



| Thematic Summary of the Positions of the Members of the Non-Aligned Movement in Plenary Meeting Records of the 49 th General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency | |
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| United Nations Fora | |
| International Atomic Energy Agency | <p>(GC(49)/OR.6, Para 115) Speaking on behalf of NAM, he noted that the Board had recognized that the SQP in its present form constituted a weakness in the safeguards system and had requested the Agency to assist SQP States in making a smooth transition to new arrangements by organizing comprehensive training programmes and providing technical assistance for capacity building, whatever option was chosen on how to proceed.</p> <p>(GC(49)/OR.6, Para 116) NAM recognized the inalienable right of all States to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes. While fully supporting efforts to ensure the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, it maintained that non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology should be addressed in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner. A clear distinction had to be made between Member States' legal obligations pursuant to their safeguards agreements and voluntary commitments. Voluntary commitments could not be turned into legal safeguards obligations and Member States should not be penalized for not adhering to their voluntary commitments.</p> <p>(GC(49)/OR.6, Para 117) The Agency was the sole competent authority for verification and NAM had full confidence in its professionalism and impartiality. All safeguards and verification issues, including those relating to Iran, should be resolved within the framework of the Agency based on technical grounds. The Agency had the legal authority to pursue verification of possible nuclear weapons, but any request for additional legal authority should be negotiated by Member States. It was therefore important to promote and strengthen the multilateral process.</p> |
| Nonproliferation | |
| Nonproliferation and Peaceful Uses | <p>(GC(49)/OR.6, Para 116) NAM recognized the inalienable right of all States to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes. While fully supporting efforts to ensure the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, it maintained that non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology should be addressed in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner. A clear distinction had to be made between</p> |

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| Small Quantities Protocol | (GC(49)/OR.6, Para 115) Speaking on behalf of NAM, he noted that the Board had recognized that the SQP in its present form constituted a weakness in the safeguards system and had requested the Agency to assist SQP States in making a smooth transition to new arrangements by organizing comprehensive training programmes and providing technical assistance for capacity building, whatever option was chosen on how to proceed. |
| Peaceful Uses | |
| UN and IAEA Authority | (GC(49)/OR.6, Para 117) The Agency was the sole competent authority for verification and NAM had full confidence in its professionalism and impartiality. All safeguards and verification issues, including those relating to Iran, should be resolved within the framework of the Agency based on technical grounds. The Agency had the legal authority to pursue verification of possible nuclear weapons, but any request for additional legal authority should be negotiated by Member States. It was therefore important to promote and strengthen the multilateral process. |
| Inalienable Right Through NPT | (GC(49)/OR.6, Para 116) NAM recognized the inalienable right of all States to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes. While fully supporting efforts to ensure the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, it maintained that non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology should be addressed in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner. A clear distinction had to be made between Member States' legal obligations pursuant to their safeguards agreements and voluntary commitments. Voluntary commitments could not be turned into legal safeguards obligations and Member States should not be penalized for not adhering to their voluntary commitments. |
| NWFZs | |
| Middle East WMDFZ | (GC(49)/OR.10, Para 71) In its capacity as Chairman of NAM and Chairman of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Malaysia re-emphasized the need for an NWFZ in the Middle East. She recalled the declaration made by the NAM Heads of Government or State at the |

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| | <p>NAM Summit in Kuala Lumpur in February 2003, reiterating their support for the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction, expressing their concern about the acquisition of nuclear capability by Israel, which posed a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States, and condemning Israel for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals. They believed that stability could not be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities were maintained, particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons which allowed one party to threaten its neighbours and the region.</p> |
| <p>Country Specific</p> | |
| <p>Israel</p> | <p>(GC(49)/OR.10, Para 71) In its capacity as Chairman of NAM and Chairman of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Malaysia re-emphasized the need for an NWFZ in the Middle East. She recalled the declaration made by the NAM Heads of Government or State at the NAM Summit in Kuala Lumpur in February 2003, reiterating their support for the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction, expressing their concern about the acquisition of nuclear capability by Israel, which posed a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States, and condemning Israel for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals. They believed that stability could not be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities were maintained, particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons which allowed one party to threaten its neighbours and the region.</p> |
| <p>Iran</p> | <p>(GC(49)/OR.6, Para 117) The Agency was the sole competent authority for verification and NAM had full confidence in its professionalism and impartiality. All safeguards and verification issues, including those relating to Iran, should be resolved within the framework of the Agency based on technical grounds. The Agency had the legal authority to pursue verification of possible nuclear weapons, but any request for additional legal authority should be negotiated by Member States. It was therefore important to promote and strengthen the multilateral process.</p> |