

**Work Paper Summaries of the Preparatory Committees for the
2010 NPT Review Conference**

NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.5:	
Working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on Verification	
Safeguards and Verification	
General views on safeguards / verification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 1, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] commends IAEA for the extensive verification activities it has undertaken since its inception and expresses full support for its ongoing efforts. • (Page 1, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes the need to achieve worldwide application of the comprehensive safeguards system and calls on all nuclear-weapon States and all States not parties to the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. • (Page 2, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, mindful of the importance of article III in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes, reiterates that obligations under this article provide credible assurances for States Parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes. Therefore, States Parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to States Parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.
IAEA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 1, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] commends IAEA for the extensive verification activities it has undertaken since its inception and expresses full support for its ongoing efforts. • (Page 1, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that the IAEA is the sole competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance by States Parties with their safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. • (Page 1, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the necessity that all members of the IAEA strictly observe its Statute. Therefore, nothing should be done to undermine the authority of IAEA in this regard. Any undue pressure or interference in the Agency's activities, especially its verification process, which could jeopardize the efficiency and credibility of the

	<p>Agency, should be avoided. States Parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance by the States Parties with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to IAEA to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its Statute.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 1, Para 5) The Group proposes that nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with IAEA in accordance with its Statute and the IAEA safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to providing baseline data for future disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States non-parties to the Treaty without exception.
Nonproliferation	
General views on nonproliferation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 1, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that the issue of proliferation should be resolved through political and diplomatic means, and that measures and initiatives taken in this regard should be within the framework of international law; relevant conventions; the Charter of the United Nations, and should contribute to the promotion of international peace, security and stability.
Peaceful uses	
Access to/transfer of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 2, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, mindful of the importance of article III in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes, reiterates that obligations under this article provide credible assurances for States Parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes. Therefore, States Parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to States Parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.
NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.6: Procedural and other arrangements for the effective and successful outcome of the Preparatory Committee and 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	
Institutional Issues	
Procedural matters	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 1, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons recalls that the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference is mandated and tasked, in fulfilment of the 1995 and 2000 decisions on the strengthened review process, to undertake the following:

- a) Consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and decisions 1 and 2, as well as the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences, including developments affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty;
 - b) At its third and, as appropriate, fourth session, the Preparatory Committee, taking into account the deliberations and results of its previous sessions, should make every effort to produce a consensus report containing recommendations to the Review Conference;
 - c) The States parties agreed that the procedural arrangements for the Review Conference should be finalized at the last session of the Preparatory Committee;
 - e) The establishment of such subsidiary bodies would be recommended by the Preparatory Committee for each Review Conference in relation to the specific objectives of the Review Conference.
- (Page 2, Para 2) In the context of the above-mentioned tasks and mandates, the Group of NonAligned States parties to the Treaty calls for:
 - a) An agreement on the provisional agenda of the Preparatory Committee and 2010 Review Conference, which would include “Preparatory work for the review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, in particular, consideration of principles, objectives and ways to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, including specific matters of substance related to the implementation of the Treaty and decisions 1 and 2, as well as the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference”;
 - b) Recalling that the 2000 Final Document states clearly that “each session of the Preparatory Committee should consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and the Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences”, the NAM States Parties to the NPT believe that this Preparatory Committee should deal with all the procedural issues necessary to take its work forward as well as with matters of substance as was decided at the

	1995 and 2000 Conferences;
Subsidiary body in Main Committees	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 3, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty furthermore calls on the Preparatory Committee and the 2010 Review Conference to: a) Reach an agreement on the establishment of subsidiary bodies, in accordance with rule 34 of the draft rules of procedure for the 2005 Review Conference, to consider, respectively, issues related to nuclear disarmament, security assurances and the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East;
Strengthen review process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 2, Para 2) In the context of the above-mentioned tasks and mandates, the Group of NonAligned States parties to the Treaty calls for: ... c) ...we wish to recall that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference called for regular reports within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process by all States Parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”. The NAM States Parties to the NPT expect that the States Parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, should submit reports to each Preparatory Committee session, including this one. We expect that the reports on article VI should cover issues and principles addressed by the 13 steps and should include specific and complete information on each of these steps. These reports should also address, inter alia, current policies and intentions, as well as developments in these areas; • (Page 3, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty furthermore calls on the Preparatory Committee and the 2010 Review Conference to: ... b) Consider the further strengthening or enhancement of the review process, including with regard to new institutions of the Treaty;
Reporting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 2, Para 2) In the context of the above-mentioned tasks and mandates, the Group of NonAligned States parties to the Treaty calls for: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • c) ...we wish to recall that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference called for regular reports within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process by all States Parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”. The NAM States Parties to the NPT expect that the States Parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, should submit reports to each Preparatory Committee session, including this one. We expect that the reports on article VI should cover issues and principles addressed by the 13 steps and should include specific and complete information on each of these steps. These reports should also address, inter alia, current policies and

	<p>intentions, as well as developments in these areas;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> d) The NAM States Parties also believe that the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on the Middle East, and further recalls that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference called on all States Parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, to report...on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. The NAM States Parties to the NPT expect that all States Parties to the Treaty, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, would submit reports in this regard as agreed in the 2000 Final Document. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (Page 3, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty furthermore calls on the Preparatory Committee and the 2010 Review Conference to: ... c) The further strengthening or enhancement of the regular reporting mechanism provided for in accordance with the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
NGO participation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (Page 3, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty furthermore calls on the Preparatory Committee and the 2010 Review Conference to: ... e) Support participation of non-governmental organizations in the Preparatory Committee and 2010 Review Conference meetings.

Security Assurances	
General views on security assurances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (Page 1, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons recalls that the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference is mandated and tasked, in fulfilment of the 1995 and 2000 decisions on the strengthened review process, to undertake the following: ... d) The Conference agrees that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Conference calls upon the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2010 Review Conference on this issue;
Disarmament	
General views on disarmament	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (Page 2, Para 2) In the context of the above-mentioned tasks and mandates, the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty calls for: ... c) To this end the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on nuclear disarmament so as to ensure that there is a proper accounting in the reports by the States of their progress in achieving nuclear disarmament.

Disarmament education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (Page 3, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty furthermore calls on the Preparatory Committee and the 2010 Review Conference to: ... d) Consider the steps and other actions that could be taken to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education, with particular reference to the Treaty;
Regional issues: the Middle East	
General views on NWFZ in the Middle East	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (Page 2, Para 2) In the context of the above-mentioned tasks and mandates, the Group of NonAligned States parties to the Treaty calls for: ... d) The NAM States Parties also believe that the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on the Middle East, and further recalls that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference called on all States Parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, to report through the United Nations Secretariat to the President of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, as well as the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of the Conference, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. The NAM States Parties to the NPT expect that all States Parties to the Treaty, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, would submit reports in this regard as agreed in the 2000 Final Document.

NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.7: Regional issues: Middle East	
Regional issues: the Middle East	
1995 Resolution on Middle East	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (Page 1, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] recalls the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and its operative paragraph 4, as well as the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference (Part I), which “calls upon all States in the Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place their facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards”. (Page 1, Para 2)The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that the 1995 resolution on the Middle East was an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995, and that the resolution remains valid until its goals and objectives are achieved. (Page 3, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty requests that specific time be made available at Preparatory Committee meetings of the 2010 Review Conference to review the

	<p>implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.</p>
<p>Israel</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 1, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East. • (Page 1, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty notes with regret that no progress has been achieved with regard to Israel's accession to the Treaty, extension of full-scope safeguards to all its nuclear facilities or establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East... • (Page 2, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms the importance of Israel's prompt accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East. • (Page 2, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty is gravely concerned by the statement made by the Prime Minister of Israel on 11 December 2006 in which he publicly admitted the possession of nuclear weapons by Israel. • (Page 2, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty demands on Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, to accede to the NPT without delay, to place promptly all its nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards according to Security Council resolution 487 (1981), and to conduct its nuclear-related activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime. It expresses great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capability by Israel, which poses a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States, and condemns Israel for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals. • (Page 2, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that nuclear-weapon States, in conformity with their obligations under article I of the Treaty, solemnly undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly to Israel, and further undertake not in any way to assist, encourage or induce Israel to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices under any circumstances

	<p>whatsoever.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 2, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, in conformity with the seventh preambular paragraph and article IV of the Treaty, hereby declares its commitment to exclusively prohibit the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. • (Page 2, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear-related scientific or technological fields to Israel. In this regard, it expresses its serious concern over the continuing development whereby Israeli scientists are provided access to the nuclear facilities of one nuclear-weapon State
General views on NWFZ in the Middle East	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 1, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with the Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus. The Group calls upon all parties concerned to take urgent and practical steps towards the fulfilment of the proposal initiated by Iran in 1974 for the establishment of such a zone. • (Page 3, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms once again the determination of the Parties to extend their fullest cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons.
Institutional Issues	
Subsidiary bodies in Main Committee	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 3, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty requests the establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the 2010 Review Conference to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.
Procedural matters	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 3, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty requests that specific time be made available at Preparatory Committee meetings of the 2010 Review Conference to review the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 3, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the establishment of a Standing Committee composed of members of the Bureau of the 2010 Review Conference to follow up intersessionally the implementation of the recommendations concerning the Middle East, in particular Israel's prompt accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, and report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee.
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NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.8: Nuclear Disarmament	
Institutional Issues	
General views on NPT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 1, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emphasizes that the Treaty is a key instrument in the efforts to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament.
Subsidiary bodies in Main Committee	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 3, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has called for the establishment of a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament to focus on the issue of fulfilment of the obligations under article VI.
Disarmament	
General views on disarmament	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 1, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty remains deeply concerned by strategic defence doctrines that set out the rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the nuclear-weapon States to consider expanding the circumstances in which these weapons could be used. • (Page 1, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty reiterates its call for a full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking given by the nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament. That undertaking should be demonstrated without delay through an accelerated process of negotiations and through the full implementation of the 13 practical steps to advance systematically and progressively towards a nuclear-weapon-free world as agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference. • (Page 2, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty remains deeply concerned by the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons despite some reports of bilateral and unilateral reductions. The Group is also concerned by the existence and continued deployment of tens of

	<p>thousands of such weapons, whose exact number remains unconfirmed, owing to the lack of transparency in various nuclear weapons programmes.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 2, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons also believes that the possible development of new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes as well as the lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies further undermine disarmament commitments.
Time bound total elimination (NWC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 1, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty deeply regrets the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. The negotiation of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame, including a nuclear weapons convention, is necessary and should commence without delay. In that regard, the Group reiterates its call to establish, as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament.
Fissile material / FMCT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 2, Para 5) The Group remains concerned by the continued inability of the Conference on Disarmament to resume its negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. In this context, the Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years. The Group is also concerned by attempts to limit the scope of the negotiations on a fissile material treaty...
Bilateral agreements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 2, Para 6) While noting the signing of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reduction on 24 May 2002, the Group stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot take the place of irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons. The non-entry into force of START II is a setback to the 13 practical steps in the field of nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2000 Review Conference. In that regard, the Group calls for the application of the principles of irreversibility and increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States regarding nuclear disarmament and nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.
Humanitarian approach to	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 2, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons underlines the

disarmament	unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.
Outer Space	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (Page 2, Para 7)The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons believes that the abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group remains concerned that the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 61/58, the Group emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.
Nonproliferation	
General views on nonproliferation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (Page 2, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons also believes that the possible development of new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes...
Other Fora	
Conference on Disarmament	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (Page 1, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty deeply regrets the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. The negotiation of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame, including a nuclear weapons convention, is necessary and should commence without delay. In that regard, the Group reiterates its call to establish, as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. (Page 2, Para 5) The Group remains concerned by the continued inability of the Conference on Disarmament to resume its negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. In this context, the Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years. The Group is also concerned by attempts to limit the scope of the negotiations on a fissile material treaty as contained in the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, which was endorsed at

	<p>both the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the 2000 Review Conference.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 2, Para 7) In accordance with General Assembly resolution 61/58, the Group emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.
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NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.9: Nuclear Testing	
Nuclear Testing	
General views on testing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 1, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons believes that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, not only because they are among the 44 States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty, but also because, on account of their position, they are expected to lead in making the ban on tests a reality. It will be possible to determine the success of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty only when it has been signed and ratified by the five nuclear-weapon States and the remaining countries in Annex 2. • (Page 2, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that one of the most significant factors in facilitating the entry into force of the CTBT is the ratification of the treaty by the nuclear-weapon States, as they bear a special responsibility in this regard. Positive decisions by the nuclear-weapon States would have the desired impact on progress towards entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Early ratification by nuclear-weapon States would pave the way and encourage the remaining countries listed in Annex 2 to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, especially the three States with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the Treaty. The failure of one major nuclear-weapon State to ratify the Treaty, and by not supporting the preparatory commission of the CTBTO through rejection of one of the main elements of the Treaty's verification regime, is undermining this important instrument against nuclear testing. • (Page 2, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons underscores the importance of the five nuclear-weapon States maintaining their voluntary moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions since the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. However, the Group believes that moratoriums do not take the place of the signing, ratification and entry into force of the latter. • (Page 2, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the

	<p>Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emphasizes that the development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the guarantee given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, States should refrain from any actions contrary to its objectives and purpose. In this context, the Group is seriously concerned by the decision by a nuclear-weapon State to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear testing to 18 months as a setback to the 2000 Review Conference agreements. The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty also remains a cause for concern.</p>
<p>CTBT</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 1, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons welcomes the signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by 177 States and its ratification by 138 States. The Group, in accordance with its long-standing and principled position in favour of the total elimination of all forms of nuclear weapons, supports the objectives of the Treaty, which is intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all nuclear test explosions, and to stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons that would pave the way towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. • (Page 1, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons stresses that the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by the five nuclear-weapon States, would inter alia, contribute towards the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore towards the enhancement of international peace and security. The Group also believes that if the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the five nuclear-weapon States, to nuclear disarmament, would be essential. • (Page 2, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation, thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear devices, as well as nuclear weapons based on new physical principles. The nuclear-weapon States stated at that time that the only steps to be followed would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons, which would not involve nuclear explosions. In that regard, the Group calls upon those States to continue to refrain

	from conducting nuclear test explosions for the development or further improvement of nuclear weapons. The Group wishes to re-emphasize the principles of the non-proliferation regime, both vertically and horizontally.
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NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.10: Security Assurances	
Security Assurances	
General views on security assurances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 1, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons believes that the Conference should also substantially focus on the issue of security assurances. • (Page 2, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee that there will be no use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and further reaffirms that non-nuclear-weapon States should be effectively assured by nuclear-weapon States that there will be no use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, the Group reiterates that efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority. • (Page 2, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons stresses that it is the legitimate right of States that have given up the nuclear-weapon option to receive security assurances...
Legally binding security assurances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 2, Para 5) The Group [of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] calls for the negotiation of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances, believing that such assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty fulfil the undertaking to the States that have voluntarily given up the nuclear-weapons option by becoming parties to the Treaty. The Group believes that legally binding security assurances within the context of the Treaty would provide an essential benefit to the States parties.
Institutional Issues	
Strengthened review process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 1, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons believes that the Conference should also substantially focus on the issue of security assurances. At the 2000 Review Conference, the States parties to the Treaty had agreed that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the non-proliferation strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and called on the

	<p>Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on this issue.</p>
Subsidiary body in Main Committee	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 2, Para 6) The Group [of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons calls for the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances for further work to be undertaken to consider legally binding security assurances by nuclear-weapon States.
Disarmament	
General views on disarmament	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 1, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons recalls that the fourteenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries reiterated that the improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons as envisaged in the United States Nuclear Posture Review contravene the security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States. They further reaffirmed that these improvements as well as the development of new types of such weapons violate the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). • (Page 1, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emphasizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals and considers, in that regard, that any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security. • (Page 2, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee that there will be no use or threat of use of nuclear weapons...

NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.11:

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

NWFZ

General views on NWFZ	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 1, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons continues to consider the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Semipalatinsk as a positive step and important measure towards
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attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The Group welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and calls for cooperation and broad consultations in order to achieve agreements freely arrived at among the States of the regions concerned.

- (Page 1, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty welcomes the signing of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia in Semipalatinsk on 8 September 2006 by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and considers the establishment of that zone as an effective contribution to strengthening regional and global peace and security.
- (Page 1, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reiterates that, in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is essential that nuclear-weapon States provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the zone. The Group urges States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. In this context, the Group considers that the further institutionalization of Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status would be an important measure towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.
- (Page 1, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emphasizes the need to strengthen the integrity of the statute of denuclearization provided for in the Treaty of Tlatelolco by a review of the declarations that were formulated by the nuclear-weapon States parties to Protocols I and II for possible withdrawal or modification.
- (Page 2, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty welcomes the ongoing consultations between the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the nuclear-weapon States on the Protocol of the South-East Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and urges the nuclear-weapon States to become parties to the Protocol of the Treaty as soon as possible.
- (Page 2, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the signature and ratification of the Treaties of Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Semipalatinsk by all States in their respective region, as well as the signature and ratification by the nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so of the relevant Protocols to those treaties.
- (Page 2, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty notes with satisfaction the convening of the First Conference

	<p>of the States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, held in Tlatelolco, Mexico, from 26 to 28 April 2005, and in this context, calls on the States parties and signatories to the Treaties on nuclear-weapon-free zones to implement further ways and means of cooperation among themselves, their treaty agencies and other interested States.</p>
NWFZ and security assurances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 1, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] reiterates that, in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is essential that nuclear-weapon States provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the zone.

NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.12: Safeguards	
Safeguards and verification	
General views on safeguards / verification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 1, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] expresses its strong concern at the growing resort to unilateralism and unilaterally imposed prescriptions and, in this context, strongly underlines and affirms that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues. In this regard, the Group underlines that the IAEA established multilateral mechanism is the most appropriate way to address verification and safeguards issues. • (Page 1, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the IAEA safeguards system. In this regard, the Group urges all States that have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible. The 2000 Review Conference considered this as a main objective to consolidate and enhance the verification system for the non-proliferation regime. However, the Group does not desire to see international efforts towards achieving universality of comprehensive safeguards to wither away in favour of pursuing additional measures and restrictions on non-nuclear-weapon States, which are already committed to non-proliferation norms and which have renounced the nuclear-weapon option. The Group also expresses its strong rejection of attempts by any Member State to use the technical cooperation programme of IAEA as a tool for political purposes in violation of its statute. • (Page 2, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty welcomes the ratification by Afghanistan, Haiti, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Turkmenistan and Uganda of the Additional Protocols and the signing of the Protocols by Belarus, Benin, Cape Verde, Comoros, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Malaysia, Senegal, Singapore, Thailand, Tunisia and Viet Nam.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 2, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty notes the importance of maintaining the principles of confidentiality regarding safeguards, and since the Agency is the only organization which receives highly confidential and sensitive information on the nuclear facilities of the Member States, the confidentiality of the information should be respected and information should not be provided to those not authorized by the Agency to receive it. • (Page 2, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the importance that the reporting of the IAEA on the implementation of safeguards should continue to be factual and technically based and reflect appropriate reference to the relevant provisions of safeguards agreements.
IAEA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 1, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] stresses the importance of the IAEA safeguards system. In this regard, the Group urges all States that have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible...The Group also expresses its strong rejection of attempts by any Member State to use the technical cooperation programme of IAEA as a tool for political purposes in violation of its statute. • (Page 1, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty fully recognizes the role of IAEA as an independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization in the United Nations system, which serves as the sole verification agency for nuclear safeguards and the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation. • (Page 1, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reiterates that the work of IAEA with regard to safeguards and verification needs to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of its statute and relevant safeguards agreements, including the Model Additional Protocol, where applicable. The Group emphasizes that it is fundamental to make the distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures in order to ensure that such voluntary undertakings are not turned into legal safeguards obligations. In this regard, the Group also emphasizes that IAEA shall ensure avoiding any ultra vires acts jeopardizing its integrity and credibility. The Group urges States Parties to the Treaty to maintain and strengthen the technical character of IAEA consistent with the role defined for it in the statute. • (Page 2, Para 5) With respect to safeguards, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the differentiated nature of the financial obligations undertaken by States members of IAEA should be recognized and respected by IAEA in its work. • (Page 2, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the

	<p>Treaty considers that the full implementation of the pertinent resolutions and decisions of the IAEA General Conference on safeguards and verification and those of the Board of Governors relating to strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards is key to the overall improvement of the safeguards system.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 2, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the need to strictly observe the provisions of the IAEA Statute, including article 12 which outlines the mandate of the Agency in verifying compliance with safeguards agreements and in particular that any non-compliance has first to be reported by the Agency's inspectors.
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NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.16: Peaceful uses of nuclear energy	
Peaceful uses	
IAEA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 1, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] stresses that this right constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. The Group expresses its rejection of any attempts by any State Party to use the IAEA technical cooperation programme as a tool for political purposes, which is in violation of the statute of IAEA. • (Page 1, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recognizes the major and important role of IAEA in assisting, in particular, developing States Parties to the Treaty in planning for and the use of nuclear science and technology for various peaceful purposes, especially in the context of accelerating socio-economic development, including sustainable transfer of such technology and knowledge towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals. • (Page 2, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that the statute of IAEA stipulated Member States' right to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes, to promote socio-economic development by way of technical cooperation and the production of electric power with due consideration for the needs of developing countries. To ensure the realization of these goals, all States Parties, developed ones in particular, shall extend their assistance, as requested by States Parties which are States members of IAEA, in the provision of equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes. • (Page 2, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, recalling that IAEA and its Director General, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, have been awarded the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize, expresses the Group's full confidence in the impartiality and professionalism of the Agency.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 2, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores that IAEA, under its statutory obligations, pursues the goals of technical cooperation in peaceful applications of nuclear energy as one of the three pillars of its activities. In order to meet the objectives of technical cooperation for peaceful purposes as enshrined in the statute of IAEA and in the Treaty, IAEA has to maintain the balance between the technical cooperation and other activities. The Group believes that all States Parties to the Treaty that are States members of IAEA have to ensure that the technical cooperation programme remains firm and sustainable through adequate financial and human resources in an assured and predictable manner. In this regard, the efficacy of the technical cooperation programme can best be ensured by formulation of the programme and the strategies strictly in accordance with the needs and the requests of the developing countries.
<p>General views on peaceful uses</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 1, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] emphasizes once more that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination as stipulated in article IV of the Treaty, and in conformity with its articles I, II and III and their right to technical cooperation among themselves or other international organizations keeping in view the needs of the developing areas of the world. • (Page 1, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that this right constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. The Group expresses its rejection of any attempts by any State Party to use the IAEA technical cooperation programme as a tool for political purposes, which is in violation of the statute of IAEA. The Group reaffirms that each country's choices and decision in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies. The Group stresses the responsibility of developed countries to facilitate and assist the legitimate development of nuclear energy of the developing countries by allowing them to participate to the fullest in possible transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes with a view to achieving the maximum benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities. • (Page 1, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recognizes the major and important role of IAEA in assisting, in particular, developing States Parties to the Treaty in planning for and the use of nuclear science and technology for various peaceful purposes, especially in the context of accelerating socio-economic

	<p>development, including sustainable transfer of such technology and knowledge towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 2, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses particularly the responsibility of developed countries to promote the legitimate need of nuclear energy of the developing countries, by allowing them to participate to the fullest possible to transfer of nuclear equipment, materials, scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes with a view to achieving the largest benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities.
<p>Access to/transfer of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 1, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned Parties to the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] stresses the responsibility of developed countries to facilitate and assist the legitimate development of nuclear energy of the developing countries by allowing them to participate to the fullest in possible transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes with a view to achieving the maximum benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities • (Page 2, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty continues to note with concern that undue restrictions on exports to developing countries of material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes persist. In this regard, the Group stresses that any undue restrictions or limitations on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, incompatible with the provisions of the Treaty, should be removed. The Group emphasizes that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. The Group further emphasizes that non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access to material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes required by developing countries for continued development. Furthermore, such arrangements must pursue and implement, without exception, the condition of adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a condition for supply to or cooperation with States not parties to the Treaty. • (Page 2, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty remains concerned about the ability of certain States not Parties to the Treaty to obtain, in particular from some nuclear-weapon States, nuclear materials, technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons. The Group calls for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological

	fields to States non-parties to the Treaty without exception.
Nuclear safety and security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 3, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] affirms the need to strengthen the radiological safety and protection systems at facilities utilizing radioactive materials as well as at radioactive waste management facilities, including the safe transportation of these materials. The Group reaffirms the need to strengthen existing international regulations relating to safety and security of transportation of such materials. While reiterating the need to take appropriate measures to prevent any dumping of nuclear or radioactive wastes, the Group calls for effective implementation of the Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste of IAEA as a means of enhancing the protection of all States from the dumping of radioactive wastes on their territories.
Nonproliferation	
General views on nonproliferation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 2, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] continues to note with concern that undue restrictions on exports to developing countries of material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes persist. In this regard, the Group stresses that any undue restrictions or limitations on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, incompatible with the provisions of the Treaty, should be removed. The Group emphasizes that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. The Group further emphasizes that non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access to material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes required by developing countries for continued development. • (Page 2, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] remains concerned about the ability of certain States not Parties to the Treaty to obtain, in particular from some nuclear-weapon States, nuclear materials, technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons. The Group calls for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to States non-parties to the Treaty without exception.
Export control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 2, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] continues to note with concern that undue restrictions on exports to developing countries of material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes persist. In this regard, the Group stresses that any undue

	<p>restrictions or limitations on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, incompatible with the provisions of the Treaty, should be removed. The Group emphasizes that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. The Group further emphasizes that non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access to material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes required by developing countries for continued development. Furthermore, such arrangements must pursue and implement, without exception, the condition of adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a condition for supply to or cooperation with States not parties to the Treaty.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 2, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to States non-parties to the Treaty without exception.
Nonproliferation and peaceful uses	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 2, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] ... stresses that any undue restrictions or limitations on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, incompatible with the provisions of the Treaty, should be removed.

<p>NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.30: Working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</p>	
<p>Institutional Issues</p>	
General views on NPT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 2, Rec. 1) To emphasize that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the key international instrument aimed at halting the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, achieving nuclear disarmament and promoting international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. • (Page 2, Rec. 2) To reaffirm that the balanced implementation of the three pillars of the Non Proliferation Treaty, in a non-discriminatory manner, remains essential for the effectiveness of the Treaty in realizing its objectives. • (Page 2, Rec. 3) To reiterate that the continued existence of nuclear weapons represents a significant threat to humanity and that the full and effective implementation of all Treaty obligations, including in particular by nuclear-weapon States, plays a crucial role in promoting international peace and security. • (Page 2, Rec. 4) To reaffirm that each article of the Treaty is binding

	<p>on States parties without distinction, and that States parties are required to comply strictly with their obligations under the Treaty as well as with those agreed by consensus at the review conferences of the Treaty, including, in particular, the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference.</p>
Strengthen review process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 9, Rec. 44) To recommend the establishment of a standing committee composed of members of the Bureau of the 2010 Review Conference to follow up intersessionally on the implementation of the recommendations concerning the Middle East and to report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committees. • (Page 9, Rec. 45) To focus the activities of the Preparatory Committee substantially on the Middle East including, in particular, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region in accordance with the 1995 resolution on the Middle East...
Subsidiary bodies in Main Committee	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 7, Rec. 36) To establish, as a matter of priority, a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament, in Main Committee I, mandated to focus on the issue of fulfillment of the obligations under article VI and further practical measures required to achieve progress in that regard.
Universality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 7, Rec. 31) To call on all States parties to exert all possible efforts to promote universal adherence to the Treaty and not to undertake any actions that could negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty.
Disarmament	
General views on disarmament	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 3, Rec. 6) To reaffirm the importance of the application of the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility by nuclear-weapon States in all measures relating to nuclear disarmament. • (Page 3, Rec. 8) To agree that the development of new types of nuclear weapon and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes and the lack of significant progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies undermine disarmament commitments and work counter to the letter and spirit of the Treaty. • (Page 4, Rec. 13) To reiterate that the improvement in existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapon as envisaged in the existing nuclear doctrines of some nuclear-weapon States, including a certain State's nuclear posture review, contravene the security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States... • (Page 4, Rec. 14) To reaffirm that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee that there will be no use or threat of use of nuclear weapons... • (Page 7, Rec. 33) To accelerate the process of negotiation that should be undertaken, in accordance with article VI, as well as the implementation of the 13 practical steps, without further delay, in

	order to advance towards a nuclear-weapon-free world.
NWC (time bound total elimination)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 7, Rec. 34) To launch the negotiation process towards a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including a nuclear weapons convention, without delay.
Role of NWS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 7, Rec. 32) To call for full implementation by the nuclear-weapon States of their disarmament commitments under the Treaty, including those agreed by consensus at the 2000 Review Conference, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament.
FMCT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 2, Rec. 5) To reconfirm that negotiations on a fissile material treaty should be conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed both at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference. • (Page 7, Rec. 35) To agree on a programme of work for the Conference on Disarmament that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on a verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, with a view to its conclusion within five years.
Outer space	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 3, Rec. 7) To voice concern about the potential for an arms race in outer space, in which the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race and further nuclear proliferation.
Nuclear Testing	
General view on testing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 3, Rec. 11) To realize the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the commitment to nuclear disarmament of all States signatories, especially the five nuclear-weapon States, is essential. The five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to take the lead in making the test ban a reality.
CTBT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 3, Rec. 9) ...the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a practical step on the road to nuclear disarmament and, therefore, cannot substitute for the objective of complete elimination of nuclear weapons. • (Page 3, Rec. 10) To support the objective of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which is intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all forms of nuclear tests without exception, and to stop the development of nuclear weapons, in the direction of total elimination of nuclear weapons. • (Page 3, Rec. 11) To realize the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the commitment to nuclear disarmament of all States signatories, especially the five nuclear-weapon States, is essential. The five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to take the lead in making the test ban a reality.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 7, Rec. 37) To stress the significance of achieving the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, requiring its ratification by the remaining annex 2 States, including, in particular, by two nuclear-weapon States, thus contributing to the process of nuclear disarmament and towards the enhancement of international peace and security. • (Page 8, Rec. 38) To ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by nuclear States with all expediency. Positive decisions by nuclear-weapon States would have a beneficial impact towards the ratification of the Test-Ban-Treaty. Nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to encourage progress on the entry into force of the Test-Ban-Treaty. These actions would encourage annex 2 States, in particular those which have not acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the Test-Ban-Treaty.
Security Assurances	
General views on security assurances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 3, Rec. 12) To recall that at the 2000 Review Conference, States parties to the Non Proliferation Treaty had agreed, by consensus, that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Legally binding security assurances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 8, Rec. 39) To call for the negotiation of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the realization of the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons, legally binding security assurances within the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty remain essential and should be materialized without further delay. • (Page 8, Rec. 40) To seek the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances for further work to be undertaken to consider legally binding security assurances by nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapons States parties to the Non Proliferation Treaty to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Legally binding security assurances within the context of the Treaty would provide an essential benefit to the States parties and to the credibility of the Treaty regime.
NWFZ	
General views on NWFZ	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 4, Rec. 15) To welcome the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and call for cooperation and consultations in order to achieve agreements freely arrived at among the States of the regions concerned. • (Page 4, Rec. 16) To welcome the ongoing consultations between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the nuclear-weapon States on the Protocol to the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty) and urge the nuclear-weapon States to become parties to the Protocol to that Treaty as soon as

	<p>possible.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 4, Rec. 17) To stress the importance of the signature and ratification of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty), the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty), and the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (Semipalatinsk Treaty), as well as Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status, by all States in their respective regions, as well as signature and ratification by the nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so of the relevant protocols to those treaties. • (Page 8, Rec. 41) To confirm that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Tlatelolco Treaty) and the Treaties of Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Semipalatinsk, as well as Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status, represents a positive step and an important measure towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. • (Page 4, Rec. 18) To welcome the talks by Mongolia with its two neighbours to conclude the required legal instrument institutionalizing Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status.
Regional issues: the Middle East	
General views on NWFZ in Middle East	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 5, Rec. 19) To welcome the efforts aimed at establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and call for cooperation and consultation in order to achieve agreement. • (Page 8, Rec. 42) To reiterate the crucial need for a speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East without any further delay.
Israel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 5, Rec. 20) To express concern that Israel continues to refrain from acceding to the Non Proliferation Treaty despite the accession of all other States in the region. • (Page 5, Rec. 23) To reaffirm the 2000 Review Conference Final Document, which underscored the importance of Israel's accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the Middle East
1995 Resolution on Middle East	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 5, Rec. 21) To reaffirm the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference (as well as the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference (part I)), which "calls upon all States in the Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards". • (Page 5, Rec. 22) To recall that the 1995 resolution on the Middle East was an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and of the basis on which the Non-

	<p>Proliferation Treaty was indefinitely extended, without a vote, in 1995, and reaffirm that the resolution remains valid until its goals and objectives are achieved.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 9, Rec. 43) To recommend the establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the 2010 Review Conference to consider and recommend proposals on concrete practical steps to promote the earliest implementation of the resolution on the Middle East. • (Page 9, Rec. 44) To recommend the establishment of a standing committee composed of members of the Bureau of the 2010 Review Conference to follow up intersessionally on the implementation of the recommendations concerning the Middle East and to report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committees. • (Page 9, Rec. 45) To focus the activities of the Preparatory Committee substantially on the Middle East including, in particular, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region in accordance with the 1995 resolution on the Middle East; and to recommend that State parties to the Treaty, in particular the three Treaty depositories and sponsors of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, should report on steps they have taken to promote the undelayed establishment of a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.
Safeguards and verification	
<p>General views on safeguards / verification</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 5, Rec. 24) To acknowledge that it is fundamental to make a distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures, in order to ensure that such voluntary undertakings are not turned into legal safeguard obligations. • (Page 6, Rec. 26) To emphasize that the States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty should consult and cooperate in resolving their issues with regard to implementation of the Treaty-related safeguards agreements within the IAEA framework. • (Page 9, Rec. 48) To request all States that have not yet done so to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements as soon as possible with a view to consolidating and enhancing the verification system for the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, through the universalization of comprehensive safeguards. • (Page 10, Rec. 49) To request all nuclear-weapon States and all States not party to the Non Proliferation Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. This should be set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with IAEA in accordance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the IAEA statute, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the obligations of nuclear-weapon States, with a view to providing baseline data for future disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons

	<p>or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities and resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not parties to the Treaty without exception.</p>
IAEA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 5, Rec. 25) To reaffirm that IAEA is the sole competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance by States parties with their safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfilment of their Treaty obligations, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation. • (Page 9, Rec. 47) To reiterate that the IAEA's work with regard to safeguards and verification needs to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of its statute and full-scope safeguards agreements.
Nonproliferation	
General views on nonproliferation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 3, Rec. 8) To agree that the development of new types of nuclear weapon and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes and the lack of significant progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies undermine disarmament commitments and work counter to the letter and spirit of the Treaty. • (Page 9, Rec. 46) To reiterate the commitment of all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to prohibit the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities and resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. • (Page 10, Rec. 51) To emphasize that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented, without exception, through the strict observance of adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.
Nonproliferation and peaceful uses	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 6, Rec. 27) To confirm that the obligation under article III in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes in accordance with article IV. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment,

	material and technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.
Peaceful Uses	
General views on Peaceful purposes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 6, Rec. 28) To underscore that nothing in the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be interpreted to affect the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; and their right to technical cooperation among themselves or international organizations, keeping in view the needs of the developing areas of the world. • (Page 6, Rec. 29) To reaffirm that each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements or its arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies. • (Page 10, Rec. 52) To reiterate that any undue restrictions or limitations on peaceful uses of nuclear energy that are incompatible with the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, should be removed. • (Page 10, Rec. 50) To stress the commitment of developed countries to facilitate and assist the legitimate development of nuclear energy by the developing countries by allowing them to participate to the fullest extent in the possible transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes, with a view to achieving maximum benefits and applying pertinent sustainable development in their health, industry, agriculture and other development-related activities.
Access to/transfer of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Page 6, Rec. 27) To confirm that the obligation under article III in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes in accordance with article IV. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements. • (Page 6, Rec. 30) To note with concern that undue restrictions on exports to developing countries of material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes persist. • (Page 10, Rec. 50) To stress the commitment of developed countries to facilitate and assist the legitimate development of nuclear energy by the developing countries by allowing them to participate to the fullest extent in the possible transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes, with a view to achieving maximum benefits and applying pertinent sustainable development in their health, industry, agriculture and

	other development-related activities.
Other Fora	
CD	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• (Page 7, Rec. 35) To agree on a programme of work for the Conference on Disarmament that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on a verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, with a view to its conclusion within five years.