

IAEA Board of Governors

Record of the 6th Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Safeguards and
Verification within the Framework of the IAEA Statute
GOV/COM.25/OR.6

(Click the link below to go directly to the NAM statement)

Review and improvement of the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards
system: (b) Secretariat activities to facilitate the conclusion of safeguards
agreements and additional protocols (Malaysia)

Review and improvement of the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards
system: (c) Enhancing IAEA satellite imagery capabilities (Malaysia)

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Issued: June 2006

Restricted Distribution

Original: English

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Advisory Committee on Safeguards and Verification within the Framework of the IAEA Statute

Record of the 6th Meeting

Held at Headquarters, on Monday, 8 May 2006, at 3 p.m.

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¹ GOV/COM.25/6.

Attendance

(The list below gives the name of the senior member of each delegation who attended the meeting, as well as that of any other member whose statement is summarized in this record.)

Ms. FEROUKHI		Chairperson (Algeria)
Mr. FASSIH	_____	Algeria
Ms. WILKINSON DE VEXINA		Argentina
Mr. BEVEN		Australia
Ms. CLAEYS		Belgium
Ms. RICHTER RIBEIRO MOURA		Brazil
Ms. GERVAIS-VIDRICAIRE	}	Canada
Mr. PROUDFOOT		
Mr. YANG Dazhu		China
Ms. QUINTERO CORREA		Colombia
Mr. CODORNIU PUJALS		Cuba
Mr. EL DIN KHALIL		Egypt
Mr. ALBERT		France
Mr. SANDTNER		Germany
Ms. BALANOU		Greece
Mr. PATEL		India
Mr. WIBOWO	}	Indonesia
Ms. LISTYOWATI		
Mr. AMANO	}	Japan
Mr. SUMI		
Mr. LEE Key-Cheol		Korea, Republic of
Mr. TAJOURI		Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
Ms. VIKØY	}	Norway
Ms. SEKSE		
Mr. INOCÊNCIO PEREIRA		Portugal
Mr. KUCHINOV		Russian Federation
Ms. YEW		Singapore
Mr. TURNER		Slovakia
Mr. KRIŽ		Slovenia
Mr. LOMBARD		South Africa
Mr. PERERA		Sri Lanka
Ms. GUSTAFSSON		Sweden
Mr. OTHMAN		Syrian Arab Republic
Mr. TULEY		United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Mr. ADAMS		United States of America
Mr. BAHRAN		Yemen
Mr. ANING	_____	Secretary of the Committee

Representatives of the following Member States also attended the meeting:

Angola, Austria, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Finland, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Malaysia, Morocco, Namibia, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Zimbabwe.

Abbreviations used in this record:

EU	European Union
LOFs	locations outside facilities
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NWAL	Network of Analytical Laboratories
R&D	research and development
RSAC	regional system of accounting for and control of nuclear material
SAGSI	Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation
SAL	Safeguards Analytical Laboratory
SIR	Safeguards Implementation Report
SQP	small quantities protocol
SSAC	State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material
TCF	Technical Cooperation Fund

* Speakers under Rule 50 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure are indicated by an asterisk.

1. Review and improvement of the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system

(a) A report on the implementation of measures to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system (continued) (Note by the Secretariat 2006/Note 23 and Corr.1)

1. The representative of CHINA said that document 2006/Note 23 gave a comprehensive account of the measures taken by the Agency since 1991 to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system and provided a good basis for the Committee's discussion.

2. Further enhancement of the safeguards system depended first and foremost on promoting the existing safeguards mandate, particularly the universalization of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols and the implementation by all countries of their safeguards obligations. China supported the work of the Committee in that regard and also its efforts to study ways of assisting developing countries to set up and improve their national legal infrastructure in such fields as the control, physical protection and export control of nuclear material and the safety and security of radioactive sources.

3. The provision of additional information on nuclear technologies provided to the Agency under additional protocols, revised SQPs and various voluntary arrangements was key in strengthening the safeguards system. Recent developments in non-proliferation meant that there were new challenges to be met. His delegation took note of the Recommendations 4 to 9 on the matter and hoped that the Secretariat would listen carefully to the views of Member States and provide further background information on the proposals. That would facilitate in-depth discussion by the Committee of relevant legal, technical and financial aspects and the achievement of consensus on some of the issues.

4. Turning to the matter of enhancement of technical capabilities, he said the rise in demand for environmental sampling meant that timely analysis of samples was crucial for the Agency in detecting undeclared nuclear activity and making objective judgements. China supported the adoption of the measures needed to improve the Agency's capabilities in processing and analysing of environmental samples. Full use should be made of available resources whilst upgrading equipment in the SAL and increasing the number of qualified network laboratories. He hoped those Member States in a position to do so would actively support the Agency in that regard.

5. The representative of NORWAY said her country was generally supportive of the assessments and recommendations contained in document 2006/Note 23. However, further consultations would be required as they would have a direct impact on the Agency's overall priorities and its Regular Budget.

6. Norway particularly supported Recommendations 1 and 2 relating to States' duty to fulfil their legal obligations under the various verification instruments and the need to universalize those instruments. Her delegation appreciated the information provided on the Agency's Plan of Action to promote universal support for the additional protocol.

7. While acknowledging the wisdom of periodic review of the annexes to the Model Additional Protocol, Norway needed more time to consider that option. It was important not to undermine efforts to universalize the additional protocol and it was necessary to consider whether the Committee was the most appropriate body for conducting such a review.

8. Referring to Recommendation 8, she said the Agency should be given the tools required to draw conclusions about undeclared nuclear activities. The willingness of Member States to provide information on past nuclear activities would contribute positively to that objective. Export control was a central tool to further non-proliferation efforts and Norway was thus generally supportive of Recommendation 9.

9. It was also important that the Agency had the necessary capacity to conduct and analyse environmental tests. Norway strongly supported expanding the NWAL and furthering cooperation between SSACs and RSACs.

10. The Agency's verification work made an important contribution to the credibility of the NPT and was central to the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Her delegation recognized the correlation between that resolution and furthering global non-proliferation norms and believed that it could contribute to facilitating the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in accordance with Article IV of the NPT. In view of the strong reservations expressed by some countries on the subject, her delegation felt it inappropriate to hold an extensive debate on the issue in the current forum.

11. The representative of MOROCCO* expressed support for enhancing the safeguards system and ensuring its universality. Morocco attached equal importance to non-proliferation and disarmament and considered that the nuclear-weapon States had a special responsibility in that regard.

12. A clear distinction should be drawn between legal obligations and voluntary measures. Once Member States had committed themselves to the latter, however, they had a moral and political obligation to fulfil them.

13. It was his delegation's understanding that the Committee's mandate was to assess the implementation of the provisions and measures of the current safeguards system in order to identify problems which needed to be addressed, such as wider adherence to the system and its technical limitations. The aim should not be to impose additional obligations on some Member States while in others nuclear activities and facilities were not subject to Agency safeguards. Thus, the Committee should focus on ensuring that all Member States concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol, and should recommend measures and activities to achieve that objective. Secondly, it should work on proposals to improve the implementation of current obligations and measures, taking into account the work of SAGSI and the Board's deliberations on the SIR.

14. Extensive review of the annexes of the Model Additional Protocol might not be very helpful in encouraging more States to conclude additional protocols, and might even further delay the ratification process by some Member States.

15. Morocco supported enhancing the analytical capabilities of the Agency and the use of advanced technologies in safeguards related activities.

16. The Secretariat's documentation and recommendations were being studied by the competent Moroccan authorities. For the time being, only Recommendations 1, 2, 10 and 11 should be considered a matter of priority. He stressed that any measures aimed at enhancing the safeguards system should not hamper technical cooperation or constitute additional barriers to nuclear energy development for peaceful purposes.

17. The representative of INDONESIA was pleased to note that, as indicated in paragraph 23 of document 2006/Note 23, there were now 75 States with an additional protocol in force and that the majority of them had submitted their declarations on time. Her delegation shared the view that it was important for States to fulfil all their legal obligations under safeguards agreements and additional protocols, which were central to the Agency's work in strengthening and improving the effectiveness of the safeguards system as a contribution to global non-proliferation objectives. Any recommendation by the Committee should take account of the necessary balance between the obligations of nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States.

18. With regard to the unannounced inspections referred to in paragraph 41, more information was required on how the Secretariat had gained knowledge through such inspections of the nature of the

nuclear weapons programme of a particular Member State with a safeguards agreement in force. The Secretariat should, in accordance with the provisions of the comprehensive safeguards agreement, make every effort to minimize the practical difficulties incurred for facility operators and States by unannounced inspections.

19. With regard to Recommendation 3, she said it was her delegation's understanding that a safeguards agreement had to be agreed between the Agency and a Member State, and even if the Board endorsed the interpretation of paragraph 38 of document INFCIRC/153, it was still up to the State whether or not to accept the Board's interpretation. In Indonesia's view, the interpretation should be treated on a case-by-case basis and agreed on by the Agency and each Member State which had a safeguards agreement in force or was about to conclude one with the Agency.

20. Regarding Recommendation 4, it was important to include new activities, technologies and materials relevant to safeguards in Annexes I and II of the Model Additional Protocol. However, the Secretariat should first assess the implementation of its Plan of Action to Promote the Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols before embarking on a new initiative to amend the annexes.

21. Recommendations 5 to 8, on the provision of additional information regarding the disposition of sensitive equipment and components from decommissioned facilities and LOFs, might entail legal and political implications for Member States and should therefore be considered very carefully.

22. Concerning the Agency's efforts effectively to address clandestine nuclear trade, rather than just requesting Member States to give information on nuclear-related trade as mentioned in Recommendation 9, the Secretariat could also cooperate actively and request other relevant international bodies to provide information on manufacturers suspected of producing technologies and materials relevant to safeguards. International cooperation would be highly effective in that regard.

23. As a developing country, Indonesia greatly valued technical cooperation. The Committee should take into account the pertinent General Conference resolutions which had repeatedly stressed that the safeguards system should not be strengthened in a way that led to any decrease in the resources available for technical assistance, and that it should be compatible with the Agency's function of promoting the development and practical application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes with adequate technology transfer.

24. The representative of ISRAEL* said his country supported most of the recommendations contained document 2006/Note 23 and would like to take part in further study with a view to their implementation as soon as possible. It was a matter of regret that a number of States had tried to use the Committee to debate issues which had no place in it. Israel's policy on regional issues in the Middle East was well-known; it had nothing to do with the purpose and work of the Committee.

25. The representative of the UNITED KINGDOM expressed concern that the work of the Committee was moving forward rather slowly. It was important to make progress in improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system and to inject a sense of urgency. His delegation could already fully support Recommendations 1, 2 and 10. With regard to Recommendation 1, in particular, it was clear from paragraph 24 of document 2006/Note 23 that most of the 30 States which had undertaken to produce voluntary reports on neptunium and americium had not done so. Such reports made an important contribution to the non-proliferation system and the United Kingdom was one of the few that had done so. He urged other States to follow suit.

26. The United Kingdom delegation could also support Recommendation 4, as it considered that the time had come to review the annexes to the Model Additional Protocol, without prejudice to the outcome of such a review. His delegation had internally identified several options for such a review,

including the valid option of taking no action at all. Under Article 16 of the Model Additional Protocol, any such review would have to be carried out by an open-ended group of experts.

27. The CHAIRPERSON, having taken note that the Islamic Republic of Iran had not yet spoken on the agenda item under discussion, proposed that a working group, comprising all interested Member States and coordinated by the Ambassador of Norway, be set up to discuss Recommendations 1 and 2, which appeared to enjoy wide support and upon which agreement could perhaps be reached relatively quickly.

28. The representative of BRAZIL supported the Chairperson's proposal but reiterated that her delegation could not go along with Recommendation 2.

29. The representative of EGYPT, supported by the representative of the SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, also expressed a reservation regarding Recommendation 2, and suggested that Recommendations 10 and 11, which enjoyed the support of many delegations, be discussed by the working group as well.

30. The representative of the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN* could not agree to the Chairperson's suggestion to discuss Recommendations 1 and 2.

31. The representative of the LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA said that discussion of the recommendations should be postponed to allow more time to study them and draw conclusions based on expert advice.

32. The representative of MALAYSIA*, speaking on behalf of NAM, said that more time was needed to examine the legal, administrative and financial implications of the recommendations. NAM had no objection to a coordinator being appointed to hold discussions with interested parties, but it was too soon to adopt any of the recommendations.

33. The representatives of SOUTH AFRICA, AUSTRIA*, speaking on behalf of the European Union, and the REPUBLIC OF KOREA expressed support for the Chairperson's proposal.

34. The representative of the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN* said it was premature to pass items to a working group for discussion without having had consultations on the scope of its work.

35. The CHAIRPERSON, urging the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to cooperate with a view to making progress, suggested that Recommendations 10 and 11 also be referred to the working group.

36. The representative of MOROCCO* requested clarification as to when the working group would be expected to reach its conclusions.

37. The CHAIRPERSON clarified that her aim was to see what could be done as a first step with regard to the recommendations. If no agreement could be reached, the working group would continue discussions to see how best to achieve progress.

38. The representative of the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN* reiterated that it was too early for the Committee to establish a working group. It would prejudice the work of the Committee.

39. The CHAIRPERSON said that the purpose of establishing the working group was to conduct the detailed discussions on the recommendations that the Committee as a whole was unable to do. She had proposed discussing Recommendations 1, 2, 10 and 11 on the basis of the views expressed.

40. The representative of CANADA expressed support for the Chairperson's suggestion.

41. The representative of the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN* said he could not accept a selective approach towards the recommendations. The Committee should review them all before proposing which should be referred to a working group.

42. The CHAIRPERSON said it was unreasonable to discuss all the recommendations in the Committee. Her approach was not “selective”; she had been trying to act in a transparent and objective manner. She urged the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to join the working group and participate in its discussions. The submission of a report by the Committee to the Board of Governors in June 2006 was desirable, but it was not obligatory; if no consensus could be reached, then discussions would continue.

43. The representative of GERMANY said that the discussions of the working group would not prejudice the outcome of the Committee’s work; they would simply assist the Committee in its work.

44. The CHAIRPERSON, following comments by the representatives of the SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC and EGYPT on the working group’s scope, said the opportunity to have detailed discussions in a working group should not be missed and that she would chair informal discussions the following day to clarify the Committee’s orientations. She would sum up discussion under agenda item 1 as a whole later.

45. The CHAIRPERSON, further to a suggestion by the representative of BRAZIL, then took it that members wished to proceed to consideration of items 1(b) and (c).

46. It was so agreed.

(b) Secretariat activities to facilitate the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols
(Information Note by the Secretariat 2006/Note 22)

47. The representative of MALAYSIA*, speaking on behalf of NAM, thanked the Secretariat for the Information Note contained in document 2006/Note 22. With regard to the implementation of the Plan of Action to Promote the Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, NAM noted the various efforts made by the Secretariat to facilitate the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols and looked forward to receiving more information on the progress of the Agency’s Medium Term Strategy for 2006–2011. NAM encouraged those States which had not yet concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency to do so as soon as possible.

48. Turning to paragraph 8 on the requests for technical and legislative assistance related to the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols through the technical cooperation programme, NAM stressed that such activities should not in any way detract from the established priorities of the programme. Technical cooperation played an essential role as the promotional pillar of the Statue, and its primary objectives were to accelerate and enhance the contribution that nuclear energy made to peace, health and prosperity in Member States by facilitating their free access to R&D, the transfer of nuclear technology and mutual cooperation.

49. The representative of JAPAN expressed appreciation to the Director General and the Secretariat for their strenuous efforts in promoting the conclusion of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. As a strong supporter of the universalization of the additional protocol, Japan was continuing its own efforts to that end in cooperation with the Secretariat.

50. The representative of CANADA expressed concern, despite the progress made to facilitate the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, that a significant number of States party to the NPT, including several members of the Agency, had yet to comply with the basic requirement of Article III of the Treaty to accept safeguards. Moreover, acceptance of the additional protocol was

disappointingly slow. Her country called upon all States which had not yet done so to submit all their nuclear activities, both existing and future, to Agency safeguards, as required by the NPT.

51. The Agency's safeguards system, which included the additional protocol, was an essential pillar of non-proliferation and the basis upon which the Agency could provide assurances as to the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes. It also laid the groundwork for the future verification of disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons, to which all States party to the NPT were legally committed.

52. The representative of AUSTRALIA said that document 2006/Note 22 provided a very useful update of planned activities for promoting the conclusion of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols and the annexes to the document provided useful updates on their status.

53. Australia welcomed initiatives under the Agency's updated Plan of Action to Promote the Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols. In that regard, it was pleased to host a regional seminar for certain Asian and Pacific Island States, to be held in Sydney from 4 to 6 July 2006. The seminar would include a workshop on the modified SQP.

54. His delegation noted that the Regular Budget provided resources for managing the Plan of Action, while most activities, such as seminars, consultations and publications, were funded through extrabudgetary contributions. He noted also that some technical and legislative assistance had been funded through the technical cooperation programme and that some legal and regulatory assistance had been provided through activities under the Nuclear Security Fund. Australia considered those to be appropriate uses of the resources available to the Agency.

55. The representative of COLOMBIA said that her country regarded the additional protocol as an instrument that strengthened and facilitated the Agency's verification system significantly. That was why Colombia had advocated its universalization.

56. Colombia welcomed inclusion of the promotion of the entry into force of outstanding comprehensive agreements and of additional protocols for all States as an objective in the Agency's Medium Term Strategy 2006–2011, and the high priority attached by the Secretariat to the conclusion of additional protocols with States, particularly those developing significant nuclear activities.

57. With regard to the specific actions proposed by the Secretariat for 2006–2007, she underlined the importance of specialized training for developing countries so that they could apply the provisions of the additional protocol.

58. Colombia was grateful to France, Japan, Sweden and the United States of America for their extrabudgetary contributions, as well as other States that had contributed in kind to the Secretariat's activities to promote safeguards agreements, additional protocols and Subsidiary Arrangements.

59. It was not appropriate to use TCF resources to finance technical and legislative assistance related to the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols. The technical cooperation programme should focus on helping States to meet their immense development challenges and to develop capacities in areas fundamental for development.

60. The representative of CHINA said that promoting the universal implementation of safeguards agreements and additional protocols was vital to strengthening the Agency's safeguards and verification system. In recent years the Secretariat had done much work in that regard, including the organization of seminars and training courses and the publication of brochures.

61. Having noted that 59 of the 72 States with significant nuclear activities had signed additional protocols and 46 had additional protocols in force, he expressed China's support for the Secretariat's

continued efforts to promote the universal implementation of additional protocols, in particular in States with significant nuclear activities. Pursuant to the Board's decision of 20 September 2005 regarding SQPs, China supported Secretariat efforts to help States implement the modified SQP. He requested the Secretariat to keep the Committee and the Board of Governors informed of progress in that regard.

62. The representative of the SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC said that his country appreciated the Agency's endeavours to strengthen its safeguards system through the decisions and resolutions of its Board of Governors and General Conference.

63. With regard to document 2006/Note 22, he noted that the Syrian Arab Republic was on the list of 78 States that had not yet submitted additional protocols to the Board for its consideration. He stressed, however, that — in accordance with footnote 8 of the document — his country did not believe it should be considered as a State with significant nuclear activities.

(c) Enhancing IAEA satellite imagery capabilities
(Note by the Secretariat 2006/Note 24)

64. The representative of MALAYSIA*, speaking on behalf of NAM, noted that the Agency was making use of satellite imagery to help confirm declarations, monitor nuclear activities and investigate indications of possible undeclared nuclear activities and planning for inspection. NAM asked for additional information from the Agency on measures to be taken to ensure the confidentiality of information obtained through satellite imagery, and he said that other dimensions still needed to be considered.

65. The representative of JAPAN said that satellite imagery could make an important contribution to enhancing the reliability and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards activities. It was Japan's understanding that the use of such technology would not lead to an increase in the Regular Budget.

66. To help Member States prioritize the recommendations contained in document 2006/Note 24, he requested that the Secretariat provide more detailed information regarding the expected enhancement of efficiency through their implementation.

67. The representative of CANADA said that satellite imagery was a verification tool available to the Agency, but a costly tool which required careful consideration as to the frequency of its use and the objectives to be achieved by it. Its use should be resisted when other, more cost effective tools, could be used. In that regard, Canada welcomed the fact that enhancement of the Agency's capabilities would be achieved through voluntary contributions and would not affect the Regular Budget.

68. Through its Member State Support Programme, Canada was continuing to assist the Agency in the application of new imagery analysis techniques, the use of radar and hyperspectral imagery and the introduction and implementation of geospatial/geographic information systems. It was also assisting with the training of satellite imagery analysis staff and with the identification of observable signatures of nuclear facilities.

69. The Agency had done an admirable job in establishing its satellite imagery capability within the Department of Safeguards and in using that capability in a focused way within existing resources. That effort had benefited from the contributions of Canada and a number of other States. The Agency should pursue that important work using existing resources and the contributions offered by States through their voluntary support programmes.

70. The representative of AUSTRALIA said that document 2006/Note 24 was a useful review of the Secretariat's satellite imagery analysis and reporting capabilities. With regard to the key limitations of the Agency's capabilities, identified in paragraph 10, it would appear that some could be

addressed through appropriate investment in expertise, assistance and money. Australia was open to considering further the Agency's needs in those areas but would need to know the financial implications.

71. With regard to Recommendation 1, his country understood that small-scale, low profile or clandestine nuclear facilities might have very few imagery signatures. Given that identifying such facilities, or observing activity there, might be particularly difficult, it was clear that the Secretariat would benefit from specialized training on imagery tools and the imagery types specified. Australia would appreciate further information on the possible resource implications for Member States.

72. With regard to Recommendation 2 on assistance in setting up a safeguards imagery library, his delegation would appreciate clarification as to whether Member States holding imagery would be asked to donate it to the Agency or whether they would be expected to assist financially in the purchase of archived imagery, and also on the concomitant financial implications.

73. As regards Recommendation 3 to deal with the problem of meteorological uncertainties, Australia would be interested in the Secretariat's views on how information on regional and local weather forecast systems could be requested and supplied in a cost effective manner.

74. Australia would also appreciate further information on Recommendations 4, 5 and 6.

75. One element of further discussions within the Committee would be the need to gain a better understanding of the financial and practical implications.

76. The representative of CHINA said that the Secretariat's recommendations in document 2006/Note 24 served as a good basis for the Committee's discussions. Satellite imagery was an important tool for strengthening safeguards and had contributed greatly to enhancing their efficiency and effectiveness. China supported efforts to enhance the Agency's capabilities in that field and noted with appreciation the assistance provided by certain countries. China hoped that such support to the Agency would continue and expand.

77. The representative of COLOMBIA pointed out that 2007 was the final year covered by the package proposal approved by the Board in 2003 involving increases to the safeguards part of the Regular Budget. That was an immense financial burden for developing countries. Her country was not in a position to accept further increases and considered it necessary to evaluate carefully the possible costs generated by adopting new satellite technology. She also emphasized the importance of the confidentiality measures taken by the Agency in that respect.

78. Recommendations 1 to 5 focused on requests for technical support and training from Member States based on extrabudgetary resources. Colombia appreciated any efforts made in that regard and encouraged States that could provide such support to do so.

79. Her delegation would like more information on the costs involved in implementing the imagery acquisition and processing system referred to in Recommendation 6, and on the options the Secretariat envisaged for provision of the resources needed.

80. The representative of NORWAY said her country supported the Agency's efforts to enhance its satellite imagery capabilities.

81. With regard to Recommendations 1 and 2 of document 2006/Note 24, Norway would provide training in the analysis of satellite images, which was important for identifying changes at declared facilities and detecting undeclared facilities.

82. Norway would also provide timely access to accurate weather forecast systems, as requested in Recommendation 3, but would like the Secretariat to give an estimate of the costs.

83. Likewise, Norway would support the Agency as requested in Recommendations 4 to 6, but would appreciate a cost estimate from the Secretariat for the last of those.

84. The representative of SWEDEN said that some of the recommendations in document 2006/Note 24 might need further examination by technical experts owing to their complex nature.

85. It was of utmost importance to provide inspectors with general training on the use and capabilities of satellite imagery and Sweden had provided such training under its Member State Support Programme. In addition, more specialized training was required for the Agency's imagery analysts, a small permanent core of staff supported by cost-free experts, to ensure that the competence established remained available to the Agency.

86. The representative of the SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, while recognizing the importance of satellite imagery, said that the costs involved prohibited the Agency from becoming a specialized body in that regard. The Secretariat should look into the shortcomings and difficulties that it had encountered in the uses of satellite imagery. Adoption of the recommendations contained in the Secretariat's Note should not entail any additional financial burden for Member States.

87. The representative of ARGENTINA said that her delegation's comments on document 2006/Note 23 at the preceding meeting also applied to document 2006/Note 24, especially those related to the need for comprehensive examination of the issues and recommendations, including analysis of the cost benefits of strengthening measures, their justification, technical aspects and their impact on safeguards as a whole. More time was required to analyse and assess properly the complex topics addressed in document 2006/Note 24 and it was important to ensure that, in the overall context, recommendations did not increase the costs of verification, while at the same time bringing only marginal or zero benefits for the effectiveness of the system.

88. More information was needed on the criteria for using satellite imagery and on information confidentiality aspects. The guiding principle aside from cost benefit analysis should be prioritization. An analysis was needed of how more conventional safeguards measures would be replaced through a more selective use of more sophisticated satellite technology, of the minimum capability required, and of how much support — including funding — might be given from Member States. In that regard and referring particularly to paragraph 9, she requested more information from the Secretariat, including the contribution expected for collection of the types of image mentioned.

89. Using the example of the first point in paragraph 10, she asked whether it was necessary to increase the Agency's capability for small-scale or low profile nuclear facilities. If that capability could be increased, then what objective would be satisfied and how would other existing measures be made redundant? More generally, what was the need for the capabilities proposed by the Secretariat? Would an adequate platform and reliance on the Member States' support in specific cases, ensuring sufficient transparency and protection of confidentiality, not suffice?

90. The representative of BRAZIL said that, although having satellite imagery as a tool seemed like a good proposal, her country was of the view that its effectiveness and efficiency should be assessed further. Brazil also believed that access to confidential information should be granted only to Agency staff and not to cost-free experts.

91. In general terms, it seemed that the Secretariat was asking for more support and resources to develop its satellite imagery capability. The context of how satellite imagery was to be incorporated into safeguards approaches was not well defined; it would be useful to know whether the tool was a complementary safeguards element or if it would substitute another tool currently in use.

92. Regarding Recommendation 1, it would be important to know how knowledge acquired through more specialized training for Agency imagery analysts would be used.

93. Turning to Recommendation 2 on developing a baseline of imagery, she wondered if it should be generalized. Given the expense involved and the lack of clarity concerning financing, perhaps a case-by-case approach should be taken.

94. The priority of Recommendations 4, 5 and 6 should be considered in the light of other relevant Agency tools which were already available and could be improved, such as State evaluations and better and faster environmental sampling analysis.

The meeting rose at 5.20 p.m.