



**Thematic Summary of the Positions of the Members of the Non-Aligned Movement in Plenary Meeting Records of the 57<sup>th</sup> General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency**

**United Nations Fora**

**UN General Assembly**

**(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 8)** Mr NAJAVI (Islamic Republic of Iran), speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated its position of principle in the matter as follows: “a. NAM strongly believes that stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are maintained, particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allow one party to threaten its neighbours and the region. “b. NAM considers the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and reiterates its support for the establishment of such a zone in accordance with relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. “c. NAM is convinced that the effective and efficient application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East promotes greater confidence among States in the region. Accordingly, NAM considers that achieving the universality of comprehensive Agency safeguards in the Middle East region is the first practical step towards that end, and is a necessary step towards the establishment of an NWFZ there.”

**(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 90)** NAM considered that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would be a positive step towards the objective of global nuclear disarmament, and it continued to advocate the establishment of such a zone in accordance with the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.

**(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 96)** In a letter attached to the Director General’s report contained in document GC(54)/14, Israel’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs had stated that Israel valued the non-proliferation regime, acknowledged its importance and had over the years demonstrated “a responsible policy of restraint in the nuclear domain”. Regrettably, numerous Agency documents were testimony to the contrary. For example, in various resolutions regarding South Africa’s nuclear capabilities adopted by it before 1994, the General Conference had recalled General Assembly resolutions dealing with relations between Israel and South Africa in which the General Assembly had, inter alia, strongly condemned the extensive collaboration between Israel and the then racist regime of South Africa, especially in the military and nuclear fields, in defiance of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.

**International Atomic  
Energy Agency**

**(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 8)** Mr NAJAVI (Islamic Republic of Iran), speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated its position of principle in the matter as follows: “a. NAM strongly believes that stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are maintained, particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allow one party to threaten its neighbours and the region. “b. NAM considers the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and reiterates its support for the establishment of such a zone in accordance with relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. “c. NAM is convinced that the effective and efficient application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East promotes greater confidence among States in the region. Accordingly, NAM considers that achieving the universality of comprehensive Agency safeguards in the Middle East region is the first practical step towards that end, and is a necessary step towards the establishment of an NWFZ there.”

**(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 9)** NAM welcomed the fact that its members parties to the NPT had concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency in fulfilment of their obligation under paragraph 1 of Article III of that treaty, as non-nuclear-weapon States. NAM noted that all States of the Middle East except for Israel were parties to the NPT and had undertaken to accept comprehensive Agency safeguards.

**(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 10)** NAM regretted Israel’s continued insistence that the issue of Agency safeguards could not be addressed in isolation from the regional peace process; there was no automatic sequence linking the application of comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East to the prior conclusion of a peace settlement — in fact, the former would contribute to the latter.

**(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 11)** NAM also regretted the fact that the Director General had not been able to make further progress in fulfilling his mandate, pursuant to resolution GC(56)/RES/15, regarding the application of comprehensive Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East.

**(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 12)** NAM, which believed that all Member States should cooperate in rectifying what was an unacceptable situation, was calling for the active participation of all Member States in achieving the universality of comprehensive Agency safeguards in the Middle East. In that context, NAM requested that, in the promotion of Agency safeguards in the Middle East, priority should be first accorded to achieving the universality of comprehensive Agency safeguards there.

**(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 13)** NAM, which noted that the Director General would continue consultations in accordance with his mandate regarding the early application of comprehensive Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East, welcomed the Director General’s efforts to encourage the development and consideration of relevant new

ideas and approaches that might help to move his mandate forward, and it requested the Director General to continue briefing Member States regularly on those efforts.

**(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 14)** The NAM members parties to the NPT, which recalled the consensus decision contained in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference on the convening, in 2012, of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, noted that, in response to a request made on 27 April 2012 by the facilitator of that conference, the Secretariat had in October 2012 provided background documentation describing the work undertaken by the Agency and the experience gained by it with regard to modalities for establishing an NWFZ in the Middle East. NAM, which would have greatly appreciated the Director General's briefing Member States on that matter earlier, had during the September 2013 session of the Board requested that the background documentation, or a detailed summary thereof, be attached to the Director General's report contained in document GC(57)/10. NAM welcomed the fact that the Director General had now provided the background documentation, in an annex to document GC(57)/10/Add.1; it would duly reflect on that documentation.

**(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 16)** NAM requested the Director General to continue his consultations with Member States on arrangements conducive to achievement of the objective of the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East.

**(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 17)** NAM, which was fully committed to cooperating with the Director General and supporting his efforts in implementing resolution GC(56)/RES/15, endorsed the draft resolution submitted by Egypt.

**(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 89)** NAM welcomed the fact that its members party to the NPT had all concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency as non-nuclear-weapon States in fulfilment of their obligations under Article III.1 of the NPT.

**(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 91)** A selective approach to the issue of nuclear capabilities in the Middle East was undermining the viability of the Agency's safeguards regime. Also, it had resulted in the continuing dangerous presence there of unsafeguarded Israeli nuclear facilities and activities, despite the repeated calls on Israel to subject those facilities and activities to comprehensive Agency safeguards.

**(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 93)** Member States should cooperate in rectifying what was an unacceptable situation and achieving the universality of comprehensive Agency safeguards in the Middle East. Implementing resolution GC(53)/RES/17 could be a first step.

**(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 94)** NAM regretted Israel's continuing insistence that the issue of Agency safeguards in the Middle East could not be addressed in isolation from the regional peace process. There was no

	<p>automatic sequence making the application of comprehensive safeguards at all nuclear facilities in the Middle East dependent on a Middle East peace settlement. The former would contribute to the latter.</p> <p><b>(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 96)</b> In a letter attached to the Director General’s report contained in document GC(54)/14, Israel’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs had stated that Israel valued the non-proliferation regime, acknowledged its importance and had over the years demonstrated “a responsible policy of restraint in the nuclear domain”. Regrettably, numerous Agency documents were testimony to the contrary. For example, in various resolutions regarding South Africa’s nuclear capabilities adopted by it before 1994, the General Conference had recalled General Assembly resolutions dealing with relations between Israel and South Africa in which the General Assembly had, inter alia, strongly condemned the extensive collaboration between Israel and the then racist regime of South Africa, especially in the military and nuclear fields, in defiance of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.</p>
<p><b>UN Security Council</b></p>	<p><b>(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 8)</b> Mr NAJAVI (Islamic Republic of Iran), speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated its position of principle in the matter as follows: “a. NAM strongly believes that stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are maintained, particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allow one party to threaten its neighbours and the region. “b. NAM considers the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and reiterates its support for the establishment of such a zone in accordance with relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. “c. NAM is convinced that the effective and efficient application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East promotes greater confidence among States in the region. Accordingly, NAM considers that achieving the universality of comprehensive Agency safeguards in the Middle East region is the first practical step towards that end, and is a necessary step towards the establishment of an NWFZ there.”</p> <p><b>(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 90)</b> NAM considered that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would be a positive step towards the objective of global nuclear disarmament, and it continued to advocate the establishment of such a zone in accordance with the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.</p> <p><b>(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 96)</b> In a letter attached to the Director General’s report contained in document GC(54)/14, Israel’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs had stated that Israel valued the non-proliferation regime, acknowledged its importance and had over the years demonstrated “a responsible policy of restraint in the nuclear domain”. Regrettably, numerous Agency documents were testimony to the contrary. For example, in various resolutions regarding South Africa’s nuclear capabilities adopted by it before 1994, the</p>

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<p><b>Peaceful Uses</b></p>	
<p><b>Access to Nuclear Technology</b></p>	<p><b>(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 95)</b> NAM continued to want a complete ban on the transfer to Israel of nuclear-related equipment, information, material, facilities, devices and other resources and on the provision to Israel of other assistance in nuclear-related scientific and technological fields.</p>
<p><b>NWFZs</b></p>	
<p><b>Contributions to Disarmament</b></p>	<p><b>(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 8)</b> Mr NAJAVI (Islamic Republic of Iran), speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated its position of principle in the matter as follows: “a. NAM strongly believes that stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are maintained, particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allow one party to threaten its neighbours and the region. “b. NAM considers the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and reiterates its support for the establishment of such a zone in accordance with relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. “c. NAM is convinced that the effective and efficient application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East promotes greater confidence among States in the region. Accordingly, NAM considers that achieving the universality of comprehensive Agency safeguards in the Middle East region is the first practical step towards that end, and is a necessary step towards the establishment of an NWFZ there.”</p> <p><b>(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 90)</b> NAM considered that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would be a positive step towards the objective of global nuclear disarmament, and it continued to advocate the establishment of such a zone in accordance with the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.</p>
<p><b>Middle East WMDFZ</b></p>	<p><b>(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 8)</b> Mr NAJAVI (Islamic Republic of Iran), speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated its position of principle in the matter as follows: “a. NAM strongly believes that stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are maintained, particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allow one party to threaten its neighbours and the region. “b.</p>

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**(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 14)** The NAM members parties to the NPT, which recalled the consensus decision contained in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference on the convening, in 2012, of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, noted that, in response to a request made on 27 April 2012 by the facilitator of that conference, the Secretariat had in October 2012 provided background documentation describing the work undertaken by the Agency and the experience gained by it with regard to modalities for establishing an NWFZ in the Middle East. NAM, which would have greatly appreciated the Director General’s briefing Member States on that matter earlier, had during the September 2013 session of the Board requested that the background documentation, or a detailed summary thereof, be attached to the Director General’s report contained in document GC(57)/10. NAM welcomed the fact that the Director General had now provided the background documentation, in an annex to document GC(57)/10/Add.1; it would duly reflect on that documentation.

**(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 15)** The NAM members parties to the NPT were profoundly disappointed that the aforementioned conference to be convened in 2012 had still not taken place. They were of the view that the failure to convene the conference in 2012 had been contrary to the letter and spirit of the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995 by the NPT Review and Extension Conference and violated the collective agreement of the States parties to the NPT contained in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Conference. They strongly rejected the conveners’ allegations regarding impediments to the convening of the conference on schedule. They urged the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation to convene the conference without any further delay, in order to avoid a negative impact on the credibility of the NPT, on the preparations for the 2015 NPT Review Conference and on the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime as a whole.

**(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 16)** NAM requested the Director General to continue his consultations with Member States on arrangements conducive to achievement of the objective of the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East.

	<p><b>(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 90)</b> NAM considered that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would be a positive step towards the objective of global nuclear disarmament, and it continued to advocate the establishment of such a zone in accordance with the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.</p>
<p><b>Country Specific</b></p>	
<p><b>United States</b></p>	<p><b>(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 15)</b> The NAM members parties to the NPT were profoundly disappointed that the aforementioned conference to be convened in 2012 had still not taken place. They were of the view that the failure to convene the conference in 2012 had been contrary to the letter and spirit of the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995 by the NPT Review and Extension Conference and violated the collective agreement of the States parties to the NPT contained in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Conference. They strongly rejected the conveners' allegations regarding impediments to the convening of the conference on schedule. They urged the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation to convene the conference without any further delay, in order to avoid a negative impact on the credibility of the NPT, on the preparations for the 2015 NPT Review Conference and on the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime as a whole.</p>
<p><b>Russia</b></p>	<p><b>(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 15)</b> The NAM members parties to the NPT were profoundly disappointed that the aforementioned conference to be convened in 2012 had still not taken place. They were of the view that the failure to convene the conference in 2012 had been contrary to the letter and spirit of the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995 by the NPT Review and Extension Conference and violated the collective agreement of the States parties to the NPT contained in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Conference. They strongly rejected the conveners' allegations regarding impediments to the convening of the conference on schedule. They urged the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation to convene the conference without any further delay, in order to avoid a negative impact on the credibility of the NPT, on the preparations for the 2015 NPT Review Conference and on the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime as a whole.</p>
<p><b>United Kingdom</b></p>	<p><b>(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 15)</b> The NAM members parties to the NPT were profoundly disappointed that the aforementioned conference to be convened in 2012 had still not taken place. They were of the view that the failure to convene the conference in 2012 had been contrary to the letter and spirit of the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995 by the NPT Review and Extension Conference and violated the collective agreement of the States parties to the NPT contained in the Final</p>

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<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Israel</b></p>	<p><b>(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 8)</b> Mr NAJAVI (Islamic Republic of Iran), speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated its position of principle in the matter as follows: “a. NAM strongly believes that stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are maintained, particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allow one party to threaten its neighbours and the region. “b. NAM considers the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and reiterates its support for the establishment of such a zone in accordance with relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. “c. NAM is convinced that the effective and efficient application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East promotes greater confidence among States in the region. Accordingly, NAM considers that achieving the universality of comprehensive Agency safeguards in the Middle East region is the first practical step towards that end, and is a necessary step towards the establishment of an NWFZ there.”</p> <p><b>(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 9)</b> NAM welcomed the fact that its members parties to the NPT had concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency in fulfilment of their obligation under paragraph 1 of Article III of that treaty, as non-nuclear-weapon States. NAM noted that all States of the Middle East except for Israel were parties to the NPT and had undertaken to accept comprehensive Agency safeguards.</p> <p><b>(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 10)</b> NAM regretted Israel’s continued insistence that the issue of Agency safeguards could not be addressed in isolation from the regional peace process; there was no automatic sequence linking the application of comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East to the prior conclusion of a peace settlement — in fact, the former would contribute to the latter.</p> <p><b>(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 88)</b> Mr NAJAVI (Islamic Republic of Iran), speaking on behalf of NAM, said that it strongly believed that stability could not be achieved in a region where a massive imbalance in military capabilities was continuing to exist, particularly owing to the fact that the possession of nuclear weapons was enabling one country to threaten its neighbours and other countries in the region.</p> <p><b>(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 91)</b> A selective approach to the issue of nuclear capabilities in the Middle East was undermining the viability of the Agency’s safeguards regime. Also, it had resulted in the continuing</p>



	<p>dangerous presence there of unsafeguarded Israeli nuclear facilities and activities, despite the repeated calls on Israel to subject those facilities and activities to comprehensive Agency safeguards.</p> <p><b>(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 92)</b> NAM was gravely concerned about the dire consequences for international security of Israel's nuclear capabilities, which posed a serious threat to Israel's neighbours and to other States, and about the continuing provision to Israeli scientists of access to the nuclear facilities of one of the nuclear-weapon States.</p> <p><b>(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 94)</b> NAM regretted Israel's continuing insistence that the issue of Agency safeguards in the Middle East could not be addressed in isolation from the regional peace process. There was no automatic sequence making the application of comprehensive safeguards at all nuclear facilities in the Middle East dependent on a Middle East peace settlement. The former would contribute to the latter.</p> <p><b>(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 95)</b> NAM continued to want a complete ban on the transfer to Israel of nuclear-related equipment, information, material, facilities, devices and other resources and on the provision to Israel of other assistance in nuclear-related scientific and technological fields.</p> <p><b>(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 96)</b> In a letter attached to the Director General's report contained in document GC(54)/14, Israel's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs had stated that Israel valued the non-proliferation regime, acknowledged its importance and had over the years demonstrated "a responsible policy of restraint in the nuclear domain". Regrettably, numerous Agency documents were testimony to the contrary. For example, in various resolutions regarding South Africa's nuclear capabilities adopted by it before 1994, the General Conference had recalled General Assembly resolutions dealing with relations between Israel and South Africa in which the General Assembly had, inter alia, strongly condemned the extensive collaboration between Israel and the then racist regime of South Africa, especially in the military and nuclear fields, in defiance of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>South Africa</b></p>	<p><b>(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 96)</b> In a letter attached to the Director General's report contained in document GC(54)/14, Israel's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs had stated that Israel valued the non-proliferation regime, acknowledged its importance and had over the years demonstrated "a responsible policy of restraint in the nuclear domain". Regrettably, numerous Agency documents were testimony to the contrary. For example, in various resolutions regarding South Africa's nuclear capabilities adopted by it before 1994, the General Conference had recalled General Assembly resolutions dealing with relations between Israel and South Africa in which the General Assembly had, inter alia, strongly condemned the extensive collaboration between Israel and the then racist regime of South Africa,</p>

especially in the military and nuclear fields, in defiance of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.

**Non-Proliferation Treaty Related**

**Disarmament Through the NPT**

**(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 14)** The NAM members parties to the NPT, which recalled the consensus decision contained in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference on the convening, in 2012, of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, noted that, in response to a request made on 27 April 2012 by the facilitator of that conference, the Secretariat had in October 2012 provided background documentation describing the work undertaken by the Agency and the experience gained by it with regard to modalities for establishing an NWFZ in the Middle East. NAM, which would have greatly appreciated the Director General’s briefing Member States on that matter earlier, had during the September 2013 session of the Board requested that the background documentation, or a detailed summary thereof, be attached to the Director General’s report contained in document GC(57)/10. NAM welcomed the fact that the Director General had now provided the background documentation, in an annex to document GC(57)/10/Add.1; it would duly reflect on that documentation.

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**1995 Review and Extension of the NPT**

**(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 15)** The NAM members parties to the NPT were profoundly disappointed that the aforementioned conference to be convened in 2012 had still not taken place. They were of the view that the failure to convene the conference in 2012 had been contrary to the letter and spirit of the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995 by the NPT Review and Extension Conference and violated the collective agreement of the States parties to the NPT contained in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Conference. They strongly rejected the conveners’ allegations regarding impediments to the convening of the

	<p>conference on schedule. They urged the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation to convene the conference without any further delay, in order to avoid a negative impact on the credibility of the NPT, on the preparations for the 2015 NPT Review Conference and on the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime as a whole.</p>
<p><b>Access to Technology and Technology Transfer</b></p>	<p><b>(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 95)</b> NAM continued to want a complete ban on the transfer to Israel of nuclear-related equipment, information, material, facilities, devices and other resources and on the provision to Israel of other assistance in nuclear-related scientific and technological fields.</p>
<p><b>2000 and 2010 Action Plans</b></p>	<p><b>(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 14)</b> The NAM members parties to the NPT, which recalled the consensus decision contained in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference on the convening, in 2012, of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, noted that, in response to a request made on 27 April 2012 by the facilitator of that conference, the Secretariat had in October 2012 provided background documentation describing the work undertaken by the Agency and the experience gained by it with regard to modalities for establishing an NWFZ in the Middle East. NAM, which would have greatly appreciated the Director General's briefing Member States on that matter earlier, had during the September 2013 session of the Board requested that the background documentation, or a detailed summary thereof, be attached to the Director General's report contained in document GC(57)/10. NAM welcomed the fact that the Director General had now provided the background documentation, in an annex to document GC(57)/10/Add.1; it would duly reflect on that documentation.</p> <p><b>(GC(57)/OR.9, Para 15)</b> The NAM members parties to the NPT were profoundly disappointed that the aforementioned conference to be convened in 2012 had still not taken place. They were of the view that the failure to convene the conference in 2012 had been contrary to the letter and spirit of the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995 by the NPT Review and Extension Conference and violated the collective agreement of the States parties to the NPT contained in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Conference. They strongly rejected the conveners' allegations regarding impediments to the convening of the conference on schedule. They urged the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation to convene the conference without any further delay, in order to avoid a negative impact on the credibility of the NPT, on the preparations for the 2015 NPT Review Conference and on the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime as a whole.</p>