

**2000 NPT Review Conference Working Papers Submitted by the NAM**

<b>Working Paper submitted by members of the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2000/WP.8)</b>	
<b>Institutional issues</b>	
<b>General views on NPT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, Preamb., Para 1) The States Parties believe that the Treaty is a key instrument to halt vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and they will work towards a fair balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the Nuclear Weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States with a view to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 2, Para 4) The Non-Aligned Movement States parties to the Treaty believe further that the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT should engage immediately, in good faith, in substantive work for the speedy and meaningful implementation of the obligations under the Treaty and the commitments in the 1995 Principles and Objectives document, and the resolution on the Middle East.</li> </ul>
<b>Strengthening review process</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, Para 1) The Non-Aligned Movement States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) believe, in terms of the strengthened review process and in the context of fully implementing the Treaty and in pursuant to the decisions and resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, that recommendations which have been deliberated upon throughout its preparatory process, should be considered at the 2000 Review Conference with a view to their adoption at the Conference.</li> <li>• (Page 2, Para 5) The Non-Aligned Movement States parties to the Treaty recall that at the Ministerial Meeting in Cartagena, Colombia, the Foreign Ministers, called for the full implementation at the 2000 NPT Review Conference of, and the firm commitment by all States parties to, the package agreed to at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference which comprises the decision on "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty", the decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament", the decision on "Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", and the "Resolution on the Middle East".</li> <li>• (Page 3, Preamb., Para 3) The Non-Aligned Movement States parties to the Treaty recall further that the Heads of State or Government of the Movement at the Durban Summit also considered positively the commitment by parties concerned in the South Asian region to exercise restraint, which contributes to regional security, to discontinue nuclear tests, and not to transfer nuclear weapons-related material, equipment and technology.</li> <li>• (Page 7, Art. 8, Para 38) The States Parties will continue their endeavors to strengthen the review process of the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty in their entirety are being realized.</li> </ul>
<b>Procedural matters</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 7, Art. 6, Para 34) The States Parties agree that specific time should be made available at Preparatory Committee meetings to deliberate on the</li> </ul>

	<p>practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 9, Res. ME., Para 46) The States Parties agree that specific time should be made available at Preparatory Committee meetings to consider proposals on the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.</li> <li>• (Page 9, Res. ME, Para 47) The States Parties agree to establish a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the Review Conference to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.</li> </ul>
<b>Universality</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 7, Art. 9, Para 39) The States Parties reemphasize the urgency and the importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty, particularly by the accession to the Treaty at the earliest possible date of those States possessing nuclear capabilities. They will make determined efforts to achieve this goal.</li> </ul>
<b>Peaceful Uses</b>	
<b>Access to/transfer of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, Preamb., Para 2) The States Parties undertake to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States Parties to the Treaty and they shall fulfill their commitments on the unimpeded and nondiscriminatory transfer of materials, equipments, scientific and technological information for peaceful uses of nuclear energy to all States Parties without exception.</li> <li>• (Page 3, Art. 1, Para 5) The Nuclear Weapon States parties to the NPT reaffirm their commitments to the fullest implementation of this Article and to refrain from nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements, among themselves, with non-nuclear-weapon states, and with States not party to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 3, Art. 1, Para 6) The States Parties remain concerned about the ability of certain States not parties to the Treaty to obtain nuclear materials, technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons. The States Parties call for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to States non-parties to the Treaty without exception.</li> <li>• (Page 4, Art. 2, Para 7) Non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT reaffirm their commitments to the fullest implementation of this Article and to refrain from nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements with the Nuclear Weapon States, non-nuclear-weapon States, and States not party to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 4, Art. 3, Para 11) The States Parties support the principles that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source of special fissionable material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of a special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require as a necessary precondition, acceptance by all States Parties of fullscope safeguards; and that excess nuclear material in military stockpiles and nuclear materials removed from nuclear weapons as a result of nuclear weapons reduction agreements</li> </ul>

	<p>should be placed under IAEA safeguards.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 5, Art. 4, Para 15) The States Parties note with concern that undue restrictions on export to developing countries of material, equipment and technology, for peaceful purposes persist. They emphasise that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. Non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States, and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access to material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes required by developing countries for their continued development. They express their strong rejection of attempts by any member state to use the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) technical cooperation programme as a tool for political purposes in violation of the IAEA's statute.</li> <li>• (Page 5, Art. 4, Para 16) The States Parties reaffirm the responsibility of nuclear supplier States parties to the Treaty to promote the legitimate needs of nuclear energy of the States Parties to the Treaty, with preferential treatment rendered to developing ones, by allowing the latter to participate to the fullest in possible transfer of nuclear equipment, materials, scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes with a view to achieving the largest benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities.</li> <li>• (Page 8, Res. ME, Para 43) The Nuclear Weapon States, in conformity with their obligations under Article I of the Treaty, solemnly undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly to Israel, and further undertake not in anyway to assist, encourage, or induce Israel to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices under any circumstances whatsoever.</li> <li>• (Page 8, Res. ME, Para 44) All States Parties, in conformity with the seventh preambular paragraph and Article 4 of the Treaty, hereby declare their commitment to exclusively prohibit the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 5, Art. 4, Para 17) The States Parties reaffirm the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities emanating from the international norms prohibiting the use of force in international relations, and in particular Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter in considering that any attacks or threat of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy would entail highly dangerous political, economic and environmental implications particularly on the civilian inhabitants; and believe that they bear a solemn responsibility to continue to play a leading role towards the establishment of comprehensive and universal norms and standards specifically prohibiting attacks, or threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.</li> </ul>
<p><b>General views on</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, Preamb., Para 2) The States Parties undertake to prevent the</li> </ul>

<p><b>Peaceful purposes</b></p>	<p>proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States Parties to the Treaty and they shall fulfil their commitments on the unimpeded and nondiscriminatory transfer of materials, equipments, scientific and technological information for peaceful uses of nuclear energy to all States Parties without exception.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, Art. 4, Para 13) The States Parties reaffirm their inalienable right to engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination; and that free and unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to all States Parties be fully ensured.</li> <li>• (Page 4, Art. 3, Para 14) The States Parties reaffirm that beyond safeguards required under the Treaty, unilaterally enforced restrictive measures which prevent peaceful nuclear development should be removed.</li> <li>• (Page 5, Art. 4, Para 18) The States Parties encourage the adoption of appropriate measures to regulate international maritime transportation of radioactive waste and spent fuel to the highest standards in international security and support current efforts within the IAEA to adopt and improve international regulations in that regard.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Disarmament</b></p>	
<p><b>General views on Disarmament</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, Para 2) The Non-Aligned Movement States parties to the Treaty recall that at the Durban Summit Meeting, the Heads of State or Government of the Movement recalled their principled positions on nuclear disarmament and the related issues of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear tests, which were contained in the Final Document of the 1995 Cartagena Summit Meeting. They expressed their concern at the slow pace of progress towards nuclear disarmament, which constitutes their primary disarmament objective. They noted the complexities arising from nuclear tests in South Asia, which underlined the need to work, even harder to achieve their disarmament objectives, including elimination of nuclear weapons. They further recalled that at the 2000 Ministerial Meeting, held in Cartagena, Colombia, the Foreign Ministers reiterated the Movement's longstanding principled position for the total elimination of all nuclear testing and expressed concern over the recent negative developments with regard to the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).</li> <li>• (Page 3, Preamb., Para 1) The States Parties believe that the Treaty is a key instrument to halt vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and they will work towards a fair balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the Nuclear Weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States with a view to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 6, Art. 6, Para 24) The States Parties note with regret that, despite the conclusion of limited agreements, the provisions of Article VI and the ninth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty have not been fulfilled since the Treaty came into force. In this regard, the States Parties stress the need to take effective measures towards nuclear disarmament, thus reaffirming their role in achieving this objective.</li> <li>• (Page 6, Art. 6, Para 25) The States Parties reaffirm that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of the civilization.</li> </ul>

	<p>It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. In this context, the goal is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In the task of achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament, all States Parties bear responsibility, in particular those Nuclear Weapon States which possess the most important nuclear arsenals.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 6, Art. 6, Para 29) The States Parties reaffirm their commitment to fulfil with determination their obligations under Article VI, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.</li> <li>• (Page 6, Art. 6, Para 30) The States Parties in particular the nuclear-weapon States shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the efforts and measures they have taken on the implementation of the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.</li> <li>• (Page 6, Art. 6, Para 31) The States Parties call upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament taking into account all proposals which have been submitted by members of the Group of 21, and to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a nuclear-weapon convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, employment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination.</li> <li>• (Page 7, Art. 6, Para 34) The States Parties agree that specific time should be made available at Preparatory Committee meetings to deliberate on the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons.</li> </ul>
<b>Bilateral agreements (START)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 6, Art. 6, Para 26) The States Parties welcome the progress made towards the full ratification of START II and call for the full and early implementation of the Treaty by both parties as well as of the early commencement of negotiations of START III.</li> </ul>
<b>Outer space</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 6, Art. 6, Para 27) The States Parties are concerned over the negative implications of the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defense systems and the pursuit of advanced military technologies capable of deployment in outer space which have, inter alia, contributed to the further erosion of an international climate conducive to the promotion of disarmament and the strengthening of international security. In this connection, the States Parties call upon the parties to the ABM Treaty to fully comply with its provisions.</li> </ul>
<b>Safeguards and verification</b>	
<b>IAEA</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, Art. 3, Para 8) The States Parties believe that the International Atomic Energy Agency is the competent authority to verify the compliance of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and reaffirm that IAEA safeguards are an essential element in guaranteeing compliance with their Article III undertakings. In this regard, all States Parties which have not yet done so should sip</li> </ul>

without delay the safeguards agreements required by Article III of the Treaty.

- (Page 4, Art. 3, Para 9) The States Parties call on the Nuclear Weapon States and all States not party to the Treaty to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope safeguards of IAEA.
- (Page 4, Art. 3, Para 10) The States Parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by any States Party should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the Agency to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate. Measures should be taken to ensure that the inalienable rights of all States Parties under the provisions of the preamble and articles of the Treaty are fully protected and that no State party is limited in the exercise of this right based on allegations of non-compliance not verified by the IAEA.
- (Page 4, Art. 3, Para 11) The States Parties support the principles that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source of special fissionable material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of a special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require as a necessary precondition, acceptance by all States Parties of fullscope safeguards; and that excess nuclear material in military stockpiles and nuclear materials removed from nuclear weapons as a result of nuclear weapons reduction agreements should be placed under IAEA safeguards.
- (Page 4, Art. 3, Para 12) Every effort should be made to ensure that the IAEA has the financial and human resources necessary in order to meet effectively its responsibilities in the areas of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety.
- (Page 4, Art. 4, Para 14) The States Parties reaffirm that beyond safeguards required under the Treaty, unilaterally enforced restrictive measures which prevent peaceful nuclear development should be removed.
- (Page 4, Art. 4, Para 15) The States Parties note with concern that undue restrictions on export to developing countries of material, equipment and technology, for peaceful purposes persist. They emphasise that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. Non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States, and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access to material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes required by developing countries for their continued development. They express their strong rejection of attempts by any member state to use the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) technical cooperation programme as a tool for political purposes in violation of the IAEA's statute.
- (Page 8, Para 42) The States Parties note that since the adoption of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, all states in the region have become parties to the Treaty, with the exception of Israel. The States Parties stress the urgent need for Israel to accede to the Treaty without further delay, to place all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards and to conduct its nuclear related activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime, in order to enhance the universality of the Treaty and

<p><b>General views on safeguards</b></p>	<p>to avert the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, Art. 3, Para 8) The States Parties believe that the International Atomic Energy Agency is the competent authority to verify the compliance of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and reaffirm that IAEA safeguards are an essential element in guaranteeing compliance with their Article III undertakings. In this regard, all States Parties which have not yet done so should sign without delay the safeguards agreements required by Article III of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 4, Art. 3, Para 10) The States Parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by any States Party should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the Agency to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate. Measures should be taken to ensure that the inalienable rights of all States Parties under the provisions of the preamble and articles of the Treaty are fully protected and that no State party is limited in the exercise of this right based on allegations of non-compliance not verified by the IAEA.</li> <li>• (Page 4, Art. 3, Para 11) The States Parties support the principles that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source of special fissionable material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of a special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require as a necessary precondition, acceptance by all States Parties of fullscope safeguards; and that excess nuclear material in military stockpiles and nuclear materials removed from nuclear weapons as a result of nuclear weapons reduction agreements should be placed under IAEA safeguards.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Nuclear testing</b></p>	
<p><b>CTBT</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, Para 2) The Non-Aligned Movement States parties to the Treaty recall that at the Durban Summit Meeting, the Heads of State or Government of the Movement recalled their principled positions on nuclear disarmament and the related issues of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear tests, which were contained in the Final Document of the 1995 Cartagena Summit Meeting. They expressed their concern at the slow pace of progress towards nuclear disarmament, which constitutes their primary disarmament objective. They noted the complexities arising from nuclear tests in South Asia, which underlined the need to work even harder to achieve their disarmament objectives, including elimination of nuclear weapons. They further recalled that at the 2000 Ministerial Meeting, held in Cartagena, Colombia, the Foreign Ministers reiterated the Movement's long standing principled position for the total elimination of all nuclear testing and expressed concern over the recent negative developments with regard to the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).</li> <li>• (Page 5, Art. 5, Para 19) The States Parties will take into account all the provisions of the CTBT related to this Article.</li> <li>• (Page 5, Art. 5, Para 20) The States Parties call upon the Nuclear Weapon States to refrain from conducting all types of tests in conformity with the objectives of the CTBT. They also call upon Nuclear Weapon States to provide transparency on-site and other measures to build confidence on the</li> </ul>



	<p>full implementation of the provisions of the Treaty in order to meet international concern.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 5, Art. 5, Para 21) The States Parties stress the significance of achieving universal adherence to the CTBT including by all the Nuclear Weapon States which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament.</li> <li>• (Page 5, Art. 5, Para 22) The States Parties call upon all of the States which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT. Pending the entry into force of the CTBT, the States Parties call upon the Nuclear Weapon States to comply with the letter and spirit of the CTBT.</li> <li>• (Page 6, Art. 5, Para 23) The States Parties reiterate that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all signatories, especially the Nuclear Weapon States, to nuclear disarmament would be essential. The States Parties express their concern over the recent negative developments with regard to the ratification of the CTBT.</li> </ul>
<b>Regional issues: the Middle East</b>	
<p><b>1995 Resolution and ME</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, Para 4) The Non-Aligned Movement States parties to the Treaty believe further that the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT should engage immediately, in good faith, in substantive work for the speedy and meaningful implementation of the obligations under the Treaty and the commitments in the 1995 Principles and Objectives document, and the resolution on the Middle East.</li> <li>• (Page 3, Para 1) We recall that the Preparatory Committee agreed to recommend to the Conference that Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure be amended to allow for the establishment of subsidiary bodies to the Main Committees of the Conference so as to provide for a focused consideration of specific issues relevant to the Treaty. In this context, the Cartagena Ministerial Meeting reaffirmed the importance of the implementation of the call by the NAM Heads of State or Government for the Review Conference to establish a subsidiary body to Main Committee I to deliberate on practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons, as well as a subsidiary body to Main Committee II to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT.</li> <li>• (Page 8, Res. ME, Para 41) The States Parties recall that the adoption of the Resolution on the Middle East by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference on 11 May 1995 constituted an integral part of the package of the 1995 outcome comprising three decisions and a Resolution, and as such they reaffirm their firm commitment to work towards the full implementation of that Resolution. In this regard, the States Parties recognize the special responsibility of the depository states, as cosponsors of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.</li> <li>• (Page 8, Res. ME, Para 42) The States Parties note that since the adoption of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, all states in the region have become parties to the Treaty, with the exception of Israel. The States Parties stress the urgent need for Israel to accede to the Treaty without further delay, to place all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards and to conduct its nuclear related activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime, in order to enhance the universality of the</li> </ul>



	<p>Treaty and to avert the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 9, Res. ME, Para 46) The States Parties agree that specific time should be made available at Preparatory Committee meetings to consider proposals on the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.</li> <li>• (Page 9, Res. ME, Para 47) The States Parties agree to establish a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the Review Conference to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.</li> </ul>
<b>Nuclear Weapons Free Zone</b>	
<p><b>General views on Nuclear Weapon Free Zone</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 7, Art. 7, Para 36) The States Parties express support for measures taken by a State Party or Group of States Parties to conclude nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties. They also support proposals to these zones in other parts of the world where they do not exist, such as the Middle East and South Asia, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned as a measure towards the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation regime and realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament. The States Parties welcome the initiative taken by the States in Central Asia freely arrived at among themselves to establish a nuclear-weapon free zone in that region. The States Parties also welcome and support the recent adoption by the Mongolian Parliament of legislation as a concrete contribution to the international efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.</li> <li>• (Page 7, Art. 7, Para 37) The States Parties and signatories to the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba that are parties to the NPT reaffirm their commitment to promote the common goals envisaged in those treaties, explore and implement further ways and means of cooperation, including the consolidation of the status of the nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas.</li> <li>• (Page 8, Res. ME, Para 45) The States Parties reaffirm once again, their determination to extend their fullest cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment in the Middle East a zone free of nuclear as well as all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.</li> </ul>
<b>Security Assurances</b>	
<p><b>General views on security assurances</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 8, Sec. Assurances, Para 40) The States Parties reaffirm that total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only genuine guarantee for all non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of such a goal, a legally-binding negative security assurances regime which will ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons must be urgently concluded. Hence, the States Parties should negotiate a legal instrument to assure non-nuclear weapons states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to be adopted by the 2000 NPT Review Conference as an annexed protocol to the NPT. They note that Ad-hoc Committee on NSA was established by the Conference on Disarmament in 1998 to conclude an international legally-binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.</li> </ul>

<b>Other Fora</b>	
<b>Conference on Disarmament</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 6, Art. 6, Para 31) The States Parties call upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament taking into account all proposals which have been submitted by members of the Group of 21, and to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a nuclear-weapon.</li> <li>• (Page 7, Art. 6, Para 32) The States Parties renew their call for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations within an appropriate ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament for a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as essential measures of nuclear disarmament as well as non-proliferation of nuclear weapons taking into account the 1995 report of the Special Coordinator on that item and the views relating to the scope of the Treaty. The Treaty should be non-discriminatory, effectively verifiable and universally applicable.</li> <li>• (Page 7, Art. 6, Para 33) The State Parties regret the continuing lack of progress on items relevant to nuclear issues in the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament.</li> </ul>
<b>Nonproliferation</b>	
<b>General views on nonproliferation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, Para 3) The Non-Aligned Movement States parties to the Treaty recall further that the Heads of State or Government of the Movement at the Durban Summit also considered positively the commitment by parties concerned in the South Asian region to exercise restraint, which contributes to regional security, to discontinue nuclear tests, and not to transfer nuclear weapons-related material, equipment and technology.</li> <li>• (Page 3, Art. 1, Para 4) The States Parties agree that the strict observance of the terms of Article I remains central to achieving the shared objectives of preventing under any circumstances further proliferation of nuclear weapons and preserving the Treaty's vital contribution to peace and security.</li> </ul>