IAEA Board of Governors Record of the 1137th Meeting GOV/OR.1137

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Nuclear Verification
(b) The conclusion of safeguards agreements and of additional protocols

Personal Matters



Board of Governors

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Record of the 1137th Meeting

Held at Headquarters, Vienna, on Tuesday, 20 September 2005, at 3.05 p.m..

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¹ GOV/2005/70 (Corrected).

Attendance

(The list below gives the name of the senior member of each delegation who attended the meeting, as well as that of any other member whose statement is summarized in this record.)

Ms. FEROUKHI Ms. CORTI Mr. BEVEN Mr. NIEUWENHUYS Mr. NIEUWENHUYS Mr. VINHAS Mr. PROUDFOOT Canada Mr. PROUDFOOT Canada Mr. PROUDFOOT Mr. CAO Shudong Mr. MOREJÓN-ALMEIDA Mr. SANDTNER Mr. SANDTNER Mr. SANDTNER Mr. RÓNAKY Mr. SHARMA Mr. MASCIA Mr. PARK Chul-Min Mr. MASCIA Mr. AMANO Mr. LEE Key-Cheol Mr. SAMBO Mr. ESPINOSA CANTELLANO Ms. COPPOOLSE Mr. SAMBO Mr. MIEWODNICZANSKI Mr. MIEWODNICZANSKI Mr. SAKJO Mr. KUCHINOV Mr. KUCHINOV Mr. GAFOOR Ms. ZIAKOVÁ Mr. MINTY Ms. KOLL Mr. POSHITHA PERERA Ms. MELIN Ms. HOUIDI LAMIA Mr. WRIGHT Mr. WRIGHT Mr. WALLER Mr. SARADEI Mr. SARADEI Mr. WALLER Mr. SARADEI Mr. WALLER Mr. SARICS Mr. GAFOOR Mr. GLASS Ms. GARCÍA de PÉREZ Mr. SARICS Mr. GAFOOR Mr. ELBARADEI Mr. WALLER Mr. WALLER Deputy Director General Deputy Director General, Department of Management Head, Office of Nuclear Security Secretary of the Board	Ms. HALL		Chairperson (Canada)
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Mr. ANING Secretary of the Board	Ms. NILSSON		
	Mr. ANING		Secretary of the Board

Representatives of the following Member States attended the meeting:

Bulgaria, Côte d'Ivoire, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Holy See, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malta, New Zealand, Norway, Romania, Syrian Arab Republic.

Abbreviations used in this record:

APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

EFTA European Free Trade Association

G8 Group of Eight

GRULAC Latin American and Caribbean Group

NAM Non-Aligned Movement

NEPAD New Partnership for Africa's Development

NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT Review Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation

Conference of Nuclear Weapons

NWFZ nuclear-weapon-free zone

Pelindaba Treaty African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

R&D research and development

SQP small quantities protocol

SSAC State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material

VIC Vienna International Centre

^{*} Speakers under Rule 50 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure are indicated by an asterisk.

6. Nuclear verification

(a) Strengthening safeguards implementation in States with small quantities protocols (continued)

- 1. Mr. PROUDFOOT (Canada) said that, in his country's view, the Board now had sufficient information for an informed decision on the SQP issue and should decide during its current session to approve only modified SQPs in the future and to authorize the Director General to enter into discussions with those States for which SQPs had been approved (SQP States) on modifying their SQPs.
- 2. His country hoped that the Secretariat would implement modified SQPs systematically, establishing priorities on the basis of State-level analyses. It also hoped that the Secretariat would, on request, assist SQP States with the implementation of their safeguards agreements.
- 3. Mr. CAO Shudong (China), having thanked the Ambassador of Poland for his efforts, said that of the two options which had been set out by the Secretariat in document GOV/2005/33 the modification option described in paragraph 7 of that document both addressed the Secretariat's concerns and took account of the actual situation of SQP States, and it was therefore preferable. China hoped that, when implementing safeguards in SQP States, the Secretariat would be objective and that it would avoid imposing additional burdens on those States and on itself. He also hoped that, assistance would be provided to SQP States in resolving safeguards implementation issues.
- 4. Mr. GLASS (United States of America), having commended the Director General for identifying SQPs as a weakness in the safeguards regime, expressed the hope that a decision addressing that weakness would be taken during the current session of the Board.
- 5. Either of the solutions proposed by the Secretariat would be acceptable to his delegation, which understood, however, that many countries would prefer that SQPs be modified rather than eliminated. Modified SQPs would minimize the impact of safeguards on States without significant nuclear activities and encourage the conclusion of comprehensive safeguards agreements.
- 6. Mr. POSHITHA PERERA (Sri Lanka), having thanked the Ambassador of Poland for his efforts, said that the Board ought now to be in a position to decide which of the two options described in document GOV/2005/33 was preferable. In his delegations view, the Board should request the Secretariat to make every effort to assist SQP States in achieving a smooth transition and to ensure that the financial burden on SQP States was minimal.
- 7. Mr. BEVEN (Australia) said that his country had strongly endorsed the rationale for the introduction of SQPs and shared the Director General's hope that the Board would resolve the SQP issue at its current session. The objective of reducing the burden of safeguards on SQP States was a good one, but it should be achieved in a way which did not undermine the efforts being made to strengthen safeguards. There was a need to arrive at an appropriate balance between the reasonable desire of SQP States to avoid unnecessary burdens and the interest of the international community in having an effective safeguards system.
- 8. The problem was that, when a state claimed SQP status, the Agency had no process for verifying the validity of the claim; in effect, it simply accepted the claim something which was clearly inconsistent with the strengthening of safeguards.

- 9. In Australia's view, notwithstanding the suspension of most safeguards procedures by SQPs, the Agency still had a right to confirm the validity of a claim to SQP status through inspections, if necessary if it had reason to believe that the State in question had nuclear material in quantities exceeding the prescribed limits or had nuclear material in a facility.
- 10. The conclusion of an additional protocol went a long way towards redressing the deficiencies arising out of the present SQP text, and Australia would therefore like to see all SQP States concluding an additional protocol. Also, it hoped that all prospective SQP States would conclude one.
- 11. Australia was in favour of modifying the present SQP text, and his delegation could go along with the Secretariat's modification proposal. If it was generally felt that the proposal should be refined, his delegation would like to participate in the necessary consultations.
- 12. Ms. KOLL (South Africa), noting that most SQP States were developing countries, said that her delegation, while recognizing the weaknesses of the present SQP text, believed that, if the text were modified, the Agency should provide those SQP States with assistance so as to enable them to implement the resulting additional measures. Under no circumstances should an unnecessary burden be placed on those SQP States. If additional funding proved to be necessary, it should not be obtained through the diversion of financial resources from the Agency's technical cooperation programmes.
- 13. The introduction of additional measures might be a lengthy process, and in his delegation's view the Secretariat should currently be concentrating on reaching out to those States party to the NPT which had not yet concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency.
- 14. Mr. LEE Key-Cheol (Republic of Korea), having thanked the Ambassador of Poland for his efforts, said that his delegation was pleased that there appeared to be a broad consensus in favour of the modification option described in paragraph 7 of document GOV/2005/33.
- 15. Although most of the concerns raised by various Member States had been resolved in a satisfactory manner, SQP States had some lingering concerns about the difficulties which the implementation of modified SQPs would entail and were calling for Agency assistance with for example the establishment of SSACs. His delegation hoped that the necessary assistance would be provided.
- 16. Mr. KUCHINOV (Russian Federation), having thanked the Secretariat for organizing a seminar on the SQP issue and having commended the efforts of Ambassador Bylica of Poland, said that, as there were currently 90 SQP States, an appropriate Board decision on the SQP issue would greatly help to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system.
- 17. Naturally, all modifications of the present SQP text would have to comply with the norms of international law; in other words, they would have to be agreed to by both parties to each SQP. Accordingly, his delegation did not expect the Board decision to produce quick results; quite a lot of time would be needed for implementation of the decision. Nevertheless, a first step should be taken now without it there would be no subsequent steps.
- 18. In advocating the taking of a first step, his delegation had noted the Secretariat's view that modification of the present SQP text would not lead to an appreciable increase in safeguards activities and would therefore have no financial consequences.
- 19. Ms. CORTI (Argentina), having thanked the Secretariat for the seminar on the SQP issue which it had organized, said that her country continued to believe that the Agency must have the capacity to provide safeguards assurances in respect of all States. It was therefore in favour of modifying the present SQP text with a view to eliminating the deficiencies relating to, in particular, the submission of initial declarations about holdings of nuclear material and the provision of facility design information

as soon as a decision had been taken to construct a facility or authorization had been granted for the construction of a facility — whichever came first.

- 20. That having been said, the decision ultimately taken should not lead to an increase in costs either for the Agency or for individual States. In that connection, her delegation was grateful for the information regarding costs provided by the Secretariat during the aforementioned seminar. Also, it understood that the resulting verification activities would not be carried out in a mechanistic manner.
- 21. Perhaps the Secretariat could report to the Board regularly and in some detail on the impact of the implementation of the second option described in document GOV/2005/33, indicating any differences in the verification efforts needed as between States with and without additional protocols in force.
- 22. Mr. VINHAS (Brazil), having thanked the Secretariat for organizing a seminar on the SQP issue and having thanked the Ambassador of Poland for his efforts, said that the explanations which had been provided by the Secretariat regarding the need to take action on the SQP issue were technically sound.
- 23. In Brazil's view, however, it was important to have a precise assessment of the financial implications of the options described in document GOV/2005/33. During the aforementioned seminar, the Secretariat had stated that implementation of the second option would have no effect on the overall safeguards budget. While appreciating how difficult it was for the Secretariat to come up with precise figures, his delegation would like something more precise than that statement. For example, had the Secretariat taken account of possible savings resulting from the implementation of integrated safeguards? If so, it would be useful to receive information about the savings achieved by the Department of Safeguards in recent years, about the Department's real financial needs and about the ability of the Department to absorb new activities within existing resources.
- 24. Moreover, the need for an appropriate balance among the Agency's various statutory activities should be borne in mind as should the significant budget increase for safeguards which had been approved two years previously.
- 25. In his country's view, it would be a mistake to establish a rule that, in order to arrive at safeguards conclusions for States with SQPs, the Agency must carry out verification activities regularly in such States. Furthermore, his country believed that the Agency's safeguards conclusions for SQP States should continue to be based on the analysis of information.
- 26. That having been said, his delegation was prepared to join a consensus in favour of the option described in paragraph 7 of document GOV/2004/33.
- 27. Ms. BRIDGE (New Zealand)*, having thanked the Ambassador of Poland for his efforts, said that SQPs had been appropriate in the early 1970s, when they had first been offered and when New Zealand had concluded its own SQP. Since then, however, the international environment had changed dramatically, and there had been significant advances in nuclear technology, which had become more easily accessible.
- 28. New Zealand could accept either of the options described in document GOV/2005/33, but many Member States appeared to favour the modification option. Her country would have no problem if the Board accepted that option during its current session.
- 29. However, her delegation remained mindful of the burden which implementation of that option might place on small States including States in New Zealand's part of the world which were not represented in Vienna. It therefore looked forward to the training and assistance necessary during the initial phase of implementation being provided to those States.

- 30. <u>The CHAIRPERSON</u>, summing up, said that the Board had recalled the Director General's report on strengthening safeguards implementation in States with SQPs contained in document GOV/2005/33.
- 31. The Board had also recalled its June 2005 conclusion that SQPs in their present form constituted a weakness in the safeguards system and that it must take a decision on means to resolve what was an important issue in a timely manner.
- 32. The Board had noted that the Director General had identified two possible options for addressing the issue and had welcomed the useful recent seminar at which the Secretariat had covered, in depth, the technical, legal, administrative and financial aspects of the implementation of both options.
- 33. The Board had welcomed the report by the Ambassador of Poland one of its Vice-Chairpersons on the open-ended consultations which he had held on the issue on behalf of its Chairperson pursuant to a request made of him by the Board at its June 2005 meetings.
- 34. The Board had noted the Vice-Chairperson's recommendation, based on those consultations, that the Board approve the option outlined by the Director General in paragraph 7 of document GOV/2005/33.
- 35. The Board had decided that SQPs should remain part of the Agency's safeguards system, subject to the modifications in the standardized text and the change in the SQP criteria referred to in paragraph 7 of document GOV/2005/33.
- 36. The Board had decided that, henceforth, it would approve only SQP texts which were based on the revised standardized text set out in Annex 3 to document GOV/2005/33 and were in conformity with the modified criteria spelled out in paragraph 7 of document GOV/2005/33.
- 37. The Board had authorized the Director General to conclude with each State with an SQP an exchange of letters giving effect to the revised standardized text and the modified criteria as contemplated in paragraph 7 of document GOV/2005/33.
- 38. The Board had, at the same time, called on the States concerned to conclude such exchanges of letters as soon as possible.
- 39. The Board had noted, on the basis of information provided by the Secretariat, that there would be no significant financial implications for the Secretariat or Member States resulting from the Board's decision on the issue.
- 40. The Board had requested the Secretariat to assist States with SQPs, including States not members of the Agency, through available resources, in the establishment and maintenance of SSACs.
- 41. The Board had requested the Director General to report to it at its June 2006 session on the progress made.
- 42. The Chairperson's summing-up was accepted.

(b) The conclusion of safeguards agreements and of additional protocols (GOV/2005/52, GOV/2005/72, GOV/2005/73 and GOV/2005/74)

43. <u>The CHAIRPERSON</u> said that the Board had before it, in document GOV/2003/73, a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Republic of Botswana in connection with the NPT. Also before the Board were three additional protocols — in document GOV/2005/52 one to be concluded with the Republic of Singapore, in document GOV/2005/72 one to be concluded with the

Kingdom of Thailand and in document GOV/2005/74 one to be concluded with the Republic of Botswana.

- 44. Mr. RAJA ADNAN (Malaysia)*, speaking on behalf of NAM, said that NAM had noted the decision of the Governments of Singapore and Thailand to conclude additional protocols to their respective NPT safeguards agreements.
- 45. Mr. AMANO (Japan), welcoming the comprehensive safeguards agreement with Botswana which was before the Board for approval, thanked the Director General and his colleagues in the Secretariat for their efforts to help universalize comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. He urged those Member States which had still to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements to conclude one as soon as possible and urged the Secretariat to develop an action plan for achieving the conclusion of such agreements by all State Parties to the NPT within a specific period of time.
- 46. Welcoming the additional protocols to be concluded with Botswana, Thailand and Singapore, he said that in the opinion of his country, which was one of the strongest supporters of the universalization of additional protocols, implementation of those three additional protocols would further increase the transparency of the nuclear activities of the States in question. Japan hoped that the additional protocols would enter into force soon, followed by the establishment of the required internal arrangements.
- 47. His country was firmly committed to maintaining the momentum towards the universalization of additional protocols through the "Friends of the Additional Protocol" and similar initiatives.
- 48. Mr. PROUDFOOT, welcoming the additional protocols proposed for Singapore and Thailand and the comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol proposed for Botswana, called on all States which had not yet concluded additional protocols to conclude one, a comprehensive safeguards agreement together with an additional protocol being the current verification standard.
- 49. His delegation was pleased that, as indicated in the Director General's introductory statement, the Agency had been able to conclude that all nuclear material in Canada remained in peaceful nuclear activities. The Agency's conclusion demonstrated the value of additional protocols. It had been reached thanks to transparent cooperation between his Government, Canadian nuclear operators and the Agency.
- 50. Canada, which was committed to continuing to cooperate transparently with the Agency in the interests of effective and efficient safeguards, would like to see all other States cooperating with the Agency in a transparent manner.
- 51. Mr. BEVEN (Australia) welcomed the comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol proposed for Botswana. Welcoming the additional protocols proposed for Singapore and Thailand, he pointed out that both countries were members of the South East Asia and the Pacific group, of which Australia was also a member. States that concluded additional protocols were to be congratulated on joining the global network of States where strengthened safeguards could be implemented.
- 52. Welcoming the fact that, as stated by the Director General on Monday, the Secretariat had been able to reach all the conclusions needed for the implementation of integrated safeguards in Canada, he said that integrated safeguards were essential for ensuring that the Agency's safeguards system was both effective and efficient. The fact that such safeguards could not be introduced without an additional protocol underscored the importance of additional protocols as the contemporary safeguards standard.

- 53. Mr. PARK Chul-Min (Republic of Korea), welcoming the decision of Botswana to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol and the decisions of Singapore and Thailand to conclude an additional protocol, said that additional protocols should be promoted as a universally applicable norm to help strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the Agency's safeguards system, which were currently faced with unprecedented challenges.
- 54. His country would like to see all States which had not yet concluded an additional protocol concluding one promptly.
- 55. Mr. GLASS (United States of America) welcomed the comprehensive safeguards agreement and the additional protocol to be concluded with Botswana and the additional protocols to be concluded with Singapore and Thailand and urged those States to bring them into force as soon as possible.
- 56. His Government had stressed the importance of the conclusion of such agreements and protocols in a number of international settings, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum, and, in November 2004, APEC ministers had agreed that all APEC member countries which that had not yet done so would endeavour to sign an additional protocol by the end of 2005. His delegation hoped that the example of Singapore would be followed by the other APEC member countries. They should not hesitate to take advantage of offers of assistance from the United States, the G8, the Agency and others in implementing the additional protocols concluded by them.
- 57. Ms. ŽIAKOVÁ (Slovakia), welcoming the comprehensive safeguards agreement and the additional protocol to be concluded with Botswana and the additional protocols to be concluded with Singapore and Thailand, expressed strong support for enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system through the conclusion of such agreements and protocols.
- 58. Ms. KOLL (South Africa), welcoming the comprehensive safeguards agreement and the additional protocol to be concluded with Botswana and the additional protocols to be concluded with Singapore and Thailand, said that all States Parties to the NPT which had not yet fulfilled their legal obligation to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency should conclude one.
- 59. It should be borne in mind that additional protocols enabled the Agency to provide the necessary assurances that nuclear capabilities were being used exclusively for peaceful purposes, which was particularly important in the case of countries with access to advanced technology that could be used in the development of nuclear weapons.
- 60. The <u>CHAIRPERSON</u>, summing up, said that the Board had expressed strong support for the Agency's efforts to promote the conclusion of outstanding comprehensive safeguards agreements. It had expressed the view that States parties to safeguards agreements which had not yet done so should conclude and bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible.
- 61. Some members had emphasized the importance of the universality of the application of comprehensive safeguards.
- 62. She assumed that the Board wished to take the action recommended in document GOV/2005/73 and authorize the Director General to conclude with the Government of the Republic of Botswana, and subsequently implement, the safeguards agreement that was the subject of that document.
- 63. It was so decided.
- 64. The <u>CHAIRPERSON</u> assumed that the Board wished to take the action recommended in document GOV/2005/52 and authorize the Director General to conclude with the Government of the

Republic of Singapore, and subsequently implement, the additional protocol that was the subject of that document.

- 65. It was so decided.
- 66. The <u>CHAIRPERSON</u> assumed that the Board wished to take the action recommended in document GOV/2005/72 and authorize the Director General to conclude with the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand, and subsequently implement, the additional protocol that was the subject of that document.
- 67. It was so decided.
- 68. The <u>CHAIRPERSON</u> assumed that the Board wished to take the action recommended in document GOV/2005/74 and authorize the Director General to conclude with the Government of the Republic of Botswana, and subsequently implement, the additional protocol that was the subject of that document.
- 69. It was so decided.

7. Other matters arising from the forth-seventh (2003) and the forty-eighth (2004) regular sessions of the General Conference

- (a) Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East (GOV/2005/53)
- 70. Mr. AMANO (Japan) said that the issue of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East was an impediment to peace and security in that region. Japan had therefore supported the United Nations General Assembly resolutions regarding the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. As all countries in that region should, in Japan's view, participate in the NPT process as non-nuclear-weapon States, it was essential to continue requesting Israel to accede to the NPT and conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency.
- 71. The Middle East peace process was the key to security in the region, and it was therefore important to encourage parties such as Israel and Palestine to continue their efforts to move the process forward.
- 72. Mr. GLASS (United States of America) said that it remained important to fully address the concerns of all parties in the Middle East about ensuring that nuclear programmes in that region were exclusively for peaceful purposes. His delegation hoped that once again it would be possible, through constructive efforts on the part of all concerned, to achieve consensus at the General Conference's forthcoming session on the resolution pertaining to IAEA safeguards in the Middle East. It was only through patient negotiation and confidence-building that the difficult challenges in the Middle East could be successfully addressed.
- 73. Mr. KUCHINOV (Russian Federation) expressed regret that the Director General had been unable to make progress in the exercise of his mandate regarding the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East. The application of full-scope safeguards in all States of the region was of key importance in the ongoing efforts to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East.

His delegation would like to see the Director General continuing his consultations with Middle East States in that regard.

- 74. The Russian Federation greatly appreciated the Director General's efforts to convene a forum in which participants from the Middle East could learn from the experience gained in confidence-building through the establishment of NWFZs in other regions.
- 75. <u>Ms. KOLL</u> (South Africa) expressed appreciation of the Director General's efforts to bring about an agreement among Middle East States on an NWFZ tailored to their needs.
- 76. South Africa considered the establishment of NWFZs as envisaged in Article VII of the NPT to be an integral part of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. It was therefore bitterly disappointed that the States of the Middle East had been unable to agree even on a draft agenda for a forum designed to encourage the establishment of an NWFZ in their region. It would like to see all States concerned entering into serious discussions and demonstrating a commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation within the NPT framework.
- 77. South Africa would also like to see Israel acceding to the NPT and placing all its nuclear facilities under full-scope Agency safeguards without delay.
- 78. Her country, as a party to the Pelindaba Treaty, stood ready to share its experience of how an NWFZ could strengthen security and stability and ultimately further social and economic development.
- 79. <u>Ms. FEROUKHI</u> (Algeria) said that her country continued to advocate nuclear non-proliferation and was therefore a supporter of the Agency's safeguards regime and universal application of the NPT.
- 80. All States in the Middle East region should place all their nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards. Most if not all Arab States had already done so, and the majority including Algeria were preparing to conclude an additional protocol.
- 81. Algeria, which was committed to the establishment of an NWFZ that would promote peace and security in the Middle Ease, hoped that the Director General would continue his efforts to bring about the application of full-scope Agency safeguards in every State in the region without exception and to convene a forum on confidence-building measures conducive to the creation of such an NWFZ.
- 82. Mr. RAMZY (Egypt)* said that the Director General was to be commended on his efforts to implement General Conference resolutions aimed at the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East. His delegation was concerned, however, at the continuing lack of tangible progress due to the determination of one State in the region to delay its accession to the NPT and accept international monitoring of its advanced nuclear programme.
- 83. Given the international consensus on the desirability of an NWFZ in the Middle East, Egypt had repeatedly expressed its willingness to join in any practical measures leading to the establishment of an NWFZ in that region and had regularly submitted a draft resolution on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East to the General Conference. Egypt, which believed that the material obligations referred to in paragraph 12 of document GOV/2005/53 should constitute the basis of an NWFZ in the Middle East, greatly appreciated the Director General's efforts to convene an international forum on the experience of regions with NWFZs. However, such a forum should focus on developing practical procedures for the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East and should not be confined to theoretical analyses of the advantages of having an NWFZ.

- 84. There was an urgent need for a serious reaffirmation of the non-proliferation philosophy, especially following the setbacks at the 2005 NPT Review Conference due to double standards and the failure of the nuclear-weapon States to honour the commitments which they had entered into at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Adopting a selective approach and concentrating on specific countries and issues while turning a blind eye to important matters such as the universality of the NPT and the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East undermined the credibility of the NPT regime as a whole.
- 85. The Director General and Member States should make determined efforts, in response to the relevant General Conference resolutions, to promote the universality of the NPT and the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East.
- 86. Mr. KHADDOUR (Syrian Arab Republic)* said that the conclusion of comprehensive safeguards agreements by all States of the Middle East was particularly important for security in that region and for building confidence in the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
- 87. For a number of years the United Nations General Assembly had been adopting, without a vote, resolutions in support of the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East. As to the General Conference, in resolution GC(48)/RES/16 it had affirmed "the urgent need for all States in the Middle East to forthwith accept the application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all their nuclear activities as an important confidence-building measure among all States in the region and as a step in enhancing peace and security in the context of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ)". However, Israel continued to be the only State in the Middle East that had not acceded to the NPT and accepted full-scope Agency safeguards, thereby challenging the global non-proliferation regime and threatening peace and stability in the Middle East.
- 88. As a member of the Security Council, the Syrian Arab Republic had late in 2003 submitted a draft resolution in which the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction was called for. That draft resolution was still to be debated. However, in view of the importance of ridding the Middle East of all such weapons, and particularly nuclear weapons, it was essential, now more than ever, that Israel accede to the NPT and place all its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards.
- 89. Mr. HOSSEINI (Islamic Republic of Iran)*, endorsing the statements made by the representatives of Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic, said that Israel's refusal to accede to the NPT and accept comprehensive Agency safeguards constituted a serious threat to peace and stability in the Middle East. It was particularly regrettable that Israel's illegal nuclear activities were being conducted with the collaboration of a certain nuclear-weapon State.
- 90. His country would like to see the Director General intensifying his efforts to bring about the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East.
- 91. Mr. MICHAELI (Israel)* said that his country continued to be of the view that the issue of establishing an NWFZ in the Middle East could not be addressed in isolation from consideration of the regional situation and the regional peace process. Israel was committed to achieving peace, stability and security in the Middle East and to the vision of a region free of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. However, progress towards that vision could not be made without a dramatic and permanent change in the relationships between the States and peoples in the region, and especially in the attitude of States, non-State actors and peoples towards Israel.
- 92. Given the number of States which had been found to be in breach of their commitments vis-àvis the Agency, there was a great need for confidence-building in the Middle East. In that context, Israel considered that the envisaged forum should be convened on the basis of the terms of reference

which had been agreed upon more than a year previously — and which, regrettably, had been rejected by others. Israel was still ready to participate in a forum convened on the basis of those terms of reference.

- 93. The issue of making the Middle East an NWFZ should be addressed within the framework of an arms control and regional security dialogue resumed in the context of the multilateral peace process. That was reflected in the Roadmap, which called for a resumption of the work of the Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security when Phase II of the Roadmap was reached.
- 94. His country hoped that the draft resolution relating to the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East likely to be before the General Conference at its forthcoming session would be adopted by consensus. It should be borne in mind, however, that the notion of the Middle East as a zone free from weapons of mass destruction embraced not only nuclear issues but also issues unconnected with the Agency. That meant that the Agency's role in the establishment of such a zone would be small. There was no substitute for direct negotiations and agreement among all the States of the Middle East.
- 95. The <u>CHAIRPERSON</u>, summing up, said that several members had expressed the view that inadequate progress had been made with regard to the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East pursuant to the relevant General Conference and General Assembly resolutions and that priority should be accorded to achieving that objective and to facilitating the implementation of the Director General's mandate in that regard.
- 96. A number of States had called on Israel to accede to the NPT and conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency.
- 97. Support had been expressed for the Director General's efforts mandated at the forty-fourth regular session of the General Conference to convene a forum on experiences relevant to the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East, and it was hoped that such a forum would produce tangible results leading towards the establishment of such a zone. The view that the forum should not be considered a forum for negotiations had been expressed.
- 98. The view that the establishment of an NWFZ could not be achieved in isolation but only as an integral part of a comprehensive regional peace settlement had also been expressed.
- 99. She assumed that the Board wished to take note of the Director General's report contained in document GOV/2005/53-GC(49)/18, which would be before the General Conference pursuant to the request made of the Director General in resolution GC(48)/RES/16.
- 100. It was so decided.

(b) Personnel matters

- (i) Staffing of the Agency's Secretariat (GOV/2005/54)
- (ii) Women in the Secretariat (GOV/2005/55)
- 101. The <u>CHAIRPERSON</u>, introducing the agenda sub-items, invited Ms. Nilsson, the Agency's Focal Point for Gender Concerns, to give a brief account of developments regarding the issue of women in the Secretariat.
- 102. <u>Ms NILSSON</u> (Head, Office of Nuclear Security), said that, in recruiting its staff, the Secretariat had to secure employees of the highest standards of efficiency, technical competence and integrity. In that context, every effort had been made to recruit more women for Professional posts. As a result, as

the report in document GOV/2005/55 showed, the representation of women in the Professional categories now exceeded 20%, and the share of women at the D-level and above had increased from 11.8% to 14.6%.

- 103. The Secretariat had implemented a variety of measures designed to help rectify the gender imbalance. For example, it had, upon request and subject to the availability of resources, carried out recruitment missions, was interacting more closely with other organizations within the United Nations system on gender issues and had established a network with points of contact in Member States. Furthermore, it had continued its efforts to create a family-friendly work environment for example, by making the option to work part-time available also to Professional staff, by creating an arrangement whereby staff might work from home and by continuing to support the child care centre at the VIC.
- 104. However, the Secretariat still had a long way to go towards achieving the United Nations goal of gender parity. Despite everything it had done, there had not been a sufficient increase in the number of well qualified female applicants, which was vital for increasing the share of women staff.
- 105. Earlier in 2005, the Secretariat had endeavoured to significantly enhance its outreach to well qualified women, requesting Member States to designate points of contact in support of its efforts to recruit women. To date, 28 Member States had designated points of contact and two points of contact meetings had been held. The points of contact had been requested to assist the Secretariat with, for example, the compilation of a list of institutions in Member States from which suitably qualified women candidates could be drawn. Those institutions, and others, would receive information about vacancies on a regular basis.
- 106. Cooperation with Member States was essential for improving the gender balance and ultimately achieving gender parity. The Secretariat could not win the battle without the support of Member States, which should all designate points of contact and cooperate with the Secretariat in pursuing what was a very worthy goal.
- 107. Mr. SHARMA (India), speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, said that the Group had noted the continuing efforts of the Secretariat to improve its recruitment practices with a view to increasing in posts at the Professional and higher levels the number of women and the number of persons from developing Member States and other unrepresented and under-represented Member States. However, it was concerned that the representation of developing Member States at those levels had decreased since 2003. The Secretariat should increase its efforts.
- 108. The Group hoped that the meetings of points of contact for the recruitment of women would produce positive results.
- 109. <u>Ms. ESPINOSA CANTELLANO</u> (Mexico), speaking on behalf of GRULAC, expressed appreciation for the Secretariat's efforts to address the problem of the under-representation of women, especially women from developing countries, at the Professional and higher levels. The Secretariat's task was a difficult one, requiring continuous liaison with universities and other relevant institutions in Member States.
- 110. The Member States of the United Nations had committed themselves to taking measures designed to improve the situation of women throughout the world, and the General Assembly had committed itself to pursuing, within the United Nations system, the aim of equal representation of men and women in the Professional and higher categories. In the report contained in document GOV/2005/55, however, it was stated that "While the percentage of women in the Professional and higher categories has continued to increase, it has not done so to the degree desired." The designation of points of contacts was a step forward, but it was not enough.

- 111. The Secretariat should examine the possibility of using Regular Budget resources for the financing of fellowships which would enable young women in developing countries to take part in Agency activities and for the promotion of the Agency by staff members during technical missions to Member States.
- 112. Mr. WRIGHT (United Kingdom), speaking on behalf of the European Union, said that the acceding countries Bulgaria and Romania, the candidate countries Croatia and Turkey, the countries of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro, the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway members of the European Economic Area and Moldova and Ukraine associated themselves with the statement which he was about to make.
- 113. The European Union, which attached great importance to the issue of the representation of women in the Professional and higher categories, acknowledged the measures being taken to rectify the gender imbalance within the Secretariat. At the same time, it believed that further measures were needed, and it would like to see faster progress being made despite factors such as the relatively small number of women professionals working in the nuclear field and the difficulties associated with the relocation of families for example, the shortage of jobs for spouses. Clearly, much remained to be done by the Secretariat with the active support of Member States.
- 114. The European Union, which welcomed the target set by the Secretariat of achieving 25% female representation by 2007, attached special importance to better outreach to young professionals, and even to undergraduates at technical universities, in different parts of the world. In its view, the points of contact designated by Member States could assist the Secretariat in among other things identifying institutions in Member States from which suitably qualified candidates could be drawn. It hoped that many more Member States would designate points of contact and that, through joint efforts, further progress would be made, so that the Director General would in 2007 be in a position to report a significant improvement in the situation.
- 115. Ms. MOHAMMED (Ethiopia)*, speaking on behalf of the African Group, expressed appreciation for the Secretariat's efforts to implement General Conference resolutions on staffing and the representation of women. The African Group welcomed the special attention being paid to applications received from developing Member States and the fact that between 1 July 2003 and 1 May 2005 the representation of Africa at the Professional levels had increased. However, there were still African Member States not represented at the higher Professional levels.
- 116. Regarding the gender balance, the Secretariat should, taking account of competence, do all it could to reduce the disparity between the number of posts held by women and that of posts held by men at the senior level. In that regard, all Member States should encourage women to apply for senior-level posts in the Secretariat.
- 117. Mr. AMANO (Japan) said that it was important to properly address the problem of the non-representation and under-representation of certain countries in the Secretariat a problem identified by the General Conference at its forty-fifth regular session. The Secretariat should present a detailed description of the actions which it proposed to take.
- 118. Tackling the problem of the under-representation of Japan in international organizations was a high priority for his Government. Japan was still the most seriously under-represented Member State in the Agency's Secretariat, accounting for only about 3% of the Professional and higher-level staff, and a substantial improvement was necessary given Japan's continuing support for the Agency. His country would, as in past, do its best to put forward well qualified candidates.

- 119. Regarding the under-representation of women, his delegation welcomed the Secretariat's efforts to rectify the gender imbalance.
- 120. Mr. BEVEN (Australia) said that his delegation welcomed the positive trend in the recruitment of well qualified persons from developing countries and the progress, albeit very limited, made with regard to the representation of women in the Professional and higher categories.
- 121. Given the Agency's unique scientific and technical nature, further success in the recruitment of suitably qualified women professionals depended to a large extent on the development and implementation of strategies actively supported by both the Secretariat and Member States. For its part, Australia had identified 42 institutions from which suitably qualified female candidates might be attracted, and it was currently establishing a network of contact points at those institutions to assist in the dissemination of information on employment opportunities within the Agency's Secretariat.
- 122. The Secretariat could in his delegation's view do more to contact the many well qualified women in the world who, for various reasons, were not aware of the employment possibilities which it offered. It should devote more effort to 'self-promotion', in particular by capitalizing to a greater extent on the high international profile which it currently had. Also, it should develop closer links with potential feeder organizations and institutions links which would ultimately not need to depend on national points of contact.
- 123. It appeared that the Junior Professional Officer programme, funded voluntarily by individual Member States, had primarily benefited developed countries. His delegation would favour the use of Regular Budget funds in support of such a programme designed to provide opportunities for women from developing countries.
- 124. Mr. PROUDFOOT (Canada) expressed concern at the fact that, despite the resolutions on 'Women in the Secretariat' adopted by the General Conference, the Agency continued to rank last within the United Nations system as regards the percentage of posts at the Professional and higher levels held by women.
- 125. The recent steps taken by the Secretariat to raise awareness of the issue among Member States and encourage them to take proactive measures were welcome, but the primary responsibility rested with the Secretariat, which should provide leadership. Also, the Secretariat should examine its recruitment and staffing practices with a view to ascertaining whether they created unintended barriers to women.
- 126. Canada would continue to support the efforts of the Secretariat by providing assistance where possible.
- 127. Mr. POSHITHA PERERA (Sri Lanka) said that the gender imbalance at the Professional and higher levels remained particularly pronounced within the Agency's Secretariat. The Secretariat and Member States should continue their joint efforts to reduce it.
- 128. His delegation, which welcomed the Secretariat's efforts to increase the number of female Professional staff members, believed that the designation of points of contact for the recruitment of women in Member States and the holding of regular meetings to review the female employment situation would prove to be useful.
- 129. At a recent meeting of points of contact, constructive proposals had been made regarding the Junior Professional Officer programme and fellowships. As financial restraints were preventing developing Member States from benefiting from the Junior Professional Officer programme, his delegation believed that the Board should authorize the Secretariat to seek resources for financing such

programmes designed for women from developing countries and to increase the number of fellowships awarded to women from developing countries.

- 130. Ms. COPPOOLSE (Netherlands) commended the Secretariat for the measures it had already taken to increase the representation of women at the higher levels and for demonstrating awareness of circumstances that might deter women from seeking employment at those levels. At the same time, she suggested that the Secretariat develop a policy for helping the partners of staff members to find employment locally and look into whether measures over and above those already taken by it were necessary.
- 131. Although the increase from 18.4% to 20.1% in the representation of women at the higher levels was small, it should not be trivialized, given the very limited availability worldwide of women with technical experience in the nuclear field, That having been said, if an agreement were reached on a target of 25%, to be achieved over a period of two years, much more would have to be done. The Netherlands stood ready to help. Such a target was rather ambitious, however, and quality should not be sacrificed to it. Sacrificing quality would not benefit either the Agency or the women serving in its Secretariat.
- 132. Her delegation would like to see all Member States designating points of contact capable of working with the Secretariat in its efforts to achieve a better gender balance.
- 133. Mr. AWAIS (Pakistan) said that the Secretariat was to be commended for its efforts to improve the situation as regards the recruitment of staff members from developing countries. However, the percentage of Professional and higher-category staff from developing countries had decreased during the previous two years.
- 134. There were a number of over-represented Member States, whose candidates were repeatedly selected despite the availability of equally qualified candidates from under-represented Member States. Certain senior-level posts had consistently been filled by applicants from the same country or, at best, had been rotated among applicants from a small number of countries. It was hard to believe that no suitable candidates from other countries had ever applied for those posts.
- 135. Pakistan had made substantial progress in the nuclear field and had a relatively large programme for the peaceful application of nuclear technologies. That could not have been achieved without suitably qualified and experienced individuals. Over the previous 20 years, Pakistan had put forward over 150 suitable candidates for various posts within the Secretariat, but only 13 had been selected. The situation was similar for many other developing countries, and the Secretariat should take immediate steps to rectify it.
- 136. Mr. PARK Chul-Min (Republic of Korea) said that the large number of positions which would become vacant during the next seven years owing to retirement and the staff rotation policy would pose a major challenge to the Secretariat, but it would also provide an opportunity for reinvigoration.
- 137. His country attached great importance to the Agency's securing staff of the highest standards of technical competence and integrity. When recruiting, however, the Secretariat should also give due consideration to the contributions of Member States and to the need for a fair geographical representation.
- 138. While appreciating the Secretariat's recent efforts to recruit more women, his delegation was disappointed that the Agency still had by far the lowest representation of women in the United Nations system. The Secretariat should consult extensively with Member States and make greater use of internships and fellowships in tapping the reserves of qualified women.

- 139. The high staff turnover within the Secretariat should be used for reducing the gender and geographical imbalances, particularly at the senior and policy-making levels, and the Secretariat should further improve its recruitment process and do more to encourage well qualified candidates in under-represented countries to apply for vacant posts.
- 140. Ms. KOLL (South Africa) said that her country welcomed the positive development in recruitment to posts subject to geographical distribution. It also welcomed the periodic forecasts of vacancies, which gave Member States ample time to identify well qualified candidates.
- 141. Her delegation, which had noted with appreciation the increase in the number of African staff members, hoped that, through the active participation of Member States in the recruitment process, the widest possible geographical distribution of staff and the highest standards of staff efficiency, technical competence and integrity would be achieved.
- 142. The Secretariat was to be commended for its efforts to achieve an equal representation of men and women in Professional and managerial categories. Her delegation remained concerned, however, that the Agency had the lowest representation of women at the Professional and higher levels within the United Nations system. It was essential that the Division of Personnel continue consulting with Member States on how to encourage well qualified women to apply for Secretariat posts.
- 143. South Africa welcomed the Junior Professional Officer programme and the financial support being provided through the Agency's technical cooperation programmes for training at the World Nuclear University.
- 144. South Africa was proud of its own record in furthering gender equality, which was high on its political agenda. In 2005, for the second time, the South African Minister of Science and Technology had presented the country's Women in Science award for outstanding achievements of women in science and engineering. In years to come, South Africa would be able to draw on a large pool of female experts.
- 145. Likewise, Africa as a whole had made gender equality a high priority. In 2004, the African Union had adopted the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa and established a Commission for Gender Equality, one aim being equal access to education opportunities. Also, NEPAD was helping to mainstream women in all development and other projects.
- 146. Ms. FEROUKHI (Algeria) said that the efforts being made by the Secretariat to achieve greater gender equality at the Professional and higher levels were commendable but should be intensified.
- 147. The Secretariat should approach more scientific institutions in Member States with a view to encouraging the submission of job applications by qualified women, and sufficient financial resources for the Secretariat's outreach efforts should be made available from the Regular Budget.
- 148. Her country, which welcomed the establishment of national points of contact for promoting the participation of women in R&D, believed that the initiative should be evaluated with a view to increasing its effectiveness.
- 149. The Junior Professional Officer programme opened up new prospects for women, but much remained to be done. Member States in a position to do so should increase their contributions in support of the programme.
- 150. Mr. GLASS (United States of America), said that his delegation, which was supporting the Secretariat efforts aimed at an appropriate representation of women in the Professional grades, was pleased that the Secretariat had established a robust programme for increasing the number of qualified female staff members in those grades.

- 151. However, the recruitment programme had not been as effective as expected. In an effort to make it more effective, the Secretariat had requested Member States to be more active in putting forward well qualified candidates. His country, which welcomed the Secretariat's approach, would establish points of contact for facilitating the recruitment of women.
- 152. His delegation, which had noted that the Agency's Recruitment and Staff Development Section had no recruitment budget, believed that the Secretariat should support its own recruitment plan by providing that section with financial resources for use in the recruitment of women. The provision of such resources would enable the Secretariat to run a more active recruitment campaign and show that the Secretariat was willing to do everything necessary in order to achieve its female recruitment goal.
- 153. As regards the overall representation of Member States, his delegation would like future reports on the staffing of the Secretariat to identify those geographical regions which were under-represented and to state the number of posts by which each region was under-represented.
- 154. Ms. BRIDGE (New Zealand)*, expressing concern over the low number of Professional and higher-category posts in the Secretariat held by women, said she hoped that the recently designated points of contact in Member States would help to improve the situation. While appreciating the actions that the Secretariat was already taking, her delegation would like it to be even more proactive.
- 155. New Zealand would support the allocation of Regular Budget resources for a proactive programme designed to increase the number of women professionals in the Secretariat. Such a programme could include the provision of more fellowships for young women who might later consider employment in the Secretariat.
- 156. Mr. JOHANSEN (Norway)* said that his country, which considered the representation of women in the Secretariat to be an important issue, welcomed the efforts reflected in the report contained in document GOV/2005/55. However, a lot more should be done to improve the gender balance at the Professional and higher-category levels. It was several years since the General Conference had adopted its first resolution on women in the Secretariat, and the progress made since then had been modest. Member States had a role to play, but the Secretariat should consider itself the principal motor in the further implementation of the Agency's gender balance policy and be still more proactive.
- 157. Ms. NILSSON (Head, Office of Nuclear Security) said that she was pleased by the signs of an increasing awareness among Member States of the importance of gender issues within the Secretariat. Those issues would continue to be addressed, along parallel tracks responding to short-term and long-term needs.
- 158. The Secretariat, which had informally set ambitious short-term targets, believed that they would be attained only if there was a close interaction with Member States.
- 159. Having analysed its recruitment and selection processes, it hoped that its programme for reaching out to points of contact in Member States would increase the number of institutions from which it could recruit well qualified women.
- 160. As regards the long term, the Secretariat hoped that the Junior Professional Officer programme and similar initiatives would prove useful.
- 161. Mr. WALLER (Deputy Director General for Management) said that the Agency was one of the most highly scientific and technical organizations within the United Nations system, so it should be no surprise that the number of female professionals in the Agency's Secretariat was so low.

- 162. The Secretariat was endeavouring to improve matters, but the Recruitment and Staff Development Section with only five Professionals was too small to maintain all the necessary contacts with ministries and other institutions in Member States. Occasional recruitment missions were arranged and staff members sometimes engaged in recruitment efforts during duty travel to Member States, but that was not enough.
- 163. The Secretariat gave special consideration to female candidates in cases where they and the male candidates had comparable qualifications. However, there were not enough well qualified female candidates.
- 164. The Secretariat, which had been encouraged by the meetings held with the designated points of contact for Member States, had been interested to learn from the Ambassador of Australia that her country had identified 42 institutions from which suitably qualified female candidates might be attracted. It would be contacting those institutions and sending them vacancy notices.
- 165. In the long term, it was important to get more women of high school and university age interested in science and technology, including nuclear science and technology. In the medium term, measures such as the awarding of internships and fellowships and the Junior Professional Officer programme would help. In the short term, however, Member States must help by identifying suitable candidates for Secretariat posts.
- 166. The informal target of 25% female representation at the Professional and higher levels within two years was very ambitious. Attaining it would require an increase of 39 in the number of women at those levels. However, the target was worth striving for, and with the help of Member States considerable progress could be made.
- 167. The CHAIRPERSON said that she would sum up at the following meeting.

8. Personnel matters: Amendment to the Staff Regulations (GOV/2005/56)

- 168. The <u>CHAIRPERSON</u> said that document GOV/2005/56 contained a proposed amendment to the Staff Regulations necessitated by a decision of the International Civil Service Commission to establish an entitlement to paternity leave for implementation throughout the United Nations common system.
- 169. She assumed that the Board wished to take the action recommended in document GOV/2005/56 and approve the amendment to Staff Regulation 7.04 set out in the Annex to that document.
- 170. It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 5.35 p.m.