

IAEA Board of Governors  
Advisory Committee on Safeguards and Verification within the Framework  
of the IAEA Statute  
Record of the 1<sup>st</sup> Meeting  
GOV/COM.25/OR.1

(Click the link below to go directly to the NAM statement)

Presentation by the Secretariat (Malaysia)

# Board of Governors

**GOV/COM.25/OR.1**

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## Advisory Committee on Safeguards and Verification within the Framework of the IAEA Statute

### Record of the 1<sup>st</sup> Meeting

*Held at Headquarters, Vienna, on Friday, 11 November 2005, at 10.50 a.m.*

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<sup>1</sup> GOV/COM.25/2.



## Attendance

(The list below gives the name of the senior member of each delegation who attended the meeting, as well as that of any other member whose statement is summarized in this record.)

Ms. FEROUKHI	Chairperson (Algeria)
Mr. FASSIH	Algeria
Ms. KELLY	Argentina
Ms. STOKES	Australia
Mr. MACKAY	Belarus
Mr. NIEUWENHUYS	Belgium
Mr. VIEIRA DE SOUZA	Brazil
Ms. GERVAIS-VIDRICAIRE	Canada
Mr. WU Hailong	China
Mr. SERRANO CADENA	Colombia
Mr. CODORNIU PUJALS	Cuba
Mr. MOREJÓN-ALMEIDA	Ecuador
Mr. RAMZY	Egypt
Mr. DENIAU	France
Mr. HONSOWITZ	Germany
Mr. SOTIROPOULOS	Greece
Mr. SHARMA	India
Mr. HISWARA	Indonesia
Mr. AMANO (Chairman of the Board of Governors)	Japan
Mr. CHO Chang-Beom	Korea, Republic of
Mr. TAJOURI	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
Ms. KOLSHUS	Norway
Ms. ARAÚJO	Portugal
Mr. BERDENNIKOV	Russian Federation
Ms. YEW	Singapore
Mr. MACHÁČ	Slovakia
Mr. KRIŽ	Slovenia
Mr. WRIGHT	South Africa
Ms. WIJEWARDANE	Sri Lanka
Mr. PETTERSSON	Sweden
Mr. GHANEM	} Syrian Arab Republic
Mr. KHADDOUR	
Mr. JENKINS	} United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Mr. ANDREWS	
Mr. SCHULTE	United States of America
Ms. GARCÍA de PÉREZ	Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of
Mr. SHUGA'A	Yemen

**Attendance** (continued)

Mr. ELBARADEI	Director General
Mr. HEINONEN	Deputy Director General, Department of Safeguards
Ms. COOLEY	Director, Division of Concepts and Planning, Department of Safeguards
Mr. ANING	Secretary of the Committee

**Representatives of the following Member States attended the meeting:**

Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Chile, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Islamic Republic of Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Latvia, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Vietnam, Zimbabwe.

**Abbreviations used in this record:**

GRULAC	Latin American and Caribbean Group
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT Review Conference	Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
R&D	research and development
SAGSI	Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation
SQP	small quantities protocol

\* Speakers under Rule 50 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure are indicated by an asterisk.

– **Adoption of the agenda**  
(GOV/COM.25/1/Rev.1)

1. The CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS recalled that, on 17 June 2005, the Board had decided to set up the Advisory Committee on Safeguards and Verification within the Framework of the IAEA Statute to consider ways and means of strengthening the safeguards system and to report thereon, with recommendations, to the Board of Governors.
2. He assumed that the Committee wished to adopt the provisional agenda set out in document GOV/COM.25/1/Rev.1.
3. The agenda was adopted.

**1. Designation of the Chairman**

4. The CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS recalled that the Board had decided that the Committee would be chaired by the Chairman of the Board or by his or her designee from the Board. Following informal consultations, there was general support for the designation of Ms. Feroukhi, the Governor from of Algeria, to chair the Committee. He took it that that designation was acceptable to the Committee.
5. It was so decided.

**Ms. Feroukhi (Algeria) took the chair.**

6. The CHAIRPERSON thanked the Chairman of the Board of Governors and the members of the Committee for the confidence they had placed in her. She felt sure that, with their active cooperation, the Committee would be able to achieve its intended goals.

– **Introductory remarks by the Director General**

7. The DIRECTOR GENERAL congratulated the Chairperson on her appointment and expressed pleasure at the convening of the Committee.
8. Both Member States and Secretariat were making efforts to review periodically all the Agency's main activities, i.e. technology, safety and verification, to ensure they were being conducted effectively and efficiently. Technology and safety had already been reviewed and now it was the turn of verification.
9. It had been 14 years since a clandestine nuclear programme had been discovered in Iraq, a programme that had been completely missed by the Agency. That had prompted the elaboration of the additional protocol which gave the Agency more authority to look for possible undeclared nuclear

activities. Given the realities of modern times and the dissemination of technology, the Agency believed that that was the most important area on which to focus. However over 100 NPT State Parties still did not have an additional protocol in force. Without the additional protocol, the Agency's ability to carry out comprehensive verification was limited, in particular with regard to the detection of possible undeclared activities. It needed to have the capacity to implement comprehensive and credible safeguards activities, which depended on legal authority, human and financial resources, technology and information. Those were the four areas that the Secretariat would like Member States to look at and that required strengthening.

10. The budget for the whole safeguards system was \$120 million, so financial limitations had to remain a consideration. With further expansion expected in the future, such as the entry into force of the agreement between India and the USA, and a number of important facilities coming on line in Japan and Brazil, there was a need for sufficient financial and human resources. The situation was not the same as several years previously when the Agency could not have carried out its tasks without additional resources, but there was a need to stay ahead of the game and not reach crisis point once again. The more resources were provided, the more the Agency could do.

11. Technology was a rapidly developing area. The Agency had to ensure that it had the technology it needed to do the best possible job. In recent years, good progress had been made in the use of new technologies, such as environmental sampling and satellite monitoring. The Agency's capabilities in that area were limited by financial constraints and the lack of a verification R&D programme. Currently the Agency had to rely on Member States' support programmes. At the very least, the Agency would like such programmes to be needs-driven, rather than centring around the technology offered by Member States. Ideally the Agency would have its own R&D support programme to ensure that the technology available to it matched its needs.

12. Even if the Agency had all the legal authority and technology it required, it could do little without the right information. However it did not have a systematic way of obtaining all the information it needed, an issue that needed consideration.

13. Another area to be considered was the Agency's independent analytical capability. Currently, its laboratory capabilities were rather limited and it continued to rely on a network of laboratories. Enhancing the capability of the Seibersdorf laboratories would ensure the Agency's independence. The network of laboratories should also be enhanced and some countries, such as Brazil, Argentina and India, could possess significant capabilities if their laboratories were upgraded. A wider network would allow for better comparison of results and would be more independent and credible.

14. The Secretariat were putting forward their views but would also like to hear the views and ideas of Member States. The Member States owned the verification system and the Agency merely ran it on their behalf. Furthermore, verification should not be strengthened at the expense of other areas of the Agency's work. All areas should continue to grow together in a balanced manner.

15. It was important to be aware of nuclear disarmament as another dimension of verification and non-proliferation. Although that issue was not dealt with directly by the Agency, it was still there in the background. It was regrettable, shocking and dismaying that the recent NPT Review Conference had not reached a conclusion on disarmament or arms control. Any progress made in those areas would also further the Agency's work.

16. The work of the Committee would not be easy, as it would have to deal with a lot of technical, legal and policy issues. However, the Secretariat would be at the disposal of Member States and a special team had been designated to work with the Committee outside of meetings. The Secretariat and Member States should continue to work together as partners to investigate how to strengthen the safeguards system.

17. With the participation of Member States and able chairmanship, the Committee should be able to make progress and keep up with the challenges it was facing, such as more countries trying to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities, illicit trafficking and the interest of terrorists in acquiring nuclear weapons. The Agency needed to be able to respond as fast as it could to those challenges to ensure that nuclear energy was used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Nuclear energy had a lot of growth potential in the coming decades and many countries had ambitious plans for acquiring or expanding nuclear power. That expansion depended on ensuring that nuclear energy was not misused. Thus, all countries had an interest in ensuring that the work of the Committee was a success.

## 2. Presentation by the Secretariat

18. The DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR SAFEGUARDS gave a presentation entitled *Advisory Committee on Safeguards and Verification within the Framework of the IAEA Statute — Topics for Discussion*<sup>2</sup>.

19. The DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION OF CONCEPTS AND PLANNING gave a presentation entitled *Advisory Committee on Safeguards and Verification within the Framework of the IAEA Statute — The Role of SAGSF*<sup>3</sup>.

20. The representative of MALAYSIA\*, speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, thanked the Chairman of the Board of Governors for holding consultations prior to convening the Committee's first meeting. She also congratulated the Chairperson of the Committee on her designation. NAM had full confidence in her ability to carry out her duties with professionalism and integrity. NAM was also grateful to the Secretariat for its presentations.

21. NAM supported all efforts to enhance the Agency's work in all its aspects, within the limits of its statutory responsibilities and legal authority, and bearing in mind the inalienable right of all States to carry out any activity related to research into, or development or practical application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Any non-proliferation efforts, including safeguards and verification, should run parallel to nuclear disarmament efforts. In that connection, NAM remained deeply concerned over the slow pace of progress towards nuclear disarmament, which remained its highest priority. Furthermore, efforts should be made to strengthen all the Agency's statutory activities in a balanced manner. The Committee should not divert resources away from promotional activities and thereby impair the balance between nuclear verification and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

22. The Committee should focus on considering ways to strengthen the safeguards system, reporting thereon to the Board of Governors with recommendations where appropriate. Any recommendations of the Committee should be in conformity with the Agency's statutory responsibilities and should not hamper the economic or technological development of Member States or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes. In that regard, NAM attached great importance to promoting and strengthening the multilateral process and rejected unilateralism. It urged the Committee to take into account all the views and concerns it had expressed at the Board's meetings in March and June that year and in informal consultations, including those concerning the Committee's future agenda and work.

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<sup>2</sup> Attached as Annex 1.

<sup>3</sup> Attached as Annex 2.



23. In fulfilling its mandate, the Committee should not duplicate either the responsibilities of the Director General or the work of SAGSI. It should focus on strengthening elements of the Agency's safeguards system, in particular those implemented in connection with the NPT, where appropriate and within existing legal obligations. Referring to General Conference resolution GC(49)/RES/13, she said that NAM attached great importance to the open-ended nature of the Committee and to the need for consensus on any decisions and recommendations. NAM took note of the decision of the Board that the Committee would have an initial two-year mandate. Before making any recommendations to the Board, the Committee should assess the full implementation of relevant decisions of previous General Conferences and of the Board related to strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards and verification system. NAM was confident that the Secretariat had the necessary expertise to support and facilitate the work of the Committee by preparing substantive documentation in all United Nations languages for distribution in a timely manner. The Committee should take advantage of the Secretariat's expertise in the area of safeguards and verification improvement.

24. With regard to the schedule for future meetings, to allow all States to participate fully in the Committee's work there should be no overlap between Committee meetings and other scheduled United Nations-related meetings in Vienna. NAM took note of the Board's decision that the Committee would consider, and make recommendations to the Board of Governors on any Committee funding issues, and it looked forward to receiving the relevant information from the Secretariat on funding requirements. It looked forward to the wide consultations to be conducted by the Chairperson with a view to reaching agreement on all pending issues, including the detailed mandate, and the agenda, subjects and timing of future meetings. More time was needed to examine some of the concrete proposals or subjects to be considered in future meetings.

25. The representative of MEXICO\*, speaking on behalf of GRULAC, congratulated Ms. Feroukhi on being designated Chairperson of the Committee, and she expressed particular pleasure at the fact that a representative of a developing country had been designated.

26. GRULAC wished to participate actively in the Committee's work in order to ensure that it made a real contribution to the safeguards system. The Committee's work should not duplicate the role of the Secretariat or SAGSI, and one of its first tasks should be to define its work programme and the specific issues it would consider. The work programme should take into account the fact that the only bodies competent to make policy decisions in the Agency were the Board of Governors and the General Conference.

27. A balance needed to be maintained among all the Agency's statutory activities. For GRULAC member countries, technical cooperation activities were of particular importance because they offered possibilities for achieving prosperity and sustainable development for their peoples.

28. GRULAC would like the Secretariat to provide information on the costs of holding Committee meetings, taking into account the fact that its members were not in a position to accept additional financial commitments and could not agree to the reallocation of resources already approved for other programmes.

29. Given the importance of the Committee, its activities should be planned in such a way as to allow all Member States to participate effectively.

30. The representative of AUSTRALIA congratulated the Chairperson on her designation.

31. The establishment of the Committee was a recognition of the considerable challenges facing the Agency in the development and implementation of an effective safeguards system. Some of those challenges could be addressed by technical measures, such as those on which the Secretariat was

receiving advice from SAGSI. Others involved policy decisions which it was appropriate for the Board to address. The new Committee provided a mechanism allowing Board members to give such issues more considered attention than was possible at Board meetings. The open-ended nature of the Committee also provided an opportunity for obtaining the views of States not represented on the Board.

32. She thanked the Secretariat for its excellent presentation on some of the current safeguards challenges. Australia wished to see the Committee carry out work in a number of specific areas falling under four broad themes.

33. The first was information sharing. Events in recent years, including the discovery of significant undeclared nuclear activities and a widespread illicit nuclear supply network, highlighted the nature of the challenges facing the Agency and the issues that needed to be addressed if the safeguards system was to continue to provide the assurances required by Member States. The Committee could explore the possible role of the Agency in assisting the effective implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540. The Agency's ability to evaluate the activities of States with additional protocols could be improved through the provision by States of information on dual-use items additional to those already listed in the annexes to the additional protocol. The Committee could usefully examine the manner in which such information could be made available to the Agency, including the possibility of updating the annexes to the additional protocol.

34. The second theme — strengthening verification capabilities — encompassed a review of existing safeguards legal authorities in the light of existing and possible future challenges, including a review of the approach to special inspections and consideration of whether any additional rights of access to locations and individuals were required where safeguards breaches were under investigation. Weaponization-related issues also merited consideration. Moreover, the Committee could examine whether the analytical capabilities currently available to the Agency were adequate or whether additional ones were needed.

35. The third theme — assisting States to improve safeguards implementation — would include promoting the adoption and effective implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. The Committee could identify obstacles which States faced in bringing into force and effectively implementing those instruments. The Agency and Member States could work together to overcome identified obstacles in a focused and coordinated manner.

36. The fourth theme — supporting the Board's authority and oversight — could include consideration of the range of safeguards implementation information reported to the Board.

37. The Committee could work toward elaborating a progress report for submission to the Board in June, which would require holding several Committee meetings before then. To assist the Committee's work, a number of briefings on topics relevant to the themes outlined could be given by the Secretariat and/or Member States at the next meeting.

38. Australia recognized the fundamental importance of effective Agency verification for the promotion of international peace and security and was firmly committed to strengthening the Agency's safeguards system.

39. The representative of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA congratulated the Chairperson on her designation and said that the work of the Committee was critical to the Board, the Agency and all Member States.

40. Nuclear power was of increasing importance to economic prosperity and development. On the other hand, nuclear weapons were the greatest destructive force devised by man. The Agency had been created to fulfil hopes for nuclear power and reduce the risks of nuclear proliferation. The safeguards

system was the principal means of accomplishing that end and peaceful nuclear cooperation and legitimate nuclear trade could only flourish when countries had full confidence in that system.

41. Ten years previously the Board had authorized the Secretariat to begin implementing strengthened safeguards. The additional protocol was a major success, but the world had changed dramatically in the ten years since it had been elaborated. Inspectors had encountered severe challenges, including illicit nuclear supply programmes, covert nuclear facilities and undeclared material and activities. The safeguards system needed to adapt to current and future challenges. Those who implemented the system were in the best position to provide advice on which measures worked well, which could be made to work better, and which new ones might be needed. He expressed appreciation for the Secretariat's analysis of the tools, cooperation and information needed by the Department of Safeguards to fulfil the Agency's mandate.

42. Many national governments also had significant experience as regards current measures and ideas for improving safeguards. All parties should think about the contribution each could make to the Committee's work, perhaps through presentations on specific items the Committee might address.

43. The Committee should work in partnership with the Secretariat and should not duplicate the work of SAGSI. The questions on which the Board had asked the Committee to report were of a different nature. The Committee had an opportunity to examine existing legal authorities, including reporting mechanisms; to determine how to strengthen safeguards in the face of clandestine supply networks; to consider how to strengthen State systems of accounting and control; and to assess Agency resources, both human and technological. It would be the Committee's job to advise the Board on those and other issues, and to recommend measures the Board might take to ensure that safeguards met current and future challenges.

44. Governments would judge the Committee's success by the actions taken by the Board of Governors to strengthen safeguards in the two years of the Committee's initial mandate. The Committee should strive to present a progress report to the Board at its June 2006 meetings with a first set of recommendations. The Committee's work programme and meeting schedule should be elaborated with that target in mind.

45. He thanked the Secretariat for its presentations, which had been very useful, and expressed the hope that additional presentations could be made at the next meeting, not only by the Secretariat but also by Member States with experiences to share. He made four specific proposals for information briefings: 1. a briefing by the Agency on legal and technical foundations of Agency safeguards; 2. a briefing by the Secretariat on safeguards reporting to the Board; 3. a presentation, possibly by Russia, on implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 and the possible role of the Agency; and 4. a presentation on experience with clandestine procurement networks, possibly by the Governor from South Africa.

46. The representative of CANADA congratulated the Chairperson on her designation.

47. Her country had supported the concept of the Committee from the outset and was pleased that the inaugural meeting was now taking place. It was critical for the Committee to begin substantive work so that it could begin to make recommendations to the Board as mandated. Canada expected initial recommendations, even if limited in scope, to be made at the Board's meeting's in June 2006 and hoped that three to four Committee meetings would take place before then.

48. There were a number of areas where the Committee could make a contribution. The Board's recent decision to reform the SQP had been exactly the type of issue the Committee would have been fitted to take on had it then existed, but there were many others. The Director General had made some useful suggestions to the Board in June 2005 when the Committee had been established. She

welcomed the Secretariat's presentations which elaborated on those ideas and proposed specific areas the Committee could productively work on. She also joined previous speakers in inviting further briefings from the Secretariat. Canada did not wish to see the Committee duplicate or cut across the work of SAGSI, and the Secretariat's presentations had helped the Committee better understand SAGSI's role and mandate.

49. The ideas for areas of work which had been presented thus far were not exhaustive, and ideas from other Member States on ways and means of strengthening the safeguards system were welcome. The current meeting and subsequent consultations should identify those areas of work that would produce a net benefit to the safeguards regime and allow the Committee to build its reputation as a competent and unbiased advisory body.

50. The safeguards system was not static but evolved in response to changing conditions. It had evolved in the recent past, for example, through the introduction of environmental sampling and the elaboration of the additional protocol, and it would continue to evolve in the future as a result of the Committee's recommendations.

51. The representative of ECUADOR joined previous speakers in congratulating the Chairperson on her designation.

52. Ecuador was ready to analyse new ideas and initiatives aimed at strengthening the effectiveness of Agency bodies so that the Agency could achieve its objectives, such as non-proliferation and strengthening of the other pillars of the Agency's activities such as safety and technical cooperation. The latter was very important to countries like his own. He therefore welcomed the Director General's confirmation that verification should not be strengthened at the expense of other activities.

53. Ecuador had made several comments in the consultation process leading up to the creation of the Committee, including that the Committee should not duplicate the activities of SAGSI or any other body, that it should make an effective contribution to strengthening the system, and that its activities should not go beyond the bounds set by the Statute or the tasks assigned to it by the Board. The Committee's mandate should be reviewed after two years, as agreed, and renewed, if necessary, depending on the benefits its work brought for the safeguards system.

54. Ecuador shared the concern voiced by other representatives regarding any new financial commitments resulting from the creation of the Committee. The Secretariat should keep Member States informed of the financial implications. In drawing up the work programme, only the essential minimum of meeting days should be scheduled, taking care that there was no overlap with the regular sessions of other international organizations based in Vienna so that missions — especially those with limited staff — would be able to plan their work and participate actively.

55. The representative of SOUTH AFRICA conveyed his hearty congratulations to the Chairperson.

56. South Africa welcomed every effort to universalize the safeguards regime by strengthening its three pillars of non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy and believed that the Agency was the sole competent authority in the field of nuclear safeguards and verification.

57. The Committee was a milestone in the efforts of Member States to work together with the Agency to strengthen safeguards and verification. It was of fundamental importance that the Committee's proposed scope and responsibilities should not duplicate or interfere with the work of the Department of Safeguards and SAGSI, and that the technical expertise that would be required for it to fulfil its advisory purpose be ascertained.

58. South Africa's position on the mutually reinforcing processes of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament was well documented. His country believed that the Committee's work on

safeguards and verification should run parallel to the international community's efforts aimed at complete nuclear disarmament. The Committee should look at all aspects of safeguards and verification in order to strengthen further the non-proliferation regime, while at the same time guarding against any unwarranted restrictions on the inalienable right of States to utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under Article IV of the NPT.

59. Finally, the Committee should strive for consensus on all recommendations to be put forward to the Board for consideration and approval by the General Conference.

60. The representative of COLOMBIA congratulated the Chairperson on her designation.

61. Colombia recognized and supported the work done by the Agency in its three statutory areas of activity. A balance needed to be maintained between those three areas and he stressed in particular the importance of technical cooperation activities owing to the enormous possibilities that nuclear applications opened up in areas of fundamental importance to development. In that connection, he agreed with the Director General that the verification system should not be strengthened at the expense of other areas of the Agency's work.

62. As Colombia had pointed out during the Board's meetings in June, it was committed to disarmament and non-proliferation. It supported discussion and exchanges of views that would lead to the strengthening of the safeguards system and the non-proliferation system, and that contributed to the search for adequate responses to the new challenges of proliferation, illicit trafficking and terrorism. It therefore supported the establishment of the Committee. It was his country's understanding that the establishment of the Committee would not create additional financial obligations. That should be borne in mind when elaborating the schedule for future meetings, as should the calendar of other meetings, so that all Member States could participate, even those with small delegations.

63. The representative of FRANCE congratulated the Chairperson on her designation.

64. France had supported the Committee's creation and was glad to see it beginning its work. Proliferation risks were one of the major challenges confronting the international community, and the Agency's safeguards system was an essential mechanism in that regard. However, it was threatened by crises of non-compliance with obligations and, even though it had been strengthened through the additional protocol, there was room for improvement. The Committee provided an opportunity to examine, in a multilateral context, possible ways of increasing the system's universality, improving its effectiveness and strengthening the Agency's capabilities.

65. The improvement of safeguards and verification in no way called into question the development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy, to which France attached particular importance. The true threat to the development of peaceful uses was proliferation.

66. Inasmuch as the Committee was advisory, it should present to the Board specific proposals for strengthening safeguards, with various options where appropriate. To do that, it would have to examine in depth the subjects it would be discussing and take adequate account of their technical aspects. However, too detailed technical analyses should be avoided, as that would duplicate the work of the Secretariat and SAGSI.

67. The best possible use should be made of the coming two years. Thus, the work programme should focus on certain themes which were particularly important and where rapid progress was necessary.

68. France agreed with the Director General that the first priority was to strengthen efforts to universalize safeguards agreements and additional protocols. It would also be opportune, as some

years had elapsed since the introduction of strengthened safeguards, to take stock of their application and acquired experience in that regard. The topics proposed by the Director General and the Secretariat, such as strengthening the Agency's analytical capabilities and technical resources, should also be considered by the Committee.

69. Following the NPT Review Conference's consideration of the issue of withdrawal from the Treaty, it could be useful to examine what the Agency's role and actions should be in such a case, specifically with regard to the application of safeguards.

70. Finally, the question of the Agency's contribution — within the framework on its verification missions — to the implementation of Security Council decisions, such as resolution 1540, should also be considered by the Committee.

71. France hoped to see an ambitious but realistic work programme which would help strengthen the role and effectiveness of the Agency.

72. The representative of SINGAPORE joined other speakers in congratulating the Chairperson.

73. Her country had long opposed the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The Agency had a central role to play in combating nuclear proliferation and it was therefore important that its safeguards system remain capable of responding to new challenges, within its mandate, in a credible and effective manner. Singapore had supported the creation of the Committee as it believed it would be helpful to the Agency's goals to reinforce the effectiveness of its safeguards and verification system.

74. The Director General's opening statement and the Secretariat's presentations had provided food for thought on possible avenues the Committee could explore in its work. Singapore would actively participate in more detailed discussions on the agenda, topics and other issues pertaining to the Committee's work during the Chairperson's subsequent consultations.

75. A strengthened safeguards system should be flexible enough to address new challenges. In that regard, Singapore supported the ongoing efforts to achieve universal application of the additional protocol. States entering into negotiations with the Secretariat to modify their SQPs should be given any technical assistance they required. In that connection, her country was willing to consider any additional measures to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards and verification regime within the limits of its Statute. It also attached importance to maintaining the impartiality and independence of the verification regime.

76. Recommendations made by the Committee to the Board should be deliberated upon in an inclusive manner and the utmost efforts should be made to achieve consensus. That would not only contribute to creating a positive atmosphere, but would also pave the way for maximum support within the Board. Singapore strongly believed that a practical, forward-looking and constructive approach, taking into account all views expressed, was the appropriate manner in which to conduct the Committee's work.

77. The representative of CUBA congratulated the Chairperson and said that his country stood ready to contribute to making the Committee a useful instrument in the efforts to improve the Agency's verification activities.

78. The Agency had been strengthening its safeguards and verification system, drawing on long years of practical experience and the lessons learned from certain special cases. The key elements of the system, which was still in a process of maturation, were comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. Additional protocols had only been applied relatively recently and a significant number of States had not yet begun to apply them. That was precisely what the Committee should be

looking at so that it could recommend to the Board ways and means of improving those areas where there were still shortcomings, or where experience had shown that there was a need for adjustments.

79. It was not appropriate for the Committee to attempt to design a new framework for safeguards or to seek ways to go beyond the accepted framework, which was the fruit of many years of negotiations, until it had exhausted the possibilities of the current framework. In order to achieve practical results and not become lost in theoretical discussions, it was imperative to take into account the experience of the Secretariat and the real problems experienced in the implementation process.

80. The success of the Committee's work would depend in large part on its ability to organize it in a manner that allowed all interested countries to participate effectively, which meant avoiding conflicts with other relevant activities of the Agency and other United Nations bodies based in Vienna, ensuring sufficient time was allowed for the circulation, study and negotiation of documents, and programming activities in such a way as to allow for the participation of all.

81. In conclusion, he joined other speakers in drawing attention to the fact that the operation of the Committee should not be allowed to constitute an additional financial burden, nor should it divert resources from other approved programmes.

82. The representative of BRAZIL congratulated the Chairperson on her designation, particularly as she came from a developing country.

83. Brazil acknowledged the improvements that had been made to the first proposal to create the Committee, following extensive consultations. The decision creating the Committee stipulated that it was advisory to the Board, that it would function within the Agency's Statute, that Member States which were not Board members could participate in its work, and that any intergovernmental organization that was party to a comprehensive safeguards agreement could also participate as an observer.

84. SAGSI already fulfilled an important function in relation to the technical aspects of safeguards implementation, even though it reported to the Director General and not the Board. The presentation on SAGSI had provided useful information which should help avoid duplication of efforts.

85. Though his country supported the strengthening of the Agency's safeguards system, it held the view that that should not affect the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in accordance with Article IV of the NPT. Any efforts to strengthen the system had to respect the safeguards agreements between Member States and the Agency and should not represent any additional burden for the majority of Member States which had already fulfilled their respective safeguards commitments. It was essential that the Committee's work remain strictly within the Agency's mandate and that due consideration be given to maintaining a balance among the Agency's statutory activities in terms of the human and financial resources they received. There was a link between non-proliferation and disarmament, and progress needed to be made on both those objectives, as highlighted by the Director General in his introductory remarks.

86. He encouraged the Chairperson to hold extensive consultations with Member States on such issues as funding, meeting schedules and the Committee's mandate. It was also important to have access to any documents to be discussed in a timely manner.

87. The representative of CHINA congratulated the Chairperson on her designation and welcomed the consensus decision of the Board in June 2005 to set up the Committee. His country intended to participate actively in its work.

88. The function of the Committee was to make recommendations to the Board on strengthening of safeguards and on policy-related issues. The Committee should conduct its work within the framework

of the Agency's Statute and relevant international law, and manage its relations with existing mechanisms such as the Board, the Secretariat and SAGSI in a way that would not affect their functions.

89. The Secretariat was responsible for safeguards implementation and had accumulated a wealth of experience and knowledge on that subject and on the problems and weaknesses of the existing safeguards system. The Secretariat should provide background information and advice to the Committee and any technical support required.

90. The Committee should follow the Board's Rules of Procedure, facilitate equal participation by all Member States in its work and make recommendations to the Board on relevant issues on the basis of consensus.

91. With regard to the schedule of future meetings, meetings should be held reasonably frequently, documents to be discussed should be distributed in time, and necessary consultations should be held prior to each meeting to improve efficiency.

92. The ideas presented by the Director General in his introductory statements to the June Board and the Committee regarding possible areas of work merited careful consideration. In addition, the following topics were worthy of consideration: promotion of the universal implementation of the Agency's existing legal authority, in particular the universal signing, ratification and implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols; ways of helping countries with SQPs to implement modified SQPs; discussion and possible revision of the annexes to the additional protocol. The issues to be discussed by the Committee should be prioritized from easy to difficult and the aim should be to achieve practical results.

93. The representative of the RUSSIAN FEDERATION congratulated the Chairperson on her designation. The work before the Committee was not simple, given the political sensitivity and technical complexity of the issues. Constructive results enjoying broad support would promote international confidence in the Agency's safeguards system, which continued to demonstrate its effectiveness as a reliable mechanism for the verification of States' activities in the field of the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

94. The Committee's agenda should reflect the interests of all Member States in a balanced manner. Only then could it hope to achieve the objectives set by the Board. Several possible areas of work had been outlined by the Director General and the Secretariat and by other delegations. Some priority issues among them could be selected for inclusion in the agenda for the Committee's next meeting.

95. Finally, the Committee's work should be transparent and remain within the bounds of the Agency's Statute.

96. The representative of NORWAY congratulated the Chairperson on her designation. Her country welcomed the decision taken at the June Board to establish the Committee.

97. The Committee should use its two-year mandate to come up with concrete and practical recommendations which would further enhance the credibility of the safeguards and verification regime and which would be brought before the Board for adoption.

98. With regard to possible areas of work, first and foremost the Committee could contribute to the universalization of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols and assess the need to provide assistance to countries experiencing difficulties concluding those instruments. It could also look at how the Agency's advisory services could be strengthened. The implementation of SQPs should also be given attention. It could explore ways to ensure more effective use of resources in the safeguards area and should consider the experience gained from integrated safeguards, without



duplicating the work done by SAGSI. Furthermore, it could explore ways to enhance the analytical and verification capacity of the Agency in the future, including improved access to relevant information. Lastly, it could consider how to develop voluntary verification arrangements such as the Trilateral Initiative.

99. She looked forward to the forthcoming consultations on the Committee's programme of work and agreed that the Committee could benefit from further presentations by the Secretariat and Member States.

100. The representative of INDIA congratulated the Chairperson on her designation. The establishment of the Committee was a major step forward and should build on the Board's achievements thus far. Many suggestions had been made regarding the future work of the Committee, and his country was confident that progress could be made in those areas.

101. The Agency was facing many challenges and the Committee should aim to empower the Agency further and enable it meet those challenges. Transparency and the ability to keep Member States and the international community informed remained important and the Committee should consider how those qualities could be enhanced. In considering the Agency's ability to deal with such issues as illicit trafficking, unauthorized activities, gaps in verification and other challenges, it should adopt a pragmatic and creative approach and view the issues in a contemporary perspective, and it should strive to maintain balance.

102. The representative of SRI LANKA applauded the designation of the Chairperson and said that her country had supported the establishment of the Committee

103. A number of contemporary global developments posed new challenges to the nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation regime. The Agency's safeguards and verification activities needed to be discussed with a fresh perspective, combining practical input from the Secretariat and policy-level guidance from the Committee and the Board. The Committee could first study the material presented to it regarding existing verification and safeguards activities, and provide advice and recommendations to the Board.

104. The presentations by the Secretariat on the Agency's ongoing safeguards and verification activities had been interesting and the Secretariat's practical experience would play an important role in shaping the Committee's future work. The further briefings proposed would also be useful. The Committee should not duplicate ongoing work on safeguards implementation.

105. A schedule needed to be set for further meetings of the Committee which should take account of the capacity of smaller missions.

106. Finally, it was important to maintain a balance between the Agency's statutory activities, and resources should not be diverted to the Committee in a manner that would affect that balance.

107. The representative of JAPAN congratulated the Chairperson on her designation and welcomed the establishment of the Committee. In the light of recent events, Japan attached great importance to strengthening the Agency's safeguards activities and enhancing the credibility of its safeguards functions.

108. The Committee should initially consider high-priority issues, with a view to producing concrete results within a reasonable amount of time. Enhancing the efficiency of safeguards activities was one such issue, in particular the universalization of the additional protocol. Other areas of interest included better resource distribution to ensure more efficient inspections and a review of ways to implement special inspections.

109. The representative of the LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA congratulated the Chairperson on her designation and stressed the inalienable right of States to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without discrimination. It was important that any recommendations by the Committee complied with Article IV of the NPT, which guaranteed access to nuclear technology and material for peaceful applications.

110. His country intended to participate actively in the Committee's work. It was important that it did not duplicate the work of SAGSI and that all Member States could actively participate in the meetings and had enough time to consider documents beforehand.

111. Significant progress had been made in the non-proliferation field, but work had to continue in order to strengthen international security. A safeguards and verification system was the only way to ensure a balanced, fair, and safe world with regard to nuclear issues. The Agency, as the competent verification body, should strive for consensus on all decisions.

112. The representative of the UNITED KINGDOM congratulated the Chairperson on her designation and welcomed the establishment of the Committee.

113. The safeguards system could not remain static. It had to respond to emerging challenges if it was to provide the assurances sought by the international community. The Director General had indicated several possible areas of work and the presentations that had been given had also been useful in that regard, and in providing a context for the future work of the Committee. Finally he welcomed the four themes proposed by the representative of the United States for presentations to be made at the Committee's next meeting.

114. The representative of the BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA congratulated the Chairperson on her designation.

115. Her country had actively participated in the establishment of the Committee and was convinced it would contribute to strengthening the Agency's safeguards system. Venezuela stood ready to take part in all the Committee's activities and study the new ideas put forward by Member States to improve the Agency's activities. It was important that the Committee's work remain within the bounds of the Agency's Statute.

116. The representative of the REPUBLIC OF KOREA congratulated the Chairperson on her designation

117. There was a clear need for a strengthened safeguards system to deal with new proliferation challenges. His country welcomed the establishment of the Committee and hoped that it would meet the expectations of the international community.

118. The ideas for future areas of work put forward by the Secretariat and Member States should be considered. The Committee had much work before it. It should begin with those issues on which consensus could more easily be reached, for example: enhancing the technical and analytical capacity and infrastructure of the Secretariat, universal implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and updating of the annexes to the additional protocol. A phased, practical approach was important to maintain the momentum created by the Board's consensus decision to establish the Committee. The work of other Agency bodies, such as SAGSI, should not be duplicated. It was also important to reach an early consensus agreement on rules of procedure for the Committee. Decisions should be made on the basis of consensus where ever possible and, in the event of a dissenting view, the Board should make the final decision based on a report submitted by the Committee.

119. The support of the Secretariat was essential, as it had the experience in safeguards implementation which the Committee would need. He expressed support for the proposal that further presentations should be made by Member States to complement the input from the Secretariat.

120. The representative of EGYPT congratulated the Chairperson on her designation and thanked the Director General for the guidance he had given with regard to the future work of the Committee. His country continued to support the nuclear non-proliferation regime and efforts to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system, in particular comprehensive safeguards.

121. The role of the Committee was to strengthen the Agency's safeguards and verification activities and capabilities in line with Member States' legal obligations. In doing so, it should strive always to achieve consensus.

122. Important ideas had been put forward regarding the Committee's future work by the Director General, the Secretariat, and Member States, which would be considered in due course. Egypt looked forward to participating actively in the work of the Committee.

123. The representative of ARGENTINA congratulated the Chairperson on her designation. She expressed the hope that the Committee would make wise proposals to the Board on ways and means of strengthening the safeguards and verification regime in order to meet the fundamental goal of non-proliferation. She thanked the Secretariat for its presentations, and the Director General for his introductory comments, which had indicated some weaknesses in the safeguards system and how they could be corrected. In order for the Agency to fulfil its mandate, it had to remain ahead of, and not behind, global technology.

124. The Committee should focus on current challenges facing the safeguards system, including undeclared nuclear activities and illicit trafficking in nuclear material. Sufficient time should be allowed to prepare for future meetings, so that all could participate actively in its work. Consensus should be sought on all decisions.

125. The representative of the SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC thanked the Director General for his introductory remarks and the Secretariat for its presentations and congratulated the Chairperson on her designation.

126. No effort should be spared to stop proliferation, but efforts in that regard should go hand in hand with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. There should be no diversion of resources, time or effort from the Agency's technical cooperation activities. Any recommendations made by the Committee should not overstep the bounds of the Agency's statutory functions.

127. The representative of INDONESIA congratulated the Chairperson on her designation, expressed appreciation for the Agency's extensive efforts to strengthen the verification system and welcomed the steady increase in the number of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols.

128. Indonesia attached great importance to the Agency's safeguards and verification system as it provided credible assurances regarding the non-diversion of nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. It took pride in being one of the first three countries where integrated safeguards were being applied at the State level.

129. His country welcomed the establishment of the Committee. Certain situations demanded a strong, effective and adaptable safeguards regime. The Committee should complement, not duplicate, the Agency's ongoing work in that regard. Indonesia looked forward to having a clearer picture of the Committee's mandate and modalities.

**The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.**





International Atomic Energy Agency

**Advisory Committee on Safeguards and Verification within the Framework of the IAEA Statute – Topics for Discussion**

11 November 2005

Olli Heinonen  
Deputy Director General  
Head of the Department of Safeguards

## Statute of the IAEA

"The Agency is authorized:

... to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy;

..."

(Article III.A.5)

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## Types of Safeguards Agreements

- INFCIRC/66-type safeguards agreements
- Voluntary offer agreements
- Comprehensive safeguards agreements

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## Application of Safeguards

"...the Agency's right and obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied, in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State, ... for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

INFCIRC/153 (corr.) paragraph 2

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## Objective of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements

To verify  
the correctness and completeness  
of State declarations

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## Earlier strengthening measures

- Early provision of design information
- Use of environmental sampling
- Open-source information analysis
- Use of satellite imagery
- Approval of the Model Additional Protocol
- Modification of Small Quantities Protocols

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## Areas to strengthen

For instance:

- Discovery of nuclear activities that should have been reported to the Agency
- Utilization of nuclear material, e.g. exempted materials, for such activities
- The existence of procurement and supply networks in sensitive nuclear technologies and information
- Agency's limited authority to verify the absence of activities related to the development of nuclear weapons

have illustrated the need to further strengthen the safeguards system

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## Strengthening in four main areas

- **Uniform legal authority**
- **Availability of information**
- **Enhanced analytical capabilities**
- **Use of new technologies**

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## POSSIBLE STRENGTHENING MEASURES

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## Uniform legal authority

### 1) Promote the conclusion of outstanding safeguards agreements and of additional protocols (APs) with all States

(As of 1 November 2005)

- APs in force in 69 States
- 36 NPT States have no CSA in force
- 88 States have not yet signed APs
- 35 States have signed an AP, but have not yet brought it into force

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## Uniform legal authority (continued)

### 2) Modify "Small Quantities Protocols" (SQPs) in accordance with the Board decision of 20 September 2005

- The Secretariat will be sending letters to States with SQPs in November 2005
- Early acceptance of the proposed modifications is urged

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## Availability of information

### 3) Increased cooperation and transparency

- Improve the efficiency of SSACs**  
Improve communication between SSACs and the Agency; provide additional guidance and training
- Improve access to persons**  
Useful in certain situations, in particular when documentary or physical evidence is not available
- Improve access to open source and third party information**  
Encourage provision of information which can be independently verified by the Secretariat

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## Availability of information (continued)

### 3) Increased cooperation and transparency (cont.)

- iv) Improve the Agency's ability to analyse and verify information provided by Member States on nuclear supply and procurement
- v) Report on Np and Am as agreed to by the Board in 1999

## Availability of information (continued)

### 4) Possible review of Annexes I and II of the AP

To include safeguards relevant information concerning sensitive technologies and items

## Enhanced analytical capabilities

### 5) Expand the Agency's capability and capacity to process and analyze environmental samples

- Ensure the integrity, impartiality and independence of the IAEA's analytical verification and improve sample turnaround time
- IAEA-SAL has demonstrated its capability for over 10 years; it could be enhanced with additional SIMS or fission track technology
- Encourage expansion of Agency's NWAL

## Use of new technologies

### 6) Improve access to satellite imagery

- Access to new available technologies, e.g. radar imagery of acceptable resolution
- Increase the Agency's independence in the collection of satellite images, e.g. over sensitive locations

### 7) Improve access to novel technologies

- Demand-driven development of novel technologies

## Final remarks

- Responding to the emerging challenges is essential for the Agency to maintain an efficient and credible safeguards system
- Improving nuclear safeguards contributes to the availability and expanded use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes

## Final remarks (continued)

- Advisory Committee on Safeguards and Verification within the framework of the IAEA Statute:
  - Policy guidance
  - Legal authority
  - Financial resources
- Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI):
  - Technical implementation of existing safeguards system






  
International Atomic Energy Agency

**Advisory Committee on Safeguards and  
Verification within the Framework of the  
IAEA Statute – The Role of SAGSI**  
11 November 2005

**Jill Cooley**  
Director, Division of Concepts and Planning  
Department of Safeguards

**Standing Advisory Group on  
Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI)**

- Established 1975 as senior committee to advise the Director General (DG) on safeguards matters.
- Reports to and considers issues remitted to it by the DG.
- Members appointed by the DG and serve in their individual capacities as safeguards experts.
- Currently 18 members representing broad geographical distribution.
- Members serve 3-year terms that are renewable.


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**SAGSI Terms of Reference**

**Functions**

To advise the Director General on technical aspects of Agency safeguards. In particular, to:

- a. Provide advice on technical objectives and implementation parameters of Agency safeguards.
- b. Make recommendations on how to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of specific safeguards implementation practices.
- c. Consider and provide advice on technical aspects of new types of verification missions for the Agency related to nuclear material.

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**SAGSI Terms of Reference**

**Method of work**

- SAGSI determines its own working procedures.
- If required, DG may invite other experts from Member States or other international organizations to participate in SAGSI meetings.

**Meetings**

- Not less than once a year (*in practice, normally two Plenary meetings of one week duration in Vienna supported by a Working Group meeting approximately one month prior to the Plenary*).

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**SAGSI – Issues Considered**

- Safeguards Implementation Report (1975)
- Significant Quantities (1977)
- Safeguards Criteria (1988-1989)
- Safeguards Strengthening Measures (1992-1997)
- Proliferation Potential of Np and Am (1999)
- Development of Integrated Safeguards (1998 – ongoing)
- Review of the Safeguards Criteria (2003-2004)

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**Current and Near-Term Work Programme**

**Safeguards Development**

- Further review of the State-Level approach
- Further review of integrated safeguards concepts and guidelines
- Evaluation under integrated safeguards
- Improving reporting of safeguards implementation (e.g., SIR)

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**Current and Near-Term Work Programme**

**Improving effectiveness and efficiency**

- Safeguards R&D Programme
- Safeguards approaches and criteria for specific facility types
- Efficiencies in inspection effort – *unattended and remote monitoring techniques, randomized inspections, transfers to dry storage*
- Costing methodology for safeguards activities

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