## The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Database



Thematic Summary of the Positions of the Members of the Non-Aligned Movement in Plenary Meeting Records of the 58 <sup>th</sup> General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency	
	United Nations Fora
UN General Assembly	<ul> <li>(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 9) Mr NAJAVI (Islamic Republic of Iran), speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated its position of principle in the matter as follows: "a. NAM strongly believes that stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are maintained, particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allow one party to threaten its neighbours and the region. "b. NAM considers the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and reiterates its support for the establishment of such a zone in accordance with relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. "c. NAM is convinced that the effective and efficient application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East promotes greater confidence among States in the region. Accordingly, NAM considers that achieving the universality of comprehensive Agency safeguards in the Middle East region is the first practical step towards that end, and is a necessary step towards the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East would be a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament, and it continued to advocate the establishment of such a zone in accordance with the relevant UN General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.</li> <li>(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 93) The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel, in a letter to the Director General (reproduced in Annex 2 of the Director General's report contained in document GC(54)/14), had stated that Israel valued the non-proliferation regime, acknowledged its importance and had over the years demonstrated a responsible policy of restraint in the nuclear domain. Regrettably, Agency documents were testimony to the contrary. Various General Conference resolutions adopted prior to 1994 regarding South Africa's nuclear capabilities had referenced UN General Assembly resolutions on relations between Israel and the th</li></ul>

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(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 10) NAM welcomed the fact that its members party to the NPT had concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency in fulfilment of their obligation under Article III.1 of that Treaty, as non-nuclear-weapon States. NAM noted that all States of the Middle East except for Israel were party to the NPT and had undertaken to accept comprehensive Agency safeguards. NAM regretted Israel's continued insistence that the issue of Agency safeguards could not be addressed in isolation from the regional peace process; there was no automatic sequence making the application of comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East dependent on a peace settlement there — in fact, the former would contribute to the latter.

(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 11) NAM also regretted the fact that the Director General had not been able to make further progress in fulfilling his mandate, pursuant to resolution GC(57)/RES/15, regarding the application of comprehensive Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East.

(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 12) In the belief that all Member States should cooperate in rectifying what was an unacceptable situation, NAM called for their active participation in achieving the universality of comprehensive Agency safeguards in the Middle East as a priority.

(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 13) Noting that the Director General would continue consultations in accordance with his mandate regarding the early application of comprehensive Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East, NAM welcomed the Director General's efforts to encourage the development and consideration of relevant new ideas and approaches that might help to move his mandate forward, and it requested the Director General to continue briefing Member States regularly on those efforts.

## International Atomic Energy Agency

(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 15) NAM requested the Director General to continue his consultations with Member States on arrangements conducive to achieving the objective of the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East.
(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 16) NAM, which was fully committed to cooperating with the Director General and supporting his efforts in implementing resolution $GC(57)/RES/15$ , endorsed the draft resolution submitted by Egypt.
(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 86) NAM welcomed the fact that its members party to the NPT had concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency as non-nuclear-weapon States in fulfilment of their obligations under Article III.1 of the NPT. NAM noted that all States of the Middle East region except Israel were party to the NPT and had undertaken to accept comprehensive Agency safeguards.
(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 88) A selective approach to the issue of nuclear capabilities in the Middle East was undermining the viability of the Agency's safeguards regime. Such an approach had also resulted in the continuing dangerous presence of unsafeguarded Israeli nuclear facilities and activities, despite the repeated calls on Israel to subject those facilities and activities to comprehensive Agency safeguards.
(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 90) Member States should cooperate in rectifying what was an unacceptable situation and achieving the universality of comprehensive Agency safeguards in the Middle East. Implementing resolution GC(53)/RES/17 would be a first step towards that end.
(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 91) NAM regretted Israel's continued insistence that the issue of Agency safeguards could not be addressed in isolation from the regional peace process. There was no automatic sequence making the application of comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East dependent on a peace settlement there. In fact, the former would contribute to the latter.
(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 93) The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel, in a letter to the Director General (reproduced in Annex 2 of the Director General's report contained in document GC(54)/14), had stated that Israel valued the non-proliferation regime, acknowledged its importance and had over the years demonstrated a responsible policy of restraint in the nuclear domain. Regrettably, Agency documents were testimony to the contrary. Various General Conference resolutions adopted prior to 1994 regarding South Africa's nuclear capabilities had referenced UN General Assembly resolutions on relations between Israel and South Africa. The General Assembly resolutions had, inter alia, strongly condemned the extensive collaboration between Israel and the then racist regime of South Africa, especially in military and nuclear fields, in defiance of General Assembly and UN Security Council resolutions.
(GC(58)/OR.9, Para 51) Mr NAJAFI (Islamic Republic of Iran), speaking on behalf of NAM, thanked the President for his diplomatic

	skills and professional leadership, which had guided the fifty-eighth session of the General Conference to a successful conclusion.
	(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 9) Mr NAJAVI (Islamic Republic of Iran), speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated its position of principle in the matter as follows: "a. NAM strongly believes that stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are maintained, particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allow one party to threaten its neighbours and the region. "b. NAM considers the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and reiterates its support for the establishment of such a zone in accordance with relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. "c. NAM is convinced that the effective and efficient application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East promotes greater confidence among States in the region. Accordingly, NAM considers that achieving the universality of comprehensive Agency safeguards in the Middle East region is the first practical step towards that end, and is a necessary step towards the establishment of an NWFZ there."
UN Security Council	(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 87) NAM considered that the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East would be a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament, and it continued to advocate the establishment of such a zone in accordance with the relevant UN General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.
	(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 93) The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel, in a letter to the Director General (reproduced in Annex 2 of the Director General's report contained in document GC(54)/14), had stated that Israel valued the non-proliferation regime, acknowledged its importance and had over the years demonstrated a responsible policy of restraint in the nuclear domain. Regrettably, Agency documents were testimony to the contrary. Various General Conference resolutions adopted prior to 1994 regarding South Africa's nuclear capabilities had referenced UN General Assembly resolutions on relations between Israel and South Africa. The General Assembly resolutions had, inter alia, strongly condemned the extensive collaboration between Israel and the then racist regime of South Africa, especially in military and nuclear fields, in defiance of General Assembly and UN Security Council resolutions.
Peaceful Uses	
Access to Nuclear Technology	(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 92) NAM reiterated its call for a complete ban on the transfer to Israel of nuclear-related equipment, information, material, facilities, devices and other resources and on the provision to Israel of other assistance in nuclear-related scientific and technological fields.

NWFZs	
Contributions to Disarmament	<ul> <li>(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 9) Mr NAJAVI (Islamic Republic of Iran), speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated its position of principle in the matter as follows: "a. NAM strongly believes that stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are maintained, particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allow one party to threaten its neighbours and the region. "b. NAM considers the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and reiterates its support for the establishment of such a zone in accordance with relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. "c. NAM is convinced that the effective and efficient application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East promotes greater confidence among States in the region. Accordingly, NAM considers that achieving the universality of comprehensive Agency safeguards in the Middle East region is the first practical step towards that end, and is a necessary step towards the establishment of an NWFZ there."</li> <li>(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 87) NAM considered that the establishment of an NWFZ there."</li> </ul>
Middle East WMDFZ	<ul> <li>(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 9) Mr NAJAVI (Islamic Republic of Iran), speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated its position of principle in the matter as follows: "a. NAM strongly believes that stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are maintained, particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allow one party to threaten its neighbours and the region. "b. NAM considers the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and reiterates its support for the establishment of such a zone in accordance with relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. "c. NAM is convinced that the effective and efficient application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East promotes greater confidence among States in the region. Accordingly, NAM considers that achieving the universality of comprehensive Agency safeguards in the Middle East region is the first practical step towards that end, and is a necessary step towards the establishment of an NWFZ there."</li> <li>(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 14) The NAM members party to the NPT recalled the consensus decision contained in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference on the convening, in 2012, of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and</li> </ul>

	all other weapons of mass destruction. They were profoundly disappointed that the conference had still not taken place. The failure to convene the conference in 2012 had been contrary to the letter and spirit of the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995 by the NPT Review and Extension Conference and violated the collective agreement of the States parties to the NPT contained in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. They strongly rejected the conveners' allegations regarding impediments to the convening of the conference on schedule. They urged the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation to convene the conference and on the ruled a negative impact on the credibility of the NPT, on the preparations for the 2015 NPT Review Conference and on the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime as a whole. (GC(58)/OR.8, Para 15) NAM requested the Director General to continue his consultations with Member States on arrangements conducive to achieving the objective of the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East would be a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament, and it continued to advocate the establishment of such a zone in accordance with the relevant UN General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.
Country Specific	
United States	(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 14) The NAM members party to the NPT recalled the consensus decision contained in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference on the convening, in 2012, of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. They were profoundly disappointed that the conference had still not taken place. The failure to convene the conference in 2012 had been contrary to the letter and spirit of the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995 by the NPT Review and Extension Conference and violated the collective agreement of the States parties to the NPT contained in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. They strongly rejected the conveners' allegations regarding impediments to the convening of the conference on schedule. They urged the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation to convene the conference without any further delay in order to avoid a negative impact on the credibility of the NPT, on the preparations for the 2015 NPT Review Conference and on the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime as a whole.
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United Kingdom	(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 14) The NAM members party to the NPT recalled the consensus decision contained in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference on the convening, in 2012, of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. They were profoundly disappointed that the conference had still not taken place. The failure to convene the conference in 2012 had been contrary to the letter and spirit of the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995 by the NPT Review and Extension Conference and violated the collective agreement of the States parties to the NPT contained in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. They strongly rejected the conveners' allegations regarding impediments to the convening of the conference on schedule. They urged the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation to convene the conference without any further delay in order to avoid a negative impact on the credibility of the NPT, on the preparations for the 2015 NPT Review Conference and on the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime as a whole.
Israel	(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 9) Mr NAJAVI (Islamic Republic of Iran), speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated its position of principle in the matter as follows: "a. NAM strongly believes that stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are maintained, particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allow one party to threaten its neighbours and the region. "b. NAM considers the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and reiterates its support for the establishment of such a zone in accordance with relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. "c. NAM is convinced that the effective and efficient application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle

East promotes greater confidence among States in the region. Accordingly, NAM considers that achieving the universality of comprehensive Agency safeguards in the Middle East region is the first practical step towards that end, and is a necessary step towards the establishment of an NWFZ there."
(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 10) NAM welcomed the fact that its members party to the NPT had concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency in fulfilment of their obligation under Article III.1 of that Treaty, as non-nuclear-weapon States. NAM noted that all States of the Middle East except for Israel were party to the NPT and had undertaken to accept comprehensive Agency safeguards. NAM regretted Israel's continued insistence that the issue of Agency safeguards could not be addressed in isolation from the regional peace process; there was no automatic sequence making the application of comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East dependent on a peace settlement there — in fact, the former would contribute to the latter.
(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 85) Mr NAJAFI (Islamic Republic of Iran), speaking on behalf of NAM, said that it strongly believed that stability could not be achieved in a region where a massive imbalance in military capabilities continued to exist, particularly owing to the fact that the possession of nuclear weapons was enabling one country to threaten its neighbours and other countries in the region.
(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 86) NAM welcomed the fact that its members party to the NPT had concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency as non-nuclear-weapon States in fulfilment of their obligations under Article III.1 of the NPT. NAM noted that all States of the Middle East region except Israel were party to the NPT and had undertaken to accept comprehensive Agency safeguards.
(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 88) A selective approach to the issue of nuclear capabilities in the Middle East was undermining the viability of the Agency's safeguards regime. Such an approach had also resulted in the continuing dangerous presence of unsafeguarded Israeli nuclear facilities and activities, despite the repeated calls on Israel to subject those facilities and activities to comprehensive Agency safeguards.
(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 89) NAM was gravely concerned about the dire consequences for international security of Israel's nuclear capabilities, which posed a serious threat to Israel's neighbours and to other States, and about the continuing provision to Israeli scientists of access to the nuclear facilities of one of the nuclear-weapon States.
(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 91) NAM regretted Israel's continued insistence that the issue of Agency safeguards could not be addressed in isolation from the regional peace process. There was no automatic sequence making the application of comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East dependent on a peace settlement there. In fact, the former would contribute to the latter.

	(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 92) NAM reiterated its call for a complete ban on the transfer to Israel of nuclear-related equipment, information, material, facilities, devices and other resources and on the provision to Israel of other assistance in nuclear-related scientific and technological fields. (GC(58)/OR.8, Para 93) The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel, in a letter to the Director General (reproduced in Annex 2 of the Director General's report contained in document GC(54)/14), had stated that Israel valued the non-proliferation regime, acknowledged its importance and had over the years demonstrated a responsible policy of restraint in the nuclear domain. Regrettably, Agency documents were testimony to the contrary. Various General Conference resolutions adopted prior to 1994 regarding South Africa's nuclear capabilities had referenced UN General Assembly resolutions on relations between Israel and South Africa. The General Assembly resolutions had, inter alia, strongly condemned the extensive collaboration between Israel and the then racist regime of South Africa, especially in military and nuclear fields, in defiance of General Assembly and UN Security Council resolutions.	
South Africa	(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 93) The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel, in a letter to the Director General (reproduced in Annex 2 of the Director General's report contained in document GC(54)/14), had stated that Israel valued the non-proliferation regime, acknowledged its importance and had over the years demonstrated a responsible policy of restraint in the nuclear domain. Regrettably, Agency documents were testimony to the contrary. Various General Conference resolutions adopted prior to 1994 regarding South Africa's nuclear capabilities had referenced UN General Assembly resolutions on relations between Israel and South Africa. The General Assembly resolutions had, inter alia, strongly condemned the extensive collaboration between Israel and the then racist regime of South Africa, especially in military and nuclear fields, in defiance of General Assembly and UN Security Council resolutions.	
	Non-Proliferation Treaty Related	
Disarmament Through the NPT	(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 14) The NAM members party to the NPT recalled the consensus decision contained in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference on the convening, in 2012, of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. They were profoundly disappointed that the conference had still not taken place. The failure to convene the conference in 2012 had been contrary to the letter and spirit of the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995 by the NPT Review and Extension Conference and violated the collective agreement of the States parties to the NPT contained in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. They strongly rejected	

	the conveners' allegations regarding impediments to the convening of the conference on schedule. They urged the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation to convene the conference without any further delay in order to avoid a negative impact on the credibility of the NPT, on the preparations for the 2015 NPT Review Conference and on the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime as a whole.
1995 Review and Extension of the NPT	(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 14) The NAM members party to the NPT recalled the consensus decision contained in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference on the convening, in 2012, of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. They were profoundly disappointed that the conference had still not taken place. The failure to convene the conference in 2012 had been contrary to the letter and spirit of the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995 by the NPT Review and Extension Conference and violated the collective agreement of the States parties to the NPT contained in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. They strongly rejected the conveners' allegations regarding impediments to the convening of the conference on schedule. They urged the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation to convene the conference without any further delay in order to avoid a negative impact on the credibility of the NPT, on the preparations for the 2015 NPT Review Conference and on the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime as a whole.
Access to Technology and Technology Transfer	(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 92) NAM reiterated its call for a complete ban on the transfer to Israel of nuclear-related equipment, information, material, facilities, devices and other resources and on the provision to Israel of other assistance in nuclear-related scientific and technological fields.
2000 and 2010 Action Plans	(GC(58)/OR.8, Para 14) The NAM members party to the NPT recalled the consensus decision contained in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference on the convening, in 2012, of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. They were profoundly disappointed that the conference had still not taken place. The failure to convene the conference in 2012 had been contrary to the letter and spirit of the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995 by the NPT Review and Extension Conference and violated the collective agreement of the States parties to the NPT contained in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. They strongly rejected the conveners' allegations regarding impediments to the convening of the conference on schedule. They urged the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation to convene the conference without any further delay in order to avoid a negative impact on the credibility of the NPT,

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