

**2000 NPT Preparatory Committee Working Papers Submitted by the NAM**

<b>NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/10: Working paper presented by the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)</b>	
<b>Institutional issues</b>	
<b>General views on NPT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• (Page 1, Para 1). The forthcoming meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will be the harbinger of a new era in our continuing endeavours to strengthen the review process of the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty in their entirety are being realized and thereby fulfill the commitments undertaken by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of Parties to the Treaty.</li><li>• (Page 2, Para 3) The Treaty is a key instrument to halt vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. The international community should work towards a fair balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States with a view to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.</li><li>• (Page 3, Para 10) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has a vital role to play in preserving the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects. The international community should make all the possible efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty.</li><li>• (Page 2, Para 2) The decisions and resolution of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference constitute a single integral undertaking. This integrality should be maintained and respected.</li></ul>
<b>Universality</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• (Page 2, Para 4) At the Cartagena summit meeting, the heads of State or Government of countries belonging to the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, consistent with the decisions and resolution adopted by the 1995 Review Conference, called upon all States and, in particular, the nuclear-weapon States, to fulfil the commitments they have undertaken in their entirety, inter alia: (a) The achievement of universality of the Treaty;</li><li>• (Page 3, Para 8) The States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emphasize the urgency and the importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty.</li><li>• (Page 3, Para 9) The Preparatory Committee meetings and the Review Conference should consider ways and means to achieve the universality of the Treaty, particularly by the accession to the Treaty at the earliest possible date of those States possessing nuclear capabilities.</li></ul>

<p><b>Procedural matters</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, Para 6) The purpose of the upcoming meeting of the Preparatory Committee would be to consider ways to promote full implementation of and universal adherence to provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to make recommendations to the 2000 Review Conference. The Preparatory Committee meetings should make substantive contributions, taken into account by the 1995 decisions on "Strengthening the review process" and "Principles and objectives" in order to enable the Review Conference to evaluate the full realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty and identify the areas in which further progress should be sought in the future.</li> <li>• (Page 3, Para 7) The preparations for the 2000 Review Conference provide an opportunity for the realization of the objectives enshrined in the Treaty. For the successful outcome of the Review Conference substantive preparation should be made by the Preparatory Committee meetings in order to elaborate rolling texts to be submitted for consideration by the Conference, as basis for its final document. In this context, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries offers its preliminary views...</li> <li>• (Page 6, Para 28) Taking the above into consideration, the upcoming meetings of the Preparatory Committee could be organized as follows: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) On substantive discussions, attention should be focused on issues of concern to all States parties, utilizing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as well as the decisions taken in the 1995 Review and Extension Conference as the yardsticks in determining the objectives to be achieved by the Review Conference to be held in the year 2000. It should be discussed in a structured, coherent and focused manner in order to obtain the maximum results as to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference;</li> <li>(b) The formulation of recommendations to be considered by the Review Conference shall not replace the evaluation of the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons since the Conference in 1995. The States parties to the Treaty should start negotiations in the first Preparatory Committee on a rolling text on the implementation of all the articles and preamble of the Treaty;</li> <li>(c) States parties of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons welcome the participation of non-governmental organizations, which could also make a positive contribution towards the attainment of these objectives.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<p><b>Nuclear Disarmament</b></p>	
<p><b>General views on disarmament</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, Para 4) At the Cartagena summit meeting, the heads of State or Government of countries belonging to the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, consistent with the decisions and resolution adopted by the 1995 Review Conference, called upon all States and, in particular, the nuclear-weapon States, to fulfil the commitments they have undertaken in their entirety, inter alia: (d) The elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, which must be accorded priority;</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, Para 5) Significant progress has been achieved in recent years in disarmament: inter alia the conclusion and the entry into force of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; adoption and the commencement of the preparatory process for the implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, adoption of an amended Protocol II and Protocol IV of the Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects; the conclusion of the treaties on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Southeast Asia (Bangkok Treaty) and in Africa (Pelindaba Treaty), which effectively mean that the entire southern hemisphere is covered by nuclear-weapon-free zones; and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. However, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries continues to believe that many important and significant tasks remain ahead of it, particularly on the shaping of the future agenda for nuclear disarmament.</li> <li>• (Page 4, Para 12) The nuclear-weapon States should express their commitment to undertake a step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat and a phased programme of progressive and deep reductions of nuclear weapons, and to carry out effective nuclear disarmament measures with a view to the total elimination of these weapons.</li> </ul>
<b>Fissile materials / FMCT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, Para 4) At the Cartagena summit meeting, the heads of State or Government of countries belonging to the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, consistent with the decisions and resolution adopted by the 1995 Review Conference, called upon all States and, in particular, the nuclear-weapon States, to fulfil the commitments they have undertaken in their entirety, inter alia: (c) A ban on fissile materials and other nuclear devices for weapon purposes;</li> <li>• (Page 4, Para 14) States parties support the establishment of a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices in the Conference on Disarmament. It would be a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation provided that such a treaty is non-discriminatory, effectively verifiable and universally applicable.</li> </ul>
<b>NWC (Time bound total elimination)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, Para 11) [The Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties [to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] should agree on a recommendation to the Conference on Disarmament to establish, on a priority basis, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time, including a nuclear-weapons convention. A universal and legally binding multilateral agreement should be concluded committing all States to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and to commence negotiations on a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. The ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament would take into account the proposal for a programme of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons submitted by 28 members of the Conference belonging to the Group of 21</li> </ul>

	<p>(CD/1419) as well as any other existing proposals and future initiatives in this regard. In this context, the nuclear-weapon States should adopt flexible approach, taking into account their commitment, as stated in article VI of the Treaty, to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.</p>
<p><b>Security Assurances</b></p>	
<p><b>Legally binding security assurance</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, Para 4) At the Cartagena summit meeting, the heads of State or Government of countries belonging to the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, consistent with the decisions and resolution adopted by the 1995 Review Conference, called upon all States and, in particular, the nuclear-weapon States, to fulfil the commitments they have undertaken in their entirety, inter alia: ... (b) The conclusion of legally binding instruments to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;</li> <li>• (Page 4, Para 13) The total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only genuine guarantee for all non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of such a goal, a legally binding negative security assurances regime which will ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons must be urgently concluded. In this regard, there is no objection, in principle, in the Conference on Disarmament and the General Assembly, to the idea of an international legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Hence, the States parties should agree to negotiate, in the Preparatory Committee meetings for the 2000 Review Conference on a legal instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to be finally adopted by the 2000 Review Conference as a protocol annexed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</li> </ul>
<p><b>NWFZ</b></p>	
<p><b>General views on Nuclear Weapon Free Zone</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, Para 4) At the Cartagena summit meeting, the heads of State or Government of countries belonging to the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, consistent with the decisions and resolution adopted by the 1995 Review Conference, called upon all States and, in particular, the nuclear-weapon States, to fulfil the commitments they have undertaken in their entirety, inter alia: ... (e) The establishment of nuclear-free zones;</li> <li>• (Page 5, Para 21) Taking into account article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the decision of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference relating to the establishment of such zones, States parties should express support on measures taken by a State party or group of States parties to establish nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and support proposals to establish these zones in other parts of the world where they do not exist on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned as a measure towards the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation regimes and realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament. States parties should welcome the initiative taken by States in Central Asia freely arrived at among themselves to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(Page 5, Para 22) The States parties and signatories to the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba should promote the common goals envisaged in those treaties, explore and implement further ways and means of cooperation, including the consolidation of the status of the nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas.</li> </ul>
<b>Peaceful Uses</b>	
<b>General views on peaceful purposes</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(Page 2, Para 4) At the Cartagena summit meeting, the heads of State or Government of countries belonging to the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, consistent with the decisions and resolution adopted by the 1995 Review Conference, called upon all States and, in particular, the nuclear-weapon States, to fulfil the commitments they have undertaken in their entirety, inter alia: ... (f) The unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to all States parties without exception.</li> <li>(Page 5, Para 18) The inalienable right of all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination must be reaffirmed by all nuclear and non-nuclear States parties alike. It is also essential that free and unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to all States parties be fully guaranteed. States parties should reaffirm their commitment to the implementation of article IV of the Treaty.</li> <li>(Page 5, Para 20) In all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty, taking into account particularly the needs of developing countries.</li> </ul>
<b>Access to/transfer of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(Page 5, Para 18) The inalienable right of all [Non-Aligned Movement] States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination must be reaffirmed by all nuclear and non-nuclear States parties alike. It is also essential that free and unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to all States parties be fully guaranteed. States parties should reaffirm their commitment to the implementation of article IV of the Treaty.</li> <li>(Page 5, Para 19) Unilaterally enforced restrictive measures, beyond safeguards required under the Treaty, which prevent peaceful nuclear development should be removed.</li> </ul>
<b>Safeguards and verification</b>	
<b>IAEA</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(Page 4, Para 15) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are an essential element in providing a guarantee that States are complying with article III undertakings. All [Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties [to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] that have not yet done so should sign without delay the safeguard agreements required by article III of the Treaty.</li> </ul>

<b>General views on safeguards</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, Para 16) The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons believe that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source of special fissionable material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of a special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require as a necessary precondition, acceptance of full-scope safeguards.</li> <li>• (Page 5, Para. 17) Nuclear material transferred from military uses to peaceful activities should be placed under IAEA safeguards.</li> </ul>
<b>Regional issues: the Middle East</b>	
<b>1995 Resolution and ME</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 5, Para 23) It has to be noted that no progress has been achieved in the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The Preparatory Committee meetings should follow up on the implementation of the provisions of this resolution with a view to reporting to the Review Conference on the progress achieved in this regard.</li> <li>• (Page 6, Para 25) The Movement of Non-Aligned States are convinced that the implementation of this resolution should proceed as soon as possible with a view to enhancing the universality of the Treaty and the non-proliferation regime as a whole. In this regard, the meetings of the Preparatory Committee should welcome the latest accessions to the Treaty and call upon Israel to accede to it without further delay as well as to place its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.</li> <li>• (Page 6, Para 27) The depository States of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have a special responsibility in this regard, as co-sponsors of the draft resolution submitted for adoption by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and as the resolution constitutes part and parcel of the package of the outcome composed of three decisions and the resolution.</li> </ul>
<b>Israel</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 5, Para 24) Since the adoption of the resolution, new realities have emerged in the Middle East pertaining to adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. With the latest accession of United Arab Emirates, Djibouti and Oman, it is now a reality that all States of the Middle East have become parties to the Treaty with the exception of Israel.</li> <li>• (Page 6, Para 25). The Movement of Non-Aligned States are convinced that the implementation of this resolution should proceed as soon as possible with a view to enhancing the universality of the Treaty and the non-proliferation regime as a whole. In this regard, the meetings of the Preparatory Committee should welcome the latest accessions to the Treaty and call upon Israel to accede to it without further delay as well as to place its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.</li> </ul>
<b>Other Fora</b>	
<b>Conference on Disarmament</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, Para 11) The [Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties [to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] should agree on a recommendation to the Conference on Disarmament to establish, on a priority basis, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time, including a nuclear-weapons convention. A universal and legally</li> </ul>



	<p>binding multilateral agreement should be concluded committing all States to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and to commence negotiations on a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. The ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament would take into account the proposal for a programme of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons submitted by 28 members of the Conference belonging to the Group of 21 (CD/1419) as well as any other existing proposals and future initiatives in this regard. In this context, the nuclear-weapon States should adopt flexible approach, taking into account their commitment, as stated in article VI of the Treaty, to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.</p>
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**NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/5:  
Working paper presented by the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)**

**Institutional issues**

<b>Procedural matters</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1) The Non-Aligned Movement States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons believe, in terms of the strengthened review process and in the context of fully implementing the Treaty and in pursuant to the decisions and resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, that recommendations which have been deliberated upon throughout its preparatory process, should be forwarded to the Review Conference in 2000 for further refining, finalization and adoption. We also believe that this kind of approach will strengthen the review process and will provide the basis for a successful outcome of the 2000 Review Conference.</li> </ul>
<b>General views on NPT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, Preamb., Para 1) The [Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties believe that the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] is a key instrument to halt vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and they will work towards a fair balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States with a view to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 2, Preamb., Para 2) The States Parties undertake to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States Parties to the Treaty and they shall fulfill their commitments on the unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of materials, equipments, scientific and technological information for peaceful uses of nuclear energy to all States Parties without exception.</li> <li>• (Page 2, Art. 1, Para 3) The States Parties agree that the strict observance of the terms of Article I remains central to achieving the shared objectives of preventing under any circumstances further proliferation of nuclear weapons and preserving the Treaty's vital contribution to peace and security.</li> </ul>
<b>Strengthening the</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 6, Art. VIII, Para 30) The [Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties</li> </ul>

<b>review process</b>	[to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] will continue their endeavors to strengthen the review process of the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty in their entirety are being realized.
<b>Universality</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 6, Art. IX, Para 31) The [Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties [to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] emphasize the urgency and the importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty, particularly by the accession to the Treaty at the earliest possible date of those States possessing nuclear capabilities. They will make determined efforts to achieve this goal.</li> </ul>
<b>Peaceful Uses</b>	
<b>Access to/transfer of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, Preamb., Para 2) The [Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties [to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] undertake to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States Parties to the Treaty and they shall fulfill their commitments on the unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of materials, equipments, scientific and technological information for peaceful uses of nuclear energy to all States Parties without exception.</li> <li>• (Page 2, Art. 1, Para 5) The States Parties remain concerned about the ability of certain States not parties to the Treaty to obtain nuclear materials, technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons. The States Parties call for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to States non-parties to the Treaty without exception.</li> <li>• (Page 4, Art. IV, Para 14) The States Parties reaffirm the responsibility of nuclear supplier states parties to the Treaty to promote the legitimate needs of nuclear energy of the states parties to the Treaty, with preferential treatment rendered to developing ones, by allowing the latter to participate to the fullest in possible transfer of nuclear equipment, materials, scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes with a view to achieving the largest benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities.</li> </ul>
<b>General views on peaceful uses</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, Art. IV, Para 12) The [Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties [to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] reaffirm their inalienable right to engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination; and that free and unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to all States Parties be fully ensured.</li> <li>• (Page 3, Art. IV, Para 13. The States Parties reaffirm that beyond safeguards required under the Treaty, unilaterally enforced restrictive measures which prevent peaceful nuclear development should be removed.</li> <li>• (Page 4, Art. IV, Para 16) The States Parties encourage the adoption of appropriate measures to regulate international maritime transportation of radioactive waste and spent fuel to the highest standards in international security and support current efforts within the IAEA to adopt and improve international regulations in that regard.</li> </ul>
<b>Attack or threat of</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, Art. IV, Para 15) The [Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties [to</li> </ul>



<p><b>attack peaceful facilities</b></p> <p><b>against nuclear</b></p>	<p>the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] reaffirm the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities emanating from the international norms prohibiting the use of force in international relations, and in particular Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter in considering that any attacks or threat of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy would entail highly dangerous political, economic and environmental implications particularly on the civilian inhabitants; and believe that they bear a solemn responsibility to continue to play a leading role towards the establishment of comprehensive and universal norms and standards specifically prohibiting attacks, or threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.</p>
<p><b>Disarmament</b></p>	
<p><b>General views on disarmament</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, Art. I, Para 4) The Nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT reaffirm their commitments to the fullest implementation of this Article and to refrain from, among themselves, with non-nuclear weapons states, and with States not party to the Treaty, nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements.</li> <li>• (Page 4, Art. VI, Para 20) The States Parties note with regret that, despite the conclusion of limited agreements, the provisions of article VI and the ninth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty have not been fulfilled since the Treaty came into force. In this regard, the States Parties stress the need to take effective measures towards nuclear disarmament, thus reaffirming their role in achieving this objective.</li> <li>• (Page 5, Art. VI, Para 21) The States Parties reaffirm that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of the civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. In this context, the goal is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In the task of achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament, all States Parties bear responsibility, in particular those nuclear-weapon States which possess the most important nuclear arsenals.</li> <li>• (Page 5, Art. VI, Para 23) The States Parties reaffirm their commitment to fulfil with determination their obligations under article VI, in particular nuclear-weapon States to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.</li> <li>• (Page 5, Art. VI, Para 24) The States Parties in particular the nuclear-weapon States shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the efforts and measures they have taken on the implementation of the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Fissile materials / FMCT</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 5, Art. VI, Para 26) The [Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties [to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] renew their call for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations within an appropriate ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament for a treaty banning the production and stockpiling-of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as an essential measures of nuclear disarmament as well as non-proliferation of</li> </ul>

	<p>nuclear weapons taking into account the 1995 report of the Special Coordinator on that item and the views relating to the scope of the Treaty. The Treaty should be nondiscriminatory, effectively verifiable and universally applicable.</p>
<p><b>Safeguards and verification</b></p>	
<p><b>IAEA</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, Art. III, Para 7) The [Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties [to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] believe that the International Atomic Energy Agency is the competent authority to verify the compliance of the States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and reaffirm that IAEA safeguards are an essential element in guaranteeing compliance with their Article III undertakings. In this regard, all States Parties which have not yet done so should sign without delay the safeguards agreements required by Article III of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 3, Art. III, Para 9) The States Parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by any State Party should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the Agency to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate. Measures should be taken to ensure that the inalienable rights of all State Parties under the provisions of the preamble and articles of the Treaty are fully protected and that no state party is limited in the exercise of this right based on allegations of non-compliance not verified by the IAEA.</li> <li>• (Page 3, Art. III, Para 11) Every effort should be made to ensure that the IAEA has the financial and human resources necessary in order to meet effectively its responsibilities in the areas of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety.</li> </ul>
<p><b>General views on safeguards / verification</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, Art. III, Para 8) The [Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties [to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] call on the nuclear weapon States and all States not party to the Treaty to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope safeguards of IAEA.</li> <li>• (Page 3, Art. III, Para 9) The States Parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by any State Party should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the Agency to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate. Measures should be taken to ensure that the inalienable rights of all State Parties under the provisions of the preamble and articles of the Treaty are fully protected and that no state party is limited in the exercise of this right based on allegations of non-compliance not verified by the IAEA.</li> <li>• (Page 3, Art. III, Para 10) The States Parties support the principles that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of a special fissionable material to non-nuclear weapon States should require as a necessary precondition, acceptance by all States Parties of fullscope safeguards; and that excess nuclear material in military stockpiles and nuclear materials removed from nuclear weapons as a result of nuclear weapons reduction agreements should be placed under IAEA safeguards.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Nuclear Testing</b></p>	

<b>CTBT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, Art. V, Para 17) The [Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties [to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] will take into account all the provisions of the CTBT related to this Article.</li> <li>• (Page 4, Art. V, Para 18) The States Parties call upon the nuclear-weapon states to refrain from conducting all types of tests in conformity with the objectives of the CTBT. They also call upon nuclear-weapon states to provide transparency on-site and other measures to build confidence on the full implementation of the provisions of the Treaty in order to meet international concern.</li> <li>• (Page 4, Art. V, Para 19) The States Parties call upon all of the States which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT. Pending the entry into force of the CTBT, the States Parties called upon the nuclear-weapon states to comply with the letter and spirit of the CTBT.</li> </ul>
<b>Other Fora</b>	
<b>UN</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 5, Art. VI, Para 22) The [Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties [to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] reaffirm that priority in disarmament negotiations shall be nuclear weapons in accordance with the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament.</li> </ul>
<b>Conference on Disarmament</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 5, Art. VI, Para 25) The States Parties call upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament taking into account all proposals which have been submitted by members of the Group of 21, and to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a nuclear-weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, employment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination.</li> <li>• (Page 6, Art. VI, Para 27) The States parties regret the continuing lack of progress on items relevant to nuclear issues in the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament.</li> </ul>
<b>Nuclear Weapons Free Zones</b>	
<b>General views on NWFZ</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 6, Art. VII, Para. 28) The [Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties [to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] express support on measures taken by a State Party or Group of States Parties to conclude nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties. They also support proposals to these zones in other parts of the world where they do not exist, such as the Middle East and South Asia, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned as a measure towards the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation regime and realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament. States Parties welcome the initiative taken by States in Central Asia freely arrived at among themselves to establish a nuclear-weapon free zone in that region.</li> <li>• (Page 6, Art. VII, Para 29) The States parties and signatories to the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba that are parties to the NPT reaffirm their commitment to promote the common goals envisaged in those treaties, explore and implement further ways and means of cooperation, including the consolidation of the status of the nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas.</li> </ul>

<b>Security Assurances</b>	
<b>Legally binding security assurance</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(Page 6, Sec. Assurances, Para 32) The [Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties [to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] reaffirm that total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only genuine guarantee for all non-nuclear-weapons states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of such a goal, a legally-binding negative security assurances regime which will ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons must be urgently concluded. Hence, the States Parties should agree to negotiate, in the Preparatory Committee meetings for the NPT Review Conference in the year 2000 on a legal instrument to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to be finally adopted by the 2000 NPT Review Conference as an annexed protocol to the NPT. They note the Ad-hoc Committee on NSA established by the Conference on Disarmament in 1998 to conclude an international legally-binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.</li> </ul>
<b>Regional issues: the Middle East</b>	
<b>1995 Resolution and the ME</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(Page 7, Res. ME, Para 33) The [Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties [to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] recall that the adoption of the Resolution on the Middle East by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference on 11 May 1995 constituted an integral part of the package of the 1995 outcome comprising three decisions and a Resolution, and as such they reaffirm their firm commitment to work towards the full implementation of that Resolution. In this regard, the States parties recognize the special responsibility of the depository states, as cosponsors of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.</li> </ul>
<b>Israel</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(Page 7, Res. ME, Para 34) The [Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties [to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] note that since the adoption of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, all states in the region have become parties to the Treaty, with the exception of Israel. The States parties stress the urgent need for Israel to accede to the Treaty without further delay and to place all its nuclear facilities under full scope IAEA safeguards, in order to enhance the universality of the Treaty and to avert the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.</li> <li>(Page 7, Res. ME, Para 35) The nuclear-weapon-states, in conformity with their obligations under Article I of the Treaty, solemnly undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly to Israel, and further undertake not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce Israel to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices under any circumstances whatsoever.</li> <li>(Page 7, Res. ME, Para 36) All States Parties, in conformity with the seventh preambular paragraph and Article 4 of the Treaty, hereby declare their commitment to exclusively prohibit the transfer of all nuclear related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under fullscope</li> </ul>

	IAEA safeguards.
<b>General views on NWFZ in the ME</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(Page 7, Res. ME, Para 37) The [Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties [to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] reaffirm once again, their determination to extend their fullest cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment in the Middle East a zone free of nuclear as well as all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.</li> </ul>
<b>Nonproliferation</b>	
<b>General views on nonproliferation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(Page 2, Art. II, Para 6) Non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT reaffirm their commitments to the fullest implementation of this Article and to refrain from nuclear sharing with nuclear-weapon States, non nuclear-weapon States, and States not party to the Treaty for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements.</li> </ul>

<p><b>NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/1:</b></p> <p><b>WORKING PAPER PRESENTED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE</b></p> <p><b>MOVEMENT OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES PARTIES TO THE</b></p> <p><b>TREATY</b></p>	
<b>Institutional issues</b>	
<b>General views on NPT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(Page 2, Preamb., Para 1) The [Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties believe that the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] is a key instrument to halt vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and they will work towards a fair balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States with a view to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>(Page 3, Art. 1, Para 4) The States Parties agree that the strict observance of the terms of Article I remains central to achieving the shared objectives of preventing under any circumstances further proliferation of nuclear weapons and preserving the Treaty's vital contribution to peace and security.</li> </ul>
<b>Strengthen review process</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(Page 3, Preamb., Para 3) The [Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties [to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] agree that to ensure the effective implementation of the Treaty, and of decisions, resolutions and documents adopted at the Review Conference, an open-ended standing committee, which would work inter-sessionally to follow up recommendations concerning the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, should be established by the Treaty's 2000 Review Conference.</li> <li>(Page 7, Art 8, Para 34) The States Parties will continue their endeavors to strengthen the review process of the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty in their entirety are being realized.</li> </ul>
<b>Subsidiary body in Main Committee</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(Page 7, Art 6, Para 31) The [Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties [to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] recommend that the 2000 Review Conference establish a subsidiary body to its Main</li> </ul>

	<p>Committee I to deliberate on the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 9, Res. ME, Para 42) The States Parties recommend that the 2000 Review Conference establish a subsidiary body to its Main Committee II to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Universality</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 8, Art 9, Para 35) The [Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties [to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] reemphasize the urgency and the importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty, particularly by the accession to the Treaty at the earliest possible date of those States possessing nuclear capabilities. They will make determined efforts to achieve this goal.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Peaceful Uses</b></p>	
<p><b>Access to/transfer of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, Preamb., Para 2) The [Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties [to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] undertake to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States Parties to the Treaty and they shall fulfill their commitments on the unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of materials, equipments, scientific and technological information for peaceful uses of nuclear energy to all States Parties without exception.</li> <li>• (Page 3, Art.1, Para 5) The Nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT reaffirm their commitments to the fullest implementation of this Article and to refrain from, among themselves, with non-nuclear-weapon states, and with States not party to the Treaty, nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements.</li> <li>• (Page 3, Art. 1, Para 6) The States Parties remain concerned about the ability of certain States not parties to the Treaty to obtain nuclear materials, technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons. The States Parties call for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to States non-parties to the Treaty without exception.</li> <li>• (Page 3, Art. 2, Para 7) Non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT reaffirm their commitments to the fullest implementation of this Article and to refrain from nuclear sharing with nuclear-weapon States, non-nuclear-weapon States, and States not party to the Treaty for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements.</li> <li>• (Page 4, Art.3, Para 11) The States Parties support the principles that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of a special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require as a necessary precondition, acceptance by all States Parties of fullscope safeguards; and that excess nuclear material in military stockpiles and nuclear materials removed from nuclear weapons as a result of nuclear weapons reduction agreements should be placed under IAEA safeguards.</li> <li>• (Page 5, Art 4, Para 16) The States Parties reaffirm the responsibility of</li> </ul>



	<p>nuclear supplier states parties to the Treaty to promote the legitimate needs of nuclear energy of the States Parties to the Treaty, with preferential treatment rendered to developing ones, by allowing the latter to participate to the fullest in possible transfer of nuclear equipment, materials, scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes with a view to achieving the largest benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 8, Res. ME, Para 39) The nuclear-weapon states, in conformity with their obligations under Article I of the Treaty, solemnly undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly to Israel, and further undertake not in anyway to assist, encourage, or induce Israel to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices under any circumstances whatsoever.</li> <li>• (Page 9, Res. ME, Para 40) All States Parties, in conformity with the seventh preambular paragraph and Article 4 of the Treaty, hereby declare their commitment to exclusively prohibit the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of knowhow or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 5, Art. 4, Para 17) The [Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties [to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] reaffirm the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities emanating from the international norms prohibiting the use of force in international relations, and in particular Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter in considering that any attacks or threat of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy would entail highly dangerous political, economic and environmental implications particularly on the civilian inhabitants; and believe that they bear a solemn responsibility to continue to play a leading role towards the establishment of comprehensive and universal norms and standards specifically prohibiting attacks, or threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.</li> </ul>
<p><b>General views on Peaceful purposes</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, Art. 4, Para 13) The [Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties [to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] reaffirm their inalienable right to engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination; and that free and unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to all States Parties be fully ensured.</li> <li>• (Page 4, Art. 4, Para 15) The States Parties emphasized that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. Nonproliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States, and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access to material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes required by developing countries for their continued development.</li> <li>• (Page 5, Art. 4, Para 18) The States Parties encourage the adoption of</li> </ul>

	appropriate measures to regulate international maritime transportation of radioactive waste and spent fuel to the highest standards in international security and support current efforts within the IAEA to adopt and improve international regulations in that regard.
<b>Safeguards and verification</b>	
<b>IAEA</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, Art. 3, Para 8) The [Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties [to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] believe that the International Atomic Energy Agency is the competent authority to verify the compliance of the States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and reaffirm that IAEA safeguards are an essential element in guaranteeing compliance with their Article III undertakings. In this regard, all States Parties which have not yet done so should sign without delay the safeguards agreements required by Article III of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 4, Art. 3, Para 12) Every effort should be made to ensure that the IAEA has the financial and human resources necessary in order to meet effectively its responsibilities in the areas of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety.</li> </ul>
<b>General views on safeguards/verification</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, Art. 3, Para 8) The [Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties [to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] believe that the International Atomic Energy Agency is the competent authority to verify the compliance of the States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and reaffirm that IAEA safeguards are an essential element in guaranteeing compliance with their Article III undertakings. In this regard, all States Parties which have not yet done so should sign without delay the safeguards agreements required by Article III of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 4, Art.3, Para 9) The States Parties call on the nuclear-weapon States and all States not party to the Treaty to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope safeguards of IAEA.</li> <li>• (Page 4, Art 3, Para 10) The States Parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by any States Party should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the Agency to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate. Measures should be taken to ensure that the inalienable rights of all States Parties under the provisions of the preamble and articles of the Treaty are fully protected and that no state party is limited in the exercise of this right based on allegations of non-compliance not verified by the IAEA.</li> <li>• (Page 4, Art. 4, Para 14) The States Parties reaffirm that beyond safeguards required under the Treaty, unilaterally enforced restrictive measures which prevent peaceful nuclear development should be removed.</li> </ul>
<b>Nuclear Disarmament</b>	
<b>General views on disarmament</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 6, Art. 6, Para. 23) The [Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties [to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] to the survival of the civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. In this context, the goal is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In the task of achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament, all States Parties bear responsibility, in particular those nuclear-weapon States which possess the most important nuclear arsenals.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 8, Sec. Assurances, Para. 36) The States Parties reaffirm that total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only genuine guarantee for all non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of such a goal, a legally-binding negative security assurances regime which will ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons must be urgently concluded. Hence, the States Parties should agree to negotiate, in the Preparatory Committee meetings for the NPT Review Conference in the year 2000 on a legal instrument to assure non-nuclear weapons states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to be finally adopted by the 2000 NPT Review Conference as an annexed protocol to the NPT. They note that Ad-hoc Committee on NSA established by the Conference on Disarmament in 1998 to conclude an international legally-binding instrument to assure nonnuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 6, Art. 6, Para 22) The States Parties note with regret that, despite the conclusion of limited agreements, the provisions of Article VI and the ninth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty have not been fulfilled since the Treaty came into force. In this regard, the States Parties stress the need to take effective measures towards nuclear disarmament, thus reaffirming their role in achieving this objectives.</li> <li>• (Page 6, Art. 6, Para 24) The States Parties reaffirm that priority in disarmament negotiations shall be nuclear weapons in accordance with the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament.</li> <li>• (Page 6, Art 6, Para 25) The States Parties reaffirm their commitment to fulfil with determination their obligations under Article VI, in particular nuclear-weapon States to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.</li> <li>• (Page 6, Art. 6, Para 26) The States Parties in particular the nuclear-weapon States shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the efforts and measures they have taken on the implementation of the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.</li> <li>• (Page 7, Art. 6, Para 30) The States Parties agree that specific time should be made available at Preparatory Committee meetings to deliberate on the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 7, Art. 6, Para 31) The States Parties recommend that the 2000 Review Conference establish a subsidiary body to its Main Committee I to deliberate on the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Fissile materials / FMCT</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 6, Art. 6, Para 28) The [Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties [to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] renew their call for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations within an appropriate ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament for a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of</li> </ul>

	<p>fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as an essential measures of nuclear disarmament as well as nonproliferation of nuclear weapons taking into account the 1995 report of the Special Coordinator on that item and the views relating to the scope of the Treaty. The Treaty should be nondiscriminatory, effectively verifiable and universally applicable.</p>
<b>Nuclear Testing</b>	
<b>CTBT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 5, Art. 5, Para 19) The [Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties [to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] will take into account all the provisions of the CTBT related to this Article.</li> <li>• (Page 5, Art. 5, Para 20) The States Parties call upon the nuclear-weapon states to refrain from conducting all types of tests in conformity with the objectives of the CTBT. They also call upon nuclear-weapon states to provide transparency on-site and other measures to build confidence on the full implementation of the provisions of the Treaty in order to meet international concern.</li> <li>• (Page 5, Art. 5, Para 21) The States Parties call upon all of the States which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT. Pending the entry into force of the CTBT, the States Parties call upon the nuclear-weapon states to comply with the letter and spirit of the CTBT.</li> </ul>
<b>Regional issues: the Middle East</b>	
<b>1995 Resolution and ME</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 8, Res. ME, Para 37) The [Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties [to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] recall that the adoption of the Resolution on the Middle East by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference on 11 May 1995 constituted an integral part of the package of the 1995 outcome comprising three decisions and a Resolution, and as such they reaffirm their firm commitment to work towards the full implementation of that Resolution. In this regard, the States Parties recognize the special responsibility of the depository states, as cosponsors of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.</li> <li>• (Page 8, Res. ME, Para 38) The States Parties note that since the adoption of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, all states in the region have become parties to the Treaty, with the exception of Israel. The States Parties stress the urgent need for Israel to accede to the Treaty without further delay and to place all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards, in order to enhance the universality of the Treaty and to avert the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.</li> </ul>
<b>Nuclear Weapons Free Zones</b>	
<b>General views on Nuclear Weapon Free Zone</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 7, Art. 7, Para 32) The [Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties [to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] express support on measure taken by a State Party or Group of States Parties to conclude nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties. They also support proposals to these zones in other parts of the world where they do not exist, such as the Middle East and South Asia, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned as a measure towards the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation regime and realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament. States Parties welcome the initiative taken by the States in Central Asia freely arrived at among themselves to establish a nuclear-weapon free zone in that region.</li> <li>• (Page 7, Art. 7, Para 33) The States Parties and signatories to the treaties</li> </ul>

	<p>of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba that are parties to the NPT reaffirm their commitment to promote the common goals envisaged in those treaties, explore and implement further ways and means of cooperation, including the consolidation of the status of the nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 9, Res. ME, Para 41) The States Parties reaffirm once again, their determination to extend their fullest cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment in the Middle East a zone free of nuclear as well as all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems</li> </ul>
<b>Security Assurance</b>	
<p><b>General views on security assurances</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 8, Sec. Assurances, Para 36) The [Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties [to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] reaffirm that total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only genuine guarantee for all non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of such a goal, a legally-binding negative security assurances regime which will ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons must be urgently concluded. Hence, the States Parties should agree to negotiate, in the Preparatory Committee meetings for the NPT Review Conference in the year 2000 on a legal instrument to assure non-nuclear weapons states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to be finally adopted by the 2000 NPT Review Conference as an annexed protocol to the NPT. They note that Ad-hoc Committee on NSA established by the Conference on Disarmament in 1998 to conclude an international legally-binding instrument to assure nonnuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.</li> </ul>
<b>Other Fora</b>	
<p><b>Conference on Disarmament</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 6, Art. 6, Para 27) The [Non-Aligned Movement] States Parties [to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] call upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament taking into account all proposals which have been submitted by members of the Group of 21, and to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a nuclear-weapon convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, employment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination.</li> <li>• (Page 6, Art. 6, Para 28) The States Parties renew their call for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations within an appropriate ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament for a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as an essential measures of nuclear disarmament as well as nonproliferation of nuclear weapons taking into account the 1995 report of the Special Coordinator on that item and the views relating to the scope of the Treaty. The Treaty should be nondiscriminatory, effectively verifiable and universally applicable.</li> <li>• (Page 7, Art. 6, Para 29) The States Parties regret the continuing lack of progress on items relevant to nuclear issues in the agenda of the</li> </ul>

	<p>Conference on Disarmament.</p>
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