

IAEA Board of Governors
Record of the 1077th Meeting
GOV/OR.1077

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Nuclear verification

- (a) The conclusion of safeguards agreements and of additional protocols

- (b) Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director General

Board of Governors

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Record of the 1077th Meeting

Held at Headquarters, Vienna, on Tuesday, 9 September 2003, at 10.20 a.m.

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[*] GOV/2003/65.

03-05233 (LXII)

Attendance

(The list below gives the name of the senior member of each delegation who attended the meeting, as well as that of any other member whose statement is summarized in this record.)

Ms. AL-MULLA		Chairperson (Kuwait)
Ms. KELLY	_____	Argentina
Ms. STOKES		Australia
Mr. ABDENUR		Brazil
Mr. DOBREV		Bulgaria
Ms. DAMIBA		Burkina Faso
Ms. HALL		Canada
Mr. GONZÁLEZ ANINAT		Chile
Mr. ZHANG Huazhu	}	China
Mr. ZHANG Yan		
Ms. QUINTERO		Colombia
Mr. CARRERA DORAL		Cuba
Ms. DRÁBOVÁ		Czech Republic
Mr. CHRISTENSEN		Denmark
Mr. YOUSSEF		Egypt
Mr. THIEBAUD		France
Mr. HONSOWITZ		Germany
Mr. SREENIVASAN		India
Mr. SALEHI		Iran, Islamic Republic of
Mr. TAKASU		Japan
Mr. AL-DAWOUD		Kuwait
Mr. GULAM HANIFF		Malaysia
Mr. ZNIBER		Morocco
Mr. RAMAKER		Netherlands
Ms. BRIDGE		New Zealand
Mr. HALPHEN PÉREZ		Panama
Mr. GARCIA		Philippines
Mr. VALECA		Romania
Mr. BERDENNIKOV	}	Russian Federation
Mr. KUCHINOV		
Mr. AL-ATHEL		Saudi Arabia
Mr. MINTY		South Africa
Mr. NÚÑEZ GARCÍA-SAÚCO		Spain
Mr. AHMAD		Sudan
Mr. MAYOR		Switzerland
Mr. ŞAHİNBAŞ		Turkey
Mr. O'SHEA		United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Mr. BRILL	_____	United States of America

Attendance (continued)

Mr. ELBARADEI	Director General
Mr. BURKART	Deputy Director General, Department of Nuclear Sciences and Applications
Mr. MOUROGOV	Deputy Director General, Department of Nuclear Energy
Mr. GOLDSCHMIDT	Deputy Director General, Department of Safeguards
Mr. CSERVENY	Acting Director, Office of External Relations and Policy Co-ordination
Mr. HEINONEN	Director, Division of Operations (B), Department of Safeguards
Mr. ANING	Secretary of the Board

Representatives of the following Member States attended the meeting:

Algeria, Angola, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mexico, Namibia, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Serbia and Montenegro, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, Uruguay, Vietnam, Yemen.

Abbreviations used in this record:

CRP	Co-ordinated research project
GRULAC	Latin American and Caribbean Group
HEU	High-enriched uranium
INPRO	International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT Review Conference	Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OPANAL	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
PATTEC	Pan African Tsetse and Trypanosomosis Eradication Campaign
R&D	Research and development
SAGNA	Standing Advisory Group of Nuclear Applications
SIT	Sterile insect technique
TCDC	Technical co-operation among developing countries
TCF	Technical Co-operation Fund
Tlatelolco Treaty	Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

* Speakers under Rule 50 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure are indicated by an asterisk.

3. Strengthening the Agency's activities related to nuclear science, technology and applications (continued) (GOV/2003/53)

1. Mr. KUCHINOV (Russian Federation) drew special attention to the Nuclear Technology Review – Update 2003 contained in document GC(47)/INF/6 which, among other things, demonstrated the great potential for the development of nuclear power, confirmed by a renewal of interest in countries which had actively developed nuclear power in the past, as well as by the increasing growth in nuclear power production capacity in a number of countries in Asia. Improvements in technology, extending operating lifetimes and upratings had all made it possible to stabilize nuclear power production in spite of the fact that some units had been taken out of operation. In a number of countries public opinion was turning in favour of nuclear power production.
2. The Agency, in co-operation with other organizations, had successfully held the International Conference on Innovative Technologies for Nuclear Fuel Cycles and Nuclear Power in Vienna in June 2003. The overwhelming majority of participants in that conference had spoken in favour of the Agency's active co-ordinating role in developing effective co-operation in the field, and had expressed a very high appreciation of the results emerging from Phase 1A of the INPRO project. The great priority now was full implementation of the tasks to be carried out in Phase 1B. The Russian Federation assumed that that priority objective would help a decision to be taken in principle to include INPRO in the Agency's Regular Budget. As for the Agency's future tasks in the development of INPRO, he said that conditions should be established for Member States to combine their efforts for the joint development and implementation of innovative nuclear power technologies aimed at sustainable development. The Russian Federation supported Agency efforts towards constructive co-operation, including regular exchanges of information and contacts among experts, between INPRO and the Generation IV International Forum.
3. The Secretariat's initiative in stimulating work aimed at conserving and accumulating nuclear knowledge was both very topical and deserving of the highest possible commendation. It was important to define the key elements and priorities for effective and fruitful activity in the whole area of handling nuclear knowledge.
4. Ms. DAMIBA (Burkina Faso) expressed particular appreciation for the Agency's support to the African Union's PATTEC as well as its efforts in the area of potable water management. The Agency's health and rural development initiatives were contributing a great deal to the development of the African continent. Her country, along with Mali, was benefiting from the tsetse fly eradication programme, and was currently proceeding towards the construction of a mass tsetse-rearing facility. A zone would soon be cleared in the country for SIT experiments.
5. Mr. ZHANG Huazhu (China) said that the Agency had achieved considerable progress in the past year in all the areas addressed in the annexes to document GOV/2003/53. China expressed its appreciation for those efforts, which it would continue to support. Also, China was very satisfied with the completion of Phase 1A of INPRO, which marked an important milestone, and hoped that the Secretariat would play an even greater part in INPRO in the future.
6. Mr. O'SHEA (United Kingdom) noted that the Agency was very active in promoting the use of nuclear science and technology to improve the availability of fresh water around the world. The United Kingdom supported the wide application of isotope techniques, which was a major area of

Agency technical expertise. It also supported the strategic aim of establishing national programmes of nuclear and radiation safety training, and welcomed the pilot project on sharing nuclear safety education and training knowledge, due to be completed at the end of 2003. His country was encouraged by the excellent co-operation between the Generation IV International Forum and INPRO, and wished to see it continue now that INPRO funding was to be included in the Regular Budget of the Agency. The United Kingdom recognized the considerable effort that had gone into the Phase 1A report, and its potential contribution to the development of future reactors.

7. The United Kingdom was grateful to the Secretariat for its progress report on SIT related work, and welcomed the Agency's efforts to help strengthen the capacity of African countries to control tsetse through an integrated range of interventions, including the use of SIT where it could be shown to be the most cost-effective method. Expansion of the Agency's SIT initiative to the major developmental problem of malaria was also of interest to the United Kingdom, although the evidence suggested that it would be an even more long-term and challenging initiative than that on tsetse. His country supported the Agency's approach of using SIT under specific conditions in suitable areas and as an adjunct to more orthodox technologies. As the initiative developed, the Agency should analyse carefully the cost-effectiveness of the approach.

8. Mr. MINTY (South Africa) noted the progress made in the various areas outlined in the annexes to the report. Isotope hydrology, combined with other geological and hydrogeological approaches, continued to play an important role in studies on two important aquifer systems in South Africa: one on groundwater resources in Gauteng province where mining activities had contaminated an aquifer, and the other, in the Western Cape, on the recharge and storage capacity of an aquifer system that supported important farmland and a growing number of farmers. The Agency's new project on nutrition and HIV/AIDS in the African region was most appropriate. The establishment of isotope techniques to study the effectiveness of food fortification programmes, as well as the study of the nutritional status of people living with HIV/AIDS, addressed problems of immense importance for that region. The Agency's continued support for the application of nuclear techniques in nutrition studies would be required for the optimal planning and application of nutritional interventions in vulnerable groups.

9. Expressing appreciation for the Agency's initiatives in the preservation and strengthening of nuclear knowledge, he said that it should continue to facilitate the exchange of experience and information between Member States. South Africa had recently established a mechanism whereby funding for nuclear training could, among other things, be generated from international counter-trade agreements. Several staff members from South Africa nuclear organizations had completed courses in France under a training agreement.

10. The studies being carried out under the INPRO initiative should be encouraged and expanded. South Africa was continuing its development work on the pebble bed modular reactor project as part of the international drive to establish novel concepts for nuclear power generation in the 21st century.

11. His country, which had developed considerable capacity and expertise in humanitarian demining, placed special importance on - and was participating in - the Agency's CRP entitled "Application of Nuclear Techniques to Anti-Personnel Landmines Identification".

12. The involvement of Agency technical experts in the PATTEC Plan of Action would be a key factor in its success. It was evident that more research on tsetse fly rearing and associated technologies was still required, so he requested the Agency to maintain, and where possible expand, the availability of experts to Africa, as well as the technical activities at its Seibersdorf laboratory. The new CRP on the production of sterile tsetse fly males was a welcome development in support of the project. With regard to malaria, South Africa urged the Agency to continue consolidating partnerships with the

African region with a view to developing techniques and approaches which would eradicate the scourge. If no sustainable techniques were developed the malaria pandemic would undermine global efforts aimed at creating a better life for all.

13. Mr. THIEBAUD (France), emphasizing the importance of the Agency's contributions to international action on sustainable development, said that nuclear technologies could make a major contribution to development in the areas of health, food and agriculture, potable water management, hydrology, sea water desalination, energy and environmental protection. France wished to see the Agency's activities in those areas develop further.

14. As for nuclear knowledge management, France was following the Agency's projects with a great deal of interest. It supported the Agency's objectives, and would continue its active participation in the programmes the Agency was developing, including hosting an international conference on the subject in 2004.

15. As part of its vigorous support for the Agency's technical co-operation activities, especially those relating to Africa, France was providing support to PATTEC, and was taking part in a important Agency project in Réunion aimed at eradicating malaria-transmitting mosquitoes using SIT.

16. Turning finally to innovative technologies and the INPRO project, he said that France, which had always desired greater complementarity between the project and the Generation IV International Forum, welcomed developments in that respect and noted with satisfaction the efforts being made to broaden and strengthen that co-operation and synergy.

17. Mr. SREENIVASAN (India) noted with appreciation the Agency's work on the use of isotope hydrology for water resources management, its increased co-operation with international professional associations and its role in the production of the United Nations World Water Development Report. Indian experts had been playing an active role in the Agency's isotope hydrology programme. He also noted the Agency's programme on SIT for the control or eradication of mosquitoes, its support to radiation therapy for the treatment of cancer, its development of nuclear techniques for humanitarian demining and its research activities and capacity building for nutrition.

18. He noted with appreciation the importance given to nuclear knowledge, and said that it had been appropriate to include a subprogramme under Major Programme 1 in the 2002-2003 programme cycle entitled "Maintenance of Knowledge in Nuclear Science and Technology". Similar initiatives in Major Programmes 2, 3, 4 and 6 were also worth pursuing. India noted with appreciation that the Agency had supported networking of education and training activities, as well as the World Nuclear Association's initiative to promote the establishment of a World Nuclear University as a network of institutions. India was a part of the World Nuclear University, and looked forward to fruitful co-operation with the Agency and the opportunity to contribute substantially to its activities in the area of human resource development.

19. The Agency's activities in the development of innovative nuclear technologies had been timely and very impressive. India, which played a very active role in INPRO, was pleased that the project was to be supported by the Regular Budget for 2004-2005, although the resources allotted were rather small. The development by India of an advanced heavy water reactor, which would not only more than meet the INPRO objectives in terms of sustainability, economy, safety and proliferation resistance but also enable large-scale energy production using thorium, was progressing according to plan.

20. Finally, India appreciated the Agency's support to PATTEC, and noted the Agency's plan for producing potable water economically using small and medium-sized nuclear reactors.

21. Mr. CARRERA DORAL (Cuba) said the report under discussion showed that the Agency had achieved a great deal in its promotional activities. His country had benefited particularly in the field of

human health: from the strengthening of its nuclear medicine infrastructure, the development of technologies for the production of radiopharmaceuticals and radiodiagnostic kits, the improvement in quality assurance in radiotherapy, and child nutrition studies. Also, with the support of the Agency, Cuba had continued to strengthen its programme for radiation protection and safety. The experience gained by Cuban experts was being passed on to other countries in the region under the Agency's programme. Cuba urged the Agency to pursue its efforts to achieve compatibility between CRPs and technical co-operation projects.

22. While acknowledging the Agency's activities and progress in nuclear knowledge management, as set out in section B.1 of Annex 3 to the report, Cuba considered that a more integrated focus was needed with respect to internal knowledge management within the Agency, the continuity of human resources and public knowledge of nuclear matters.

23. Ms. QUINTERO (Colombia) reiterated her country's unswerving support for the Agency's work in the application of nuclear science and technology, especially for the developing countries. Colombia attached special importance to the development of nuclear techniques for humanitarian demining. However, with a view to better encouragement and co-ordination of such development, it was extremely important for the Agency to intensify its R&D activities for the removal of anti-personnel mines. Their detection and eradication was of particular concern to her country, which had suffered many civilian deaths following their use by terrorist groups. Colombia supported the Agency's CRP entitled "Application of Nuclear Techniques to Anti-personnel Landmines Identification", and recommended that it be promoted as widely as possible.

24. Mr. HALPHEN PÉREZ (Panama), associating his delegation in particular with the statements made on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, and GRULAC, recommended that the Board take note of the report and authorize the Director General to submit it to the General Conference.

25. Mr. NAQVI (Pakistan)* said that, of the areas covered by the Director General's report, his country was particularly interested in the promotion and development of innovative nuclear technologies with special reference to INPRO, the use of isotope hydrology for water resource management, the preservation of nuclear knowledge, desalination and Agency support to PATTEC. Success in those promotional areas depended on close and unrestricted co-operation between the developed and developing Member States of the Agency. More effective mechanisms should be evolved to strengthen TCDC in a meaningful way. The new approaches to strengthening the Agency's activities related to nuclear science, technology and applications should include: improving Agency-Member State consultative procedures, revamping co-ordinated research project methodologies, strengthening the role of advisory groups, and increasing the participation of developing countries' nuclear institutions in regional projects.

26. Pakistan would continue its active support of the Agency's endeavours by not only extending its technical co-operation to developing countries in the areas of human health, agriculture, biotechnology and genetic engineering, isotope hydrology, radiopharmaceuticals and environmental studies under the various Agency fellowship programmes, but also increasing the number of experts it provided for Agency missions in developing Member States, thereby enhancing the cost-effectiveness of the Agency's promotional programmes.

27. Mr. BURKART (Deputy Director General for Nuclear Sciences and Applications), responding to comments made, said all would be considered carefully by the Secretariat. With respect to the increased efforts being made to form partnerships within and outside the United Nations system, he noted the suggestion to increase the use of regional resource centres, which were a feature of the technical co-operation programme. Pointing out that some 50% of the resources of Major Programme 2 were either directly or indirectly used for technical co-operation implementation, he said

he would examine closely, together with the Department for Technical Cooperation, what more could be done in that area.

28. He welcomed the comments made by the Governor from the United States of America, who had encouraged the Agency to be more proactive in seeking funding and sponsors for its programmes, reaching out beyond its traditional resources. He thanked the United States for its high levels of extrabudgetary support, in particular its support for the Seibersdorf mosquito-rearing facility.

29. In response to the observations made by the Governor from Japan regarding the dissemination of information on the use of nuclear technology and isotope techniques, he said the same advice had recently been received from SAGNA, recognizing the need to further publicize the life-sciences aspects of nuclear technology to counter negative public impressions. He would examine what could be done with modern technology.

30. Several speakers had referred to the need for close co-operation needed between the Agency's technical co-operation and its other programmes. Such co-operation was reflected in the reports presented to the Board covering Major Programmes 1 to 6 and the achievements were the result of programmes under both the TCF and the Regular Budget working towards the same goal of responding to Member States' needs. Noting also the call for CRPs to be fully complementary to both programmes, and recalling the Director General's comments on CRPs in his introductory statement to the current series of meetings¹, he expressed confidence that the issue would be resolved.

31. In reply to the request for the Secretariat to assess the impact of its work and make recommendations for changes if needed, he said that the task had already begun and the Secretariat would report on the potential for socio-economic analysis of nuclear applications in the forthcoming Nuclear Technology Review.

32. He thanked the members of the Board for their useful and informative comments and their encouragement to strengthen programmes in isotope hydrology, human health, SIT for tsetse and research into the use of SIT for malaria. He looked forward to reporting more concrete results at future meetings.

33. Mr. MOUROGOV (Deputy Director General for Nuclear Energy), responding to comments made in his area of responsibility, thanked Board Members for their observations and said his Department would analyse them and do its best to adjust its programmes accordingly.

34. The nuclear energy related topics presented in document GOV/2003/53 reflected just a few of the varied aspects of Major Programme 1. His Department was result-oriented and an integrated approach to programme activities was crucial. Many of the topics covered were interlinked. For example, innovative technologies could not be developed without preserving and maintaining knowledge.

35. To ensure the development of nuclear power the upcoming generation needed nuclear knowledge as well as a vision for the future. The young generation should see not only waste management and decommissioning but also such advanced technologies as nuclear fusion or fast reactors. Also, to play a global role in sustainable development, nuclear energy would have to be used not only in electricity but also in, for example, potable water, district heating and hydrogen production with nuclear desalination and small reactors becoming essential elements.

¹ See document GOV/OR.1075 para. 8.

36. The CHAIRPERSON, summing up, said that several members had commended the Agency for its efforts in implementing nuclear applications in different domains contributing to achieving sustainable development and meeting needs, especially in developing countries. They had encouraged the Secretariat to strengthen the approaches and efforts in many of those areas, such as projects related to potable water, improvement of nutrition standards and servicing immediate human needs.

37. The Agency's support of the PATTEC Plan of Action had been commended and the Agency had been called on to continue its efforts to build the technical, strategic and financial partnerships for supporting the PATTEC project. Appreciation had been expressed for the progress made so far in the expansion of the SIT initiative to malaria.

38. With regard to the INPRO, the need for appropriate linkages to national and international projects in that area had been emphasized and support had been expressed for the co-operation between INPRO and the Generation IV International Forum. The belief had been expressed that the case studies for the next phase of the project would be open to an international peer review process.

39. Support had been expressed for the nuclear techniques involved in humanitarian demining and for an integrated approach to be used.

40. Reference had been made to the role of nuclear technology in the process of the treatment of carbon dioxide resulting from fuel burning, in order to mitigate its environmental impact. The Agency had been invited to participate actively in the workshop to be held in Kuwait in 2004 on that issue.

41. Several members had emphasized the importance of the maintenance and preservation of nuclear knowledge and had noted with appreciation the Agency's effort in transforming it into an inter-sectoral activity included in each major programme. A call had been made for the further development of a co-ordinated approach in the new programme biennium.

42. Several members had encouraged the increased participation of national and regional resource centers in the nuclear applications activities of the Agency and stronger programmes for training and education.

43. The Agency had been encouraged to continue to play a proactive role in the global forums relevant to nuclear technology and to raise the public profile of the Agency's activities and promote the dissemination of information on the role of nuclear technology. It had been emphasized that the Agency should work diligently to build and develop partnerships with other United Nations and international and bilateral organizations in order to increase the effectiveness of the role of nuclear techniques in sustainable development.

44. Several members had proposed that the Secretariat's reports on promotional issues should not remain entirely descriptive in nature but should include an assessment of the importance of results achieved, impact produced, difficulties faced during implementation and recommendations for improvement.

45. Several members had supported strengthening the CRP mechanism and its greater synergy with the technical co-operation programme, with a view to increasing transfer of technology to developing countries.

46. She assumed that the Board wished to take note of the reports contained in Annexes 1-5 to document GOV/2003/53.

47. It was so decided.

4. Nuclear verification

(a) The conclusion of safeguards agreements and of additional protocols (GOV/2003/60, 61 and 62)

48. The CHAIRPERSON noted that the Board had before it document GOV/2003/61 relating to a comprehensive safeguards agreement to be concluded with Cuba in connection with the NPT and the Tlatelolco Treaty and documents GOV/2003/60 and 62 relating to additional protocols to be concluded with Iceland and Cuba, respectively.

49. Mr. GONZÁLEZ ANINAT (Chile), speaking on behalf of GRULAC, said that Latin America and the Caribbean, as the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in the world, congratulated the Government of Cuba on its decision to sign a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol. GRULAC recognized the determination shown by the Cuban authorities and the Agency enabling both agreements to be signed within one year of Cuba's accession to the NPT and ratification of the Tlatelolco Treaty. He also noted the importance that the 18th Regular Session of the General Conference of OPANAL, to be held in Havana in November 2003, would have in working towards the objectives of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

50. Mr. HENDAOU (Tunisia)*, speaking on behalf of the African Group, reiterated the Group's support for the Agency's safeguards system, which provided the international community with credible assurances about Member States' safeguards commitments. Noting the Agency's efforts to strengthen and improve the efficiency of that system, he encouraged the Agency to redouble its efforts towards achieving its universal application.

51. The Group supported all instruments that strengthened the Agency's ability to detect undeclared nuclear materials and considered that, in pressing for progress in the field of safeguards, priority must continue to be given to the universality of comprehensive safeguards and the NPT.

52. He expressed disappointment that, of the States Party to the NPT, 47 had yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency, thereby casting doubt on the effectiveness of all efforts, including the Agency's, to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

53. He welcomed Cuba's decision to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol as a positive step towards achieving universality of the NPT and urged all non-adherents to the NPT to do the same without delay.

54. Mr. GULAM HANIFF (Malaysia), speaking on behalf of the NAM, condemned the recent bomb attack on the United Nations Headquarters in Baghdad and extended sincere condolences to the victims and bereaved families. Such attacks could not break the international community's will to assist the Iraqi people in regaining their national sovereignty. He was convinced that the United Nations would continue to play its role in Iraq.

55. He welcomed Cuba's decision to sign a safeguards agreement and an additional protocol, and noted the significance of holding the 18th OPANAL General Conference in Havana in November 2003. Likewise, he welcomed Iceland's decision to sign an additional protocol.

56. Mr. YOUSSEF (Egypt) also stressed the importance of the universality of the Agency's safeguards system in working towards the goal of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. He called on all Member States to join the comprehensive safeguards system as a vital element in consolidation of the system and ensuring the credibility of the non-proliferation regime as a whole. The international community, particularly the countries bearing a special responsibility, needed to take effective measures to achieve that objective and there should be no double standards. The conclusion

of additional protocols was important, but the benefits of any additional measures would be limited so long as the original was flawed.

57. Mr. TAKASU (Japan), expressing appreciation for the efforts of the Secretariat to ensure the effectiveness of the Agency's safeguards system, welcomed the conclusion of the safeguards agreement with Cuba and the additional protocols for that country and Iceland. Cuba deserved particular mention for concluding a safeguards agreement and additional protocol at the same time, firstly since it had only recently acceded to the NPT and secondly because, under Article III (1) of the NPT, "Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards ... in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and *the Agency's safeguards system*". The evolving Agency's safeguards system now included both safeguards agreements and additional protocols.

58. He shared the Director General's disappointment that 47 States had failed to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements and that, of the 75 States having signed additional protocols, only 35 had brought them into force.

59. With a view to promoting the universalization of the Agency's comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol, Japan had organized an international conference on wider adherence to strengthened safeguards in Tokyo in December 2002 in co-operation with the Agency, and was a supporter of the informal "Friends of the Additional Protocol", established in Vienna in 2003.

60. Mr. ZNIBER (Morocco) recalled that the previous NPT Review Conference had confirmed that the Treaty was the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime and that the Agency's safeguards system was its principal instrument. A strong and credible verification regime would allow the Agency to play its essential role in safeguarding peace and security worldwide. He congratulated Iceland and Cuba on their decisions to sign a safeguards agreement and additional protocols.

61. Morocco, which supported all initiatives aimed at avoiding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction worldwide and ridding the world of nuclear weapons, was convinced that the credibility of the safeguards system lay not only in its ability to verify information supplied and detect illicit activities but also in its universality, transparency and fairness.

62. Ms. STOKES (Australia), welcoming the conclusion of the safeguards agreement and additional protocols by Cuba and Iceland, said additional protocols had now been ratified by 36 States and signed by a further 44. Thus, three-quarters of comprehensive safeguards States with significant nuclear activities had ratified or signed additional protocols. With the ratification by the European Union Member States, expected at the end of 2003, well over 70% of all safeguarded nuclear facilities would be in States with an additional protocol in force. The combination of a safeguards agreement and an additional protocol was now firmly established as the comprehensive safeguards standard.

63. She urged all States that had not already done so to conclude additional protocols as soon as possible; 17 States with significant nuclear activities still had not signed. It was essential that the large number of States with only small levels of nuclear activities that had yet to sign additional protocols did so in order to reinforce the additional protocol as the safeguards standard.

64. Ms. HALL (Canada) welcomed the conclusion of a safeguards agreement by Cuba and of additional protocols by both Cuba and Iceland. The simultaneous conclusion of a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol by Cuba, which had recently acceded to the NPT, underlined the fact that - together - they represented the contemporary standard and logical fulfilment of Article III of the NPT. She called on all States which had not yet done so to sign, ratify and implement a comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol without delay.

65. Mr. CARRERA DORAL (Cuba), said Cuba's position with regard to the NPT, namely that it was an insufficient and discriminatory instrument, was well known. Nevertheless and despite the fact that the only nuclear power in the Americas maintained its hostile policy and sanctions against his country, his Government had decided to ratify the Tlatelolco Treaty and to accede to the NPT in September 2002 because it was in favour of an effective process of disarmament to guarantee world peace and hoped that nuclear weapons could finally be eliminated.

66. In accordance with that decision, Cuba had begun the process of consultation with the Agency leading to the comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol being presented to the Board. On the basis of its nuclear programme and the amount of nuclear material it possessed, Cuba could have concluded a small quantities protocol. However, demonstrating again its will to work towards a strengthened, effective and efficient safeguards system based on universal, fair and equitable non-proliferation system leading to the total and unconditional elimination of nuclear weapons, his Government had decided to conclude a standard agreement and protocol.

67. He thanked the Secretariat for its support and professionalism in the consultation process, which had facilitated a climate of understanding, trust, comprehension and transparency. His Government hoped to sign the agreement and protocol the following week during the 47th General Conference. Finally, he congratulated Iceland on its decision to sign an additional protocol.

68. Mr. HALPHEN PÉREZ (Panama) welcomed the important step taken by Cuba in signing the additional protocol, thus signalling its intention to join the international community in helping to ensure that nuclear energy was used solely for peaceful purposes.

69. The CHAIRPERSON, summing up the discussions, said that the Board had expressed strong support for the Agency's efforts to promote the completion of outstanding comprehensive safeguards agreements.

70. Concern had been expressed by some speakers at the slow progress in the conclusion and entry into force of additional protocols. They had expressed the view that States party to safeguards agreements that had not yet done so should conclude and bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible.

71. Some members had emphasised the importance of the universality of the application of comprehensive safeguards, and its priority among the elements that comprised the non-proliferation regime.

72. She assumed that the Board wished to take the action recommended in document GOV/2003/61, and to authorize the Director General to conclude with the Government of Cuba, and subsequently implement, the comprehensive safeguards agreement which was the subject of that document.

73. It was so decided.

74. The CHAIRPERSON said she assumed that the Board wished to take the action recommended in document GOV/2003/62 and authorize the Director General to conclude with the Government of Cuba, and subsequently implement, the additional protocol which was the subject of that document.

75. It was so decided.

76. The CHAIRPERSON said she assumed that the Board wished to take the action recommended in document GOV/2003/60 and authorize the Director General to conclude with the Government of Iceland, and subsequently implement, the additional protocol which was the subject of that document.

77. It was so decided.

(b) Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director General
(GOV/2003/63)

78. The CHAIRPERSON recalled that the Board had last considered the matter of the implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement by Iran in June of that year, and had requested the Director General to provide a further report on the situation whenever appropriate.

79. Mr. GULAM HANIFF (Malaysia), speaking on behalf of the NAM, commended the Secretariat for the extensive verification activities it had undertaken since June and expressed full support for its ongoing efforts to resolve outstanding questions. He welcomed the increased co-operation shown by Iran in supplying information to the Agency, allowing access to additional locations and in the taking of associated environmental samples. He encouraged Iran to continue to handle the issue with full transparency. He welcomed the letter dated 24 August 2003 informing the Director General that Iran was prepared to begin negotiation with the Agency on the additional protocol.

80. The NAM recognized the basic right of all Member States to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes, as well as the importance of achieving an appropriate balance between rights and obligations. He urged that co-operation between Iran and the Agency be accelerated, and that the issue be resolved through constructive dialogue within the framework of the Agency.

81. Mr. MORENO (Italy)*, speaking on behalf of the European Union, the acceding countries Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, and the associated countries Bulgaria, Iceland, Norway, Romania and Turkey, said that although the report showed that there had been increased co-operation on the part of Iran, some questions remained unresolved and gave cause for concern as far as non-proliferation was concerned. The European Union regretted that the full extent of Iran's nuclear programme had not been made known earlier and that its reporting obligations under the safeguards agreement with the Agency had not been met. Neither the receipt of nuclear material nor the facilities where that material had been stored and processed had been duly declared. The European Union also regretted that despite the Board's appeal to Iran not to introduce nuclear material in the pilot enrichment facilities in Natanz it had done so. Contrary to its previous statements, Iran had been receiving sophisticated nuclear technology from abroad as early as the 1980s. Comprehensive information on the origins of that technology was needed. The presence of undeclared HEU was also deeply disturbing. He called on the Iranian authorities to suspend all activities related to the enrichment process until that question had been resolved by the Agency. All third countries should co-operate fully with the Agency in clarifying the open questions on Iran's nuclear programme.

82. Also, he expressed concern about the differing explanations given for Iran's heavy water projects and the unresolved question regarding its production of uranium metal.

83. He called on Iran to accelerate its co-operation with the Agency, to respond without delay and in detail to all the Agency's questions, and to ensure full transparency with regard to its nuclear programme.

84. He took note of Iran's positive decision with regard to the additional protocol and requested the Secretariat to provide the necessary legal assistance for its prompt conclusion. Stressing that the text of the standard additional protocol, having been approved by consensus, could not be re-negotiated, he urged that it be concluded unconditionally and without further delay. He appealed to Iran, as a confidence-building measure, to apply the additional protocol's provisions voluntarily in the meantime

so that the Agency could provide credible assurances regarding the peaceful nature of that country's nuclear activities, particularly the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

85. Mr. SALEHI (Islamic Republic of Iran) expressed deep dismay at the recent bomb attacks on the United Nations Headquarters and the Aliman Ali mosque in Baghdad, and extended his condolences to the bereaved families. Iran condemned all such barbaric acts, and called on the international community to examine their root causes so that they could be eradicated once and for all.

86. It was clear from the Director General's report that Iran had provided a great deal of detailed information about its peaceful nuclear activities and had granted the requested access to additional locations where environmental samples could be taken. Such a degree of co-operation went beyond his country's legal obligations, and indeed was tantamount to provisional application of the additional protocol. It demonstrated Iran's willingness to dispel the legitimate concerns of the international community and to respond to the calls made by the Board of Governors in June.

87. His delegation was committed to the Board's tradition of consensus, which enabled the Director General to fulfil his responsibilities freely and objectively. Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in Iran was an ongoing process; any attempt to hinder it was unwelcome and might undo what had been achieved so far. Also, the use of threatening language was futile. Despite its unprecedented co-operation, Iran had received only increased pressure from a few influential Member States.

88. Iran had consistently honoured its obligations under international treaties, and during the war imposed on it had never succumbed to the temptation to use chemical weapons by way of reprisals. It regarded the NPT as the protector of its right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology. To deny a country's rights while laying undue stress on its obligations was unproductive.

89. Full co-operation with the Agency depended on avoiding politicization of the situation. Politicization had led some elements in his country to question the acceptance of further obligations under the additional protocol, and even to advocate withdrawal from the NPT. Having been subjected to unjustified sanctions on the one hand, while following a policy of transparency beyond its obligations on the other, meant that Iran was having to make great efforts to create a domestic consensus favourable to co-operation with the Agency. The report contained in document GOV/2003/63 was not conclusive. Analysis results were still outstanding and sufficient time should be allowed for that process to be completed.

90. With regard to concerns about its enrichment activities, he stressed that Iran was fully prepared to take remedial action where necessary to ensure that its programme remained peaceful. Finally, he expressed appreciation for the fact that the Agency's focus on nuclear activities in the country had always been related to treaty obligations, and had never intruded on matters outside its mandate.

91. Ms. KELLY (Argentina), expressing support for the work done by the Secretariat on the issue, said that the Director General's latest report only deepened her country's doubts about Iran's nuclear programme, particularly in regard to uranium enrichment. It mentioned contradictions with explanations provided earlier by the Iranian authorities and indicated that full collaboration with Agency inspectors had not been forthcoming. Nevertheless, the report as a whole could be interpreted as showing a greater willingness to co-operate.

92. It was important to dispel any doubts and ensure that nuclear energy was being used solely for peaceful purposes in Iran, with due verification by the Agency of that country's compliance with its non-proliferation and safeguards commitments. Some steps had been taken in that direction, such as Iran's decision to sign an additional protocol. It was vital that Iran co-operate fully with the Agency.

Argentina was prepared to work with other countries to provide the Agency with effective verification tools.

93. Mr. ZNIBER (Morocco) said the increased co-operation shown by Iran and its willingness to sign an additional protocol were encouraging and should help to dissipate any remaining questions regarding the implementation of safeguards in Iran. The concerns of the international community were justified and it was important to reach a satisfactory solution to help strengthen the Agency's credibility and avoid a crisis with unforeseeable consequences.

94. Mr. BRILL (United States of America) welcomed the report, but found it less effectively organized and less clear in some respects than the report that had been submitted in June². After a further two months of intensive work, the unanswered questions had only grown both in number and in significance.

95. The United States of America agreed that the Secretariat should continue its efforts to clarify the history, nature and purposes of the Iranian nuclear programme. However, Board members also had a responsibility to look at the facts already established. There was need for serious reflection on the patterns that had emerged to date - which were inconsistent with Iran's safeguards agreement and its professions of transparency. They included: working in secret since the 1980s to develop sophisticated nuclear facilities; stalling and providing the Agency with false information, which had been changed when the original was revealed to be inaccurate; and attempting to cover up the traces of activities in order to avoid detection.

96. The June report had stated clearly that Iran had failed to meet important obligations under its safeguards agreements and had listed those failures. It had also reviewed a number of open questions being pursued by the Secretariat, particularly regarding the country's enrichment programme, the role of uranium metal in its nuclear fuel cycle, and its heavy water programme. In response to that report, the Board had urged Iran promptly to rectify all safeguards problems identified, and to resolve questions that remained open. It had also encouraged Iran not to introduce nuclear material at the pilot enrichment plant at Natanz, and called on it to permit environmental sampling at the Kalaye Electric Company site where there were alleged enrichment activities.

97. The report now under discussion added to the already significant list of failures by Iran to meet its safeguards obligations. Contrary to earlier statements, and only in response to damning evidence and repeated Agency enquiries, Iran had now confirmed that it had conducted undeclared uranium conversion experiments on two occasions in the 1990s.

98. The most important open question in the June report related to Iran's enrichment programme. The report now under discussion made it clear that the authorities had consistently misled the Agency. Paragraph 30 stated that its centrifuge programme had begun in 1985 and not in 1997 as Iran had claimed, and also that it was not entirely indigenous as the President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran had assured an informal meeting of the Board in May. Iran now said that it had received centrifuge drawings from - a still unnamed - foreign intermediary and had imported centrifuge components and a cascade design. Despite Iran's original claim that the Kalaye Electric Company produced only centrifuge components, it now said it had been a central part of its centrifuge testing programme from 1997 to 2002. Iran - rather implausibly - maintained that it had never introduced nuclear material into the centrifuges. The results of recent sampling were still outstanding. Following months of requests, Agency inspectors had finally been allowed to take environmental

² See document GOV/2003/40.

samples but, as paragraph 32 noted, Iran had used the intervening period to make considerable modifications that could affect the accuracy of the sampling and the Agency's ability to verify Iran's declaration about the types of activities previously carried out there.

99. There were also open questions in the June report about laser enrichment. They remained open because, according to paragraph 42, Iran had not allowed Agency inspectors to take environmental samples at a previously unacknowledged key site and had not allowed them to visit the site until equipment, including a large imported vacuum vessel, had been moved elsewhere.

100. Without detailing other open questions involving, for instance, uranium metal and heavy water, it was clear that the more the Secretariat had probed beneath the surface, the less plausible Iran's explanations had become, leaving even more open questions than had existed in June.

101. Most of the increased co-operation by Iran in the amount and detail of information provided had seemingly come a mere fortnight before the appearance of the Director General's report in an attempt to influence its content and tone. The delay had also possibly been intended to prevent sampling results from the Kalaye Electric Company being available to the current session of the Board. Iran's co-operation with the Agency had been at best selective, episodic and reluctant, characterized by delay, denial of access and misinformation, and could be more accurately described as damage control rather than genuine co-operation.

102. The careful wording of paragraph 52 of the report did not suggest any improvement in the quality or accuracy of information since June, describing it as slow in coming, incremental and sometimes in contrast to that previously provided. Only the future work of Agency inspectors could determine whether the new stories were as unreliable as previous Iranian claims. The Director General's description, in his introductory statement, of the information as "piecemeal" and "reactive" attested to Iran's failure to make a positive effort to allay the Agency's concerns. Further proof of Iran's reluctant and grudging co-operation with the Agency was given in paragraph 33 of the report. Within ten days of the Board's request in June that - as a confidence-building measure - it not introduce nuclear material at the Natanz pilot enrichment facility, pending the resolution of related outstanding issues, Iran had introduced UF₆ into the first centrifuge and on August 19 had begun testing a ten-machine cascade with UF₆. Also, it had emerged from a recent discussion involving various Board members, including Iran, that paragraph 50 wrongly stated that Iran had agreed to provide the Agency with information on its foreign suppliers of centrifuge information. Far from it, Iran was refusing to provide that information on the grounds that "intermediaries" had been used to acquire the information, drawings and components. As stated in paragraph 28 of the report, in response to the Agency's June request for the original centrifuge drawings supplied to Iran by a foreign entity in 1987, the country had so far submitted only redrawn copies. Also, paragraph 45 reported that hot cells were not mentioned in the updated design information provided in August, although they were essential for Iran's intended use of its heavy water reactor, and published reports indicated that it was seeking equipment for hot cells. Given its lack of transparency, Iran should not be surprised that Board members were concerned about possible reprocessing activities. Paragraph 42 reported that the Iranians had undertaken to consider the Agency's request to take environmental samples at the laser R&D laboratory at Lashkar Ab'ad. Was that the kind of co-operation the Board regarded as adequate?

103. The report contained in document GOV/2003/63 also detailed, in paragraphs 34 and 29, the disturbing news that the Agency had found not one, but two different types of HEU in Iran. That had been explained away by a belated admission that senior officials had erred in repeatedly telling the Agency, the Board and the world that the centrifuge enrichment programme was wholly indigenous, and that Iran must have acquired contaminated centrifuge components from previously unacknowledged foreign sources. Given prior revisions of Iran's explanations, the latest assertions

must be carefully scrutinized to determine if the particles discovered reflected enrichment activities at home, abroad or both. The Agency had every right to call on Iran to provide immediately full documentation on all related transactions if the latter's credibility was to be salvaged.

104. Without much conviction, his delegation hoped that the Iranian authorities' recent letter to the Director General to the effect that it was prepared to begin negotiation on an additional protocol was not another delaying tactic. How long would Iran take to accept the provisions of a document already signed by scores of Member States? Would it agree in the interim, as specifically requested by the Director General, to apply additional protocol provisions in an effort to give much-needed reassurance to the international community?

105. The combined evidence in the Director General's two reports showed that Iran had failed in many important ways to meet its NPT safeguards agreement obligations. The more recent report made it clear that the Agency was currently unable to provide assurance to the Board that Iran had not diverted nuclear material to non-peaceful purposes, a situation that would still prevail unless Iran provided continued and accelerated co-operation and full transparency.

106. Based on that evidence the Board had a responsibility to act. The Agency - which included the Board - must preserve the credibility of the global non-proliferation regime by standing firm against all efforts to violate or circumvent NPT obligations. The Board must forthwith send a clear message of political support for the Director General and the Secretariat in their efforts to penetrate the fog of obfuscation, misinformation and delayed admissions in which Iran continued to envelop its nuclear programme. The Agency inspectors, despite their professionalism, hard work and skill, needed help in order to complete their task in a timely manner.

107. Contrary to some accusations, the United States of America was not seeking to politicize the Agency process. It sought to ensure that the Agency met its responsibility to find peaceful solutions to critical non-proliferation issues. It was not politicization to support the NPT or expect its signatories to meet their safeguards obligations.

108. Although his country was convinced that the facts fully justified an immediate finding of Iran's non-compliance with its safeguard obligations, it took note of the desire of other Member States to give Iran a last chance to desist from its evasions. His delegation therefore joined the appeal to Iran to take essential and urgent action to demonstrate that it had done so.

109. His delegation looked forward to working with others to support the Agency and the NPT in resolving the issue and proposed that, on the basis of past practice and full transparency, the Director General's report contained in document GOV/2003/63 be released to the public.

110. Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) said that document GOV/2003/63 attested to the useful work accomplished by the Secretariat since the Director General had submitted his report to the Board in June³. Russia welcomed the increased degree of co-operation shown by Iran and the fact that Iran had allowed inspectors access to facilities, including the Kalaye Electric Company, and had permitted sample taking. It was clear that the Secretariat needed more time to assess the new information and to analyse the samples.

111. At the same time, it was regrettable that the information and access had been at times slow in coming and incremental, and that some information was in contrast with that previously provided by

³ See document GOV/2003/40.

Iran. Russia hoped that Iran would draw the right conclusions and further strengthen its co-operation with the Agency so that the important unresolved issues could be settled soonest. His delegation assumed that the Agency had at its disposal all the technical and human resources it needed. The Agency was the only international body with the authority to evaluate Iran's compliance with its NPT safeguards obligations.

112. As always, Russia supported the Secretariat's efforts and was convinced that the Agency's conclusions would be objective, justified and impartial. His delegation appealed to Iran to sign immediately and unconditionally an additional protocol and welcomed its decision to begin negotiations with the Agency to that end. Such a step would not only strengthen the worldwide non-proliferation regime but also be in Iran's own best interest and encourage co-operation between that country and the Agency. He urged Iran to ensure complete transparency regarding its past and current nuclear activities, as well as full and unconditional co-operation with the Agency.

113. He urged all interested Member States to help resolve all issues in a spirit of co-operation, dialogue and mutual understanding. Confrontation would not lead to a speedy solution and might serve only to complicate the situation.

114. Mr. ZHANG Huazhu (China) expressed support for the international community's efforts aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. States party to the NPT should conscientiously fulfil their Treaty obligations. His country actively supported the Agency's safeguards verification system and encouraged Member States to sign, ratify and implement additional protocols as soon as possible.

115. The Director General's objective report on the implementation of Iran's NPT safeguards agreement, while noting increased co-operation by that country with the Agency also pointed to a number of important outstanding issues. China was pleased that Iran had no intention to develop nuclear weapons and that it was prepared to begin negotiation on an additional protocol. Hopefully that process could reach conclusion in the near future. His delegation also hoped that, in co-operation with the Agency and with encouragement from the international community, Iran would take practical steps towards the prompt and peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue. That would not only enhance the credibility of the non-proliferation regime, but also benefit Iran itself.

116. Mr. TAKASU (Japan) said his country attached great importance to the Agency's role in supporting the global nuclear non-proliferation regime through its safeguards activities. The Director General had clearly spelled out in his introductory statement the action required by Iran to resolve the outstanding issues. While acknowledging Iran's increased co-operation and its serious efforts to move towards the swift conclusion of an additional protocol, his delegation was deeply concerned about the piecemeal and reactive nature of that co-operation, the inconsistencies in much of that information and the lack of clarification of many outstanding issues.

117. He expressed particular dismay at the introduction of nuclear material into the Natanz enrichment facility, despite the Board's earlier appeal to Iran, in an effort at confidence-building, to refrain from so doing. As the Agency was currently unable to provide Member States with assurances that all the nuclear material in Iran was declared and subject to Agency safeguards and that there were no undeclared nuclear activities there, his delegation called on Iran to accelerate co-operation and full transparency so that those assurances could soon be forthcoming.

118. He urged Iran to take immediately all the measures identified by the Director General so that the Agency could verify its compliance with its safeguards agreement, and to suspend all uranium enrichment activities, pending the resolution of outstanding issues. That would assure the international community of its commitment to the use of nuclear material for strictly peaceful purposes.

119. Convinced that countries with extensive nuclear activities, especially advanced fuel cycle technologies, had a greater responsibility to be transparent in their nuclear activities, Japan had endeavoured to improve the transparency of its programme and had been one of the first countries to implement an additional protocol. Iran should accelerate its efforts to sign unconditionally, ratify and fully implement an additional protocol, and, as a confidence-building measure, should start implementing the relevant provisions forthwith.

120. Mr. MAYOR (Switzerland), while welcoming the increased co-operation shown by Iran and its readiness to initiate negotiation on an additional protocol, shared the concerns regarding important outstanding issues, such as the uranium enrichment programme, the delays in providing information and the fact that new information contradicted that given previously. He called on Iran to co-operate fully and permit Agency inspectors to use additional protocol approaches in order to resolve the open questions as quickly as possible. His delegation hoped that Iran would promptly sign an additional protocol. Further, it supported the Director General's request that all States that had contributed to Iran's nuclear programme should furnish the Agency with any information it deemed necessary.

121. He applauded the Director General's latest efforts to preserve the credibility of the safeguards regime in Iran and trusted the Board would continue to give him its full support.

122. Mr. SREENIVASAN (India) said that, while the Director General's report showed progress had been made in assessing the current situation in Iran and outlined further steps to be taken, some old questions and some new ones called for further analysis, clarification and resolution.

123. India welcomed the readiness with which Iran had co-operated with the Agency, and its promise to enter into negotiations for signing an additional protocol, and had noted Iran's statement that it had no nuclear weapons programme and that its nuclear programme was solely for peaceful purposes.

124. While Iran's compliance with its NPT obligations was a matter for the States party to that Treaty, his delegation trusted that Iran would act to allay the considerable international concern regarding implementation of its safeguards agreement. The Agency's safeguards system was built on the premise that parties to safeguards agreements would co-operate fully with the Agency in a transparent system of reporting and inspection so that the Agency could provide the required assurances. It was essential that Iran do so.

125. The Board should urge the Director General to continue his efforts with respect to Iran, and it should urge Iran to co-operate fully with the Agency and provide accurate information on all matters, including the origin and use of nuclear equipment and material. The Board should proceed with caution and stress the shared responsibility of Iran and the Agency to find a satisfactory resolution.

The meeting rose at 1.00 p.m.