



2017 Preparatory Committee to the 2020 NPT Review Conference  
Working Papers Submitted by the NAM Thematic Summaries

<b>Working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.18)</b>	
<b>Disarmament</b>	
<b>General views on disarmament</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• (Page 1, para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the only way to rid the world of the threat or use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination. ...the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a practical step on the road to nuclear disarmament and, therefore, cannot substitute for the objective of complete elimination of nuclear weapons.</li><li>• (Page 2, para 5) The Group, in accordance with its long-standing and principled position in favour of the total elimination of all forms of nuclear weapons, supports the objectives of the [CTBT] ... in order to pave the way towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</li><li>• (Page 2, para 6) ...stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by all the nuclear -weapon States, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Group reiterates that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment to nuclear disarmament of all States signatories, especially the nuclear -weapon States, would be essential.</li><li>• (Page 2, para 7) The Group is of the firm belief that the early achievement of the goal of universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons...would be essential to achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.</li><li>• (Page 3, para 11) ...the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was envisaged as the first of 13 practical steps leading to nuclear disarmament.</li></ul>
<b>Modernization</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• (Page 1, para 2) ...all States parties that have not yet done so ... should prohibit completely nuclear weapons research and development and also refrain from ... the use of new technologies for upgrading existing nuclear weapons systems, which would defeat the object and the purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty.</li><li>• (Page 1, para 3) ...recalls and reaffirms once again the commitment of all States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to end all nuclear weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosions, thereby constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons. ...expresses grave concern about nuclear weapon test explosions in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading existing nuclear weapons systems and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, which may result in the resumption of tests and a lowering of the nuclear threshold. Accordingly, the Group strongly calls on the nuclear-weapon States to put an immediate end to such activities...</li><li>• (Page 2, para 4) ...stresses that improvement of existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons contravene even the mere and</li></ul>

	<p>still conditional, very limited and insufficient statements on negative security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States and violate their commitments undertaken at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) ...supports the objectives of the [CTBT], which is intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all nuclear test explosions and to stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons in order to pave the way towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 9) ...recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation, thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear devices and of nuclear weapons based on new physical principles. ...the Group calls upon those [nuclear-weapon] States to continue to refrain from conducting any type of nuclear test for the modernization, development or further improvement of nuclear weapons. ...emphasizes that the modernization or development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the assurances given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, namely that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Role of nuclear weapon states</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) ...the Group expresses grave concern about nuclear weapon test explosions in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading existing nuclear weapons systems and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, which may result in the resumption of tests and a lowering of the nuclear threshold. Accordingly, the Group strongly calls on the nuclear-weapon States to put an immediate end to such activities ...</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 4) ...stresses that improvement of existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient statements on negative security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States and violate their commitments undertaken at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6) ...stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by all the nuclear-weapon States, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Group reiterates that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment to nuclear disarmament of all States signatories, especially the nuclear-weapon States, would be essential.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 9) ...recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation, thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear devices and of nuclear weapons based on new physical principles. The nuclear -weapon States stated at that time that the only steps to be followed would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons, which would not involve nuclear explosions. In that regard, the Group calls upon those States to continue to refrain from conducting any type of nuclear test for the modernization, development or further improvement of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 10) ...underscores the importance of the five nuclear-weapon States maintaining and observing their unilateral moratoriums on nuclear weapon tests since the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. However, the Group believes that those moratoriums do not substitute for the entry into force of the Treaty and its ratification.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 11) ...emphasizes that the modernization or development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the assurances given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons.</li> </ul>
<b>Humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 12) ...underlines the need for increased attention to the problems of safety and contamination related to the discontinuation of nuclear operations formerly associated with nuclear weapons programmes, including, where appropriate, the safe resettlement of any displaced human populations and the restoration of economic productivity to affected areas. ...the Group acknowledges the existence of a special responsibility towards the affected people and areas, including those in the former United Nations trust territories who have been adversely affected as a result of nuclear weapon tests conducted in the past.</li> </ul>
<b>Nonproliferation</b>	
<b>General views on nonproliferation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) ...the early achievement of the goal of universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons... would be essential to achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 9) ...recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States...to ensure that the [CTBT] would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation... The Group wishes to re-emphasize the principles of the non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal.</li> </ul>
<b>General views NPT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) It will be possible to determine the success of the Comprehensive Nuclear -Test-Ban Treaty only when it has been signed and ratified, in particular by the five nuclear-weapon States and by those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. The Group is of the firm belief that the early achievement of the goal of universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, through the accession of the only non-parties to this instrument, would be essential to achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 9) The Group wishes to re-emphasize the principles of the non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal.</li> </ul>
<b>States not party to the NPT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) It will be possible to determine the success of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty only when it has been signed and ratified, in particular by the five nuclear-weapon States and by those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.</li> </ul>
<b>Security assurances</b>	
<b>General views on security assurances</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 4) ...stresses that improvement of existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient statements on negative security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States...</li> </ul>
<b>Role of nuclear weapon states</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 4) ...stresses that improvement of existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient statements on negative security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States and violate their commitments undertaken at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.</li> </ul>

<p><b>Legally binding negative security assurances</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 4) ...stresses that improvement of existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient statements on negative security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States...</li> </ul>
<p><b>Nuclear Testing</b></p>	
<p><b>General views on testing</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) While underlining the significance of achieving the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Group ...strongly calls for immediate and unconditional cessation of all nuclear weapon tests and the closure of all nuclear weapon test sites. ...all States parties that have not yet done so should close and dismantle, as soon as feasible and in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner, any remaining sites for nuclear test explosions and their associated infrastructure, and should prohibit completely nuclear weapons research and development and also refrain from conducting nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, or nuclear weapon test explosions in alternative ways, as well as from the use of new technologies for upgrading existing nuclear weapons systems, which would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) ...recalls and reaffirms once again the commitment of all States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to ending all nuclear weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosions...the Group expresses grave concern about nuclear weapon test explosions in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading existing nuclear weapons systems and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, which may result in the resumption of tests and a lowering of the nuclear threshold. Accordingly, the Group strongly calls on the nuclear-weapon States to put an immediate end to such activities...</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) The Group, in accordance with its long-standing and principled position in favour of the total elimination of all forms of nuclear weapons, supports the objectives of the [CTBT], which is intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all nuclear test explosions and to stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons in order to pave the way towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by all the nuclear-weapon States ...</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) ...believes that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, not only because they are among the 44 States listed in annex 2 to the Treaty, but also because, on account of their position, they are expected to lead in making the ban on tests a reality.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) The failure of one major nuclear-weapon State to ratify the Treaty, and its not supporting the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization through rejection of one of the main elements of the Treaty's verification regime, is undermining this important instrument against nuclear testing.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 9) The nuclear -weapon States stated at that time that the only steps to be followed would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons, which would not involve nuclear explosions. ...the Group calls upon those [nuclear-weapon] States to continue to refrain from conducting any type of nuclear test for the modernization, development or further improvement of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 10) ...underscores the importance of the five nuclear-weapon States maintaining and observing their unilateral moratoriums on nuclear</li> </ul>

	<p>weapon tests since the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. However, the Group believes that those moratoriums do not substitute for the entry into force of the Treaty and its ratification.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 11) ...is seriously concerned by the decision of a nuclear-weapon State to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear testing to 18 months as a setback to the agreements reached at the 2000 Review Conference.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 12) ...the Group acknowledges the existence of a special responsibility towards the affected people and areas, including those in the former United Nations trust territories who have been adversely affected as a result of nuclear weapon tests conducted in the past.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Role of nuclear weapon states</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) ...recalls and reaffirms once again the commitment of all States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to ending all nuclear weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosions...the Group expresses grave concern about nuclear weapon test explosions in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading existing nuclear weapons systems and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, which may result in the resumption of tests and a lowering of the nuclear threshold. Accordingly, the Group strongly calls on the nuclear-weapon States to put an immediate end to such activities and to refrain from any other action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban treaty pending its entry into force.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 4) ...stresses that improvement of existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient statements on negative security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States and violate their commitments undertaken at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear -Test-Ban Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6) ...stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by all the nuclear-weapon States, which inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) ...believes that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, not only because they are among the 44 States listed in annex 2 to the Treaty, but also because, on account of their position, they are expected to lead in making the ban on tests a reality. It will be possible to determine the success of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty only when it has been signed and ratified, in particular by the five nuclear-weapon States...</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...positive decisions by the nuclear-weapon States would have the desired impact on facilitating the progress towards entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Early ratification of this Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States would pave the way and encourage the remaining required countries, especially those with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the Treaty. The failure of one major nuclear-weapon State to ratify the [CTBT], and its not supporting the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization through rejection of one of the main elements of the Treaty's verification regime, is undermining this important instrument against nuclear testing.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 9) ...recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation, thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear devices and of nuclear weapons based on new physical principles. The nuclear-weapon</li> </ul>

	<p>States stated at that time that the only steps to be followed would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons, which would not involve nuclear explosions. ...the Group calls upon those [nuclear-weapon] States to continue to refrain from conducting any type of nuclear test for the modernization, development or further improvement of nuclear weapons.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 10) ...underscores the importance of the five nuclear-weapon States maintaining and observing their unilateral moratoriums on nuclear weapon tests since the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. However, the Group believes that those moratoriums do not substitute for the entry into force of the Treaty and its ratification.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 11) ...the modernization or development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the assurances given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. ...seriously concerned by the decision of a nuclear-weapon State to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear testing to 18 months as a setback to the agreements reached at the 2000 Review Conference.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the need for increased attention to the problems of safety and contamination related to the discontinuation of nuclear operations formerly associated with nuclear weapons programmes, including, where appropriate, the safe resettlement of any displaced human populations and the restoration of economic productivity to affected areas. In this regard, the Group acknowledges the existence of a special responsibility towards the affected people and areas, including those in the former United Nations trust territories who have been adversely affected as a result of nuclear weapon tests conducted in the past.</li> </ul>
<b>Moratorium on testing</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 10) ...underscores the importance of the five nuclear-weapon States maintaining and observing their unilateral moratoriums on nuclear weapon tests since the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. However, the Group believes those moratoriums do not substitute for then entry into force of the Treaty and its ratification.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 11) ...the Group is seriously concerned by the decision of a nuclear -weapon State to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear testing to 18 months as a setback to the agreements reached at the 2000 Review Conference. It is the view of the Group that such decisions undermine the validity of the commitment to declared moratoriums...</li> </ul>
<b>CTBT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) ...the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a practical step on the road to nuclear disarmament and, therefore, cannot substitute for the objective of complete elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) While underlining the significance of achieving the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Group...strongly calls for immediate and unconditional cessation of all nuclear weapon tests and the closure of all nuclear weapon test sites. ...the Group is of the firm view that all States parties that have not yet done so should close and dismantle, as soon as feasible and in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner, any remaining sites for nuclear test explosions and their associated infrastructure, and should prohibit completely nuclear weapons research and development and also refrain from conducting nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, or nuclear weapon test explosions in alternative ways, as well as from the use of new technologies for upgrading existing nuclear weapons systems, which would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.</li> </ul>

- (Page 1, para 3) ...expresses grave concern about nuclear weapon test explosions in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading existing nuclear weapons systems and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, which may result in the resumption of tests and a lowering of the nuclear threshold. Accordingly, the Group strongly calls on the nuclear-weapon States to put an immediate end to such activities and to refrain from any other action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, pending its entry into force.
- (Page 2, para 4) ...stresses that improvement of existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons...by the nuclear-weapon States...violate their commitments undertaken at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
- (Page 2, para 5) ...welcomes the signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by 183 States and its ratification by 166 States. In this context, the ratifications of Angola, the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Myanmar, Niue and Swaziland are welcomed. The Group, in accordance with its long-standing and principled position in favour of the total elimination of all forms of nuclear weapons, supports the objectives of the [CTBT], which is intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all nuclear test explosions and to stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons in order to pave the way towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
- (Page 2, para 6) ...stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by all the nuclear-weapon States... The Group reiterates that if the objectives of the [CTBT] were to be fully realized, the continued commitment to nuclear disarmament of all States signatories, especially the nuclear-weapon States, would be essential.
- (Page 2, para 7) ...believes that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, not only because they are among the 44 States listed in annex 2 to the Treaty, but also because, on account of their position, they are expected to lead in making the ban on tests a reality. It will be possible to determine the success of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty only when it has been signed and ratified, in particular by the five nuclear-weapon States and by those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
- (Page 2, para 8) ...reaffirms that positive decisions by the nuclear-weapon States would have the desired impact on facilitating the progress towards entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Early ratification of this Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States would pave the way and encourage the remaining required countries, especially those with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the Treaty. The failure of one major nuclear-weapon State to ratify the Treaty [CTBT], and its not supporting the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization through rejection of one of the main elements of the Treaty's verification regime, is undermining this important instrument against nuclear testing.
- (Page 2, para 9) ...recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear devices and of nuclear weapons based on new physical principles. The nuclear-weapon States stated at that time that the only steps to be followed would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons,

	<p>which would not involve nuclear explosions.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 10) ...underscores the importance of the five nuclear-weapon States maintaining and observing their unilateral moratoriums on nuclear weapon tests since the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. However, the Group believes that those moratoriums do not substitute for the entry into force of the Treaty and its ratification.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 11) ...emphasizes that the modernization or development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the assurances given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, namely that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. Pending the entry into force of the [CTBT], States should refrain from any actions contrary to its objectives and purpose.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 11) ...the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was envisaged as the first of 13 practical steps leading to nuclear disarmament.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 11) The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty also remains a cause for concern.</li> </ul>
<b>Institutional Issues</b>	
<b>General views NPT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) It will be possible to determine the success of the Comprehensive Nuclear -Test-Ban Treaty only when it has been signed and ratified, in particular by the five nuclear-weapon States and by those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. The Group is of the firm belief that the early achievement of the goal of universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, through the accession of the only non-parties to this instrument, would be essential to achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 11) ...the Group is seriously concerned by the decision of a nuclear-weapon State to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear testing to 18 months as a setback to the agreements reached at the 2000 Review Conference. It is the view of the Group that such decisions undermine the validity of the commitment to declared moratoriums as well as the commitments under the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was envisaged as the first of 13 practical steps leading to nuclear disarmament.</li> </ul>
<b>Universality</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) The Group is of the firm belief that the early achievement of the goal of universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, through the accession of the only non-parties to this instrument, would be essential to achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.</li> </ul>
<b>Peaceful Uses</b>	
<b>Nuclear safety and security</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 12) ...underlines the need for increased attention to the problems of safety and contamination related to the discontinuation of nuclear operations formerly associated with nuclear weapons programmes...</li> </ul>
<b>Safeguards and verification</b>	
<b>General views on safeguards and verification</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) It will be possible to determine the success of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty only when it has been signed and ratified, in particular by the five nuclear-weapon States and by those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) Early ratification of this Treaty [CTBT] by the nuclear-weapon States would pave the way and encourage the remaining required</li> </ul>



	countries, especially those with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the Treaty.
<b>Other For a</b>	
<b>United Nations</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 12) ...the Group acknowledges the existence of a special responsibility towards the affected people and areas, including those in the former United Nations trust territories who have been adversely affected as a result of nuclear weapon tests conducted in the past.</li> </ul>



**2017 Preparatory Committee to the 2020 NPT Review Conference Working  
Papers Submitted by the NAM Thematic Summaries**

<b>Working Paper submitted by members of the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.19)</b>	
<b>Disarmament</b>	
<b>General views on disarmament</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) ...reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be an important step towards strengthening nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regimes. The Group is, therefore, of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is not a substitute for nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group underlines the importance of the early fulfilment of the legal obligations of and unequivocal undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate all their nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) ...welcomes the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), Bangkok (Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone), Pelindaba (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty) and Semipalatinsk (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia) and considers them as positive steps and important measures towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6) ...urges States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear -weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist, in accordance with the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (see A/S-10/4) and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session.</li> </ul>
<b>Role of nuclear weapon states</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) ...the Group underlines the importance of the early fulfilment of the legal obligations of and unequivocal undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate all their weapons.</li> </ul>
<b>Nonproliferation</b>	
<b>General views on nonproliferation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) ...reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be an important step towards strengthening nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regimes.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) ...welcomes the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), Bangkok (Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone), Pelindaba (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty) and Semipalatinsk (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia) and considers them as positive steps and important measures</li> </ul>

	<p>towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 4) ...reiterates that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons and in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, it is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable and legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6) ...the Group considers that the further institutionalization of the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia would be an important step towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...stresses the importance of the ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Semipalatinsk and Bangkok in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the territories of the States parties to those treaties, as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</li> </ul>
<b>General views NPT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) ...reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be an important step towards strengthening nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regimes.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) ...strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and calls for the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which is an integral and essential part of the package of decisions reached without a vote that enabled the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...stresses the importance of the ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Semipalatinsk and Bangkok in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the territories of the States parties to those treaties, as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</li> </ul>
<b>Security assurances</b>	
<b>Role of nuclear weapon states</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 4) ...in the context of the nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is also essential that all the nuclear-weapon States provide unconditional, non-discriminatory and concrete legal assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all non-nuclear-weapon States of the zone that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Group reaffirms that, in the context of the nuclear -weapon-free zones, it is also essential that all the nuclear-weapon States provide unconditional, non-discriminatory and concrete legal assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all non-nuclear-weapon States of the zone that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In this regard, the Group strongly calls for the withdrawal of any related reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of such treaties.</li> </ul>
<b>Legally binding security assurances</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 4) ...reiterates that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons and in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, it is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable and legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Group reaffirms that, in the context of the nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is also essential that all the nuclear-weapon States provide unconditional, non-discriminatory and concrete legal assurances</li> </ul>

	<p>against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all non-nuclear-weapon States of the zone that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</p>
<p><b>Legally binding negative security assurances</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 4) ...reiterates that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons and in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, it is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable and legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Group reaffirms that, in the context of the nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is also essential that all the nuclear-weapon States provide unconditional, non-discriminatory and concrete legal assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all non-nuclear-weapon States of the zone that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</li> </ul>
<p><b>NWFZ</b></p>	
<p><b>General views on NWFZ</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) ...reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be an important step towards strengthening nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regimes. The Group is, therefore, of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is not a substitute for nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) ...welcomes the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), Bangkok (Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone), Pelindaba (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty) and Semipalatinsk (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia) and considers them as positive steps and important measures towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) ...the Group welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing other nuclear-weapon-free zones worldwide and calls for cooperation and broad consultation among the States of the regions concerned to conclude agreements establishing such zones.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 4) The Group reaffirms that, in the context of the nuclear - weapon-free zones, it is also essential that all the nuclear-weapon States provide unconditional, non-discriminatory and concrete legal assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all non-nuclear-weapon States of the zone that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In this regard, the Group strongly calls for the withdrawal of any related reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of such treaties. The Group further calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations to achieve the objectives of the treaties to establish nuclear -weapon-free zones and their protocols.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6) ...urges States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist, in accordance with the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (see A/S-10/4) and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. In this context, the Group considers that the further institutionalization of the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia would be an important step towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) ...recalling the convening of the third Conference of the States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, held in New York on 24 April 2015, calls upon the States parties and signatories to those treaties to put in place further forms of cooperation among themselves, their treaty agencies and other interested States.</li> </ul>
<b>NWFZ and security assurances</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 4) ...in the context of the nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is also essential that all the nuclear-weapon States provide unconditional, non-discriminatory and concrete legal assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all non-nuclear-weapon States of the zone that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. ...the Group strongly calls for the withdrawal of any related reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of such treaties.</li> </ul>
<b>NWFZ in Middle East</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) ...strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and calls for the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which is an integral and essential part of the package of decisions reached without a vote that enabled the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 3) ...expresses its disappointment that, as a result of the opposition by Canada, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America at the concluding session of the 2015 Review Conference ... consensus on measures regarding the process to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction was not achieved.</li> </ul>
<b>Bangkok Treaty</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) ...welcomes the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of...Bangkok (Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone)...and considers them as positive steps and important measures towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...stresses the importance of the ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Semipalatinsk and Bangkok in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the territories of the States parties to those treaties, as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</li> </ul>
<b>Tlatelolco Treaty</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) ...welcomes the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean) ... and considers them as positive steps and important measures towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) ...while commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, emphasizes the need to strengthen the integrity of the statute of denuclearization provided for in that Treaty by reviewing the declarations that were formulated by the nuclear-weapon States parties to Additional Protocols I and II thereto, for possible withdrawal or modification.</li> </ul>
<b>Pelindaba Treaty</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) ...welcomes the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of...Pelindaba (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty)...and considers them as positive steps and important measures towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...stresses the importance of the ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Semipalatinsk and Bangkok in order to ensure the total absence</li> </ul>

	<p>of nuclear weapons in the territories of the States parties to those treaties, as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</p>
<b>Rarotonga Treaty</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) ...welcomes the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of ... Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty)...and considers them as positive steps and important measures towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...stresses the importance of the ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Semipalatinsk and Bangkok in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the territories of the States parties to those treaties, as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</li> </ul>
<b>Mongolia as NWFZ</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 6) ...the Group considers that the further institutionalization of the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia would be an important step towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) ...recalling the convening of the third Conference of the States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia...calls upon the States parties and signatories to those treaties to put in place further forms of cooperation among themselves, their treaty agencies and other interested States.</li> </ul>
<b>Central Asia Treaty</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) ...welcomes the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of...Semipalatinsk (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia)...</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...stresses the importance of the ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Semipalatinsk and Bangkok in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the territories of the States parties to those treaties, as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</li> </ul>
<b>Role of nuclear weapon states</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 4) The Group reaffirms that, in the context of the nuclear -weapon-free zones, it is also essential that all the nuclear-weapon States provide unconditional, non-discriminatory and concrete legal assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all non-nuclear-weapon States of the zone that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In this regard, the Group strongly calls for the withdrawal of any related reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of such treaties. The Group further calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations to achieve the objectives of the treaties to establish nuclear -weapon-free zones and their protocols.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) ...emphasizes the need to strengthen the integrity of the statute of denuclearization provided for in [the Treaty of Tlatelolco] by reviewing the declarations that were formulated by the nuclear-weapon States parties to Additional Protocols I and II thereto, for possible withdrawal or modification.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...stresses the importance of the ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Semipalatinsk and Bangkok in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the territories of the States parties to those treaties, as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</li> </ul>

**Regional issue: Middle East**

<p><b>General views on NWFZ in the Middle East</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) ...the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and calls for the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East ...</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 3) ...expresses its disappointment that, as a result of the opposition by Canada, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America at the concluding session of the 2015 Review Conference ... consensus on measures regarding the process to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction was not achieved.</li> </ul>
<p><b>1995 ME Resolution</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) ...calls for the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which is an integral and essential part of the package of decisions reached without a vote that enabled the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995. The resolution remains valid until its objectives are achieved.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Institutional Issues</b></p>	
<p><b>General views NPT</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) ...reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be an important step towards strengthening nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regimes.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) ...strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and calls for the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which is an integral and essential part of the package of decisions reached without a vote that enabled the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...stresses the importance of the ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Semipalatinsk and Bangkok in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the territories of the States parties to those treaties, as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Other Fora</b></p>	
<p><b>SSOD</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 6) ...urges States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist, in accordance with the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (see A/S-10/4) and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session.</li> </ul>
<p><b>United Nations</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 6) ...urges States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist, in accordance with the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (see A/S-10/4) and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session.</li> </ul>



**2017 Preparatory Committee to the 2020 NPT Review Conference Working  
Papers Submitted by the NAM Thematic Summaries**

<p align="center"><b>Working Paper submitted by members of the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.20)</b></p>	
<p align="center"><b>Disarmament</b></p>	
<p><b>General views on disarmament</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 5, para 21) ...underscores the strong call by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that all States parties shall ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated, particularly, in articles I, II and III of the Treaty, as well as the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty.</li> </ul>
<p align="center"><b>Nonproliferation</b></p>	
<p><b>General views on nonproliferation</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, para 14) ...emphasizes that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. The Group further emphasizes that non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access to material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes required by developing countries for their continued development.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 15) ...remains deeply concerned about the ability of certain States that are not parties to the Treaty to obtain, in particular from some nuclear-weapon States, nuclear materials, technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons. The Group strongly calls for the enforcement, without exception or further delay, of the total and complete prohibition, as stipulated in the Treaty, of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and of the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields, to States that are not parties to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 20) ...emphasizes that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented, without exception, through the strict observance of, and adherence to, IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States that are not parties to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 21) ...underscores the strong call by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that all States parties shall ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated, particularly, in articles I, II and III of the Treaty, as well as the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty.</li> </ul>
<p><b>General views on NPT</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) ...emphasizes once more that promoting international</li> </ul>



	<p>cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the realization of “the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the Treaty”, as stipulated in its article IV, constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. The Group strongly calls upon all States parties to the Treaty to fully respect this inalienable right [to peaceful nuclear energy] and underscores that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting this right.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) ...is of the firm belief that the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of article IV of the Treaty plays a crucial role in achieving the object and purpose of the Treaty. ...any measure aimed at hampering, fully or partly, the fullest exercise of these inalienable rights, would seriously jeopardize the delicate balance between rights and obligations of States parties in contravention of the Treaty’s object and purpose...</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) ...underlines that the activities of IAEA in the field of technical cooperation, nuclear power and non-power applications ... as well as bilateral and other multilateral cooperation, contribute to achieving the objectives set forth in article IV of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 10) ...underlines that “all the parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy” (art. IV, para. 2). In this regard, the Group stresses particularly the obligation of developed countries to promote the legitimate need of the developing countries to nuclear energy, by fully respecting this right with a view to achieving the widest benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 12) The elimination of constraints inconsistent with the requirements of the Treaty would ensure that article IV of the Treaty is fully implemented with regard to the facilitation of transfer of nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes among the States parties.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 13) The Group firmly believes that fostering the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by providing a framework of confidence and cooperation within which those uses can take place, is one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 23) ...article III, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be “in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes”.</li> </ul>
<b>Export controls</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, para 15) The Group strongly calls for the enforcement, without exception or further delay, of the total and complete prohibition, as stipulated in the Treaty, of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and of the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields, to States that are not parties to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 20) ...new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition,</li> </ul>

	<p>acceptance of the full scope of IAEA safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 5, para 21) ...underscores the strong call by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that all States parties shall ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated, particularly, in articles I, II and III of the Treaty, as well as the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty.</li> </ul>
<b>Nonproliferation and peaceful uses</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, para 14) ...emphasizes that non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access to material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes required by developing countries for their continued development.</li> </ul>
<b>Transfer to states not party to the NPT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, para 14) ...emphasizes that non-proliferation control arrangements...must pursue and implement, without exception, the condition of adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a condition for supply to or cooperation with States that are not parties to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 15) ...remains deeply concerned about the ability of certain States that are not parties to the Treaty to obtain, in particular from some nuclear-weapon States, nuclear materials, technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons. The Group strongly calls for the enforcement, without exception or further delay, of the total and complete prohibition, as stipulated in the Treaty, of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and of the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields, to States that are not parties to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 20) ...emphasizes that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented, without exception, through the strict observance of, and adherence to, IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States that are not parties to the Treaty.</li> </ul>
<b>Safeguards</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 13) ...emphasizes that the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology, equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their “sensitivity”, and only stipulates that such technology, equipment and material must be subject to the full scope of IAEA safeguards.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 14) ...emphasizes that non-proliferation control arrangements...must pursue and implement, without exception, the condition of adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a condition for supply to or cooperation with States that are not parties to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 20) ...emphasizes that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented, without exception, through the strict observance of, and adherence to, IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States that are not parties to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 20) ...new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the full scope of IAEA safeguards and internationally legally</li> </ul>

	<p>binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 5, para 23) ...expresses its serious concern over certain unilateral politically motivated attempts to hamper exercising the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes, in this regard, that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 23) ...article III, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be “in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes”.</li> <li>• (Page 6, para 24) ...while stressing the importance of safeguards and the significance of maintaining the principles of confidentiality regarding safeguards, underlines the vital responsibility of IAEA in this regard. ... safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way, to any party not authorized by the Agency.</li> </ul>
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**Peaceful uses**

<p><b>General views on peaceful uses</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) ...emphasizes once more that promoting international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the realization of “the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the Treaty”, as stipulated in its article IV, constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) The Group strongly calls upon all States parties to the Treaty to fully respect this inalienable right [to peaceful nuclear energy] and underscores that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting this right.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) ...reaffirms the importance of the right of States parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as well as their right to cooperate among themselves, in particular in the technological field, in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) ...is of the firm belief that the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of article IV of the Treaty plays a crucial role in achieving the object and purpose of the Treaty. In this regard, the Group also firmly believes that any measure aimed at hampering, fully or partly, the fullest exercise of these inalienable rights, would seriously jeopardize the delicate balance between rights and obligations of States parties in contravention of the Treaty’s object and purpose and widens the gap between developed and developing countries in that field.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 4) The Group recalls that the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also stipulates the right of member States to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes...</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 4) ...all States parties, developed ones in particular, shall extend their assistance, as requested by States parties that are States members of IAEA, in the provision of nuclear equipment, material, technology and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes with a view to</li> </ul>
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	<p>achieving the maximum benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities for peaceful purposes.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• (Page 2, para 5) ...underlines that the activities of IAEA in the field of technical cooperation, nuclear power and non-power applications contribute in an important way to meet energy needs, improve human health, including the application of nuclear technology in cancer therapy, combat poverty, protect the environment, develop agriculture, manage the use of water resources and optimize industrial processes, and that these activities, as well as bilateral and other multilateral cooperation, contribute to achieving the objectives set forth in article IV of the Treaty.</li><li>• (Page 2, para 6) ...stresses that the IAEA technical cooperation programme, as the main vehicle for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, should continue to be formulated and implemented ...</li><li>• (Page 2, para 7) ...reaffirms that the choices and decisions of each State party to the Treaty in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies.</li><li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...once again acknowledges and reaffirms that each State party to the Treaty has the sovereign right to define its national energy policies, including fuel-cycle policies, in accordance with its national requirements and its rights and obligations under the Treaty.</li><li>• (Page 3, para 9) ...stresses that any decision on proposals regarding multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle ... must be ... without prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty, if they so decide, to develop a full national fuel cycle, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty.</li><li>• (Page 3, para 10) ...underlines that “all the parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy” (art. IV, para. 2). In this regard, the Group stresses particularly the obligation of developed countries to promote the legitimate need of the developing countries to nuclear energy, by fully respecting this right with a view to achieving the widest benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities.</li><li>• (Page 3, para 11) ...underlines the contribution that uses of nuclear energy can make to progress in general and to helping overcome the technological and economic disparities between developed and developing States parties to the Treaty in particular. The Group firmly believes that as a fundamental principle, in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment shall be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, taking particularly the needs of developing countries into account.</li><li>• (Page 3, para 12) ...expresses its deep concern about the continued imposition and/or maintaining of limitations and restrictions on exports to developing countries of nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes, which is inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty. ...the Group stresses that the technical cooperation and assistance provided by IAEA in meeting the needs of its member States for material, equipment and technology for peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall not be subject to any political, economic, military or other conditions incompatible with the provisions of its statute. The Group therefore strongly calls for the immediate removal of any restrictions or limitations imposed on peaceful uses of nuclear energy that are incompatible with the provisions of the Treaty. ...The elimination of constraints inconsistent with the requirements of the Treaty</li></ul>
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would ensure that article IV of the Treaty is fully implemented with regard to the facilitation of transfer of nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes among the States parties.

- (Page 3, para 13) ...emphasizes that the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology, equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their “sensitivity”, and only stipulates that such technology, equipment and material must be subject to the full scope of IAEA safeguards.
- (Page 3, para 13) The Group firmly believes that fostering the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by providing a framework of confidence and cooperation within which those uses can take place, is one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. ...cooperation to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world is the core objective enshrined in the IAEA statute. Accordingly, the Group strongly encourages all States parties to actively cooperate, among themselves and through IAEA, in the peaceful uses and applications of nuclear energy, including through international technical cooperation.
- (Page 4, para 14) ...non-proliferation control arrangements should...not impose restrictions on access to material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes required by developing countries for their continued development.
- (Page 4, para 16) ...underscores that IAEA, under its statutory obligations, pursues the goals of technical cooperation in peaceful applications of nuclear energy as one of the three pillars of its activities. ...to meet the objectives of peaceful purposes...IAEA has to maintain the balance between technical cooperation and other activities.
- (Page 5, para 19) ...emphasizes that measures and initiatives aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and nuclear security must not be used as a pretext or leverage to violate, deny or restrict the inalienable right of developing countries to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.
- (Page 5, para 22) ...reaffirms the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities, operational or under construction, poses a great danger to human beings and the environment and constitutes a grave violation of international law, the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and the regulations of IAEA. ...the Group recognizes the need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks, or the threat of attacks, on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. ...the Group strongly calls upon all States, ...to refrain from attack or threat to attack nuclear facilities, operational or under construction, devoted to peaceful purposes.
- (Page 5, para 23) ...expresses its serious concern over certain unilateral politically motivated attempts to hamper exercising the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes, in this regard, that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end.
- (Page 5, para 23) ...article III, ...is...explicit in articulating that the implementation of such [IAEA] safeguards shall be “in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes”.
- (Page 6, para 25) ...determined to propose during the 2020 review process of

	<p>the Treaty measures required to ensure that the inalienable rights of all States parties under the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination are fully protected.</p>
<p><b>Access to technology and technology transfer</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) ...reaffirms the importance of the right of States parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as well as their right to cooperate among themselves, in particular in the technological field, in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 4) ...recalls that the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also stipulates the right of member States to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes and to promote socioeconomic development by way of technical cooperation and the production of electric power, with due consideration for the needs of developing countries. ...all States parties, developed ones in particular, shall extend their assistance, as requested by States parties that are States members of IAEA, in the provision of nuclear equipment, material, technology and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes with a view to achieving the maximum benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities for peaceful purposes.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) The Group stresses the importance of nuclear knowledge-sharing and the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries for the sustaining and further enhancement of their scientific and technological capabilities, thereby also contributing to their socioeconomic development. Moreover, the Group underlines that the activities of IAEA in the field of technical cooperation, nuclear power and non-power applications contribute in an important way to meet energy needs, improve human health, including the application of nuclear technology in cancer therapy, combat poverty, protect the environment, develop agriculture, manage the use of water resources and optimize industrial processes, ...</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6) ...stresses that the IAEA technical cooperation programme, as the main vehicle for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, should continue to be formulated and implemented in accordance with the IAEA statute and the agreed guiding principles as contained in INFCIRC/267, as well as the decisions of the IAEA policymaking organs. The Group reiterates that the current guidelines and criteria for the selection of technical cooperation projects are robust and effective and that no additional criteria should be imposed for fulfilling the above objectives.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) ...the Group strongly rejects any attempts by any State to politicize the work of IAEA, including its technical cooperation programme, in violation of its statute, ...the Group also expresses its rejection of any attempts by any State party to use the IAEA technical cooperation programme as a tool for political purposes, ...the choices and decisions of each State party to the Treaty in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 10) ...underlines that “all the parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy” (art. IV, para. 2).</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 12) ...expresses its deep concern about the continued imposition and/or maintaining of limitations and restrictions on exports to developing</li> </ul>

countries of nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes, which is inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty. In this regard, the Group stresses that the technical cooperation and assistance provided by IAEA in meeting the needs of its member States for material, equipment and technology for peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall not be subject to any political, economic, military or other conditions incompatible with the provisions of its statute. The Group therefore strongly calls for the immediate removal of any restrictions or limitations imposed on peaceful uses of nuclear energy that are incompatible with the provisions of the Treaty. In the view of the Group, transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with the Treaty shall be supported and pursued in good faith without discrimination. The elimination of constraints inconsistent with the requirements of the Treaty would ensure that article IV of the Treaty is fully implemented with regard to the facilitation of transfer of nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes among the States parties.

- (Page 3, para 13) ...emphasizes that the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology, equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their "sensitivity", and only stipulates that such technology, equipment and material must be subject to the full scope of IAEA safeguards. ...the Group strongly encourages all States parties to actively cooperate, among themselves and through IAEA, in the peaceful uses and applications of nuclear energy, including through international technical cooperation.
- (Page 4, para 14) ...emphasizes that non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access to material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes required by developing countries for their continued development. Furthermore, such arrangements must pursue and implement, without exception, the condition of adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a condition for supply to or cooperation with States that are not parties to the Treaty.
- (Page 4, para 15) ...remains deeply concerned about the ability of certain States that are not parties to the Treaty to obtain, in particular from some nuclear-weapon States, nuclear materials, technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons. The Group strongly calls for the enforcement, without exception or further delay, of the total and complete prohibition, as stipulated in the Treaty, of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and of the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields, to States that are not parties to the Treaty.
- (Page 4, para 16) ...underscores that IAEA, under its statutory obligations, pursues the goals of technical cooperation in peaceful applications of nuclear energy as one of the three pillars of its activities. In order to meet the objectives of peaceful purposes as enshrined in the statute of IAEA and in the Treaty, IAEA has to maintain the balance between technical cooperation and other activities. The Group believes that all States parties to the Treaty that are States members of IAEA have to ensure that the technical cooperation programme remains firm and sustainable through sufficient, assured and predictable financial and human resources. In this regard, the efficacy of the technical cooperation programme can best be ensured by the formulation of the programme and the strategies strictly in accordance with the needs and the requests of the developing countries.
- (Page 5, para 20) ...new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or

	<p>special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the full scope of IAEA safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 5, para 23) ...article III, ...is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such [IAEA] safeguards shall be “in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes”.</li> </ul>
<p><b>IAEA</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 4) ...recalls that the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also stipulates the right of member States to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes and to promote socioeconomic development by way of technical cooperation and the production of electric power, with due consideration for the needs of developing countries. To ensure the realization of these goals, all States parties, developed ones in particular, shall extend their assistance, as requested by States parties that are States members of IAEA, in the provision of nuclear equipment, material, technology and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes with a view to achieving the maximum benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities for peaceful purposes.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) ...recognizes the major and important role of IAEA in assisting, in particular developing States parties to the Treaty, in planning for and the use of nuclear science and technology.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) ...underlines that the activities of IAEA in the field of technical cooperation, nuclear power and non-power applications contribute in an important way to meet energy needs, improve human health, including the application of nuclear technology in cancer therapy, combat poverty, protect the environment, develop agriculture, manage the use of water resources and optimize industrial processes, and that these activities ... contribute to achieving the objectives set forth in article IV of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6) ...stresses that the IAEA technical cooperation programme, as the main vehicle for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, should continue to be formulated and implemented in accordance with the IAEA statute and the agreed guiding principles as contained in INFCIRC/267, as well as the decisions of the IAEA policymaking organs. The Group reiterates that the current guidelines and criteria for the selection of technical cooperation projects are robust and effective and that no additional criteria should be imposed for fulfilling the above objectives.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) ...recalls that IAEA and its then-Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei, were awarded the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize and reiterates the importance it attaches to the impartiality, professionalism and integrity of IAEA.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) While expressing its full confidence in the impartiality and professionalism of IAEA, the Group strongly rejects any attempts by any State to politicize the work of IAEA, including its technical cooperation programme, in violation of its statute, as well as any pressure on or interference in the Agency’s activities that could jeopardize the efficiency and credibility of IAEA. In this connection, the Group also expresses its rejection of any attempts by any State party to use the IAEA technical cooperation programme as a tool for political purposes, which is in violation of the statute of IAEA.</li> </ul>



- (Page 3, para 9) The multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle should be multilateral, economically viable, sustainable, non-discriminatory, predictable and transparent under the auspices of IAEA, as well as other possible regional and multilateral forums.
- (Page 3, para 9) The multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle should be multilateral, economically viable, sustainable, non-discriminatory, predictable and transparent under the auspices of IAEA, as well as other possible regional and multilateral forums.
- (Page 3, para 9) ...stresses that any decision on proposals regarding multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle shall be made by consensus taking into account the interests of all member States, with the participation of all IAEA member States, and any proposal from IAEA must be consistent with its statute, without prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty, if they so decide, to develop a full national fuel cycle, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty.
- (Page 3, para 12) ...the Group stresses that the technical cooperation and assistance provided by IAEA in meeting the needs of its member States for material, equipment and technology for peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall not be subject to any political, economic, military or other conditions incompatible with the provisions of its statute.
- (Page 3, para 13) ...emphasizes that the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology, equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their "sensitivity", and only stipulates that such technology, equipment and material must be subject to the full scope of IAEA safeguards.
- (Page 4, para 13) ...cooperation to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world is the core objective enshrined in the IAEA statute. Accordingly, the Group strongly encourages all States parties to actively cooperate, among themselves and through IAEA, in the peaceful uses and applications of nuclear energy, including through international technical cooperation.
- (Page 4, para 14) ...emphasizes that non-proliferation control arrangements...must pursue and implement, without exception, the condition of adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a condition for supply to or cooperation with States that are not parties to the Treaty.
- (Page 4, para 16) ...underscores that IAEA, under its statutory obligations, pursues the goals of technical cooperation in peaceful applications of nuclear energy as one of the three pillars of its activities. In order to meet the objectives of peaceful purposes as enshrined in the statute of IAEA and in the Treaty, IAEA has to maintain the balance between technical cooperation and other activities.
- (Page 4, para 16) ...The Group believes that all States parties to the Treaty that are States members of IAEA have to ensure that the technical cooperation programme remains firm and sustainable through sufficient, assured and predictable financial and human resources.
- (Page 4, para 17) ...the Group calls for effective implementation of the IAEA Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste as a means of enhancing the protection of all States from the dumping of radioactive wastes on their territories.
- (Page 5, para 18) The Group reaffirms the central role of IAEA in nuclear-safety-related matters including through the establishment of nuclear safety standards. The Group stresses that IAEA must retain its centrality in this field, owing to its mandatory functions and long-standing expertise. The Group stresses that any possible review of nuclear safety standards at the global level must be carried out within IAEA in an inclusive, gradual and transparent

	<p>manner and in consultation with and based on the guidance and participation of all member States, and shall incorporate the views of all member States. The Group also calls for the implementation of the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety endorsed by the IAEA General Conference in September 2011.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 5, para 20) ...emphasizes that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented, without exception, through the strict observance of, and adherence to, IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States that are not parties to the Treaty. In the view of the Group, new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the full scope of IAEA safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 22) ...any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities, operational or under construction, ...constitutes a grave violation of international law, the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and the regulations of IAEA.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 23) ...article III, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be “in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty...”</li> <li>• (Page 6, para 24) ...while stressing the importance of safeguards and the significance of maintaining the principles of confidentiality regarding safeguards, underlines the vital responsibility of IAEA in this regard. Since the Agency is the only organization which receives highly confidential and sensitive information on nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidents of leakage of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime for their protection needs to be greatly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related information should not be provided in any way, to any party not authorized by the Agency.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Assurance of supply/multilateral approach to nuclear fuel supply</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) ...reaffirms that the choices and decisions of each State party to the Treaty in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...acknowledges and reaffirms that each State party to the Treaty has the sovereign right to define its national energy policies, including fuel-cycle policies, in accordance with its national requirements and its rights and obligations under the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 9) ...stresses that multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including proposals for assurance of supply in response to the needs of interested States, shall fully take into account all technical, legal, political and economic complexities surrounding these issues, and be conducted through wide, integral, comprehensive and transparent multilateral consultations and negotiations. The multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle should be multilateral, economically viable, sustainable, non-discriminatory, predictable and transparent under the auspices of IAEA, as well as other possible regional and multilateral forums.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 9) ...any decision on proposals regarding multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle shall be made by consensus taking into account the interests of all member States, with the participation of all IAEA member States, and any proposal from IAEA must be consistent with its</li> </ul>

	<p>statute, without prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty, if they so decide, to develop a full national fuel cycle, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty.</p>
<p><b>Attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 5, para 22) ...reaffirms the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities, operational or under construction, poses a great danger to human beings and the environment and constitutes a grave violation of international law, the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and the regulations of IAEA. In this regard, the Group recognizes the need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks, or the threat of attacks, on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Moreover, the Group strongly calls upon all States, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter, to refrain from attack or threat to attack nuclear facilities, operational or under construction, devoted to peaceful purposes.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Nuclear safety and security</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, para 17) ...affirms the need to strengthen the radiological safety and protection systems at facilities utilizing radioactive materials as well as at radioactive waste management facilities, including the safe transportation of these materials. The Group reaffirms the need to strengthen existing international regulations relating to the safety and security of transportation of such materials. While reiterating the need to take necessary measures to prevent any dumping of nuclear or radioactive wastes, the Group calls for effective implementation of the IAEA Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste as a means of enhancing the protection of all States from the dumping of radioactive wastes on their territories.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 18) The Group recognizes that the primary responsibility for nuclear safety rests with individual States. The Group reaffirms the central role of IAEA in nuclear-safety-related matters including through the establishment of nuclear safety standards. ...any possible review of nuclear safety standards at the global level must be carried out within IAEA in an inclusive, gradual and transparent manner and in consultation with and based on the guidance and participation of all member States, and shall incorporate the views of all member States. The Group also calls for the implementation of the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety endorsed by the IAEA General Conference in September 2011.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 19) ...measures and initiatives aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and nuclear security must not be used as a pretext or leverage to violate, deny or restrict the inalienable right of developing countries to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Transfer to states not party to the NPT</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, para 14) ...emphasizes that non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access to material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes required by developing countries for their continued development. Furthermore, such arrangements must pursue and implement, without exception, the condition of adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a condition for supply to or cooperation with States that are not parties to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 15) ...remains deeply concerned about the ability of certain States that are not parties to the Treaty to obtain, in particular from some nuclear-weapon States, nuclear materials, technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons. The Group strongly calls for the enforcement, without exception or further delay, of the total and complete prohibition, as</li> </ul>

	<p>stipulated in the Treaty, of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and of the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields, to States that are not parties to the Treaty.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 5, para 20) ...emphasizes that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented, without exception, through the strict observance of, and adherence to, IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States that are not parties to the Treaty.</li> </ul>
<b>Safeguards and verification</b>	
<p><b>General views on safeguards and verification</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 13) ...emphasizes that the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology, equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their “sensitivity”, and only stipulates that such technology, equipment and material must be subject to the full scope of IAEA safeguards.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 14) ...emphasizes that non-proliferation control arrangements...must pursue and implement, without exception, the condition of adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a condition for supply to or cooperation with States that are not parties to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 20) ...emphasizes that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented, without exception, through the strict observance of, and adherence to, IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States that are not parties to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 20) ...new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the full scope of IAEA safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 23) ...expresses its serious concern over certain unilateral politically motivated attempts to hamper exercising the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes, in this regard, that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 23) ...article III, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be “in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes”.</li> <li>• (Page 6, para 24) ...while stressing the importance of safeguards and the significance of maintaining the principles of confidentiality regarding safeguards, underlines the vital responsibility of IAEA in this regard. ... safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way, to any party not authorized by the Agency.</li> </ul>
<p><b>IAEA</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 6, para 24) ...while stressing the importance of safeguards and the significance of maintaining the principles of confidentiality regarding safeguards, underlines the vital responsibility of IAEA in this regard. Since the Agency is the only organization which receives highly confidential and sensitive information on nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidents of leakage of such information, the Group emphasizes</li> </ul>

	<p>that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime for their protection needs to be greatly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way, to any party not authorized by the Agency.</p>
<p><b>IAEA safeguards</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 13) ...emphasizes that the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology, equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their “sensitivity”, and only stipulates that such technology, equipment and material must be subject to the full scope of IAEA safeguards.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 14) ...emphasizes that non-proliferation control arrangements ... must pursue and implement, without exception, the condition of adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a condition for supply to or cooperation with States that are not parties to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 20) ...emphasizes that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented, without exception, through the strict observance of, and adherence to, IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States that are not parties to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 20) ...new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the full scope of IAEA safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 23) ...article III, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be “in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes”.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Institutional Issues</b></p>	
<p><b>General views on NPT</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) ...emphasizes once more that promoting international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the realization of “the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the Treaty”, as stipulated in its article IV, constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. The Group strongly calls upon all States parties to the Treaty to fully respect this inalienable right [to peaceful nuclear energy] and underscores that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting this right.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) ...is of the firm belief that the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of article IV of the Treaty plays a crucial role in achieving the object and purpose of the Treaty. ...any measure aimed at hampering, fully or partly, the fullest exercise of these inalienable rights, would seriously jeopardize the delicate balance between rights and obligations of States parties in contravention of the Treaty’s object and purpose...</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) ...underlines that the activities of IAEA in the field of technical cooperation, nuclear power and non-power applications...as well as bilateral and other multilateral cooperation, contribute to achieving the objectives set forth in article IV of the Treaty.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 9) The Group also stresses that any decision on proposals regarding multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle shall be made by consensus taking into account the interests of all member States, with the participation of all IAEA member States, and any proposal from IAEA must be consistent with its statute, without prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty, if they so decide, to develop a full national fuel cycle, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 10) ...underlines that “all the parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy” (art. IV, para. 2). In this regard, the Group stresses particularly the obligation of developed countries to promote the legitimate need of the developing countries to nuclear energy, by fully respecting this right with a view to achieving the widest benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 12) The elimination of constraints inconsistent with the requirements of the Treaty would ensure that article IV of the Treaty is fully implemented with regard to the facilitation of transfer of nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes among the States parties.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 13) The Group firmly believes that fostering the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by providing a framework of confidence and cooperation within which those uses can take place, is one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 23) ...article III, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be “in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes”.</li> </ul>
<b>Other Fora</b>	
<b>United Nations</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 5, para 22) ...any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities, operational or under construction, poses a great danger to human beings and the environment and constitutes a grave violation of international law, the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and the regulations of IAEA. In this regard, the Group recognizes the need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks, or the threat of attacks, on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Moreover, the Group strongly calls upon all States, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter, to refrain from attack or threat to attack nuclear facilities, operational or under construction, devoted to peaceful purposes.</li> </ul>



## The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Database

### 2017 Preparatory Committee to the 2020 NPT Review Conference Working Papers Submitted by the NAM Thematic Summaries

#### **Working Paper submitted by members of the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.21)**

##### **Institutional Issues**

###### **General views NPT**

- (Page 1, para 2) The 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons considered the universality of the comprehensive safeguards as a main objective in order to consolidate and enhance the verification system for the non-proliferation regime.
- (Page 2, para 4) ...calls upon all States not party to the Treaty to accede, without any further delay and any preconditions and as non-nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards.
- (Page 2, para 5) The Group also calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under this Treaty. In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such an agreement would be concluded with the aim to:
  - (a) Ensure full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty;
  - (c) Strictly observe the prohibition of the transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, the object and the purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, materials and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.
- (Page 2, para 6) ...confirms that the obligation under article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology for peaceful purposes, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty.
- (Page 3, para 16) In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be "in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing".

###### **Universality**

- (Page 2, para 4) ...calls upon all States not party to the Treaty to accede, without any further delay and any preconditions and as non-nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards.

##### **Disarmament**

<p><b>General views on disarmament</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) ...expresses its strong concern at the growing resort to unilateralism and unilaterally imposed prescriptions and, in this context, strongly underlines and affirms that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) The Group further stresses that efforts aimed at nuclear non-proliferation must be parallel to simultaneous efforts aiming at nuclear disarmament.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) The Group also calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under this Treaty. In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such an agreement would be concluded with the aim to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(b) Provide baseline data regarding the fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and prevent further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;</li> </ul> </li> <li>• (Page 3, para 15) ...stresses the statutory role of IAEA in nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the capability of the Agency to verify nuclear disarmament agreements.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Role of nuclear weapon states</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) The Group also calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under this Treaty. In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such an agreement would be concluded with the aim to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(b) Provide baseline data regarding the fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and prevent further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<p><b>Verification and disarmament</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) The Group also calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under this Treaty. In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such an agreement would be concluded with the aim to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(b) Provide baseline data regarding the fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and prevent further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;</li> </ul> </li> <li>• (Page 3, para 15) ...stresses the statutory role of IAEA in nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the capability of the Agency to verify nuclear disarmament agreements.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Nonproliferation</b></p>	
<p><b>General views on nonproliferation</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) The 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons considered the universality of the comprehensive safeguards as a main objective in order to consolidate and enhance the verification system for the non-proliferation regime. However, in</li> </ul>



	<p>the view of the Group, additional measures related to the safeguards shall not affect the rights of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, which are already committed to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and have renounced the nuclear-weapon option. The Group further stresses that efforts aimed at nuclear non-proliferation must be parallel to simultaneous efforts aiming at nuclear disarmament.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) The Group also calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under this Treaty. In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such an agreement would be concluded with the aim to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Ensure full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty;</li> <li>(c) Strictly observe the prohibition of the transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, the object and the purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, materials and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<p><b>General views NPT</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) The 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons considered the universality of the comprehensive safeguards as a main objective in order to consolidate and enhance the verification system for the non-proliferation regime.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 4) ...calls upon all States not party to the Treaty to accede, without any further delay and any preconditions and as non-nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) The Group also calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under this Treaty. In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such an agreement would be concluded with the aim to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Ensure full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty;</li> <li>(c) Strictly observe the prohibition of the transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, the object and the purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, materials and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<p><b>Nonproliferation and peaceful uses</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) The Group also calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under this Treaty. In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such an agreement would be concluded with the aim to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(b) Provide baseline data regarding the fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and prevent further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 6) ...confirms that the obligation under article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology for peaceful purposes, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) ...fully recognizes that IAEA, an independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for the verification of the fulfilment of safeguards obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear material and technology from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, ...</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 16) In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be “in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing”.</li> </ul>
<p><b>States not party to the NPT</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) ...emphasizes that strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty are a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 4) ...calls upon all States not party to the Treaty to accede, without any further delay and any preconditions and as non-nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) The Group also calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under this Treaty. In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such an agreement would be concluded with the aim to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Ensure full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty;</li> <li>(c) Strictly observe the prohibition of the transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, the object and the purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, materials and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<p><b>Transfer to States not party to the NPT</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) ...emphasizes that strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty are a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty confirms that all States parties to the Treaty shall refrain from the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to States not party to the Treaty unless those conditions are met.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) The Group also calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an</li> </ul>

	<p>agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under this Treaty. In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such an agreement would be concluded with the aim to:</p> <p>(a) Ensure full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty;</p> <p>(c) Strictly observe the prohibition of the transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, the object and the purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, materials and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.</p>
<p><b>Export controls</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) ... emphasizes that strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty are a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty confirms that all States parties to the Treaty shall refrain from the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to States not party to the Treaty unless those conditions are met.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Peaceful uses</b></p>	
<p><b>General views on peaceful uses</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) The Group also calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under this Treaty. In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such an agreement would be concluded with the aim to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(b) Provide baseline data regarding the fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and prevent further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;</li> </ul> </li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6) ...confirms that the obligation under article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology for peaceful purposes, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) ...fully recognizes that IAEA, an independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for the verification of the fulfilment of safeguards obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear material and technology from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 16) ...expresses its serious concern about certain unilateral politically motivated attempts to hamper exercising the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes in this regard that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be "in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this</li> </ul>

	<p>Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing”.</p>
<p><b>Access to technology and technology transfer</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) ...emphasizes that strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty are a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty confirms that all States parties to the Treaty shall refrain from the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to States not party to the Treaty unless those conditions are met.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) The Group also calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under this Treaty. In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such an agreement would be concluded with the aim to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(c) Strictly observe the prohibition of the transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, the object and the purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, materials and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6) ...confirms that the obligation under article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology for peaceful purposes, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restrictions or limitations on the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) ...fully recognizes that IAEA, an independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for the verification of the fulfilment of safeguards obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear material and technology from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 16) In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be “in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing”.</li> </ul>
<p><b>IAEA</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) ...fully recognizes that IAEA, an independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for the verification of the fulfilment of safeguards obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear material and technology from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well</li> </ul>

	<p>as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 16) In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be “in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing”.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Transfer to States not party to the NPT</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) ...emphasizes that strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty are a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty confirms that all States parties to the Treaty shall refrain from the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to States not party to the Treaty unless those conditions are met.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) The Group also calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under this Treaty. In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such an agreement would be concluded with the aim to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(c) Strictly observe the prohibition of the transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, the object and the purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, materials and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<p><b>Safeguards and verification</b></p>	
<p><b>General views on safeguards and verification</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) ...the Group underlines that the multilateral mechanism established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the most appropriate way to address verification and safeguards issues. At the same time, the Group emphasizes that the work of the Agency with regard to safeguards and verification has to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of its statute and safeguards agreements.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) ...stresses the importance of the IAEA safeguards system and urges all States that have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible, in order to achieve the universality of the comprehensive safeguards. The 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons considered the universality of the comprehensive safeguards as a main objective in order to consolidate and enhance the verification system for the non-proliferation regime. However, in the view of the Group, additional measures related to the safeguards shall not affect the rights of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, which are already committed to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and have renounced the nuclear-weapon option.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) ...emphasizes that strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty are a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.</li> </ul>

- (Page 2, para 4) ...calls upon all States not party to the Treaty to accede, without any further delay and any preconditions and as non-nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards.
- (Page 2, para 5) The Group also calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under this Treaty.
- (Page 2, para 6) ...confirms that the obligation under article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology for peaceful purposes, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restrictions or limitations on the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.
- (Page 2, para 7) ...fully recognizes that IAEA, an independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for the verification of the fulfilment of safeguards obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear material and technology from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, ...
- (Page 2, para 8) ...emphasizes that it is fundamental to make a clear distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures and that such voluntary undertakings shall not be turned into legal safeguards obligations.
- (Page 2, para 9) With respect to financial aspects of the safeguards, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the differentiated nature of the financial obligations undertaken by member States of IAEA should be recognized and respected by the Agency in its work.
- (Page 3, para 10) ...underscores the need to strictly observe the principle of balance between the promotional and other statutory activities of the Agency, in particular verification and safeguards-related activities.
- (Page 3, para 11) ...underlines the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards, including reporting, in accordance with the Agency's statute and safeguards agreements. ...Hence, in the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency.
- (Page 3, para 12) ...calls for the implementation of resolution GC(60)/RES/13 on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system, adopted by the General Conference of the Agency at its sixtieth session, in which the General Conference, "stressing the importance of maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the Agency's statute and safeguards agreements", acknowledged the concerns expressed by the Director General on the need to protect safeguards confidential information within the Secretariat and his announcement of additional measures to protect such information, accordingly urged the Director General "to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of safeguards confidential information" and requested that he "continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of safeguards confidential

	<p>information”.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 13) ...underlines the necessity that the reporting of IAEA on the implementation of safeguards be factual and technically based and reflect appropriate reference to the relevant provisions of safeguards agreements, while ensuring the protection of confidential information.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 14) ...stresses the need to strictly observe the provisions of the IAEA statute, including article XII, which outlines the mandate of the Agency in verifying compliance with safeguards agreements and, in particular, that any non-compliance has first to be reported by the Agency’s inspectors.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 15) ...stresses the statutory role of IAEA in nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the capability of the Agency to verify nuclear disarmament agreements.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 16) ...expresses its serious concern about certain unilateral politically motivated attempts to hamper exercising the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes in this regard that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be “in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing”.</li> </ul>
IAEA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) ...the Group underlines that the multilateral mechanism established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the most appropriate way to address verification and safeguards issues. At the same time, the Group emphasizes that the work of the Agency with regard to safeguards and verification has to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of its statute and safeguards agreements.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) The Group also calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under this Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) ...fully recognizes that IAEA, an independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for the verification of the fulfilment of safeguards obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear material and technology from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...the Group also emphasizes that IAEA shall ensure avoiding any ultra vires acts that would jeopardize its integrity and credibility. The Group urges States parties to the Treaty to maintain and strengthen the technical character of IAEA consistent with its statute.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 9) With respect to financial aspects of the safeguards, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the differentiated nature of the financial obligations undertaken by member States of IAEA should be recognized and respected by the Agency in its work.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 10) ...underscores the need to strictly observe the principle of balance between the promotional and other statutory activities of the Agency, in particular verification and safeguards-related activities.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 11) ...underlines the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards, including reporting, in accordance with the Agency’s statute and safeguards agreements. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on the nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidents of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and its relevant regime pertaining to the protection of confidential information needs to be further strengthened. Hence, in the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 12) ...calls for the implementation of resolution GC(60)/RES/13 on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system, adopted by the General Conference of the Agency at its sixtieth session, in which the General Conference, “stressing the importance of maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the Agency’s statute and safeguards agreements”, acknowledged the concerns expressed by the Director General on the need to protect safeguards confidential information within the Secretariat and his announcement of additional measures to protect such information, accordingly urged the Director General “to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of safeguards confidential information” and requested that he “continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of safeguards confidential information”.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 13) ...underlines the necessity that the reporting of IAEA on the implementation of safeguards be factual and technically based and reflect appropriate reference to the relevant provisions of safeguards agreements, while ensuring the protection of confidential information.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 14) ...stresses the need to strictly observe the provisions of the IAEA statute, including article XII, which outlines the mandate of the Agency in verifying compliance with safeguards agreements and, in particular, that any non-compliance has first to be reported by the Agency’s inspectors.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 15) ...stresses the statutory role of IAEA in nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the capability of the Agency to verify nuclear disarmament agreements.</li> </ul>
<b>IAEA safeguards</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) ...the Group underlines that the multilateral mechanism established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the most appropriate way to address verification and safeguards issues. At the same time, the Group emphasizes that the work of the Agency with regard to safeguards and verification has to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of its statute and safeguards agreements.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) ...stresses the importance of the IAEA safeguards system and urges all States that have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible, in order to achieve the universality of the comprehensive safeguards. The 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons considered the universality of the comprehensive safeguards as a main objective in order to consolidate and enhance the verification system for the non-proliferation regime. However, in the view of the Group, additional measures related to the safeguards shall not affect the rights of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, which are already committed to the non-proliferation of nuclear</li> </ul>



weapons and have renounced the nuclear-weapon option.

- (Page 1, para 3) ...emphasizes that strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty are a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.
- (Page 2, para 4) ...calls upon all States not party to the Treaty to accede, without any further delay and any preconditions and as non-nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards.
- (Page 2, para 5) The Group also calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under this Treaty.
- (Page 2, para 6) States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restrictions or limitations on the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.
- (Page 2, para 8) ...emphasizes that it is fundamental to make a clear distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures and that such voluntary undertakings shall not be turned into legal safeguards obligations.
- (Page 2, para 9) With respect to financial aspects of the safeguards, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the differentiated nature of the financial obligations undertaken by member States of IAEA should be recognized and respected by the Agency in its work.
- (Page 3, para 11) ...underlines the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards, including reporting, in accordance with the Agency's statute and safeguards agreements. ...Hence, in the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency.
- (Page 3, para 12) ...calls for the implementation of resolution GC(60)/RES/13 on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system, adopted by the General Conference of the Agency at its sixtieth session, in which the General Conference, "stressing the importance of maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the Agency's statute and safeguards agreements", acknowledged the concerns expressed by the Director General on the need to protect safeguards confidential information within the Secretariat and his announcement of additional measures to protect such information, accordingly urged the Director General "to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of safeguards confidential information" and requested that he "continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of safeguards confidential information".
- (Page 3, para 13) ...underlines the necessity that the reporting of IAEA on the implementation of safeguards be factual and technically based and reflect appropriate reference to the relevant provisions of safeguards agreements, while ensuring the protection of confidential information.
- (Page 3, para 15) ...stresses the statutory role of IAEA in nuclear

	<p>disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the capability of the Agency to verify nuclear disarmament agreements.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 16) In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be “in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing”.</li> </ul>
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<b>Other Fora</b>	
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<b>United Nations</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) ...expresses its strong concern at the growing resort to unilateralism and unilaterally imposed prescriptions and, in this context, strongly underlines and affirms that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues.</li> </ul>
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**2017 Preparatory Committee to the 2020 NPT Review Conference Working  
Papers Submitted by the NAM Thematic Summaries**

<b>Working Paper submitted by members of the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.22)</b>	
<b>Institutional Issues</b>	
<b>Strengthen review process</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(Page 3, para 14) ...calls for the 2020 Review Conference to establish a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreements by the nuclear-weapon States.</li> </ul>
<b>Disarmament</b>	
<b>General views on disarmament</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(Page 2, para 8) ...calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of the verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(b) Providing baseline data regarding the fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;</li> </ul> </li> <li>(Page 2, para 10) ...stresses the statutory role of IAEA on nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the Agency's capability of verifying nuclear disarmament agreements.</li> <li>(Page 3, para 11) ...strongly believes that the nuclear-weapon States, in implementing their unequivocal undertaking to totally eliminate their nuclear arsenals, should undertake further efforts, in a transparent, irreversible and internationally verifiable manner, to eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, as well as their nuclear weapon-related materials, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures.</li> <li>(Page 3, para 12) In that regard, the Group supports the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Group further urges the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to examine such legally binding verification arrangements and the means of making them operational, with the aim of ensuring the realization of that objective.</li> <li>(Page 3, para 14) ...calls for the 2020 Review Conference to establish a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreements by the nuclear-weapon States.</li> </ul>
<b>Fissile material / FMCT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(Page 3, para 11) ...the Group calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to dismantle or convert for peaceful uses facilities and related equipment for the</li> </ul>

	<p>production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 12) In that regard, the Group supports the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Group further urges the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to examine such legally binding verification arrangements and the means of making them operational, with the aim of ensuring the realization of that objective.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 13) ...recalls action 16 of the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference and urges the nuclear-weapon States to commit to declaring to IAEA all weapons-grade fissile material and to place such material, as soon as practicable, under the supervision of IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, in order to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes. The Group calls upon the 2020 Review Conference to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the fulfilment of those commitments through the establishment of an international mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the action, which should be made mandatory for the nuclear-weapon States.</li> </ul>
<b>Bilateral agreements</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 11) ...strongly believes that the nuclear-weapon States, in implementing their unequivocal undertaking to totally eliminate their nuclear arsenals, should undertake further efforts, in a transparent, irreversible and internationally verifiable manner, to eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, as well as their nuclear weapon-related materials, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 14) ...calls for the 2020 Review Conference to establish a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreements by the nuclear-weapon States.</li> </ul>
<b>Role of nuclear weapon states</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of the verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(b) Providing baseline data regarding the fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;</li> </ul> </li> <li>• (Page 3, para 11) ...strongly believes that the nuclear-weapon States, in implementing their unequivocal undertaking to totally eliminate their nuclear arsenals, should undertake further efforts, in a transparent, irreversible and internationally verifiable manner, to eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, as well as their nuclear weapon-related materials, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. Furthermore, the Group calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to dismantle or convert for peaceful uses facilities and related equipment for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 13) ...recalls action 16 of the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference and urges the nuclear-weapon States to commit to declaring to IAEA all weapons-grade fissile material and to</li> </ul>

	<p>place such material, as soon as practicable, under the supervision of IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, in order to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes. The Group calls upon the 2020 Review Conference to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the fulfilment of those commitments through the establishment of an international mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the action, which should be made mandatory for the nuclear-weapon States.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 14) ...calls for the 2020 Review Conference to establish a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreements by the nuclear-weapon States.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Verification and disarmament</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of the verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(b) Providing baseline data regarding the fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;</li> </ul> </li> <li>• (Page 2, para 10) ...stresses the statutory role of IAEA on nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the Agency's capability of verifying nuclear disarmament agreements.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 11) ...strongly believes that the nuclear-weapon States, in implementing their unequivocal undertaking to totally eliminate their nuclear arsenals, should undertake further efforts, in a transparent, irreversible and internationally verifiable manner, to eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, as well as their nuclear weapon-related materials, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 12) In that regard, the Group supports the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Group further urges the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to examine such legally binding verification arrangements and the means of making them operational, with the aim of ensuring the realization of that objective.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 13) ...recalls action 16 of the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference and urges the nuclear-weapon States to commit to declaring to IAEA all weapons-grade fissile material and to place such material, as soon as practicable, under the supervision of IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, in order to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes. The Group calls upon the 2020 Review Conference to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the fulfilment of those commitments through the establishment of an international mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the action, which should be made mandatory for the nuclear-weapon States.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 14) ...calls for the 2020 Review Conference to establish a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreements by the nuclear-</li> </ul>

	weapon States.
<b>Nonproliferation</b>	
<b>General views on nonproliferation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) ...reaffirms that, under article III (1) of the Treaty, each non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards “for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of the verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Ensuring full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Treaty;</li> <li>(b) Providing baseline data regarding the fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;</li> <li>(c) Strictly observing the prohibition of the transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, object and purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>General views NPT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) ...reaffirms that, under article III (1) of the Treaty, each non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards “for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of the verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Ensuring full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Treaty;</li> <li>(c) Strictly observing the prohibition of the transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, object and purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Nonproliferation and peaceful uses</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) ...reaffirms that, under article III (1) of the Treaty, each non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards “for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) ...fully recognizes that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an independent intergovernmental, science-and technology-</li> </ul>

	<p>based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for the verification of the fulfilment of safeguard obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of the verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(b) Providing baseline data regarding the fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<p><b>States not party to the NPT</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) ...emphasizes the need to achieve worldwide application of the comprehensive safeguards system and calls upon all nuclear-weapon States and all States not party to the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of the verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Ensuring full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Treaty;</li> <li>(c) Strictly observing the prohibition of the transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, object and purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<p><b>Transfer to States not party to the NPT</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of the verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Ensuring full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Treaty;</li> <li>(c) Strictly observing the prohibition of the transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, object and purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<p><b>Peaceful uses</b></p>	
<p><b>General views on peaceful uses</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) ...reaffirms that, under article III (1) of the Treaty, each non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards "for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive</li> </ul>

	<p>devices”.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) ...also reaffirms the importance and calls for the strict observance of article III (3) of the Treaty, by which the required safeguards shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the preamble of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of the verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(b) Providing baseline data regarding the fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;</li> </ul> </li> <li>• (Page 2, para 9) ...mindful of the importance of article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes, reiterates that obligations under that article provide credible assurances for States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Access to technology and technology transfer</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) ...also reaffirms the importance and calls for the strict observance of article III (3) of the Treaty, by which the required safeguards shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the preamble of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of the verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(c) Strictly observing the prohibition of the transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, object and purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• (Page 2, para 9) ...mindful of the importance of article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes, reiterates that obligations under that article provide credible assurances for States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the</li> </ul>



	transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to other States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.
<b>IAEA</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) ...fully recognizes that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an independent intergovernmental, science-and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for the verification of the fulfilment of safeguard obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6) ...stresses that all States members of IAEA shall strictly observe its statute and that nothing should be done to undermine its authority. Furthermore, the Group calls upon all States to avoid any pressure or interference in the Agency’s activities, especially its verification process, that could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility.</li> </ul>
<b>Transfer to States not party to the NPT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of the verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(c) Strictly observing the prohibition of the transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, object and purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Safeguards and verification</b>	
<b>General views on safeguards and verification</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) ...reaffirms that, under article III (1) of the Treaty, each non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards “for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) ...also reaffirms the importance and calls for the strict observance of article III (3) of the Treaty, by which the required safeguards shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the preamble of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) ...fully recognizes that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an independent intergovernmental, science-and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for the verification of the fulfilment of safeguard obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, ...</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 4) ...while supporting the verification activities of IAEA, underlines the importance of strict observance of the IAEA statute and relevant comprehensive safeguards agreements in conducting verification activities.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) ...while stressing the importance of safeguards, underlines the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the Agency’s statute and safeguards agreements.</li> </ul>

Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on the nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidences of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime, for its protection, needs to be significantly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency. The Group recalls IAEA General Conference resolution GC(60)/RES/13, paragraph 38, in which the IAEA Director General is urged to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of classified safeguards information and is requested to continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of classified safeguards information within the secretariat.

- (Page 2, para 6) ...the Group calls upon all States to avoid any pressure or interference in the Agency's activities, especially its verification process, that could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility.
- (Page 2, para 7) ...emphasizes the need to achieve worldwide application of the comprehensive safeguards system and calls upon all nuclear-weapon States and all States not party to the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards.
- (Page 2, para 8) ...calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of the verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of:

(a) Ensuring full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Treaty;

(b) Providing baseline data regarding the fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

(c) Strictly observing the prohibition of the transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, object and purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.

- (Page 2, para 9) ...mindful of the importance of article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes, reiterates that obligations under that article provide credible assurances for States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to other States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.
- (Page 2, para 10) ...stresses the statutory role of IAEA on nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the Agency's capability of verifying nuclear disarmament agreements.
- (Page 3, para 12) In that regard, the Group supports the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Group further urges the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to examine such legally binding verification arrangements and the means of making

	<p>them operational, with the aim of ensuring the realization of that objective.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 13) ...recalls action 16 of the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference and urges the nuclear-weapon States to commit to declaring to IAEA all weapons-grade fissile material and to place such material, as soon as practicable, under the supervision of IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, in order to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.</li> </ul>
<p><b>IAEA</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) ...fully recognizes that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an independent intergovernmental, science-and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for the verification of the fulfilment of safeguard obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices...</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 4) ...while supporting the verification activities of IAEA, underlines the importance of strict observance of the IAEA statute and relevant comprehensive safeguards agreements in conducting verification activities.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) ...while stressing the importance of safeguards, underlines the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the Agency's statute and safeguards agreements. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on the nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidences of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime, for its protection, needs to be significantly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency. The Group recalls IAEA General Conference resolution GC(60)/RES/13, paragraph 38, in which the IAEA Director General is urged to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of classified safeguards information and is requested to continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of classified safeguards information within the secretariat.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6) ...stresses that all States members of IAEA shall strictly observe its statute and that nothing should be done to undermine its authority. Furthermore, the Group calls upon all States to avoid any pressure or interference in the Agency's activities, especially its verification process, that could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) ...emphasizes the need to achieve worldwide application of the comprehensive safeguards system and calls upon all nuclear-weapon States and all States not party to the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of the verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 10) ...stresses the statutory role of IAEA on nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the Agency's capability of verifying nuclear disarmament agreements.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 12) ...the Group supports the development of appropriate</li> </ul>

	<p>legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• (Page 3, para 13) ...recalls action 16 of the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference and urges the nuclear-weapon States to commit to declaring to IAEA all weapons-grade fissile material and to place such material, as soon as practicable, under the supervision of IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, in order to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.</li></ul>
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**2017 Preparatory Committee to the 2020 NPT Review Conference Working  
Papers Submitted by the NAM Thematic Summaries**

<b>Working Paper submitted by members of the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.22)</b>	
<b>Institutional Issues</b>	
<b>Strengthen review process</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 14) ...calls for the 2020 Review Conference to establish a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreements by the nuclear-weapon States.</li> </ul>
<b>Disarmament</b>	
<b>General views on disarmament</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of the verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(b) Providing baseline data regarding the fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;</li> </ul> </li> <li>• (Page 2, para 10) ...stresses the statutory role of IAEA on nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the Agency's capability of verifying nuclear disarmament agreements.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 11) ...strongly believes that the nuclear-weapon States, in implementing their unequivocal undertaking to totally eliminate their nuclear arsenals, should undertake further efforts, in a transparent, irreversible and internationally verifiable manner, to eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, as well as their nuclear weapon-related materials, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 12) In that regard, the Group supports the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Group further urges the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to examine such legally binding verification arrangements and the means of making them operational, with the aim of ensuring the realization of that objective.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 14) ...calls for the 2020 Review Conference to establish a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreements by the nuclear-weapon States.</li> </ul>
<b>Fissile material / FMCT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 11) ...the Group calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to dismantle or convert for peaceful uses facilities and related equipment for the</li> </ul>

	<p>production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 12) In that regard, the Group supports the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Group further urges the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to examine such legally binding verification arrangements and the means of making them operational, with the aim of ensuring the realization of that objective.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 13) ...recalls action 16 of the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference and urges the nuclear-weapon States to commit to declaring to IAEA all weapons-grade fissile material and to place such material, as soon as practicable, under the supervision of IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, in order to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes. The Group calls upon the 2020 Review Conference to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the fulfilment of those commitments through the establishment of an international mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the action, which should be made mandatory for the nuclear-weapon States.</li> </ul>
<b>Bilateral agreements</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 11) ...strongly believes that the nuclear-weapon States, in implementing their unequivocal undertaking to totally eliminate their nuclear arsenals, should undertake further efforts, in a transparent, irreversible and internationally verifiable manner, to eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, as well as their nuclear weapon-related materials, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 14) ...calls for the 2020 Review Conference to establish a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreements by the nuclear-weapon States.</li> </ul>
<b>Role of nuclear weapon states</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of the verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(b) Providing baseline data regarding the fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;</li> </ul> </li> <li>• (Page 3, para 11) ...strongly believes that the nuclear-weapon States, in implementing their unequivocal undertaking to totally eliminate their nuclear arsenals, should undertake further efforts, in a transparent, irreversible and internationally verifiable manner, to eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, as well as their nuclear weapon-related materials, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. Furthermore, the Group calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to dismantle or convert for peaceful uses facilities and related equipment for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 13) ...recalls action 16 of the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference and urges the nuclear-weapon States to commit to declaring to IAEA all weapons-grade fissile material and to</li> </ul>

	<p>place such material, as soon as practicable, under the supervision of IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, in order to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes. The Group calls upon the 2020 Review Conference to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the fulfilment of those commitments through the establishment of an international mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the action, which should be made mandatory for the nuclear-weapon States.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 14) ...calls for the 2020 Review Conference to establish a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreements by the nuclear-weapon States.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Verification and disarmament</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of the verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(b) Providing baseline data regarding the fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;</li> </ul> </li> <li>• (Page 2, para 10) ...stresses the statutory role of IAEA on nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the Agency's capability of verifying nuclear disarmament agreements.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 11) ...strongly believes that the nuclear-weapon States, in implementing their unequivocal undertaking to totally eliminate their nuclear arsenals, should undertake further efforts, in a transparent, irreversible and internationally verifiable manner, to eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, as well as their nuclear weapon-related materials, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 12) In that regard, the Group supports the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Group further urges the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to examine such legally binding verification arrangements and the means of making them operational, with the aim of ensuring the realization of that objective.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 13) ...recalls action 16 of the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference and urges the nuclear-weapon States to commit to declaring to IAEA all weapons-grade fissile material and to place such material, as soon as practicable, under the supervision of IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, in order to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes. The Group calls upon the 2020 Review Conference to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the fulfilment of those commitments through the establishment of an international mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the action, which should be made mandatory for the nuclear-weapon States.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 14) ...calls for the 2020 Review Conference to establish a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreements by the nuclear-</li> </ul>

	weapon States.
<b>Nonproliferation</b>	
<b>General views on nonproliferation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) ...reaffirms that, under article III (1) of the Treaty, each non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards “for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of the verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Ensuring full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Treaty;</li> <li>(b) Providing baseline data regarding the fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;</li> <li>(c) Strictly observing the prohibition of the transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, object and purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>General views NPT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) ...reaffirms that, under article III (1) of the Treaty, each non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards “for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of the verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Ensuring full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Treaty;</li> <li>(c) Strictly observing the prohibition of the transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, object and purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Nonproliferation and peaceful uses</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) ...reaffirms that, under article III (1) of the Treaty, each non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards “for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) ...fully recognizes that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an independent intergovernmental, science-and technology-</li> </ul>



	<p>based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for the verification of the fulfilment of safeguard obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of the verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(b) Providing baseline data regarding the fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<p><b>States not party to the NPT</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) ...emphasizes the need to achieve worldwide application of the comprehensive safeguards system and calls upon all nuclear-weapon States and all States not party to the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of the verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Ensuring full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Treaty;</li> <li>(c) Strictly observing the prohibition of the transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, object and purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<p><b>Transfer to States not party to the NPT</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of the verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Ensuring full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Treaty;</li> <li>(c) Strictly observing the prohibition of the transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, object and purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<p><b>Peaceful uses</b></p>	
<p><b>General views on peaceful uses</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) ...reaffirms that, under article III (1) of the Treaty, each non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards "for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive</li> </ul>

	<p>devices”.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) ...also reaffirms the importance and calls for the strict observance of article III (3) of the Treaty, by which the required safeguards shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the preamble of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of the verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(b) Providing baseline data regarding the fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;</li> </ul> </li> <li>• (Page 2, para 9) ...mindful of the importance of article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes, reiterates that obligations under that article provide credible assurances for States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Access to technology and technology transfer</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) ...also reaffirms the importance and calls for the strict observance of article III (3) of the Treaty, by which the required safeguards shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the preamble of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of the verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(c) Strictly observing the prohibition of the transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, object and purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• (Page 2, para 9) ...mindful of the importance of article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes, reiterates that obligations under that article provide credible assurances for States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the</li> </ul>

	transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to other States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.
<b>IAEA</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) ...fully recognizes that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an independent intergovernmental, science-and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for the verification of the fulfilment of safeguard obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6) ...stresses that all States members of IAEA shall strictly observe its statute and that nothing should be done to undermine its authority. Furthermore, the Group calls upon all States to avoid any pressure or interference in the Agency’s activities, especially its verification process, that could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility.</li> </ul>
<b>Transfer to States not party to the NPT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of the verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(c) Strictly observing the prohibition of the transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, object and purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Safeguards and verification</b>	
<b>General views on safeguards and verification</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) ...reaffirms that, under article III (1) of the Treaty, each non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards “for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) ...also reaffirms the importance and calls for the strict observance of article III (3) of the Treaty, by which the required safeguards shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the preamble of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) ...fully recognizes that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an independent intergovernmental, science-and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for the verification of the fulfilment of safeguard obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, ...</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 4) ...while supporting the verification activities of IAEA, underlines the importance of strict observance of the IAEA statute and relevant comprehensive safeguards agreements in conducting verification activities.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) ...while stressing the importance of safeguards, underlines the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the Agency’s statute and safeguards agreements.</li> </ul>

Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on the nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidences of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime, for its protection, needs to be significantly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency. The Group recalls IAEA General Conference resolution GC(60)/RES/13, paragraph 38, in which the IAEA Director General is urged to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of classified safeguards information and is requested to continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of classified safeguards information within the secretariat.

- (Page 2, para 6) ...the Group calls upon all States to avoid any pressure or interference in the Agency's activities, especially its verification process, that could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility.
- (Page 2, para 7) ...emphasizes the need to achieve worldwide application of the comprehensive safeguards system and calls upon all nuclear-weapon States and all States not party to the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards.
- (Page 2, para 8) ...calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of the verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of:

(a) Ensuring full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Treaty;

(b) Providing baseline data regarding the fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

(c) Strictly observing the prohibition of the transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, object and purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.

- (Page 2, para 9) ...mindful of the importance of article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes, reiterates that obligations under that article provide credible assurances for States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to other States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.
- (Page 2, para 10) ...stresses the statutory role of IAEA on nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the Agency's capability of verifying nuclear disarmament agreements.
- (Page 3, para 12) In that regard, the Group supports the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Group further urges the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to examine such legally binding verification arrangements and the means of making

	<p>them operational, with the aim of ensuring the realization of that objective.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 13) ...recalls action 16 of the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference and urges the nuclear-weapon States to commit to declaring to IAEA all weapons-grade fissile material and to place such material, as soon as practicable, under the supervision of IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, in order to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.</li> </ul>
<p><b>IAEA</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) ...fully recognizes that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an independent intergovernmental, science-and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for the verification of the fulfilment of safeguard obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices...</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 4) ...while supporting the verification activities of IAEA, underlines the importance of strict observance of the IAEA statute and relevant comprehensive safeguards agreements in conducting verification activities.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) ...while stressing the importance of safeguards, underlines the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the Agency's statute and safeguards agreements. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on the nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidences of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime, for its protection, needs to be significantly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency. The Group recalls IAEA General Conference resolution GC(60)/RES/13, paragraph 38, in which the IAEA Director General is urged to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of classified safeguards information and is requested to continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of classified safeguards information within the secretariat.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6) ...stresses that all States members of IAEA shall strictly observe its statute and that nothing should be done to undermine its authority. Furthermore, the Group calls upon all States to avoid any pressure or interference in the Agency's activities, especially its verification process, that could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) ...emphasizes the need to achieve worldwide application of the comprehensive safeguards system and calls upon all nuclear-weapon States and all States not party to the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of the verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 10) ...stresses the statutory role of IAEA on nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the Agency's capability of verifying nuclear disarmament agreements.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 12) ...the Group supports the development of appropriate</li> </ul>

	<p>legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• (Page 3, para 13) ...recalls action 16 of the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference and urges the nuclear-weapon States to commit to declaring to IAEA all weapons-grade fissile material and to place such material, as soon as practicable, under the supervision of IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, in order to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.</li></ul>
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## The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Database

### 2017 Preparatory Committee to the 2020 NPT Review Conference

#### Working Papers Submitted by the NAM

##### Thematic Summaries

<b>Working Paper submitted by members of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.1/WP.23)</b>	
<b>Disarmament</b>	
<b>General Views on Disarmament</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• (Page 1, para 1) The total elimination of nuclear weapons and the legally binding assurance that they will never be produced again is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. To achieve that goal, nuclear -weapon States need to implement their nuclear obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and their disarmament commitments agreed upon in 1995, 2000 and 2010, including the unequivocal undertaking towards the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. The 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty on the Non -Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be fully implemented in accordance with the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility.</li><li>• (Page 1, para 3) ...proposes a plan of action for the total elimination of nuclear weapons consisting of the following concrete steps and measures, particularly through the negotiation and adoption of a nuclear weapons convention which includes a phased programme and a specified time frame for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, as a basis for consideration by the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</li><li>• (Page 1, para 4) Commencement of negotiations on and conclusion of an international, non-discriminatory comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons which:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>(a) Prohibits the possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;</li><li>(b) Provides for their destruction;</li></ul></li><li>• (Page 2, para 6) Acceleration of the ratification and early entry into force of the comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, which includes a phased programme and a specified time frame for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.</li><li>• (Page 2, para 7) Upon entry into force of the comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, the following steps must be undertaken:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>(a) The establishment of a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance with the provisions of the comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons;</li><li>(b) Declarations by possessor States parties of their stocks of nuclear weapons and material usable for nuclear weapons;</li><li>(c) The preparation, under international auspices, of an inventory of nuclear arsenals, including fissile materials, nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles;</li><li>(d) The separation of nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles;</li></ul></li></ul>

	<p>(e) The placement of nuclear warheads in secure storage under international supervision, pending the removal of special nuclear materials from those warheads;</p>
<p><b>Role of NWS</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) To achieve that goal, nuclear-weapon States need to implement their nuclear obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and their disarmament commitments agreed upon in 1995, 2000 and 2010, including the unequivocal undertaking towards the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) Pending the conclusion of a comprehensive convention, the immediate implementation of the following measures, which include agreed steps from the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, must be undertaken: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) A moratorium on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes by nuclear-weapon States;</li> <li>(b) The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the ratification of the Treaty by the remaining nuclear-weapon States;</li> <li>(c) The cessation of the upgrading and modernization of the existing nuclear weapon systems through new technology, including nuclear weapon research and development by nuclear-weapon States;</li> <li>(d) The cessation of the role of nuclear weapons in the security doctrines of nuclear-weapon States, leading to the elimination of such a role;</li> <li>(e) Provisions of unconditional and legally binding negative security assurances by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States; ...</li> <li>(f) The reduction of nuclear arsenals and de-alerting by nuclear-weapon States.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) Upon entry into force of the comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, the following steps must be undertaken: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Declarations by possessor States parties of their stocks of nuclear weapons and material usable for nuclear weapons;</li> <li>(b) The irreversible placement of nuclear fissile material transferred from military to peaceful uses by nuclear-weapon States under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<p><b>Nuclear Weapons Convention (time bound total elimination)</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) In that context, negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention which includes a phased programme and a specified time frame for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are needed.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) ...proposes a plan of action for the total elimination of nuclear weapons consisting of the following concrete steps and measures, particularly through the negotiation and adoption of a nuclear weapons convention which includes a phased programme and a specified time frame for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, as a basis for consideration by the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 4) Commencement of negotiations on and conclusion of an international, non-discriminatory comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons which: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Prohibits the possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;</li> <li>(b) Provides for their destruction;</li> <li>(c) Includes a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance with the provisions of the convention.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>



	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 6) Acceleration of the ratification and early entry into force of the comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, which includes a phased programme and a specified time frame for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) Upon entry into force of the comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, the following steps must be undertaken: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) The establishment of a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance with the provisions of the comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons;</li> <li>(b) Declarations by possessor States parties of their stocks of nuclear weapons and material usable for nuclear weapons;</li> <li>(c) The preparation, under international auspices, of an inventory of nuclear arsenals, including fissile materials, nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles;</li> <li>(d) The separation of nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles; <sup>[1]</sup><sub>[SEP]</sub></li> <li>(e) The placement of nuclear warheads in secure storage under international supervision, pending the removal of special nuclear materials from those warheads;</li> <li>(f) The transfer of nuclear materials, including fissile materials, to “peaceful purposes”;</li> <li>(g) The irreversible placement of nuclear fissile material transferred from military to peaceful uses by nuclear-weapon States under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• (Page 3, para 8) Further measures for the full implementation of the comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons and of its verification regime include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) The elimination of all nuclear weapons in an irreversible and verifiable manner;</li> <li>(b) The conversion of all facilities for the production of nuclear weapons to “peaceful purposes” in an irreversible and verifiable manner;</li> <li>(c) The placement of all nuclear material, equipment and facilities under IAEA safeguards.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Modernization</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) Pending the conclusion of a comprehensive convention, the immediate implementation of the following measures, which include agreed steps from the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, must be undertaken: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(e) The cessation of the upgrading and modernization of the existing nuclear weapon systems through new technology, including nuclear weapon research and development by nuclear-weapon States;</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Fissile material/FMCT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) Pending the conclusion of a comprehensive convention, the immediate implementation of the following measures, which include agreed steps from the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, must be undertaken: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) A moratorium on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes by nuclear-weapon States;</li> </ul> </li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) Upon entry into force of the comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, the following steps must be undertaken: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(b) Declarations by possessor States parties of their stocks of nuclear weapons and material usable for nuclear weapons;</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

	<p>(c) The preparation, under international auspices, of an inventory of nuclear arsenals, including fissile materials, nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles;</p> <p>(e) The placement of nuclear warheads in secure storage under international supervision, pending the removal of special nuclear materials from those warheads;</p> <p>(f) The transfer of nuclear materials, including fissile materials, to “peaceful purposes”;</p> <p>(g) The irreversible placement of nuclear fissile material transferred from military to peaceful uses by nuclear-weapon States under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.</p>
<p><b>Verification and disarmament</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) The 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be fully implemented in accordance with the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 4) Commencement of negotiations on and conclusion of an international, non-discriminatory comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons which: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(c) Includes a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance with the provisions of the convention.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) Upon entry into force of the comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, the following steps must be undertaken: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) The establishment of a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance with the provisions of the comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons;</li> </ul> </li> <li>• (Page 3, para 8) Further measures for the full implementation of the comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons and of its verification regime include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) The elimination of all nuclear weapons in an irreversible and verifiable manner;</li> <li>(b) The conversion of all facilities for the production of nuclear weapons to “peaceful purposes” in an irreversible and verifiable manner;</li> <li>(c) The placement of all nuclear material, equipment and facilities under IAEA safeguards.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<p><b>Security Assurances</b></p>	
<p><b>General views on Security Assurances</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) Pending the conclusion of a comprehensive convention, the immediate implementation of the following measures, which include agreed steps from the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, must be undertaken: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(g) Provisions of unconditional and legally binding negative security assurances by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States;</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<p><b>Legally binding Security Assurances</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) The total elimination of nuclear weapons and the legally binding assurance that they will never be produced again is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) Pending the conclusion of a comprehensive convention, the immediate implementation of the following measures, which include agreed steps from the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, must be undertaken: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(g) Provisions of unconditional and legally binding negative security assurances by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States;</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

<b>Legally binding negative security assurances</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) Pending the conclusion of a comprehensive convention, the immediate implementation of the following measures, which include agreed steps from the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, must be undertaken: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(g) Provisions of unconditional and legally binding negative security assurances by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States;</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Role of NWS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) Pending the conclusion of a comprehensive convention, the immediate implementation of the following measures, which include agreed steps from the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, must be undertaken: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(g) Provisions of unconditional and legally binding negative security assurances by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States;</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Safeguards and Verification</b>	
<b>General views on Safeguards and Verification</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 4) Commencement of negotiations on and conclusion of an international, non-discriminatory comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons which: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(c) Includes a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance with the provisions of the convention.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) Upon entry into force of the comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, the following steps must be undertaken: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) The establishment of a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance with the provisions of the comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons;</li> <li>(e) The placement of nuclear warheads in secure storage under international supervision, pending the removal of special nuclear materials from those warheads;</li> <li>(g) The irreversible placement of nuclear fissile material transferred from military to peaceful uses by nuclear-weapon States under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• (Page 3, para 8) Further measures for the full implementation of the comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons and of its verification regime include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) The elimination of all nuclear weapons in an irreversible and verifiable manner;</li> <li>(b) The conversion of all facilities for the production of nuclear weapons to “peaceful purposes” in an irreversible and verifiable manner;</li> <li>(c) The placement of all nuclear material, equipment and facilities under IAEA safeguards.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>IAEA</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) Upon entry into force of the comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, the following steps must be undertaken: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(g) The irreversible placement of nuclear fissile material transferred from military to peaceful uses by nuclear-weapon States under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• (Page 3, para 8) Further measures for the full implementation of the comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons and of its verification regime include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(c) The placement of all nuclear material, equipment and facilities under IAEA safeguards.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Peaceful Uses</b>	
<b>General views on peaceful uses</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) Upon entry into force of the comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, the following steps must be undertaken:</li> </ul>

	<p>(f) The transfer of nuclear materials, including fissile materials, to “peaceful purposes”;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 8) Further measures for the full implementation of the comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons and of its verification regime include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(b) The conversion of all facilities for the production of nuclear weapons to “peaceful purposes” in an irreversible and verifiable manner;</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>NWFZ</b>	
<b>General views on NWFZ</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) Pending the conclusion of a comprehensive convention, the immediate implementation of the following measures, which include agreed steps from the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, must be undertaken: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(h) The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, in particular in the Middle East;</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>NWFZ in Middle East</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) Pending the conclusion of a comprehensive convention, the immediate implementation of the following measures, which include agreed steps from the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, must be undertaken: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(h) The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, in particular in the Middle East;</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Nuclear Testing</b>	
<b>General views on testing</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 4) Commencement of negotiations on and conclusion of an international, non-discriminatory comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons which: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Prohibits the possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;</li> </ul> </li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) Pending the conclusion of a comprehensive convention, the immediate implementation of the following measures, which include agreed steps from the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, must be undertaken: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(b) The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the ratification of the Treaty by the remaining nuclear-weapon States;</li> <li>(c) The cessation of all nuclear test explosions pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;</li> <li>(d) Ending all types of nuclear weapon tests and the closure of all nuclear weapon test sites and their associated infrastructure;</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>CTBT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) Pending the conclusion of a comprehensive convention, the immediate implementation of the following measures, which include agreed steps from the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, must be undertaken: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(b) The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the ratification of the Treaty by the remaining nuclear-weapon States;</li> <li>(c) The cessation of all nuclear test explosions pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Regional issue: Middle East</b>	
<b>General Views on NWFZ in the Middle East</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) Pending the conclusion of a comprehensive convention, the immediate implementation of the following measures, which include agreed steps from the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, must be undertaken:</li> </ul>

	(h) The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, in particular in the Middle East;
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**2017 Preparatory Committee to the 2020 NPT Review Conference**  
**Working Papers Submitted by the NAM Thematic Summaries**

**Working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.24)**

**Disarmament**

**General views on disarmament**

- (Page 1, para 1) ...emphasizes that the Treaty is an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament.
- (Page 1, para 3) ...reaffirms the principled positions of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries on nuclear disarmament, which remains its highest priority, and on the related issue of nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects. The Group also reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the legally binding assurance that they will never be produced again is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Group further stresses that efforts aimed at nuclear non-proliferation must be parallel to simultaneous efforts aiming at nuclear disarmament.
- (Page 2, para 7) ...underlines the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.
- (Page 2, para 9) ...underlines that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues.
- (Page 3, para 13) ...calls upon the 2020 Review Conference to take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of article VI of the Treaty in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
- (Page 4, para 22) The Group is also concerned about the lack of tangible progress in enhancing transparency, in accordance with action 5 (g) of the action plan on nuclear disarmament of the 2010 Review Conference.
- (Page 4, para 24) ...stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons and, accordingly, calls on the nuclear-weapon States to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability to all such cuts, to further reduce their nuclear arsenals, both warheads and delivery systems, thus contributing to the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations and facilitating the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest date. The Group also recalls the commitment by the Russian Federation and the United States under action 4 of the action plan on nuclear disarmament of the 2010 Review Conference for the full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and strongly urges them to adopt all required measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 5, para 26) ...believes that the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes and the lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies further undermine disarmament commitments.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 32) ...stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear -Test- Ban Treaty and realizing its entry into force through its ratification by the remaining States whose ratification is required for its entry into force, including, in particular, by two nuclear-weapon States, thus contributing to the process of nuclear</li> <li>• (Page 6, para 33) ...recalls its working paper entitled “Draft elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons”, which was submitted to the 2015 Review Conference (see NPT/CONF.2015/WP.14), and has presented an updated version of this plan to the 2017 Preparatory Committee.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Role of nuclear weapon states</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 4) ...recalls that, in pursuit of the full, effective and urgent implementation of the obligation of nuclear disarmament under article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, and building upon the 13 practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in particular the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the goal of the complete elimination of their nuclear weapons, the 2010 Review Conference agreed on an action plan on nuclear disarmament, set out in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference, that includes concrete measures to accelerate progress towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 5) ...further recalls that the nuclear-weapon States committed, in action 5 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference, to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, inter alia, through: (a) rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons; (b) addressing the question of all nuclear weapons, regardless of their type or their location, as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process; (c) further diminishing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies; (d) discussing policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons; (e) considering the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security; (f) reducing the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and (g) further enhancing transparency and increasing mutual confidence.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6) ...expresses deep concern at the continued lack of progress in the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations by the nuclear-weapon States, which could undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty and the credibility of the non-proliferation regime.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) ...In the context of the review of action 5 (c) of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty remains deeply concerned by military and security doctrines of the nuclear -weapon States that set out the rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the recent posture review by one of</li> </ul>

the nuclear-weapon States to consider expanding the circumstances in which these weapons could be used.

- (Page 2, para 10) ...reiterates its strong call for the full and systematic implementation of the unequivocal undertaking given by the nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 Review Conference, including through the implementation of the 13 practical steps, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, which was also reaffirmed by the 2010 Review Conference.
- (Page 2, para 11) ...recalls that, in implementing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the nuclear-weapon States, in accordance with action 3 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference, have committed to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. ...calls for the full compliance of the nuclear-weapon States with such undertakings towards fulfilling their legal obligations under article VI of the Treaty.
- (Page 3, para 12) ...emphasizes in particular the prime importance of and the urgent need for full and prompt implementation of the commitments by the nuclear-weapon States under action 5 of the action plan on nuclear disarmament of the 2010 Review Conference.
- (Page 3, para 16) ...deeply regrets the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee to negotiate on nuclear disarmament.
- (Page 4, para 21) In order to comply with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, as well as with their commitments under the 13 practical steps and the action plan on nuclear disarmament of the 2010 Review Conference, the nuclear-weapon States must immediately cease their plans to further invest in modernizing, upgrading, refurbishing or extending the lives of their nuclear weapons and related facilities.
- (Page 4, para 24) ...stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons and, accordingly, calls on the nuclear-weapon States to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability to all such cuts, to further reduce their nuclear arsenals, both warheads and delivery systems, thus contributing to the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations and facilitating the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest date.
- (Page 5, para 27) ...emphasizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals, and considers, in that regard, that any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.
- (Page 5, para 31) ...the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty is of the view that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States shall seriously refrain, at any circumstances, from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.



<p><b>Nuclear Weapons Convention (Time bound total elimination)</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 15) ...welcomes the adoption by the General Assembly of resolutions 68/32, 70/34 and 71/71, entitled “Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament”, in which, in particular, the Assembly: (a) called for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction;</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 17) ...reaffirms the urgent necessity of negotiating and bringing to a conclusion a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 18) ...reiterates its call to the Conference on Disarmament to immediately establish, as the highest priority, a subsidiary body to negotiate and conclude a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Fissile material / FMCT</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 19) ...strongly supports banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and eliminating all the past production and existing stockpiles of such materials, in an irreversible and verifiable manner and taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, without prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including their past production, existing stockpiles and future production of fissile materials under the International Atomic Energy Agency comprehensive safeguards.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 20) ...underlines that non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have already agreed to a legally binding commitment not to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Bilateral agreements (START)</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, para 23) ...while noting the conclusion and entry into force of the New START Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America, expresses concern that domestic commitments to nuclear weapon modernization in exchange for ratification of the New START Treaty undermine the minimal reductions agreed upon in it.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Bilateral agreements</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 11) ...recalls that, in implementing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the nuclear –weapon States, in accordance with action 3 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference, have committed to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 24) ...recalls the commitment by the Russian Federation and the United States under action 4 of the action plan on nuclear disarmament of the 2010 Review Conference for the full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and strongly urges them to adopt all required measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 25) ...recalls the commitment by the Russian Federation and the United States under action 4 of the action plan on nuclear disarmament of the 2010 Review Conference for the full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and strongly urges them to adopt all required measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> </ul>

<p><b>Outer space</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, para 25) ...recalls the commitment by the Russian Federation and the United States under action 4 of the action plan on nuclear disarmament of the 2010 Review Conference for the full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and strongly urges them to adopt all required measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The Group further emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 71/31.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) ...stresses its deep concern at the threat to humanity posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and their possible use or threat of use.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 20) ...recalls the advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons that “there is in neither customary nor conventional international law any specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons” and that “the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law”.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 31) ...In the view of the Group, any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be a crime against humanity and a violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular international humanitarian law. The Group further believes that the mere possession of nuclear weapons is inconsistent with the principles of international humanitarian law. In this regard, the Group strongly calls for the complete exclusion of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from military doctrines.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Modernization</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, para 21) ...remains deeply concerned by the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons, despite some reports of bilateral and unilateral reductions. Any such reductions are undermined by the modernization of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and related infrastructure by the nuclear-weapon States. In order to comply with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, as well as with their commitments under the 13 practical steps and the action plan on nuclear disarmament of the 2010 Review Conference, the nuclear-weapon States must immediately cease their plans to further invest in modernizing, upgrading, refurbishing or extending the lives of their nuclear weapons and related facilities.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Modernization</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) ... all States parties that have not yet done so ... should prohibit completely nuclear weapons research and development and also refrain from ... the use of new technologies for upgrading existing nuclear weapons systems, which would defeat the object and the purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) ... recalls and reaffirms once again the commitment of all States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to end all nuclear weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosions, thereby constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) ... expresses grave concern about nuclear weapon test explosions in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading existing nuclear weapons systems and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, which may result in the resumption of tests and a</li> </ul>

	<p>lowering of the nuclear threshold. Accordingly, the Group strongly calls on the nuclear-weapon States to put an immediate end to such activities ...</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 4) ... stresses that improvement of existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient statements on negative security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States and violate their commitments undertaken at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) ... supports the objectives of the [CTBT], which is intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all nuclear test explosions and to stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons in order to pave the way towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 9) ... recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation, thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear devices and of nuclear weapons based on new physical principles.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 9) ... the Group calls upon those [nuclear-weapon] States to continue to refrain from conducting any type of nuclear test for the modernization, development or further improvement of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 11) ... emphasizes that the modernization or development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the assurances given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, namely that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Role of NWS</b></p>	<p>(Page 1, para 3) ... the Group expresses grave concern about nuclear weapon test explosions in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading existing nuclear weapons systems and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, which may result in the resumption of tests and a lowering of the nuclear threshold. Accordingly, the Group strongly calls on the nuclear-weapon States to put an immediate end to such activities ...</p> <p>(Page 2, para 4) ... stresses that improvement of existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient statements on negative security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States and violate their commitments undertaken at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.</p> <p>(Page 2, para 6) ... stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by all the nuclear-weapon States, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Group reiterates that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment to nuclear disarmament of all States signatories, especially the nuclear-weapon States, would be essential.</p> <p>(Page 2, para 9) ... recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation, thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear devices and of nuclear weapons based on new physical principles. The nuclear -weapon States stated at that time that the only steps to be followed would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons, which would not involve nuclear explosions. In that regard, the Group calls upon those States to continue to refrain from conducting any type of nuclear test for the modernization, development or further improvement of nuclear weapons.</p> <p>(Page 3, para 11) ... emphasizes that the modernization or development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the assurances given by the five nuclear-weapon</p>

	States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons.
<b>Institutional Issues</b>	
<b>Subsidiary bodies in Main Committee</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(Page 6, para 34) ...reiterates its call for the establishment, as a matter of priority, of a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament in Main Committee I, mandated to focus on the issue of fulfilment of the obligations under article VI of the Treaty and on further practical measures required to achieve progress in that regard.</li> </ul>
<b>General views on NPT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(Page 1, para 1) ...emphasizes that the Treaty is an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament.</li> </ul>
<b>Nonproliferation</b>	
<b>General views on nonproliferation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(Page 1, para 3) ...reaffirms the principled positions of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries on nuclear disarmament, which remains its highest priority, and on the related issue of nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects. ...stresses that efforts aimed at nuclear non-proliferation must be parallel to simultaneous efforts aiming at nuclear disarmament.</li> <li>(Page 4, para 20) ...underlines that non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have already agreed to a legally binding commitment not to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</li> </ul>
<b>Security Assurances</b>	
<b>General views on security assurances</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(Page 5, para 28) ...reaffirms that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, it is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States that, by becoming parties to the Treaty, have given up the nuclear weapon option, inter alia, to receive effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances.</li> </ul>
<b>Legally binding security assurances</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(Page 5, para 28) ...reaffirms that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, it is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States that, by becoming parties to the Treaty, have given up the nuclear weapon option, inter alia, to receive effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances.</li> </ul>
<b>Other Fora</b>	
<b>Conference on Disarmament</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(Page 3, para 15) ...welcomes the adoption by the General Assembly of resolutions 68/32, 70/34 and 71/71, entitled "Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament", in which, in particular, the Assembly: (a) called for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction; (b) decided to convene, no later than 2018, a United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to review the progress made in this regard;</li> <li>(Page 3, para 16) ...recalls action 6 of the action plan on nuclear disarmament of the 2010 Review Conference, through which all States have agreed that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work. The Group deeply regrets the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee to negotiate on nuclear disarmament.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 18) ...reiterates its call to the Conference on Disarmament to immediately establish, as the highest priority, a subsidiary body to negotiate and conclude a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 25) ...reiterates its call to the Conference on Disarmament to immediately establish, as the highest priority, a subsidiary body to negotiate and conclude a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction.</li> </ul>
<b>Nuclear Testing</b>	
<b>CTBT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 5, para 32) ...stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear -Test- Ban Treaty and realizing its entry into force through its ratification by the remaining States whose ratification is required for its entry into force, including, in particular, by two nuclear-weapon States, thus contributing to the process of nuclear disarmament and the enhancement of international peace and security. The Group underlines that the nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to take the lead in this regard.</li> </ul>
<b>Role of nuclear weapon states</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 11) ... the Group is seriously concerned by the decision of a nuclear-weapon State to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear testing to 18 months as a setback to the agreements reached at the 2000 Review Conference. It is the view of the Group that such decisions undermine the validity of the commitment to declared moratoriums as well as the commitments under the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was envisaged as the first of 13 practical steps leading to nuclear disarmament.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 32) ...stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear -Test- Ban Treaty and realizing its entry into force through its ratification by the remaining States whose ratification is required for its entry into force, including, in particular, by two nuclear-weapon States, thus contributing to the process of nuclear disarmament and the enhancement of international peace and security. The Group underlines that the nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to take the lead in this regard.</li> </ul>
<b>Peaceful Uses</b>	
<b>Nuclear Safety and Security</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 12) ... underlines the need for increased attention to the problems of safety and contamination related to the discontinuation of nuclear operations formerly associated with nuclear weapons programmes,</li> </ul>
<b>Safeguards and verification</b>	
<b>General views on safeguards and verification</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) It will be possible to determine the success of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty only when it has been signed and ratified, in particular by the five nuclear-weapon States and by those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) Early ratification of this Treaty [CTBT] by the nuclear-weapon States would pave the way and encourage the remaining required countries, especially those with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the Treaty.</li> </ul>
<b>Other Fora</b>	
<b>United Nations</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 14) ...welcomes the convening of the first-ever high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament on 26 September 2013, and</li> </ul>

	<p>underlines that the strong support expressed at that meeting for taking urgent and effective measures to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons demonstrated that nuclear disarmament remains the highest priority of the international community.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 15) ...welcomes the adoption by the General Assembly of resolutions 68/32, 70/34 and 71/71, entitled “Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament”, in which, in particular, the Assembly: (a) called for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction; (b) decided to convene, no later than 2018, a United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to review the progress made in this regard; and (c) declared 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, as well as the adoption of resolution 69/58 on this subject. The Group calls for the full implementation of these resolutions, which provide a concrete pathway for realizing the objective of nuclear disarmament.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Conference on Disarmament</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 15) ...welcomes the adoption by the General Assembly of resolutions 68/32, 70/34 and 71/71, entitled “Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament”, in which, in particular, the Assembly: (a) called for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction; (b) decided to convene, no later than 2018, a United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to review the progress made in this regard; and (c) declared 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, as well as the adoption of resolution 69/58 on this subject. The Group calls for the full implementation of these resolutions, which provide a concrete pathway for realizing the objective of nuclear disarmament.</li> </ul>



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**Working Papers Submitted by the NAM Thematic Summaries**

<b>Working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.25)</b>	
<b>Disarmament</b>	
<b>General views on Disarmament</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• (Page 1, para 1) ...reaffirms its view that the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the legally binding assurance that they will never be produced again is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.</li><li>• (Page 1, para 2) ...stresses that the granting of such assurances by all five nuclear-weapon States parties to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties is a commitment, the fulfilment of which provides an essential security benefit to the States parties to the Treaty and is necessary to strengthen the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and its credibility.</li><li>• (Page 2, para 6) ...emphasizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals, and considers, in that regard, that any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the integrity and both the vertical and horizontal sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.</li><li>• (Page 3, para 13) ...therefore, calls on the participants in the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in addition to keeping nuclear disarmament as their highest priority, to fully address this legitimate right [legally binding security assurances] as a matter of priority.</li></ul>
<b>Humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• (page 2, para 8) ...expresses its deepest concern over the immediate, indiscriminate and massive death and destruction that would be caused by any nuclear weapon detonation and its long-term catastrophic consequences for human health, the environment and other vital economic resources, thus endangering the life of present and future generations. The Group affirms the importance of humanitarian considerations in the context of all deliberations and efforts in promoting the goal of nuclear disarmament.</li><li>• (Page 2, para 9) ...firmly believes that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be a crime against humanity and a violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular international humanitarian law. The Group further believes that the mere possession of nuclear weapons is inconsistent with the principles of international humanitarian law.</li><li>• (Page 2, para 10) ...reaffirms the validity of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, that “there is in neither customary nor conventional international law any specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons” and that “the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law”.</li></ul>

<b>Modernization</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) ...recalls that...it has been reiterated that improvements in existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, such as those envisaged in the Nuclear Posture Review of the United States of America, contravene the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty</li> </ul>
<b>Security Assurances</b>	
<b>General views on security assurances</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) ...The Group is of the firm belief that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, it is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States that have given up the nuclear-weapon option by becoming parties to the Treaty to receive effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) ...stresses that the granting of such assurances by all five nuclear-weapon States parties to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties is a commitment, the fulfilment of which provides an essential security benefit to the States parties to the Treaty and is necessary to strengthen the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and its credibility.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 4) It is the view of the Group that such unilateral statements fail to meet any of the requirements of universal, legally binding, effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) ...pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which is the only absolute guarantee against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States should seriously refrain, in any circumstances, from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 12) ...all nuclear-weapon States should fully respect their existing commitments with regard to negative security assurances, which are limited, conditional and insufficient, and should extend these assurances, without any condition and discrimination, to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 13) ...therefore, calls on the participants in the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in addition to keeping nuclear disarmament as their highest priority, to fully address this legitimate right as a matter of priority.</li> </ul>
<b>Legally binding security assurances</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) ...The Group is of the firm belief that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, it is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States that have given up the nuclear-weapon option by becoming parties to the Treaty to receive effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 4) It is the view of the Group that such unilateral statements fail to meet any of the requirements of universal, legally binding, effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 13) ...in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the parties to the Treaty reaffirmed and recognized that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances from nuclear-weapon States which could strengthen the nuclear disarmament and</li> </ul>



	<p>non-proliferation regime.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 14) ...urgent negotiations on the provision of the effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable, universal and legally binding security assurances by all the nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances should also be pursued as a matter of priority and without further delay.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 15) ...in accordance with the decision at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances to consider legally binding, unconditional, irrevocable and non-discriminatory negative security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Role of nuclear weapon states</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) ...stresses that the granting of such assurances by all five nuclear-weapon States parties to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties is a commitment, the fulfilment of which provides an essential security benefit to the States parties to the Treaty and is necessary to strengthen the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and its credibility.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 4) ...takes note of the unilateral statements by each of the nuclear-weapon States, in which they give very limited, conditional and insufficient security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) ...pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which is the only absolute guarantee against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States should seriously refrain, in any circumstances, from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 11) ...while deploring the military and security doctrines of the nuclear-weapon States and the strategic concept for the defence and security of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which are based on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and which maintain unjustifiable concepts of security based on promoting and developing military alliances and nuclear deterrence policies, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to exclude completely the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from their military and security doctrines.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 12) ...pending the conclusion of negotiations on universal, legally binding, effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, all nuclear-weapon States should fully respect their existing commitments with regard to negative security assurances, which are limited, conditional and insufficient, and should extend these assurances, without any condition and discrimination, to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 13) ...in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the parties to the Treaty reaffirmed and recognized that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances from nuclear-weapon States which could strengthen the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. The Group expresses its dissatisfaction over the lack of required political will and efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to fully address this legitimate interest.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 14) ...urgent negotiations on the provision of the effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable, universal and legally binding security assurances by all the nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances should also be pursued as a matter of priority and without further delay.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 15) ...in accordance with the decision at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances to consider legally binding, unconditional, irrevocable and non-discriminatory negative security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.</li> </ul>
<b>Legally binding negative security assurances</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) ...expresses its concern that, in spite of long-standing requests by non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive legally binding, effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable negative security assurances, no tangible progress has been made in that regard.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 12) ...pending the conclusion of negotiations on universal, legally binding, effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, all nuclear-weapon States should fully respect their existing commitments with regard to negative security assurances, which are limited, conditional and insufficient, and should extend these assurances, without any condition and discrimination, to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.</li> </ul>
<b>Nuclear Testing</b>	
<b>CTBT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) ...recalls that ... it has been reiterated that improvements in existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, such as those envisaged in the Nuclear Posture Review of the United States of America, contravene the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty</li> </ul>
<b>Role of nuclear weapon states</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) ...recalls that ... it has been reiterated that improvements in existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, such as those envisaged in the Nuclear Posture Review of the United States of America, contravene the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty</li> </ul>
<b>Institutional Issues</b>	
<b>General views NPT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 6) ...emphasizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals...</li> </ul>
<b>Subsidiary bodies</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 15) ...in accordance with the decision at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances to consider legally binding, unconditional, irrevocable and non-discriminatory negative security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.</li> </ul>