## Working Paper submitted by members of the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.2)

### General views on NPT

- (Page 1 para 2)…stresses that the granting of assurances by all five nuclear-weapon States parties to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties is a commitment the fulfilment of which that provides an essential security benefit…necessary to strengthen the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and its credibility.
- (Page 2, para 6)…emphasizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals…any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the integrity and both the vertical and horizontal sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.
- (Page 3, para 13)…recalls that in the final document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the parties to the Treaty reaffirmed and recognized that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances from nuclear-weapon States which could strengthen the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. The Group expresses its dissatisfaction over the lack of required political will and efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to fully address this legitimate interest.
- (Page 3, para 13)…recalls that in the final document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the parties to the Treaty reaffirmed and recognized that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
- (Page 3, para 15)…in keeping with the above-mentioned position and in accordance with the decision at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances to consider legally binding, unconditional, irrevocable and non-discriminatory negative security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States parties to all non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Treaty.

### Other Fora

- United Nations
  - (Page 2, para 9)…firmly believes that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be a crime against humanity and a violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular international humanitarian law.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
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<tr>
<td>Disarmament</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>General Views on disarmament</strong></td>
<td>(Page 1, para 1)…the Group is of the firm belief that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, it is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States that have given up the nuclear-weapon option by becoming parties to the Treaty to receive effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances.</td>
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<td>(Page 2, para 7)…recalls the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996 on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the Group believes that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which is the only absolute guarantee against the threat or use of nuclear weapons.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Role of Nuclear Weapon States</strong></td>
<td>(Page 2, para 5)…recalls that at successive conferences of Heads of State or Government of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and ministerial conferences of the Movement, it has been reiterated improvements in existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, such as those envisaged in the Nuclear Posture Review of the United States of America, contravene the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.</td>
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<td>(Page 3, para 11)…strongly calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to exclude completely the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from their military and security doctrines.</td>
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<td><strong>Humanitarian Approach on Disarmament</strong></td>
<td>(Page 2, para 8)…deepest concern over the immediate, indiscriminate and massive death and destruction that would be caused by any nuclear weapon detonation and its long-term catastrophic consequences for human health, the environment, and other vital economic resources, thus endangering the life of present and future generations. The Group affirms the importance of humanitarian considerations in the context of all deliberations and efforts in promoting the goal of nuclear disarmament. In that regard, it welcomed the convening of the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, held in Vienna on 8 and 9 December 2014.</td>
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<td>(Page 2, para 9)…firmly believes that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be a crime against humanity and a violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular international humanitarian law. The Group further believes that the mere possession of nuclear weapons is inconsistent with the principles of international humanitarian law.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Nuclear Testing</strong></td>
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<td><strong>CTBT</strong></td>
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unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances.

- (Page 1, para 3)...expresses its concern that, in spite of long-standing requests by non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive legally binding, effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable negative security assurances, no tangible progress has been made in that regard.

- (Page 1, para 4)...takes note of the unilateral statements by each of the nuclear-weapon States, in which they give very limited, conditional and insufficient security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. It is the view of the Group that such unilateral statements fail to meet any of the requirements of universal, legally binding, effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

- (Page 2, para 7)...the nuclear-weapon States should seriously refrain, in any circumstances, from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon States party

- (Page 3, para 11)...strongly calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to exclude completely the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from their military and security doctrines.

- (Page 3, para 12)...is also of the view that, pending the conclusion of negotiations on universal, legally binding, effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, all nuclear-weapon States should fully respect their existing commitments with regard to negative security assurances, which are limited, conditional and insufficient, and should extend these assurances, without any condition and discrimination, to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

- (Page 3, para 13)...recalls that in the final document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation

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of Nuclear Weapons, the parties to the Treaty reaffirmed and recognized that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

- (Page 3, para 14)…stresses that the urgent negotiations on the provision of the effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable, universal and legally binding security assurances by all the NWS to all NNWS parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances should also be pursued as a matter of priority and without further delay.
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<td>- (Page 3, para 11)…while deploring the military and security doctrines of the nuclear-weapon States and the strategic concept for the defence and security of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which are based on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and which maintain unjustifiable concepts of security based on promoting and developing military alliances and nuclear deterrence policies, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to exclude completely the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from their military and security doctrines.</td>
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### General Views on Safeguards and Verification

- **(Page 1, para 1)** reaffirms that, under article III (1) of the Treaty, each NNWS party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards “for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.
- **(Page 1, para 2)** reaffirms the importance and calls for the strict observance of article III (3) of the Treaty, by which the required safeguards “shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the preamble of the Treaty”.
- **(Page 1, para 3)** recognizes that the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA, an independent intergovernmental, science- and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for verification of the fulfilment of safeguard obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
- **(Page 1, para 4)** while supporting the verification activities of IAEA, underlines the importance of strict observance of the IAEA statute and relevant comprehensive safeguards agreements in conducting verification activities.
- **(Page 2, para 6)** stresses that all States members of IAEA shall strictly observe its statute and that nothing should be done to undermine its authority. Furthermore, the Group calls upon all States to avoid any pressure or interference in the Agency’s activities, especially its verification process that could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility.
- **(Page 2, para 7)** emphasizes the need to achieve worldwide application of the comprehensive safeguards system and calls upon all nuclear-weapon States and all States not parties to the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards.
- **(Page 2, para 8)** calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under the Treaty.
IAEA

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- (Page 1, para 4) while supporting the verification activities of IAEA, underlines the importance of strict observance of the IAEA statute and relevant comprehensive safeguards agreements in conducting verification activities.

- (Page 1, para 5) while stressing the importance of safeguards, underlines the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the Agency’s statute and safeguards agreements … the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime, for its protection, needs to be significantly strengthened.

- (Page 2, para 8) calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under the Treaty.

- (Page 3, para 10) stresses the statutory role of IAEA on nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the Agency’s capability of verifying nuclear disarmament agreements.

Nonproliferation

General views on nonproliferation

- (Page 1, para 8) calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of:
  (a) Ensuring full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Treaty;
  (b) Providing baseline data regarding the fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Nonproliferation and Peaceful Uses

- (Page 1, para 8) calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of:
  (a) Ensuring full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Treaty;
  (b) Providing baseline data regarding the fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

- (Page 3, para 11) calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to dismantle or convert for peaceful uses facilities and related equipment for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices.

- (Page 3, para 13)...recalls action 16 of the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference and urges the nuclear-weapon States to commit to declaring to IAEA all weapon-grade fissile material and to place such material, as soon as practicable, under the supervision of IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.

**Transfer to States Not Party to the NPT**

- (Page 1, para 8)...calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of:
  - (c) Strictly observing the prohibition of the transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, object and purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.

**Disarmament**

**General views on disarmament**

- (Page 3, para 10)...stresses the statutory role of IAEA on nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the Agency's capability of verifying nuclear disarmament agreements.
- (Page 3, para 11)...strongly believes that the nuclear-weapon States, in implementing their unequivocal undertaking to totally eliminate their nuclear arsenals, should undertake further efforts, in a transparent, irreversible and internationally verifiable manner, to eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, as well as their nuclear weapon-related materials, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures.
- (Page 3, para 14)...calls for the establishment by the 2015 Review Conference of a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreements by the nuclear-weapon States.

**Fissile Material / FMCT**

- (Page 3, para 12)...the Group supports the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
- (Page 3, para 13)...recalls action 16 of the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference and urges the nuclear-weapon States to commit to declaring to IAEA all weapon-grade fissile material and to place such material, as soon as practicable, under the supervision of IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.

**General views of the NPT**

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| **Strengthen Review Process** | (Page 3, para 14) calls for the establishment by the 2015 Review Conference of a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreements by the nuclear-weapon States. |
### General Views of the NPT

- (Page 1, para 1)...recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be an important step towards strengthening nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regimes.

- (Page 1, para 3)...strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and calls for the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which is an integral and essential part of the package of decisions reached without a vote that enabled the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995. The resolution remains valid until its objectives are achieved.

### Nuclear Weapons Free Zones

- (Page 1, para 1)...recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be an important step towards strengthening nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regimes.

- (Page 1, para 2)...the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty welcomes the establishment of the Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Semipalatinsk nuclear-weapon-free zones and consider them as positive steps and important measures towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

- (Page 1, para 2)...the Group welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing other nuclear weapon-free zones worldwide and calls for cooperation and broad consultation among the States of the regions concerned to conclude agreements establishing such zones.

- (Page 1, para 3)...strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and calls for the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

- (Page 2, para 6)...urges States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist, in accordance with the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. In this context, the Group considers that the further institutionalization of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status would be an important step towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.

- (Page 2, para 7)...while noting with satisfaction the convening of the third preparatory meeting for the Third Conference of States Parties and
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<th>Topic</th>
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<tr>
<td>Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia…</td>
<td>calls upon the States parties and signatories to those treaties to put in place further forms of cooperation among themselves, their treaty agencies and other interested States.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Treaty of Tlatelolco</td>
<td>(Page 2, para 8)… the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba, Rorotonga, Semipalatinsk and Bangkok in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the territories of the States parties to those treaties.</td>
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<td>NWFZ ME</td>
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<td>General Views on the NWFZ ME</td>
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<td>Security Assurances and NWFZ</td>
<td>(Page 2, para 4)… the Group reaffirms that, in the context of the nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is also essential that all the nuclear-weapon States provide unconditional, non-discriminatory and concrete legal assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all non-nuclear-weapon States of the zone that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</td>
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an important step towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.

### Disarmament

#### General views of disarmament

- (Page 1, para 1)…reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be an important step towards strengthening nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regimes. The Group is, therefore, of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is not a substitute for nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group underlines the importance of the early fulfilment of the legal obligations of and unequivocal undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate all their nuclear weapons.

- (Page 1, para 2)…the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty welcomes the establishment of the Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Semipalatinsk nuclear-weapon-free zones and consider them as positive steps and important measures towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

#### Role of Nuclear Weapon States

- (Page 1, para 1)…the Group underlines the importance of the early fulfilment of the legal obligations of and unequivocal undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate all their nuclear weapons.

#### NWC (Time Bound Total Elimination)

- (Page 1, para 1)…the Group underlines the importance of the early fulfilment of the legal obligations of and unequivocal undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate all their nuclear weapons.

### Security Assurances

#### General Views on Security Assurances

- (Page 2, para 4)…reiterates that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons and in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, it is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable and legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

#### Legally Binding Security Assurances

- (Page 2, para 4)…reiterates that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons and in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, it is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable and legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

#### Legally Binding Instrument on Security Assurances

- (Page 2, para 4)…the Group reaffirms that, in the context of the nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is also essential that all the nuclear-weapon States provide unconditional, non-discriminatory and concrete legal assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all non-nuclear-weapon States of the zone that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

### Regional Issues: Middle East

#### NWFZ ME

- (Page 1, para 3)…strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East

#### General Views on NWFZ ME

- (Page 1, para 3)…strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East

#### 1995 Resolution on the Middle East

- (Page 1, para 3)…calls for the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which is an integral and essential part of the package of decisions reached without a vote that enabled the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995.
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<td>• (Page 1, para 1)…emphasizes once more the significance of article IV of the Treaty on the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the Treaty, the realization of which constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. The Group stresses that, as stipulated in that article, nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting that inalienable right.</td>
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<td>• (Page 1, para 2)…underscores the importance of promoting international cooperation, without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the Treaty, for the full realization of that inherent right and strongly calls upon all States parties to the Treaty to fully fulfil their legal obligations to respect that inalienable right and its full realization.</td>
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<td>• (Page 1, para 3)…reaffirms the importance of the right of all States parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Moreover, the Group stresses the importance of full compliance with the obligations under article IV (2) of the Treaty, which stipulates that States parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing, alone or together with other States or international organizations, to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.</td>
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<td>• (Page 1, para 4)…firmly believes that the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of article IV of the Treaty plays a crucial role in achieving the object and purpose of the Treaty. In that regard, the Group also firmly believes that any measure aiming at hampering, fully or partly, the fullest exercise of the inalienable rights under article IV of the Treaty would seriously jeopardize the delicate balance between rights and obligations of States parties in contravention to the Treaty’s object and purpose, and would widen the gap between developed and developing countries in that field.</td>
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<td>• (Page 6, para 25)…underscores the strong call by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that all States parties shall ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated particularly in its articles I, II and III, and with the decision on the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and</td>
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| Nonproliferation and Peaceful Uses | ● (Page 1, para 3)…reaffirms the importance of the right of all States parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Moreover, the Group stresses the importance of full compliance with the obligations under article IV (2) of the Treaty, which stipulates that States parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing, alone or together with other States or international organizations, to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.  
● (Page 3, para 11)…underlines that concerns related to nuclear proliferation shall not, in any way, restrict the inalienable right of any State party to develop all aspects of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, without discrimination, as stipulated in article IV of the Treaty.  
● (Page 5, para 18)…emphasizes that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. The Group further emphasizes that non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States and do not impose restrictions on access by developing countries to material, equipment or technology for peaceful purposes, which such countries require for their continued development.  
● (Page 6, para 24)…emphasizes that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented without exception through the strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not party to the Treaty. |
| Export Controls | ● (Page 3, para 11)…expresses its concern that some States parties have set conditions such as concluding and bringing into force an additional protocol on nuclear exports in contravention of article IV of the Treaty, and calls upon those States parties to promptly remove any such condition.  
● (Page 4, para 15)…strongly rejects, and calls for the immediate removal of, any restrictions or limitations posed on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including restrictions on exports to other States parties of nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes, since such restrictions or limitations are inconsistent with the provisions and object and purpose of the Treaty.  
● (Page 6, para 25)…underscores the strong call by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that all States parties shall ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated particularly in its articles I, II and III, and with the decision on the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty. |
| Transfer to States Not Party to the NPT | ● (Page 5, para 19)…remains deeply concerned about the ability of certain States not party to the Treaty to obtain, in particular from some nuclear-weapon States, nuclear materials, technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons. The Group strongly calls for the enforcement, without exception or further delay, of the total and complete prohibition. |
as stipulated in the Treaty, of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty.

States Not Party to the NPT

- (Page 6, para 24)…emphasizes that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented without exception through the strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not party to the Treaty.

Peaceful uses

General Views on Peaceful Purposes

- (Page 1, para 3)…reaffirms the importance of the right of all States parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Moreover, the Group stresses the importance of full compliance with the obligations under article IV (2) of the Treaty, which stipulates that States parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing, alone or together with other States or international organizations, to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

- (Page 2, para 5)…recalls that the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) mandates the Agency, in support of the full realization of the inalienable right under article IV of the Treaty, to make provision, in accordance with the statute, for materials, services, equipment and facilities to meet the needs of research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes, including the production of electric power, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. To ensure the realization of those goals, all States parties, particularly developed States, shall extend their assistance, as requested by States parties that are States members of IAEA, in the provision of nuclear equipment, material, technology and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes, with a view to achieving the maximum benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities for peaceful purposes.

- (Page 2, para 7)…stresses that the IAEA Technical Co-operation Programme, as the main vehicle for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, should continue to be formulated and implemented in accordance with the statute of IAEA and the agreed guiding principles as contained in INFCIRC/267, as well as the decisions of IAEA policymaking organs.

- (Page 3, para 9)…acknowledges and reaffirms that each State party, in line with its national requirements and in accordance with its rights and obligations under the Treaty, has a sovereign right to define its national energy and fuel-cycle policies, which, inter alia, includes an inalienable right to develop, for peaceful purposes, a full national nuclear fuel cycle.

- (Page 3, para 10)…strongly emphasizes that any proposal from IAEA must be consistent with its statute, without any prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy and sciences, in all its aspects, for peaceful purposes, and if they so decide, to develop a full national nuclear fuel cycle, according to its article IV.

- (Page 3, para 11)…underlines that concerns related to nuclear
proliferation shall not, in any way, restrict the inalienable right of any State party to develop all aspects of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, without discrimination, as stipulated in article IV of the Treaty.

- (Page 4, para 15)…strongly rejects, and calls for the immediate removal of, any restrictions or limitations posed on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including restrictions on exports to other States parties of nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes, since such restrictions or limitations are inconsistent with the provisions and object and purpose of the Treaty.

- (Page 4, para 15)…transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with the Treaty shall be supported and pursued in good faith without discrimination. The elimination of constraints inconsistent with the requirements of the Treaty would ensure that article IV of the Treaty be fully implemented with regard to the facilitation of the transfer of nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes among the States parties.

- (Page 4, para 16)…emphasizes that the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology, equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their sensitivity but stipulates only that such technology, equipment and material must be subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards. In the view of the Group, the provisions of article IV of the Treaty are explicit in that regard, leaving no room for reinterpretation or setting conditions for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by non-nuclear-weapon States. The Group is of the view that any interpretation that is used as a pretext to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is inconsistent with the objectives of the Treaty and, therefore, the unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes must be ensured.

- (Page 5, para 18)…emphasizes that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. The Group further emphasizes that non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States and do not impose restrictions on access by developing countries to material, equipment or technology for peaceful purposes, which such countries require for their continued development.

- (Page 5, para 20)…underscores that IAEA, under its statutory obligations, pursues the goals of technical cooperation in peaceful applications of nuclear energy as one of the three pillars of its activities. In order to meet the objectives of technical cooperation for peaceful purposes, as enshrined in the statute of IAEA and in the Treaty, IAEA has to maintain a balance between technical cooperation and other activities.

- (Page 6, para 23)…emphasizes that measures and initiatives aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and nuclear security must not be used as a pretext or leverage to violate, deny or restrict the inalienable right of developing countries to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.

- (Page 6, para 26)…the Group recognizes the need for a comprehensive, multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks or the threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Moreover, the Group strongly urges all States to undertake unequivocally, in accordance with the purpose and principles of the Charter, to refrain from attacks or the threat of attacks on nuclear
facilities, operational or under construction, devoted to peaceful purposes.

- (page 6, para 27)...expresses its serious concern regarding certain unilateral, politically motivated restrictions and/or limitations posed on developing countries that seriously hamper the exercise of the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes, in that regard, that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end.

- (Page 7, para 29)...determined to promote, during the 2015 Review Process of the Treaty, measures required to ensure that the inalienable rights of all States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination are fully protected.

### General Views on Peaceful Uses

- (Page 1, para 3)...reaffirms the importance of the right of all States parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Moreover, the Group stresses the importance of full compliance with the obligations under article IV (2) of the Treaty, which stipulates that States parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing, alone or together with other States or international organizations, to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

- (Page 3, para 8)...reaffirms that the choices and decisions of each State party to the Treaty in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies.

- (Page 3, para 12)...underlines that all the parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

- (Page 4, para 13)...The Group firmly believes that, as a fundamental principle, in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment shall be given to the non-nuclear-weapons States parties to the Treaty, particularly taking into account the needs of developing countries.

- (Page 4, para 15)...strongly rejects, and calls for the immediate removal of, any restrictions or limitations posed on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including restrictions on exports to other States parties of nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes, since such restrictions or limitations are inconsistent with the provisions and object and purpose of the Treaty.

- (Page 4, para 16)...emphasizes that the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology, equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their sensitivity but stipulates only that such technology, equipment and material must be subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards. In the view of the Group, the provisions of article IV of the Treaty are explicit in that regard, leaving no room for reinterpretation or setting conditions for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by non-nuclear-weapon States. The Group is of the view that any interpretation that is used as a pretext to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is inconsistent with the objectives of the Treaty and...
therefore, the unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes must be ensured.

- (Page 4, para 17)…firmly believes that fostering the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by providing a framework of confidence and cooperation within which those uses can take place is one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty… the Group strongly encourages all States parties to actively cooperate, among themselves and through IAEA, in the peaceful uses and applications of nuclear energy, including through international technical cooperation.

- (Page 6, para 26)…the Group recognizes the need for a comprehensive, multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks or the threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Moreover, the Group strongly urges all States to undertake unequivocally, in accordance with the purpose and principles of the Charter, to refrain from attacks or the threat of attacks on nuclear facilities, operational or under construction, devoted to peaceful purposes.

### Access to Technology and Technology Transfer

- (Page 1, para 3)…further reaffirms the importance of the right of all States parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Moreover, the Group stresses the importance of full compliance with the obligations under article IV (2) of the Treaty.

- (Page 1, para 4)…the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty firmly believes that the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of article IV of the Treaty plays a crucial role in achieving the object and purpose of the Treaty. In that regard, the Group also firmly believes that any measure aiming at hampering, fully or partly, the fullest exercise of the inalienable rights under article IV of the Treaty would seriously jeopardize the delicate balance between rights and obligations of States parties in contravention to the Treaty’s object and purpose, and would widen the gap between developed and developing countries in that field.

- (Page 2, para 5)…recalls that the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) mandates the Agency, in support of the full realization of the inalienable right under article IV of the Treaty, to make provision, in accordance with the statute, for materials, services, equipment and facilities to meet the needs of research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes, including the production of electric power, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. To ensure the realization of those goals, all States parties, particularly developed States, shall extend their assistance, as requested by States parties that are States members of IAEA, in the provision of nuclear equipment, material, technology and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes, with a view to achieving the maximum benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities for peaceful purposes.

- (Page 2, para 6)…recognizes the major and important role of IAEA in assisting States parties, particularly developing States, in planning for and using nuclear science and technology. The Group stresses the importance of nuclear knowledge-sharing and the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries to sustain and further enhance their scientific and technological capabilities, thereby also contributing to their socioeconomic development. Moreover, the Group emphasizes
that the activities of IAEA in the field of technical cooperation, nuclear power and non-power applications would contribute in an important way to meeting energy needs; improving human health, including the application of nuclear technology in cancer therapy; combating poverty; protecting the environment; developing agriculture; managing the use of water resources; and optimizing industrial processes.

- (Page 2, para 7)...stresses that the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, as the main vehicle for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, should continue to be formulated and implemented in accordance with the statute of IAEA and the agreed guiding principles as contained in INFCIRC/267, as well as the decisions of IAEA policymaking organs.

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- (Page 4, para 15)...transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with the Treaty shall be supported and pursued in good faith without discrimination. The elimination of constraints inconsistent with the requirements of the Treaty would ensure that article IV of the Treaty be fully implemented with regard to the facilitation of the transfer of nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes among the States parties.

- (Page 4, para 16)...emphasizes that the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology, equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their sensitivity but stipulates only that such technology, equipment and material must be subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards. In the view of the Group, the provisions of article IV of the Treaty are explicit in that regard, leaving no room for reinterpretation or setting conditions for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by non-nuclear-weapon States. The Group is of the view that any interpretation that is used as a pretext to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is inconsistent with the objectives of the Treaty and, therefore, the unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes must be ensured.

- (Page 5, para 20)...underscores that IAEA, under its statutory obligations, pursues the goals of technical cooperation in peaceful applications of nuclear energy as one of the three pillars of its activities. In order to meet the objectives of technical cooperation for peaceful purposes, as enshrined in the statute of IAEA and in the Treaty, IAEA has to maintain a balance between technical cooperation and other activities.

IAEA

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- (Page 2, para 8)…recalls that, in 2005, IAEA and its then-Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, and reiterates the importance it attaches to the impartiality, professionalism and integrity of the Agency. While expressing its full confidence in that impartiality and professionalism, the Group strongly rejects any attempt by any State to politicize the work of the Agency, including its Technical Cooperation Programme, in violation of its statute, as well as any pressure or interference in its activities that could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility. In that connection, the Group also expresses its rejection of any attempt by any State party to use the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme as a tool for political purposes, which would be in violation of the statute of the Agency.

- (Page 3, para 10)…takes note of the adoption by the IAEA Board of Governors, through a vote, in 2010 and 2011, of three proposals of assurance of supply mechanisms within the framework of the multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. In the view of the Group, the multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle should be economically viable, sustainable, non-discriminatory, predictable and transparent under the auspices of IAEA and any other possible regional and multilateral forums. …The Group also stresses that any decision on proposals regarding multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel supply shall be made by consensus following wide, integral, comprehensive and transparent multilateral consultations, with the participation of all IAEA member States and taking into account the interests of all its member States.

- (Page 4, para 13)…the Group stresses that the technical cooperation and assistance provided by IAEA in meeting the needs of its member States for material, equipment and technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall not be subject to any political, economic, military or other conditions incompatible with the provisions of its statute.

- (Page 4, para 17)…the Group emphasizes that cooperation to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world is the core objective enshrined in the
| Assurance of Supply/ Multilateral Approach to Nuclear Fuel Supply | (Page 3, para 8)...reaffirms that the choices and decisions of each State party to the Treaty in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies.  
**(Page 3, para 9)...acknowledges and reaffirms that each State party, in line with its national requirements and in accordance with its rights and obligations under the Treaty, has a sovereign right to define its national energy and fuel-cycle policies, which, inter alia, includes an inalienable right to develop, for peaceful purposes, a full national nuclear fuel cycle.**  
**(Page 3, para 10)...takes note of the adoption by the IAEA Board of Governors, through a vote, in 2010 and 2011, of three proposals of assurance of supply mechanisms within the framework of the multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. In the view of the Group, the multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle should be economically viable, sustainable, non-discriminatory, predictable and transparent under the auspices of IAEA and any other possible regional and multilateral forums...the Group also stresses that any decision on proposals regarding multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel supply shall be made by consensus following wide, integral, comprehensive and transparent multilateral consultations, with the participation of all IAEA member States and taking into account the interests of all its member States...Strongly emphasizes that any proposal from IAEA must be consistent with its statute, without any prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy and sciences, in all its aspects, for peaceful purposes, and if they so decide, to develop a full national nuclear fuel cycle, according to its article IV.** |
| Nuclear Safety and Security | (Page 5, para 21)...affirms the need to strengthen the radiological safety and protection systems at facilities utilizing radioactive materials and at radioactive waste management facilities, including the safe transportation of those materials. The Group reaffirms the need to strengthen existing international regulations relating to the safety and security of the transportation of such materials. While reiterating the statute of IAEA.  
• (Page 5, para 20)...underscores that IAEA, under its statutory obligations, pursues the goals of technical cooperation in peaceful applications of nuclear energy as one of the three pillars of its activities. In order to meet the objectives of technical cooperation for peaceful purposes, as enshrined in the statute of IAEA and in the Treaty, IAEA has to maintain a balance between technical cooperation and other activities.  
• (Page 5, para 22)...recognizes that the primary responsibility for nuclear safety rests with individual States. The Group reaffirms the central role of IAEA in nuclear safety-related matters, including through the establishment of nuclear safety standards. The Group stresses that IAEA must retain centrality in that field, owing to its mandatory functions and long-standing expertise. The Group stresses that any possible review of nuclear safety standards at the global level must be carried out within IAEA in an inclusive, gradual and transparent manner, with the guidance and participation of and in consultation with all member States, and shall incorporate the views of all member States. The Group also calls for the implementation of the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety endorsed by the General Conference of IAEA in September 2011.
need to take necessary measures to prevent any dumping of nuclear or radioactive wastes, the Group calls for the effective implementation of the IAEA Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste as a means of enhancing the protection of all States from the dumping of radioactive wastes on their territories.

- (Page 5, para 22)…recognizes that the primary responsibility for nuclear safety rests with individual States. The Group reaffirms the central role of IAEA in nuclear safety-related matters, including through the establishment of nuclear safety standards.
- (Page 6, para 23)…emphasizes that measures and initiatives aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and nuclear security must not be used as a pretext or leverage to violate, deny or restrict the inalienable right of developing countries to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.

**Attack or Threat of Attack Against Peaceful Nuclear Facilities**

- (Page 6, para 26)…reaffirms the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities, operational or under construction, poses a threat to international peace and security and a great danger to human beings and the environment and constitutes a grave violation of international law, the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and the regulations of IAEA. In that regard, the Group recognizes the need for a comprehensive, multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks or the threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Moreover, the Group strongly urges all States to undertake unequivocally, in accordance with the purpose and principles of the Charter, to refrain from attacks or the threat of attacks on nuclear facilities, operational or under construction, devoted to peaceful purposes.

**Safeguards and Verification**

**General Views on Safeguards and Verification**

- (Page 6, para 24)…emphasizes that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented without exception through the strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not party to the Treaty. In the view of the Group, supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

**IAEA Safeguards**

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**IAEA**

- (Page 7, para 28)…while stressing the importance of safeguards, underlines the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the
In the view of the Group, safeguards related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency. The Group recalls IAEA General Conference resolution GC(58)/RES/14, paragraph 34, in which the IAEA Director General is urged to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of classified safeguards information and requested to continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of classified safeguards information within the Secretariat.

**Institutional Issues**

**Attack or Threat of Attack Against Peaceful Nuclear Facilities**

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**Access to Technology and Technology Transfer**

- (Page 1, para 3)…further reaffirms the importance of the right of all States parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Moreover, the Group stresses the importance of full compliance with the obligations under article IV (2) of the Treaty.
- (Page 1, para 4)…the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty firmly believes that the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of article IV of the Treaty plays a crucial role in achieving the object and purpose of the Treaty. In that regard, the Group also firmly believes that any measure aiming at hampering, fully or partly, the fullest exercise of the inalienable rights under article IV of the Treaty would seriously jeopardize the delicate balance between rights and obligations of States parties in contravention to the Treaty’s object and purpose, and would widen the gap between developed and developing countries in that field.
- (Page 2, para 5)…recalls that the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) mandates the Agency, in support of the full realization of the inalienable right under article IV of the Treaty, to make provision, in accordance with the statute, for materials, services, equipment and facilities to meet the needs of research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes, including the production of electric power, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. To ensure the realization of those goals, all States parties, particularly developed States, shall extend their assistance, as requested by States parties that are States members of IAEA, in the provision of nuclear equipment, material, technology and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes, with a view to achieving the maximum benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities for peaceful purposes.
recognizes the major and important role of IAEA in assisting States parties, particularly developing States, in planning for and using nuclear science and technology. The Group stresses the importance of nuclear knowledge-sharing and the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries to sustain and further enhance their scientific and technological capabilities, thereby also contributing to their socioeconomic development. Moreover, the Group emphasizes that the activities of IAEA in the field of technical cooperation, nuclear power and non-power applications would contribute in an important way to meeting energy needs; improving human health, including the application of nuclear technology in cancer therapy; combating poverty; protecting the environment; developing agriculture; managing the use of water resources; and optimizing industrial processes.

stresses that the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, as the main vehicle for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, should continue to be formulated and implemented in accordance with the statute of IAEA and the agreed guiding principles as contained in INFCIRC/267, as well as the decisions of IAEA policymaking organs.

underlines that all the parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with the Treaty shall be supported and pursued in good faith without discrimination. The elimination of constraints inconsistent with the requirements of the Treaty would ensure that article IV of the Treaty be fully implemented with regard to the facilitation of the transfer of nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes among the States parties.

emphasizes that the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology, equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their sensitivity but stipulates only that such technology, equipment and material must be subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards. In the view of the Group, the provisions of article IV of the Treaty are explicit in that regard, leaving no room for reinterpretation or setting conditions for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by non-nuclear-weapon States. The Group is of the view that any interpretation that is used as a pretext to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is inconsistent with the objectives of the Treaty and, therefore, the unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes must be ensured.

underscores that IAEA, under its statutory obligations, pursues the goals of technical cooperation in peaceful applications of nuclear energy as one of the three pillars of its activities. In order to meet the objectives of technical cooperation for peaceful purposes, as enshrined in the statute of IAEA and in the Treaty, IAEA has to maintain a balance between technical cooperation and other activities.
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<td><strong>IAEA</strong></td>
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<td>- (Page 1, para 1)...in this regard, the Group underlines that the multilateral mechanism established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the most appropriate way to address verification and safeguards issues. At the same time, the Group emphasizes that the work of the Agency with regard to safeguards and verification has to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of its statute and safeguards agreements.</td>
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<td>- (Page 2, para 5)...calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under this Treaty.</td>
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<td>- (Page 2, para 7)...fully recognizes that IAEA, an independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for the verification of the fulfilment of safeguards obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty.</td>
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<td>- (Page 2, para 8)...the Group also emphasizes that IAEA shall ensure avoiding any <em>ultra vires</em> acts that would jeopardize its integrity and credibility. The Group urges States parties to the Treaty to maintain and strengthen the technical character of IAEA consistent with its statute.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- (Page 3, para 9) With respect to financial aspects of the safeguards, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the differentiated nature of the financial obligations undertaken by member States of IAEA should be recognized and respected by the Agency in its work.</td>
</tr>
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<td>- (Page 3, para 11)...underlines the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards, including reporting, in accordance with the Agency’s statute and safeguards agreements...Hence, in the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency.</td>
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<td><strong>General Views on Safeguards and Verification</strong></td>
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conducted in accordance with the provisions of its statute and safeguards agreements.

- (Page 1, para 2) stresses the importance of the IAEA safeguards system and urges all States that have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible, in order to achieve the universality of the comprehensive safeguards. The 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons considered the universality of the comprehensive safeguards as a main objective in order to consolidate and enhance the verification system for the non-proliferation regime. However, in the view of the Group, additional measures related to the safeguards shall not affect the rights of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, which are already committed to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and have renounced the nuclear-weapon option.

- (Page 1, para 3) emphasizes that strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty are a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.

- (Page 2, para 4) calls upon all States not parties to the Treaty to accede, without any further delay and any preconditions and as non-nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards.

- (Page 2, para 5) calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfillment of the nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under this Treaty.

- (Page 2, para 7) fully recognizes that IAEA, an independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for the verification of the fulfillment of safeguards obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty.

- (Page 3, para 9) with respect to financial aspects of the safeguards, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the differentiated nature of the financial obligations undertaken by member States of IAEA should be recognized and respected by the Agency in its work.

- (Page 3, para 10) underscores the need to strictly observe the principle of balance between the promotional and other statutory activities of the Agency, in particular verification and safeguards-related activities.

- (Page 3, para 11) underlines the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards, including reporting, in accordance with the Agency’s statute and safeguards agreements. Hence, in the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency.

**IAEA Safeguards**

- (Page 1, para 1) in this regard, the Group underlines that the multilateral mechanism established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the most appropriate way to address verification and safeguards issues. At the same time, the Group emphasizes that the work of the Agency with regard to safeguards and verification has to be
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- (Page 1, para 2) stresses the importance of the IAEA safeguards system and urges all States that have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible, in order to achieve the universality of the comprehensive safeguards. The 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons considered the universality of the comprehensive safeguards as a main objective in order to consolidate and enhance the verification system for the non-proliferation regime. However, in the view of the Group, additional measures related to the safeguards shall not affect the rights of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, which are already committed to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and have renounced the nuclear-weapons option.

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- (Page 2, para 5) calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under this Treaty.

- (Page 2, para 6) states parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restrictions or limitations on the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.

- (Page 2, para 8) emphasizes that it is fundamental to make a clear distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures and that such voluntary undertakings shall not be turned into legal safeguards obligations.

- (Page 3, para 11) underlines the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards, including reporting, in accordance with the Agency’s statute and safeguards agreements.

- (Page 3, para 12) calls for the implementation of resolution GC(54)/RES/11 on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system, adopted by the General Conference of the Agency at its fifty-fourth session, in which the General Conference, “stressing the importance of maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the Agency’s statute and safeguards agreements”, acknowledged “the concerns expressed by the Director General on the need to protect safeguards confidential information within the Secretariat and his announcement of additional measures to protect such information”, accordingly urged the Director General “to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the
proper protection of safeguards confidential information” and requested that he “continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of safeguards confidential information”.

- (Page 3, para 13)…underlines the necessity of reporting of IAEA on the implementation of safeguards being factual, technically based and reflecting appropriate reference to the relevant provisions of safeguards agreements, while ensuring the protection of confidential information.

- (Page 3, para 14)…stresses the need to strictly observe the provisions of the IAEA statute, including article XII, which outlines the mandate of the Agency in verifying compliance with safeguards agreements and, in particular, that any non-compliance has first to be reported by the Agency’s inspectors.

- Page 3, para 15)…stresses the statutory role of IAEA in nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the capability of the Agency to verify nuclear disarmament agreements.

- (Page 4, para 16)…expresses its serious concern about certain unilateral politically motivated attempts to hamper exercising the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes in this regard that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be “in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing”.

### Disarmament

| General Views on Disarmament | ● (Page 1, para 1)…expresses its strong concern at the growing resort to unilateralism and unilaterally imposed prescriptions and, in this context, strongly underlines and affirms that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues.  
● (Page 1, para 2)…in the view of the Group, additional measures related to the safeguards shall not affect the rights of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, which are already committed to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and have renounced the nuclear-weapon option. The Group further stresses that efforts aimed at nuclear non-proliferation must be parallel to simultaneous efforts aiming at nuclear disarmament.  
● (Page 3, para 15)…stresses the statutory role of IAEA in nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the capability of the Agency to verify nuclear disarmament agreements. |
| Role of Nuclear Weapon States | ● (Page 2, para 5)…calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfillment of the nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under this Treaty. …Such agreement would be concluded with the aim to: (b) Provide baseline data regarding fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and prevent further |
diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

**Other Fora**

| United Nations |  ● (Page 1, para 1)...expresses its strong concern at the growing resort to unilateralism and unilaterally imposed prescriptions and, in this context, strongly underlines and affirms that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues. |
| General Views NPT |  ● (Page 1, para 2)...the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons considered the universality of the comprehensive safeguards as a main objective in order to consolidate and enhance the verification system for the non-proliferation regime. |
| General Views on Nonproliferation |  ● (Page 1, para 2)...in the view of the Group, additional measures related to the safeguards shall not affect the rights of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, which are already committed to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and have renounced the nuclear-weapons option. The Group further stresses that efforts aimed at nuclear non-proliferation must be parallel to simultaneous efforts aiming at nuclear disarmament. |
| States Not Party to the NPT |  ● (Page 1, para 3)...emphasizes that strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty are a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.  ● (page 2, para 4)...calls upon all States not parties to the Treaty to accede, without any further delay and any preconditions and as non-nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. |
| Transfer to States Not Party to the NPT |  ● (Page 1, para 3)...confirms that all States parties to the Treaty shall refrain from the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to States not parties to the Treaty unless those conditions are met.  ● (Page 2, para 5)...calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfillment of the nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under this Treaty. …Such agreement would be concluded with the aim to:  (a) Ensure full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty…  (c) Strictly observe the prohibition of transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, the object and the purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, materials and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not parties to the Treaty, without exception. |
| Nonproliferation and Peaceful Uses |  ● (Page 2, para 6)...confirms that the obligation under article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of |
nuclear equipment, materials and technology for peaceful purposes, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty.

- (Page 2, para 7)...fully recognizes that IAEA, an independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for the verification of the fulfilment of safeguards obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear material and technology from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

- (Page 4, para 16)...expresses its serious concern about certain unilateral politically motivated attempts to hamper exercising the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes in this regard that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be “in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing”.

### General Views on Peaceful Uses

- (Page 2, para 6)...confirms that the obligation under article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology for peaceful purposes, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty.

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### IAEA

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### Access to Technology and Technology Transfer

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### Institutional Issues

- (Page 4, para 16)…expresses its serious concern about certain unilateral politically motivated attempts to hamper exercising the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes in this regard that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be “in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing”.

### Access to Technology and Technology Transfer

- (Page 2, para 6)…confirms that the obligation under article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology for peaceful purposes, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restrictions or limitations on the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.
General Views of the NPT

- (Page 1, para 4)…recalls and reaffirms once again the commitment of all States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to ending all nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions… the Group expresses grave concern regarding the conducting of nuclear weapon tests in alternative ways and the use of new technologies for upgrading existing nuclear weapons systems, as well as the development of new types of nuclear weapons, which are in contravention of the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and would undermine its effectiveness and contradict the commitments undertaken at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conferences by nuclear-weapon States.

- (Page 1, para 5)…stresses that the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons… are incompatible with action 1 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference, in which all States Parties committed to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.

- (Page 2, para 8)…it will be possible to determine the success of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty only when it has been signed and ratified, in particular by the five nuclear-weapon States and those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.

- (Page 3, para 10)…the Group wishes to re-emphasize the principles of the non-proliferation regime, both vertically and horizontally.

- (Page 3, para 12)…pending its entry into force, States should refrain from any actions contrary to its objectives and purpose. In that context, the Group is seriously concerned by the decision of some nuclear-weapon States to modernize their nuclear weapons. It is the view of the Group that such decisions undermine the validity of the commitment to declared moratoriums as well as the commitments under the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was envisaged as the first of 13 practical steps leading to nuclear disarmament.

Nuclear Testing

- (Page 1, para 2)…supports the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which is intended to enforce a comprehensive, irreversible and verifiable ban on all nuclear test explosions and to stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons in order to pave the way towards their total elimination.
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<td>the Group is of the firm view that all States parties… should close and dismantle, as soon as feasible and in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner, any remaining sites for nuclear test explosions and their associated infrastructure, and prohibit completely nuclear weapons research and development.</td>
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<td>reaffirms that the early ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States would pave the way and encourage the remaining required countries, especially those with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The failure of one major nuclear-weapon State to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is undermining this important instrument against nuclear testing.</td>
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<td>(Page 3, para 13)…</td>
<td>the Group acknowledges the existence of a special responsibility towards the affected people and areas, including those in the former United Nations Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories who have been adversely affected as a result of the nuclear weapon tests conducted in the past.</td>
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CTBT

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Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which is intended to enforce a comprehensive, irreversible and verifiable ban on all nuclear test explosions and to stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons.

- (Page 1, para 3)…underlining the significance of achieving the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, strongly calls for immediate and unconditional cessation of all nuclear weapon tests and the closure of all nuclear weapon test sites… The Group is of the firm view that all States parties… refrain from conducting nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, or nuclear weapon tests in alternative ways, as well as prohibit the use of new technologies for upgrading existing nuclear weapons systems, which would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

- (Page 1, para 4)…recalls and reaffirms once again the commitment of all States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to ending all nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions… the Group expresses grave concern regarding the conducting of nuclear weapon tests in alternative ways and the use of new technologies for upgrading existing nuclear weapons systems, as well as the development of new types of nuclear weapons, which are in contravention of the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and would undermine its effectiveness and contradict the commitments undertaken at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conferences by nuclear-weapon States.

- (Page 2, para 5)…stresses that the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons violate the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

- (Page 2, para 6)…stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by all the nuclear-weapon States, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament.

- (Page 2, para 7)…in that context, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty welcomes the signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by 183 States and its ratification by 163 States, including the recent ratification by Brunei Darussalam, Chad, the Congo, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Iraq and Niue.

- (Page 2, para 8)…further believes that the nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, not only because they are among the 44 States listed in annex 2 to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, but also because, owing to their position, they are expected to lead in ratifying it and making the ban on nuclear tests a reality. It will be possible to determine the success of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty only when it has been signed and ratified, in particular by the five nuclear-weapon States and those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.

- (Page 3, para 9)…reaffirms that the early ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States would pave the way and encourage the remaining required countries, especially those with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The failure of one major nuclear-weapon State to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is undermining this important instrument against nuclear testing.

- (Page 3, para 10)…recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that it would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation… The nuclear-weapon States stated at that time that the only steps to be followed would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons, which would not involve nuclear explosions.

- (Page 3, para 11)…underscores the importance for the five nuclear-weapon States to maintain and observe their commitments to unilateral moratoriums on nuclear weapon tests pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. However, the Group believes that those moratoriums do not substitute for the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its entry into force.

- (Page 3, para 12)…emphasizes that the modernization or development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the assurances given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty…Pending its entry into force, States should refrain from any actions contrary to its objectives and purpose. In that context, the Group is seriously concerned by the decision of some nuclear-weapon States to modernize their nuclear weapons… such decisions undermine the validity of the commitment to declared moratoriums as well as the commitments under the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was envisaged as the first of 13 practical steps leading to nuclear disarmament.

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Further believes that the nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, not only because they are among the 44 States listed in annex 2 to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, but also because, owing to their position, they are expected to lead in ratifying it and making the ban on nuclear tests a reality. It will be possible to determine the success of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty only when it has been signed and ratified, in particular by the five nuclear-weapon States and those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.

- (Page 3, para 9) reaffirms that the early ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States would pave the way and encourage the remaining required countries, especially those with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The failure of one major nuclear-weapon State to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is undermining this important instrument against nuclear testing.

- (Page 3, para 11) underscores the importance for the five nuclear-weapon States to maintain and observe their commitments to unilateral moratoriums on nuclear weapon tests pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. However, the Group believes that those moratoriums do not substitute for the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its entry into force.

- (Page 3, para 12) emphasizes that the modernization or development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the assurances given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Pending its entry into force, States should refrain from any actions contrary to its objectives and purpose. In that context, the Group is seriously concerned by the decision of some nuclear-weapon States to modernize their nuclear weapons... such decisions undermine the validity of the commitment to declared moratoriums as well as the commitments under the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was envisaged as the first of 13 practical steps leading to nuclear disarmament.

### Disarmament

- (Page 1, para 5) the Group calls on the nuclear-weapon States to end plans to modernize their nuclear weapons arsenal, in compliance with their commitments.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role of Nuclear Weapon States</th>
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<tr>
<td>(Page 2, para 6)...stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by all the nuclear-weapon States, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Group reiterates that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to nuclear disarmament would be essential.</td>
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| (Page 1, para 4)...recalls and reaffirms once again the commitment of all States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to ending all nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions... the Group expresses grave concern regarding the conducting of nuclear weapon tests in alternative ways and the use of new technologies for upgrading existing nuclear weapons systems... the Group strongly calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to put an immediate end to such activities and refrain from any other action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, pending its entry into force. |

| (Page 1, para 5)...the Group calls on the nuclear-weapon States to end plans to modernize their nuclear weapons arsenal, in compliance with their commitments. |

| (Page 2, para 8)...further believes that the nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, not only because they are among the 44 States listed in annex 2 to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, but also because, owing to their position, they are expected to lead in ratifying it and making the ban on nuclear tests a reality. It will be possible to determine the success of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty only when it has been signed and ratified, in particular by the five nuclear-weapon States and those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. |

| (Page 3, para 9)...reaffirms that the early ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States would pave the way and encourage the remaining required countries, especially those with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The failure of one major nuclear-weapon State to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is undermining this important instrument against nuclear testing. |

| (Page 3, para 10)...recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that it would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation...The nuclear-weapon States stated at that time that the only steps to be followed would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons, which would not involve nuclear explosions. |

| (Page 3, para 11)...underscores the importance for the five nuclear-weapon States to maintain and observe their commitments to unilateral moratoriums on nuclear weapon tests pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. |

| (Page 3, para 12)...emphasizes that the modernization or development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the assurances given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. ....Pending its entry into |
force, States should refrain from any actions contrary to its objectives and purpose. In that context, the Group is seriously concerned by the decision of some nuclear-weapon States to modernize their nuclear weapons.

- (Page 3, para 12)…pending its entry into force, States should refrain from any actions contrary to its objectives and purpose. In that context, the Group is seriously concerned by the decision of some nuclear-weapon States to modernize their nuclear weapons. It is the view of the Group that such decisions undermine the validity of the commitment to declared moratoriums as well as the commitments under the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was envisaged as the first of 13 practical steps leading to nuclear disarmament.

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>• (Page 3, para 10)…the Group wishes to re-emphasize the principles of the non-proliferation regime, both vertically and horizontally.</td>
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2015 NPT Review Conference Working Papers Submitted by the NAM

Thematic Summaries

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<th>Nuclear disarmament</th>
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<td>• (Page 1, para 3)…reaffirms the principled positions of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries on nuclear disarmament, which remains its highest priority, and on the related issue of nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects. The Group stresses its deep concern at the threat to humanity posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and their possible use or threat of use. The Group also reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the legally binding assurance that they will never be produced again is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Group further stresses that efforts aimed at nuclear non-proliferation must be parallel to simultaneous efforts aiming at nuclear disarmament.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• (Page 1, para 4)...recalls that, in pursuit of the full, effective and urgent implementation of the obligation of nuclear disarmament under article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, and building upon the 13 practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, particularly the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the goal of the complete elimination of their nuclear weapons, the 2010 Review Conference agreed on an action plan on nuclear disarmament that includes concrete measures to accelerate progress towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</td>
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<td>• (Page 1, para 5)...further recalls that the nuclear-weapon States committed, in action 5 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference, to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, inter alia, through (a) rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons; (b) addressing the question of all nuclear weapons, regardless of their type or their location, as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process; (c) further diminishing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies; (d) discussing policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons; (e) considering the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security; (f) reducing the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and (g) further enhancing transparency and increase mutual confidence.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• (Page 2, para 6)...expresses deep concern at the continued lack of</td>
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progress in the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations by the nuclear-weapon States, which could undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty and the credibility of the non-proliferation regime.

- (Page 2, para 7) underlines the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

- (Page 2, para 9) underlines that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues.

- (Page 2, para 10) reiterates its strong call for the full and systematic implementation of the unequivocal undertaking given by the nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 Review Conference, including through the implementation of the 13 practical steps, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, which was also reaffirmed by the 2010 Review Conference.

- (Page 2, para 11) recalls that in implementing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the nuclear-weapon States, in accordance with action 3 of the 2010 Final Document, have committed to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. The Group expresses its disappointment over the lack of progress in the implementation of this commitment. In this regard, the Group calls for full compliance of the nuclear-weapon States with such undertakings.

- (Page 3, para 12) emphasizes in particular the prime importance of and the urgent need for full and prompt implementation of the commitments by the nuclear-weapon States under action 5 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament.

- (Page 3, para 13) noting the reports submitted under action 5 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference to the Preparatory Committee in 2014, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls upon the 2015 Review Conference to take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of article VI of the Treaty in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

- (Page 3, para 14) welcomes the convening of the first ever high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament on 26 September 2013 and underlines that the strong support expressed at that meeting for taking urgent and effective measures to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons demonstrated that nuclear disarmament remains the highest priority of the international community.

- (Page 3, para 15) welcomes the adoption by the General Assembly of resolutions 68/32 entitled “Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament”, in which, in particular, the Assembly (a) called for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing,
stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction; (b) decided to convene, no later than 2018, a United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to review the progress made in this regard; and (d) declared 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, as well as the adoption of resolution 69/58 on this subject. The Group calls for the full implementation of these resolutions, which provide a concrete pathway for realizing the objective of nuclear disarming.

- (Page 3, para 16)...recalls action 6 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament, through which all States have agreed that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work. The Group deeply regrets the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee to negotiate on nuclear disarmament.

- (Page 4, para 21)...remains deeply concerned by the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons, despite some reports of bilateral and unilateral reductions. Any such reductions are undermined by the modernization of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and related infrastructure by the nuclear-weapon States. In order to comply with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, as well as with their commitments under the 13 practical steps and 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament, the nuclear-weapon States must immediately cease their plans to further invest in modernizing, upgrading, refurbishing or extending the lives of their nuclear weapons and related facilities.

- (Page 4, para 22)...is also concerned about the lack of tangible progress in enhancing transparency, in accordance with action 5 (g).

- (Page 4, para 24)...stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons and, accordingly, calls on the nuclear-weapon States to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability to all such cuts, to further reduce their nuclear arsenals, both warheads and delivery systems.

- (Page 5, para 26)...also believes that the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options... and the lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies further undermine disarmament commitments.

- (Page 5, para 27)...emphasizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals and considers, in that regard, that any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.

- (Page 5, para 30)...recalls the advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons that “there is in neither customary nor conventional international law any specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons” and that “the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Humanitarian Approach to Nuclear Disarmament</strong></th>
<th><strong>Role of Nuclear Weapon States</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>• (Page 1, para 3)…the Group stresses its deep concern at the threat to humanity posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and their possible use or threat of use.</td>
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<td>• (Page 1, para 5)…further recalls that the nuclear-weapon States committed, in action 5 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference, to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament.</td>
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<td>• (Page 5, para 31)…any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be a crime against humanity and a violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular international humanitarian law. The Group further believes that the mere possession of nuclear weapons is inconsistent with the principles of international humanitarian law.</td>
<td>• (Page 2, para 6)…expresses deep concern at the continued lack of progress in the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations by the nuclear-weapon States, which could undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty and the credibility of the non-proliferation regime.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• (Page 5, para 31)…pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States shall seriously refrain, at any circumstances, from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.</td>
<td>• (Page 2, para 8)…remains deeply concerned by military and security doctrines of the nuclear-weapon States that set out the rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the recent posture review by one of the nuclear-weapon States to consider expanding the circumstances in which these weapons could be used… also remains deeply concerned at the “Strategic Concept for the defence and security of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization”, which justifies the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and maintains unjustifiably the concept of security based on nuclear military alliances and nuclear deterrence policies.</td>
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<td>• (Page 5, para 33)…recalls its working paper entitled “Elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons”, which was submitted to the 2010 Review Conference in document NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, and expresses its determination to present an updated version of this plan to the 2015 Review Conference.</td>
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<td>• (Page 5, para 34) Reiterates its call for the establishment, as a matter of priority, of a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament in Main Committee I, mandated to focus on the issue of fulfilment of the obligations under article VI of the Treaty and on further practical measures required to achieve progress in that regard.</td>
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humanitarian law”.

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<tr>
<td>(Page 2, para 10)</td>
<td>reiterates its strong call for the full and systematic implementation of the unequivocal undertaking given by the nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 Review Conference, including through the implementation of the 13 practical steps, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, which was also reaffirmed by the 2010 Review Conference.</td>
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<td>recalls that in implementing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the nuclear-weapon States, in accordance with action 3 of the 2010 Final Document, have committed to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. The Group expresses its disappointment over the lack of progress in the implementation of this commitment. In this regard, the Group calls for full compliance of the nuclear-weapon States with such undertakings.</td>
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**Bilateral Agreement**

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<tr>
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**NWC (Time Bound Total Elimination)**

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**Fissile Material/FMCT**

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| (Page 4, para 19) | the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the
Treaty strongly supports banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and eliminating all the past production and existing stockpiles of such materials, in an irreversible and verifiable manner and taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, without prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including their past production, existing stockpiles and future production of fissile materials under the International Atomic Energy Agency Agenda comprehensive safeguards.

- (Page 4, para 20)…underlines that non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have already agreed to a legally binding commitment not to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

### Bilateral Agreements (START)

- (Page 4, para 23)…while noting the conclusion and entry into force of the New START Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America, expresses concern that domestic commitments to nuclear weapon modernization in exchange for ratification of this Treaty undermine the minimal reductions agreed upon in it.

- (Page 4, para 24)…recalls the commitment by the Russian Federation and the United States under action 4 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament for the full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and strongly urges them to adopt all required measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

### General Views on Outer Space

- (Page 5, para 25)…expresses concern over the negative implications of the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defence systems and the threat of weaponization of outer space and at the negative security consequences of the deployment of such systems, which could trigger an arms race(s) and lead to further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. The Group emphasizes the paramount importance of strict compliance with existing arms limitation and disarmament agreements relevant to outer space, including bilateral agreements, and with the existing legal regime concerning the use of outer space.

### Outer Space

- (Page 5, para 25)…expresses concern over the negative implications of the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defence systems and the threat of weaponization of outer space and at the negative security consequences of the deployment of such systems, which could trigger an arms race(s) and lead to further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. The Group emphasizes the paramount importance of strict compliance with existing arms limitation and disarmament agreements relevant to outer space, including bilateral agreements, and with the existing legal regime concerning the use of outer space.

### General Views NPT

- (Page 1, para 1)…emphasizes that the Treaty is an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament.

- (Page 1, para 2)…reiterates that each article of the Treaty is binding on all States parties at all times and in all circumstances.

- (Page 1, para 4)…recalls that, in pursuit of the full, effective and urgent implementation of the obligation of nuclear disarmament under
article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, and building upon the 13 practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, particularly the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the goal of the complete elimination of their nuclear weapons, the 2010 Review Conference agreed on an action plan on nuclear disarmament that includes concrete measures to accelerate progress towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

- (Page 4, para 19)…strongly supports banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and eliminating all the past production and existing stockpiles of such materials… without prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
- (Page 5, para 27)…emphasizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals and considers, in that regard, that any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.

### General Views on Nonproliferation

- (Page 1, para 3)…reaffirms the principled positions of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries on nuclear disarmament, which remains its highest priority, and on the related issue of nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects. The Group further stresses that efforts aimed at nuclear non-proliferation must be parallel to simultaneous efforts aiming at nuclear disarmament.
- (Page 4, para 19)…strongly supports banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and eliminating all the past production and existing stockpiles of such materials, in an irreversible and verifiable manner and taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives.

### Other Fora

- (Page 2, para 9)…underlines that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues.
- (Page 3, para 14)…welcomes the convening of the first ever high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament on 26 September 2013 and underlines that the strong support expressed at that meeting for taking urgent and effective measures to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons demonstrated that nuclear disarmament remains the highest priority of the international community.
- (Page 3, para 15)…welcomes the adoption by the General Assembly of resolutions 68/32 entitled “Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament”, in which, in particular, the Assembly (a) called for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction; (b) decided to convene, no later than 2018, a United Nations Conference on Disarmament to achieve such an objective. 

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Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to review the progress made in this regard; and (d) declared 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, as well as the adoption of resolution 69/58 on this subject. The Group calls for the full implementation of these resolutions, which provide a concrete pathway for realizing the objective of nuclear disarmament

- (Page 5, para 29) reaffirms that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the principles and purposes of the United Nations.

- (Page 5, para 31) any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be a crime against humanity and a violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular international humanitarian law.

### Conference on Disarmament

- (Page 3, para 15) welcomes the adoption by the General Assembly of resolutions 68/32 entitled “Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament”, in which, in particular, the Assembly (a) called for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction

- (Page 3, para 16) recalls action 6 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament, through which all States have agreed that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work. The Group deeply regrets the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee to negotiate on nuclear disarmament.

- (Page 3, para 18) reiterates its call to the Conference on Disarmament to immediately establish, as the highest priority, a subsidiary body to negotiate and conclude a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction.

- (Page 5, para 25) the Group further emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 69/31.

### Safeguards and Verification

#### General Views on Safeguards and Verification

- (Page 4, para 19) strongly supports banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and eliminating all the past production and existing stockpiles of such materials, in an irreversible and verifiable manner ... under the International Atomic Energy Agency Agenda comprehensive safeguards.

#### IAEA

- (Page 4, para 19) strongly supports banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and eliminating all the past production and existing stockpiles of such materials, in an irreversible and verifiable manner ... under the International Atomic Energy Agency Agenda comprehensive safeguards.
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## Working Paper submitted by members of the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.14)

### General Views on NPT

| NWC (Time Bound Total Elimination) | • (Page 1, para 2) In that context, negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention which include a phased programme and a specified time frame for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are needed.  
| • (Page 1, para 3) The Non-Aligned Movement proposes a plan of action for the total elimination of nuclear weapons consisting of the following concrete steps and measures, particularly through the negotiation and adoption of a nuclear weapons convention which includes a phased programme and a specified time frame for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, as a basis for consideration by the 2015 Review Conference. The list of measures in each phase is indicative rather than exhaustive. Nevertheless, it should be understood that, in any nuclear disarmament programme, all steps and measures are inextricably linked.  
| • (Page 2, para 6) Acceleration of the ratification and early entry into force of the comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, which includes a phased programme and a specified time frame for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.  
| • (Page 2, para 7) Upon entry into force of the comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, the following steps must be undertaken:  
  (a) The establishment of a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance with the provisions of the comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons;  
  (b) Declarations by possessor States parties of their stocks of nuclear weapons and material usable for nuclear weapons;  
  (c) The preparation, under international auspices, of an inventory of nuclear arsenals, including fissile materials, nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles;  

### Disarmament
(d) The separation of nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles;
(e) The placement of nuclear warheads in secure storage under international supervision, pending the removal of special nuclear materials from those warheads;
(f) The transfer of nuclear materials, including fissile materials, to “peaceful purposes”;

- (Page 3, para 8) Further measures for the full implementation of the comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons and of its verification regime include:
  (a) The elimination of all nuclear weapons in an irreversible and verifiable manner;
  (b) The conversion of all facilities for the production of nuclear weapons to “peaceful purposes” in an irreversible and verifiable manner;
  (c) The placement of all nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.

### General Views on Disarmament

- (Page 1, para 3) The Non-Aligned Movement proposes a plan of action for the total elimination of nuclear weapons consisting of the following concrete steps and measures, particularly through the negotiation and adoption of a nuclear weapons convention which includes a phased programme and a specified time frame for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, as a basis for consideration by the 2015 Review Conference. The list of measures in each phase is indicative rather than exhaustive. Nevertheless, it should be understood that, in any nuclear disarmament programme, all steps and measures are inextricably linked.
- (Page 1, para 4) Commencement of negotiations on and conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, which:
  (a) Prohibits the possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
  (b) Provides for their destruction;
  (c) Includes a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance with the provisions of the convention.

### Fissile Material/FMCT

- (Page 2, Para 5) (a) A moratorium on the production of fissile materials by nuclear-weapon States;
- (Page 2, para 7) (c) The preparation, under international auspices, of an inventory of nuclear arsenals, including fissile materials, nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles;
- (Page 3 para 8) (f) The transfer of nuclear materials, including fissile materials, to “peaceful purposes”;
- (Page 3 para 8) (g) The placement of nuclear fissile material transferred from military to peaceful uses by nuclear-weapon States under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

### Role of Nuclear Weapon States

- (Page 2, para 5) (e) The cessation of the upgrading of the existing nuclear weapon systems through new technology, including nuclear weapon research and development by nuclear-weapon States;
- (Page 2, para 5) (f) The cessation of the role of nuclear weapons in the security doctrines of nuclear-weapon States, leading to the elimination of such a role;
- (Page 2, para 5) (i) The reduction of nuclear arsenals and de-alerting by nuclear-weapon States.
- (Page 2, para 7) (b) Declarations by possessor States parties of their stocks of nuclear weapons and material usable for nuclear weapons;
| Nuclear Testing | CTBT | • (Page 2, para 7) (c) The preparation, under international auspices, of an inventory of nuclear arsenals, including fissile materials, nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles; |
| Test Ban and CTBT | • (Page 2, para 5) (b) The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the ratification of the Treaty by the remaining nuclear-weapon States; |
| | • (Page 2, para 5) (c) The cessation of all nuclear test explosions pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; |
| General Views on Testing | • (Page 2, para 5) (c) The cessation of all nuclear test explosions pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; |
| | (d) The closure of all nuclear weapon test sites and their associated infrastructure; |
| | (e) The cessation of the upgrading of the existing nuclear weapon systems through new technology, including nuclear weapon research and development by nuclear-weapon States; |
| Security Assurances | Role of Nuclear Weapon States | • (Page 2, para 5) (g) Provisions of unconditional and legally binding negative security assurances by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States; |
| | Legally Binding Security Assurances | • (Page 2, para 5) (g) Provisions of unconditional and legally binding negative security assurances by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States; |
| | Legally Binding Negative Security Assurances | • (Page 2, para 5) (g) Provisions of unconditional and legally binding negative security assurances by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States; |
| | General Views on Security Assurances | • (Page 2, para 5) (g) Provisions of unconditional and legally binding negative security assurances by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States; |
| Regional Issue: Middle East | General Views on NWFZ ME | • (Page 2, para 5) (h) The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, in particular in the Middle East; |
| | NWFZ ME | • (Page 2, para 5) (h) The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, in particular in the Middle East; |
| Nuclear Weapons Free Zones | General Views on NWFZ ME | • (Page 2, para 5) (h) The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, in particular in the Middle East; |
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<td>• (Page 1, para 1)...emphasizes that the Treaty is an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and the key instrument in the efforts to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Group further underscores that the realization of the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty.</td>
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<td>• (Page 2, recommendation 1) To emphasize that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the key international instrument aimed at achieving nuclear disarmament, halting the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and promoting international cooperation and assistance in support of the inalienable right of its States parties to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.</td>
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<td>• (Page 2, recommendation 2) To reaffirm that the full, non-discriminatory and balanced implementation of the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty remains essential for promoting its credibility and effectiveness and in realizing its objectives.</td>
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<td>• (Page 2, recommendation 5) To reaffirm that each article of the Treaty is binding on all States parties at all times and in all circumstances, without exception, and that States parties are required to comply strictly with their legal obligations under the Treaty and to implement those commitments agreed by consensus at the Review Conferences of the Treaty, including, in particular, the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences.</td>
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<td>• (Page 2, recommendation 6) To underline that the immediate and unconditional accession to the Treaty by all States not party, as non-nuclear-weapon States, is essential for the full realization of its objectives. All States parties should make every effort to achieve the universality of the Treaty and refrain from taking any actions that could negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty.</td>
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<td>• (Page 3, recommendation 8) To reaffirm the integrity of article IX, paragraph 3, of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the obligation of all States parties not to accord any status or recognition in any form contrary to the provisions of the Treaty to any State not party to the Treaty.</td>
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<td>• (Page 3, recommendation 11) To emphasize that the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States, and that any such assumption is incompatible with the object and purpose of the Treaty, with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.</td>
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- (Page 3, recommendation 13) To urge the nuclear-weapon States to fully comply with their nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty and completely implement their unequivocal nuclear disarmament commitments, including the 13 practical steps, that were agreed and reaffirmed by consensus at the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Treaty, in order to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

- (Page 4, recommendation 18) To acknowledge that the development of new types of nuclear weapons and the lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies run counter to the letter and spirit of the Treaty and undermine the realization of its objectives.

- (Page 6, recommendation 29) To underscore the necessity of the full and non-discriminatory implementation of articles I and II of the Treaty by all States parties, in particular nuclear-weapon States, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, including through nuclear weapon-sharing with other States under any kind of security and military arrangements or alliances.

- (Page 6, recommendation 30) To strongly support a comprehensive ban on all forms of nuclear-weapon tests without exception, as well as any nuclear explosion, and reaffirm the importance of such ban in the realization of objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

- (Page 12, recommendation 64) To call upon the nuclear-weapon States to accept IAEA full-scope safeguards to ensure full compliance with their obligations assumed under article I of the Treaty.

### Disarmament

**General Views on Disarmament**

- (Page 1, para 1)...emphasizes that the Treaty is an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and the key instrument in the efforts to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.

- (Page 1, para 2)...stresses, once more, the fundamental importance of the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of the obligations under the Treaty, in particular on nuclear disarmament. In this context, the Group calls for the full implementation of all commitments and the unequivocal undertakings assumed by the nuclear-weapon States, at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament.

- (Page 2, recommendation 1) To emphasize that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the key international instrument aimed at achieving nuclear disarmament, halting the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and promoting international cooperation and assistance in support of the inalienable right of its States parties to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

- (Page 2, recommendation 3) To reiterate that the continued existence of nuclear weapons represents the greatest threat to humanity and that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as the risk of their unauthorized, unintentional or accidental use.

- (Page 2, recommendation 4) To stress that the full and effective implementation of all obligations under the Treaty on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, including in particular by the nuclear-weapon States, as well as the implementation of commitments and unequivocal undertakings assumed by them to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to
nuclear disarmament, are crucial in promoting international peace and security.

- (Page 3, recommendation 9) To acknowledge that the strong support for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, expressed at the first-ever high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament, on 26 September 2013, demonstrated that nuclear disarmament remains the highest priority of the international community.

- (Page 3, recommendation 10) To reaffirm that all parties have a legal obligation under article VI of the Treaty to pursue in good faith, and to bring to a conclusion, negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under transparent, strict and effective international control.

- (Page 3, recommendation 11) To emphasize that the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States, and that any such assumption is incompatible with the object and purpose of the Treaty, with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.

- (Page 3, recommendation 12) To express deep concern at the continued lack of progress in the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations by the nuclear-weapon States, which could undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty, as well as at the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament.

- (Page 3, recommendation 13) To urge the nuclear-weapon States to fully comply with their nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty and completely implement their unequivocal nuclear disarmament commitments, including the 13 practical steps, that were agreed and reaffirmed by consensus at the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Treaty, in order to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

- (Page 4, recommendation 14) To strongly call for the prompt and full implementation of the action plan on nuclear disarmament adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty, particularly the commitments made by the nuclear-weapon States under action 5 to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament.

- (Page 4, recommendation 17) To stress that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons and that such reductions are undermined by the modernization of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and related infrastructure by the nuclear-weapon States, and accordingly, to call upon the nuclear-weapon States to accelerate the reduction in their nuclear arsenals, weapons and their delivery systems, which should involve dismantling them in the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations.

- (Page 4, recommendation 18) To acknowledge that the development of new types of nuclear weapons and the lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies run counter to the letter and spirit of the Treaty and undermine the realization of its objectives.

- (Page 4, recommendation 19) To urge the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to completely prohibit nuclear weapons research, and to immediately cease all plans to further invest in modernizing, upgrading, refurbishing or extending the lives, or other measures regarding the
humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament

- (Page 2, recommendation 3) To reiterate that the continued existence of nuclear weapons represents the greatest threat to humanity and that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee
against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as the risk of their unauthorized, unintentional or accidental use.

- (Page 5, recommendation 25) To reaffirm that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be a crime against humanity and a violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular international humanitarian law, and that the mere possession of nuclear weapons is inconsistent with the principles of international humanitarian law.

- (Page 8, recommendation 38) To underline the need for increased attention to the problems of safety and contamination related to the discontinuation of nuclear operations formerly associated with nuclear weapons programmes, including, where appropriate, the safe resettlement of any displaced human populations and the restoration of economic productivity to affected areas, bearing in mind the special responsibility of countries that have undertaken nuclear tests towards the affected people and areas, including those in the former United Nations Trust Territories that have been adversely affected as a result of the nuclear-weapon tests conducted in the past.

- (Page 8, recommendation 42) To reaffirm that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be a crime against humanity and a violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular, international humanitarian law, and to reiterate that the mere possession of nuclear weapons is inconsistent with the principles of international humanitarian law.

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### Role of Nuclear Weapon States

- (Page 2, recommendation 4) To stress that the full and effective implementation of all obligations under the Treaty on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, including in particular by the nuclear-weapon States, as well as the implementation of commitments and unequivocal undertakings assumed by them to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, are crucial in promoting international peace and security.

- (Page 4, recommendation 17) To stress that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of nuclear weapons and that such reductions are undermined by the modernization of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and related infrastructure by the nuclear-weapon States, and accordingly, to call upon the nuclear-weapon States to accelerate the reduction in their nuclear arsenals, weapons and their delivery systems, which should involve dismantling them in the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations.

- (Page 4, recommendation 19) To urge the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to completely prohibit nuclear weapons research, and to immediately cease all plans to further invest in modernizing, upgrading, refurbishing or extending the lives, or other measures regarding the qualitative improvement, of their nuclear weapons and related facilities and to end the production of new types of nuclear weapons in compliance with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, as well as with their commitments under the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty and the action plan on nuclear disarmament, agreed in 2000 and 2010, respectively.

- (Page 6, recommendation 27) To establish a standing committee to monitor and verify the fulfilment by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty, as well as the
implementation of their unequivocal undertakings agreed at the Review Conferences of the Treaty, and to make recommendations to the Review Conference on the next steps for the full implementation of article VI of the Treaty in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

- **(Page 6, recommendation 28)** To call for the complete exclusion of the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons from all military and security policies, concepts and doctrines, including the “Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization”, which not only set out rationales for the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, but also maintain unjustifiable concepts of security based on promoting and developing military alliances that pursue nuclear deterrence policies.

- **(Page 6, recommendation 29)** To underscore the necessity of the full and non-discriminatory implementation of articles I and II of the Treaty by all States parties, in particular nuclear-weapon States, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, including through nuclear weapon-sharing with other States under any kind of security and military arrangements or alliances.

- **(Page 6, recommendation 31)** To support the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which is intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all nuclear test explosions and to stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons, and to stress that while the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a practical step for systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament as well as non-proliferation in all its aspects, it cannot substitute the objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

- **(Page 7, recommendation 33)** To stress the significance of achieving the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, through its ratification by the remaining States whose ratification is required for its entry into force, including, in particular, by two nuclear-weapon States, thus contributing to the process of nuclear disarmament and towards the enhancement of international peace and security.

- **(Page 7, recommendation 34)** To stress that the improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons violate the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

- **(Page 7, recommendation 35)** To call on nuclear-weapon States to end plans to modernize their nuclear weapons arsenal, in compliance with their commitments, in particular under action 1 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty, in which all States parties commit to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.

- **(Page 7, recommendation 36)** To stress that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to take the lead in realizing the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and to underline in this regard the commitments of the nuclear-weapon States under the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is envisaged as the first of 13 practical steps, and accordingly calls for the early ratification of that Treaty, in particular by the remaining nuclear-weapon States and those that are not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

- **(Page 8, recommendation 39)** To call upon the nuclear-weapon States to
refrain from conducting nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, or nuclear-weapon tests in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapons system, as they are in contravention of the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and would undermine its effectiveness and contradict the commitments undertaken at the Review Conferences of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by nuclear-weapon States.

- (Page 9, recommendation 47) To reaffirm that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones by the Treaties of Bangkok, Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Semipalatinsk and Tlatelolco, as well as Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, represent positive steps towards attaining the objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and enhancing international peace and security.

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<td>• (Page 4 recommendation 15) To emphasize the necessity of starting negotiations without further delay on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time.</td>
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<td>• (Page 4, recommendation 16) To call for the immediate establishment, as the highest priority, in the Conference on Disarmament, of a subsidiary body to negotiate and conclude a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction.</td>
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<td>• (Page 5, recommendation 26) To fully support and call for the full implementation of resolutions 68/32 and 69/58, entitled “Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament”, through which the General Assembly: (a) called for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction; (b) decided to convene, no later than 2018, a United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to review the progress made in that regard; and (c) designated 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in order to mobilize international efforts towards achieving the common goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.</td>
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<td>• (Page 5, recommendation 21) To support the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, including all practical measures to eliminate the past production and existing stockpiles of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, in an irreversible and verifiable manner, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives, without prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including their past production, existing stockpiles and future production of fissile materials under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comprehensive safeguards.</td>
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<td>• (Page 12, recommendation 61) To support the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context</td>
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| **Outer space** | • (Page 5, recommendation 22) To express concern over the negative implications of the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defence systems and the threat of weaponization of outer space and over the negative security consequences of the deployment of such systems, which could trigger an arms race(s) and lead to further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. 
• (Page 5, recommendation 23) To emphasize the paramount importance of strict compliance with existing arms limitation and disarmament agreements relevant to outer space, including bilateral agreements, and with the existing legal regime concerning the use of outer space. 
• (Page 5, recommendation 24) To further emphasize the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 69/31. |
| **General Views on Outer Space** | • (Page 5, recommendation 22) To express concern over the negative implications of the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defence systems and the threat of weaponization of outer space and over the negative security consequences of the deployment of such systems, which could trigger an arms race(s) and lead to further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. 
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• (Page 5, recommendation 24) To further emphasize the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 69/31. |
| **Peaceful uses** | • (Page 1, para 1) The Group further underscores that the realization of the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. 
• (Page 5, recommendation 21) To support the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, including all practical measures to eliminate the past production and existing stockpiles of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, in an irreversible and verifiable manner, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives, without prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including their past production, existing stockpiles and future production of fissile materials under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comprehensive safeguards. 
• (Page 10, recommendation 52) To reaffirm that safeguards are accepted
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<td>• (Page 10, recommendation 52) To reaffirm that safeguards are accepted for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of obligations assumed under the Non-Proliferation Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that, accordingly, they shall be implemented without affecting the inalienable rights under article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes.</td>
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<td>• (Page 11, recommendation 55) To reaffirm that IAEA is the sole competent authority responsible for verifying the fulfilment of safeguards obligations assumed by States parties under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear materials and technology from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation, and that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of IAEA, and in this context to reject attempts</td>
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by any State member of IAEA to use the technical cooperation programme of the Agency as a tool for political purposes in violation of its statute.

- (Page 11, Recommendation 56) To confirm that article III of the Treaty on verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes in accordance with article IV, and therefore States parties to the Treaty shall refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.

- (Page 13, recommendation 65) To underscore that nothing in the Non-Proliferation Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, including the development of a full national nuclear fuel cycle, and their right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as well as technical cooperation among themselves or international organizations, with due consideration for the needs of the developing countries, and that the realization of these rights constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty.

- (Page 13, recommendation 68) To underline that concerns related to nuclear proliferation shall not, in any way, restrict the inalienable right of any State party to develop all aspects of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes without discrimination, as stipulated in article IV of the Treaty, and, accordingly, to call upon the States parties to refrain from any action that would limit certain peaceful nuclear activities on the grounds of their “sensitivity”, as the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology, equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their sensitivity but stipulates only that such technology, equipment and material must be subject to IAEA comprehensive safeguards.

- (Page 14, recommendation 69) To express concern that certain unilateral, politically motivated restrictions and/or limitations seriously hamper the exercise by developing States parties of their inalienable rights to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

- (Page 14, recommendation 71) To reaffirm that any interpretation that is used as a pretext to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Treaty, and, therefore, to strongly call for the fulfilment of the obligations under article IV, paragraph 2, of the Treaty with regard to exports, to other States parties, of nuclear materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes.

- (Page 14, recommendation 74) To underscore the importance of IAEA assistance, in particular to its developing member States, in planning for and using nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, and the need for strengthening this role of the Agency, and, in this regard, to call on IAEA to ensure a balance between technical cooperation and its other activities.

- (Page 15, recommendation 75) To stress that the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, as the main vehicle for the transfer of nuclear
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<td>• (Page 5, recommendation 21) To support the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, including all practical measures to eliminate the past production and existing stockpiles of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, in an irreversible and verifiable manner, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives, without prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including their past production, existing stockpiles and future production of fissile materials under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comprehensive safeguards.</td>
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<td>• (Page 10, recommendation 52) To reaffirm that safeguards are accepted for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of obligations assumed under the Non-Proliferation Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that, accordingly, they shall be implemented without affecting the inalienable rights under article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes.</td>
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<td>• (Page 14, recommendation 71) To reaffirm that any interpretation that is used as a pretext to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Treaty, and, therefore, to strongly call for the fulfilment of the obligations under article IV, paragraph 2, of the Treaty with regard to exports, to other States parties, of nuclear materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes.</td>
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<td>• (Page 14, recommendation 72) To emphasize that non-proliferation control arrangement should be transparent and open to participation by all States and should ensure and facilitate, to the fullest extent possible, the access by developing countries parties to the Treaty to nuclear material, equipment or technology for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.</td>
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<td>• (Page 15, recommendation 75) To stress that the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, as the main vehicle for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, should continue to be formulated and implemented in accordance with the statute of IAEA and the agreed guiding principles as contained in IAEA document INFCIRC/267 and the decisions of IAEA policymaking organs, as well as under preferential and concessional terms.</td>
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<td>• (Page 15, recommendation 77) To stress the importance of full compliance, by the developed countries parties to the Treaty, with the</td>
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obligations under article IV paragraph 2 of the Treaty, which stipulates that parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes...

- (Page 16, recommendation 81) To strongly emphasize that any decision in the context of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle must be consistent with the statute of IAEA and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, without any prejudice to the inalienable right of each State party to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy and sciences, in all their aspects, for peaceful purposes, and, if it so decides, to develop a full national nuclear fuel cycle, according to article IV of the Treaty...

**IAEA**

- (Page 12, recommendation 61) To support the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to stress the statutory role of IAEA on nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons; to recognize, in this context, the Agency’s capability of verifying nuclear disarmament agreements...

- (Page 11, recommendation 55) To reaffirm that IAEA is the sole competent authority responsible for verifying the fulfilment of safeguards obligations assumed by States parties under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear materials and technology from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation, and that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of IAEA, and in this context to reject attempts by any State member of IAEA to use the technical cooperation programme of the Agency as a tool for political purposes in violation of its statute...

- (Page 14, recommendation 74) To underscore assistance, in particular to its developing member States, in planning for and using nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, and the need for strengthening this role of the Agency, and, in this regard, to call on IAEA to ensure a balance between technical cooperation and its other activities.

- (Page 15, recommendation 75) To stress that the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, as the main vehicle for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, should continue to be formulated and implemented in accordance with the statute of IAEA and the agreed guiding principles as contained in IAEA document INFCIRC/267 and the decisions of IAEA policymaking organs, as well as under preferential and concessional terms...

- (Page 15, recommendation 76) To strongly reject any attempt by any State to politicize the work of IAEA, including the use of its Technical Cooperation Programme as a tool for political purposes, which would be in violation of the statute of the Agency.

- (Page 15, recommendation 78) To recognize that the primary responsibility for nuclear safety rests with individual States to reaffirm the central role of IAEA in nuclear safety-related matters, including through the establishment of nuclear safety standards, owing to its mandatory functions and long-standing expertise; and to stress that any possible review of nuclear safety standards at the global level must be
carried out within IAEA in an inclusive, gradual and transparent manner, with the guidance and participation of and in consultation with all member States, that shall incorporate the views of all member States.

- (Page 15, recommendation 79) To recognize that the primary responsibility for nuclear security rests with individual States and that IAEA has the mandate, the authority and the central role in the area of nuclear security; and to reaffirm that any process to develop multilateral norms, guidelines or rules on nuclear security should be pursued within the framework of IAEA, should be driven by member States, should be negotiated multilaterally in a gradual, inclusive and transparent manner incorporating the views of all member States and should not encroach upon the mandate, competence and central role of IAEA in the area of nuclear security.

- (Page 16, recommendation 80) To emphasize that measures and initiatives aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and nuclear security must not be used as a pretext or leverage to violate, deny or restrict the inalienable right of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.

- (Page 16, recommendation 81) To strongly emphasize that any decision in the context of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle must be consistent with the statute of IAEA and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, without any prejudice to the inalienable right of each State party to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy and sciences, in all their aspects, for peaceful purposes, and, if it so decides, to develop a full national nuclear fuel cycle, according to article IV of the Treaty...

- (Page 16, recommendation 83) To reaffirm the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities —operational or under construction —poses a great danger to human lives and the environment, and constitutes a grave violation of international law, the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and resolutions of IAEA; to recognize the need for a comprehensive, multilaterally negotiated, legally binding instrument prohibiting attacks and the threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and, pending the conclusion of such an instrument, to strongly urge all States to refrain from attacks or the threat of attacks on such facilities.

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**Assurance of Supply/ Multilateral Approach to Nuclear Fuel Supply**

- (Page 13, recommendation 67) To reaffirm the sovereign right of each State party to define its national energy and fuel-cycle policies, which, inter alia, includes an inalienable right to develop, for peaceful purposes, a full national nuclear fuel cycle, and that such rights of States parties, including expanding their own production capacity in the nuclear fuel cycle, shall not, in any way, be compromised or diminished, including as a result of any possible decision in the context of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.

- (Page 16, recommendation 81) To strongly emphasize that any decision in the context of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle must be consistent with the statute of IAEA and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, without any prejudice to the inalienable right of each State party to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy and sciences, in all their aspects, for peaceful purposes, and, if it so decides, to develop a full national nuclear fuel cycle, according to article IV of the Treaty...

- (Page 16, recommendation 82) To reiterate a need for caution in thoroughly addressing the associated technical, legal and economic
aspects, as well as the underlying political dimensions of the issue of assurances of nuclear fuel supply, and to stress the necessity of ensuring that any further consideration of this issue is based on a coherent and comprehensive conceptual framework that adequately addresses the views and concerns of all States parties and that any proposal that eventually emerges in this regard is in full accordance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and takes into account the respective legal obligations of States parties and the principle of non-discrimination.

### Nuclear Safety and Security

- (Page 15, recommendation 78) To recognize that the primary responsibility for nuclear safety rests with individual States to reaffirm the central role of IAEA in nuclear safety-related matters, including through the establishment of nuclear safety standards, owing to its mandatory functions and long-standing expertise; and to stress that any possible review of nuclear safety standards at the global level must be carried out within IAEA in an inclusive, gradual and transparent manner, with the guidance and participation of and in consultation with all member States, that shall incorporate the views of all member States.
- (Page 15, recommendation 79) To recognize that the primary responsibility for nuclear security rests with individual States and that IAEA has the mandate, the authority and the central role in the area of nuclear security; and to reaffirm that any process to develop multilateral norms, guidelines or rules on nuclear security should be pursued within the framework of IAEA, should be driven by member States, should be negotiated multilaterally in a gradual, inclusive and transparent manner incorporating the views of all member States and should not encroach upon the mandate, competence and central role of IAEA in the area of nuclear security.
- (Page 16, recommendation 80) To emphasize that measures and initiatives aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and nuclear security must not be used as a pretext or leverage to violate, deny or restrict the inalienable right of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.

### Attack or Threat of Attack Against Peaceful Nuclear Facilities

- (Page 16, recommendation 83) To reaffirm the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities —operational or under construction —poses a great danger to human lives and the environment, and constitutes a grave violation of international law, the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and resolutions of IAEA; to recognize the need for a comprehensive, multilaterally negotiated, legally binding instrument prohibiting attacks and the threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and, pending the conclusion of such an instrument, to strongly urge all States to refrain from attacks or the threat of attacks on such facilities.

### NONPROLIFERATION

### States Not Party To the NPT

- (Page 2, recommendation 6) To underline that the immediate and unconditional accession to the Treaty by all States not party, as non-nuclear-weapon States, is essential for the full realization of its objectives. All States parties should make every effort to achieve the universality of the Treaty and refrain from taking any actions that could negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty.
- (Page 3, recommendation 7) To strongly call on all States that are not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to accede, without any further delay and precondition, to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.
- (Page 7, recommendation 36) To stress that the five nuclear-weapon
States have a special responsibility to take the lead in realizing the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and to underline in this regard the commitments of the nuclear-weapon States under the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is envisaged as the first of 13 practical steps, and accordingly calls for the early ratification of that Treaty, in particular by the remaining nuclear-weapon States and those that are not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

- (Page 11, recommendation 57) To emphasize that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented, without exception, through the strict observance of and adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty.
- (Page 12, recommendation 62) To call upon all nuclear-weapon States and all States not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards, in order to ensure, inter alia, preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities and resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty without exception.
- (Page 12, recommendation 64) To call upon the nuclear-weapon States to accept IAEA full-scope safeguards to ensure full compliance with their obligations assumed under article I of the Treaty.
- (Page 14, recommendation 73) To express deep concern over the ability of certain States not party to the Treaty to obtain, in particular from some nuclear-weapon States, nuclear materials, technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons, and to strongly call for the enforcement, without exception or further delay, of the total and complete prohibition, as stipulated in the Treaty, of the transfer of nuclear-related equipment, information, materials and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty.

**General Views on Nonproliferation**

- (Page 5, recommendation 21) To support the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, including all practical measures to eliminate the past production and existing stockpiles of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, in an irreversible and verifiable manner, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives.
- (Page 6, recommendation 29) To underscore the necessity of the full and non-discriminatory implementation of articles I and II of the Treaty by all States parties, in particular nuclear-weapon States, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, including through nuclear weapon-sharing with other States under any kind of security and military arrangements or alliances.
- (Page 9, recommendation 47) To reaffirm that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones by the Treaties of Bangkok, Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Semipalatinsk and Tlatelolco, as well as Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, represent positive steps towards attaining the objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and enhancing international
peace and security.

- (Page 11, recommendation 57) To emphasize that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented, without exception, through the strict observance of and adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty...
- (Page 12, recommendation 64) To call upon the nuclear-weapon States to accept IAEA full-scope safeguards to ensure full compliance with their obligations assumed under article I of the Treaty.
- (Page 14, recommendation 72) To emphasize that non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States and should ensure and facilitate, to the fullest extent possible, the access by developing countries parties to the Treaty to nuclear material, equipment or technology for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Nonproliferation and Peaceful Uses

- (Page 5, recommendation 21) To support the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, including all practical measures to eliminate the past production and existing stockpiles of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, in an irreversible and verifiable manner, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives, without prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including their past production, existing stockpiles and future production of fissile materials under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comprehensive safeguards.
- (Page 13, recommendation 68) To underline that concerns related to nuclear proliferation shall not, in any way, restrict the inalienable right of any State party to develop all aspects of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes without discrimination, as stipulated in article IV of the Treaty, and, accordingly, to call upon the States parties to refrain from any action that would limit certain peaceful nuclear activities on the grounds of their “sensitivity”, as the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology, equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their sensitivity but stipulates only that such technology, equipment and material must be subject to IAEA comprehensive safeguards.
- (Page 14, recommendation 72) To emphasize that non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States and should ensure and facilitate, to the fullest extent possible, the access by developing countries parties to the Treaty to nuclear material, equipment or technology for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Israel

- (Page 12, recommendation 63) To reiterate the commitment of all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to prohibit the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities and resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards.

Safeguards

- (Page 12, recommendation 63) To reiterate the commitment of all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to prohibit the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities and
resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards.

- (Page 12, recommendation 64) To call upon the nuclear-weapon States to accept IAEA full-scope safeguards to ensure full compliance with their obligations assumed under article I of the Treaty.

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<tr>
<td>- (Page 14, recommendation 70) To express concern that some States parties have set conditions that limit the export of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to developing States parties, such as concluding and bringing into force an additional protocol. Any such conditions contravene article IV of the Treaty, which is explicit in that regard, leaving no room for reinterpretation or setting conditions for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by non-nuclear-weapon States.</td>
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<td>- (Page 3, recommendation 12) To express deep concern at the continued lack of progress in the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations by the nuclear-weapon States, which could undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty, as well as at the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament.</td>
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<td>- (Page 4, recommendation 16) To call for the immediate establishment, as the highest priority, in the Conference on Disarmament, of a subsidiary body to negotiate and conclude a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction.</td>
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<td>- (Page 5, recommendation 24) To further emphasize the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 69/31.</td>
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<td>- (Page 5, recommendation 26) To fully support and call for the full implementation of resolutions 68/32 and 69/58, entitled “Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament”, through which the General Assembly: (a) called for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development,</td>
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production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction; (b) decided to convene, no later than 2018, a United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to review the progress made in that regard; and (c) designated 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in order to mobilize international efforts towards achieving the common goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

- (Page 5, recommendation 26) To fully support and call for the full implementation of resolutions 68/32 and 69/58, entitled “Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament”, through which the General Assembly: (a) called for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction; (b) decided to convene, no later than 2018, a United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to review the progress made in that regard; and (c) designated 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in order to mobilize international efforts towards achieving the common goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

- (Page 3, recommendation 9) To acknowledge that the strong support for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, expressed at the first-ever high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament, on 26 September 2013, demonstrated that nuclear disarmament remains the highest priority of the international community.

- (Page 5, recommendation 24) To further emphasize the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 69/31.

- (Page 5, recommendation 26) To fully support and call for the full implementation of resolutions 68/32 and 69/58, entitled “Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament”, through which the General Assembly: (a) called for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction; (b) decided to convene, no later than 2018, a United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to review the progress made in that regard; and (c) designated 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in order to mobilize international efforts towards achieving the common goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

- (Page 8, recommendation 38) To underline the need for increased attention to the problems of safety and contamination related to the discontinuation of nuclear operations formerly associated with nuclear weapons programmes, including, where appropriate, the safe resettlement of any displaced human populations and the restoration of economic productivity to affected areas, bearing in mind the special responsibility of countries that have undertaken nuclear tests towards the affected people and areas, including those in the former United Nations Trust Territories that have been adversely affected as a result of the nuclear-weapon tests conducted in the past.

**Safeguards and Verification**

- (Page 5, recommendation 21) To support the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear...
explosive devices, including all practical measures to eliminate the past production and existing stockpiles of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, in an irreversible and verifiable manner, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives, without prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including their past production, existing stockpiles and future production of fissile materials under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comprehensive safeguards.

- (Page 10, recommendation 53) To stress the importance of achieving the universality of the comprehensive safeguards and to call upon all States parties that have not yet done so to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements as soon as possible with a view to consolidating and enhancing the verification system for the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, through the universalization of comprehensive safeguards, and, in this context, to urge all States not parties to the Treaty to accede, without any further delay and any preconditions and as non-nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements as soon as possible in order to place all their nuclear facilities and activities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards.

- (Page 11, recommendation 54) To acknowledge that it is fundamental to make a distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures, in order to ensure that such voluntary undertakings should not be considered as legal safeguard obligations.

- (Page 12, recommendation 59) To underline the importance of and the need for strict observance by IAEA of its statute and relevant comprehensive safeguards agreements in conducting verification activities and the necessity of IAEA reporting on the implementation of safeguards being factual, technically based and reflecting appropriate reference to the relevant provisions of safeguards agreements.

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possible in order to place all their nuclear facilities and activities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards.

- (Page 11, recommendation 57) To emphasize that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented, without exception, through the strict observance of and adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty...

- (Page 11, recommendation 58) To underscore that the principle of balance between the promotional and other statutory activities of the Agency, in particular verification and safeguards-related activities, needs to be strictly observed and that IAEA shall ensure avoiding any ultra vires acts that would jeopardize its integrity and credibility.

- (Page 12, recommendation 60) To reiterate the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards, including reporting, in accordance with the Agency’s statute and safeguards agreements and the regime’s need for the protection of such confidential information to be significantly strengthened; and to urge, in this regard.

- (Page 12, recommendation 62) To call upon all nuclear-weapon States and all States not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards, in order to ensure, inter alia, preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities and resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty without exception.

- (Page 12, recommendation 64) To call upon the nuclear-weapon States to accept IAEA full-scope safeguards to ensure full compliance with their obligations assumed under article I of the Treaty.

IAEA

- (Page 11, recommendation 55) To reaffirm that IAEA is the sole competent authority responsible for verifying the fulfilment of safeguards obligations assumed by States parties under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear materials and technology from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation, and that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of IAEA, and in this context to reject attempts by any State member of IAEA to use the technical cooperation programme of the Agency as a tool for political purposes in violation of its statute...

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Nuclear Testing

Test Ban and CTBT

- (Page 6, recommendation 31) To support the objectives of the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which is intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all nuclear test explosions and to stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons, and to stress that while the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a practical step for systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament as well as non-proliferation in all its aspects, it cannot substitute the objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

- (Page 6, recommendation 32) To support the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which is intended to enforce a comprehensive, irreversible and verifiable ban on all nuclear test explosions, and to stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons in order to pave the way towards their total elimination.

- (Page 8, recommendation 39) To call upon the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from conducting nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, or nuclear-weapon tests in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapons system, as they are in contravention of the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and would undermine its effectiveness and contradict the commitments undertaken at the Review Conferences of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by nuclear-weapon States.

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<td>- (Page 6, recommendation 30) To strongly support a comprehensive ban on all forms of nuclear-weapon tests without exception, as well as any nuclear explosion, and reaffirm the importance of such ban in the realization of objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.</td>
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<td>- (Page 7, recommendation 37) To strongly call for the immediate and unconditional cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests and nuclear explosions and to close and dismantle, in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner, any remaining sites for nuclear test explosions and their associated infrastructure.</td>
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<td>- (Page 8, recommendation 38) To underline the need for increased attention to the problems of safety and contamination related to the discontinuation of nuclear operations formerly associated with nuclear weapons programmes, including, where appropriate, the safe resettlement of any displaced human populations and the restoration of economic productivity to affected areas, bearing in mind the special responsibility of countries that have undertaken nuclear tests towards the affected people and areas, including those in the former United Nations Trust Territories that have been adversely affected as a result of the nuclear-weapon tests conducted in the past.</td>
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<td>- (Page 8, recommendation 39) To call upon the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from conducting nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, or nuclear-weapon tests in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapons system, as they are in contravention of the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and would undermine its effectiveness and contradict the commitments undertaken at the Review Conferences of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by nuclear-weapon States.</td>
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<th>CTBT</th>
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<td>- (Page 6, recommendation 31) To support the objectives of the</td>
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Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which is intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all nuclear test explosions and to stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons, and to stress that while the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a practical step for systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament as well as non-proliferation in all its aspects, it cannot substitute the objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

- (Page 6, recommendation 32) To support the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which is intended to enforce a comprehensive, irreversible and verifiable ban on all nuclear test explosions, and to stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons in order to pave the way towards their total elimination.

- (Page 7, recommendation 33) To stress the significance of achieving the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, through its ratification by the remaining States whose ratification is required for its entry into force, including, in particular, by two nuclear-weapon States, thus contributing to the process of nuclear disarmament and towards the enhancement of international peace and security.

- (Page 7, recommendation 34) To stress that the improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons violate the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

- (Page 7, recommendation 36) To stress that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to take the lead in realizing the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and to underline in this regard the commitments of the nuclear-weapon States under the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is envisaged as the first of 13 practical steps, and accordingly calls for the early ratification of that Treaty, in particular by the remaining nuclear-weapon States and those that are not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

- (Page 8, recommendation 39) To call upon the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from conducting nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear weapons, or nuclear-weapon tests in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapons system, as they are in contravention of the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and would undermine its effectiveness and contradict the commitments undertaken at the Review Conferences of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by nuclear-weapon States.

### Security Assurances

**General Views on Security Assurances**

- (Page 8, recommendation 40) ...pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, the provision of effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances by all five nuclear-weapon States to all the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances, is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. The provision of such assurances is a commitment, the early fulfilment of which is necessary to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

- (Page 8, recommendation 41) To reiterate that military and security policies, concepts and doctrines that allow the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons contravene the existing insufficient negative security
assurances provided through unilateral statements made by each of the nuclear-weapon States.

| Role of Nuclear Weapon States | • (Page 8, recommendation 40)...pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, the provision of effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances by all five nuclear-weapon States to all the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances, is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. The provision of such assurances is a commitment, the early fulfilment of which is necessary to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.  
  • (Page 8, recommendation 41) To reiterate that military and security policies, concepts and doctrines that allow the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons contravene the existing insufficient negative security assurances provided through unilateral statements made by each of the nuclear-weapon States.  
  • (Page 9, recommendation 43) To call on nuclear-weapon States to refrain, under all circumstances, from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty, including, inter alia, by the complete exclusion of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from all their military and security concepts, doctrines and policies.  
  • (Page 9, recommendation 44) To express dissatisfaction over the lack of required political will and efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to fully address the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States by providing them with effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable, universal and legally binding security assurances which could strengthen the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.  
  • (Page 9, recommendation 45) To strongly support the urgent commencement of negotiations on effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances, by all nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, pending the realization of the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons.  
  • (Page 9, recommendation 46) To call for the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances for further work to consider legally binding, unconditional, irrevocable and non-discriminatory negative security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. |

| Legally Binding Security Assurances | • (Page 8, recommendation 40)...pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, the provision of effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances by all five nuclear-weapon States to all the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances, is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. The provision of such assurances is a commitment, the early fulfilment of which is necessary to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.  
  • (Page 9, recommendation 44) To express dissatisfaction over the lack of required political will and efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to fully address the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States by providing them with effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable, universal and legally binding security assurances which could strengthen the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. |
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**Legally Binding Negative Security Assurances**

- (Page 8, recommendation 40)… Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, the provision of effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances by all five nuclear-weapon States to all the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances, is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. The provision of such assurances is a commitment, the early fulfilment of which is necessary to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
- (Page 9, recommendation 44) To express dissatisfaction over the lack of required political will and efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to fully address the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States by providing them with effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable, universal and legally binding security assurances which could strengthen the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.
- (Page 9, recommendation 45) To strongly support the urgent commencement of negotiations on effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances, by all nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, pending the realization of the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons.
- (Page 9, recommendation 46) To call for the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances for further work to consider legally binding, unconditional, irrevocable and non-discriminatory negative security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

**Nuclear Weapons Free Zones**

- (Page 9, recommendation 47) To reaffirm that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones by the Treaties of Bangkok, Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Semipalatinsk and Tlatelolco, as well as Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, represent positive steps towards attaining the objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and enhancing international peace and security.
- (Page 10, recommendation 50) To stress the importance of the early ratification of the existing treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, by all States whose ratification is required for the entry into force of such treaties, as well as the early ratification, by all the nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so, of the relevant protocols to those treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the respective territories of parties to such treaties, as envisaged in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
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<tr>
<th>Treaty of Tlatelolco</th>
<th>(Page 9, recommendation 47) To reaffirm that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones by the Treaties of Bangkok, Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Semipalatinsk and Tlatelolco, as well as Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, represent positive steps towards attaining the objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and enhancing international peace and security.</th>
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<td>NWFZ and Security Assurances</td>
<td>(Page 10, recommendation 49) To reaffirm that the fulfilment of the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States to provide to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances is essential in the realization of the objectives of treaties establishing such zones.</td>
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<td>Role of Nuclear Weapon States</td>
<td>(Page 10, recommendation 49) To reaffirm that the fulfilment of the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States to provide to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances is essential in the realization of the objectives of treaties establishing such zones.</td>
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To stress the importance of the early ratification of the existing treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, by all States whose ratification is required for the entry into force of such treaties, as well as the early ratification, by all the nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so, of the relevant protocols to those treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the respective territories of parties to such treaties, as envisaged in the Non-Proliferation Treaty zones.

To urge the nuclear-weapon States that, having signed or ratified some of the relevant protocols to a treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, have done so with reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of such treaties and affect the denuclearization status of that zone, to withdraw such reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations and to fulfil their obligations to achieve the objectives of the treaties to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and their protocols.

**Regional Issue: Middle East**

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<th>General Views on NWFZ ME</th>
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**Institutional Issues**

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<tr>
<th>Attack or Threat of Attack Against Peaceful Nuclear Facilities</th>
<th>(Page 16, recommendation 83) To reaffirm the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities —operational or under construction —poses a great danger to human lives and the environment, and constitutes a grave violation of international law, the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and resolutions of IAEA; to recognize the need for a comprehensive, multilaterally negotiated, legally binding instrument prohibiting attacks and the threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and, pending the conclusion of such an instrument, to strongly urge all States to refrain from attacks or the threat of attacks on such facilities.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Access to Technology and Technology Transfer</td>
<td>(Page 10, recommendation 52) To reaffirm that safeguards are accepted for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of obligations assumed under the Non-Proliferation Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that, accordingly, they shall be implemented without affecting the inalienable rights under article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes.</td>
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<td>(Page 11, recommendation 55) To reaffirm that IAEA is the sole competent authority responsible for verifying the fulfillment of safeguards obligations assumed by States parties under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear materials and technology from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation, and that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of IAEA, and in this context to reject attempts by any State member of IAEA to use the technical cooperation</td>
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programme of the Agency as a tool for political purposes in violation of its statute…

- (Page 11, Recommendation 56) To confirm that article III of the Treaty on verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes in accordance with article IV, and therefore States parties to the Treaty shall refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.

- (Page 13, recommendation 65) To underscore that nothing in the Non-Proliferation Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, including the development of a full national nuclear fuel cycle, and their right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as well as technical cooperation among themselves or international organizations, with due consideration for the needs of the developing countries, and that the realization of these rights constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty.

- (Page 13, recommendation 68) To underline that concerns related to nuclear proliferation shall not, in any way, restrict the inalienable right of any State party to develop all aspects of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes without discrimination, as stipulated in article IV of the Treaty, and, accordingly, to call upon the States parties to refrain from any action that would limit certain peaceful nuclear activities on the grounds of their “sensitivity”, as the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology, equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their sensitivity but stipulates only that such technology, equipment and material must be subject to IAEA comprehensive safeguards.

- (Page 14, recommendation 69) To express concern that certain unilateral, politically motivated restrictions and/or limitations seriously hamper the exercise by developing States parties of their inalienable rights to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

- (Page 14, recommendation 71) To reaffirm that any interpretation that is used as a pretext to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Treaty, and, therefore, to strongly call for the fulfilment of the obligations under article IV, paragraph 2, of the Treaty with regard to exports, to other States parties, of nuclear materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes.

- (Page 14, recommendation 74) To underscore the importance of IAEA assistance, in particular to its developing member States, in planning for and using nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, and the need for strengthening this role of the Agency, and, in this regard, to call on IAEA to ensure a balance between technical cooperation and its other activities.

- (Page 15, recommendation 75) To stress that the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, as the main vehicle for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, should continue to be formulated and
implemented in accordance with the statute of IAEA and the agreed guiding principles as contained in IAEA document INFCIRC/267 and the decisions of IAEA policymaking organs, as well as under preferential and concessional terms;

**Reporting**

- (Page 12, recommendation 59) To underline the importance of and the need for strict observance by IAEA of its statute and relevant comprehensive safeguards agreements in conducting verification activities and the necessity of IAEA reporting on the implementation of safeguards being factual, technically based and reflecting appropriate reference to the relevant provisions of safeguards agreements.
- (Page 12, recommendation 60) To reiterate the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards, including reporting, in accordance with the Agency’s statute and safeguards agreements and the regime’s need for the protection of such confidential information to be significantly strengthened; and to urge, in this regard.

**Subsidiary Bodies in Main Committees**

- (Page 4, recommendation 16) To call for the immediate establishment, as the highest priority, in the Conference on Disarmament, of a subsidiary body to negotiate and conclude a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction.
- (Page 9, recommendation 46) To call for the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances for further work to consider legally binding, unconditional, irrevocable and non-discriminatory negative security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

**Strengthen Review Process**

- (Page 6, recommendation 27) To establish a standing committee to monitor and verify the fulfilment by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty, as well as the implementation of their unequivocal undertakings agreed at the Review Conferences of the Treaty, and to make recommendations to the Review Conference on the next steps for the full implementation of article VI of the Treaty in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
| 1995 Resolution on the Middle East | • (Page 1, para 2) stresses the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which reaffirmed the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty.  
• (Page 1, para 3) underlines furthermore that the 2010 Review Conference also reaffirmed the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recalled the affirmation of its goals and objectives by the 2000 Review Conference. The Conference also stressed that the Resolution remains valid until the goals and objectives are achieved, and that the Resolution is an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995.  
• (Page 2, para 4) recalls that the 2010 Review Conference, by taking note of the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, recalled the reaffirmation by the 2000 Review Conference of the importance of Israel’s accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.  
• (Page 2, para 5) welcomed the adoption by consensus of a detailed plan of action on the Middle East, particularly the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference, and urged the Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, to convene and exert utmost efforts in ensuring the success of a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.  
• (Page 2, para 6) expresses deep concern over the long delay in the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and urges the three co-sponsors of the Resolution to fulfil their responsibility in taking all necessary measures to fully implement it without any further delay.  
• (Page 3, para 15) the Group further recalls that the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences stipulated that all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, should report through the Secretariat to the President of the Review Conference, as well as the Chairs of its Preparatory Committee meetings, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such a zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. |
| (Page 3, para 16) | emphasizes the importance of submitting required reports by all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, as well as the facilitator of the 2012 conference. It is essential that the 2015 Review Conference conduct substantive discussions on the above-mentioned reports and evaluate the fulfilment of the commitments on the Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. |
| (Page 4, para 17) | request the establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the 2015 Review Conference to assess the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and reaffirmed by the Final. |
| (Page 4, para 19) | the Group underscored that the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and the convening of a successful 2012 conference are integral and essential parts of the implementation of the consensus “conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty. |
| (Page 4, para 20) | emphasizes the importance of the mandated responsibility of the United Nations Secretary-General in accordance with paragraph 7 of the 2010 action plan on the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. Accordingly, the Group calls upon the United Nations Secretary-General to accelerate his efforts to ensure the convening, without any further delay, of a successful conference. |
| (Page 5, para 21) | stresses once again the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States, in particular the obligations and commitments of the three depositary States of the Treaty that co-sponsored the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, to implement the Resolution. Moreover, the Group also underlined the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. |
| (Page 5, para 23) | expresses profound disappointment over the failure of Conveners to convene the conference in 2012 as scheduled. The failure to convene the conference in 2012 contradicts and violates the collective agreement of the States parties contained in “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty and contravenes the letter and spirit of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. |
| (Page 6, para 25) | the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East bear special responsibility for the establishment of the Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, and for the full implementation of the 1995 Resolution, which they co-sponsored in order to guarantee the indefinite extension of the Treaty without a vote. |
| (Page 6, para 28) | determined to continue pursuing, as a matter of high priority, the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. In this regard, the Group urges all States parties, in this Review Conference, to shoulder their responsibility in order to prevent further negative repercussions of not implementing the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. |

**General Views on NWFZ ME**

| (Page 2, para 5) | welcomed the adoption by consensus of a detailed plan of action on the Middle East, particularly the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference, and urged the Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, to convene and exert utmost efforts in ensuring the success of a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle |
East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. ... The Group stressed the importance of the full implementation of the plan of action and the active and constructive engagement by all parties concerned to allow for the success of the conference in leading to the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

- (Page 2, para 7) expresses its serious concern over the delay in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, all of which are objectives and priorities that were stressed in Review Conferences of the Treaty in 1995, 2000 and 2010.
- (Page 3, para 14) reaffirms once again its determination to extend fullest cooperation and to exert utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons.
- (Page 3, para 15) underlines that the Review Conference should substantially focus on the Middle East by devoting sufficient time within the indicative timetable and giving all speakers the full opportunity to thereby engage in a substantive debate. The Group further recalls that the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences stipulated that all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, should report through the Secretariat to the President of the Review Conference, as well as the Chairs of its Preparatory Committee meetings, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such a zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.
- (Page 3, para 19) stresses that, as clearly stipulated by the 2010 Review Conference, the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction should have been convened in the year 2012.
- (Page 6, para 26) reaffirms the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus. The Group is also of the view that the Conference

**NWFZ ME**

- (Page 2, para 5) welcomed the adoption by consensus of a detailed plan of action on the Middle East, particularly the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference, and urged the Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, to convene and exert utmost efforts in ensuring the success of a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction… the Group stressed the importance of the full implementation of the plan of action and the active and constructive engagement by all parties concerned to allow for the success of the conference in leading to the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.
- (Page 2, para 7) expresses its serious concern over the delay in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, all of which are objectives and priorities that were stressed in Review Conferences of the Treaty in 1995, 2000 and 2010.
- (Page 3, para 14) reaffirms once again its determination to extend fullest cooperation and to exert utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons.
- (Page 3, para 15) underlines that the Review Conference should
substantially focus on the Middle East by devoting sufficient time within
the indicative timetable and giving all speakers the full opportunity to
thereby engage in a substantive debate. The Group further recalls that the
2000 and 2010 Review Conferences stipulated that all States parties to the
Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle
East and other interested States, should report through the Secretariat to the
President of the Review Conference, as well as the Chairs of its Preparatory
Committee meetings, on the steps that they have taken to promote the
achievement of such a zone and the realization of the goals and objectives
of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

- (Page 5, para 24)…underscores that efforts, by the United Nations
Secretary-General related to the Conference should be undertaken in
accordance with the following elements, and should be focused on
convening the Conference within 180 days from the adoption of the 2015
Review Conference Final Document, aimed at launching a process to
negotiate and conclude a legally binding Treaty to establish a Middle East
Zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction, with the
following mandate, and in doing so, he shall exert all efforts and take all
necessary measures with a view to ensuring the success of the conference:
  a) The United Nations Secretary-General shall invite States of the
Middle East region to attend the Conference;
  b) The United Nations Secretary-General shall also invite the five
nuclear-weapon States, the International Atomic Energy Agency,
the Organization on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the
Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit and
the League of Arab States to attend the Conference, as observers;
  c) The Middle East Resolution, adopted at 1995 Review and
Extension Conference, shall be the terms of reference of the
Conference;
  d) The Conference shall establish two working groups as follows:
     i) Working Group I to deal with the scope, geographic
demarcation of the zone, prohibitions and interim
measures;
     ii) Working Group II to deal with verification measures
and implementation mechanisms;
     iii) The Conference shall meet annually in its plenary
format and working groups;
     (iv) When the draft of the treaty is agreed among all
states of the region, the United Nations Secretary-General
shall reconvene the Conference for its adoption;
     (v) The United Nations Secretary-General shall report to
the 2020 Review Conference and its preparatory
committees on progress made and the status of the
implementation of the 1995 Resolution;
     (vi) The five nuclear-weapon States should provide all
necessary support for the implementation of this mandate,
and should present reports on their actions in this regard
to the 2020 Review Conference and its preparatory
committees;
     (vii) The United Nations Secretary-General shall exert all
efforts to secure the required funds, including through a
voluntary fund that he could establish to support the
implementation of this mandate;
     (viii) The conference shall not be postponed. In case the
States that announced their participation in the
Conference decide to postpone the convening of the
conference, it should be held within 90 days.

- (Page 6, para 26)...reaffirms the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus. The Group is also of the view that the Conference

Israel

- (Page 1, para 2)...the Group recalls that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel’s accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.
- (Page 2, para 4)...recalls that the 2010 Review Conference, by taking note of the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, recalled the reaffirmation by the 2000 Review Conference of the importance of Israel’s accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.
- (Page 2, para 7)...expresses its serious concern that no progress has been achieved with regard to Israel’s accession to the Treaty, and placing all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards.
- (Page 2, para 8)...remains gravely concerned by the statement made by the then Prime Minister of Israel on 11 December 2006, in which he publicly admitted the possession of nuclear weapons by Israel.
- (Page 2, para 9)...expresses great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by Israel, which pose a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States, and condemns Israel for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals.
- (Page 3, para 10)...demands that Israel, the only country in the region that has neither joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons nor declared its intention to do so, renounce possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the Treaty without any precondition or further delay as a non-nuclear-weapon State, place promptly all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and conduct all its nuclear-related activities in full conformity with the non-proliferation regime, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty, in particular in the Middle East.
- (Page 4, para 18)...calls for the establishment of a standing committee comprising members of the Bureau of the 2015 Review Conference to follow up inter-sessionally on the implementation of the recommendations by the Review Conference concerning Israel’s prompt accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards.
- (Page 5, para 22) Deplores that Israel continues its refusal to participate in the Conference.

Safeguards and Verification

- (Page 1, para 2)...the Group recalls that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel’s accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.
- (Page 2, para 4)...recalls that the 2010 Review Conference, by taking note of the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, recalled the reaffirmation by the 2000
**Review Conference of the importance of Israel’s accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.**

- (Page 2, para 7)...expresses its serious concern that no progress has been achieved with regard to Israel’s accession to the Treaty, and placing all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards.

**IAEA Safeguards**

- (Page 1, para 2)...the Group recalls that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel’s accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.

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- (Page 2, para 7)...expresses its serious concern that no progress has been achieved with regard to Israel’s accession to the Treaty, and placing all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards.

- (Page 3, para 10)...demands that Israel, the only country in the region that has neither joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons nor declared its intention to do so, renounce possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the Treaty without any precondition or further delay as a non-nuclear-weapon State, place promptly all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981).

- (Page 3, para 12)...hereby declares its commitment to the effective prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards.

- (Page 4, para 18)...calls for the establishment of a standing committee comprising members of the Bureau of the 2015 Review Conference to follow up interessionally on the implementation of the recommendations by the Review Conference concerning Israel’s prompt accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards.

**General Views on NPT**

- (Page 1, para 1)...reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be a contribution towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. However, the Group is of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones does not substitute legal obligations and unequivocal undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

- (Page 2, para 4)...further recalls that the 2010 Review Conference... also reaffirmed the urgency and importance of achieving universality of the Treaty and called on all States in the Middle East that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States so as to achieve its universality at an early date.
### Nuclear Weapons Free Zones

<table>
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<tr>
<th>General Views on NWFZ</th>
<th>• (Page 1, para 1)…reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be a contribution towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The Group further welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world.</th>
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| General Views on NWFZ ME | • (Page 1, para 1)…the Group further welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and, in this regard, strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.  
- (Page 2, para 5)…welcomed the adoption by consensus of a detailed plan of action on the Middle East, particularly the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference, and urged the Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, to convene and exert utmost efforts in ensuring the success of a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction… the Group stressed the importance of the full implementation of the plan of action and the active and constructive engagement by all parties concerned to allow for the success of the conference in leading to the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.  
- (Page 2, para 7)…expresses its serious concern over the delay in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, all of which are objectives and priorities that were stressed in Review Conferences of the Treaty in 1995, 2000 and 2010.  
- (Page 3, para 14)…reaffirms once again its determination to extend fullest cooperation and to exert utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons.  
- (Page 3, para 15)…underlines that the Review Conference should substantially focus on the Middle East by devoting sufficient time within the indicative timetable and giving all speakers the full opportunity to thereby engage in a substantive debate. The Group further recalls that the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences stipulated that all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, should report through the Secretariat to the President of the Review Conference, as well as the Chairs of its Preparatory Committee meetings, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such a zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. |
| Nonproliferation | • (Page 3, para 11)…reaffirms that the nuclear-weapon States, in conformity with their legal obligations under article I of the Treaty, shall solemnly undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly to Israel, and further undertake not, in any way, to assist, encourage or induce Israel to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices under any circumstances whatsoever.  
- (Page 3, para 13)…calls for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer, by any State, of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance |
| Transfer to States Not Party to the NPT | • (Page 3, para 11)…reaffirms that the nuclear-weapon States, in conformity with their legal obligations under article I of the Treaty, shall solemnly undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly to Israel, and further undertake not, in any way, to assist, encourage or induce Israel to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices under any circumstances whatsoever.  
- (Page 3, para 13)…calls for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer, by any State, of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance |
in the nuclear-related scientific or technological fields to Israel.

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<td>• (Page 3, para 12)…hereby declares its commitment to the effective prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards.</td>
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<td>• (Page 3, para 13)…calls for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer, by any State, of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear-related scientific or technological fields to Israel. In this regard, the Group expresses its serious concern over Israeli scientists’ continued access to the nuclear facilities of one nuclear-weapon State, which has potentially serious negative implications on the security of the region as well as the reliability of the global non-proliferation regime.</td>
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<td>• (Page 4, para 17)…request the establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the 2015 Review Conference to assess the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and reaffirmed by the Final.</td>
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