



**1990 NPT Review Conference Working Papers submitted by the NAM**  
**Thematic Summaries**

<b>Draft Resolution on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy in Relation with Preambular Paragraphs 6 and 7 and Article IV of the NPT (NPT/CONF.IV/L.2)</b>	
<b>Safeguards and verification</b>	
<b>General views on safeguards/verification</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, Point 8 Emphasizes that: a. no single State or group of States shall impose unilaterally or collectively any precondition of access to or transfer of equipment, materials, services and scientific and technical information, nor impose any non-proliferation conditions which go beyond the safeguards required under the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons];</li> <li>• (Page 4, Point 8) Emphasizes that: ...c. non-nuclear weapon States party to the Treaty and States that have safeguards equal to those required under Article III.1 of the Treaty should be provided preferential treatment in access to or transfer of equipment, materials, services, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking particularly into account the special needs of developing countries. In doing so, special attention shall also be given to the needs of the least developed countries;</li> </ul>
<b>IAEA and safeguards</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, Para 3) <u>Conscious</u> of the importance of the work of the IAEA in the implementation of safeguard provisions of the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] and other international treaties, conventions and agreements;</li> </ul>
<b>Peaceful uses</b>	
<b>General views on peaceful uses</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, Para 1) <u>Reiterating</u> that, in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article IV of the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons], all States Party to the Treaty have the inalienable right to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs,</li> <li>• (Page 1, Para 2) <u>Convinced</u> that the significance of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic development and its important role in accelerating the growth of developing countries can greatly contribute to progress in general, and to the elimination of technological and economic gaps between the developed and developing countries,</li> <li>• (Page 1, Para 3) <u>Stressing</u> that, in the framework of Article IV. 2 of the Treaty, all Parties to the Treaty have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, services and scientific and technological information and to contribute, alone or in co-operation with other states, to the further development of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Furthermore, it is indispensable to ensure a free transfer of nuclear technology, including its latest achievements and its use in the interest of the accelerated development of states Party to the Treaty and, particularly, of the developing ones,</li> <li>• (Page 1, Para 4) <u>Confirming</u> that each country's choice and decision in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international co-operation agreements and</li> </ul>

	<p>contracts for peaceful uses of nuclear energy,</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, Para 5) <u>Expressing dissatisfaction</u> with the implementation of preambular paragraphs 6 and 7 and of Article IV, as well as with the related obligation deriving from the "Final Document of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of May 1975",</li> <li>• (Page 2, Para 2) <u>Noting with regret</u> that the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, originally planned for 1983 and held from 23 March to 10 April 1987 at Geneva - while recognizing that nuclear energy could contribute to economic and social development and to the well-being of many countries, and urging that international peaceful nuclear co-operation be enhanced and broadened – was unable to reach agreement on "principles universally acceptable for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and on appropriate ways and means for the promotion of such co-operation, as envisaged in the United Nations General Assembly resolution 32/50, and in accordance with mutually acceptable considerations of non-proliferation",</li> <li>• (Page 3, Point 1) <u>Calls on</u> all nuclear supplier states Party to the Treaty to respect the inalienable right of the developing states Party to the Treaty to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs;</li> <li>• (Page 3, Point 2) <u>Calls on</u> all States Party to the Treaty, especially nuclear supplier states, to significantly increase their technical assistance, bilaterally and through international bodies such as IAEA and UNDP, in order to meet the growing needs of the developing countries Party to the Treaty in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy;</li> <li>• (Page 3, Point 3) <u>Requests</u> that the World Bank, UNDP, IAEA and other relevant international organizations accord priority and provide increased funding to projects in developing countries Party to the Treaty in the field of non-energy applications of nuclear technology and in this context, special attention be accorded to least developed countries;</li> <li>• (Page 4, Point 7) <u>Reiterates</u> that: a. concern for non-proliferation should not be used as a pretext to prevent States party to the Treaty from acquiring and developing nuclear technology for peaceful uses and to impose conditions which are incompatible with the sovereign rights and independence of countries;</li> <li>• (Page 4, Point 8,) <u>Emphasizes</u> that: ... e. more developing countries Party to the NPT should enjoy and benefit from the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund for the development of their nuclear energy programme for peaceful purposes;</li> </ul>
<p><b>Access to/transfer of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, Para 3) <u>Stressing</u> that, in the framework of Article IV. 2 of the Treaty, all Parties to the Treaty have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, services and scientific and technological information and to contribute, alone or in co-operation with other states, to the further development of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.</li> <li>• (Page 2, Para 1) <u>Noting with deep concern</u> that instead of facilitating the fullest exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, and particularly developing countries as called for by the Treaty, some States Party to the Treaty continue to co-operate and give assistance in the nuclear field to States not Party to the Treaty and which are known to have acquired the capability to manufacture nuclear</li> </ul>

	<p>weapons, while at the same time apply discriminatory policies against the non-nuclear-weapon developing States party to the Treaty;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, Para 4) <u>Considering</u> that the unilaterally enforced restrictive measures beyond safeguards required under the Treaty are in contradiction with the spirit of the Treaty, since they seriously limit the right of the non-nuclear-weapon states Party to the Treaty to develop research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and that some of them indirectly affect the sovereign rights of the Party to the Treaty; that such measures have contributed to a slow-down in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and have caused serious complications in relations between the Parties and have eroded confidence. Furthermore, establishment of multilateral agreements such as the London Suppliers Club and also the enactment of unilateral and retroactive laws in certain supplier countries have further eroded the right of access by the developing countries Party to the Treaty in gaining access to the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and nuclear power in particular,</li> <li>• (Page 2, Para 6) <u>Reaffirming</u> the responsibility of nuclear supplier States Party to the Treaty to promote the legitimate nuclear energy needs of the States Party to the Treaty, especially developing ones, by allowing the latter to participate in the fullest possible transfer of nuclear equipment, materials, scientific and technological information,</li> <li>• (Page 4, Point 8) Emphasizes that: a. no single State or group of States shall impose unilaterally or collectively any precondition of access to or transfer of equipment, materials, services and scientific and technical information, nor impose any non-proliferation conditions which go beyond the safeguards required under the Treaty;</li> <li>• (Page 4, Point 8) Emphasizes that: ... b. non-proliferation requirements in future transactions should be limited to conditions and criteria agreed to by the Board of Governors of the IAEA;</li> <li>• (Page 4, point 8) Emphasizes that: ... c. non-nuclear weapon States party to the Treaty and States that have safeguards equal to those required under Article III.1 of the Treaty should be provided preferential treatment in access to or transfer of equipment, materials, services, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking particularly into account the special needs of developing countries. In doing so, special attention shall also be given to the needs of the least developed countries;</li> </ul>
IAEA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, Para 3) <u>Noting also with regret</u> that the IAEA's Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) to consider, first, ways and means in which supplies of nuclear materials, equipment and technology and fuel cycle services can be assured on a more predictable and longer-term basis in accordance with mutually acceptable considerations of non-proliferation: and second, the Agency's role to reach agreement on a set of principles for international co-operation and that in 1987 it suspended its formal discussions,</li> <li>• (Page 3, Para 1) <u>Recognizing</u> the special needs of the developing countries for technical assistance by the IAEA in order to benefit effectively from the application of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, as well as from the contribution of nuclear energy to their economic development,</li> <li>• (Page 3, Para 2) <u>Commending</u> the role and activities of [the importance of the work of] the IAEA in the field of technical assistance and co-operation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, for the benefit of developing countries in particular, but noting with regret that the technical assistance budget of the IAEA currently is in no way conducive to the goals of the Agency in this respect, considering especially its unassured voluntary</li> </ul>

	<p>nature,</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, Para 3) <u>Conscious</u> of the importance of the work of the IAEA in the implementation of safeguard provisions of the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] and other international treaties, conventions and agreements,</li> <li>• (Page 3, Para 4) <u>Further</u> recognizing the importance of the work of the IAEA on nuclear power, nuclear safety, radiological protection and radioactive waste management including its work directed towards assisting developing countries in planning for the introduction of nuclear power in accordance with their needs,</li> <li>• (Page 3, Para 5) <u>Recognizing also</u> the benefits from the IAEA-sponsored Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund for the developing countries Party to the Treaty in the development of their nuclear energy programme for peaceful purposes.</li> <li>• (Page 3, Point 4) <u>Calls upon</u> the States Party belonging to the donor community which are in a position to do so, to provide resources to a Trust Fund to be managed by the IAEA in order to fund "technically sound" project requests for assistance submitted by developing countries Party to the Treaty, without prejudice to existing arrangements for the financing of technical co-operation projects;</li> <li>• (Page 3, Point 5) <u>Requests</u> the IAEA to take the necessary steps to further increase technical assistance by allocating more funds for this purpose to the developing countries for the application of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, as well as for the contribution of nuclear energy to their economic development;</li> <li>• (Page 4, Point 9) <u>Urges</u> that States Party to the Treaty which are in a position to do so, assure the further expansion of the activities of the IAEA for the promotion of international co-operation in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and for the further development of these uses;</li> <li>• (Page 5, Point 10) <u>Requests further</u> the IAEA to fully implement its General Conference resolutions which request the Director General, <u>inter alia</u>, to provide, upon request, assistance in securing finance from outside sources for nuclear power projects in developing countries;</li> <li>• (Page 5, Point 11) <u>Calls on</u> the IAEA to further expand its activities for the promotion of international co-operation in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and non-energy applications for their further development and urges all States Party to the Treaty to substantially increase in real terms, their support required for these objectives;</li> <li>• (Page 5, Point 12) <u>Calls further</u> on the IAEA to render greater support for regional co-operative agreements promoting regional projects based on regionally-agreed priorities and using inputs from intra as well as extra-regional countries;</li> </ul>
<p><b>Assurance of supplies / multilateral approach to nuclear fuel supply</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, Para 3) <u>Noting also with regret</u> that the IAEA's Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) to consider, first, ways and means in which supplies of nuclear materials, equipment and technology and fuel cycle services can be assured on a more predictable and longer-term basis in accordance with mutually acceptable considerations of non-proliferation: and second, the Agency's role to reach agreement on a set of principles for international co-operation and that in 1987 it suspended its formal discussions,</li> <li>• (Page 4, Point 6) <u>Requests</u> all States Party to the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] to set up a consultative mechanism among them in order to examine the problem of supplies of nuclear materials, technology and services;</li> <li>• (Page 4, Point 7, b) <u>Reiterates</u> that: all contracts in force in the nuclear</li> </ul>

	<p>field for peaceful uses should be honoured by the nuclear supplier States Party to the Treaty;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, Point 7) <u>Reiterates</u> that: ... c. threats of cut-off of supplies covered by contracts or agreements in force must not be used as an instrument of negotiation;</li> <li>• (Page 4, Point 8) <u>Emphasizes</u> that: ... d. States Party to the Treaty should set up conditions for long term assurances of supply;</li> <li>• (Page 5, Point 13) <u>Stresses</u> the importance of the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply in establishing principles for international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the adoption of measures to assure the long-term supply of nuclear material, equipment and technology in a predictable manner, with appropriate assurances against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and urges the prompt renewal of its formal discussions. In this respect the full co-operation of the nuclear supplier States Party to the Treaty;</li> </ul>
<b>Attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 5, Point 14) <u>Reaffirms</u> the inviolability of peaceful nuclear facilities emanating from the international norms prohibiting the use of force in international relations, and in particular Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter;</li> <li>• (Page 5, Point 15) <u>Reaffirms also</u> that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities would entail highly dangerous political, economic and environmental implications, particularly for civilian inhabitants;</li> <li>• (Page 5, Point 16) <u>Believes</u> that the States Party to the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] bear a solemn responsibility to continue to play a leading role in the relevant forum towards the establishment of comprehensive and universal norms and standards, specifically prohibiting attacks, or threats of attack, against all peaceful nuclear facilities.</li> </ul>
<b>Nuclear safety and security</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, Para 4) <u>Further recognizing</u> the importance of the work of the IAEA on nuclear power, nuclear safety, radiological protection and radioactive waste management including its work directed towards assisting developing countries in planning for the introduction of nuclear power in accordance with their needs,</li> </ul>
<b>Nonproliferation</b>	
<b>Nonproliferation and peaceful uses</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, Point 7) <u>Reiterates</u> that: a. concern for non-proliferation should not be used as a pretext to prevent States party to the Treaty from acquiring and developing nuclear technology for peaceful uses and to impose conditions which are incompatible with the sovereign rights and independence of countries;</li> </ul>
<b>Export Control</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, Point 8) <u>Emphasizes</u> that: a. no single State or group of States shall impose unilaterally or collectively any precondition of access to or transfer of equipment, materials, services and scientific and technical information, nor impose any non-proliferation conditions which go beyond the safeguards required under the Treaty;</li> <li>• (Page 4, Point 8) <u>Emphasizes</u> that: ... b. non-proliferation requirements in future transactions should be limited to conditions and criteria agreed to by the Board of Governors of the IAEA;</li> </ul>

**Draft Resolution on disarmament and other security related issues  
(NPT/CONF.IV/L.1)**

**Disarmament**

<b>General views on</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, Point 1) <u>Urges</u> all States, Parties and non-Parties to the Treaty [on</li> </ul>
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<p><b>disarmament</b></p>	<p>the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons], to contribute to the achievement of the objective of a world entirely free of nuclear weapons;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, Para. 2) <u>Recalling further</u> Article VI of the Treaty wherein "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control",</li> <li>• (Page 1, Para 5) <u>Reaffirming</u> its desire to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,</li> <li>• (Page 2, Point 4) <u>Calls upon</u> the governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the United States of America to redouble their efforts on the field of nuclear disarmament and to proceed to adopt the following concrete steps to enhance the possibility of a significant extension of the Treaty beyond 1995: ... c) to agree to a complete freeze on the testing, production and deployment of all nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles and to commence negotiations for such purposes early in 1991;</li> <li>• (Page 2, Point 4) <u>Calls upon</u> the governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the United States of America to redouble their efforts on the field of nuclear disarmament and to proceed to adopt the following concrete steps to enhance the possibility of a significant extension of the Treaty beyond 1995: ... e) to intensify their negotiations on the reduction of nuclear weapons and to undertake negotiations with the other nuclear-weapon states for the complete elimination of such weapons;</li> <li>• (Page 2, Point 4) <u>Calls upon</u> the governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the United States of America to redouble their efforts on the field of nuclear disarmament and to proceed to adopt the following concrete steps to enhance the possibility of a significant extension of the Treaty beyond 1995: ... j) to promote negotiations on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control;</li> <li>• (Page 3, Point 6) <u>Calls upon</u> the Conference on Disarmament: ... f) to resume in 1991 negotiations on a comprehensive programme of disarmament;</li> <li>• (Page 3, Point 6) <u>Calls upon</u> the Conference on Disarmament: ... g) to begin negotiations in 1991 on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control;</li> </ul>
<p><b>Role of NWS</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, Point 4) <u>Calls upon</u> the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United- States of America to redouble their efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament and to proceed to adopt the following concrete steps to enhance the possibility of a significant extension of the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] beyond 1995: ... e) to intensify their negotiations on the reduction of nuclear weapons and to undertake negotiations with the other nuclear-weapon states for the complete elimination of such weapons;</li> </ul>
<p><b>Fissile materials / FMCT</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, Point 4) <u>Calls upon</u> the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United- States of America to redouble their efforts in the</li> </ul>

	field of nuclear disarmament and to proceed to adopt the following concrete steps to enhance the possibility of a significant extension of the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] beyond 1995: ... d) to cease completely the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes and to commence negotiations on a verifiable treaty on this subject early in 1991;
<b>NWC (Time bound total elimination)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, Point 6) <u>Calls upon</u> the Conference on Disarmament: ... g) to begin negotiations in 1991 on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.</li> </ul>
<b>Outer space</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, Point 6) <u>Calls upon</u> the Conference on Disarmament: ... e) to undertake in 1991 negotiations for a treaty on the prevention of an arms race in outer space;</li> </ul>
<b>Nuclear testing</b>	
<b>General views on nuclear testing</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, Para 3) <u>Mindful also</u> of the tenth preambular paragraph of the Treaty wherein the Parties recalled "the determination expressed by the Parties of the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end",</li> <li>• (Page 2, Point 4) <u>Calls upon</u> the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United- States of America to redouble their efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament and to proceed to adopt the following concrete steps to enhance the possibility of a significant extension of the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] beyond 1995: a) to institute, as a provisional measure pending the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, an immediate moratorium on all nuclear testing;</li> <li>• (Page 2, Point 4) <u>Calls upon</u> the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United- States of America to redouble their efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament and to proceed to adopt the following concrete steps to enhance the possibility of a significant extension of the Treaty beyond 1995: ... c) to agree to a complete freeze on the testing, production and deployment of all nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles and to commence negotiations for such purposes early in 1991;</li> </ul>
<b>CTBT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, Point 4) <u>Calls upon</u> the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United- States of America to redouble their efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament and to proceed to adopt the following concrete steps to enhance the possibility of a significant extension of the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] beyond 1995: ... b) to support fully the Partial Test Ban Amendment Conference and to commit themselves at that Conference to pursue negotiations in good faith with a view to achieving a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty prior to 1995, as an indispensable step towards implementing their obligations under Article VI of the Non-proliferation Treaty</li> <li>• (Page 3, Point 6) <u>Calls upon</u> the Conference on Disarmament: a) to undertake in 1991 negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty;</li> </ul>
<b>PTBT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, Para 3) <u>Mindful also</u> of the tenth preambular paragraph of the Treaty Wherein the Parties recalled "the determination expressed by the Parties of the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end",</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, Point 4) Calls upon the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United- States of America to redouble their efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament and to proceed to adopt the following concrete steps to enhance the possibility of a significant extension of the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] beyond 1995: ... b) to support fully the Partial Test Ban Amendment Conference and to commit themselves at that Conference to pursue negotiations in good faith with a view to achieving a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty prior to 1995, as an indispensable step towards implementing their obligations under Article VI of the Non-proliferation Treaty;</li> </ul>
<b>Security Assurances</b>	
<b>General views on security assurances</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, Point 4) Calls upon the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United- States of America to redouble their efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament and to proceed to adopt the following concrete steps to enhance the possibility of a significant extension of the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] beyond 1995: ... f) to make, together with all nuclear-weapon States, a solemn declaration that each of them will never be the first to use nuclear weapons;</li> <li>• (Page 2, Point 4) Calls upon the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United- States of America to redouble their efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament and to proceed to adopt the following concrete steps to enhance the possibility of a significant extension of the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] beyond 1995: ...g) within the context of the proposal submitted in November 1989 on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT, to convene a Conference not later than 1991 in order to conclude an agreement aimed at assuring non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;</li> <li>• (Page 3, Point 6) <u>Calls upon</u> the Conference on Disarmament: ... b) to intensify negotiations with a view to concluding an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;</li> </ul>
<b>Legally binding NSA</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, Point 6) <u>Calls upon</u> the Conference on Disarmament: ... b) to intensify negotiations with a view to concluding an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;</li> </ul>
<b>General views on NPT</b>	
<b>General views on NPT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, Para 4) <u>Committed</u> to the strengthening of the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, and convinced of the need that it become a universal regime,</li> <li>• (Page 2, Point 3) <u>Urges</u> all states Parties to the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] to comply fully with the letter and the spirit of the Treaty;</li> </ul>
<b>Institutional issues</b>	
<b>Reporting</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, Point 4) <u>Calls upon</u> the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United- States of America to redouble their efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament and to proceed to adopt the following concrete steps to enhance the possibility of a significant extension of the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] beyond 1995: ... k)</li> </ul>



	to report to all Parties to the Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons on the progress of their negotiations by 1 September 1991 and annually thereafter;
<b>Procedural matters</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, Para 1) <u>Recalling</u> that the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] entered into force on March 5, 1970, and that in paragraph 2 of Article X it stipulates that "Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods" and that "This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty",</li> </ul>
<b>Universality</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, Para 4) <u>Committed</u> to the strengthening of the regime of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, and convinced of the need that it become a universal regime,</li> <li>• (Page 2, point 2) <u>Urges</u> all states that are not yet Parties to the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] to adhere to it,</li> </ul>
<b>NWFZ</b>	
<b>General views on NWFZ</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, Point 4) <u>Calls upon</u> the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United- States of America to redouble their efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament and to proceed to adopt the following concrete steps to enhance the possibility of a significant extension of the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] beyond 1995: ... h) to respect and adhere to those international instruments that have established nuclear-weapon-free zones, and to support the initiatives taken by State or States Parties in accordance with article VII of the Treaty with a view to establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned;</li> <li>• (Page 3, Point 4) <u>Calls upon</u> the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United- States of America to redouble their efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament and to proceed to adopt the following concrete steps to enhance the possibility of a significant extension of the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] beyond 1995: ... i) to respect those zones of peace that have been declared;</li> </ul>
<b>Other Fora</b>	
<b>CD</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, Point 6) <u>Calls upon</u> the Conference on Disarmament: a) to undertake in 1991 negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty;</li> <li>• (Page 3, Point 6) <u>Calls upon</u> the Conference on Disarmament: ... b) to intensify negotiations with a view to concluding an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;</li> <li>• (Page 3, Point 6) <u>Calls upon</u> the Conference on Disarmament: ... c) to resume in 1991 and intensify negotiations on a prohibition of radiological weapons, including armed attacks or the threat of attacks against nuclear facilities;</li> <li>• (Page 3, Point 6) <u>Calls upon</u> the Conference on Disarmament: ... d) intensify negotiations with a view to concluding at the earliest possible date a convention for the elimination of all chemical weapons;</li> <li>• (Page 3, Point 6) <u>Calls upon</u> the Conference on Disarmament: ... e) to undertake in 1991 negotiations for a treaty on the prevention of an arms race in outer space;</li> <li>• (Page 3, Point 6) <u>Calls upon</u> the Conference on Disarmament: ... f) to resume in 1991 negotiations on a comprehensive programme of disarmament;</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• (Page 3, Point 6) <u>Calls upon</u> the Conference on Disarmament: ... g) to begin negotiations in 1991 on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.</li></ul>
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