

IAEA Board of Governors
Record of the 1131st Meeting
GOV/OR.1131

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Nuclear Verification
(f) Creation of a Committee on Safeguards and Verification

Board of Governors

GOV/OR.1131

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Record of the 1131st Meeting

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¹ GOV/2005/45.

Attendance

(The list below gives the name of the senior member of each delegation who attended the meeting, as well as that of any other member whose statement is summarized in this record.)

Ms. HALL		Chairperson (Canada)
Mr. FASSIH	_____	Algeria
Ms. KELLY		Argentina
Ms. STOKES		Australia
Mr. NIEUWENHUYS		Belgium
Mr. VIEIRA DE SOUZA		} Brazil
Ms. RICHTER RIBEIRO MOURA		
Mr. PROUDFOOT		Canada
Mr. ZHANG Huazhu		} China
Mr. WU Hailong		
Mr. MOREJÓN-ALMEIDA		Ecuador
Mr. THIEBAUD		France
Mr. HONSOWITZ		} Germany
Mr. SCHELLER		
Mr. BEKOE		Ghana
Mr. HORVÁTH		Hungary
Mr. SHARMA		India
Mr. DE CEGLIE		Italy
Mr. TAKASU		Japan
Mr. CHO Chang-Beom		Korea, Republic of
Ms. ESPINOSA CANTELLANO		Mexico
Mr. KOP		Netherlands
Ms. LAOSE		Nigeria
Mr. BUTT		} Pakistan
Mr. NAQVI		
Mr. BELEVAN-McBRIDE		Peru
Mr. BYLICA		Poland
Mr. SENNFELT		Portugal
Mr. BERDENNIKOV		Russian Federation
Ms. YEW		Singapore
Mr. MACHÁČ		Slovakia
Mr. MINTY		South Africa
Ms. WIJEWARDANE		Sri Lanka
Ms. MELIN		Sweden
Mr. BOUGACHA		Tunisia
Mr. WRIGHT		United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Ms. SANDERS		} United States of America
Mr. GLASS		
Ms. GARCÍA de PÉREZ		Venezuela
Mr. LAI NGOC DOAN		Vietnam
Mr. OBEID	_____	Yemen

Attendance (continued)

Mr. ELBARADEI
Mr. GOLDSCHMIDT

Director General
Deputy Director General, Department
of Safeguards
Secretary of the Board

Mr. ANING

Representatives of the following Member States attended the meeting:

Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Holy See, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Kuwait, Latvia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Morocco, Namibia, New Zealand, Paraguay, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia, Spain, Sudan, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay.

Abbreviations used in this record:

AEOI	Atomic Energy Organization of Iran
CPPNM	Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
G8	Group of Eight
ISSPA	International Source Suppliers and Producers Association
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT Review Conference	Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
PBC	Programme and Budget Committee
SAGSI	Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation
SQP	small quantities protocol
TACC	Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee

* Speakers under Rule 50 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure are indicated by an asterisk.

6. Nuclear verification (continued)

(f) Creation of a Committee on Safeguards and Verification (GOV/2005/38/Rev.1)

1. The CHAIRPERSON recalled that at its meetings on 2 March the Board had extensively discussed the issue of the creation of a committee on safeguards and verification on the basis of a draft proposal submitted by the United States. Broad support had been expressed for the creation of such an advisory committee of the Board, but it had been felt that more time was required for further consideration of the proposal. She also recalled that on Tuesday the Director General had, in his introductory statement, indicated that a new committee would explore ways of further strengthening the safeguards system and had expressed the hope that the Board would be in a position to act on the proposal at its June session.
2. The Board had before it, in document GOV/2005/38/Rev.1, a substantially revised proposal which she understood had been prepared by the United States with account taken of comments and suggestions received from Member States since the February-March session of the Board.
3. Ms. SANDERS (United States of America), introducing the proposal contained in document GOV/2005/38/Rev.1, said that her delegation took pride in proposing a new committee of the Board to consider ways and means to strengthen the safeguards system. The threat of nuclear proliferation was dynamic, complex and real, and the safeguards system, on which everyone relied, needed to adapt to that changing reality. The United States had consulted on its proposal that a committee be created to examine how to respond to such threats during, or on the margins of, each session of the Board since early 2004. Her Government believed that a committee on safeguards and verification would not only help in addressing the proliferation threat, but also improve the safeguards system and thereby enhance international security and serve common security interests. Strengthening the safeguards system would also help to create a security environment in which peaceful nuclear cooperation could flourish, thereby reinforcing the other important areas of Agency activity — nuclear technology transfer and nuclear safety. Her delegation believed that the proposed committee on safeguards and verification would help to create an environment conducive to encouraging legitimate nuclear trade among States and putting an end to clandestine supply networks.
4. Her delegation was pleased that many Board members and other Member States had expressed support for its proposal. Also, it appreciated the supportive remarks made by the Director General in his opening statement.
5. In the course of extensive consultations with other delegations and with regional groups, her delegation had received a number of helpful comments and suggestions. As a result, it had provided the Secretariat with a significantly simplified decision document.
6. That document did not have a title, and her delegation proposed that it be entitled “Decision of the Board to create an advisory committee of the Board within the framework of the IAEA Statute”.
7. The mandate of the committee as set forth in the document would be to consider ways and means to strengthen the safeguards system. It would be chaired by the Board’s Chairperson or by his or her designee from the Board. All Member States of the Agency would be able to participate in the

committee's work. The committee would have a two-year mandate starting from the time when it first convened. Thereafter, the Board would have to decide whether or not to extend the mandate.

8. The committee, if created, would be advisory in character. It would be created by the Board and would be responsible to the Board. It would have no independent decision-making authority and would not intervene in the day-to-day operations of the Department of Safeguards, although it would be able to draw upon the Department's expertise. Any recommendations emanating from the committee would be reviewed by the Board and accepted, rejected or modified by it

9. In her delegation's view, the committee's work would support the work of the Board and the Secretariat and not duplicate their work or that of SAGSI. The committee would, of course, operate within the mandate of the Agency.

10. Her delegation expected that the committee would provide a valuable catalyst for new ideas and new methodologies that could be helpful in keeping pace with the changing international security environment. The Agency's inspectorate had had to face new, unexpected and expanding challenges in the past few years, including investigations of covert nuclear programmes involving hidden nuclear facilities, undeclared material and undeclared activities. Those investigations might require innovative measures in order to arrive at a successful closure. Also, the United States believed that the committee should consider whether there were any measures that could be brought to bear on emerging proliferation threats emanating from non-State actors.

11. In her delegation's view, the proposal before the Board was a good basis for a decision at the present time, and the work of the committee could be conducted in such a manner that it would supplement rather than conflict with the Secretariat's activities. Her delegation believed that the committee could make a major contribution to strengthening the non-proliferation regime and thereby increase collective security. It therefore hoped that the Board would decide to create the committee during the current meeting.

12. The CHAIRPERSON said she understood that the Board was prepared to take a decision on agenda sub-item 6(f) before further statements were made. If there were no objections to proceeding in that manner, she would take it that the Board wished to adopt the proposed Board decision set out on page 3 of document GOV/2005/38/Rev.1, with the title "Decision of the Board to create an advisory committee of the Board within the framework of the IAEA Statute".

13. It was so decided.

14. Mr. FABER (Luxembourg)*, speaking on behalf of the European Union, said that the acceding countries Bulgaria and Romania, the candidate countries Turkey and Croatia, the countries of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro and the EFTA countries Iceland and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, and Ukraine associated themselves with the statement which he was about to make.

15. The European Union was grateful to the delegation of the United States for submitting a modified proposal for establishing a committee on safeguards and verification which took account of comments made at the previous Board session.

16. The European Union took note with interest of the proposals made by the Director General in his introductory statement with regard to the possible tasks to be addressed by the committee.

17. The European Union believed that the creation of a committee on safeguards and verification would further enhance the credibility and effectiveness of the Agency's safeguards and verification activities.

18. Mr. HUSSAIN (Malaysia)*, speaking on behalf of the Vienna Chapter of the Non-Aligned Movement, said that NAM, which had taken note of the revised proposal of the United States delegation, welcomed the consultations held by the United States delegation with other delegations and with various groups on the contents of the proposal.

19. NAM, which was in favour of all efforts to enhance the Agency's work in all its aspects, in accordance with the Statute and bearing in mind the inalienable right of all Member States to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes, considered it essential to strengthen all statutory activities of the Agency in a balanced manner.

20. NAM attached great importance to promoting and strengthening multilateralism and rejected unilateralism. In accordance with its position of principle on nuclear disarmament and the related issue of nuclear non-proliferation, it also attached great importance to the efforts aimed at non-proliferation being paralleled by simultaneous efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament. In that connection, NAM remained deeply concerned about the slow pace of progress towards nuclear disarmament, which continued to be its highest priority.

21. As to the proposal just adopted, NAM believed that the decisions on such proposals should result from careful and transparent consultations among Member States. It had noted the comments made by the Director General regarding the proposal.

22. Mr. TAKASU (Japan) said that his delegation welcomed the United States proposal to establish a Board committee responsible for strengthening the Agency's safeguards and verification activities and was pleased at the decision of the Board to establish such a body. The international community must take urgent measures to deal effectively with proliferation challenges like the series of safeguards implementation issues that had arisen and the existence of a clandestine network for the supply of nuclear material and related items, and the Agency had an important role to play in connection with such measures. Accordingly, its safeguards and verification activities needed to be strengthened.

23. There was clearly a role for a committee that was specifically dedicated to the in-depth consideration of policy aspects of strengthening the safeguards system and that reported to the Board for decision, while respecting the valuable role that expert bodies such as SAGSI had been playing.

24. Japan hoped that when preparing its programme of work the committee would focus on the policy issues of highest priority and greatest urgency. It also hoped that duplication with the work of bodies such as SAGSI would be avoided.

25. As to the funding of the committee's work, his delegation believed that the necessary resources should be provided from within the Agency's Regular Budget.

26. Mr. MOREJÓN-ALMEIDA (Ecuador) said that his Government was open to new ideas for increasing the ability of the Agency to fulfil its tasks relating to disarmament and non-proliferation and also its tasks relating to areas such as safety and technical cooperation, the latter being of fundamental importance for developing countries.

27. His delegation recognized that the revised proposal submitted by the United States took account to a large degree of the concerns expressed by members of the Board and by regional groups. Also, it had taken note with interest of the comments regarding the committee which the Director General had made in his introductory statement.

28. Ecuador saw the committee as a body which would submit reports and recommendations to the Board, whose work would not duplicate the work of other bodies and the duration of whose mandate would depend on its usefulness in helping to improve the application of safeguards and verification measures.

29. Although it had been indicated with some optimism that the financial implications of the creation of the committee would not be burdensome, his delegation would follow developments in the financial area very closely.

30. Ecuador, which was particularly pleased that the committee would be open to all Member States, welcomed the decision just taken by the Board.

31. Mr. MINTY (South Africa), having welcomed the decision just taken by the Board, said that South Africa was in favour of the efforts being made to universalize the safeguards regime and to strengthen the pillars of non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It continued to believe that the Agency was the sole competent authority in the field of nuclear safeguards and verification.

32. As to the advisory committee just established, in his delegation's view it would be able to operate only within the framework of and in accordance with the Statute. Also, care would have to be taken to avoid duplication and all interference with the work of the Department of Safeguards and to maintain the integrity of the Secretariat, with which the committee should cooperate closely.

33. Mr. DE CEGLIE (Italy) said that his Government agreed with the Government of the United States and many other governments that the safeguards system should be scrutinized with a view to being improved.

34. Given the rapid spread of nuclear knowledge and capabilities to an unprecedented number of countries, and hence the greatly increased risk of nuclear weapons proliferation, Italy had from the outset been in favour of establishing a special committee on safeguards and verification.

35. Italy, which was grateful to the delegation of the United States for taking into account the points of view expressed by many other delegations, looked forward to participating in the new committee's work and hoped that the results would benefit the entire international community.

36. Mr. HONSOWITZ (Germany), having welcomed the statement just made by the representative of the United States and the decision just taken by the Board, said that his delegation attached great importance to the fact that the letter of 13 June 2005 from the United States reproduced in document GOV/2005/38//Rev.1 contained the following sentences: "Our new proposal gives the Committee a clear initial mandate of two years. At the end of that time, the Board would make a decision whether to extend the Committee's mandate." In Germany's view, there must be no overlapping of the work of the committee with that of SAGSI and no interference in the safeguards tasks of the Secretariat, and the compromise conclusions of Committee 24 must not be reopened or revoked.

37. It should be borne in mind that the first priority in the safeguards field was the conclusion of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols by all Member States, in order to achieve universality. New safeguards measures must not be allowed to increase the reluctance of some Member States to conclude such agreements and protocols; rather, they should promote their conclusion. It would be highly regrettable if the creation of the committee proved to be counterproductive with regard to the achievement of universality.

38. In view of the committee's unspecified mandate, the definition of its work programme would no doubt be time-consuming. The possible areas to be addressed which the Director General had mentioned in his introductory statement were interesting and, at first glance, attractive.

39. Mr. BYLICA (Poland), having welcomed the Board's decision, said that, given the serious challenges to the non-proliferation regime in recent years, the numerous developments taking place in the international security environment and the advances being made in relevant areas of technology, a

thorough review of the safeguards system was essential. His delegation hoped that the new committee would carry out such a review and submit its recommendations to the Board in a timely manner.

40. Poland was pleased that the Board's decision provided for any intergovernmental organization that was a party to a comprehensive safeguards agreement to participate as an observer in the committee's deliberations.

41. Mr. KOP (Netherlands), having welcomed the Board's decision to create a committee on safeguards and verification, said that his delegation was grateful to the United States delegation for tirelessly pursuing the issue during the past 16 months. It hoped that, like the PBC and TACC, the committee would prepare the ground for well-informed decision-making by the Board. His delegation was pleased that all Member States would be able to participate in the work of the committee, as safeguards and verification matters concerned not just the members of the Board.

42. In his delegation's view, the part of the last sentence of the Board's decision after the semicolon ("and that the Committee ... after two years") in no way affected the statutory rights of Member States or of the Board and was in fact superfluous.

43. Mr. BELEVAN-McBRIDE (Peru), welcoming the Board's decision, said that his delegation agreed with the Director General that strengthening of the safeguards system to deal effectively with evolving proliferation challenges should be "an ongoing process". It was therefore ready to support any initiative aimed at achieving more effective checks on proliferation, provided that the legitimate right of States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was not affected.

44. He thanked Mr. Goldschmidt for the fruitful work done by him during his years as Deputy Director General for Safeguards and wished him well for the future.

45. Mr. THIEBAUD (France), having thanked the United States delegation for taking account of the suggestions made by other delegations, said that the creation of a committee on safeguards and verification was a logical sequel to the adoption of the G8 Action Plan on Non-proliferation.

46. It was important that the work of the committee be strictly in line with the Statute, and in particular with Article XII (Agency safeguards), for only the Secretariat was able to carry out safeguards inspections with the impartiality and professionalism necessary for giving the international community the assurances which it needed regarding the fulfilment of commitments entered into pursuant to the NPT.

47. It was also important that the committee's work harmonize with the work of SAGSI. In line with what the Director General said in his introductory statement, his delegation believed that the committee should focus on the formulation of practical recommendations to the Board for further increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system, especially in the light of the new threats which have appeared on the scene and of developments in the area of nuclear technology, and thereby promoting universalization of the safeguards system in keeping with the respective status of each State — universalization remaining France's first priority.

48. Those recommendations should be consistent with the relevant resolutions adopted recently by the Security Council, particularly resolution 1540, and the efforts under way within the United Nations framework to further strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

49. Ms. YEW (Singapore), welcoming the Board's decision, said that recent challenges to the Agency's safeguards system called for new approaches and that her country agreed with the Director General that strengthening of the safeguards system to deal effectively with evolving proliferation challenges should be an ongoing process.

50. Her delegation's understanding was that the advisory committee on safeguards and verification would function within the framework of the Statute, complementing the roles of other bodies.

51. Mr. SENNFELT (Portugal), welcoming the Board's decision, said that his delegation looked forward to participating in the work of the special committee on safeguards and verification.

52. Ms. KELLY (Argentina) thanked the United States delegation for taking account of the comments made by Member States, including her country, on the earlier proposed Board decision.

53. The Agency had amply demonstrated its effectiveness in recent years by the way in which it had met various challenges, but Argentina welcomed any initiative for further increasing its effectiveness and credibility — a task that was the responsibility of its policy-making organs.

54. In Argentina's view, the terms of the decision just taken by the Board would not only uphold but strengthen the Board's role, which would not be diminished by the activities of the committee on safeguards and verification. Argentina expected that advisory committee to consult and coordinate with the Secretariat, so avoiding unnecessary duplication, and to take account of the comments made by her delegation on various occasions.

55. Mr. MACHÁČ (Slovakia), welcoming the Board's decision, thanked the delegation of the United States for the flexibility which it had shown in accommodating other delegations' views.

56. Ms. ESPINOSA CANTELLANO (Mexico) thanked the United States delegation for modifying its proposal in the light of the concerns expressed by many other delegations, including her own, and said that her delegation stood ready to participate very actively in the work of the committee on safeguards and verification, which should draw on SAGSI's experience and knowledge.

57. However, Mexico would not be in a position to assume any financial commitments in connection with the creation of the committee.

58. She thanked Mr. Goldschmidt, Deputy Director General for Safeguards, for his hard work over the years and wished him well for the future.

59. Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) said that the modified version of the proposed Board decision and the statement just made by the United States representative had taken account of ideas put forward during and after the Board's previous session. His delegation understood that the activities of the committee on safeguards and verification would be transparent and open to all interested Member States. It welcomed the fact that the committee's mandate would be limited to two years, with a possible extension only if approved by the Board.

60. In his delegation's view — a view clearly shared by the United States delegation — the committee's work should not duplicate the work of the Department of Safeguards or SAGSI. His delegation would like the committee's work programme to include matters relating to the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540, the universalization of additional protocols, the Agency's relations with the Security Council and the future of small quantities protocols.

61. Mr. FASSIH (Algeria) said that his delegation had been able to join the consensus in favour of creating a committee on safeguards and verification in accordance with the Statute because the consensus had been the outcome of lengthy negotiations during which the United States delegation had displayed a commendable spirit of cooperation.

62. Member States would now have an additional forum in which to address the challenges confronting the safeguards system, especially those of international security and regional security in a rapidly changing world and the credibility of the commitments entered into pursuant to NPT safeguards agreements, the universalization of which must be achieved.

63. The work of the committee should supplement that of SAGSI, and the committee should assist the Board in fulfilling its mission as a policy-making organ of the Agency. Moreover, the committee should help to strengthen the role and powers assigned to the Agency by the Statute and hence the multilateral system for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction.

64. At the end of the committee's two-year mandate, it would be possible to assess the progress made and the programmatic and budgetary impact on the Agency — and judge the wisdom of the decision just taken.

65. Mr. PROUDFOOT (Canada), welcoming the Board's decision to create a committee on safeguards and verification, said that the committee could make a valuable contribution to the Agency's efforts to assess and respond to current and future verification challenges and thus help ensure that nuclear energy was used for peaceful purposes only.

66. Having commended the flexibility demonstrated by the United States delegation, he said that Canada, although drawn to the idea of a standing committee, had in a spirit of compromise decided to go along with the idea of a committee with a two-year renewable mandate.

67. Mr. WRIGHT (United Kingdom), welcoming the Board's decision, said that safeguards could not remain rooted in past assumptions and technologies. At a time when the safeguards system faced new challenges, such as the development of organized clandestine nuclear supply networks, it was only right that the Agency should make a special effort to examine those challenges and ways in which the safeguards system might respond to them.

68. He thanked the United States delegation for taking into account the comments which had been made by the United Kingdom and other Board members at previous sessions of the Board.

69. Mr. SHARMA (India) said that his delegation welcomed the Board's decision on a proposal which had undergone a year-long evolutionary process, during which the concerns of Member States had been taken into account.

70. Firmly committed to the unique role of the Agency within the United Nations system, India had been consistently receptive to proposals for strengthening that role and had contributed to the work of other Board committees established for that purpose.

71. As regards the open-ended committee just established, India envisaged that participation in it would be governed by the Board's Provisional Rules of Procedure, that the designation of its chairperson would be made with the Board's approval, that its work would be conducted within the framework of the Statute, that it would be funded from the Regular Budget, and that it would have a two-year mandate extendable on the basis of a review and a consensus decision.

72. His delegation wished to place on record its appreciation of the work done by Mr. Goldschmidt, Deputy Director General for Safeguards, of his excellent leadership of the Department of Safeguards and of his constant readiness to cooperate with Board members — including India.

73. Mr. HORVÁTH (Hungary), welcoming the Board's decision, said that, against the backdrop of the changing security environment, it was essential that the Agency's safeguards system be able to vigorously confront the alarming proliferation risks which had arisen. Strengthening the Agency's verification capabilities required a comprehensive review of the operation of the safeguards system from the legal, financial and technical standpoints.

74. Since Board meetings did not always provide sufficient opportunities for in-depth consideration of the various issues connected with the strengthening of those capabilities, Hungary had welcomed

the United States delegation's initiative and greatly appreciated the flexibility demonstrated by that delegation in accommodating the concerns of different groups of Member States.

75. Ms. STOKES (Australia), welcoming the Board's decision, said that her country attached great importance to the focused scrutiny by Board members of issues relating to the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system, which must continue to evolve in order to be credible. Board members must work — and be seen to be working — towards ensuring that the Agency had access to the full range of technical, administrative, diplomatic and political measures needed for the fulfilment of its verification mandate. The committee on safeguards and verification would enable Board members to do that.

76. Australia looked forward to working with other Member States in the committee, whose work should complement — rather than duplicate — that of SAGSI, which had contributed for 35 years to the development and effective operation of the Agency's safeguards system.

77. Mr. CHO Chang-Beom (Republic of Korea), welcoming the Board's decision, said that the United States delegation had taken into account many constructive ideas put forward by Board members, including his own country, and had demonstrated great flexibility. His delegation particularly welcomed the open-ended nature of the committee and its broad mandate.

78. Given the mounting challenges facing the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the safeguards system, and in the light of the outcome of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, the decision to create a committee on safeguards and verification was very timely. His delegation stood ready to take an active part in the committee's deliberations.

79. Mr. BUTT (Pakistan), having thanked the United States delegation for the consultations which it had held, said that his delegation would have liked to see a reference to the Statute in the text of the proposed Board decision (for example, through the inclusion of the phrase “within the framework of the Agency's statutory responsibilities and legal authority” after “the safeguards system” in the first paragraph of the decision). In keeping with the spirit of Vienna, however, it was prepared to go along with the mention of the Statute in the title alone.

80. That having been said, his delegation hoped that the activities of the committee would be consistent with the Agency's statutory responsibilities and legal authority, so that its recommendations to the Board could be broadly accepted by Member States.

81. Ms. WIJewardane (Sri Lanka), having expressed appreciation of the statement just made by the United States representative, said that, given the serious new challenges in the areas of nuclear security and non-proliferation, the Agency's safeguards and verification mandate needed to be strengthened. That called for a fresh perspective which combined policy-level input with legal and practical insight.

82. The decision just taken by the Board was a constructive one, and in supporting it her delegation had taken into account the views expressed by the Director General in his introductory statement.

83. Her delegation welcomed the fact that the Board's decision, which had evolved through a process of consultation, had taken account of concerns expressed at previous Board sessions. It hoped that the committee on safeguards and verification, operating within the framework of the Statute, would prove to be a useful forum for the discussion of substantive issues.

84. She thanked Mr. Goldschmidt for all his hard work as Deputy Director General for Safeguards and wished him well in the future.

85. Ms. LAOSE (Nigeria), welcoming the Board's decision, thanked the United States delegation for its initiative and for modifying its original proposal in the light of extensive consultations with other delegations.

86. Her delegation was pleased that the committee on safeguards and verification would be of an advisory nature and welcomed the fact that it would work within the framework of the Statute.

87. Her delegation hoped that the creation of the committee would neither undermine the legitimate rights of States to pursue peaceful nuclear activities in the interest of their socio-economic development nor add to their NPT obligations.

88. She commended Mr. Goldschmidt's strenuous efforts as Deputy Director General for Safeguards and wished him good luck for the future.

89. Ms. MELIN (Sweden), welcoming the Board's decision, said that the committee on safeguards and verification should refrain from issuing detailed directives. Her delegation was therefore in general agreement with the committee's mandate. It would like to see the committee — inter alia — reviewing and commenting on the Secretariat's Safeguards Implementation Reports, addressing the threats presented by non-State actors and considering the need for existing legal authorities to be revised. It did not believe that the safeguards system needed to be drastically overhauled. Further experience of implementing additional protocols should be gathered before measures were taken to elaborate on them.

90. Her delegation was grateful to Mr. Goldschmidt for his hard work as Deputy Director General for Safeguards and wished him well for the future.

91. Mr. WU Hailong (China), welcoming the Board's decision, said that his country would participate constructively in the work of the committee on safeguards and verification.

92. The Board was the Agency's main policy-making organ, and the committee's main function would be to provide it with advice as a basis for decision-making, within the framework of the Statute. The committee should avoid undermining the Board's authority and the effectiveness of the Secretariat and bodies such as SAGSI.

93. There should be extensive consultations regarding the committee's operating mechanisms and the necessary financial arrangements. The Director General's views regarding the direction of the committee's work deserved careful consideration.

94. The creation of the committee should not be allowed to divert resources away from promotional activities and thereby impair the balance between nuclear non-proliferation efforts and the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

95. His delegation was grateful to Mr. Goldschmidt for all he had done as Deputy Director General for Safeguards and wished him every success in the future.

96. Mr. BEKOE (Ghana) said that his delegation, which believed that there was a need to be more proactive in responding to the current proliferation challenges, greatly appreciated the initiative of the United States delegation and welcomed the creation of the advisory committee on safeguards and verification.

97. He thanked the Deputy Director General for Safeguards, Mr. Goldschmidt, for his contribution to the Agency over the previous six years and wished him every success in the future.

98. Mr. NIEUWENHUYIS (Belgium), welcoming the establishment of the committee on safeguards and verification, said that his country, which believed that the Agency must be able to give credible

assurances that every State was fulfilling its safeguards obligations, would participate constructively in the committee's work with a view to further increasing the effectiveness of the safeguards system.

99. Ms. RICHTER RIBEIRO MOURA (Brazil) said that her delegation had joined the consensus in favour of establishment of an advisory committee on safeguards and verification following the improvements made by the United States delegation to its initial proposal. Her delegation understood that the committee would focus on matters pertaining to the Agency's mandate, operating within the framework of the Statute and of the safeguards agreements in force. It hoped that the work of the committee would not duplicate that of SAGSI and that its establishment would not have significant budgetary implications.

100. The strengthening of safeguards, which Brazil supported, should not be allowed to affect the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Member States.

101. Ms. GARCÍA de PÉREZ (Venezuela), welcoming the Board's decision, said that her country would support any initiative aimed at strengthening the Agency's safeguards system. It hoped that the establishment of the committee on safeguards and verification would result in progress towards the common objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation without detriment to the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. Venezuela looked forward to participating in the work of the committee.

102. Mr. OBEID (Yemen), having expressed appreciation of the flexibility demonstrated by the United States delegation, said that the committee on safeguards and verification should avoid duplication of effort, its mandate should be limited to two years and its establishment should not have any budgetary implications. The committee should be advisory in nature and operate within the framework of the Agency's Statute.

103. He thanked the Deputy Director General for Safeguards, Mr. Goldschmidt, for his work and wished him every success in the future.

104. Mr. BOUGACHA (Tunisia), having thanked the United States delegation for its efforts, said that Tunisia welcomed all endeavours to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system provided that they remained within the framework of the Statute and did not undermine the right of States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Tunisia hoped that the advisory committee on safeguards and verification would enable the Agency to respond effectively to the challenges facing the safeguards system.

105. Mr. STRUB (Switzerland)* said that his delegation had looked forward to the establishment of the committee on safeguards and verification with some caution, as it was mindful of a potential conflict of roles between the committee, SAGSI and the Board. In its view, the committee would have to fit in between SAGSI and the Board. His delegation would follow developments in the committee with great interest.

106. He thanked the Deputy Director General for Safeguards, Mr. Goldschmidt, for all his hard work over the previous six years and wished him every success in the future.

107. Mr. ZNIBER (Morocco)*, having congratulated the Director General on his re-appointment, said that the Agency should have the strongest possible support in discharging its non-proliferation role. His delegation would participate in the work of the committee on safeguards and verification, whose main task should be to consider ways of inducing those States which had not yet done so to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols, thereby achieving universality of the non-proliferation regime.

108. His country continued to attach great importance to the right of all countries to use nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes, and hoped that the committee would respect that right.

109. His country was grateful to the Deputy Director General for Safeguards, Mr. Goldschmidt, and wished him every happiness in the future.

110. Ms. QUINTERO CORREA (Colombia)*, having congratulated the Director General on his re-appointment, thanked the United States delegation for putting forward a revised proposal on the establishment of an advisory committee on safeguards and verification. Colombia would support any exchange of views that would help to strengthen the safeguards system in response to the new challenges to the system posed by illicit trafficking and terrorism.

111. Colombia understood that the committee would operate within the Statute and that its funding would not create any additional financial obligations for Member States — obligations which her country would not be able to assume.

112. She thanked the Deputy Director General for Safeguards, Mr. Goldschmidt, for the excellent work done by him during his term of office and wished him well for the future.

113. Mr. POPTCHEV (Bulgaria)*, having congratulated the Director General on his re-appointment, said that the establishment of the committee on safeguards and verification, which his country welcomed, was a very timely measure for responding effectively to evolving proliferation challenges. Bulgaria looked forward with interest to the committee's future activities.

114. Mr. RAMZY (Egypt)* said that his delegation, which hoped that the work of the committee on safeguards and verification would not conflict with that of the Board, was grateful to the United States delegation for taking into account the concerns of Egypt and other Member States.

115. Egypt would participate in the committee's work on strengthening the safeguards system and hoped that the committee would focus on ways of implementing the General Conference's resolutions concerning the application of the Agency's comprehensive safeguards.

116. Mr. KLUCKÝ (Czech Republic)*, welcoming the creation of the committee on safeguards and verification, said that his delegation was grateful to the United States delegation for its tireless efforts in helping to bring about the decision just taken by the Board. It hoped that committee would — inter alia — provide national authorities with information about export controls which would help States to fulfil their obligations under Security Council resolution 1540.

117. Mr. SOLTANIEH (Islamic Republic of Iran)* said that his delegation continued to believe that the creation of a committee on safeguards and verification was premature at the present juncture and that it might jeopardize the conclusion and entry into force of further additional protocols. Also, his delegation was concerned about the possibility of duplication with, for example, the work of SAGSI and of the "open-ended group of experts" provided for in Article 16 of the Model Additional Protocol.

118. It was his delegation's understanding that the committee just created would be open to all Member States without exception and that the recommendations of the committee relevant to national security would be arrived at by consensus.

119. Ms. BRIDGE (New Zealand)* said that the establishment of the committee on safeguards and verification was very timely and that her country hoped that the committee would provide a useful focus for efforts to strengthen the safeguards system.

120. Her delegation, which had noted that the committee would have no independent decision-making authority, welcomed the fact that participation in the committee's work would be open to all Member States.

121. Mr. MICHAELI (Israel)* said that the establishment of the committee on safeguards and verification was an important step forward and expressed the hope that the committee would prove to be a useful forum for the detailed examination of the serious safeguards challenges facing the Agency.

122. He commended the Deputy Director General for Safeguards, Mr. Goldschmidt, on his excellent work over the previous six years and wished him every success in the future.

123. Mr. PÉREZ GIRALDA (Spain)*, having congratulated the Director General on his re-appointment, expressed satisfaction that a consensus had been reached on establishing the committee on safeguards and verification and thanked the United States delegation for the flexibility it had shown. Spain would participate in the committee's work with a view to strengthening the Agency's safeguards system.

124. He thanked the Deputy Director General for Safeguards, Mr. Goldschmidt, for the work done by him during his term of office and wished him well for the future.

125. The DIRECTOR GENERAL said that, in his view, the establishment of the committee on safeguards and verification, which he welcomed, would not detract from the value of the activities being carried out by the Secretariat pursuant to additional protocols. It was still important to strive for the conclusion of additional protocols by all States, as additional protocols were essential for enabling the Secretariat to carry out its safeguards responsibilities under the NPT in a credible manner. The Secretariat's task was to ensure that all the nuclear material in States with comprehensive safeguards agreements was under safeguards and that none of it was diverted for non-peaceful purposes, and additional protocols were essential in that connection.

126. In carrying out activities pursuant to additional protocols, however, the Secretariat needed still more information, greater access to emerging technologies and further qualified personnel.

127. For example, in recent years he had been trying to obtain information about exports and imports from members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and from other countries, as the Secretariat had not been receiving such information in a systematic manner. So, greater information sharing was something he would like the committee to look into.

128. As regards emerging technologies, the Secretariat was already using satellite imagery and wide-area environmental sampling, but there was a need to consider whether it could do a better job with the help of still more advanced technologies. As he had said in his introductory statement, strengthening the safeguards system should be an ongoing process — a remark with which several speakers had agreed.

129. As regards qualified personnel, the Secretariat now knew that it should focus closely on enrichment and reprocessing, but it had very few people with extensive experience of those areas. Could Member States help it to recruit more such people?

130. Those were all practical issues which he would like the committee to examine together with the Secretariat.

131. A great deal had happened during the eight years since the Board's approval of the Model Additional Protocol, and he believed that the time had come for a fresh appraisal in the light of, for example, resolution 1540 adopted by the Security Council in response to challenges arising out of illicit trafficking in nuclear material and related equipment. Could the Secretariat help by enabling States to establish better systems of accounting and control and of physical protection? Some Member States had made offers of assistance in that connection, and the possibility of taking up such offers should be examined.

132. There had been many references to SAGSI. However, SAGSI was a group of experts which advised him and whose job was to consider ‘the nuts and bolts’ of safeguards implementation, whereas the committee on safeguards and verification would be a committee of governmental representatives established to consider ‘the big picture’. As with the activities being carried out pursuant to additional protocols, he did not think that the establishment of the committee would detract from SAGSI’s role.

133. What the Secretariat already had was good, but the Secretariat needed to remain up to date so that the Agency’s safeguards system continued to be sharp and adequate.

134. Ms. SANDERS (United States) said that the establishment of the committee on safeguards and verification would strengthen the Agency’s capacity to monitor and enforce compliance with nuclear non-proliferation obligations, which would help the Agency to meet its key challenges. President Bush had called for the establishment of the committee in February 2004, in a groundbreaking speech at the National Defense University in Washington, DC. In the past, the Agency had evolved in response to emerging challenges. Revelations about Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme in the early 1990s had led to reforms strengthening the Agency’s capacity to monitor safeguards compliance and detect undeclared activities. Today’s proliferation challenges required further evolution, and the committee should play a key role in helping to bring it about. Her country was grateful to other Member States for their cooperation in establishing the committee and to the Chairperson of the Board for her efforts in bringing about a consensus on the issue. Her delegation welcomed the Director General’s endorsement of the committee and had taken note of his proposals regarding areas which the committee might address.

135. The most important work was still to come, however, and her delegation hoped that the Chairperson would begin informal consultations with the Secretariat and Board members soon, so that the committee might be convened with the minimum of delay.

136. Her delegation looked forward to working constructively with other delegations during those consultations and within the committee, in order to ensure that the safeguards system continued to serve the security needs of the international community.

(e) Other safeguards implementation issues (resumed)
(GOV/2005/33)

137. The CHAIRPERSON, summing up the discussion of the Director General’s report on “Strengthening Safeguards Implementation in States with Small Quantities Protocols” (SQPs), said that the Board welcomed the report.

138. The Board recognized that SQPs in their present form constituted a weakness in the safeguards system and that it must take a decision on ways to resolve that important issue in a timely manner.

139. The Board noted that the Director General had identified two possible options for addressing the issue.

140. It also noted that a number of members had indicated flexibility as regards eventually joining in a consensus on either of those two options, as proposed in document GOV/2005/33, following more in-depth consideration of the issue.

141. The Board requested the Secretariat to provide additional information on the implications of the two options, including the possible financial burden on the Agency and on Member States with SQPs in force, and in that context it welcomed the announcement by the Secretariat that it would be holding a seminar on the SQP issue early in September 2005.

142. The Board called on its Chairperson to continue open-ended consultations on the issue, utilizing the expertise of the Secretariat as appropriate, with a view to making a recommendation on a decision to the Board at its September 2005 meetings.

143. The Board decided to include the issue in the agenda for those meetings before the consideration of any new requests regarding the conclusion of safeguards agreements.

144. The Board agreed to remain seized of the issue until a final decision could be taken by it in a timely manner.

145. Mr. TAKASU (Japan) proposed the addition of the words “and outside experts” in the summing-up after “the expertise of the Secretariat”.

146. The DIRECTOR GENERAL, responding to the proposal made by the Governor from Japan, said that SQPs were a feature of safeguards implementation, which was the sole responsibility of the Secretariat. In his view, if technical expertise was required, it should be sought from within the Secretariat or from SAGSI.

147. Mr. TAKASU (Japan) proposed that his original proposal be amended to read “and, if necessary, outside experts”.

148. Mr. MINTY (South Africa) expressed concern regarding the implication of the summing-up that a country wishing to join the safeguards regime could not do so until after the issue of SQPs had been discussed at the September 2005 meetings of the Board. Countries — particularly developing ones — should be encouraged to join the safeguards regime — not discouraged by such a delay.

149. As regards the proposal made by the Governor from Japan, perhaps no reference to expertise was necessary in the summing-up.

150. The DIRECTOR GENERAL, responding to the first comment made by the Governor from South Africa, said that the SQP issue might be resolved in September. If it was not, the Agency had a legal responsibility to continue concluding safeguards agreements with requesting States.

151. With regard to the second proposal made by the Governor from Japan, he said that the Secretariat could always utilize the expertise of outside experts when necessary.

152. The CHAIRPERSON said that, in the light of what the Director General had just said, perhaps — as suggested by the Governor from South Africa — no reference to expertise was necessary in the summing-up.

153. She proposed, following interventions by Mr. NIEUWENHUYS (Belgium) and Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation), that the Board revert to the question of the summing-up later, after informal consultations.

154. It was so agreed.

7. Designation of members to serve on the Board in 2005–2006 (GOV/2005/34)

155. The CHAIRPERSON said that, in accordance with Article VI of the Statute, she had prepared a list of members proposed for designation to serve on the Board in 2005–2006. The members on the list were: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Japan, the Russian Federation, South Africa, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America.

156. She took it that the Board wished to designate the members on the list she had read out to serve on the Board in 2005–2006.

157. It was so decided.

158. Mr. MINTY (South Africa) said that his country remained committed to the objectives of the Agency.

159. The CHAIRPERSON took it that the Board wished to communicate its decision to the General Conference as indicated in document GOV/2005/34.

160. It was so agreed.

9. Provisional agenda for the forty-ninth (2005) regular session of the General Conference (GOV/2005/27 and Corr.1 and Add.1)

161. The CHAIRPERSON said that, under Rule 11 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Conference, the provisional agenda for the regular session of the General Conference was drawn up by the Director General in consultation with the Board. The provisional agenda for the forthcoming session of the General Conference was contained in documents GOV/2005/27 and Corr.1 and Add.1, and although its adoption was ultimately a matter for the General Conference itself, it usually acted on the recommendation of the General Committee of the Conference. Some items as well as annotations might need to be updated before the agenda was finally issued. The provisional agenda should be circulated not later than 90 days in advance of the session, that was 28 June 2005.

162. Mr. MINTY (South Africa), referring to document GOV/2005/27/Corr.1, which dealt with the inclusion of the item “Amendment to Article VI of the Statute”, said that the amendment in question had been approved by the General Conference — in resolution GC(43)/RES/19 — almost six years previously. At that time, many Member States had argued strongly in favour of the more equitable regional representation within the Board that the amendment’s entry into force would bring. His delegation would like to see more substantial progress being made towards the entry into force of the amendment.

163. Mr. NAQVI (Pakistan) expressed support for the statement made by the representative of South Africa.

164. Mr. CHO Chang-Beom (Republic of Korea), expressing support for the statement, said that Member States should follow through on resolutions in whose consensus adoption they had participated. His delegation hoped that the forthcoming session of the General Conference would lead to the entry into force of the amendment soon afterwards.

165. The CHAIRPERSON assumed that the Board wished to take note of the draft provisional agenda for the forty-ninth (2005) regular session of the General Conference contained in documents GOV/2005/27 and Corr.1 and Add.1, it being understood that the provisional agenda would be updated as necessary before it was finally issued as a General Conference document.

166. It was so decided.

10. Representation of other organizations at the forty-ninth (2005) regular session of the General Conference

GOV/2005/35

167. Mr. SCHELLER (Germany) said that in April 2005 three companies had established the International Source Suppliers and Producers Association (ISSPA) with headquarters in Vienna. Those three companies produced approximately 80% of the radioactive sources used in medicine, science and industry around the world. At the first regular ISSPA meeting, a further 12 companies had expressed an interest in joining that association.

168. Germany welcomed the founding of ISSPA and supported its request to be recognized as a non-governmental organization affiliated to the Agency and to be invited to sessions of the General Conference as an observer.

169. The CHAIRPERSON, having noted that the Secretariat would contact the German delegation regarding ISSPA's request, said she assumed that the Board wished to invite the intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations referred to in paragraphs 2, 4 and 5 of document GOV/2005/35 to be represented in an observer capacity at the forty-ninth (2005) regular session of the General Conference.

170. It was so decided.

6. Nuclear verification

(e) Other safeguards implementation issues (resumed) **(GOV/2005/33)**

171. The CHAIRPERSON said, with regard to her summing-up on the SQP issue, that it had been agreed in informal consultations that the sentence starting "The Board called on its Chairperson ..." would read as follows: "The Board called on its Chairperson to continue open-ended consultations on the issue, with a view to making a recommendation on a decision to the Board at its September 2005 meetings."

172. The DIRECTOR GENERAL said that the Secretariat was the sole technical advisor to the Board and its Chairperson.

173. The CHAIRPERSON took it that the Board accepted her summing-up with the sentence which she had just read out.

174. It was so decided.

175. The CHAIRPERSON thanked Ambassador Bylica of Poland for guiding the informal consultations.

11. Any other business

176. Mr. WRIGHT (United Kingdom) said that the subject of the future of nuclear power in his country had recently become the subject of lively debate there. In that connection, his Government had made clear its continued firm commitment to playing a leading role in efforts to tackle the causes of climate change. Nuclear power remained an option, but, as set out in a 2003 White Paper on energy, his Government's priority would continue to be the implementation of renewable energy sources and of other new technologies. Before any decision was taken on whether or not to build new nuclear power stations, the fullest public consultation would be undertaken and a further White Paper would be published.

177. Recently, at the Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) at Sellafield, a leak had occurred in a sealed cell used in the early stage of the process for separating out plutonium and uranium from spent fuel. The sealed cell was designed to cope with leaks of the kind in question, and the leaked material had been captured in the secondary containment. There had been no release to the environment and no exposure of workers. The leaked material had now been returned to the appropriate tanks, and the secondary containment was being cleaned up. The plant was in a safe and stable state, but it remained closed while options were being assessed. The United Kingdom's Health and Safety Executive was carrying out an investigation and would make its findings public in due course.

178. The recently established Nuclear Decommissioning Authority had assumed responsibility for the decommissioning and cleanup of the United Kingdom's civil nuclear legacy, the aim being to ensure that decommissioning and cleanup had a clear focus and were given high priority. The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority now had responsibility for the 20 nuclear sites previously operated by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority and British Nuclear Fuels Limited.

179. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was essential for combating the threat of nuclear terrorism, and his delegation hoped that there would be a large participation by Member States in the diplomatic conference taking place in July 2005 to consider and adopt proposed amendments to the CPPNM.

180. Mr. PROUDFOOT (Canada) said that the diplomatic conference just referred to by the Governor from the United Kingdom would represent the culmination of about six years of deliberations, conducted under the Agency's auspices, about amending the CPPNM — one of the 12 universal terrorism-related conventions currently in force. An amended CPPNM could significantly strengthen the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes and contribute to efforts to prevent the sabotage of nuclear facilities and to prevent nuclear trafficking.

181. An open-ended working group established by the Agency had reached a consensus on most of the proposed amendments, and since the group had produced its final report Austria, China and other countries had been endeavouring to formulate an overall amendment proposal for adoption by consensus at the diplomatic conference. A two-thirds majority of the States parties to the CPPNM would be required for adoption of the proposed amendments, so that the participation of all States parties was the best way to ensure a successful outcome of the diplomatic conference. His country hoped that all States parties would attend the diplomatic conference and support the adoption of an amended CPPNM.

182. An International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Energy for the 21st Century held in Paris in March 2005 had sent a strong and positive political message regarding the part which nuclear power could play in connection with important issues such as energy security and poverty reduction. The keynote speeches, panel discussions and national presentations by ministers had clearly demonstrated a renewed high-level interest in nuclear power, emphasizing the potential role of nuclear power in helping to meet — inter alia — the Millennium Development Goals and to address environmental challenges such as climate change. The Agency was to be commended for its part in organizing the Conference and the French Government for hosting it.

183. Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) said that his delegation welcomed the proposed amendments to the CPPNM, including an amendment, proposed by China, relating to the use of force and threats to use force against nuclear material and nuclear facilities being used for peaceful purposes. It hoped that the forthcoming diplomatic conference would be attended by the necessary number of States parties to the CPPNM and that the proposed amendments would be adopted by consensus.

184. He proposed that the International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability (INLEX) be requested to examine the relationship between the conventions on civil liability for nuclear damage and other legal instruments adopted under the auspices of the Agency.

185. He thanked Mr. Goldschmidt, Deputy Director General for Safeguards, for the valuable work done by him during the previous six years and wished him success in his future endeavours.

186. Mr. GLASS (United States of America), recalling the request made by the representative of his country at the Board's previous meeting that the text of the oral report on safeguards implementation in Iran given by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards at the meeting be made public, said that making such reports public was in line with Board practice. The Iran nuclear issue was a matter of international concern, and the international community had the right to know the latest developments regarding it. Past reports by the Director General that had been made public had been much longer and had contained much more detail, so he did not see why the text of Mr. Goldschmidt's oral report should not be made public, especially as numerous published articles clearly indicated that the text was already in the hands of some press organizations.

187. He urged all States parties to the CPPNM to attend the diplomatic conference due to be held in July 2005 to consider and adopt proposed amendments to that convention. Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States, there was international consensus on the need to strengthen the CPPNM, which covered the protection of nuclear material being used for peaceful purposes only during international transport and related storage. The proposed amendments would extend the physical protection obligations of States parties to cover such material also during domestic use, storage and transport and would help to protect such material, and nuclear facilities, from sabotage. In addition, they would provide for greater cooperation among States parties in physical protection matters and add new offences — such as sabotage and smuggling — to the existing criminal regime.

188. A two-thirds majority of the States parties to the CPPNM would be required for adoption of the proposed amendments, and the best way to ensure that successful conclusion was the participation of all States parties in the diplomatic conference.

189. Ms. STOKES (Australia) thanked Mr. Goldschmidt for the way in which he had led the Department of Safeguards during the past six years and wished him well for the future.

190. With regard to the forthcoming diplomatic conference to consider proposed amendments to the CPPNM, she said that her country too hoped that all States parties to the CPPNM would attend the conference and support the amendments which had been proposed.

191. Mr. MINTY (South Africa), having wished Mr. Goldschmidt well for the future, said that his country was still seriously concerned about the fact that the oral report given by Mr. Goldschmidt at the Board's previous meeting had been leaked to the media.

192. He was not trying to ensure that the information in such reports was restricted to Board members. However, Board members made statements in the Board in the light of such reports and, if the reports were made public, the Board members who had made statements might well request that their statements be made public also. They were entitled to do that, but there was a possibility that they would make statements not just for consideration within the Board but for a wider purpose.

193. The CHAIRPERSON said it was clear that the United States delegation's request that the text of Mr. Goldschmidt's oral report be made public did not have the full support of the Board.

194. Mr. SOLTANIEH (Islamic Republic of Iran)*, referring to the oral report given by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards at the Board's previous meeting, said that on several occasions his delegation had expressed the serious concern of the Iranian Government about the leaking of highly confidential information to the media. Also, there had been similar expressions of concern on the part of other Member States — particularly ones which were members of NAM.

195. Highly confidential technical information regarding a plutonium separation research project in Iran had been provided to one particular Board member. That had clearly facilitated the preparation of a detailed statement covering various issues — including the research project — dealt with in Mr. Goldschmidt's oral report, the text of which had been leaked to the Western media even before being given in the Board.

196. Still more discouraging was the fact that the report had contained conclusions, based on only partial quotations from communications of the AEOL, which had been arrived at before the completion of the analysis of discs that Iran had — in line with its policy of cooperation — sent to Vienna, and before technical discussions with the relevant Iranian scientists.

197. Before the oral report had been given, the Department of Safeguards had informed Iran that a team of Agency inspectors would be travelling to Tehran two weeks later for technical discussions on — inter alia — the results of the analysis of the discs. The conclusions regarding a sensitive technical matter presented in the oral report had therefore been premature, and confusion had been created not only among the general public but also — as had been observed the previous day — within the Board.

198. If all of the AEOL's communications and clarifications had been reviewed thoroughly and presented to the Board clearly, the reason for the misunderstanding about the date of the termination of plutonium production would have been obvious.

199. A clear distinction should be made between the date of termination of the plutonium separation research project and the dates of activities such as those relating to purification and waste management — activities which were not part of the research project and which any laboratory could carry out at a

later date. The AEOI had repeatedly told the Agency that the research project had been terminated in 1993 and that no more samples had been sent to the research reactor for irradiation for the purpose of plutonium production and subsequent separation. The AEOI's statements remained valid, as the other dates mentioned in the oral report were not connected to the process in question.

200. The Director General should make every effort to protect highly confidential information and to ensure that such information was not leaked to the media, and the Department of Safeguards should take account of the comments which he had just made regarding particularly complex technical issues of a sensitive nature when preparing future reports to the Board.

201. Mr. GOLDSCHMIDT (Deputy Director General for Safeguards) said that he had done his best to serve the cause of nuclear non-proliferation during his term as Deputy Director General for Safeguards and that in his view the Agency's safeguards system had never been so effective as it was now — for three main reasons.

202. Firstly, there had been a major increase in the number of States where the strengthened safeguards measures approved by the Board after the 1991 Gulf War were being implemented. Of particular importance was the fact that 40 of the 63 non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT with known significant nuclear activities now had an additional protocol in force, compared with two in 1998.

203. Secondly, there had been a revolution in the Agency's approach to safeguards — a shift in focus from nuclear material accountancy at the facility level to a State-level approach reflected in well-documented State evaluation reports which were regularly updated.

204. Thirdly, during the past ten years substantial progress had been made in improving safeguards through — inter alia — the acquisition of an expanded open source information analysis capability, the establishment of a satellite imagery analysis unit, the use of environmental swipe sampling to detect undeclared nuclear activities, the replacement of all analogue surveillance cameras by digital systems allowing the remote monitoring of data, the development of new digital seals and high-tech verification equipment, and the establishment in 2004 of a unit for supporting the analysis of trade in sensitive nuclear technologies (NUTRAN).

205. There was now broad recognition of the fact that the role and technical capabilities of the Agency's verification system were irreplaceable and should be further strengthened.

206. However, much remained to be done. Although some Member States were cooperating fully with the Agency and providing valuable information as expected in the light of Article VIII of the Statute, other States were less forthcoming.

207. Among the most important lessons learned by the Secretariat were that, depending on the circumstances, the Agency's ability to discover undeclared nuclear-related activities could be extremely limited and that it could be quite difficult for the Agency to determine whether previously undeclared nuclear activities had been carried out for exclusively peaceful applications.

208. It had become clear that, for the international community to obtain the greatest safeguards assurances, it was essential that States cooperate fully with the Agency and demonstrate adequate transparency with regard to their nuclear programmes. It was also essential that the Board be kept well informed about the extent to which States did so.

209. A question constantly on his mind was: Is the world safer now, from a nuclear proliferation perspective, than it was ten years ago? He did not think so. Could the world be made safer in the years to come? Probably, but only in a global environment where all States were deeply committed to fulfilling their non-proliferation undertakings, not only in word but also in deed.

210. The Agency had a unique role to play in deterring States from seeking nuclear weapons, but it depended on Member States providing the support and authority which it needed in order to play that role effectively. He hoped that Member States would draw on the lessons learned from the past and support the Agency accordingly, thereby reducing the likelihood of the occurrence of crises similar to those experienced in the past.

211. He had been most fortunate to work for the Agency as its Deputy Director General for Safeguards at a time of major changes and new challenges. He had done his best to address the challenges as objectively and constructively as possible. He was grateful to all those who had supported him, particularly his colleagues in the Department of Safeguards and other parts of the Secretariat, who had demonstrated admirable dedication and high professionalism and had extended their friendship to him.

212. His successor, Mr. Olli Heinonen, had already demonstrated his competence in all aspects of nuclear verification, and he was a born detective. With him, the safeguards system would be in good hands. He wished Mr. Heinonen great success in his future endeavours.

213. As to his own future, even from the outside he would continue to support the Agency in any way he could.

214. The CHAIRPERSON, speaking on behalf of the Board, said that Mr. Goldschmidt's contribution had been outstanding. He and the Department of Safeguards had risen to every challenge, carrying out extraordinarily well all the tasks given to them by the Board. The Board was profoundly grateful to him and wished him all the best for the future.

215. Mr. FABER (Luxembourg)*, speaking on behalf of the European Union, thanked Mr. Goldschmidt for the work done and the integrity and kindness demonstrated by him during the past six years and wished him and his family well for the future.

– Tributes

216. The CHAIRPERSON, bidding farewell to colleagues who were shortly leaving Vienna or had already left, said that Ambassador Grönberg of Finland, who had been in Vienna for almost seven years, had served as his country's Governor on the Board and proved himself a most skilful President of the General Conference in 2001.

217. Among the other Resident Representatives leaving were Ambassador Horváth of Hungary, Ambassador Hosseini of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ambassador Lindholm of Sweden and Ambassador Tavčiovski of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

218. Special mention should be made of Mr. Martti Mutru of the Permanent Mission of Finland, who had from 1975 to 1988 been a staff member of the Secretariat and subsequently scientific adviser at the Permanent Mission. His long institutional memory had been invaluable, not least to the Secretariat.

219. Several senior staff members of the Secretariat were also leaving. Mr. James Dargie, Director of the Joint FAO/IAEA Division of Nuclear Techniques in Food and Agriculture was leaving after 22 years. The Division had recently commemorated its 40th anniversary, and its continuing successes and the close cooperation between FAO and the Agency were very much due to the able work of Mr. Dargie.

220. Mr. Dirk Schriefer had served in senior positions in the Department of Safeguards for 22 years. He was soon leaving his position as Director of the Division of Safeguards Information Technology, having made a substantial contribution to the development of the Department's information technology.

221. Finally, Mr. Mark Gwozdecky, the Director of the Division of Public Information, had served the Agency at a time when it had frequently been in the news. He had played a substantial role in putting the Agency on the map for the public at large.

222. To all the persons mentioned she wished well for the future.

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.