

IAEA Board of Governors

Record of the 1145th Meeting
GOV/OR.1145

Nuclear Verification
(b) Other safeguards implementation issues

Board of Governors

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Record of the 1145th Meeting

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¹ GOV/2005/88.

Attendance

(The list below gives the name of the senior member of each delegation who attended the meeting, as well as that of any other member whose statement is summarized in this record.)

Mr. AMANO	Chairman (Japan)
Ms. FEROUKHI	Algeria
Ms. KELLY	Argentina
Ms. STOKES	Australia
Mr. GAISENAK	Belarus
Mr. NIEUWENHUYS	Belgium
Mr. VIEIRA DE SOUZA	Brazil
Ms. GERVAIS-VIDRICAIRE	Canada
Mr. WU Hailong	China
Mr. SERRANO CADENA	Colombia
Ms. GOICOCHEA ESTENOZ	Cuba
Mr. MOREJÓN-ALMEIDA	Ecuador
Mr. RAMZY	Egypt
Mr. CARON	France
Mr. HONSOWITZ	Germany
Mr. BEKOE	Ghana
Mr. SOTIROPOULOS	Greece
Mr. SHARMA	India
Mr. INKIRIWANG	Indonesia
Mr. SUMI	Japan
Mr. CHO Chang-Beom	Korea, Republic of
Mr. ALOBIDI	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
Mr. AAS	Norway
Mr. SENNFELT	Portugal
Mr. BERDENNIKOV	Russian Federation
Mr. GAFOOR	Singapore
Mr. TURNER	Slovakia
Mr. PETRIČ	Slovenia
Mr. MINTY	South Africa
Ms. WIJEWARDANE	Sri Lanka
Ms. MELIN	Sweden
Mr. GHANEM	Syrian Arab Republic
Mr. WRIGHT	} United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Mr. JENKINS	
Mr. SCHULTE	United States of America
Ms. GARCÍA de PÉREZ	Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of
Mr. SHARAF	Yemen
Mr. ELBARADEI	Director General
Mr. ANING	Secretary of the Board

Representatives of the following Member States attended the meeting:

Albania, Angola, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Georgia, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia and Montenegro, Spain, Sudan, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Vietnam, Zimbabwe.

Abbreviations used in this record:

AFRA	African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ARCAL	Cooperation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean
CPF	Country Programme Framework
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EU	European Union
GTRI	Global Threat Reduction Initiative
HEU	high-enriched uranium
LEU	low-enriched uranium
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NPCs	national participation costs
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PACT	Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy
PCMF	Programme Cycle Management Framework
R&D	research and development
SIT	sterile insect technique
TACC	Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee
TCF	Technical Cooperation Fund

* Speakers under Rule 50 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure are indicated by an asterisk.

– Opening of the meeting

1. The CHAIRPERSON welcomed all participants, especially the new Governors (Mr. Gaisenak of Belarus, Ms. Gervais-Vidricaire of Canada and Mr. Alobidi of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) and the new Resident Representatives (Mr. Amehou of Benin, Mr. Dilberović of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ms. Goicochea Estenoz of Cuba and Mr. Seisay of Sierra Leone).

– Adoption of the agenda (GOV/2005/81/Rev.1)

2. The CHAIRPERSON suggested that, as no new safeguards agreements or additional protocols had been submitted for the Board's consideration, item 3(a) of the revised provisional agenda contained in document GOV/2005/81/Rev.1 should be deleted.

3. She took it that the Board wished to adopt the agenda as amended.

4. The agenda was adopted.

1. Introductory statement by the Director General

5. The DIRECTOR GENERAL said that the TACC had recommended that the Board should approve a number of modifications to the Agency's proposed technical cooperation programme for 2006. The focus of technical cooperation programme management continued to be the achievement of meaningful and sustained benefits for recipient Member States, in line with national needs and priorities. Following a year-long change initiative to enhance technical cooperation structures and processes, the Agency was moving towards what it hoped would be a period of stability, marked by the efficient delivery of a high-quality programme.

6. He welcomed the decision of the Committee to recommend that the Board should synchronize the regular programme and technical cooperation programme cycles. That recommendation was consistent with the one-house approach to programmes and to management which he had been promoting. It would help with coordination among departments in planning, formulating and assessing programme performance. It would also ensure that all programme activities reflected Member States' priorities and help improve the Agency's impact, effectiveness and efficiency. He recommended that the Board adopt the Committee's proposal.

7. The Agency's role as an independent, objective verification body remained central to the effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. However, the extent of the Agency's authority remained uneven from country to country. On the whole, 2005 had been a good year in terms of States concluding comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. However, it was important

to continue and accelerate that trend. Since the Board's preceding meeting, the safeguards agreement for Niger had entered into force and additional protocols had been signed with Belarus and Malaysia.

8. The Agency had not performed any verification activities in the DPRK since December 2002 and could therefore provide no assurances about the DPRK's nuclear activities since that time. It continued to follow with interest the six-party talks, which aimed to achieve a comprehensive settlement on the Korean peninsula. He expressed the hope that those efforts would, inter alia, lead to the DPRK's return to the non-proliferation regime, and that the Agency would be given the authority required to provide credible, comprehensive assurances regarding the nuclear programme in the DPRK. The Secretariat stood ready to contribute to that process.

9. The report before the Board in document GOV/2005/87 on the implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran provided an update on that issue. The Agency was continuing its efforts to clarify the nature and extent of the country's nuclear programme.

10. Iran had provided additional documentation, permitted interviews with relevant individuals, and allowed further access. He welcomed those actions and the Agency was currently assessing the results of this additional information. He urged Iran to respond positively and without delay to the Agency's remaining questions related to uranium enrichment, and to the additional transparency measures it had requested which were indispensable if the Agency were to clarify remaining outstanding issues, in particular the scope and chronology of Iran's centrifuge enrichment programme. Clarification of those issues was overdue after three years of intensive verification efforts. The Agency would continue its investigation of those and other issues, in order to be in a position to provide the required assurance about the peaceful nature of the programme. He would continue to report to the Board, as appropriate.

11. The Agency continued to monitor installations related to Iran's enrichment programmes and had not observed any deviation from Iran's voluntary suspension of enrichment activities. Iran had continued to conduct uranium conversion activities at its Esfahan facility. The Agency had been verifying that activity, and all UF₆ produced so far at the facility remained under Agency containment and surveillance.

12. He expressed the hope that every effort would be made to resume the dialogue between Iran and all parties concerned, with a view to achieving a comprehensive solution that addressed, inter alia, both Iran's concerns about its right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the concerns of the international community about the peaceful nature of those activities. He still believed that robust verification by the Agency, combined with active dialogue among all parties concerned, was the best way to move forward.

13. The Advisory Committee on Safeguards and Verification within the Framework of the IAEA Statute had held its first meeting earlier that month. The Secretariat had informed the Committee of the areas where it believed the safeguards system could be strengthened. He hoped that, in time, the Committee would be able to consider all ways and means of strengthening the system, and would be in a position to recommend concrete measures to the Board.

14. In October 2005, the Russian Federation had become the 36th country to ratify the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. The 2nd review meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention would be held in May 2006. The Convention still had only a limited number of Parties, despite the fact that almost all States possessed radioactive waste: wide-ranging adherence to the Convention would be of clear benefit to the safety and security of all States. The Secretariat intended to organize a series of regional workshops to encourage more States to adhere to the Convention.

2. Technical cooperation: Report of the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee (GOV/2005/85)

15. Mr. MINTY (South Africa) said that his country was strongly committed to the Agency's technical cooperation activities, particularly those which helped developing countries — especially in Africa — to meet their sustainable development goals. He called upon the Agency to identify elements within the technical cooperation programme which could be harmonized with the development goals of NEPAD and the Millennium Development Goals. Partnerships with the relevant United Nations bodies remained an important goal. South Africa was appreciative of the Agency's efforts to establish thematic clusters of activities to support NEPAD's goals. Technical cooperation activities contributed to common efforts to defeat poverty and underdevelopment. Those issues were also closely linked to international security.

16. Mr. CARON (France) said that his country's financial support and contributions of expertise and fellowship and training opportunities testified to its commitment to the technical cooperation programme. In order to increase the value and effectiveness of the programme, the Secretariat should continue its efforts to implement it in a more balanced manner and set priorities. He noted with interest that an evaluation of knowledge management activities was planned for the coming year.

17. France recognized the importance of adequate financing for technical cooperation. It regularly paid its contributions to the TCF and urged other Member States to do the same. Member States had a shared responsibility for the financing of technical cooperation.

18. Technical cooperation provided nuclear medicine, agricultural, industrial and scientific applications for many countries which had no nuclear power programme. France had made a substantial contribution to the financing of footnote-a/ projects for African Member States in 2005. It would continue to support Model Projects in particular, such as those on malaria control in Africa using the SIT and on cancer control, through AFRA. He congratulated the countries of Latin America on the recent entry into force of the ARCAL agreement, which his country also supported financially.

19. Drawing attention to the project to convert the core of the Polish Maria research reactor, which contributed to the goals of non-proliferation and nuclear security and was linked to the GTRI, he pointed out that France had been supplying low-enriched fuel for the Pitesti research reactor in Romania under the technical cooperation programme since the preceding year.

20. Finally, welcomed the consensus which had been reached on harmonization of the technical cooperation and regular programme cycles, although the two cycles were driven by different criteria.

21. Mr. INKIRIWANG (Indonesia) proposed adding the following sentence at the end of paragraph 5 in Annex 3 of the report: "A Member State proposed that secondary standard dosimetry laboratories should be taken into account in the implementation of PACT".

22. Ms. MELIN (Sweden) welcomed the changes in the planning and approval phases of the Programme Cycle Management Framework. Her country was willing to join the consensus on the harmonization of the technical cooperation programme cycle with the regular programme cycle. She shared the concerns expressed by other delegations concerning Member States' failure to pay their full share of the TCF, which implied that they did not fully appreciate the importance of the technical cooperation programme. However, the NPC mechanism had enabled 278 out of 295 new projects for 2005 to begin. Sweden consistently pledged and paid its full share of the TCF and called upon all other Member States to do likewise.

23. Mr. AAS (Norway) said that his country was impressed by the Agency's restructuring of the technical cooperation programme and by the use of planning tools such as CPFs. The Agency

maintained a dialogue with central authorities in Member States and contributed to development through nuclear technology transfer in areas of national priority. The CPF mechanism should be integrated into national development strategies as the Agency's technical cooperation activities were vital in meeting the economic and social needs of developing countries.

24. The Agency was not listed as a development agency by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, despite the impact of its activities on sustainable development. It was a challenge for the Agency to make its contribution to the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals more visible, which would enable it to mobilize more resources from bilateral donors and multilateral financial institutions.

25. The CHAIRMAN, referring to the proposal made by the representative of Indonesia, said that the Board could not rewrite the report of the TACC, but his statement would be taken into account in implementing PACT. Turning to Annex 1 of document GOV/2005/85 on the proposed technical cooperation programme for 2006, he took it that, as recommended by the TACC, the Board wished to take the actions set out in paragraph 15.

26. It was so decided.

27. The CHAIRMAN, turning to Annex 2 of document GOV/2005/85, took it that, as recommended by the TACC, the Board agreed to approve the synchronization of the regular programme and technical cooperation programme cycles by introducing a three-year technical cooperation programme cycle for the years 2009-2011, thereby synchronizing the programmes as of 2012.

28. It was so decided.

29. The CHAIRMAN, turning to Annex 3 of document GOV/2005/85, took it that, as recommended by the TACC, the Board wished to take note of the Secretariat's report on its evaluation activities in 2005 contained in document GOV/INF/2005/14 and the proposed work plan for 2006.

30. It was so decided.

31. The CHAIRMAN then took it that the Board wished to adopt the TACC's report, contained in document GOV/2005/85, as a whole.

32. It was so decided.

33. The CHAIRMAN thanked Ms. Sandra Collett of the Permanent Mission of Australia for serving as Rapporteur of the Committee, and the Mission for having made her services available.

3. Nuclear verification

(a) Report by the Director General on the implementation of safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

34. The CHAIRMAN recalled that, in his introductory statement, the Director General had brought the Board up to date regarding the status of the Agency's safeguards activities in the DPRK.

35. Mr. WU Hailong (China) said that the fourth round of six-party talks had reached an important milestone by achieving consensus on the overall objective of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and by issuing the first joint statement since the talks had begun, thereby demonstrating the

political will of the parties involved to solve the problem peacefully through dialogue. Building upon that achievement, the first phase of the fifth round of talks had taken place in Beijing from 9 to 11 November 2005. The parties had explored ways and means of implementing the joint statement in an earnest and pragmatic manner and had put forward views and ideas.

36. In a chairman's statement issued after the talks, the parties had reiterated that they would fully implement the joint statement in line with the principle of matching commitment for commitment and action for action, so as to realize the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula at an early date and contribute to lasting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in North-East Asia. The parties had emphasized that they were willing comprehensively to implement the joint statement through confidence building, to fulfil all commitments, to commence and conclude the process in a timely and coordinated manner, and to achieve a balance of interests and a win-win result. Furthermore, the parties had agreed to formulate concrete plans, measures and steps to implement the joint statement, and to hold the second phase of the fifth round as soon as possible.

37. In the next phase, the parties would discuss further how to implement the substantive aspects of the joint statement and the talks might face even more complexities and difficulties. China was confident that, as long as the parties continued to approach the talks in a constructive spirit, follow the principle of commitment for commitment and action for action, and earnestly fulfil their political commitments, talks would move forward step by step. China would continue to play a constructive role and work together with the other parties concerned and the international community with a view to achieving the early denuclearization of, and peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

38. Mr. CHO Chang-Beom (Republic of Korea) said that, since the Board's most recent discussions of the issue, diplomatic efforts had continued to accelerate a negotiated comprehensive solution to the DPRK nuclear issue in the context of the six-party talks process.

39. As his own country had emphasized on various occasions, the most important task ahead was the full implementation of the commitments all parties had made through the joint statement issued at the end of the fourth round of talks. It was not possible to overemphasize the critical importance of the implementation of the DPRK's commitment to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes and to return at an early date to the NPT and Agency safeguards. The DPRK's commitment to dismantlement and the other parties' commitment to corresponding measures should be faithfully implemented in a timely and coordinated manner. The Republic of Korea earnestly hoped that the next phase of the fifth round of talks would take place at the earliest possible date and would accelerate agreement on implementation of the joint statement.

40. The peaceful and diplomatic resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue at an early date would have a significant bearing on the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the security of the Korean Peninsula and beyond, and was an earnest hope not only of the parties to the talks but also of the entire international community. The Republic of Korea was confident that all members of the international community would give their continued support and cooperation to facilitate achievement of the common goal of a comprehensive negotiated solution to that critically important issue.

41. His country welcomed the outcome of the discussion of the issue at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit meeting held in Busan the preceding week. The chairman's statement issued after that meeting welcomed the recent positive developments in the six-party talks and encouraged further substantial progress in those talks, in particular the faithful implementation — in line with the principle of commitment for commitment and action for action — of the joint statement unanimously adopted at the fourth round.

42. He noted with appreciation the readiness of the Director General and the Secretariat to contribute to the talks process, and that the Director General had expressed the hope that the Agency

would be given the authority required to provide credible, comprehensive assurances regarding the nuclear programme in the DPRK. The Agency's role was central to the resolution of the issue and the Republic of Korea trusted that the Agency would continue to make available its valuable support and advice, based on its verification expertise, to facilitate the success of the talks. The Director General should keep the Board informed of any further developments.

43. Mr. WRIGHT (United Kingdom), speaking on behalf of the European Union, said the EU welcomed the fact that a further round of six-party talks had taken place since the IAEA General Conference and stood ready to support the process in an appropriate manner. The EU had noted with particular interest the commitments announced in the joint statement of 19 September 2005 and looked forward to their early implementation and to the establishment of effective verification arrangements, in which the Agency could play a useful role. It was particularly appreciative of the role China had played as an initiator of the process and in chairing each of the five rounds of talks that had taken place.

44. Mr. MINTY (South Africa), noting that the continuation of the six-party talks at the earliest opportunity was of the utmost importance to secure long-lasting peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, welcomed the fact that all parties to the talks had declared their willingness comprehensively to implement the joint statement. South Africa called upon the parties to strive for early action to fulfil their commitments. It was of the utmost importance that the DPRK return to the NPT and place its nuclear facilities and material under full Agency safeguards, and that it completely and verifiably dismantle any nuclear weapons programme.

45. Mr. SUMI (Japan) welcomed the fact that, at the first phase of the fifth round of the six-party talks, the parties had put forward proposals on how to implement the joint statement agreed on at the fourth round. The DPRK's nuclear weapons and nuclear programmes were a direct threat to peace and stability in North-East Asia, including Japan, and a serious challenge to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The commitments made by the DPRK in the joint statement, specifically its commitment to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes and return at an early date to the NPT and Agency safeguards, and its commitment to observe and implement the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, provided an important ground for achieving the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

46. It was now essential to achieve concrete agreement on the details of verification measures and procedures for the prompt realization of the verifiable dismantlement of all nuclear weapons and nuclear programmes by the DPRK. In that regard, the Agency had an essential verification role to play. Japan hoped that the DPRK would comply with all international agreements related to nuclear issues, including the NPT, and implement completely and swiftly its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency.

47. The second phase of the fifth round of talks should be held at the earliest possible date, and the parties should negotiate in a thorough and detailed manner so that concrete results could be achieved with respect to how the joint statement should to be implemented. Japan, together with other partners, would continue to make every effort through the six-party talks and other diplomatic endeavours.

48. Ms. GERVAIS-VIDRICAIRE (Canada) said that, though her country recognized that the process of taking concrete steps towards implementation of the joint statement commitments would be difficult, it found it regrettable that more progress had not been achieved during the first phase of the fifth round of the six-party talks. Canada remained deeply concerned by the DPRK's nuclear activities and lack of NPT safeguards in that country. The DPRK's declaration in February 2005 that it possessed nuclear weapons had compounded that concern. Canada welcomed the DPRK's agreement, in the joint statement, to dismantle its nuclear weapons and all existing nuclear programmes and

looked forward to seeing it follow through on that commitment in a verifiable fashion. As a first step towards implementation of the joint statement commitments, it expected to see the DPRK reaffirm its status as an NPT State Party and comply fully with its NPT safeguards agreement.

49. Ms. STOKES (Australia) said that the DPRK's nuclear programme posed a serious challenge to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. The six-party talks were the best way for the DPRK to build international confidence in its commitment to denuclearization and normalize its relations with the international community. Australia welcomed the valuable efforts of the other five participants in the process. She strongly urged the DPRK to work towards speedy implementation of its joint statement commitments, most notably the abandonment of all nuclear weapons, a return to the NPT and the fulfilment of its Agency safeguards obligations. The Australian Government had informed the DPRK that it would not move forward with bilateral relations without real progress by the DPRK towards verifiably dismantling its nuclear programmes. It was important that progress be made on the key issues of disclosure, verification and sequencing. To that end, and in accordance with the principle of action for action, Australia stood ready to contribute to any assistance package negotiated through the six-party talks, including through energy assistance, bilateral development assistance and safeguards expertise.

50. Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) said that the chairman's statement following the first phase of the fifth round of the six-party talks showed the willingness of the participants to work towards enhancing mutual confidence and fulfilling all commitments in a timely and coordinated manner, striving for a balance of interests and a win-win result. His country would continue to work in close coordination with other participants in the six-party talks process to prepare a package of specific proposals which could facilitate full implementation of the joint statement agreed on at the fourth round. The Russian Federation counted on the successful continuation of the six-party process. Furthermore, the Agency should play a key role in verifying nuclear activities in the DPRK.

51. Mr. SCHULTE (United States of America) said that the proof of the DPRK's intent would be its readiness to move forward rapidly to implement the joint statement without preconditions. Unfortunately, that country continued to operate facilities related to its nuclear weapons programmes. The continued production of fissile material, including the operation of the 5 MW reactor at Nyongbyon, was inconsistent with the object and purpose of the joint statement and of the six-party talks.

52. Under the joint statement, all elements of the DPRK's past and present nuclear programmes and all nuclear weapons were to be comprehensively declared and completely, verifiably and irreversibly eliminated, and were not to be reconstituted in the future. In return, the parties had offered security assurances, had agreed to promote economic cooperation in energy, trade and investment, and had offered steps towards normalization consistent with their bilateral policies. It was essential that the DPRK make concrete progress towards implementing its commitments and that it move rapidly with the other parties to implement the goals outlined in the joint statement.

53. The DPRK had asserted that it had the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In the joint statement, the other parties had agreed to discuss, at an appropriate time, the subject of the provision of a light-water reactor to the DPRK. The United States had made it clear that the appropriate time for such a discussion would come only after the DPRK had promptly eliminated all nuclear weapons and all nuclear programmes, after that elimination had been verified to the satisfaction of all parties including the IAEA, after the DPRK had come into full compliance with the NPT and Agency safeguards, after the DPRK had demonstrated a sustained commitment to cooperation and transparency, and after the DPRK had ceased proliferating nuclear technology.

54. As the Board well knew, the international community continued to have serious concerns over the DPRK's nuclear programme. Any transfer of nuclear material, or testing of a nuclear weapon or longer-range missile, would undermine the basis for the settlement that it was hoped would be achieved through the six-party talks. While the nuclear issue was critical, the DPRK would also have to address other issues that divided it from the international community. It would also have to abandon criminal activities such as currency counterfeiting and smuggling, illicit financial transfers and efforts to earn revenue through weapons proliferation and narcotics trafficking, if it was to receive the benefits of normalized relations and the economic assistance its people so desperately needed.

55. The full implementation of Agency safeguards would be an important part of any permanent resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue. The United States knew that the Agency would be prepared to resume that role. The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula continued to be a regional and global priority, and the DPRK had to realize that the pursuit of nuclear weapons had not made it more secure and that it had to end its nuclear programmes.

56. The United States looked forward to the continuation of the six-party talks with a view to the peaceful resolution of the problem. It was also essential to move rapidly to implement the goals outlined in the joint statement. His country would work with all parties, including the DPRK, to achieve the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all the DPRK's nuclear weapons and nuclear programmes. It wanted to DPRK to join it and the other parties in building a peaceful, stable future for North-East Asia.

57. Mr. GAFOOR (Singapore) said that his country remained concerned that the Agency had been unable to provide any assurances about the DPRK's nuclear activities since 2002. It was encouraged by the progress made in the six-party talks, which provided the basis for resolving the issue peacefully and achieving the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Singapore urged the DPRK to work within the six-party framework, return to the non-proliferation regime and provide credible, comprehensive assurances regarding its nuclear programme.

58. The CHAIRMAN, summing up the discussion, said that several members had regarded the DPRK nuclear issue as a serious challenge to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and had urged the DPRK to dismantle completely any nuclear weapons programme in a prompt, transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner. Concern had been expressed that the DPRK had not permitted any Agency verification activities since December 2002 and that the Agency was thus still not in a position to provide any assurances about nuclear material and activities in the DPRK. The Board had emphasized the importance of continued dialogue to achieve a peaceful and comprehensive resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue.

59. Recalling the joint statement of the fourth round of six-party talks in which, inter alia, the DPRK had expressed its commitment to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes and returning at an early date to the NPT and to Agency safeguards, the Board had welcomed the fact that, at the first session of the fifth round of the six-party talks, held in Beijing from 9 to 11 November 2005, the parties had conducted serious, pragmatic and constructive discussions and had agreed to formulate concrete plans, measures and steps to fulfil the joint statement in accordance with the spirit expressed in the chairman's statement. The Board had also noted that the joint statement called for the implementation of the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The Board had looked forward to the holding of the second session of the fifth round of six-party talks at the earliest possible date and to the early implementation of all the commitments contained in the joint statement.

60. The Board had expressed appreciation for the efforts of the participants in the six-party talks, in particular China which had chaired the talks, and had expressed the view that a successfully negotiated

settlement of that longstanding issue, maintaining the Agency's essential verification role, would be a significant accomplishment for international peace and security. It had also requested the Director General to keep it informed of future developments.

61. He took it that his summing-up was agreeable to the Board.

62. The Chairman's summing-up was accepted.

(b) Other safeguards implementation issues
(GOV/2005/87)

63. Ms. HUSSAIN (Malaysia)*, speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, stressed the basic and inalienable right of all Member States to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes without any discrimination and in conformity with their respective legal obligations. She also reaffirmed that Member States' choices and decisions in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and their fuel cycle policies had to be respected.

64. NAM reiterated its principled position that non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology should be addressed in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner and that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It was also deeply concerned over the slow pace of progress towards nuclear disarmament, which remained its highest priority.

65. A clear distinction had to be made between the legal obligations of Member States under their respective safeguards agreements and voluntary commitments, in order to ensure that the latter were not turned into the former. The provision of information on dual-use material and equipment was not a legal obligation.

66. All problematic issues should be resolved through dialogue and peaceful means. NAM encouraged the resumption of negotiations and cooperation between the Governments of France, Germany and the United Kingdom and Iran to promote mutual confidence with a view to facilitating the Agency's work on Iran's nuclear programme. In that connection, NAM took note of the recent statement by the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the letter from the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran to the ministers of the three European countries expressing Iran's readiness to resume negotiations. NAM urged the three European countries to respond positively to that initiative.

67. NAM appreciated all initiatives by other Member States aimed at facilitating the speedy resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue and noted with appreciation the recent initiative by the President of Iran at the sixtieth session of the General Assembly concerning the involvement of foreign public and private sectors in uranium enrichment activities in Iran.

68. On 11–12 November 2005, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia and Cuba and the Deputy Foreign Minister of South Africa, three NAM members, had visited Tehran to exchange views and explore ways and means of resolving the Iranian nuclear issue.

69. The Agency was the sole competent authority for verification and NAM had full confidence in its professionalism and impartiality. All issues relating to safeguards and verification, including that of Iran, should be resolved within the framework of the Agency and based on technical grounds, and NAM hoped that all safeguards activities in Iran would soon be implemented in a routine manner.

70. NAM welcomed the fact that all declared nuclear material in Iran had been accounted for by the Agency and that no such material had been diverted to prohibited activities. The Agency's work on verifying Iran's peaceful nuclear programme on the basis of that country's declarations was ongoing

and it was crucial that it be concluded. Iran's continuing cooperation with a view to resolving the remaining issues, which went beyond its legal obligations, was welcome, in particular the confidence-building measures voluntarily undertaken by Iran, including the provisional implementation of the additional protocol. NAM was optimistic that the remaining questions would be resolved promptly.

71. The Agency's legal authority to pursue verification of possible nuclear-weapons-related activity was limited. Any request for additional legal authority had to be negotiated with Member States. Hence the importance of promoting and strengthening the multilateral process. It was encouraging that, since the September 2005 report to the Board, Iran had been more forthcoming on the issue of its P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programmes, providing access to additional documentation relating to the 1987 offer and permitting interviews with individuals. NAM encouraged Iran to provide all supporting documentation requested in order to facilitate the Agency's work. It also welcomed the access provided by Iran to the Parchin site for the second time.

72. Mr. WRIGHT (United Kingdom), speaking on behalf of the European Union, the acceding countries Bulgaria and Romania, the candidate countries Croatia and Turkey, the countries of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidates Albania and Serbia and Montenegro, the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, and Moldova and Ukraine, said that the EU had taken careful note of the Director General's latest progress report on implementation of Iran's NPT safeguards agreement, contained in document GOV/2005/87, and his introductory statement and it commended the impartiality and professionalism of the Director General and the Secretariat.

73. The report suggested that, since September 2005, the progress made towards resolving the questions arising from Iran's multiple failures to fulfil its safeguards obligations had been modest. Iran had handed over a number of documents and allowed the Agency access to two individuals for interview, which had shed useful light on the 1987 offer. However, the details of the mid-1990s offer remained shrouded in uncertainty and the Agency was no closer to being able to provide a reasonable assurance that no P-2 centrifuge programme had been conducted between 1995 and 2002. Moreover, while Iran had allowed access to the Parchin site, it had continued to deny access to the Lavisian-Shian site and appeared not to have responded to Agency requests for clarification of the nature of projects that might be relevant to its nuclear programme, following reports relating to equipment, materials and activities that had nuclear military applications. In addition, the Agency appeared still not to be in a position to draw final conclusions with respect to other outstanding questions: the origin of some of the HEU and LEU particle contamination found at various locations in Iran, Iran's statements about plutonium research, its activities at the Gchine uranium mine and activities involving polonium.

74. It emerged clearly from the Director General's report that one reason progress had been modest was that cooperation remained inadequate, and that full transparency was indispensable and overdue. It was disturbing that a State that had practiced a policy of concealment for 18 years should be so reluctant to demonstrate that it no longer had anything to hide. Such reluctance made Iran's claim that its nuclear programme was exclusively peaceful ring hollow. The Board should give full support to the Director General's call for full transparency, which should extend beyond the formal requirements of the safeguards agreement and the additional protocol to include the provision of information and documentation related to the procurement of dual-use equipment, and visits to military-owned workshops and R&D locations associated with the Physics Research Centre and the Lavisian-Shian site.

75. The EU was disturbed to see that Iran had admitted to possessing a document related to the casting and machining of enriched uranium metal into hemispherical forms. Such a process had no other application than in the production of nuclear warheads. That document, which had not been

included in the information previously handed over to inspectors, raised a set of new questions. The Director General should give priority to investigation of those matters, and Iran should give all necessary access to sites and individuals who might be able to assist.

76. Paragraph 3 of the Director General's report said that no traces of nuclear material had been found in the analysis of environmental samples collected at a location in another State where, according to Iran, the centrifuge components had been stored in the mid-1990s prior to their shipment to Iran. Did that mean that the storage location could not have been the source of the contamination found on centrifuge components in Iran, or that the components could not have been contaminated prior to or during storage at that location and therefore the contamination must have occurred subsequently, namely in Iran?

77. The European Union deplored the fact that Iran had yet again failed to heed the Board's call for all enrichment-related activity to be suspended while outstanding issues were addressed. The uranium conversion campaign initiated in early August 2005 had come to an end three weeks previously. That had provided Iran with an opportunity to re-establish full and sustained suspension at the Uranium Conversion Facility in Esfahan, as called for by the Board. Iran had not taken advantage of that opportunity, which would have facilitated the resumption of the negotiating process that the Board had also called for. Iran had abruptly walked away from that negotiating process by resuming work at the Uranium Conversion Facility in clear contravention of the November 2005 Paris agreement, which had stated that the suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities would be sustained while negotiations proceeded on a mutually acceptable agreement on long-term arrangements. It was therefore incumbent on Iran to take steps to restore a basis for negotiations.

78. The Board should make it clear to Iran that it continued to attach the highest importance to the full suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities while outstanding issues were being addressed i.e. until confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme was established. It should repeat its demand for suspension of all activity at the Uranium Conversion Facility and should warn Iran that any resumption of enrichment-related activities at Natanz would seriously aggravate the situation created by the resumption of activity at Esfahan. It should note with concern that Iran was continuing with civil construction at the Natanz enrichment plant, which was not consistent with the spirit of the confidence-building measures undertaken by Iran. It should also express its deep concern that, despite numerous calls, Iran had continued building a research reactor moderated by heavy water. In addition, it should remind Iran that respecting the Board's calls for full suspension would lead to the resumption of talks between Iran and the EU.

79. In its resolution adopted on 24 September 2005, the Board had found that Iran's many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its safeguards agreements constituted non-compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency's Statute. The Board had also found that the history of concealment of Iran's nuclear activities, the nature of those activities, issues brought to light in the course of the Agency's verification of declarations made by Iran since September 2002, and the resulting absence of confidence that Iran's nuclear programme was exclusively for peaceful purposes had given rise to questions that were within the competence of the Security Council. The Board had decided to address the timing and content of the communications required by those findings at a later date. It had done that because it saw reason to hope that Iran would take the opportunity to exert a positive influence on the timing and content of those communications to the Security Council by taking the measures urged upon it. With every passing week that hope had become harder to sustain. Only in relation to transparency had Iran taken positive steps, and they had been no more than half-measures. Having listened carefully to the views of many Board members, the EU saw reason to think that the window of opportunity should not be closed immediately, but it would not stay open in all circumstances. The EU expected Iran to adopt a responsive attitude, to implement the confidence-building measures for which the Board had called, to refrain from any further unilateral move that

might aggravate the situation and to re-engage in serious discussions on a reasonable basis and in good faith.

80. Mr. WU Hailong (China) said that his country had noted the cooperative measures adopted by Iran since the Board's September 2005 meetings, as well as the outstanding issues that still needed to be clarified, and hoped that Iran would continue to cooperate with the Secretariat to clarify those issues.

81. If not handled well, the Iranian nuclear issue might no longer be manageable within the framework of the Agency or might even spin totally out of control. That would be in the interests of no-one concerned, nor was it conducive to the effectiveness of the NPT regime, the authority of the Agency or regional peace and stability. As long as all parties exercised restraint and demonstrated patience and flexibility, and the international community adopted constructive measures and a constructive attitude, the situation could move in the direction of a final, peaceful settlement.

82. China had always advocated the settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue within the framework of the Agency. It supported the efforts of the EU and Iran to find a long-term settlement through dialogue and negotiation. Even though negotiations were facing difficulties at present, that road should not be abandoned. Only a negotiated plan that was acceptable to all parties could lead to the proper settlement of the issue. China therefore hoped that all parties would exercise restraint and demonstrate flexibility in order to create a favourable environment for the early resumption of negotiations, so that differences could be resolved and any measures that might lead to escalation of the situation averted.

83. Concerted efforts by all sides were necessary to solve the issue within the framework of the Agency. China hoped that Iran would continue to cooperate with the Agency, implement all the resolutions adopted by the Board, seek to gain the understanding of the international community and create favourable conditions for the resumption of negotiations with the EU. All other parties should give objective and fair consideration to the legitimate concerns of Iran and make positive efforts aimed at the resumption of negotiations. China was ready to make a constructive contribution to achieving those goals.

84. Mr. MINTY (South Africa) said that the Director General's report clearly illustrated the progress made in resolving the outstanding issues surrounding Iran's peaceful nuclear programme. At the Board's September 2005 meetings, South Africa and many other Board members had abstained in the vote on the resolution which found Iran to be in non-compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency's Statute. His country and many others believed that the resolution was not the correct course of action, and it continued to believe that the Board should allow more time for the Agency to clarify certain issues pertaining to Iran's peaceful nuclear programme.

85. The latest report showed a continuing positive trend of cooperation and transparency by Iran. It recognized that Iran continued to act as if its additional protocol were in force. The Agency was currently reviewing new information provided by Iran on the P-1 and P-2 enrichment programmes and, subject to receiving the requested documentation, was hopeful that the issue would soon be resolved. Monitoring of installations related to the uranium gas centrifuge and laser enrichment programmes had revealed no inconsistencies with Iran's undertaking not to carry out any enrichment activities. Furthermore, the activities at the Uranium Conversion Facility remained under Agency containment and surveillance measures. According to Iran, documents related to the casting and machining of enriched, natural and depleted uranium metal into hemispherical forms had been provided on the initiative of the procurement network and not at the request of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran.

86. Recent experiences with such illicit networks clearly demonstrated that individuals and structures operated through various centres worldwide, sourcing and supplying both tangible and

intangible technology. It was therefore imperative that those with information on those networks — especially the countries from which they operated or sourced technology — share it with the Agency, as South Africa had done. The Agency should be given every possible opportunity to gain an understanding of how those networks operated. Such cooperation was urgently needed, since the illicit structures were adapting to the increased focus on their activities.

87. It was of particular significance that Iran had allowed the Agency access to buildings within the military Parchin site and had permitted the taking of environmental samples. His country commended Iran for that action and urged it to continue with such proactive cooperation which contributed to the clarification of outstanding issues and strengthened the confidence of the international community.

88. South Africa remained steadfast in its belief that weapons of mass destruction posed a threat to humanity and should be eradicated. With regard to nuclear weapons, it was important that the nuclear-weapon States implement their unequivocal undertaking to eliminate their nuclear arsenals and that adherence to the NPT be universal. All should agree that no one should develop, acquire or possess nuclear weapons.

89. The confidence-building measures which Iran had agreed to were without prejudice to its inalienable right, as an NPT State Party, to pursue a nuclear programme for peaceful purposes. South Africa had consistently urged members of the Agency not to equate such voluntary measures with the legally binding obligations stemming from their safeguards agreements with the Agency. Iran's confidence-building measures, in particular the implementation of the additional protocol as if it had been ratified, were important for facilitating dialogue and enabled the Agency to discharge its verification responsibilities. It was imperative that the Agency conclude its work without undue pressure, haste or hindrance.

90. The confidence-building measures, continued cooperation between Iran and the Agency, and current initiatives to facilitate a long-term solution provided a narrow window of opportunity to find a peaceful solution. It was important for States with access to advanced technologies that could also be used for the development of nuclear weapons to build confidence with the international community. All should recognize the responsibility to avoid actions that could be counterproductive and should concentrate on the central challenge. At the current important juncture, the parties concerned should reflect on all the issues involved and, at all costs, avoid a confrontation that could escalate into a spiralling conflict with consequences none could foretell. That would benefit no one and threaten international peace and security. His country urged the countries concerned to engage constructively in a dialogue that would enable negotiations to be undertaken again in good faith. The golden opportunity now within the international community's grasp might not occur again and it should not be lost.

91. Mr. GAISENAK (Belarus) informed the Board that, on 15 November 2005, his country had signed an additional protocol to its NPT safeguards agreement, thus reaffirming its commitment to the principles of nuclear non-proliferation and acknowledging the authority of the Agency in the verification of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Belarus intended to continue to focus on strengthening the safeguards system and it supported the Secretariat's active efforts to implement safeguards in Iran.

92. The Director General's report showed that there had been a number of positive developments: Iran had provided additional documentation and information to the Agency, allowed interviews with interested parties and granted Agency inspectors access to the Parchin site. Furthermore, the Agency had not observed any inconsistency with Iran's voluntary undertaking not to carry out any enrichment activities and Iran had continued to act as if its additional protocol were in force. Belarus also

welcomed the Iranian President's initiative, put forward at the United Nations Summit, of involving private and public sectors of other countries in Iran's uranium enrichment programme.

93. However, there was a pressing need to clarify the outstanding issues and Iran should continue to cooperate constructively with the Agency. With goodwill on the part of Iran, and the objective and professional work of Agency staff, it should be possible to achieve progress in the near future and resolve the issue through negotiations and dialogue within the framework of the Agency.

94. In conclusion, every country had an inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and using NPT mechanisms to suppress peaceful nuclear programmes was unacceptable and prejudicial to non-proliferation efforts. However, every State Party, in implementing such programmes, should act with transparency, in accordance with the spirit and letter of its commitments under the NPT.

95. Mr. NIEUWENHUYIS (Belgium) said that the least that could be said upon reading the Director General's report was that the question of the purpose of Iran's nuclear programme was still open. It was up to Iran to establish confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. The Agency's resolutions had indicated the path that Iran should take to achieve that goal. The matter could not be resolved unless the Agency had Iran's full cooperation. Iran's uranium conversion activities should be suspended and it should continue to refrain from any enrichment activities. Belgium welcomed any efforts aimed at promoting a negotiated settlement of the problem.

96. Ms. GERVAIS-VIDRICAIRE (Canada) said that nearly three years had elapsed since the question of Iran's nuclear activities had first come before the Board. In that time, despite the absence of full and transparent cooperation from Iran, Agency safeguards experts had made progress in clarifying some of the issues but a number remained outstanding, including the origin of HEU and LEU contamination on equipment from Iran's centrifuge enrichment programme and the exact nature of the information Iran had received from clandestine nuclear networks. Each of those issues was important in itself. What was perhaps more significant, however, was how they formed a larger pattern of concealment and misrepresentation and what they meant in terms of Iran's true intentions. Even as the Agency was working on building an understanding of the outstanding issues, new questions were arising. Iran's reluctance fully to disclose its nuclear programme made it impossible to have confidence in the declarations it had made.

97. Some would say that Iran's failure to provide transparency and access was now in its past, but that was not true. Even in the most recent report from the Director General it could be seen that Iran had only now provided a set of documents associated with an offer of nuclear technology which it had received from a clandestine nuclear trafficking network in 1987. Had Iran been open about declaring the full scope of its nuclear activities, in accordance with its announced policy of full disclosure of October 2003, those documents would have already been in Agency hands.

98. Her country was particularly concerned about the existence of documents referring to the casting and machining of enriched, natural and depleted uranium metal into hemispherical forms. If those documents did contain information related to nuclear weapons technology, which might be the only plausible explanation, then it would have been more than appropriate for Iran, as a party with an interest in the nuclear non-proliferation regime, to bring the documents to the immediate attention of the Agency. She urged the Director General and Agency inspectors to investigate the matter further without delay and to report on their conclusions to the Board in a timely manner.

99. It was important to recognize that Iran had failed to meet its safeguards obligations. The Director General had presented more than ten reports to the Board detailing repeated failures by Iran to declare its nuclear activities appropriately and to cooperate adequately with safeguards inspectors. The right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, guaranteed by Article IV of the NPT, could only be

seen in the context of the obligations imposed by Article III of the Treaty, which required that nuclear facilities be subjected to safeguards.

100. Iran wanted the international community to believe that the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was at stake when its nuclear programme came before the Board. That was not true. Iran had created a unique situation for itself through its many failures. Other Agency members dutifully met their safeguards obligations and thus maintained the confidence of the Board and the related right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Recently, the Board had found that Iran had not been in compliance with its safeguards obligations, a fact that distinguished it from other members. That finding called into question the confidence that the Board could have in Iran's declarations and in its uses of nuclear energy.

101. Not only had Iran created that situation for itself, but it had refused to take advantage of many opportunities to rebuild its credibility with the Agency and the international community. More than two years previously, Agency inspectors had detected and reported to the Board Iran's failure to comply in full with its safeguards obligations. In accordance with Article XII.C of the Agency's Statute, the Board was obliged to report such failures to the United Nations Security Council. Such a report had been held in abeyance as the United Kingdom, France and Germany undertook negotiations with Iran to assist it in restoring its credibility. In August 2005, those three countries had made Iran a generous offer which had included economic and political benefits in addition to an opportunity to influence the tone of an eventual Board report to the Security Council. Instead of taking the time to consider that offer, Iran had quickly dismissed it and responded by resuming its conversion process, in defiance of successive Board resolutions.

102. In September, the Board had adopted a resolution which found that Iran's past nuclear activities were not in compliance with its safeguards obligations, and had concluded that Iran's nuclear programme posed questions that were within the competence of the United Nations Security Council. However, the resolution had left open the possibility that Iran could influence the timing and the nature of a report to the Security Council by heeding the resolution's calls, most notably to resume the suspension of its enrichment-related activities, including conversion, and to offer the transparency and access measures requested by the Director General. Instead of taking that opportunity, Iran had responded by initiating a new conversion campaign in further defiance of Board resolutions, as was reflected in the most recent report from the Director General.

103. The Russian Federation, with the full support of the three European countries, had recently made efforts to engage Iran in dialogue. Canada encouraged Iran to take advantage of that opportunity without further delay and to resume discussions with the three European countries on a comprehensive long-term solution. If Iran did not make every effort to rebuild the confidence it had lost, then the Board should move expeditiously to meet the requirements of the Agency's Statute and report Iran's non-compliance to the United Nations Security Council for appropriate action.

104. Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) said that the Director General's report indicated that, since September, the Iranian authorities had cooperated with the Agency, had provided access to additional documentation and had granted interviews with persons associated with the uranium centrifuge enrichment programme. As a transparency measure, Iran had allowed the Agency to visit the Parchin site, make a visual inspection and take environmental samples. It was to be hoped that the results of that visit would enable the Agency to draw definitive conclusions regarding the site. It was also important that Iran was maintaining its moratorium on uranium enrichment activities.

105. However, it also emerged from the report that, if Iran was to dispel definitively questions about its past nuclear activities, it would have to take a more active cooperative stance. That would include enhanced transparency measures, such as permission to visit the Lavisan-Shian site, provision of

additional information and further interviews. The Iranian authorities should heed the Director General's requests.

106. The fact that Iran was continuing with its conversion activities was not conducive to an early resolution of the situation. Calls for a moratorium on such activities had been included in the resolutions adopted by the Board of Governors. However, it was important to note Iran's continued implementation of the additional protocol prior to its entry into force and its continuing moratorium on uranium enrichment activities.

107. All States party to the NPT had a right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. That right was inseparable from the non-proliferation obligations enshrined in the Treaty. His country called on Iran to focus on clarifying all outstanding issues and restoring the confidence of the international community in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme through consistent and continuous cooperation with the Agency on the basis of full transparency. Clearly, that would require additional efforts and would take time. In particular, a suitable explanation would be required with regard to the information on Iran's receipt of documents relating to technology for producing uranium metal and machining it into hemispherical forms.

108. His country was convinced that the resumption of dialogue between Iran and the three European countries would help bring about a diplomatic settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue. Since the preceding meetings of the Board, the Russian Federation had taken steps to achieve that objective. As a neighbour and longstanding partner of Iran, Russia was prepared to engage in the broadest possible cooperation with Tehran in order to guarantee supplies of ready-made fuel to meet Iran's legitimate nuclear energy needs. A solution should be possible on such a basis which would ensure predictable stability in the development of nuclear power in Iran and dispel questions about the nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

109. He called on Iran to step up its efforts to resolve outstanding issues and restore confidence. There was still scope for continuing work on those issues within the framework of the Agency. His country noted that the Secretariat would continue to study all relevant information at its disposal and that the Director General would report on the matter as necessary.

110. Mr. SERRANO CADENA (Colombia) said that Iran needed to demonstrate full transparency in order to restore international confidence and allay the concerns of the international community regarding the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. He called on Iran to resume the suspension of its uranium conversion activities and to comply fully with the Board's request to suspend all activities related to enrichment and reprocessing, as well as to adopt the additional voluntary confidence-building measures requested by the Director General, such as providing additional access to documentation, facilities and persons.

111. The new initiatives regarding cooperation with the Russian Federation and broadening of the international consensus for the resumption of negotiations with the three European countries were very positive developments. Colombia was confident that Iran could be counted on to move forward in a constructive and multilateral spirit thus restoring confidence, which was an essential prerequisite for arriving at a satisfactory solution. The stage was set for talks to resume, and his country called on Iran to seize that opportunity and dispel the concerns of the international community about its nuclear programme.

112. Mr. MOREJÓN-ALMEIDA (Ecuador) said that his country, as a member of the world's first densely populated nuclear-weapon-free zone, was committed to non-proliferation. It agreed with other delegations that nothing should prejudice the inalienable right of all countries to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. However,

countries also had to comply with their obligations under the NPT, safeguards agreements and other relevant international instruments.

113. Ecuador attached great importance to dialogue and consensus-based resolution of international conflicts. It had therefore warmly welcomed the negotiations initiated pursuant to the Paris agreement in November 2004 between Iran and Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the High Representative of the European Union. Accordingly, it was pleased to learn, albeit unofficially, that a new and active diplomatic process had begun.

114. His country was deeply concerned that Iran had resumed conversion activities in August in Esfahan and that a second uranium conversion campaign had begun in November at the Uranium Conversion Facility. Those activities were not conducive to providing the necessary assurances which the international community had requested in the resolution issued in document GOV/2005/77.

115. His country had taken note of the progress made, such as the access provided to facilities in Parchin and Arak, and to persons and documentation, and the continued implementation of the additional protocol. However, it agreed with the Director General that Iran's transparency was indispensable and overdue and it therefore called upon Iran to provide additional access to information, persons and facilities.

116. It was important to allow the ongoing diplomatic process to take its course and to give the Agency enough time to clarify pending matters on the basis of the new information. He urged Iran to give careful consideration to the proposals and options that had been presented to it. Furthermore, in keeping with the resolution adopted by the Board on 24 September, it was vital that Iran suspend all activities related to enrichment and reprocessing in order to create the necessary atmosphere of confidence.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.