President of the Review Conference, as well as the Chairs of its Preparatory Committee meetings, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such a zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. The Group further recalls that the 2010 Review Conference requested the facilitator to report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 21) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses once again the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States, in particular the obligations and commitments of the three depositary States of the Treaty that co-sponsored the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, to implement the Resolution. Moreover, the Group considers the implementation of the practical steps adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Middle East as a collective responsibility, since the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference had clearly stipulated that the States parties renew their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at its prompt implementation, and also underlined the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Arms Races</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 18) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group remains concerned that the deployment of national and strategic missile defence systems could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 66/27, the Group emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A1) Although there have been some positive signals and developments in the area of nuclear disarmament, the world is still faced with unresolved challenges. The recent statements by some nuclear-weapon States about their intention to pursue actions in achieving a world free of nuclear weapons are positive. However, urgent and concrete actions by the nuclear-weapon States in accordance with their multilaterally agreed commitments to achieve general and complete disarmament remain essential. Unless the role of nuclear weapons in the context of security is delegitimized and existing nuclear doctrines are abandoned, there will always be a threat of a nuclear arms race and an escalation of nuclear threats. The total</p>

	<p>elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>Bilateral Disarmament</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that in implementing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the nuclear-weapon States have committed to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. In this regard, the Group calls for full compliance of the nuclear-weapon States with such undertakings.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty remains deeply concerned by the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons, despite some reports of bilateral and unilateral reductions. Any such reductions are undermined by the modernization of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and related infrastructure by the nuclear-weapon States. In order to comply with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, as well as with their commitments under the 13 practical steps and 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament, the nuclear-weapon States must immediately cease their plans to further invest in modernizing, upgrading, refurbishing or extending the lives of their nuclear weapons and related facilities. The Group is also concerned about the existence and continued deployment of tens of thousands of such weapons, whose exact number remains unconfirmed, owing to the lack of transparency in various nuclear weapons programmes.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 16) In this connection, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while noting the conclusion and entry into force of the New START Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America, confirms the validity of its position delivered at the time of adoption of resolution 65/61, entitled “Bilateral reductions of strategic nuclear arms and the new framework for strategic relations”. The Group further expresses concern that the domestic commitments to nuclear weapon modernization in exchange for ratification of this Treaty undermines the minimal reductions agreed upon in it.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 17) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons and, accordingly, calls on the United States of America and the Russian Federation to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability to such cuts, to further reduce their nuclear arsenals, both warheads and delivery systems, thus contributing to the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations and facilitating the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest date. The Group also recalls the commitment by the Russian Federation and the United States of</p>

America under action 4 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament for the full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and strongly urges them to adopt all required measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 18) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group remains concerned that the deployment of national and strategic missile defence systems could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 66/27, the Group emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:

- (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference;
- (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on:
 - (i) The cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites;
 - (ii) Measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development;
- (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies;
- (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention);
- (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones;
- (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives;
- (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons

	<p>and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A6) Conclusion of negotiations on further reductions of nuclear arsenals (START).</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly believes that the nuclear-weapon States, in implementing their unequivocal undertaking to totally eliminate their nuclear arsenals, should undertake further efforts, in a transparent, irreversible and internationally verifiable manner, to eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, as well as their nuclear weapon-related materials, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. Furthermore, the Group calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to dismantle or convert for peaceful uses facilities and related equipment for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for the establishment by the Review Conference of a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreement by the nuclear-weapon States.</p>
<p>Disarmament and Nonproliferation</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emphasizes that the Treaty is an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and a key instrument in the efforts to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms the principled positions of the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries on nuclear disarmament, which remains its highest priority, and on the related issue of nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects and stresses the importance that efforts aimed at nuclear non-proliferation should be parallel to simultaneous efforts aiming at nuclear disarmament. The Group stresses its concern at the threat to humanity posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and of their possible use or threat of use. The Group also reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 9) In this connection, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes in particular the prime importance of and the urgent need for full and prompt implementation of the commitments by the nuclear-weapon States under action 5 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament. In this context, the Group further recalls that the</p>

nuclear-weapon States committed to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, inter alia, through (a) rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons; (b) addressing the question of all nuclear weapons, regardless of their type or their location, as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process; (c) further diminishing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies; (d) discussing policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons; (e) considering the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security; (f) reducing the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and (g) further enhancing transparency and increase mutual confidence.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty remains concerned by the continued inability of the Conference on Disarmament to resume its negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, including all practical measures to eliminate in an irreversible manner the past production and existing stockpiles of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. In this context, the Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reconfirms that negotiations on a fissile materials treaty should be conducted on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein (Shannon mandate), taking into account nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, as well as all related issues, including the past production and existing stockpiles of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Group expresses concern over the attempts to limit the scope of the negotiations on a fissile material treaty as contained in the Shannon mandate, which was endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences. In this regard, the Group recognizes that non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Treaty have already agreed to a legally binding commitment not to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 22) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals, and considers, in that regard, that any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons

is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals, and considers, in that regard, that any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 24) In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores the strong call by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that all States parties shall ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated particularly in its articles I, II and III, and with the decision on the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.17, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, not only because they are among the 44 States listed in annex 2 to the Treaty, but also because, on account of their position, they are expected to lead in making the ban on tests a reality. It will be possible to determine the success of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty only when it has been signed and ratified, in particular by the five nuclear-weapon States and those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. The Group is of the firm belief that the early achievement of the goal of the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, through accession of the only non-parties to this instrument, would be essential to achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be an important step towards strengthening nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regimes. The Group is, therefore, of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is not a substitute for nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group underlines the importance of the early fulfilment of the legal obligations of and

	<p>unequivocal undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate all their nuclear weapons.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty continues to consider the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), Bangkok (Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone), Pelindaba (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty) and Semipalatinsk (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia) to be a positive step and important measure towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing other nuclear-weapon-free zones worldwide and calls for cooperation and broad consultation among the States of the regions concerned to conclude agreements establishing such zones.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 24) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty urges the Conveners — the United Nations Secretary-General, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation — in accordance with the mandate entrusted to them by the Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty, to convene the Conference without any further delay in order to avoid any negative repercussions on the credibility of the Treaty, its 2015 Review process and the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime as a whole. The Group calls on the facilitator to intensify consultations with all capitals in the region and to exert maximum efforts to that end.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Disarmament and the Environment</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.17, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the need for increased attention to the problems of safety and contamination related to the discontinuation of nuclear operations formerly associated with nuclear weapons programmes, including where appropriate, the safe resettlement of any displaced human populations and the restoration of economic productivity to affected areas. In this regard, the Group acknowledges the existence of a special responsibility towards the affected people and areas, including those in the former United Nations Trust Territories who have been adversely affected as a result of the nuclear weapon tests conducted in the past.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">International Humanitarian Law and ICJ</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 20) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.</p>

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 25) In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons that “there is in neither customary nor conventional international law any specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons” and that “the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law”.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 26) Accordingly, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty is of the view that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States shall seriously refrain, at any circumstances, from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. In the view of the Group, any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular international humanitarian law. The Group further believes that the mere possession of nuclear weapons is inconsistent with the principles of international humanitarian law. In this regard, the Group strongly calls upon all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to exclude completely the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from their military doctrines.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A2) To achieve the total elimination of their nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States need to implement the unequivocal undertaking agreed upon in 2000. The 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI should be fully implemented in accordance with the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility. The nuclear-weapon States should be urged to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of their nuclear weapons within a specified time framework, including a nuclear weapons convention. It should also be recalled that there is a unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice regarding the obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. While recalling the advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the Group believes that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as the only absolute guarantee against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States shall seriously refrain, in any circumstances,

	<p>from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty firmly believes that the mere possession or any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular, international humanitarian law.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Modernization and Development of Nuclear Weapons</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty remains deeply concerned by the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons, despite some reports of bilateral and unilateral reductions. Any such reductions are undermined by the modernization of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and related infrastructure by the nuclear-weapon States. In order to comply with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, as well as with their commitments under the 13 practical steps and 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament, the nuclear-weapon States must immediately cease their plans to further invest in modernizing, upgrading, refurbishing or extending the lives of their nuclear weapons and related facilities. The Group is also concerned about the existence and continued deployment of tens of thousands of such weapons, whose exact number remains unconfirmed, owing to the lack of transparency in various nuclear weapons programmes.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 16) In this connection, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while noting the conclusion and entry into force of the New START Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America, confirms the validity of its position delivered at the time of adoption of resolution 65/61, entitled “Bilateral reductions of strategic nuclear arms and the new framework for strategic relations”. The Group further expresses concern that the domestic commitments to nuclear weapon modernization in exchange for ratification of this Treaty undermines the minimal reductions agreed upon in it.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 18) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group remains concerned that the deployment of national and strategic missile defence systems could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 66/27, the Group emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 19) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also believes that the development</p>

and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes and the lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies further undermine disarmament commitments.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:

- (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference;
- (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on:
 - (i) The cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites;
 - (ii) Measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development;
- (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies;
- (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention);
- (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones;
- (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives;
- (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively;
- (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that, at successive conferences of Heads of State or Government of the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries and ministerial conferences of the Movement, it has been reiterated that improvements in existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, as envisaged in the Nuclear Posture Review of the United States of America, contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient unilateral statements made by each of the nuclear-weapon States. It has further been reaffirmed that these improvements and the development

of new types of such weapons violate the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.17, Para 2) While underlining the significance of achieving the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly calls for immediate and unconditional cessation of all nuclear weapon tests and the closure of all nuclear weapon test sites. In this regard, the Group is of the firm view that all States parties that have not yet done so should close and dismantle, as soon as feasible and in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner, any remaining sites for nuclear test explosions and their associated infrastructure, and prohibit completely nuclear weapons research and development, and also refrain from conducting nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, or nuclear weapon test explosions in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapons system, which would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.17, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls and reaffirms once again the commitment of all States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to ending all nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions and thereby constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group expresses grave concern at the nuclear weapon test explosions in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapons systems as well as the development of new types of nuclear weapons, which may result in the resumption of tests and a lowering of the nuclear threshold. Accordingly the Group strongly calls on the nuclear-weapon States to put an immediate end to such activities and refrain from any other action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, pending its entry into force.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.17, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that the improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient statements on negative security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States and violate their commitments undertaken at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.17, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty welcomes the signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by 183 States and its ratification by 159 States. In this context, the ratifications by Brunei Darussalam, Chad, Guatemala, Guinea and Indonesia are welcomed. The Group, in accordance with its long-standing and principled position in favour of the total elimination of all forms of nuclear weapons, supports the objectives of the Treaty, which is intended to

	<p>enforce a comprehensive ban on all nuclear test explosions, and to stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons in order to pave the way towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.17, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation, thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear devices, as well as nuclear weapons based on new physical principles. The nuclear-weapon States stated at that time that the only steps to be followed would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons, which would not involve nuclear explosions. In that regard, the Group calls upon those States to continue to refrain from conducting any type of nuclear tests for the modernization, development or further improvement of nuclear weapons. The Group wishes to re-emphasize the principles of the non-proliferation regime, both vertically and horizontally.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.17, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the modernization or development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the assurances given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, States should refrain from any actions contrary to its objectives and purpose. In this context, the Group is seriously concerned by the decision of a nuclear-weapon State to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear testing to 18 months as a setback to the 2000 Review Conference agreements. It is the view of the Group that such decisions undermine the validity of the commitment to declared moratoriums as well as the commitments under the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has been envisaged as the first of 13 practical steps leading to nuclear disarmament. The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty also remains a cause for concern.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Missiles</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 18) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group remains concerned that the deployment of national and strategic missile defence systems could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 66/27, the Group emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.</p>

<p style="text-align: center;">NAM Involvement and Contributions</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emphasizes that the Treaty is an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and a key instrument in the efforts to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms the principled positions of the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries on nuclear disarmament, which remains its highest priority, and on the related issue of nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects and stresses the importance that efforts aimed at nuclear non-proliferation should be parallel to simultaneous efforts aiming at nuclear disarmament. The Group stresses its concern at the threat to humanity posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and of their possible use or threat of use. The Group also reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that, in pursuit of the full, effective and urgent implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, and building upon the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, the 2010 Review Conference agreed on an action plan on nuclear disarmament that includes concrete steps for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the Group strongly calls for prompt and full implementation of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses deep concern at the continued lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, which could undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty. The Group also deeply regrets the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. The negotiations of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame, including a nuclear weapons convention, is necessary and should commence without any further delay. In that regard, the Group reiterates its call to establish, as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on</p>

nuclear disarmament and recalls action 6 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament, through which all States have agreed that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 12) In this context, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reiterates its call on the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a balanced and comprehensive programme of work. In this regard, the Group expresses its appreciation to the Algerian presidency of the Conference, under which decision CD/1864 (2009) was adopted and was not implemented, and to the subsequent presidencies from the members and observer States of the Non-Aligned Movement, including the most recent, the Egyptian presidency of the Conference, for its tireless efforts and for presenting a proposal contained in CD/1933 (2012).

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reconfirms that negotiations on a fissile materials treaty should be conducted on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein (Shannon mandate), taking into account nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, as well as all related issues, including the past production and existing stockpiles of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Group expresses concern over the attempts to limit the scope of the negotiations on a fissile material treaty as contained in the Shannon mandate, which was endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences. In this regard, the Group recognizes that non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Treaty have already agreed to a legally binding commitment not to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 21) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while recalling the Statement on the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons adopted by the XVI Ministerial Conference and Commemorative Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Bali, Indonesia, from 23 to 27 May 2011, reiterates its firm commitment to work for convening a high-level international conference to identify ways and means of eliminating nuclear weapons, at the earliest possible date, with the objective of an agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, to prohibit their development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer and use or threat of use, and to provide for their destruction.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 27) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms the validity of its working paper (see annex) entitled “Elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons”, which was submitted to the 2010 Review Conference in document NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47. The Group

is determined to integrate this action plan into the outcome document of the 2015 review process of the Treaty, and strongly calls for its integration. The Group calls in this regard for the speedy and full implementation by the nuclear-weapon States of all its measures in accordance with the proposed timeline and at a pace that makes up for the time elapsed.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 28) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reiterates its call for the establishment, as a matter of priority, of a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament in Main Committee I, mandated to focus on the issue of fulfilment of the obligations under article VI of the Treaty and on further practical measures required to achieve progress in that regard.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 29) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty notes with concern the lack of agreement on a number of its key priorities, including, inter alia, to begin negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention, and expresses its determination to continue collective efforts in pursuing the realization of its aforementioned priority in the 2015 review process of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A3) The Non-Aligned Movement proposes a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame that includes the following concrete steps and measures, as a basis for consideration by the Review Conference. The list of measures in each phase is indicative rather than exhaustive, and the order in which they are mentioned does not necessarily reflect their priority. Nevertheless, it should be understood that, in any nuclear disarmament programme, all steps and measures are inextricably linked.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:

- (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference;
- (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on:
 - (i) The cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites;
 - (ii) Measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development;
- (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies;
- (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time

frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention); (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones; (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A5) Full implementation by the nuclear-weapon States of their disarmament obligations and commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including those agreed at the 2000 Review Conference; acceleration of the negotiation process, in accordance with article VI; and implementation of the 13 practical steps.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A6) Conclusion of negotiations on further reductions of nuclear arsenals (START).

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A7) Moratorium on the production of fissile materials, pending conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A8) Placement of nuclear fissile material transferred from military to peaceful uses by nuclear-weapon States under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A9) Formal declaration of the decade 2010-2020 as the "Decade for nuclear disarmament" and realization of its objectives.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A10) Entry into force of the treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons and the establishment of a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance, including such measures as the: (a) Separation of nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles; (b) Placement of nuclear warheads in secure storage under international supervision, pending the removal of special nuclear materials from those warheads; (c) Transfer of nuclear materials, including fissile materials and delivery vehicles, to "peaceful purposes".

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A11) Preparation, under international auspices, of an inventory of nuclear arsenals, including fissile materials, nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A12) Progressive and balanced reduction of missiles intended for carrying nuclear warheads.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A13) Recommendation by the 2020 Review Conference to declare 2020 as the “Decade for the total elimination of nuclear weapons”.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A14) Full implementation of the treaty to eliminate all nuclear weapons and of its verification regime through the: (a) Elimination of all nuclear weapons; (b) Conversion of all facilities for the production of nuclear weapons to “peaceful purposes”; (c) Placement of nuclear facilities under safeguards, on a universal basis.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that, at successive conferences of Heads of State or Government of the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries and ministerial conferences of the Movement, it has been reiterated that improvements in existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, as envisaged in the Nuclear Posture Review of the United States of America, contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient unilateral statements made by each of the nuclear-weapon States. It has further been reaffirmed that these improvements and the development of new types of such weapons violate the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. While recalling the advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the Group believes that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as the only absolute guarantee against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States shall seriously refrain, in any circumstances, from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 9) In this regard, while deploring the strategic doctrines of the nuclear-weapon States and the strategic concept for the security of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which are based on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and maintain unjustifiable concepts on international security based on promoting and developing military alliances and nuclear deterrence policies, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to exclude completely the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from their military and security doctrines.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that the 2010 Review Conference “reaffirms and recognizes that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances from nuclear-weapon States which could strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime”. The Group, therefore, calls on the 2015 Review Conference, in addition to nuclear disarmament being its highest priority, to fully address this legitimate right as a matter of priority.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 13) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while noting the lack of progress since the re-establishment, in 1998, of an ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a universal legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, expresses concern that, despite long-standing requests by non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive such legally binding assurances, no tangible progress has been made in this regard. In this connection, the Group calls for the commencement, without further delay, of the negotiation for the conclusion of such an instrument.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.17, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty welcomes the signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by 183 States and its ratification by 159 States. In this context, the ratifications by Brunei Darussalam, Chad, Guatemala, Guinea and Indonesia are welcomed. The Group, in accordance with its long-standing and principled position in favour of the total elimination of all forms of nuclear weapons, supports the objectives of the Treaty, which is intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all nuclear test explosions, and to stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons in order to pave the way towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls action 16 of the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty and urges the nuclear-weapon States to commit to declaring to IAEA all weapon-grade fissile material and to place such material, as soon as practicable, under the supervision of IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes. The Group calls upon the Conference to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the fulfilment of these commitments through the establishment of an international mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the action, which should be made mandatory for the nuclear-weapon States.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for the establishment by the Review Conference of a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreement by the nuclear-weapon States.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while noting with satisfaction the convening of the first preparatory meeting for the Third Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, which was held in Vienna on 27 April 2012, calls upon the States parties and signatories to those treaties to put in place further forms of cooperation among themselves, their treaty agencies and other interested States.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty remains gravely concerned by the statement made by the then Prime Minister of Israel on 11 December 2006, in which he publicly admitted the possession of nuclear weapons by Israel. In this regard, the Group reaffirms the continued validity of the statement of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement on this subject as contained in document NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/19.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, in conformity with the Treaty, hereby declares its commitment to the effective prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms once again its determination to extend fullest cooperation and to exert utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 17) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty requests the establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the 2015 Review Conference to assess the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and reaffirmed by the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, as well as the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 18) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the establishment of a standing committee comprising members of the Bureau of the 2015 Review Conference to follow up intersessionally on the implementation of the recommendations by the Review Conference concerning Israel's prompt accession to the Treaty on the Non-

	<p>Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, and to report to the 2020 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 27) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty is determined to continue pursuing, as a matter of high priority, the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and section IV of the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty. In this regard, the Group urges all States parties, in this session of the Preparatory Committee, to shoulder their responsibility in order to prevent further negative repercussions of not implementing the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and section IV, including the convening of the Conference, as mandated by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty.</p>
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UN General Assembly	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 16) In this connection, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while noting the conclusion and entry into force of the New START Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America, confirms the validity of its position delivered at the time of adoption of resolution 65/61, entitled “Bilateral reductions of strategic nuclear arms and the new framework for strategic relations”. The Group further expresses concern that the domestic commitments to nuclear weapon modernization in exchange for ratification of this Treaty undermines the minimal reductions agreed upon in it.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 18) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group remains concerned that the deployment of national and strategic missile defence systems could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 66/27, the Group emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty urges States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist, in accordance with the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. In this context, the Group considers that the further</p>
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	<p>institutionalization of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status would be an important step towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 26) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus. The Group is also of the view that the Conference should lead, without further delay, to the universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East and the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, and to preserve the credibility of the Treaty.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">SSOD</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty urges States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist, in accordance with the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. In this context, the Group considers that the further institutionalization of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status would be an important step towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Test Ban and CTBT</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:</p> <p>(a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference; (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on: (i) The cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites; (ii) Measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development; (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies; (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time</p>

frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention); (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones; (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that, at successive conferences of Heads of State or Government of the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries and ministerial conferences of the Movement, it has been reiterated that improvements in existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, as envisaged in the Nuclear Posture Review of the United States of America, contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient unilateral statements made by each of the nuclear-weapon States. It has further been reaffirmed that these improvements and the development of new types of such weapons violate the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.17, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the only way to rid the world of the threat or use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination. In this regard, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a practical step on the road to nuclear disarmament and, therefore, cannot substitute for the objective of complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.17, Para 2) While underlining the significance of achieving the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly calls for immediate and unconditional cessation of all nuclear weapon tests and the closure of all nuclear weapon test sites. In this regard, the Group is of the firm view that all States parties that have not yet done so should close and dismantle, as soon as feasible and in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner, any remaining sites for nuclear test explosions and their associated infrastructure, and prohibit completely nuclear weapons research and development, and also refrain from conducting nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, or nuclear weapon test explosions in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapons system, which would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.17, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls and reaffirms once again the commitment of all States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to ending all nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions and thereby constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group expresses grave concern at the nuclear weapon test explosions in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapons systems as well as the development of new types of nuclear weapons, which may result in the resumption of tests and a lowering of the nuclear threshold. Accordingly the Group strongly calls on the nuclear-weapon States to put an immediate end to such activities and refrain from any other action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, pending its entry into force.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.17, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that the improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient statements on negative security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States and violate their commitments undertaken at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.17, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty welcomes the signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by 183 States and its ratification by 159 States. In this context, the ratifications by Brunei Darussalam, Chad, Guatemala, Guinea and Indonesia are welcomed. The Group, in accordance with its long-standing and principled position in favour of the total elimination of all forms of nuclear weapons, supports the objectives of the Treaty, which is intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all nuclear test explosions, and to stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons in order to pave the way towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.17, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by all the nuclear-weapon States, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Group reiterates that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States Signatories, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to nuclear disarmament, would be essential.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.17, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, not only because they are among the 44 States listed in annex 2 to the Treaty, but also because, on account of their position, they are expected to lead in making the ban on tests a reality. It will be possible to determine the success of the

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty only when it has been signed and ratified, in particular by the five nuclear-weapon States and those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. The Group is of the firm belief that the early achievement of the goal of the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, through accession of the only non-parties to this instrument, would be essential to achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.17, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that positive decisions by the nuclear-weapon States would have the desired impact on facilitating the progress towards entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Early ratification of this Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States would pave the way and encourage the remaining required countries, especially those with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the Treaty. The failure of one major nuclear-weapon State to ratify the Treaty, and its not supporting the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization through rejection of one of the main elements of the Treaty's verification regime, is undermining this important instrument against nuclear testing.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.17, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation, thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear devices, as well as nuclear weapons based on new physical principles. The nuclear-weapon States stated at that time that the only steps to be followed would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons, which would not involve nuclear explosions. In that regard, the Group calls upon those States to continue to refrain from conducting any type of nuclear tests for the modernization, development or further improvement of nuclear weapons. The Group wishes to re-emphasize the principles of the non-proliferation regime, both vertically and horizontally.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.17, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores the importance of the five nuclear-weapon States maintaining and observing their unilateral moratoriums on nuclear weapon tests since the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. However, the Group believes that those moratoriums do not substitute the entry into force of the Treaty and its ratification.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.17, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the modernization or development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the assurances given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear

	<p>weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, States should refrain from any actions contrary to its objectives and purpose. In this context, the Group is seriously concerned by the decision of a nuclear-weapon State to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear testing to 18 months as a setback to the 2000 Review Conference agreements. It is the view of the Group that such decisions undermine the validity of the commitment to declared moratoriums as well as the commitments under the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has been envisaged as the first of 13 practical steps leading to nuclear disarmament. The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty also remains a cause for concern.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.17, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the need for increased attention to the problems of safety and contamination related to the discontinuation of nuclear operations formerly associated with nuclear weapons programmes, including where appropriate, the safe resettlement of any displaced human populations and the restoration of economic productivity to affected areas. In this regard, the Group acknowledges the existence of a special responsibility towards the affected people and areas, including those in the former United Nations Trust Territories who have been adversely affected as a result of the nuclear weapon tests conducted in the past.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Conference on Disarmament</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses deep concern at the continued lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, which could undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty. The Group also deeply regrets the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. The negotiations of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame, including a nuclear weapons convention, is necessary and should commence without any further delay. In that regard, the Group reiterates its call to establish, as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament and recalls action 6 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament, through which all States have agreed that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 12) In this context, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reiterates its call on the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a balanced and comprehensive programme of work. In this regard, the Group expresses its appreciation to the Algerian presidency of the Conference, under which decision CD/1864 (2009) was adopted and was not implemented, and to the</p>

subsequent presidencies from the members and observer States of the Non-Aligned Movement, including the most recent, the Egyptian presidency of the Conference, for its tireless efforts and for presenting a proposal contained in CD/1933 (2012).

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty remains concerned by the continued inability of the Conference on Disarmament to resume its negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, including all practical measures to eliminate in an irreversible manner the past production and existing stockpiles of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. In this context, the Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reconfirms that negotiations on a fissile materials treaty should be conducted on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein (Shannon mandate), taking into account nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, as well as all related issues, including the past production and existing stockpiles of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Group expresses concern over the attempts to limit the scope of the negotiations on a fissile material treaty as contained in the Shannon mandate, which was endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences. In this regard, the Group recognizes that non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Treaty have already agreed to a legally binding commitment not to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 18) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group remains concerned that the deployment of national and strategic missile defence systems could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 66/27, the Group emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 13) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while noting the lack of progress since the re-establishment, in 1998, of an ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a universal legally

	<p>binding instrument on effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, expresses concern that, despite long-standing requests by non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive such legally binding assurances, no tangible progress has been made in this regard. In this connection, the Group calls for the commencement, without further delay, of the negotiation for the conclusion of such an instrument.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 12) In this regard, the Group supports furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide nuclear disarmament and the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Group further urges the Conference to examine such legally binding verification arrangements and the means of making them operational, with the aim of ensuring the realization of that objective.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls action 16 of the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty and urges the nuclear-weapon States to commit to declaring to IAEA all weapon-grade fissile material and to place such material, as soon as practicable, under the supervision of IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes. The Group calls upon the Conference to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the fulfilment of these commitments through the establishment of an international mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the action, which should be made mandatory for the nuclear-weapon States.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">UN Disarmament Commission</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty urges States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist, in accordance with the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. In this context, the Group considers that the further institutionalization of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status would be an important step towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">International Atomic Energy Agency</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A8) Placement of nuclear fissile material transferred from military to peaceful uses by nuclear-weapon States under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.</p>

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) mandates the Agency, in support of the full realization of the inalienable right under article IV of the NPT, to make provision, in accordance with the statute, for materials, services, equipment, and facilities to meet the needs of research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes, including the production of electric power, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. To ensure the realization of these goals, all States parties, particularly developed States, shall extend their assistance, as requested by States parties that are States members of IAEA, in the provision of nuclear equipment, material, technology and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes, with a view to achieving the maximum benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities for peaceful purposes.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 5) In this connection, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recognizes the major and important role of IAEA in assisting States parties, particularly developing States, in planning for and using nuclear science and technology. The Group stresses the importance of nuclear knowledge-sharing and the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries to sustain and further enhance their scientific and technological capabilities, thereby also contributing to their socioeconomic development. Moreover, the Group emphasizes that the activities of IAEA in the field of technical cooperation, nuclear power and non-power applications would contribute, in an important way, to meeting energy needs, improving human health, including the application of nuclear technology in cancer therapy, combating poverty, protecting the environment, developing agriculture, managing the use of water resources and optimizing industrial processes. The Group further highlights that these activities, as well as bilateral and other multilateral cooperation, would contribute to achieving the objectives set forth in article IV of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, as the main vehicle for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, should continue to be formulated and implemented in accordance with the statute of IAEA and the agreed guiding principles as contained in INFCIRC/267, as well as the decisions of IAEA policymaking organs. The Group reiterates that the current guidelines and criteria for the selection of technical cooperation projects are robust and effective, and that no additional criteria should be imposed for fulfilling the above-mentioned objectives.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that, in 2005, IAEA and its then-Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei, were awarded the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize, and reiterates the importance it attaches to the impartiality, professionalism and integrity of the Agency. While expressing its full

confidence in that impartiality and professionalism, the Group strongly rejects any attempt by any State to politicize the work of the Agency, including its technical cooperation programme, in violation of its statute, as well as any pressure or interference in its activities that could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility. In this connection, the Group also expresses its rejection of any attempt by any State party to use the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme as a tool for political purposes, which would be in violation of the statute of the Agency. The Group reaffirms that choices and decisions of each State party to the Treaty in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty takes note of the adoption by the IAEA Board of Governors, through a vote, in 2010 and 2011, of three proposals of assurance of supply mechanisms within the framework of the multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. In the view of the Group, the multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle should be economically viable, sustainable, non-discriminatory, predictable and transparent under the auspices of IAEA and any other possible regional and multilateral forums. The Group emphasizes that all technical, legal, political and economic implications and complexities surrounding this sensitive matter shall be fully taken into account. The Group also stresses that any decision on proposals regarding multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle shall be made by consensus following wide, integral, comprehensive and transparent multilateral consultations, with the participation of all IAEA member States and taking into account the interests of all its member States. Furthermore, the Group strongly emphasizes that any proposal from IAEA must be consistent with its statute, without any prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy and sciences, in all its aspects, for peaceful purposes, and if they so decide, to develop a full national nuclear fuel cycle, according to its article IV.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly rejects, and calls for the immediate removal of, any restrictions or limitations posed on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including restrictions on exports to other States parties of nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes, since such restrictions or limitations are inconsistent with the provisions and object and purpose of the Treaty. In this regard, the Group stresses that the technical cooperation and assistance provided by IAEA in meeting the needs of its member States for material, equipment and technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall not be subject to any political, economic, military or other conditions incompatible with the provisions of its statute.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology, equipment or

material for peaceful purposes based on their sensitivity but stipulates only that such technology, equipment and material must be subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards. In the view of the Group, provisions of article IV of the Treaty are explicit in that regard, leaving no room for reinterpretation or setting conditions for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by non-nuclear-weapon States. The Group is of the view that any interpretation that is used as a pretext to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is inconsistent with the objectives of the Treaty and, therefore, the unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes must be ensured.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 16) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty firmly believes that fostering the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by providing a framework of confidence and cooperation within which those uses can take place, is one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. Moreover, the Group emphasizes that cooperation to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world is the core objective enshrined in the statute of IAEA. Accordingly, the Group strongly encourages all States parties to actively cooperate, among themselves and through IAEA, in the peaceful uses and applications of nuclear energy, including through international technical cooperation.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 17) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. The Group further emphasizes that non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access by developing countries to material, equipment or technology for peaceful purposes, which such countries require for their continued development. Furthermore, such arrangements must pursue and implement, without exception, the condition of adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for the supply to or cooperation with States not party to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 19) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores that IAEA, under its statutory obligations, pursues the goals of technical cooperation in peaceful applications of nuclear energy as one of the three pillars of its activities. In order to meet the objectives of technical cooperation for peaceful purposes, as enshrined in the statute of IAEA and in the Treaty, IAEA has to maintain a balance between technical cooperation and other activities. The Group believes that all States parties to the Treaty that are States members of IAEA have to ensure that the Technical Cooperation Programme remains firm and sustainable through sufficient, assured and predictable financial and human resources. In this regard, the efficacy of the Programme can best be achieved by ensuring that its formulation and strategies are in strict accordance with the needs and the requests of developing countries.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 20) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty affirms the need to strengthen the radiological safety and protection systems at facilities utilizing radioactive materials and at radioactive waste management facilities, including the safe transportation of these materials. The Group reaffirms the need to strengthen existing international regulations relating to the safety and security of transportation of such materials. While reiterating the need to take necessary measures to prevent any dumping of nuclear or radioactive wastes, the Group calls for the effective implementation of the Code of Practice on the IAEA International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste as a means of enhancing the protection of all States from the dumping of radioactive wastes on their territories.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 21) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recognizes that the primary responsibility for nuclear safety rests with individual States. The Group reaffirms the central role of IAEA in nuclear safety-related matters, including through the establishment of nuclear safety standards. The Group stresses that IAEA must retain centrality in this field, owing to its mandatory functions and longstanding expertise. The Group stresses that any possible review of nuclear safety standards at the global level must be carried out within IAEA in an inclusive, gradual and transparent manner, with the guidance and participation of and in consultation with all member States, and shall incorporate the views of all member States. The Group also calls for the implementation of the Nuclear Safety Action Plan endorsed by the General Conference of IAEA in September 2011.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 23) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented without exception through the strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not party to the Treaty. In the view of the Group, new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 25) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty once again reaffirms the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities, operational or under construction, poses a threat to international peace and security and a great danger to human beings and the environment and constitutes a grave violation of international law, the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and the regulations of IAEA. In this regard, the Group recognizes the need for a comprehensive

multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks or the threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Moreover, the Group strongly urges all States to undertake unequivocally, in accordance with the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from attacks or the threat of attacks on nuclear facilities, operational or under construction, devoted to peaceful purposes.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 26) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern about certain unilateral, politically motivated restrictions and/or limitations posed on developing countries which seriously hamper the exercise of the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes, in this regard, that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be in a manner designed to comply with article IV of the Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 27) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while stressing the importance of safeguards, underlines the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the Agency's statute and safeguards agreements. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidents of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime, for its protection, needs to be highly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency. The Group recalls IAEA General Conference resolution GC(56)/RES/13, paragraph 27, in which the IAEA Director General is urged to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of classified safeguards information and requested to continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of classified safeguards information within the Secretariat.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons expresses its strong concern at the growing resort to unilateralism and unilaterally imposed prescriptions and, in this context, strongly underlines and affirms that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter of the

United Nations, provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues. In this regard, the Group underlines that the multilateral mechanism established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the most appropriate way to address verification and safeguards issues. At the same time, the Group emphasizes that the work of the Agency with regard to safeguards and verification has to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of its statute and safeguards agreements.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the IAEA safeguards system and urges all States that have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible, in order to achieve the universality of the comprehensive safeguards. The 2000 Review Conference considered the universality of the comprehensive safeguards as a main objective in order to consolidate and enhance the verification system for the non-proliferation regime. However, in the view of the Group, additional measures related to the safeguards shall not affect the rights of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, which are already committed to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and have renounced the nuclear-weapon option. The Group also expresses its strong rejection of attempts by any member State to use the technical cooperation programme of IAEA as a tool for political purposes in violation of its statute.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty are a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls on all States not parties to the Treaty to accede, without any further delay and any preconditions and as non-nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group also calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under this Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty confirms that all States parties to the Treaty shall refrain from the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to States not parties to the Treaty unless they are placed under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards. In this connection, the Group confirms that the obligation under article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials

and technology for peaceful purposes, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restrictions or limitations on the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty fully recognizes that IAEA, an independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for the verification of the fulfilment of safeguard obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that it is fundamental to make a clear distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures and that such voluntary undertakings shall not be turned into legal safeguards obligations. In this regard, the Group also emphasizes that IAEA shall ensure avoiding any ultra vires acts that would jeopardize its integrity and credibility. The Group urges States parties to the Treaty to maintain and strengthen the technical character of IAEA consistent with its statute.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 9) With respect to financial aspects of the safeguards, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the differentiated nature of the financial obligations undertaken by member States of IAEA should be recognized and respected by the Agency in its work.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores also that the principle of balance between the promotional and other statutory activities of the Agency, in particular verification and safeguards-related activities, needs to be strictly observed.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards, including reporting, in accordance with the Agency's statute and safeguards agreements. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on the nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidents of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime, for its protection, needs to be highly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 12) In this context, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the implementation of IAEA resolutions GC(54)/RES/11 and GC(56)/RES/13 on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system and application of the Model Additional Protocol, adopted by the General Conference of the Agency at its fifty-fourth and fifty-sixth sessions, respectively, in which the General Conference, “Stressing the importance of maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the Agency’s statute and safeguards agreements”, acknowledged “the concerns expressed by the Director General on the need to protect safeguards confidential information within the secretariat and his announcement of additional measures to protect such information”, accordingly urged the Director General “to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of safeguards confidential information”, and requested that he “continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of safeguards confidential information”.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the necessity of reporting of IAEA on the implementation of safeguards being factual and technically based and reflecting appropriate reference to the relevant provisions of safeguards agreements, while ensuring the protection of confidential information.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the need to strictly observe the provisions of the IAEA statute, including article XII, which outlines the mandate of the Agency in verifying compliance with safeguards agreements and, in particular, that any non-compliance has first to be reported by the Agency’s inspectors.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the statutory role of IAEA in nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the capability of the Agency to verify nuclear disarmament agreements.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 16) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern about certain unilateral politically motivated attempts to hamper exercising the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes in this regard that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be “in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear

activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing ...”.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty fully recognizes that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an independent intergovernmental, science- and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for verification of the fulfilment of safeguard obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while supporting the verification activities of IAEA, underlines the importance of strict observance of the IAEA statute and relevant comprehensive safeguards agreements in conducting verification activities.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 5) In this connection, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while stressing the importance of safeguards, underlines the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the Agency’s statute and safeguards agreements. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on the nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidences of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime, for its protection, needs to be significantly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency. The Group recalls IAEA General Conference resolution GC(56)/RES/13, paragraph 27, in which the IAEA Director General is urged to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of classified safeguards information and is requested to continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of classified safeguards information within the secretariat.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that all States members of IAEA shall strictly observe its statute and that nothing should be done to undermine its authority. Furthermore, the Group calls upon all States to avoid any pressure or interference in the Agency’s activities, especially its verification process, that could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes the need to achieve worldwide application of the comprehensive safeguards system and calls upon all nuclear-weapon States and all States not parties to the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group

calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the statutory role of IAEA on nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the Agency's capability of verifying nuclear disarmament agreements.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 12) In this regard, the Group supports furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide nuclear disarmament and the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Group further urges the Conference to examine such legally binding verification arrangements and the means of making them operational, with the aim of ensuring the realization of that objective.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls action 16 of the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty and urges the nuclear-weapon States to commit to declaring to IAEA all weapon-grade fissile material and to place such material, as soon as practicable, under the supervision of IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes. The Group calls upon the Conference to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the fulfilment of these commitments through the establishment of an international mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the action, which should be made mandatory for the nuclear-weapon States.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which reaffirmed the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty. The Group recalls that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further recalls that the 2010 Review Conference, by taking note of the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to

	<p>a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, recalled the reaffirmation by the 2000 Review Conference of the importance of Israel’s accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The Conference also reaffirmed the urgency and importance of achieving universality of the Treaty and called on all States in the Middle East that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States so as to achieve its universality at an early date.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern that no progress has been achieved with regard to Israel’s accession to the Treaty, and placing all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, and over the delay in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, all of which are objectives and priorities that were stressed in Review Conferences of the Treaty in 1995, 2000 and 2010.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty demands that Israel, the only country in the region that has neither joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons nor declared its intention to do so, renounce possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the Treaty without any precondition or further delay as a non-nuclear-weapon State, place promptly all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and conduct all its nuclear-related activities in full conformity with the non-proliferation regime, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty, in particular in the Middle East.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, in conformity with the Treaty, hereby declares its commitment to the effective prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 18) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the establishment of a standing committee comprising members of the Bureau of the 2015 Review Conference to follow up intersessionally on the implementation of the recommendations by the Review Conference concerning Israel’s prompt accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, and to report to the 2020 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee.</p>
<p>UN Security Council</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty demands that Israel, the only country in the region that has neither joined the Treaty on the Non-</p>

	<p>Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons nor declared its intention to do so, renounce possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the Treaty without any precondition or further delay as a non-nuclear-weapon State, place promptly all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and conduct all its nuclear-related activities in full conformity with the non-proliferation regime, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty, in particular in the Middle East.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 26) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus. The Group is also of the view that the Conference should lead, without further delay, to the universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East and the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, and to preserve the credibility of the Treaty.</p>
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Outer Space	
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International Cooperation on Outer Space	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 18) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group remains concerned that the deployment of national and strategic missile defence systems could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 66/27, the Group emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.</p>
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International Treaty on Outer Space	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 18) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group remains concerned that the deployment of national and strategic missile defence systems could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 66/27, the Group emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.</p>
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<p>Missile Defense Systems</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 18) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group remains concerned that the deployment of national and strategic missile defence systems could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 66/27, the Group emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Nonproliferation</p>	
<p>Proliferation-Sensitive Information Safeguards</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 27) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while stressing the importance of safeguards, underlines the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the Agency's statute and safeguards agreements. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidents of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime, for its protection, needs to be highly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency. The Group recalls IAEA General Conference resolution GC(56)/RES/13, paragraph 27, in which the IAEA Director General is urged to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of classified safeguards information and requested to continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of classified safeguards information within the Secretariat.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards, including reporting, in accordance with the Agency's statute and safeguards agreements. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on the nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidents of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime, for its protection, needs to be highly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential</p>

	<p>information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 12) In this context, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the implementation of IAEA resolutions GC(54)/RES/11 and GC(56)/RES/13 on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system and application of the Model Additional Protocol, adopted by the General Conference of the Agency at its fifty-fourth and fifty-sixth sessions, respectively, in which the General Conference, “Stressing the importance of maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the Agency’s statute and safeguards agreements”, acknowledged “the concerns expressed by the Director General on the need to protect safeguards confidential information within the secretariat and his announcement of additional measures to protect such information”, accordingly urged the Director General “to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of safeguards confidential information”, and requested that he “continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of safeguards confidential information”.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the necessity of reporting of IAEA on the implementation of safeguards being factual and technically based and reflecting appropriate reference to the relevant provisions of safeguards agreements, while ensuring the protection of confidential information.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 5) In this connection, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while stressing the importance of safeguards, underlines the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the Agency’s statute and safeguards agreements. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on the nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidences of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime, for its protection, needs to be significantly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency. The Group recalls IAEA General Conference resolution GC(56)/RES/13, paragraph 27, in which the IAEA Director General is urged to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of classified safeguards information and is requested to continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of classified safeguards information within the secretariat.</p>
<p>Nonproliferation and Noncompliance</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the need to strictly observe</p>

	<p>the provisions of the IAEA statute, including article XII, which outlines the mandate of the Agency in verifying compliance with safeguards agreements and, in particular, that any non-compliance has first to be reported by the Agency's inspectors.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Nonproliferation and Peaceful Uses</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty firmly believes that the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of article IV of the NPT plays a crucial role in achieving the object and purpose of the Treaty. In this regard, the Group also firmly believes that any measure aiming at hampering, fully or partly, the fullest exercise of the inalienable rights under article IV of the Treaty, would seriously jeopardize the delicate balance between rights and obligations of States parties, in contravention with the Treaty's object and purpose, and would widen the gap between developed and developing countries in this field.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 8) In this regard, while recognizing that a diverse portfolio of energy sources will be needed to allow access to sustainable energy and electricity resources in all regions of the world, and that States parties may pursue different ways to achieve their energy security and climate protection goals, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty once again acknowledges and reaffirms that each State party, in line with its national requirements and in accordance with its rights and obligations under the Treaty, has a sovereign right to define its national energy and fuel-cycle policies, that, inter alia, includes an inalienable right to develop, for peaceful purposes, a full national nuclear fuel cycle.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty takes note of the adoption by the IAEA Board of Governors, through a vote, in 2010 and 2011, of three proposals of assurance of supply mechanisms within the framework of the multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. In the view of the Group, the multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle should be economically viable, sustainable, non-discriminatory, predictable and transparent under the auspices of IAEA and any other possible regional and multilateral forums. The Group emphasizes that all technical, legal, political and economic implications and complexities surrounding this sensitive matter shall be fully taken into account. The Group also stresses that any decision on proposals regarding multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle shall be made by consensus following wide, integral, comprehensive and transparent multilateral consultations, with the participation of all IAEA member States and taking into account the interests of all its member States. Furthermore, the Group strongly emphasizes that any proposal from IAEA must be consistent with its statute, without any prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy and sciences, in all its aspects, for peaceful purposes, and if they so decide, to develop a full national nuclear fuel cycle, according to its article IV.</p>

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 10) In this context, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty rejects, in principle, any attempt aimed at discouraging certain peaceful nuclear activities on the grounds of their alleged “sensitivity.” The Group further underlines that concerns related to nuclear non-proliferation shall not, in any way, restrict the inalienable right of any State party to develop all aspects of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, without discrimination, as stipulated in article IV of the Treaty. In this regard, the Group expresses its concern that some States parties have set conditions such as concluding and bringing into force an additional protocol on nuclear export in contravention of article IV of the Treaty, and calls upon those States parties to promptly remove any such condition.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly rejects, and calls for the immediate removal of, any restrictions or limitations posed on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including restrictions on exports to other States parties of nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes, since such restrictions or limitations are inconsistent with the provisions and object and purpose of the Treaty. In this regard, the Group stresses that the technical cooperation and assistance provided by IAEA in meeting the needs of its member States for material, equipment and technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall not be subject to any political, economic, military or other conditions incompatible with the provisions of its statute.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 14) In the view of the Group, transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with the Treaty shall be supported and pursued in good faith without discrimination. The elimination of constraints inconsistent with the requirements of the Treaty would ensure that article IV of the Treaty is fully implemented with regard to the facilitation of transfer of nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes among the States parties.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology, equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their sensitivity but stipulates only that such technology, equipment and material must be subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards. In the view of the Group, provisions of article IV of the Treaty are explicit in that regard, leaving no room for reinterpretation or setting conditions for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by non-nuclear-weapon States. The Group is of the view that any interpretation that is used as a pretext to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is inconsistent with the objectives of the Treaty and, therefore, the unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes must be ensured.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 17) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. The Group further emphasizes that non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access by developing countries to material, equipment or technology for peaceful purposes, which such countries require for their continued development. Furthermore, such arrangements must pursue and implement, without exception, the condition of adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for the supply to or cooperation with States not party to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 22) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that measures and initiatives aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and nuclear security must not be used as a pretext or leverage to violate, deny or restrict the inalienable right of developing countries to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 23) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented without exception through the strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not party to the Treaty. In the view of the Group, new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 24) In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores the strong call by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that all States parties shall ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated particularly in its articles I, II and III, and with the decision on the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 26) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern about certain unilateral, politically motivated restrictions and/or limitations posed on developing countries which seriously hamper the exercise of the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes, in this

regard, that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be in a manner designed to comply with article IV of the Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the IAEA safeguards system and urges all States that have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible, in order to achieve the universality of the comprehensive safeguards. The 2000 Review Conference considered the universality of the comprehensive safeguards as a main objective in order to consolidate and enhance the verification system for the non-proliferation regime. However, in the view of the Group, additional measures related to the safeguards shall not affect the rights of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, which are already committed to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and have renounced the nuclear-weapon option. The Group also expresses its strong rejection of attempts by any member State to use the technical cooperation programme of IAEA as a tool for political purposes in violation of its statute.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 5) In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such agreement would be concluded with the aim to: (a) Ensure full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; (b) Provide baseline data regarding fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and prevent further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (c) Strictly observe the prohibition of transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, the object and the purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, materials and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not parties to the Treaty, without exception.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty confirms that all States parties to the Treaty shall refrain from the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to States not parties to the Treaty unless they are placed under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards. In this connection, the Group confirms that the obligation under article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology for peaceful purposes, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restrictions or limitations on

the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty fully recognizes that IAEA, an independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for the verification of the fulfilment of safeguard obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that it is fundamental to make a clear distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures and that such voluntary undertakings shall not be turned into legal safeguards obligations. In this regard, the Group also emphasizes that IAEA shall ensure avoiding any ultra vires acts that would jeopardize its integrity and credibility. The Group urges States parties to the Treaty to maintain and strengthen the technical character of IAEA consistent with its statute.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 16) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern about certain unilateral politically motivated attempts to hamper exercising the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes in this regard that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be “in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing ...”.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that, under article III (1) of the Treaty, each non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards “for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 2) In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also reaffirms the importance and calls for strict observance of article III (3) of the Treaty, by which the required safeguards “shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international

	<p>cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the preamble of the Treaty”.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty fully recognizes that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an independent intergovernmental, science- and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for verification of the fulfilment of safeguard obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 8) In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of: (a) Ensuring full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; (b) Providing baseline data regarding the fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (c) Strictly observing the prohibition of transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, object and purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, mindful of the importance of article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes, reiterates that obligations under that article provide credible assurances for States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to other States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.</p>
<p>Peaceful Uses</p>	
<p>Access to Nuclear Technology</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further reaffirms the importance of the right of all States parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Moreover, the Group stresses the importance of full compliance with the obligations under article IV (2) of the Treaty, which stipulates that Parties to the Treaty in a position to</p>

do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) mandates the Agency, in support of the full realization of the inalienable right under article IV of the NPT, to make provision, in accordance with the statute, for materials, services, equipment, and facilities to meet the needs of research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes, including the production of electric power, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. To ensure the realization of these goals, all States parties, particularly developed States, shall extend their assistance, as requested by States parties that are States members of IAEA, in the provision of nuclear equipment, material, technology and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes, with a view to achieving the maximum benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities for peaceful purposes.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 5) In this connection, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recognizes the major and important role of IAEA in assisting States parties, particularly developing States, in planning for and using nuclear science and technology. The Group stresses the importance of nuclear knowledge-sharing and the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries to sustain and further enhance their scientific and technological capabilities, thereby also contributing to their socioeconomic development. Moreover, the Group emphasizes that the activities of IAEA in the field of technical cooperation, nuclear power and non-power applications would contribute, in an important way, to meeting energy needs, improving human health, including the application of nuclear technology in cancer therapy, combating poverty, protecting the environment, developing agriculture, managing the use of water resources and optimizing industrial processes. The Group further highlights that these activities, as well as bilateral and other multilateral cooperation, would contribute to achieving the objectives set forth in article IV of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, as the main vehicle for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, should continue to be formulated and implemented in accordance with the statute of IAEA and the agreed guiding principles as contained in INFCIRC/267, as well as the decisions of IAEA policymaking organs. The Group reiterates that the current guidelines and criteria for the selection of technical cooperation projects are robust and effective, and that no additional criteria should be imposed for fulfilling the above-mentioned objectives.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that, in 2005, IAEA and its then-Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei, were awarded the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize, and reiterates the importance it attaches to the impartiality, professionalism and integrity of the Agency. While expressing its full confidence in that impartiality and professionalism, the Group strongly rejects any attempt by any State to politicize the work of the Agency, including its technical cooperation programme, in violation of its statute, as well as any pressure or interference in its activities that could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility. In this connection, the Group also expresses its rejection of any attempt by any State party to use the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme as a tool for political purposes, which would be in violation of the statute of the Agency. The Group reaffirms that choices and decisions of each State party to the Treaty in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 8) In this regard, while recognizing that a diverse portfolio of energy sources will be needed to allow access to sustainable energy and electricity resources in all regions of the world, and that States parties may pursue different ways to achieve their energy security and climate protection goals, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty once again acknowledges and reaffirms that each State party, in line with its national requirements and in accordance with its rights and obligations under the Treaty, has a sovereign right to define its national energy and fuel-cycle policies, that, inter alia, includes an inalienable right to develop, for peaceful purposes, a full national nuclear fuel cycle.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty takes note of the adoption by the IAEA Board of Governors, through a vote, in 2010 and 2011, of three proposals of assurance of supply mechanisms within the framework of the multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. In the view of the Group, the multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle should be economically viable, sustainable, non-discriminatory, predictable and transparent under the auspices of IAEA and any other possible regional and multilateral forums. The Group emphasizes that all technical, legal, political and economic implications and complexities surrounding this sensitive matter shall be fully taken into account. The Group also stresses that any decision on proposals regarding multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle shall be made by consensus following wide, integral, comprehensive and transparent multilateral consultations, with the participation of all IAEA member States and taking into account the interests of all its member States. Furthermore, the Group strongly emphasizes that any proposal from IAEA must be consistent with its statute, without any prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy and sciences, in all its aspects, for peaceful purposes, and if they so decide, to develop a full national nuclear fuel cycle, according to its article IV.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 10) In this context, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty rejects, in principle, any attempt aimed at discouraging certain peaceful nuclear activities on the grounds of their alleged “sensitivity.” The Group further underlines that concerns related to nuclear non-proliferation shall not, in any way, restrict the inalienable right of any State party to develop all aspects of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, without discrimination, as stipulated in article IV of the Treaty. In this regard, the Group expresses its concern that some States parties have set conditions such as concluding and bringing into force an additional protocol on nuclear export in contravention of article IV of the Treaty, and calls upon those States parties to promptly remove any such condition.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines that all the parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this regard, the Group stresses particularly the obligation of developed countries to promote the legitimate need of the developing countries to nuclear energy by fully respecting this right with a view to achieving the widest benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the contribution that uses of nuclear energy can make to progress in general and to helping overcome the technological and economic disparities between developed and developing States parties to the Treaty in particular. The Group firmly believes that, as a fundamental principle, in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment shall be given to the non-nuclear-weapons States parties to the Treaty, particularly taking into account the needs of developing countries.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly rejects, and calls for the immediate removal of, any restrictions or limitations posed on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including restrictions on exports to other States parties of nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes, since such restrictions or limitations are inconsistent with the provisions and object and purpose of the Treaty. In this regard, the Group stresses that the technical cooperation and assistance provided by IAEA in meeting the needs of its member States for material, equipment and technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall not be subject to any political, economic, military or other conditions incompatible with the provisions of its statute.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 14) In the view of the Group, transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with the Treaty shall be supported and

pursued in good faith without discrimination. The elimination of constraints inconsistent with the requirements of the Treaty would ensure that article IV of the Treaty is fully implemented with regard to the facilitation of transfer of nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes among the States parties.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology, equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their sensitivity but stipulates only that such technology, equipment and material must be subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards. In the view of the Group, provisions of article IV of the Treaty are explicit in that regard, leaving no room for reinterpretation or setting conditions for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by non-nuclear-weapon States. The Group is of the view that any interpretation that is used as a pretext to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is inconsistent with the objectives of the Treaty and, therefore, the unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes must be ensured.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 16) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty firmly believes that fostering the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by providing a framework of confidence and cooperation within which those uses can take place, is one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. Moreover, the Group emphasizes that cooperation to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world is the core objective enshrined in the statute of IAEA. Accordingly, the Group strongly encourages all States parties to actively cooperate, among themselves and through IAEA, in the peaceful uses and applications of nuclear energy, including through international technical cooperation.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 17) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. The Group further emphasizes that non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access by developing countries to material, equipment or technology for peaceful purposes, which such countries require for their continued development. Furthermore, such arrangements must pursue and implement, without exception, the condition of adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for the supply to or cooperation with States not party to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 18) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty remains deeply concerned about the ability of certain States not party to the Treaty to obtain, in particular from some nuclear-weapon States, nuclear materials,

technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons. The Group strongly calls for the enforcement, without exception or further delay, of the total and complete prohibition, as stipulated in the Treaty, of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 19) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores that IAEA, under its statutory obligations, pursues the goals of technical cooperation in peaceful applications of nuclear energy as one of the three pillars of its activities. In order to meet the objectives of technical cooperation for peaceful purposes, as enshrined in the statute of IAEA and in the Treaty, IAEA has to maintain a balance between technical cooperation and other activities. The Group believes that all States parties to the Treaty that are States members of IAEA have to ensure that the Technical Cooperation Programme remains firm and sustainable through sufficient, assured and predictable financial and human resources. In this regard, the efficacy of the Programme can best be achieved by ensuring that its formulation and strategies are in strict accordance with the needs and the requests of developing countries.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 23) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented without exception through the strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not party to the Treaty. In the view of the Group, new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 24) In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores the strong call by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that all States parties shall ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated particularly in its articles I, II and III, and with the decision on the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 26) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern about certain unilateral, politically motivated restrictions and/or limitations posed on developing countries which seriously hamper the exercise of the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production

and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes, in this regard, that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be in a manner designed to comply with article IV of the Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the IAEA safeguards system and urges all States that have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible, in order to achieve the universality of the comprehensive safeguards. The 2000 Review Conference considered the universality of the comprehensive safeguards as a main objective in order to consolidate and enhance the verification system for the non-proliferation regime. However, in the view of the Group, additional measures related to the safeguards shall not affect the rights of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, which are already committed to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and have renounced the nuclear-weapon option. The Group also expresses its strong rejection of attempts by any member State to use the technical cooperation programme of IAEA as a tool for political purposes in violation of its statute.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty are a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 5) In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such agreement would be concluded with the aim to: (a) Ensure full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; (b) Provide baseline data regarding fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and prevent further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (c) Strictly observe the prohibition of transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, the object and the purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, materials and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not parties to the Treaty, without exception.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty confirms that all States parties to the Treaty shall refrain from the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to States not parties to the Treaty unless they are placed under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards. In this connection, the Group confirms that the obligation under article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology for peaceful purposes, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restrictions or limitations on the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty fully recognizes that IAEA, an independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for the verification of the fulfilment of safeguard obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 16) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern about certain unilateral politically motivated attempts to hamper exercising the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes in this regard that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be “in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing ...”.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 2) In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also reaffirms the importance and calls for strict observance of article III (3) of the Treaty, by which the required safeguards “shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the preamble of the Treaty”.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty fully recognizes that the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an independent intergovernmental, science- and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for verification of the fulfilment of safeguard obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 8) In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of: (a) Ensuring full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; (b) Providing baseline data regarding the fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (c) Strictly observing the prohibition of transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, object and purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, mindful of the importance of article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes, reiterates that obligations under that article provide credible assurances for States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to other States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, in conformity with the Treaty, hereby declares its commitment to the effective prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer, by any State, of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear-related scientific or technological fields to Israel. In this regard, the Group expresses its serious concern over Israeli scientists' continued access to the nuclear facilities of one nuclear-weapon State, which has potentially serious negative implications on the security of the region as well as the reliability of the global non-proliferation regime.

<p style="text-align: center;">Attack or Threat of Attack Against Peaceful Nuclear Facilities</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 25) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty once again reaffirms the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities, operational or under construction, poses a threat to international peace and security and a great danger to human beings and the environment and constitutes a grave violation of international law, the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and the regulations of IAEA. In this regard, the Group recognizes the need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks or the threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Moreover, the Group strongly urges all States to undertake unequivocally, in accordance with the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from attacks or the threat of attacks on nuclear facilities, operational or under construction, devoted to peaceful purposes.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">UN and IAEA Authority</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) mandates the Agency, in support of the full realization of the inalienable right under article IV of the NPT, to make provision, in accordance with the statute, for materials, services, equipment, and facilities to meet the needs of research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes, including the production of electric power, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. To ensure the realization of these goals, all States parties, particularly developed States, shall extend their assistance, as requested by States parties that are States members of IAEA, in the provision of nuclear equipment, material, technology and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes, with a view to achieving the maximum benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities for peaceful purposes.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 5) In this connection, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recognizes the major and important role of IAEA in assisting States parties, particularly developing States, in planning for and using nuclear science and technology. The Group stresses the importance of nuclear knowledge-sharing and the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries to sustain and further enhance their scientific and technological capabilities, thereby also contributing to their socioeconomic development. Moreover, the Group emphasizes that the activities of IAEA in the field of technical cooperation, nuclear power and non-power applications would contribute, in an important way, to meeting energy needs, improving human health, including the application of nuclear technology in cancer therapy, combating poverty, protecting the environment, developing agriculture, managing the use of water resources and optimizing industrial processes. The Group further highlights that these activities, as well as bilateral and other multilateral</p>

cooperation, would contribute to achieving the objectives set forth in article IV of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, as the main vehicle for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, should continue to be formulated and implemented in accordance with the statute of IAEA and the agreed guiding principles as contained in INFCIRC/267, as well as the decisions of IAEA policymaking organs. The Group reiterates that the current guidelines and criteria for the selection of technical cooperation projects are robust and effective, and that no additional criteria should be imposed for fulfilling the above-mentioned objectives.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that, in 2005, IAEA and its then-Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei, were awarded the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize, and reiterates the importance it attaches to the impartiality, professionalism and integrity of the Agency. While expressing its full confidence in that impartiality and professionalism, the Group strongly rejects any attempt by any State to politicize the work of the Agency, including its technical cooperation programme, in violation of its statute, as well as any pressure or interference in its activities that could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility. In this connection, the Group also expresses its rejection of any attempt by any State party to use the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme as a tool for political purposes, which would be in violation of the statute of the Agency. The Group reaffirms that choices and decisions of each State party to the Treaty in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty takes note of the adoption by the IAEA Board of Governors, through a vote, in 2010 and 2011, of three proposals of assurance of supply mechanisms within the framework of the multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. In the view of the Group, the multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle should be economically viable, sustainable, non-discriminatory, predictable and transparent under the auspices of IAEA and any other possible regional and multilateral forums. The Group emphasizes that all technical, legal, political and economic implications and complexities surrounding this sensitive matter shall be fully taken into account. The Group also stresses that any decision on proposals regarding multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle shall be made by consensus following wide, integral, comprehensive and transparent multilateral consultations, with the participation of all IAEA member States and taking into account the interests of all its member States. Furthermore, the Group strongly emphasizes that any proposal from IAEA must be consistent with its statute, without any prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy and sciences, in all its aspects, for peaceful purposes,

and if they so decide, to develop a full national nuclear fuel cycle, according to its article IV.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly rejects, and calls for the immediate removal of, any restrictions or limitations posed on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including restrictions on exports to other States parties of nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes, since such restrictions or limitations are inconsistent with the provisions and object and purpose of the Treaty. In this regard, the Group stresses that the technical cooperation and assistance provided by IAEA in meeting the needs of its member States for material, equipment and technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall not be subject to any political, economic, military or other conditions incompatible with the provisions of its statute.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology, equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their sensitivity but stipulates only that such technology, equipment and material must be subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards. In the view of the Group, provisions of article IV of the Treaty are explicit in that regard, leaving no room for reinterpretation or setting conditions for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by non-nuclear-weapon States. The Group is of the view that any interpretation that is used as a pretext to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is inconsistent with the objectives of the Treaty and, therefore, the unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes must be ensured.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 16) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty firmly believes that fostering the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by providing a framework of confidence and cooperation within which those uses can take place, is one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. Moreover, the Group emphasizes that cooperation to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world is the core objective enshrined in the statute of IAEA. Accordingly, the Group strongly encourages all States parties to actively cooperate, among themselves and through IAEA, in the peaceful uses and applications of nuclear energy, including through international technical cooperation.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 17) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. The Group further emphasizes that non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access by developing countries to material, equipment or technology for peaceful purposes, which such countries require for their continued development.

Furthermore, such arrangements must pursue and implement, without exception, the condition of adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for the supply to or cooperation with States not party to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 19) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores that IAEA, under its statutory obligations, pursues the goals of technical cooperation in peaceful applications of nuclear energy as one of the three pillars of its activities. In order to meet the objectives of technical cooperation for peaceful purposes, as enshrined in the statute of IAEA and in the Treaty, IAEA has to maintain a balance between technical cooperation and other activities. The Group believes that all States parties to the Treaty that are States members of IAEA have to ensure that the Technical Cooperation Programme remains firm and sustainable through sufficient, assured and predictable financial and human resources. In this regard, the efficacy of the Programme can best be achieved by ensuring that its formulation and strategies are in strict accordance with the needs and the requests of developing countries.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 23) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented without exception through the strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not party to the Treaty. In the view of the Group, new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 25) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty once again reaffirms the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities, operational or under construction, poses a threat to international peace and security and a great danger to human beings and the environment and constitutes a grave violation of international law, the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and the regulations of IAEA. In this regard, the Group recognizes the need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks or the threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Moreover, the Group strongly urges all States to undertake unequivocally, in accordance with the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from attacks or the threat of attacks on nuclear facilities, operational or under construction, devoted to peaceful purposes.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 26) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern about

certain unilateral, politically motivated restrictions and/or limitations posed on developing countries which seriously hamper the exercise of the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes, in this regard, that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be in a manner designed to comply with article IV of the Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 27) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while stressing the importance of safeguards, underlines the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the Agency's statute and safeguards agreements. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidents of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime, for its protection, needs to be highly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency. The Group recalls IAEA General Conference resolution GC(56)/RES/13, paragraph 27, in which the IAEA Director General is urged to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of classified safeguards information and requested to continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of classified safeguards information within the Secretariat.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons expresses its strong concern at the growing resort to unilateralism and unilaterally imposed prescriptions and, in this context, strongly underlines and affirms that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues. In this regard, the Group underlines that the multilateral mechanism established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the most appropriate way to address verification and safeguards issues. At the same time, the Group emphasizes that the work of the Agency with regard to safeguards and verification has to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of its statute and safeguards agreements.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the IAEA safeguards system and urges all States that have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible, in order to achieve the universality of the comprehensive safeguards. The 2000 Review Conference considered the universality of the comprehensive safeguards as a main objective in order to consolidate and enhance the verification system for the non-proliferation regime. However, in the view of the Group, additional measures related to the safeguards shall not affect the rights of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, which are already committed to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and have renounced the nuclear-weapon option. The Group also expresses its strong rejection of attempts by any member State to use the technical cooperation programme of IAEA as a tool for political purposes in violation of its statute.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty are a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls on all States not parties to the Treaty to accede, without any further delay and any preconditions and as non-nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group also calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under this Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty confirms that all States parties to the Treaty shall refrain from the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to States not parties to the Treaty unless they are placed under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards. In this connection, the Group confirms that the obligation under article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology for peaceful purposes, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restrictions or limitations on the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty fully recognizes that IAEA, an independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization, is the

sole competent authority responsible for the verification of the fulfilment of safeguard obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that it is fundamental to make a clear distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures and that such voluntary undertakings shall not be turned into legal safeguards obligations. In this regard, the Group also emphasizes that IAEA shall ensure avoiding any ultra vires acts that would jeopardize its integrity and credibility. The Group urges States parties to the Treaty to maintain and strengthen the technical character of IAEA consistent with its statute.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores also that the principle of balance between the promotional and other statutory activities of the Agency, in particular verification and safeguards-related activities, needs to be strictly observed.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards, including reporting, in accordance with the Agency's statute and safeguards agreements. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on the nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidents of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime, for its protection, needs to be highly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 12) In this context, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the implementation of IAEA resolutions GC(54)/RES/11 and GC(56)/RES/13 on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system and application of the Model Additional Protocol, adopted by the General Conference of the Agency at its fifty-fourth and fifty-sixth sessions, respectively, in which the General Conference, "Stressing the importance of maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the Agency's statute and safeguards agreements", acknowledged "the concerns expressed by the Director General on the need to protect safeguards confidential information within the secretariat and his announcement of additional measures to protect such information", accordingly urged the Director General "to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of safeguards confidential information", and requested that

he “continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of safeguards confidential information”.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the need to strictly observe the provisions of the IAEA statute, including article XII, which outlines the mandate of the Agency in verifying compliance with safeguards agreements and, in particular, that any non-compliance has first to be reported by the Agency’s inspectors.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 16) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern about certain unilateral politically motivated attempts to hamper exercising the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes in this regard that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be “in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing ...”.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty fully recognizes that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an independent intergovernmental, science- and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for verification of the fulfilment of safeguard obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while supporting the verification activities of IAEA, underlines the importance of strict observance of the IAEA statute and relevant comprehensive safeguards agreements in conducting verification activities.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 5) In this connection, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while stressing the importance of safeguards, underlines the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the Agency’s statute and safeguards agreements. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on the nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidences of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime, for its

	<p>protection, needs to be significantly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency. The Group recalls IAEA General Conference resolution GC(56)/RES/13, paragraph 27, in which the IAEA Director General is urged to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of classified safeguards information and is requested to continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of classified safeguards information within the secretariat.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that all States members of IAEA shall strictly observe its statute and that nothing should be done to undermine its authority. Furthermore, the Group calls upon all States to avoid any pressure or interference in the Agency’s activities, especially its verification process, that could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Inalienable Right Through NPT</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) emphasizes once more the significance of article IV of the Treaty on the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty, the realization of which constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. The Group stresses that, as stipulated in that article, nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting this inalienable right. The Group further underscores the importance of promoting international cooperation, without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the Treaty, for the full realization of this inherent right and strongly calls upon all States parties to the Treaty to fully fulfil their legal obligations to respect this inalienable right and its full realization.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty firmly believes that the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of article IV of the NPT plays a crucial role in achieving the object and purpose of the Treaty. In this regard, the Group also firmly believes that any measure aiming at hampering, fully or partly, the fullest exercise of the inalienable rights under article IV of the Treaty, would seriously jeopardize the delicate balance between rights and obligations of States parties, in contravention with the Treaty’s object and purpose, and would widen the gap between developed and developing countries in this field.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) mandates the Agency, in support of the full realization of the inalienable right under article IV of the NPT, to make provision, in accordance with the statute, for materials, services, equipment, and facilities to meet the needs of research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful</p>

purposes, including the production of electric power, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. To ensure the realization of these goals, all States parties, particularly developed States, shall extend their assistance, as requested by States parties that are States members of IAEA, in the provision of nuclear equipment, material, technology and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes, with a view to achieving the maximum benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities for peaceful purposes.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 8) In this regard, while recognizing that a diverse portfolio of energy sources will be needed to allow access to sustainable energy and electricity resources in all regions of the world, and that States parties may pursue different ways to achieve their energy security and climate protection goals, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty once again acknowledges and reaffirms that each State party, in line with its national requirements and in accordance with its rights and obligations under the Treaty, has a sovereign right to define its national energy and fuel-cycle policies, that, inter alia, includes an inalienable right to develop, for peaceful purposes, a full national nuclear fuel cycle.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty takes note of the adoption by the IAEA Board of Governors, through a vote, in 2010 and 2011, of three proposals of assurance of supply mechanisms within the framework of the multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. In the view of the Group, the multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle should be economically viable, sustainable, non-discriminatory, predictable and transparent under the auspices of IAEA and any other possible regional and multilateral forums. The Group emphasizes that all technical, legal, political and economic implications and complexities surrounding this sensitive matter shall be fully taken into account. The Group also stresses that any decision on proposals regarding multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle shall be made by consensus following wide, integral, comprehensive and transparent multilateral consultations, with the participation of all IAEA member States and taking into account the interests of all its member States. Furthermore, the Group strongly emphasizes that any proposal from IAEA must be consistent with its statute, without any prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy and sciences, in all its aspects, for peaceful purposes, and if they so decide, to develop a full national nuclear fuel cycle, according to its article IV.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 10) In this context, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty rejects, in principle, any attempt aimed at discouraging certain peaceful nuclear activities on the grounds of their alleged “sensitivity.” The Group further underlines that concerns related to nuclear non-proliferation shall not, in any way, restrict the inalienable right of any State party to develop all aspects of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, without discrimination, as stipulated in article IV of the Treaty. In this regard,

the Group expresses its concern that some States parties have set conditions such as concluding and bringing into force an additional protocol on nuclear export in contravention of article IV of the Treaty, and calls upon those States parties to promptly remove any such condition.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 22) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that measures and initiatives aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and nuclear security must not be used as a pretext or leverage to violate, deny or restrict the inalienable right of developing countries to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 26) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern about certain unilateral, politically motivated restrictions and/or limitations posed on developing countries which seriously hamper the exercise of the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes, in this regard, that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be in a manner designed to comply with article IV of the Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 28) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty is determined to propose, during the 2015 Review Process of the Treaty, measures required to ensure that the inalienable rights of all States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination are fully protected.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 16) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern about certain unilateral politically motivated attempts to hamper exercising the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes in this regard that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be “in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear

	activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing ...”.
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Contributions to Disarmament	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be an important step towards strengthening nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regimes. The Group is, therefore, of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is not a substitute for nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group underlines the importance of the early fulfilment of the legal obligations of and unequivocal undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate all their nuclear weapons.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty continues to consider the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), Bangkok (Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone), Pelindaba (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty) and Semipalatinsk (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia) to be a positive step and important measure towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing other nuclear-weapon-free zones worldwide and calls for cooperation and broad consultation among the States of the regions concerned to conclude agreements establishing such zones.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Semipalatinsk and Bangkok in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the territories of the States parties to those treaties, as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be a contribution towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. However, the Group is of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones does not substitute legal</p>
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	<p>obligations and unequivocal undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The Group further welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and, in this regard, strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Contributions to Nonproliferation</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be an important step towards strengthening nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regimes. The Group is, therefore, of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is not a substitute for nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group underlines the importance of the early fulfilment of the legal obligations of and unequivocal undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate all their nuclear weapons.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty continues to consider the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), Bangkok (Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone), Pelindaba (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty) and Semipalatinsk (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia) to be a positive step and important measure towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing other nuclear-weapon-free zones worldwide and calls for cooperation and broad consultation among the States of the regions concerned to conclude agreements establishing such zones.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Semipalatinsk and Bangkok in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the territories of the States parties to those treaties, as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be a contribution towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. However, the Group is of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones does not substitute legal obligations and unequivocal undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States</p>

	<p>for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The Group further welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and, in this regard, strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.</p>
<p>Treaty of Tlatelolco</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference; (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) The cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites; (ii) Measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development; (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies; (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention); (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones; (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems. <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty continues to consider the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), Bangkok (Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone), Pelindaba (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty) and Semipalatinsk (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia) to be a positive step and important measure towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.</p>

	<p>In this regard, the Group welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing other nuclear-weapon-free zones worldwide and calls for cooperation and broad consultation among the States of the regions concerned to conclude agreements establishing such zones.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes the need to strengthen the integrity of the statute of denuclearization provided for in the Treaty of Tlatelolco by reviewing the declarations that were formulated by the nuclear-weapon States parties to Additional Protocols I and II thereto, for possible withdrawal or modification.</p>
<p>Treaty of Pelindaba</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference; (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) The cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites; (ii) Measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development; (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies; (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention); (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones; (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems. <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty continues to consider the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the</p>

	<p>Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), Bangkok (Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone), Pelindaba (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty) and Semipalatinsk (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia) to be a positive step and important measure towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing other nuclear-weapon-free zones worldwide and calls for cooperation and broad consultation among the States of the regions concerned to conclude agreements establishing such zones.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty welcomes the entry into force of the treaties of Semipalatinsk and Pelindaba on 21 March 2009 and 15 July 2009, respectively, and considers the establishment of these zones to be an effective contribution towards strengthening regional and global peace and security.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Semipalatinsk and Bangkok in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the territories of the States parties to those treaties, as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</p>
<p>Treaty of Bangkok</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference; (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) The cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites; (ii) Measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development; (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies; (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention); (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of

	<p>Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones; (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty continues to consider the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), Bangkok (Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone), Pelindaba (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty) and Semipalatinsk (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia) to be a positive step and important measure towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing other nuclear-weapon-free zones worldwide and calls for cooperation and broad consultation among the States of the regions concerned to conclude agreements establishing such zones.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty welcomes continued consultations between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the nuclear-weapon States on the Protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok and urges the nuclear-weapon States to become parties to the Protocol as soon as possible. The Group looks forward to the signing and ratification of the Protocol by the five nuclear-weapon States as early as possible.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Semipalatinsk and Bangkok in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the territories of the States parties to those treaties, as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</p>
<p>Treaty of Rarotonga</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of: (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference; (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on: (i) The cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the</p>

	<p>early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites; (ii) Measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development; (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies; (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention); (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones; (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty continues to consider the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), Bangkok (Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone), Pelindaba (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty) and Semipalatinsk (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia) to be a positive step and important measure towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing other nuclear-weapon-free zones worldwide and calls for cooperation and broad consultation among the States of the regions concerned to conclude agreements establishing such zones.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Semipalatinsk and Bangkok in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the territories of the States parties to those treaties, as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</p>
<p>Treaty of Semipalatinsk</p>	

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:

- (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference;
- (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on:
 - (i) The cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites;
 - (ii) Measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development;
- (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies;
- (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention);
- (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones;
- (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives;
- (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively;
- (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty continues to consider the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), Bangkok (Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone), Pelindaba (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty) and Semipalatinsk (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia) to be a positive step and important measure towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing other nuclear-weapon-free zones worldwide and calls for cooperation and broad consultation among the States of the regions concerned to conclude agreements establishing such zones.

	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty welcomes the entry into force of the treaties of Semipalatinsk and Pelindaba on 21 March 2009 and 15 July 2009, respectively, and considers the establishment of these zones to be an effective contribution towards strengthening regional and global peace and security.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Semipalatinsk and Bangkok in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the territories of the States parties to those treaties, as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</p>
<p>Mongolia as a NWFZ</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference; (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) The cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites; (ii) Measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development; (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies; (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention); (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones; (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.

	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty urges States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist, in accordance with the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. In this context, the Group considers that the further institutionalization of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status would be an important step towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while noting with satisfaction the convening of the first preparatory meeting for the Third Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, which was held in Vienna on 27 April 2012, calls upon the States parties and signatories to those treaties to put in place further forms of cooperation among themselves, their treaty agencies and other interested States.</p>
<p>Middle East WMDFZ</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference; (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) The cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites; (ii) Measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development; (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies; (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention); (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones; (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear

and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 3) In this context, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and calls for the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which is an integral and essential part of the package of decisions reached without a vote that enabled the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995. In the Group's view, the resolution remains valid until its objectives are achieved.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be a contribution towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. However, the Group is of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones does not substitute legal obligations and unequivocal undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The Group further welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and, in this regard, strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which reaffirmed the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty. The Group recalls that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines furthermore that the 2010 Review Conference also reaffirmed the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recalled the affirmation of its goals and objectives by the 2000 Review Conference. The Conference also stressed that the Resolution remains valid until the goals and objectives are achieved, and that the Resolution is an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995. The Group recalls also that at the Conference, States parties renewed their resolve to undertake,

individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at its prompt implementation.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further recalls that the 2010 Review Conference, by taking note of the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, recalled the reaffirmation by the 2000 Review Conference of the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The Conference also reaffirmed the urgency and importance of achieving universality of the Treaty and called on all States in the Middle East that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States so as to achieve its universality at an early date.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 5) In this context, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty welcomes the adoption by consensus of a detailed plan of action on the Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference and urges the Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, to convene and exert utmost efforts in ensuring the success of a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.¹ While recalling that the 2010 Review Conference emphasized the importance of a process leading to full implementation of the objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, the Group stresses the importance of the full implementation of the plan of action and the active and constructive engagement by all parties concerned to allow for the success of the conference in leading to the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses deep concern over the delay in the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and urges the three co-sponsors of the Resolution to fulfil their responsibility in taking all necessary measures to fully implement it without any further delay.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern that no progress has been achieved with regard to Israel's accession to the Treaty, and placing all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, and over the delay in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, all of which are objectives and priorities that were stressed in Review Conferences of the Treaty in 1995, 2000 and 2010.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms once again its

determination to extend fullest cooperation and to exert utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines that the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on the Middle East by devoting sufficient time within the indicative timetable and giving all speakers the full opportunity to thereby engage in a substantive debate. The Group further recalls that the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences stipulated that all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, should report through the Secretariat to the President of the Review Conference, as well as the Chairs of its Preparatory Committee meetings, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such a zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. The Group further recalls that the 2010 Review Conference requested the facilitator to report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 16) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty accordingly emphasizes the importance of submitting required reports by all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, as well as the facilitator of the 2012 conference. It is essential that the successive sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference conduct substantive discussions on the above-mentioned reports and evaluate the fulfilment of the commitments on the Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, as contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted by consensus at the 2010 Review Conference.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 17) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty requests the establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the 2015 Review Conference to assess the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and reaffirmed by the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, as well as the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 19) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that, as clearly stipulated by the 2010 Review Conference, the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction shall have been convened in the year 2012. In the First Session of the Preparatory Committee in 2012, the Group warned that any delay in convening the 2012 conference would seriously jeopardize the overall implementation of the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions and would represent a major setback in this regard. Likewise, the Group underscored that the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and the convening of a successful 2012 conference are integral and essential

parts of the implementation of the consensus conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 20) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also emphasizes, as it did in the First Session of the Preparatory Committee, the mandated responsibility of the Secretary-General and the commitments and special responsibility of the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution regarding the convening of the 2012 conference, and accordingly calls upon them to accelerate their efforts to ensure the convening of a successful conference in the year 2012. Furthermore, the Group calls upon the facilitator to exert maximum efforts for more intensive and regular consultations and coordination with all States of the region on all aspects of the 2012 conference, starting well in advance of its convening.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 21) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses once again the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States, in particular the obligations and commitments of the three depositary States of the Treaty that co-sponsored the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, to implement the Resolution. Moreover, the Group considers the implementation of the practical steps adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Middle East as a collective responsibility, since the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference had clearly stipulated that the States parties renew their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at its prompt implementation, and also underlined the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 22) While appreciating the constructive engagement and the positive reactions from all Arab countries and the Islamic Republic of Iran towards the Conference, including the announcement of their willingness to participate in the Conference, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty deplores that Israel continues to undermine the convening of the Conference by not declaring its intention to participate in it.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 23) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while appreciating the efforts made by the facilitator, Mr. Jaakko Laajava, and the host Government of the 2012 conference, Finland, expresses profound disappointment on not convening the conference in 2012 as scheduled. The failure to convene the conference in 2012 contradicts and violates the collective agreement of the States parties contained in “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty and contravenes the letter and spirit of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. Furthermore, the Group strongly rejects the alleged impediments cited by Conveners for not convening

the conference on schedule, and expresses serious concern that the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Treaty is meeting while the Conference has not been convened yet.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 24) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty urges the Conveners — the United Nations Secretary-General, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation — in accordance with the mandate entrusted to them by the Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty, to convene the Conference without any further delay in order to avoid any negative repercussions on the credibility of the Treaty, its 2015 Review process and the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime as a whole. The Group calls on the facilitator to intensify consultations with all capitals in the region and to exert maximum efforts to that end.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 25) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores that efforts, by the Conveners and the Facilitator, related to the Conference should be undertaken in accordance with the mandate contained in “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty, and should be focused on convening the Conference at the earliest date in 2013 and on seeking out in advance, by the Conveners and the Facilitator of the Conference, credible assurances regarding the unconditional participation of Israel, the only country of the region that has not declared its participation in the Conference.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 26) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus. The Group is also of the view that the Conference should lead, without further delay, to the universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East and the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, and to preserve the credibility of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 27) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty is determined to continue pursuing, as a matter of high priority, the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and section IV of the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty. In this regard, the Group urges all States parties, in this session of the Preparatory Committee, to shoulder their responsibility in order to prevent further negative repercussions of not implementing the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and section IV, including the convening of the Conference, as mandated by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty.

Security Assurances

Nuclear-Weapon States Role

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty remains deeply concerned by strategic defence doctrines of the nuclear-weapon States that set out the rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the recent posture review by one of the nuclear-weapon States to consider expanding the circumstances in which these weapons could be used.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty remains also deeply concerned at the strategic concept for the defence and security of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which justifies the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and maintains unjustifiable concepts on international security based on promoting and developing military alliances and nuclear deterrence policies.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 23) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further reaffirms that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty should be effectively assured by the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons through the urgent conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 24) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 26) Accordingly, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty is of the view that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States shall seriously refrain, at any circumstances, from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. In the view of the Group, any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular international humanitarian law. The Group further believes that the mere possession of nuclear weapons is inconsistent with the principles of international humanitarian law. In this regard, the Group strongly calls upon all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to exclude completely the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from their military doctrines.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that the granting of such assurances

by all five nuclear-weapon States parties to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties is a commitment, the fulfilment of which is necessary to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 3) In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty notes the unilateral statements by each of the nuclear-weapon States, in which they give very limited, conditional and insufficient “security assurances” against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such unilateral statements fail to meet any of the requirements of a universal legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that, at successive conferences of Heads of State or Government of the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries and ministerial conferences of the Movement, it has been reiterated that improvements in existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, as envisaged in the Nuclear Posture Review of the United States of America, contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient unilateral statements made by each of the nuclear-weapon States. It has further been reaffirmed that these improvements and the development of new types of such weapons violate the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. While recalling the advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the Group believes that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as the only absolute guarantee against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States shall seriously refrain, in any circumstances, from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty firmly believes that the mere possession or any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular, international humanitarian law.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 9) In this regard, while deploring the strategic doctrines of the nuclear-weapon States and the strategic concept for the security of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which are based on the use or threat of use of

nuclear weapons, and maintain unjustifiable concepts on international security based on promoting and developing military alliances and nuclear deterrence policies, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to exclude completely the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from their military and security doctrines.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reiterates that efforts to conclude a universal legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority and should be materialized without further delay.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty is also of the view that, pending the conclusion of a universal legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, all nuclear-weapon States shall fully respect their existing commitments with regard to negative security assurances and shall extend these assurances, without any condition and discrimination, to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that the 2010 Review Conference “reaffirms and recognizes that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances from nuclear-weapon States which could strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime”. The Group, therefore, calls on the 2015 Review Conference, in addition to nuclear disarmament being its highest priority, to fully address this legitimate right as a matter of priority.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 14) In keeping with the above-mentioned position and in accordance with the decision at the 2000 Review Conference, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances for further work to consider legally binding, unconditional, irrevocable and non-discriminatory negative security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.17, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that the improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient statements on negative security assurances provided by the

	<p>nuclear-weapon States and violate their commitments undertaken at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reiterates that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons and in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, it is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable and legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Group reaffirms that, in the context of the nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is also essential that all the nuclear-weapon States provide unconditional, non-discriminatory and concrete legal assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all non-nuclear-weapon States of the zone that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In this regard, the Group strongly calls for the withdrawal of any related reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of such treaties. The Group further calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations to achieve the objectives of the treaties to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and their protocols.</p>
<p>Legally-Binding International Convention or Instrument</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 23) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further reaffirms that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty should be effectively assured by the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons through the urgent conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference; (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on: (i) The cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites; (ii) Measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development; (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies; (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time

frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention); (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones; (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Group is of the firm belief that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, it is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States that, by becoming parties to the Treaty, have given up the nuclear-weapon option, inter alia, to receive effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 3) In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty notes the unilateral statements by each of the nuclear-weapon States, in which they give very limited, conditional and insufficient "security assurances" against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such unilateral statements fail to meet any of the requirements of a universal legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reiterates that efforts to conclude a universal legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority and should be materialized without further delay.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty is also of the view that, pending the conclusion of a universal legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, all nuclear-weapon States shall fully respect their existing commitments with regard to negative

security assurances and shall extend these assurances, without any condition and discrimination, to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that the 2010 Review Conference “reaffirms and recognizes that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances from nuclear-weapon States which could strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime”. The Group, therefore, calls on the 2015 Review Conference, in addition to nuclear disarmament being its highest priority, to fully address this legitimate right as a matter of priority.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 13) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while noting the lack of progress since the re-establishment, in 1998, of an ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a universal legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, expresses concern that, despite long-standing requests by non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive such legally binding assurances, no tangible progress has been made in this regard. In this connection, the Group calls for the commencement, without further delay, of the negotiation for the conclusion of such an instrument.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 14) In keeping with the above-mentioned position and in accordance with the decision at the 2000 Review Conference, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances for further work to consider legally binding, unconditional, irrevocable and non-discriminatory negative security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses concern over the lack of agreement on a number of its key priorities, including, inter alia, to commence negotiations on a universal legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, and expresses its determination to continue its collective efforts in pursuing the realization of the aforementioned priority in the 2015 review process of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reiterates that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons and in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, it is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive effective, universal, unconditional, non-

	<p>discriminatory, irrevocable and legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Group reaffirms that, in the context of the nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is also essential that all the nuclear-weapon States provide unconditional, non-discriminatory and concrete legal assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all non-nuclear-weapon States of the zone that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In this regard, the Group strongly calls for the withdrawal of any related reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of such treaties. The Group further calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations to achieve the objectives of the treaties to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and their protocols.</p>
<p>NWFZs and Security Assurances</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reiterates that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons and in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, it is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable and legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Group reaffirms that, in the context of the nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is also essential that all the nuclear-weapon States provide unconditional, non-discriminatory and concrete legal assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all non-nuclear-weapon States of the zone that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In this regard, the Group strongly calls for the withdrawal of any related reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of such treaties. The Group further calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations to achieve the objectives of the treaties to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and their protocols.</p>
<p>Security Assurances and the NPT</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 23) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further reaffirms that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty should be effectively assured by the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons through the urgent conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 26) Accordingly, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty is of the view that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States shall seriously refrain, at any circumstances, from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. In the view of the Group, any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular</p>

international humanitarian law. The Group further believes that the mere possession of nuclear weapons is inconsistent with the principles of international humanitarian law. In this regard, the Group strongly calls upon all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to exclude completely the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from their military doctrines.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of: (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference; (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on: (i) The cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites; (ii) Measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development; (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies; (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention); (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones; (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Group is of the firm belief that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, it is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States that, by becoming parties to the Treaty, have given up the nuclear-weapon option, inter alia, to receive effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally

binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that the granting of such assurances by all five nuclear-weapon States parties to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties is a commitment, the fulfilment of which is necessary to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 3) In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty notes the unilateral statements by each of the nuclear-weapon States, in which they give very limited, conditional and insufficient “security assurances” against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such unilateral statements fail to meet any of the requirements of a universal legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that negative security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty would fulfil the undertaking to the States that have voluntarily given up the nuclear-weapons option by becoming parties to the Treaty. The Group further believes that legally binding negative security assurances within the context of the Treaty would provide an essential benefit to the States parties to the Treaty and to the credibility of the Treaty regime.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that, at successive conferences of Heads of State or Government of the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries and ministerial conferences of the Movement, it has been reiterated that improvements in existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, as envisaged in the Nuclear Posture Review of the United States of America, contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient unilateral statements made by each of the nuclear-weapon States. It has further been reaffirmed that these improvements and the development of new types of such weapons violate the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. While recalling the advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the Group believes that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as the only absolute guarantee against the threat or use of nuclear weapons,

the nuclear-weapon States shall seriously refrain, in any circumstances, from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reiterates that efforts to conclude a universal legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority and should be materialized without further delay.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty is also of the view that, pending the conclusion of a universal legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, all nuclear-weapon States shall fully respect their existing commitments with regard to negative security assurances and shall extend these assurances, without any condition and discrimination, to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that the 2010 Review Conference “reaffirms and recognizes that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances from nuclear-weapon States which could strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime”. The Group, therefore, calls on the 2015 Review Conference, in addition to nuclear disarmament being its highest priority, to fully address this legitimate right as a matter of priority.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 13) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while noting the lack of progress since the re-establishment, in 1998, of an ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a universal legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, expresses concern that, despite long-standing requests by non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive such legally binding assurances, no tangible progress has been made in this regard. In this connection, the Group calls for the commencement, without further delay, of the negotiation for the conclusion of such an instrument.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 14) In keeping with the above-mentioned position and in accordance with the decision at the 2000 Review Conference, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances for further work to consider legally binding, unconditional,

	<p>irrevocable and non-discriminatory negative security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses concern over the lack of agreement on a number of its key priorities, including, inter alia, to commence negotiations on a universal legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, and expresses its determination to continue its collective efforts in pursuing the realization of the aforementioned priority in the 2015 review process of the Treaty.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reiterates that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons and in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, it is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable and legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Group reaffirms that, in the context of the nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is also essential that all the nuclear-weapon States provide unconditional, non-discriminatory and concrete legal assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all non-nuclear-weapon States of the zone that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In this regard, the Group strongly calls for the withdrawal of any related reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of such treaties. The Group further calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations to achieve the objectives of the treaties to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and their protocols.</p>
<p>Country Specific</p>	
<p>United States</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 16) In this connection, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while noting the conclusion and entry into force of the New START Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America, confirms the validity of its position delivered at the time of adoption of resolution 65/61, entitled “Bilateral reductions of strategic nuclear arms and the new framework for strategic relations”. The Group further expresses concern that the domestic commitments to nuclear weapon modernization in exchange for ratification of this Treaty undermines the minimal reductions agreed upon in it.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 17) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons and, accordingly,</p>

	<p>calls on the United States of America and the Russian Federation to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability to such cuts, to further reduce their nuclear arsenals, both warheads and delivery systems, thus contributing to the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations and facilitating the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest date. The Group also recalls the commitment by the Russian Federation and the United States of America under action 4 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament for the full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and strongly urges them to adopt all required measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that, at successive conferences of Heads of State or Government of the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries and ministerial conferences of the Movement, it has been reiterated that improvements in existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, as envisaged in the Nuclear Posture Review of the United States of America, contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient unilateral statements made by each of the nuclear-weapon States. It has further been reaffirmed that these improvements and the development of new types of such weapons violate the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 24) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty urges the Conveners — the United Nations Secretary-General, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation — in accordance with the mandate entrusted to them by the Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty, to convene the Conference without any further delay in order to avoid any negative repercussions on the credibility of the Treaty, its 2015 Review process and the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime as a whole. The Group calls on the facilitator to intensify consultations with all capitals in the region and to exert maximum efforts to that end.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Russia</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 16) In this connection, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while noting the conclusion and entry into force of the New START Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America, confirms the validity of its position delivered at the time of adoption of resolution 65/61, entitled “Bilateral reductions of strategic nuclear arms and the new framework for strategic relations”. The Group further expresses concern that the domestic commitments to nuclear weapon modernization in exchange for ratification of this Treaty undermines the minimal reductions agreed upon in it.</p>

	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 17) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons and, accordingly, calls on the United States of America and the Russian Federation to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability to such cuts, to further reduce their nuclear arsenals, both warheads and delivery systems, thus contributing to the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations and facilitating the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest date. The Group also recalls the commitment by the Russian Federation and the United States of America under action 4 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament for the full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and strongly urges them to adopt all required measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 24) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty urges the Conveners — the United Nations Secretary-General, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation — in accordance with the mandate entrusted to them by the Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty, to convene the Conference without any further delay in order to avoid any negative repercussions on the credibility of the Treaty, its 2015 Review process and the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime as a whole. The Group calls on the facilitator to intensify consultations with all capitals in the region and to exert maximum efforts to that end.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">United Kingdom</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 24) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty urges the Conveners — the United Nations Secretary-General, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation — in accordance with the mandate entrusted to them by the Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty, to convene the Conference without any further delay in order to avoid any negative repercussions on the credibility of the Treaty, its 2015 Review process and the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime as a whole. The Group calls on the facilitator to intensify consultations with all capitals in the region and to exert maximum efforts to that end.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Israel</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which reaffirmed the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty. The Group recalls that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel’s accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under</p>

comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further recalls that the 2010 Review Conference, by taking note of the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, recalled the reaffirmation by the 2000 Review Conference of the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The Conference also reaffirmed the urgency and importance of achieving universality of the Treaty and called on all States in the Middle East that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States so as to achieve its universality at an early date.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern that no progress has been achieved with regard to Israel's accession to the Treaty, and placing all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, and over the delay in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, all of which are objectives and priorities that were stressed in Review Conferences of the Treaty in 1995, 2000 and 2010.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty remains gravely concerned by the statement made by the then Prime Minister of Israel on 11 December 2006, in which he publicly admitted the possession of nuclear weapons by Israel. In this regard, the Group reaffirms the continued validity of the statement of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement on this subject as contained in document NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/19.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further expresses great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by Israel, which pose a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States, and condemns Israel for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals. The Group also reaffirms that stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are maintained, particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allows one party to threaten its neighbours and the region, and constitutes a threat to international peace and security.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty demands that Israel, the only country in the region that has neither joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons nor declared its intention to do so, renounce possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the Treaty without any precondition or further delay as a non-nuclear-weapon State, place promptly all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and conduct

all its nuclear-related activities in full conformity with the non-proliferation regime, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty, in particular in the Middle East.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that the nuclear-weapon States, in conformity with their legal obligations under article I of the Treaty, shall solemnly undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly to Israel, and further undertake not, in any way, to assist, encourage or induce Israel to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices under any circumstances whatsoever.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, in conformity with the Treaty, hereby declares its commitment to the effective prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer, by any State, of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear-related scientific or technological fields to Israel. In this regard, the Group expresses its serious concern over Israeli scientists' continued access to the nuclear facilities of one nuclear-weapon State, which has potentially serious negative implications on the security of the region as well as the reliability of the global non-proliferation regime.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 18) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the establishment of a standing committee comprising members of the Bureau of the 2015 Review Conference to follow up intersessionally on the implementation of the recommendations by the Review Conference concerning Israel's prompt accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, and to report to the 2020 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 22) While appreciating the constructive engagement and the positive reactions from all Arab countries and the Islamic Republic of Iran towards the Conference, including the announcement of their willingness to participate in the Conference, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty deplores that Israel continues to undermine the convening of the Conference by not declaring its intention to participate in it.

	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 25) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores that efforts, by the Conveners and the Facilitator, related to the Conference should be undertaken in accordance with the mandate contained in “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty, and should be focused on convening the Conference at the earliest date in 2013 and on seeking out in advance, by the Conveners and the Facilitator of the Conference, credible assurances regarding the unconditional participation of Israel, the only country of the region that has not declared its participation in the Conference.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Iran</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 22) While appreciating the constructive engagement and the positive reactions from all Arab countries and the Islamic Republic of Iran towards the Conference, including the announcement of their willingness to participate in the Conference, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty deplores that Israel continues to undermine the convening of the Conference by not declaring its intention to participate in it.</p>
<p>Non-Proliferation Treaty Related</p>	
<p style="text-align: center;">Disarmament Through the NPT</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emphasizes that the Treaty is an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and a key instrument in the efforts to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reiterates its strong call for the full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking given by the nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 Review Conference to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, which has also been reaffirmed by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty. That undertaking should be demonstrated without further delay through an accelerated process of negotiations and through the full implementation of the 13 practical steps to advance systematically and progressively towards a nuclear-weapon-free world as agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference, as well as in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference, which reaffirmed the continued validity of that undertaking.</p>

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that, in pursuit of the full, effective and urgent implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, and building upon the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, the 2010 Review Conference agreed on an action plan on nuclear disarmament that includes concrete steps for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the Group strongly calls for prompt and full implementation of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that in implementing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the nuclear-weapon States have committed to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. In this regard, the Group calls for full compliance of the nuclear-weapon States with such undertakings.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 9) In this connection, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes in particular the prime importance of and the urgent need for full and prompt implementation of the commitments by the nuclear-weapon States under action 5 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament. In this context, the Group further recalls that the nuclear-weapon States committed to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, inter alia, through (a) rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons; (b) addressing the question of all nuclear weapons, regardless of their type or their location, as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process; (c) further diminishing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies; (d) discussing policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons; (e) considering the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security; (f) reducing the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and (g) further enhancing transparency and increase mutual confidence.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 10) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to submit a comprehensive substantive report about their undertakings under action 5 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament to the Preparatory Committee in 2014, in order to enable the 2015 Review Conference to take stock and consider the

next steps for the full implementation of article VI of the Treaty in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses deep concern at the continued lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, which could undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty. The Group also deeply regrets the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. The negotiations of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame, including a nuclear weapons convention, is necessary and should commence without any further delay. In that regard, the Group reiterates its call to establish, as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament and recalls action 6 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament, through which all States have agreed that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reconfirms that negotiations on a fissile materials treaty should be conducted on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein (Shannon mandate), taking into account nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, as well as all related issues, including the past production and existing stockpiles of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Group expresses concern over the attempts to limit the scope of the negotiations on a fissile material treaty as contained in the Shannon mandate, which was endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences. In this regard, the Group recognizes that non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Treaty have already agreed to a legally binding commitment not to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty remains deeply concerned by the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons, despite some reports of bilateral and unilateral reductions. Any such reductions are undermined by the modernization of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and related infrastructure by the nuclear-weapon States. In order to comply with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, as well as with their commitments under the 13 practical steps and 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament, the nuclear-weapon States must immediately cease their plans to further invest in modernizing, upgrading, refurbishing or extending the lives of their nuclear weapons and related facilities. The Group is also concerned about the existence and continued deployment of tens of thousands of such weapons, whose exact number remains

unconfirmed, owing to the lack of transparency in various nuclear weapons programmes.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 17) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons and, accordingly, calls on the United States of America and the Russian Federation to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability to such cuts, to further reduce their nuclear arsenals, both warheads and delivery systems, thus contributing to the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations and facilitating the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest date. The Group also recalls the commitment by the Russian Federation and the United States of America under action 4 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament for the full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and strongly urges them to adopt all required measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 19) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also believes that the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes and the lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies further undermine disarmament commitments.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 20) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 22) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals, and considers, in that regard, that any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 27) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms the validity of its working paper (see annex) entitled “Elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons”, which was submitted to the 2010 Review Conference in document NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47. The Group is determined to integrate this action plan into the outcome document of the 2015 review process of the Treaty, and strongly calls for its

integration. The Group calls in this regard for the speedy and full implementation by the nuclear-weapon States of all its measures in accordance with the proposed timeline and at a pace that makes up for the time elapsed.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 28) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reiterates its call for the establishment, as a matter of priority, of a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament in Main Committee I, mandated to focus on the issue of fulfilment of the obligations under article VI of the Treaty and on further practical measures required to achieve progress in that regard.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 29) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty notes with concern the lack of agreement on a number of its key priorities, including, inter alia, to begin negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention, and expresses its determination to continue collective efforts in pursuing the realization of its aforementioned priority in the 2015 review process of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A1) Although there have been some positive signals and developments in the area of nuclear disarmament, the world is still faced with unresolved challenges. The recent statements by some nuclear-weapon States about their intention to pursue actions in achieving a world free of nuclear weapons are positive. However, urgent and concrete actions by the nuclear-weapon States in accordance with their multilaterally agreed commitments to achieve general and complete disarmament remain essential. Unless the role of nuclear weapons in the context of security is delegitimized and existing nuclear doctrines are abandoned, there will always be a threat of a nuclear arms race and an escalation of nuclear threats. The total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A2) To achieve the total elimination of their nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States need to implement the unequivocal undertaking agreed upon in 2000. The 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI should be fully implemented in accordance with the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility. The nuclear-weapon States should be urged to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of their nuclear weapons within a specified time framework, including a nuclear weapons convention. It should also be recalled that there is a unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice regarding the obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A3) The Non-Aligned Movement proposes a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame that includes the following concrete steps and measures, as a basis for consideration by the Review Conference. The list of measures in each phase is indicative rather than

exhaustive, and the order in which they are mentioned does not necessarily reflect their priority. Nevertheless, it should be understood that, in any nuclear disarmament programme, all steps and measures are inextricably linked.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:

- (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference;
- (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on:
 - (i) The cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites;
 - (ii) Measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development;
- (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies;
- (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention);
- (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones;
- (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives;
- (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively;
- (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A5) Full implementation by the nuclear-weapon States of their disarmament obligations and commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including those agreed at the 2000 Review Conference; acceleration of the negotiation process, in accordance with article VI; and implementation of the 13 practical steps.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A6) Conclusion of negotiations on further reductions of nuclear arsenals (START).

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A7) Moratorium on the production of fissile materials, pending conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A8) Placement of nuclear fissile material transferred from military to peaceful uses by nuclear-weapon States under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A9) Formal declaration of the decade 2010-2020 as the “Decade for nuclear disarmament” and realization of its objectives.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A10) Entry into force of the treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons and the establishment of a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance, including such measures as the: (a) Separation of nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles; (b) Placement of nuclear warheads in secure storage under international supervision, pending the removal of special nuclear materials from those warheads; (c) Transfer of nuclear materials, including fissile materials and delivery vehicles, to “peaceful purposes”.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A11) Preparation, under international auspices, of an inventory of nuclear arsenals, including fissile materials, nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A12) Progressive and balanced reduction of missiles intended for carrying nuclear warheads.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A13) Recommendation by the 2020 Review Conference to declare 2020 as the “Decade for the total elimination of nuclear weapons”.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A14) Full implementation of the treaty to eliminate all nuclear weapons and of its verification regime through the: (a) Elimination of all nuclear weapons; (b) Conversion of all facilities for the production of nuclear weapons to “peaceful purposes”; (c) Placement of nuclear facilities under safeguards, on a universal basis.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals, and considers, in that regard, that any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 24) In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores the strong call by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that all States parties

shall ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated particularly in its articles I, II and III, and with the decision on the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.17, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the modernization or development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the assurances given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, States should refrain from any actions contrary to its objectives and purpose. In this context, the Group is seriously concerned by the decision of a nuclear-weapon State to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear testing to 18 months as a setback to the 2000 Review Conference agreements. It is the view of the Group that such decisions undermine the validity of the commitment to declared moratoriums as well as the commitments under the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has been envisaged as the first of 13 practical steps leading to nuclear disarmament. The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty also remains a cause for concern.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons expresses its strong concern at the growing resort to unilateralism and unilaterally imposed prescriptions and, in this context, strongly underlines and affirms that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues. In this regard, the Group underlines that the multilateral mechanism established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the most appropriate way to address verification and safeguards issues. At the same time, the Group emphasizes that the work of the Agency with regard to safeguards and verification has to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of its statute and safeguards agreements.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls action 16 of the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty and urges the nuclear-weapon States to commit to declaring to IAEA all weapon-grade fissile material and to place such material, as soon as practicable, under the supervision of IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes. The

Group calls upon the Conference to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the fulfilment of these commitments through the establishment of an international mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the action, which should be made mandatory for the nuclear-weapon States.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for the establishment by the Review Conference of a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreement by the nuclear-weapon States.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be an important step towards strengthening nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regimes. The Group is, therefore, of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is not a substitute for nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group underlines the importance of the early fulfilment of the legal obligations of and unequivocal undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate all their nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty continues to consider the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), Bangkok (Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone), Pelindaba (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty) and Semipalatinsk (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia) to be a positive step and important measure towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing other nuclear-weapon-free zones worldwide and calls for cooperation and broad consultation among the States of the regions concerned to conclude agreements establishing such zones.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be a contribution towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. However, the Group is of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones does not substitute legal obligations and unequivocal undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The Group further welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones

	<p>in all regions of the world and, in this regard, strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 24) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty urges the Conveners — the United Nations Secretary-General, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation — in accordance with the mandate entrusted to them by the Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty, to convene the Conference without any further delay in order to avoid any negative repercussions on the credibility of the Treaty, its 2015 Review process and the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime as a whole. The Group calls on the facilitator to intensify consultations with all capitals in the region and to exert maximum efforts to that end.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 26) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus. The Group is also of the view that the Conference should lead, without further delay, to the universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East and the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, and to preserve the credibility of the Treaty.</p>
<p>1995 Review and Extension of the NPT</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that, in pursuit of the full, effective and urgent implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, and building upon the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, the 2010 Review Conference agreed on an action plan on nuclear disarmament that includes concrete steps for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the Group strongly calls for prompt and full implementation of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reconfirms that negotiations on a fissile materials treaty should be conducted on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein (Shannon mandate), taking into account nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, as well as all related issues, including the past production and existing stockpiles of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Group expresses concern over the attempts to limit the scope of the negotiations on a fissile material treaty as contained in the Shannon mandate, which was endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences. In this regard,</p>

the Group recognizes that non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Treaty have already agreed to a legally binding commitment not to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 22) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals, and considers, in that regard, that any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:

- (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference;
- (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on:
 - (i) The cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites;
 - (ii) Measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development;
- (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies;
- (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention);
- (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones;
- (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives;
- (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively;
- (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the indefinite extension of

the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals, and considers, in that regard, that any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 24) In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores the strong call by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that all States parties shall ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated particularly in its articles I, II and III, and with the decision on the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.20, Para 3) In this context, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and calls for the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which is an integral and essential part of the package of decisions reached without a vote that enabled the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995. In the Group's view, the resolution remains valid until its objectives are achieved.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which reaffirmed the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty. The Group recalls that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines furthermore that the 2010 Review Conference also reaffirmed the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recalled the affirmation of its goals and objectives by the 2000 Review Conference. The Conference also stressed that the Resolution remains valid until the goals and objectives are achieved, and that the Resolution is an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995. The Group recalls also that at the Conference, States parties renewed their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at its prompt implementation.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further recalls that the 2010 Review Conference, by taking note of the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, recalled the reaffirmation by the 2000 Review Conference of the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The Conference also reaffirmed the urgency and importance of achieving universality of the Treaty and called on all States in the Middle East that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States so as to achieve its universality at an early date.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 5) In this context, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty welcomes the adoption by consensus of a detailed plan of action on the Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference and urges the Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, to convene and exert utmost efforts in ensuring the success of a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.¹ While recalling that the 2010 Review Conference emphasized the importance of a process leading to full implementation of the objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, the Group stresses the importance of the full implementation of the plan of action and the active and constructive engagement by all parties concerned to allow for the success of the conference in leading to the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses deep concern over the delay in the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and urges the three co-sponsors of the Resolution to fulfil their responsibility in taking all necessary measures to fully implement it without any further delay.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern that no progress has been achieved with regard to Israel's accession to the Treaty, and placing all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, and over the delay in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, all of which are objectives and priorities that were stressed in Review Conferences of the Treaty in 1995, 2000 and 2010.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines that the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on the Middle East by devoting sufficient time within the indicative timetable and giving all speakers the full opportunity to thereby engage in a substantive debate. The

Group further recalls that the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences stipulated that all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, should report through the Secretariat to the President of the Review Conference, as well as the Chairs of its Preparatory Committee meetings, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such a zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. The Group further recalls that the 2010 Review Conference requested the facilitator to report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 16) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty accordingly emphasizes the importance of submitting required reports by all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, as well as the facilitator of the 2012 conference. It is essential that the successive sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference conduct substantive discussions on the above-mentioned reports and evaluate the fulfilment of the commitments on the Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, as contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted by consensus at the 2010 Review Conference.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 17) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty requests the establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the 2015 Review Conference to assess the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and reaffirmed by the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, as well as the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 19) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that, as clearly stipulated by the 2010 Review Conference, the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction shall have been convened in the year 2012. In the First Session of the Preparatory Committee in 2012, the Group warned that any delay in convening the 2012 conference would seriously jeopardize the overall implementation of the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions and would represent a major setback in this regard. Likewise, the Group underscored that the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and the convening of a successful 2012 conference are integral and essential parts of the implementation of the consensus conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 20) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also emphasizes, as it did in the First Session of the Preparatory Committee, the mandated responsibility of the Secretary-General and the commitments and special responsibility of the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution

regarding the convening of the 2012 conference, and accordingly calls upon them to accelerate their efforts to ensure the convening of a successful conference in the year 2012. Furthermore, the Group calls upon the facilitator to exert maximum efforts for more intensive and regular consultations and coordination with all States of the region on all aspects of the 2012 conference, starting well in advance of its convening.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 21) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses once again the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States, in particular the obligations and commitments of the three depositary States of the Treaty that co-sponsored the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, to implement the Resolution. Moreover, the Group considers the implementation of the practical steps adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Middle East as a collective responsibility, since the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference had clearly stipulated that the States parties renew their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at its prompt implementation, and also underlined the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 23) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while appreciating the efforts made by the facilitator, Mr. Jaakko Laajava, and the host Government of the 2012 conference, Finland, expresses profound disappointment on not convening the conference in 2012 as scheduled. The failure to convene the conference in 2012 contradicts and violates the collective agreement of the States parties contained in “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty and contravenes the letter and spirit of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. Furthermore, the Group strongly rejects the alleged impediments cited by Conveners for not convening the conference on schedule, and expresses serious concern that the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Treaty is meeting while the Conference has not been convened yet.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 27) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty is determined to continue pursuing, as a matter of high priority, the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and section IV of the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty. In this regard, the Group urges all States parties, in this session of the Preparatory Committee, to shoulder their responsibility in order to prevent further negative repercussions of not implementing the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and section IV, including the convening of the Conference, as mandated by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty.

**Access to Technology and
Technology Transfer**

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further reaffirms the importance of the right of all States parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Moreover, the Group stresses the importance of full compliance with the obligations under article IV (2) of the Treaty, which stipulates that Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) mandates the Agency, in support of the full realization of the inalienable right under article IV of the NPT, to make provision, in accordance with the statute, for materials, services, equipment, and facilities to meet the needs of research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes, including the production of electric power, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. To ensure the realization of these goals, all States parties, particularly developed States, shall extend their assistance, as requested by States parties that are States members of IAEA, in the provision of nuclear equipment, material, technology and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes, with a view to achieving the maximum benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities for peaceful purposes.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 5) In this connection, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recognizes the major and important role of IAEA in assisting States parties, particularly developing States, in planning for and using nuclear science and technology. The Group stresses the importance of nuclear knowledge-sharing and the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries to sustain and further enhance their scientific and technological capabilities, thereby also contributing to their socioeconomic development. Moreover, the Group emphasizes that the activities of IAEA in the field of technical cooperation, nuclear power and non-power applications would contribute, in an important way, to meeting energy needs, improving human health, including the application of nuclear technology in cancer therapy, combating poverty, protecting the environment, developing agriculture, managing the use of water resources and optimizing industrial processes. The Group further highlights that these activities, as well as bilateral and other multilateral cooperation, would contribute to achieving the objectives set forth in article IV of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, as the main vehicle for the transfer of nuclear

technology for peaceful purposes, should continue to be formulated and implemented in accordance with the statute of IAEA and the agreed guiding principles as contained in INFCIRC/267, as well as the decisions of IAEA policymaking organs. The Group reiterates that the current guidelines and criteria for the selection of technical cooperation projects are robust and effective, and that no additional criteria should be imposed for fulfilling the above-mentioned objectives.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that, in 2005, IAEA and its then-Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei, were awarded the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize, and reiterates the importance it attaches to the impartiality, professionalism and integrity of the Agency. While expressing its full confidence in that impartiality and professionalism, the Group strongly rejects any attempt by any State to politicize the work of the Agency, including its technical cooperation programme, in violation of its statute, as well as any pressure or interference in its activities that could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility. In this connection, the Group also expresses its rejection of any attempt by any State party to use the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme as a tool for political purposes, which would be in violation of the statute of the Agency. The Group reaffirms that choices and decisions of each State party to the Treaty in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 8) In this regard, while recognizing that a diverse portfolio of energy sources will be needed to allow access to sustainable energy and electricity resources in all regions of the world, and that States parties may pursue different ways to achieve their energy security and climate protection goals, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty once again acknowledges and reaffirms that each State party, in line with its national requirements and in accordance with its rights and obligations under the Treaty, has a sovereign right to define its national energy and fuel-cycle policies, that, inter alia, includes an inalienable right to develop, for peaceful purposes, a full national nuclear fuel cycle.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty takes note of the adoption by the IAEA Board of Governors, through a vote, in 2010 and 2011, of three proposals of assurance of supply mechanisms within the framework of the multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. In the view of the Group, the multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle should be economically viable, sustainable, non-discriminatory, predictable and transparent under the auspices of IAEA and any other possible regional and multilateral forums. The Group emphasizes that all technical, legal, political and economic implications and complexities surrounding this sensitive matter shall be fully taken into account. The Group also stresses that any decision on proposals regarding multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle shall be made by consensus following wide, integral, comprehensive and transparent multilateral

consultations, with the participation of all IAEA member States and taking into account the interests of all its member States. Furthermore, the Group strongly emphasizes that any proposal from IAEA must be consistent with its statute, without any prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy and sciences, in all its aspects, for peaceful purposes, and if they so decide, to develop a full national nuclear fuel cycle, according to its article IV.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 10) In this context, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty rejects, in principle, any attempt aimed at discouraging certain peaceful nuclear activities on the grounds of their alleged “sensitivity.” The Group further underlines that concerns related to nuclear non-proliferation shall not, in any way, restrict the inalienable right of any State party to develop all aspects of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, without discrimination, as stipulated in article IV of the Treaty. In this regard, the Group expresses its concern that some States parties have set conditions such as concluding and bringing into force an additional protocol on nuclear export in contravention of article IV of the Treaty, and calls upon those States parties to promptly remove any such condition.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines that all the parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this regard, the Group stresses particularly the obligation of developed countries to promote the legitimate need of the developing countries to nuclear energy by fully respecting this right with a view to achieving the widest benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the contribution that uses of nuclear energy can make to progress in general and to helping overcome the technological and economic disparities between developed and developing States parties to the Treaty in particular. The Group firmly believes that, as a fundamental principle, in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment shall be given to the non-nuclear-weapons States parties to the Treaty, particularly taking into account the needs of developing countries.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly rejects, and calls for the immediate removal of, any restrictions or limitations posed on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including restrictions on exports to other States parties of nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes, since such restrictions or limitations are inconsistent with the provisions and object and purpose of the Treaty. In this regard, the Group stresses that the technical cooperation and assistance

provided by IAEA in meeting the needs of its member States for material, equipment and technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall not be subject to any political, economic, military or other conditions incompatible with the provisions of its statute.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly rejects, and calls for the immediate removal of, any restrictions or limitations posed on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including restrictions on exports to other States parties of nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes, since such restrictions or limitations are inconsistent with the provisions and object and purpose of the Treaty. In this regard, the Group stresses that the technical cooperation and assistance provided by IAEA in meeting the needs of its member States for material, equipment and technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall not be subject to any political, economic, military or other conditions incompatible with the provisions of its statute.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 14) In the view of the Group, transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with the Treaty shall be supported and pursued in good faith without discrimination. The elimination of constraints inconsistent with the requirements of the Treaty would ensure that article IV of the Treaty is fully implemented with regard to the facilitation of transfer of nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes among the States parties.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology, equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their sensitivity but stipulates only that such technology, equipment and material must be subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards. In the view of the Group, provisions of article IV of the Treaty are explicit in that regard, leaving no room for reinterpretation or setting conditions for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by non-nuclear-weapon States. The Group is of the view that any interpretation that is used as a pretext to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is inconsistent with the objectives of the Treaty and, therefore, the unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes must be ensured.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 16) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty firmly believes that fostering the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by providing a framework of confidence and cooperation within which those uses can take place, is one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. Moreover, the Group emphasizes that cooperation to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world is the core objective enshrined in the statute of IAEA. Accordingly, the Group strongly encourages all States parties to actively cooperate, among themselves and through IAEA, in

the peaceful uses and applications of nuclear energy, including through international technical cooperation.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 17) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. The Group further emphasizes that non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access by developing countries to material, equipment or technology for peaceful purposes, which such countries require for their continued development. Furthermore, such arrangements must pursue and implement, without exception, the condition of adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for the supply to or cooperation with States not party to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 18) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty remains deeply concerned about the ability of certain States not party to the Treaty to obtain, in particular from some nuclear-weapon States, nuclear materials, technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons. The Group strongly calls for the enforcement, without exception or further delay, of the total and complete prohibition, as stipulated in the Treaty, of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 19) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores that IAEA, under its statutory obligations, pursues the goals of technical cooperation in peaceful applications of nuclear energy as one of the three pillars of its activities. In order to meet the objectives of technical cooperation for peaceful purposes, as enshrined in the statute of IAEA and in the Treaty, IAEA has to maintain a balance between technical cooperation and other activities. The Group believes that all States parties to the Treaty that are States members of IAEA have to ensure that the Technical Cooperation Programme remains firm and sustainable through sufficient, assured and predictable financial and human resources. In this regard, the efficacy of the Programme can best be achieved by ensuring that its formulation and strategies are in strict accordance with the needs and the requests of developing countries.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 23) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented without exception through the strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not party to the Treaty. In the view of the Group, new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-

nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 24) In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores the strong call by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that all States parties shall ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated particularly in its articles I, II and III, and with the decision on the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 26) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern about certain unilateral, politically motivated restrictions and/or limitations posed on developing countries which seriously hamper the exercise of the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes, in this regard, that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be in a manner designed to comply with article IV of the Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the IAEA safeguards system and urges all States that have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible, in order to achieve the universality of the comprehensive safeguards. The 2000 Review Conference considered the universality of the comprehensive safeguards as a main objective in order to consolidate and enhance the verification system for the non-proliferation regime. However, in the view of the Group, additional measures related to the safeguards shall not affect the rights of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, which are already committed to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and have renounced the nuclear-weapon option. The Group also expresses its strong rejection of attempts by any member State to use the technical cooperation programme of IAEA as a tool for political purposes in violation of its statute.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty are a

condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 5) In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such agreement would be concluded with the aim to: (a) Ensure full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; (b) Provide baseline data regarding fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and prevent further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (c) Strictly observe the prohibition of transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, the object and the purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, materials and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not parties to the Treaty, without exception.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty confirms that all States parties to the Treaty shall refrain from the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to States not parties to the Treaty unless they are placed under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards. In this connection, the Group confirms that the obligation under article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology for peaceful purposes, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restrictions or limitations on the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 16) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern about certain unilateral politically motivated attempts to hamper exercising the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes in this regard that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be “in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing ...”.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 2) In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also reaffirms the importance and calls for strict observance of article III (3) of the Treaty, by which

the required safeguards “shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the preamble of the Treaty”.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 8) In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of: (a) Ensuring full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; (b) Providing baseline data regarding the fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (c) Strictly observing the prohibition of transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, object and purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, mindful of the importance of article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes, reiterates that obligations under that article provide credible assurances for States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to other States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, in conformity with the Treaty, hereby declares its commitment to the effective prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer, by any State, of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear-related scientific or technological fields to Israel. In this regard, the Group expresses its serious concern over Israeli scientists’ continued access to the nuclear facilities of one nuclear-weapon State, which has potentially serious negative implications on the security of the region as well as the reliability of the global non-proliferation regime.

<p style="text-align: center;">2000 and 2010 Action Plans</p>	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reiterates its strong call for the full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking given by the nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 Review Conference to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, which has also been reaffirmed by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty. That undertaking should be demonstrated without further delay through an accelerated process of negotiations and through the full implementation of the 13 practical steps to advance systematically and progressively towards a nuclear-weapon-free world as agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference, as well as in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference, which reaffirmed the continued validity of that undertaking.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that, in pursuit of the full, effective and urgent implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, and building upon the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, the 2010 Review Conference agreed on an action plan on nuclear disarmament that includes concrete steps for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the Group strongly calls for prompt and full implementation of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 9) In this connection, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes in particular the prime importance of and the urgent need for full and prompt implementation of the commitments by the nuclear-weapon States under action 5 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament. In this context, the Group further recalls that the nuclear-weapon States committed to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, inter alia, through (a) rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons; (b) addressing the question of all nuclear weapons, regardless of their type or their location, as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process; (c) further diminishing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies; (d) discussing policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons; (e) considering the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security; (f) reducing the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and (g) further enhancing transparency and increase mutual confidence.</p>

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 10) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to submit a comprehensive substantive report about their undertakings under action 5 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament to the Preparatory Committee in 2014, in order to enable the 2015 Review Conference to take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of article VI of the Treaty in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses deep concern at the continued lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, which could undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty. The Group also deeply regrets the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. The negotiations of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame, including a nuclear weapons convention, is necessary and should commence without any further delay. In that regard, the Group reiterates its call to establish, as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament and recalls action 6 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament, through which all States have agreed that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reconfirms that negotiations on a fissile materials treaty should be conducted on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein (Shannon mandate), taking into account nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, as well as all related issues, including the past production and existing stockpiles of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Group expresses concern over the attempts to limit the scope of the negotiations on a fissile material treaty as contained in the Shannon mandate, which was endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences. In this regard, the Group recognizes that non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Treaty have already agreed to a legally binding commitment not to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty remains deeply concerned by the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons, despite some reports of bilateral and unilateral reductions. Any such reductions are undermined by the modernization of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and related infrastructure by the nuclear-weapon States. In order to comply with their obligations under

article VI of the Treaty, as well as with their commitments under the 13 practical steps and 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament, the nuclear-weapon States must immediately cease their plans to further invest in modernizing, upgrading, refurbishing or extending the lives of their nuclear weapons and related facilities. The Group is also concerned about the existence and continued deployment of tens of thousands of such weapons, whose exact number remains unconfirmed, owing to the lack of transparency in various nuclear weapons programmes.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 17) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons and, accordingly, calls on the United States of America and the Russian Federation to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability to such cuts, to further reduce their nuclear arsenals, both warheads and delivery systems, thus contributing to the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations and facilitating the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest date. The Group also recalls the commitment by the Russian Federation and the United States of America under action 4 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament for the full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and strongly urges them to adopt all required measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para 27) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms the validity of its working paper (see annex) entitled “Elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons”, which was submitted to the 2010 Review Conference in document NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47. The Group is determined to integrate this action plan into the outcome document of the 2015 review process of the Treaty, and strongly calls for its integration. The Group calls in this regard for the speedy and full implementation by the nuclear-weapon States of all its measures in accordance with the proposed timeline and at a pace that makes up for the time elapsed.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A2) To achieve the total elimination of their nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States need to implement the unequivocal undertaking agreed upon in 2000. The 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI should be fully implemented in accordance with the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility. The nuclear-weapon States should be urged to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of their nuclear weapons within a specified time framework, including a nuclear weapons convention. It should also be recalled that there is a unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice regarding the obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading

to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:

- (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference;
- (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on:
 - (i) The cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites;
 - (ii) Measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development;
- (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies;
- (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention);
- (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones;
- (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives;
- (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively;
- (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, Para A5) Full implementation by the nuclear-weapon States of their disarmament obligations and commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including those agreed at the 2000 Review Conference; acceleration of the negotiation process, in accordance with article VI; and implementation of the 13 practical steps.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that the 2010 Review Conference “reaffirms and recognizes that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security

assurances from nuclear-weapon States which could strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime". The Group, therefore, calls on the 2015 Review Conference, in addition to nuclear disarmament being its highest priority, to fully address this legitimate right as a matter of priority.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, Para 14) In keeping with the above-mentioned position and in accordance with the decision at the 2000 Review Conference, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances for further work to consider legally binding, unconditional, irrevocable and non-discriminatory negative security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 24) In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores the strong call by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that all States parties shall ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated particularly in its articles I, II and III, and with the decision on the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.17, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the modernization or development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the assurances given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, States should refrain from any actions contrary to its objectives and purpose. In this context, the Group is seriously concerned by the decision of a nuclear-weapon State to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear testing to 18 months as a setback to the 2000 Review Conference agreements. It is the view of the Group that such decisions undermine the validity of the commitment to declared moratoriums as well as the commitments under the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has been envisaged as the first of 13 practical steps leading to nuclear disarmament. The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty also remains a cause for concern.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the IAEA safeguards system and urges all States that have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible, in order to achieve the universality of the comprehensive safeguards. The 2000 Review Conference considered the universality of the

comprehensive safeguards as a main objective in order to consolidate and enhance the verification system for the non-proliferation regime. However, in the view of the Group, additional measures related to the safeguards shall not affect the rights of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, which are already committed to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and have renounced the nuclear-weapon option. The Group also expresses its strong rejection of attempts by any member State to use the technical cooperation programme of IAEA as a tool for political purposes in violation of its statute.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.19, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls action 16 of the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty and urges the nuclear-weapon States to commit to declaring to IAEA all weapon-grade fissile material and to place such material, as soon as practicable, under the supervision of IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes. The Group calls upon the Conference to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the fulfilment of these commitments through the establishment of an international mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the action, which should be made mandatory for the nuclear-weapon States.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which reaffirmed the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty. The Group recalls that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines furthermore that the 2010 Review Conference also reaffirmed the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recalled the affirmation of its goals and objectives by the 2000 Review Conference. The Conference also stressed that the Resolution remains valid until the goals and objectives are achieved, and that the Resolution is an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995. The Group recalls also that at the Conference, States parties renewed their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at its prompt implementation.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further recalls that the 2010 Review Conference, by taking note of the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review

Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, recalled the reaffirmation by the 2000 Review Conference of the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The Conference also reaffirmed the urgency and importance of achieving universality of the Treaty and called on all States in the Middle East that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States so as to achieve its universality at an early date.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 5) In this context, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty welcomes the adoption by consensus of a detailed plan of action on the Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference and urges the Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, to convene and exert utmost efforts in ensuring the success of a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. While recalling that the 2010 Review Conference emphasized the importance of a process leading to full implementation of the objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, the Group stresses the importance of the full implementation of the plan of action and the active and constructive engagement by all parties concerned to allow for the success of the conference in leading to the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern that no progress has been achieved with regard to Israel's accession to the Treaty, and placing all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, and over the delay in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, all of which are objectives and priorities that were stressed in Review Conferences of the Treaty in 1995, 2000 and 2010.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines that the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on the Middle East by devoting sufficient time within the indicative timetable and giving all speakers the full opportunity to thereby engage in a substantive debate. The Group further recalls that the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences stipulated that all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, should report through the Secretariat to the President of the Review Conference, as well as the Chairs of its Preparatory Committee meetings, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such a zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. The Group further recalls that the 2010 Review Conference requested the facilitator to report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 16) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty accordingly emphasizes the importance of submitting required reports by all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, as well as the facilitator of the 2012 conference. It is essential that the successive sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference conduct substantive discussions on the above-mentioned reports and evaluate the fulfilment of the commitments on the Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, as contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted by consensus at the 2010 Review Conference.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 17) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty requests the establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the 2015 Review Conference to assess the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and reaffirmed by the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, as well as the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 19) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that, as clearly stipulated by the 2010 Review Conference, the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction shall have been convened in the year 2012. In the First Session of the Preparatory Committee in 2012, the Group warned that any delay in convening the 2012 conference would seriously jeopardize the overall implementation of the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions and would represent a major setback in this regard. Likewise, the Group underscored that the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and the convening of a successful 2012 conference are integral and essential parts of the implementation of the consensus conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 21) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses once again the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States, in particular the obligations and commitments of the three depositary States of the Treaty that co-sponsored the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, to implement the Resolution. Moreover, the Group considers the implementation of the practical steps adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Middle East as a collective responsibility, since the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference had clearly stipulated that the States parties renew their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at its prompt implementation, and also underlined the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their

commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 23) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while appreciating the efforts made by the facilitator, Mr. Jaakko Laajava, and the host Government of the 2012 conference, Finland, expresses profound disappointment on not convening the conference in 2012 as scheduled. The failure to convene the conference in 2012 contradicts and violates the collective agreement of the States parties contained in “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty and contravenes the letter and spirit of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. Furthermore, the Group strongly rejects the alleged impediments cited by Conveners for not convening the conference on schedule, and expresses serious concern that the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Treaty is meeting while the Conference has not been convened yet.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 24) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty urges the Conveners — the United Nations Secretary-General, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation — in accordance with the mandate entrusted to them by the Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty, to convene the Conference without any further delay in order to avoid any negative repercussions on the credibility of the Treaty, its 2015 Review process and the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime as a whole. The Group calls on the facilitator to intensify consultations with all capitals in the region and to exert maximum efforts to that end.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 25) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores that efforts, by the Conveners and the Facilitator, related to the Conference should be undertaken in accordance with the mandate contained in “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty, and should be focused on convening the Conference at the earliest date in 2013 and on seeking out in advance, by the Conveners and the Facilitator of the Conference, credible assurances regarding the unconditional participation of Israel, the only country of the region that has not declared its participation in the Conference.

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.42, Para 27) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty is determined to continue pursuing, as a matter of high priority, the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and section IV of the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty. In this regard, the Group urges all States parties, in this session of the Preparatory Committee, to shoulder their responsibility in order to prevent further negative repercussions of not implementing the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and section IV,

	including the convening of the Conference, as mandated by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty.
Nuclear Safety and Security	
IAEA and Safety and Security	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 20) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty affirms the need to strengthen the radiological safety and protection systems at facilities utilizing radioactive materials and at radioactive waste management facilities, including the safe transportation of these materials. The Group reaffirms the need to strengthen existing international regulations relating to the safety and security of transportation of such materials. While reiterating the need to take necessary measures to prevent any dumping of nuclear or radioactive wastes, the Group calls for the effective implementation of the Code of Practice on the IAEA International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste as a means of enhancing the protection of all States from the dumping of radioactive wastes on their territories.</p> <p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 21) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recognizes that the primary responsibility for nuclear safety rests with individual States. The Group reaffirms the central role of IAEA in nuclear safety-related matters, including through the establishment of nuclear safety standards. The Group stresses that IAEA must retain centrality in this field, owing to its mandatory functions and longstanding expertise. The Group stresses that any possible review of nuclear safety standards at the global level must be carried out within IAEA in an inclusive, gradual and transparent manner, with the guidance and participation of and in consultation with all member States, and shall incorporate the views of all member States. The Group also calls for the implementation of the Nuclear Safety Action Plan endorsed by the General Conference of IAEA in September 2011.</p>
Individual State Responsibilities	<p>(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.16, Para 21) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recognizes that the primary responsibility for nuclear safety rests with individual States. The Group reaffirms the central role of IAEA in nuclear safety-related matters, including through the establishment of nuclear safety standards. The Group stresses that IAEA must retain centrality in this field, owing to its mandatory functions and longstanding expertise. The Group stresses that any possible review of nuclear safety standards at the global level must be carried out within IAEA in an inclusive, gradual and transparent manner, with the guidance and participation of and in consultation with all member States, and shall incorporate the views of all member States. The Group also calls for the implementation of the Nuclear Safety Action Plan endorsed by the General Conference of IAEA in September 2011.</p>

