

IAEA Board of Governors

Record of the 1162<sup>nd</sup> Meeting  
GOV/OR.1162

Nuclear Verification

- (d) Strengthening safeguards implementation in States with small quantities protocols

Nuclear Verification

- (f) Report by the Director General on the implementation of safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

# Board of Governors

**GOV/OR.1162**

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## Record of the 1162<sup>nd</sup> Meeting

*Held at Headquarters, Vienna, on Wednesday, 14 June 2006, at 3.15 p.m.*

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<sup>1</sup> GOV/2006/39.



## Attendance

(The list below gives the name of the senior member of each delegation who attended the meeting, as well as that of any other member whose statement is summarized in this record.)

Mr. AMANO		Chairman (Japan)
Ms. FEROUKHI	_____	Algeria
Ms. CONTRERAS DE ECKER		Argentina
Ms. STOKES		Australia
Mr. NIEUWENHUYS		Belgium
Mr. VIEIRA DE SOUZA		Brazil
Ms. GERVAIS-VIDRICAIRE	}	Canada
Mr. PROUDFOOT		
Mr. SUN Qin	}	China
Mr. TANG Guoqiang		
Mr. SERRANO CADENA		Colombia
Ms. GOICOCHEA ESTENOZ		Cuba
Mr. MOREJÓN-ALMEIDA		Ecuador
Mr. RAMZY		Egypt
Mr. CARON		France
Mr. SANDTNER		Germany
Mr. BEKOE		Ghana
Mr. PAPADIMITROPOULOS		Greece
Mr. SHARMA		India
Mr. WIBOWO		Indonesia
Mr. SUMI		Japan
Mr. KIM Sung-Hwan	}	Korea, Republic of
Mr. CHOI Sung-Joo		
Mr. GASHUT		Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
Mr. AAS		Norway
Mr. BRAMÃO RAMOS		Portugal
Mr. BERDENNIKOV		Russian Federation
Mr. GAFOOR		Singapore
Mr. MACHÁČ		Slovakia
Mr. PETRIČ		Slovenia
Mr. MINTY		South Africa
Ms. WIJEWARDANE		Sri Lanka
Ms. MELIN		Sweden
Mr. OTHMAN		Syrian Arab Republic
Mr. WRIGHT		United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Mr. SCHULTE		United States of America
Ms. GARCÍA DE PÉREZ		Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of
Mr. SHUGA'A		Yemen
Mr. ELBARADEI	_____	Director General
Mr. HEINONEN		Deputy Director General, Department of Safeguards
Mr. ANING		Secretary of the Board

**Representatives of the following Member States also attended the meeting:**

Albania, Angola, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, Vietnam.

**Abbreviations used in this record:**

ABACC	Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
CRP	coordinated research project
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EU	European Union
Euratom	European Atomic Energy Community
GIF	Generation IV International Forum
GUAM	Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova
INPRO	International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles
ISSAS	IAEA SSAC Advisory Service
LEU	low-enriched uranium
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NDA	non-destructive assay
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NUTRAN	Nuclear Trade Analysis Unit
RSAC	regional system of accounting for and control of nuclear material
SAGSI	Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation
SIR	Safeguards Implementation Report
SQP	small quantities protocol
SSAC	State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material

\* Speakers under Rule 50 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure are indicated by an asterisk.

## 8. Nuclear verification

### (a) **The Safeguards Implementation Report for 2005** (continued) (GOV/2006/31, Corr.1 and Add.1)

1. Mr. GASHUT (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) said that his country, which attached great importance to the Agency's safeguards system, felt that the system was not being implemented in a non-discriminatory manner. There were countries which, having concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements, were accepting the implementation of the system in its entirety; there were countries which were accepting safeguards only at certain locations; and there were countries which were simply disregarding the system despite its international legitimacy. No-one should be surprised, therefore, if some countries in the first category, out of fear, contemplated the launching of clandestine nuclear programmes involving the diversion of nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes.
2. The international community should open its eyes to the effects of what was a flagrant case of discrimination through the application of double standards.
3. In his country's view, there should be non-discriminatory safeguards based on comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols and implemented in all countries, and all safeguards matters should be dealt with exclusively within the framework of the Agency.
4. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya stood ready to continue cooperating with the Secretariat in the strengthening of the safeguards system, drawing on the experience which it had gained as a result of voluntarily terminating programmes which could have led to the production of prohibited weapons. It would like to see all countries with such programmes terminating them without delay and all countries with weapons of mass destruction ridding themselves of those weapons.
5. Mr. VIEIRA DE SOUZA (Brazil) said that his delegation was pleased that the Safeguards Statement for 2005 contained the conclusion that in the 147 States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force all declared nuclear material placed under safeguards had remained in peaceful nuclear activities. Also, his delegation had noted that for 24 of the 70 States with comprehensive safeguards agreements and also additional protocols in force it had been possible to draw a broader conclusion — one relating to the absence of any indication of a diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and to the absence of any indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities for the State as a whole. On that basis, the Secretariat had concluded that all the nuclear material in those States had remained in peaceful activities.
6. In addition, his delegation had noted that for 46 of the 70 States with comprehensive safeguards agreements and also additional protocols in force, the Secretariat had, pending completion of the appropriate evaluations, concluded that the declared nuclear material had remained in peaceful activities.
7. For the 77 States with comprehensive safeguards agreements but no additional protocols in force, the Secretariat had found no indication of a diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and had concluded, for those States, that the declared nuclear material had remained in peaceful activities.
8. Brazil was supporting the efforts of the Secretariat to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system. However, his delegation considered it necessary to recall — in line with what he had said when commenting on the draft Annual Report for 2005 — that all 147 non-

nuclear-weapon States belonging to the three aforementioned 'categories' were bound by the same non-proliferation undertakings even though 70 of them had additional protocols in force.

9. In noting the broader conclusion that could be drawn in respect of those States which, having a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force, had also voluntarily concluded an additional protocol, an instrument applicable to safeguards agreements of all types, his delegation considered it important to emphasize that the broader conclusion had no legal effect as regards the validity or the implementation of the comprehensive safeguards agreements of those States which had not concluded an additional protocol but were continuing to fulfil all their safeguards obligations.

10. As stated on previous occasions, his delegation's position was that additional protocols, as tools for strengthening the Agency's safeguards system, should add to the system, not detract from it by creating doubts about the good faith of the vast majority of countries that had been living up to their non-proliferation undertakings.

11. In that connection, it should be recalled that the appropriate forum for discussing the status of the additional protocols concluded by non-nuclear-weapon States was the review conferences of the Parties to the NPT, a treaty that should be universalized in view of its important role within the international regime for disarmament and non-proliferation.

12. Paragraph 10 of the SIR for 2005 referred to the obligation of the Agency in the case of a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force. That being so, his delegation believed that the paragraph should have read "under a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol, ...".

13. As regards section B.1.1.2 of the document under consideration, which related to the 77 States with comprehensive safeguards agreements but no additional protocols in force, his delegation believed that paragraphs 17 and 18 might give the impression that the safeguards conclusion for those States was insufficient. In his delegation's view, what was stated under the heading "Deriving Conclusions" would have been more precise if paragraph 11 had been reproduced there also.

14. As regards section C.4.3 (Design Information Verification Techniques), his delegation doubted whether the application of an NDA system based on X-ray fluorescence analysis fell within the scope of safeguards agreements conforming to document INFCIRC/153 (Corrected).

15. In the context of Brazil's support for the efforts of the Secretariat to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system, his delegation considered it important to emphasize that the cooperation between the Agency, ABACC and Brazil's National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) had done much to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards implementation in Brazil and that there was a need for continuous integration of the international safeguards system operated by the Agency and the regional safeguards system operated by ABACC.

16. Welcoming paragraphs 92 and 93 of the SIR for 2005, he said that his country attached great importance to the cooperation between ABACC and the Agency as a means of avoiding unnecessary duplication of effort and strengthening the implementation of safeguards in Brazil and Argentina.

17. Mr. SCHULTE (United States of America) said that his delegation welcomed the findings and conclusions presented in the SIR for 2005 and the manner in which the basis for them was described. The document rightly reflected the limitations of technical safeguards.

18. Clearly, the Secretariat was making steady progress both in the area of basic safeguards technology and in the development of facility- and State-level safeguards approaches. The significant contributions of the Agency's increasingly sophisticated safeguards system to global security were now widely recognized. At the same time, the SIR for 2005 made it clear that further progress would

depend largely on the active cooperation of Member States with the Secretariat. It noted that at the end of the previous year 77 States with comprehensive safeguards agreements had not had additional protocols in force and 36 non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT had not yet brought comprehensive safeguards agreements into force. His delegation, which was disappointed that no comprehensive safeguards agreements or additional protocols were before the Board for consideration at its current session, would like to see those States taking prompt action so as to enable the Secretariat to draw the broadest possible safeguards conclusions. Recent events had shown that the full potential of the safeguards system would not be realized until the system was being implemented in all countries, including countries without nuclear facilities. For its part, his country remained committed to working with the Secretariat and with other Member States in encouraging the widest possible adherence to the strengthened safeguards system of the Agency.

19. In 2005, the Agency had taken an important step by revising the standardized text of the SQP. His country, which hoped that all States with SQPs would soon conclude the exchanges of letters necessary for giving effect to the revised standardized text, was supporting the outreach efforts being made by the Secretariat to that end.

20. The SIR for 2005 mentioned a number of problems relating to the support of SSACs and RSACs. His country would like to see those problems resolved through cooperation.

21. In June 2005, his delegation had voiced concern about the 'shorthand' manner in which the implementation of integrated safeguards had been evaluated in the SIR for 2004.<sup>2</sup> Particularly in circumstances where it was expected that different safeguards activities would be carried out in different States, it was important to express clearly and transparently how the activities in question were justified and their results assessed, thereby providing assurance that safeguards were effective and non-discriminatory.

22. His delegation was pleased that the SIR for 2005 provided significantly more information than the SIR for 2004, identifying four objectives for State-level safeguards evaluation. That represented progress, but those objectives were very general — and difficult to relate to specific technical objectives or activities.

23. For example, one of the objectives concerned the Secretariat's ability to detect the undeclared production of nuclear material at declared facilities. The SIR for 2005 stated that that objective had been met for all States. However, the Secretariat had recently taken an important step by identifying a new technical objective for enrichment plants — the detection of undeclared LEU production. It was unclear whether or how that could be part of the positive assessment by the Secretariat of its new objectives, as current safeguards approaches did not appear to address that scenario.

24. The Secretariat and SAGSI should continue to elaborate a framework to support the conclusions relating to the four general objectives that had been identified. Without returning to the traditional criteria-based approach, that framework ought to include more systematic reporting on the technical objectives that formed the basis for drawing State-level conclusions.

25. Mr. CARON (France), having commended the Secretariat on the SIR for 2005, said that his delegation, which continued to attach great importance to the principle of the universality of safeguards, welcomed the steps taken in 2005 by those States which had brought comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols into force. It would like to see all States that had not yet done so taking such steps as soon as possible.

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<sup>2</sup> See document GOV/OR.1128, para. 122.



26. His delegation also welcomed the start in 2005 of the process of strengthening the implementation of safeguards in States with SQPs, and it looked forward to the revised standardized text approved by the Board being accepted by all those States.

27. In that connection, it would like to see the Secretariat organizing further seminars designed to make States aware of the importance of universalizing safeguards and of strengthening them through — in particular — the entry into force of additional protocols and acceptance of the revised standardized SQP text. A seminar of that kind held in 2005 in Rabat, with France contributing through its safeguards support programme, had been a good example of what could be done at the regional level.

28. His delegation, which welcomed the establishment of ISSAS, believed that the new service would help to increase the effectiveness of the Agency's safeguards system.

29. Given the safeguards role played by the European Commission within the EU, his delegation would like the Secretariat and the Commission to continue their efforts to resolve the problems mentioned in section E.1.1 of the SIR for 2005 through constructive dialogue, including high-level exchanges of views.

30. During 2005, the Secretariat had continued with the gradual introduction of integrated safeguards, thereby helping to streamline verification activities at a time when it was having to fulfil statutory obligations at a growing number of facilities.

31. Also, with a view to confronting the challenges of the future, the Secretariat had — inter alia — been introducing new safeguards approaches, modernizing its safeguards equipment and developing a new information management system. His country had been assisting the Secretariat with some of the activities in question through its safeguards support programme, and it stood ready to continue doing so.

32. France, which was supporting the work of the Advisory Committee on Safeguards and Verification within the Framework of the IAEA Statute, considered the Committee to be a useful forum for the examination of ways of increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system and strengthening safeguards.

33. His country, which was particularly pleased with the work done by NUTRAN during 2005 in helping to draft and update State-level evaluation reports, stood ready to continue cooperating with it by responding to its requests for information.

34. France continued to be very interested in the work being done on proliferation-resistant nuclear energy systems within the framework of INPRO and GIF. In its view, further Secretariat participation in the work of GIF's Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Expert Group would help to strengthen coordination between INPRO and GIF.

35. Mr. CHOI Sung-Joo (Republic of Korea), having welcomed the SIR for 2005, said that his delegation was pleased that the number of States with comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force was growing steadily. At the same time, it would like to see many more States — especially ones with significant nuclear activities — bringing such instruments into force.

36. His country, which shared the Secretariat's view that well-functioning SSACs were essential for effective and efficient safeguards implementation, welcomed the efforts of the Secretariat to strengthen SSACs.

37. As indicated in paragraph 90 of the document under consideration, in 2005 there had been an ISSAS mission to the Republic of Korea. The resulting advice and recommendations had been useful

to his country's relevant authorities, helping them to identify areas where improvements were necessary. In his delegation's view, other Member States would do well to avail themselves of ISSAS.

38. The Secretariat was to be commended on its efforts — described in section C.4 of the SIR for 2005 — to develop new safeguards approaches and procedures. As regards safeguards technology, his country was pleased to be involved in the field testing of the unattended radiation monitoring and surveillance system referred to in paragraph 86 of that document.

39. His country would continue supporting the Secretariat's efforts to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear material.

40. Mr. OTHMAN (Syrian Arab Republic), having commended the efforts of the Secretariat to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system, said it was regrettable that the non-proliferation regime was not universal and that it made a distinction between, on the hand, States with nuclear weapons and, on the other, States without nuclear weapons. The States without nuclear weapons were predominantly developing countries that were fulfilling all the obligations arising out of comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency, and their ultimate goal was complete nuclear disarmament.

41. In the document under consideration, the Secretariat stated that in 2005 it had found no indication of the diversion of nuclear material or of the misuse of the facilities or other items to which safeguards were being applied pursuant to INFCIRC/66-type agreements in countries which had such agreements in force. His delegation was not comforted by that statement as one of those countries — situated in the Middle East — had very substantial nuclear capabilities not subject to Agency safeguards.

42. In paragraph 122 of the SIR for 2005, the Secretariat stated that, in the case of States with comprehensive safeguards agreements but no additional protocols in force, its ability to ensure that safeguards were applied to all nuclear material within a State was limited. In his delegation's view, that statement was not very convincing as all States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force were required to submit all their nuclear facilities to Agency safeguards.

43. He endorsed the request made during the previous meeting by the Governor from Egypt for a Secretariat paper setting out all General Conference and Board resolutions concerning comprehensive safeguards and indicating the extent to which they had been implemented.

44. With regard to the Advisory Committee on Safeguards and Verification within the Framework of the IAEA Statute, referred to in paragraph 42 of the SIR for 2005, his delegation attached great importance to the fact that the Committee was of a purely advisory nature. In its view, all of the Commission's conclusions should be arrived at on the basis of consensus.

45. The Syrian Arab Republic, which was determined to continue fulfilling all its NPT obligations, greatly appreciated the efforts of the Director General to bring about universality of the non-proliferation regime. In that connection, it would like to see the international community putting more pressure on the one country in the Middle East that had so far not acceded to the NPT.

46. Ms. MELIN (Sweden), having commended the Secretariat on the document under consideration, said that her delegation was concerned about the fact that at the end of the previous year 36 non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT had still not brought comprehensive safeguards agreements into force and 77 States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force had not yet concluded additional protocols.

47. As Sweden had repeatedly expressed concern about the slow pace with which the Agency was developing a safeguards approach for geological repositories for spent nuclear fuel, her delegation was

disappointed that that issue had not been considered by SAGSI in 2005. Although it was pleased that work had continued on the development of a safeguards approach specifically for the planned geological repositories at Olkiluoto, Finland, her delegation believed that the Agency's work on establishing a safeguards approach suitable for implementation at more than just one geological repository for spent nuclear fuel ought to be completed soon. Early completion was essential for Sweden and other Member States with advanced repository programmes.

48. Sweden, which welcomed the establishment of NUTRAN, was voluntarily providing the Secretariat with information about the approval of licences for the export of nuclear equipment and relevant non-nuclear material.

49. Her delegation, which was concerned about the reported delays in environmental sample analysis, agreed with the Secretariat as to the remedial action required in order to reduce sample processing times to an acceptable level.

50. Referring to paragraph 211 of the SIR for 2005, she said that her delegation was disappointed with the response to the Board's 1999 decision regarding neptunium and americium. It agreed with the Secretariat that "More consistent reporting by Member States would improve the Agency's ability to assess the quantities of separated americium and neptunium and the associated proliferation risk", and it would like the Member States concerned to provide for more consistent reporting.

51. Having urged those non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT which did not have comprehensive safeguards agreements in force to remedy the situation without delay, she welcomed the conclusion of comprehensive safeguards agreements including additional protocols with the Marshall Islands, Palau and the United Republic of Tanzania and the conclusion of additional protocols to existing agreements with Afghanistan, Estonia, Malta, Nicaragua, Slovakia and Switzerland.

52. Mr. WIBOWO (Indonesia) said that the Agency's safeguards system was an essential part of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and that his country considered the Agency to be the sole competent body for nuclear verification within the framework of that system.

53. His country greatly appreciated the efforts being made by the Secretariat to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system and was convinced that the Agency would be able to meet the safeguards challenges of the future.

54. Indonesia, which was party to the NPT and had concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol with the Agency, remained committed to the fulfilment of all its obligations arising out of those instruments. It was one of the first three countries where the Secretariat had started to implement integrated safeguards, and his delegation was pleased with the positive conclusions which the Secretariat had drawn regarding the nuclear material and activities in Indonesia.

55. Ms. GARCÍA DE PÉREZ (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) commended the Secretariat on its efforts to create an effective safeguards system.

56. Her country would like to see all States which were not yet party to the NPT acceding to that important international legal instrument.

57. Her country intended to participate fully in the work being done by the Advisory Committee on Safeguards and Verification within the Framework of the IAEA Statute under the wise leadership of the Governor from Algeria.

58. Ms. ZODELAVA (Georgia)\*, speaking on behalf of GUAM, commended the Department of Safeguards for the work done by it in 2005.

59. GUAM, which attached great importance to the Agency's safeguards system as a means of preventing diversion of nuclear material from peaceful to military uses, detecting clandestine nuclear activities and reducing the risk of nuclear and radiological terrorism, would like to see the Secretariat's ability to detect undeclared nuclear material and clandestine nuclear activities strengthened.

60. She welcomed the initiation by the Secretariat of a comprehensive project for helping States with the establishment and strengthening of SSACs and the organization by the Secretariat of training courses for SSAC staff.

61. She said GUAM attached great importance to the inspection at the Sukhumi Institute in Abkhazia, Georgia, which had been carried out in September 2005 with the assistance of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia and to the completion of the design of the Chernobyl shelter.

62. GUAM, which welcomed the Secretariat services designed to assist States in combating illicit trafficking in nuclear material, hoped that the Secretariat would continue to administer the work being done within the framework of the CRP on the improvement of technical measures to detect and respond to illicit trafficking in nuclear material and other radioactive material.

63. The Republic of Moldova had brought its comprehensive safeguards agreement and SQP into force on 17 May 2006 and Ukraine had brought its additional protocol into force on 24 January 2006 — indications of the great importance attached to the Agency's safeguards system by GUAM, which believed that comprehensive safeguards agreements combined with additional protocols should become the de facto safeguards standard.

64. Mr. SOLTANIEH (Islamic Republic of Iran)\* said that, as his delegation had stated during the 29 May 2005 informal briefing, there were shortcomings in the SIR for 2005, particularly its selective approach with regard to his country. For example, the SIR for 2005 unjustifiably reflected developments that had taken place in 2006.

65. The fact that most States had not yet received a certificate of assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities had not been duly reflected in the SIR for 2005, which gave the incorrect impression that only his country had not yet received such a certificate.

66. If a State was mentioned by name in an SIR, for the sake of comprehensiveness the responses given by that State to Secretariat comments should be reflected in the SIR.

67. On 5 June 2006, his delegation had, in writing, expressed its concerns about the SIR for 2005 and requested that corrections be made to it and also to the draft Annual Report for 2005. On 12 June 2006 there had been a follow-up meeting with Secretariat representatives for which he was very appreciative but on which, owing to time constraints, he would not elaborate.

68. Mr. EISINGERICH (Austria)\*, speaking on behalf of the EU and the acceding countries Bulgaria and Romania, said, with regard to section E.1.1 (European Commission's RSAC) of the SIR for 2005, that the EU had repeatedly underscored the importance of continuing cooperation between Euratom and the Agency for maintaining the high standard achieved by them in the safeguards field. The EU appreciated the corresponding endeavours of the two organizations.

69. The matters dealt with in section E.1.1 would be taken up at a meeting between the European Commission's Director General for Transport and Energy and the Director General of the Agency on 22 June 2006.

70. Mr. HEINONEN (Deputy Director General for Safeguards) said that the Secretariat would carefully examine the comments made during the Board's consideration of the SIR for 2005 and take account of them when preparing the SIR for 2006.

71. The Advisory Committee on Safeguards and Verification within the Framework of the IAEA Statute was already considering a number of topics, including environmental sampling and the analysis of satellite imagery, and the Secretariat looked forward to the results of its consideration of them.

72. In response to comments made by the Governor from Australia and the representative of Singapore, the Secretariat would include in the SIR for 2006 a section on lessons learned by it in dealing with problems encountered during safeguards implementation.

73. In response to what the Governor from Canada had said about naming the States with a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force, the Secretariat would prepare an addendum to the SIR for 2005 naming the States in the five categories into which the Secretariat placed States for SIR purposes.

74. The CHAIRMAN, summing up, said that the Board had welcomed the revised SIR format, which — it had felt — was concise and made for substantially improved clarity and readability. Some suggestions had been made for further improvements in the future. Some members had requested clarifications of certain issues covered in the SIR for 2005. The Board had noted the Secretariat's responses.

75. The Board had noted the conclusions drawn for various categories of States, in accordance with their safeguards undertakings vis-à-vis the Agency.

76. States party to the NPT which had not yet done so had been urged to conclude safeguards agreements with the Agency. Some members had expressed disappointment at the slow rate of conclusion and entry into force of additional protocols and had expressed the view that States, particularly States with significant nuclear activities, which had not yet done so should conclude and bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible. Support had been expressed for the Secretariat's outreach activities in that regard.

77. Some members had emphasized that the Agency's safeguards system could provide credible assurances with regard both to the non-diversion of nuclear material from peaceful activities and to the absence of undeclared activities only in States with comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force. In that connection, the view had been expressed that additional protocols should become a non-proliferation standard in the Agency's safeguards system.

78. Some members had emphasized that comprehensive safeguards agreements were the legal basis for safeguards implementation, and that that should be more fully reflected in the Secretariat's safeguards conclusions. They had expressed the view that the conclusion of additional protocols was a voluntary measure.

79. Some members had expressed the view that it was important to achieve universality of the Agency's safeguards system.

80. Several members had drawn attention to the major challenges which the Agency had faced in the field of verification during 2005. Concern had been expressed at the delays faced by the Secretariat in analysing environmental samples, and members had emphasized that problems in that area needed to be addressed. Several members had requested the Secretariat to help interested Member States to enhance their national capabilities, which might contribute to expanding the Agency's analytical resources. In that regard, the view had been expressed that the Agency should significantly reduce the number of samples taken and analysed.

81. The Board had noted the progress made in improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system. Several members had noted with appreciation that the Secretariat had begun to

assist States in establishing SSACs, and they had called on the Secretariat to continue those efforts. Also, they had expressed appreciation of the training courses and seminars organized to help States fulfil their safeguards obligations.

82. The Board had welcomed the implementation of integrated safeguards in a number of States and the reports of savings in verification effort that were beginning to be achieved. The Secretariat had been urged to make every effort to introduce integrated safeguards as quickly as possible in States with significant nuclear activities, in order to improve the efficiency of the system.

83. Several members had expressed the view that, when safeguards approaches were being elaborated, consultations with Member States were necessary in order to ensure that those approaches addressed their concerns.

84. Appreciation had been expressed for the cooperation between the Agency and SSACs and RSACs (including Euratom and ABACC), and it had been requested that the cooperation be strengthened.

85. Members had welcomed the efforts of the Secretariat to strengthen the Agency's capabilities for investigating and analysing nuclear supply and procurement networks and had called on all States to further cooperate with the Secretariat in that regard.

86. With those comments, he assumed that the Board wished to take note of the Director General's SIR for 2005, authorize the release of the Safeguards Statement and authorize the release of the Background to the Safeguards Statement and Executive Summary with any possible adjustments that the Director General deemed appropriate in light of the comments made in the Board.

87. It was so decided.

**(b) The conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols**

88. The CHAIRMAN said that no requests for the conclusion of safeguards agreements or additional protocols had been received for the Board's consideration at the present session. He appealed to Member States which were obliged to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements but had not yet done so to take the necessary steps to do so and bring them into force.

**(c) The staff of the Department of Safeguards to be used as inspectors**  
(GOV/2006/9 and Corr.1, Note to Governors of 29 May 2006)

89. The CHAIRMAN, introducing document GOV/2006/9 and Corr.1 thereto, said that it contained proposals by the Secretariat regarding the staff of the Department of Safeguards to be used as inspectors. The curricula vitae of the staff members in question had been circulated to all Board members by the Secretariat under cover of a letter dated 18 April 2006.

90. An updated summary, by nationality, of the staff of the Department of Safeguards to be used as inspectors had also been circulated by the Secretariat under cover of a Note to Governors dated 29 May 2006.

91. Mr. MINTY (South Africa) expressed appreciation for the Agency safeguards inspectors who were doing the critical technical and scientific groundwork to fulfil the Agency's mandate as the sole legitimate authority to verify nuclear activities in Member States. He commended the Director General and his staff for their unbiased and professional approach, including their valuable and efficient contribution to recent challenges such as the unveiling of clandestine, illicit trade networks. Aware that inspectors needed the best expertise to tackle those challenges, South Africa welcomed the addition of experienced officials to the inspection teams.

92. The CHAIRMAN took it that the Board wished to take the action recommended in document GOV/2006/9 and Corr.1 and authorize the Director General to use the professional staff members referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of that document as safeguards inspectors.

93. It was so decided.

**(d) Strengthening safeguards implementation in States with small quantities protocols (GOV/INF/2006/9)**

94. The CHAIRMAN said that the Board of Governors, recalling its June 2005 conclusion that the SQP to comprehensive safeguards agreements in its present form constituted a weakness of the safeguards system, had taken a number of decisions on 20 September 2005 to strengthen the implementation of safeguards in States with SQPs.

95. Document GOV/INF/2006/9 had been prepared in response to the request of the Board for a progress report with regard to the implementation of the Board's decisions.

96. Ms. HUSSAIN (Malaysia)\*, speaking on behalf of NAM, thanked the Director General for providing document GOV/INF/2006/9 and noted with appreciation that the Secretariat, at the Board's request, was assisting States with SQPs to establish and maintain SSACs through the development of a standard form for submitting initial reports on nuclear material and an adapted SSAC training module, and the publication of a booklet entitled *Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Security: Overview of Safeguards Requirements for States with Limited Nuclear Material and Activities.*

97. NAM welcomed the Secretariat's intention to continue advising SQP States so as to ensure the smooth implementation of the Board's decision of September 2005 and looked forward to receiving further information from the Secretariat regarding the legal implications of rescinding a non-operational SQP for States with nuclear facilities.

98. Mr. MOREJÓN-ALMEIDA (Ecuador) said his country recognized the Agency as the competent authority to verify and ensure observance of safeguards agreements to which Member States had subscribed in accordance with the NPT and the Agency Statute with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear knowledge, technology and material to military use. Safeguards mechanisms were a unique tool for ensuring that nuclear equipment, technology and material were exclusively for peaceful use. He stressed the importance of achieving universal application of the Agency's safeguards system, even to countries outside the safeguards regime. He also stressed the importance of Article III of the NPT and the need to verify the peaceful nature of all States' nuclear programmes, without exception.

99. Ecuador was committed to contributing to efforts to face the new global challenges. In 2005, it had supported the Board's conclusion that SQPs were a weakness in the safeguards system. It had hosted a regional seminar on verifying compliance with nuclear non-proliferation commitments covering strengthened safeguards, small quantities protocols and additional protocols on 5 and 6 April 2006. In connection with that event, Ecuador had presented the Agency with the instrument of acceptance of its modified SQP, becoming the first country in the region to do so. The seminar had been held to clarify doubts concerning the additional protocol and to promote rapid signing of amendments by countries with SQPs, which he urged all countries to do promptly.

100. Also, Ecuador had organized, in collaboration with the Agency, the first pan-American meeting on strengthening implementation of international instruments for enhanced nuclear and radiological security at the Vice-Ministerial level, held in Quito on 3 and 4 April 2006.

101. In conclusion, his delegation encouraged the Secretariat to continue its efforts to assist States with SQPs in maintaining SSACs with a view to facilitating preparation of the relevant reports in a timely manner.

102. Mr. SUMI (Japan) expressed his appreciation to the Secretariat for its efforts since the Board's decision to amend the SQP. He looked forward to further efforts to that end as, to date, only a few States had accepted the revised SQP. Enhancing the efficiency of the SQP States was an important activity for promoting universalization of the comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol.

103. Japan would be contributing, both personally and financially, to the seminar to be held in Sydney, Australia on 4 to 6 July 2006, which was referred to in document GOV/INF/2006/9.

104. Ms. GERVAIS-VIDRICAIRE (Canada) noted that only four countries with comprehensive safeguards agreements and an additional protocol in force or being applied, namely Ecuador, Mali, Palau and Tajikistan, had begun the exchange of letters required for the modified SQP to enter into force. Her delegation encouraged other countries with SQPs to follow their example.

105. Ms. CONTRERAS DE ECKER (Argentina) welcomed the action taken by the Secretariat and commended those countries which had adopted the revised SQPs. It was important for the Secretariat to continue and to expand cooperation with countries which were required to implement the modified version of the protocol. The implementation of the measures described therein, including those relating to the verification effort and the establishment of a State infrastructure, must take account of the particular situation in each country concerned. Verification activities must be proportionate to the fact that such countries had little or virtually no nuclear activity.

106. Interregional and regional seminars were effective mechanisms for disseminating information and raising the awareness of the countries concerned. For that reason, in its future progress reports the Secretariat should include some explanation of how those activities contributed to the adoption of the Board's decisions.

107. Her delegation underscored the need to maintain a conceptual distinction between safeguards and physical security with regard not only to the topics addressed in the booklet entitled *Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Security: Overview of Safeguards Requirements for States with Limited Nuclear Material and Activities*, but also to such dissemination activities as seminars and training.

108. Her delegation urged the Secretariat to keep the Board informed on the implementation of its decisions on that question.

109. Mr. MINTY (South Africa) noted with appreciation that Comoros had concluded its safeguards agreement under the modified SQP text and that five other countries had exchanged their letters with the standardized modified text. His delegation encouraged the other 72 States to attend to the revision of the standardized text in a speedy manner.

110. South Africa, while recognizing the weakness of the original SQP text, stressed that any additional financial implications in the administration and implementation of the requirements under the modified text should be kept to a minimum. The Agency should continue to assist SQP States with the establishment and maintenance of their SSACs and to highlight the importance of regional training courses.

111. Ms. STOKES (Australia) was pleased to note that the Secretariat had moved promptly to initiate the exchange of letters envisaged in the Board's decision. Australia encouraged all SQP States to adopt the modified SQP text without delay.



112. Also, her delegation welcomed the information in document GOV/INF/2006/9 that the Secretariat was actively assisting SQP States to establish and maintain SSACs.

113. In conclusion, she said that Australia was pleased to be hosting a safeguards seminar for SQP States from the Asia/Pacific region in Sydney from 4 to 6 July.

114. Ms. MELIN (Sweden) commended those Member States that had accepted the modifications to their SQP based on the revised standardized text contemplated in document GOV/2005/33. Her delegation expressed appreciation to the Secretariat for the extensive training and information programme related to the introduction of revised protocols, which had provided training to more than 60 SQP States.

115. Sweden looked forward to continued good progress being made and to the early rescission of existing SQPs by Member States with nuclear facilities. It urged the Director General to produce periodic reports on the progress achieved.

116. Ms. BRIDGE (New Zealand)\* said that her Government had supported the Board's decision to modify the SQP in order to address a weakness in the safeguards system. New Zealand was a strong advocate of providing the Agency with all the necessary tools to draw adequate safeguards conclusions.

117. Her delegation was pleased that seven States had already accepted the modified SQP and that the Secretariat would continue to assess SQP States' implementation of the Board's decision. In particular, it welcomed the holding of the seminar in Sydney for SQP States from the Asia/Pacific region.

118. New Zealand, itself a SQP State, was currently working to conclude the exchange of letters which would give effect to the revised standardized SQP text and the modified criteria.

119. The CHAIRMAN, summing up the discussion, said that the Board had taken note of the Secretariat's report contained in document GOV/INF/2006/9. Several members had noted with appreciation the Secretariat's efforts in assisting States with SQPs to ensure the smooth implementation of the Board's decision of September 2005. Some members had requested further information regarding the legal implications of rescinding non-operational SQPs for States with nuclear facilities.

120. The Board had requested the Secretariat to keep it informed, as appropriate, of the progress achieved with regard to the Board's decision on that issue.

121. The Chairman's summing-up was accepted.

**(e) Advisory Committee on Safeguards and Verification within the Framework of the IAEA Statute — Progress report**

122. The CHAIRMAN recalled that the Advisory Committee had last met from 8 to 9 May 2006.

123. Ms. FEROUKHI (Algeria), Chairperson of the Advisory Committee on Safeguards and Verification within the Framework of the IAEA Statute, said that since her previous report to the Board on 25 November 2005 the Committee had convened two meetings, one in January and one in May 2006. She had continued her informal consultations with groups, interested Member States and the Secretariat on issues related to the work of the Committee and its funding.

124. The Secretariat had provided the Committee with a set of recommendations on measures to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system and on enhancing Agency satellite imagery capabilities, contained in Notes by the Secretariat 2006/Note 23 and 24, respectively. An

Information Note by the Secretariat, contained in document 2006/Note 22, on its activities to facilitate the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols had also been provided.

125. It had been clear from comments made by Member States during the Committee's meeting in May that questions remained regarding the technical, legal and financial aspects of the recommendations.

126. Subsequently, the eleven recommendations set out in document 2006/Note 23 and the six recommendations in document 2006/Note 24 had been recast in three categories: firstly, those that represented current existing legal obligations or were within the framework of document INFCIRC/153, and those that represented current existing legal obligations or were within the framework of document INFCIRC/540 (including parts of recommendations 1 and 2 as well as recommendations 3, 8 and 4); secondly, those regarding voluntary actions (including parts of recommendations 1 and 2 as well as recommendations 5, 6, 7 and 9); and thirdly, those that would expand the Agency's technical capabilities (recommendations 10 and 11 on the environmental sample analysis capabilities of the Agency and the network of laboratories, and the six recommendations concerning satellite imagery from document 2006/Note 24).

127. The recommendations put forward by the Secretariat were within the existing legal framework or were strictly voluntary. The Secretariat would be providing additional details on technical, legal and financial aspects of the recommendations for consideration by the Committee at its coming meeting in September 2006.

128. To ensure that any revised documents addressed Member States' questions and concerns, she had suggested that informal consultations with Member States be held during the week of the present June Board meetings to take advantage of the presence of Member States' technical experts. The idea of those informal consultations, which were now ongoing, was to provide participants with an opportunity to ensure that the Secretariat was aware of Member States' concerns regarding the proposed recommendations so that they could be properly addressed in a new note, which would be prepared by the Secretariat in anticipation of the Committee's forthcoming meeting.

129. She intended to continue the process of informal consultations to provide experts from Member States with the opportunity of exchanging views on the technical aspects of the recommendations regarding the enhancement of the Agency's technical capabilities, in particular those recommendations related to the network of laboratories and satellite imagery. Member States would be consulted on the appropriate dates for that informal exchange of views.

130. Furthermore, the Committee had noted a briefing which had been presented by the delegation from the United States of America on lessons learned regarding clandestine networks for the supply of nuclear technology and equipment.

131. At the session of the Programme and Budget Committee in May 2006, Member States had taken note of the Secretariat's suggestion that the meetings of the Policy-Making Organs could be funded from existing resources until the September meetings of the Board when, if necessary, the Secretariat would report to the Board with updated information on the funding situation.

132. The next meeting of the Committee was scheduled to take place on 26 September 2006. Members would be provided with the respective agenda and documents in due course. She looked forward to cooperating with all members to ensure a fruitful outcome of the Committee's work.

133. Mr. STELZER (Austria)\*, speaking on behalf of the EU and countries which associated themselves with its statement, said that the open-ended mechanism proposed by the Chairperson at the previous meeting of the Committee, and which had enjoyed the EU's support, had the potential for creating a positive environment for discussions.

134. The EU welcomed the ongoing regional consultations with a view to clarifying issues which would allow the Secretariat to further refine the supporting documentation. That exercise would enable substantive discussions to begin at the Committee's meeting in September 2006 with a view to making recommendations to the Board of Governors.

135. Mr. SUMI (Japan) said that his country's basic position with regard to the draft recommendations was that priority should be given to enhancing safeguards implementation and that the recommendations should be limited to investigating non-declared activities in those Member States which had not ratified an additional protocol.

136. In that regard, Japan asked the Agency to provide more detailed information on the content of the recommendations and the budget for them so as to facilitate discussions at future meetings of the Committee.

137. His delegation emphasized once again that funding for the Committee should be absorbed within the Regular Budget.

138. Mr. SCHULTE (United States of America) said that the various documents that had been issued by the Secretariat for the Committee's consideration served as a basis for serious discussions on ways and means of strengthening the Agency's safeguards system.

139. The United States welcomed the Chairperson's consultations with various regional groups during the present week, which contributed to the effective work of the Committee. His delegation encouraged further informal consultations throughout the summer on the technical, legal and financial aspects of the Secretariat's recommendations. Those efforts should help pave the way for the Committee to begin to reach common ground at its next meeting.

140. An important new stage had been reached in efforts to strengthen safeguards. The development and implementation of the Model Additional Protocol and integrated safeguards had shifted the focus of the safeguards system from the facility to the State level. It was now clear that the Board must approach the subject from a collaborative perspective in which all Member States had important roles to play. For example, the discussion in the Committee on lessons learned from illicit nuclear procurement networks showed that a number of States had instituted measures designed to prohibit, discourage or prevent the future involvement of their citizens in such clandestine proliferation activities. In turn, those measures helped to reduce the risk of undeclared nuclear activities and thus to strengthen the safeguards system. Also, those measures could contribute to implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and the export/import reporting provisions of the additional protocol. Greater cooperation and transparency in those critical areas would help the Agency and Member States investigate and shut down illicit trafficking and procurement networks. The Agency could make a unique contribution in that regard.

141. The Committee had at last begun to address significant issues, but much remained to be done before it could be said that it had fulfilled its mandate. His Government was committed to working with other members of the Committee to further strengthen the Agency safeguards system, increase the effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and improve mutual security.

142. Mr. MINTY (South Africa) reiterated his country's view that the Committee's work in safeguards and verification should be parallel to the international community's efforts to achieve irreversible, verifiable and complete nuclear disarmament leading to the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

143. The reports prepared by the Secretariat for the Committee's consideration, and in particular the recommendations contained therein, had provided ideas on how to structure the Committee's work.

There was already agreement on some of the recommendations, while others would require more in-depth consideration.

144. Ms. STOKES (Australia) said that at the Committee's May meetings, the Secretariat had put forward several useful recommendations on measures to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system. The Secretariat's thoughtful work now needed to be matched by serious deliberation in the Committee. The Committee should continue its work with a view to taking decisions that strengthened the safeguards system. Her delegation hoped that it would be able to move forward expeditiously.

145. Mr. KIM Sung-Hwan (Republic of Korea) said the Committee was already midway through its initial two-year mandate. To maintain momentum and to ensure that the Committee fully discharged its mandate, the Board needed to encourage it to step up its efforts to achieve tangible results. He underlined the Republic of Korea's strong commitment to contribute to that end.

146. Mr. SUN Qin (China) said his country supported efforts to strengthen international nuclear non-proliferation and to improve the Agency's safeguards system so as to adapt to the changing nuclear non-proliferation situation. China actively supported the work of the Committee and had participated constructively in its discussions.

147. Having noted that comprehensive safeguards agreements were not yet universal and that more additional protocols needed to be signed and ratified, he said priority should be given to universalization of the Agency's existing legal instruments. At the same time, independent, objective and accurate evaluation of verification results by the Agency was an important means of ensuring the effectiveness of the current safeguards system. For that reason China supported enhancing the Agency's technical verification capabilities, including improving its ability to analyse environmental samples and process satellite imagery. His Government was looking into joining the network of analytical laboratories.

148. The Secretariat had presented practical recommendations for strengthening the Agency's safeguards system. His delegation urged the Secretariat to elaborate on their technical, legal and financial implications for Member States and to intensify consultations with Member States with a view to achieving consensus.

149. Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) said the work of the Committee should focus on measures for improving the existing strengthened safeguards system. The Secretariat's proposals for enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the safeguards system and for strengthening the Agency's technical capabilities might indeed serve as a basis for the Committee's recommendations to the Board.

150. Unfortunately, one year after its establishment the Committee had made no perceptible progress towards preparing such recommendations. States held differing views about which priorities should be set. While that should come as no surprise as the Committee's work touched upon the interests of all Member States, regardless of whether they had nuclear programmes, materials or facilities, his delegation believed there was scope for the Committee to find common ground.

151. Ms. ZODELAVA (Georgia)\*, speaking on behalf of GUAM, expressed support for the Agency's programme to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of safeguards in order to enhance its ability to detect, deter and prevent nuclear proliferation. She welcomed the Committee's efforts to that end. At the same time, it was important for the Committee to proceed from general to organized results-oriented discussion.

152. The documents submitted by the Secretariat to the Committee, particularly Note by the Secretariat 2006/Note 23, provided a good basis for making progress. The recommendations contained

therein did, however, need to be amended and amplified. GUAM, convinced that promoting the universal application of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols should be a high priority of the Committee's work, supported recommendations 1 and 2 of that report. It also supported recommendations 10 and 11 and stressed that action was needed to improve the timeliness of the analysis of environmental sampling results.

153. Finally, she expressed GUAM's view that the cost of the Committee should be absorbed into the Regular Budget.

154. Mr. PROUDFOOT (Canada) thanked the Committee's Chairperson for her efforts to find a consensus on a work plan for the Committee. It was disappointing that despite those efforts and a year after its establishment, the Committee had yet to agree on how to proceed. Canada, which had hopes that the Committee would produce concrete recommendations to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system, called upon its members to focus on modest, achievable goals within the ambit of existing legal authorities.

155. The CHAIRMAN, summing up, said that the Board had expressed its appreciation to the Chairperson of the Advisory Committee for her report and efforts. The Board had noted the ongoing informal consultations taking place between the Secretariat and groups of Member States in order to enable experts from Member States to provide their views and seek clarification from the Secretariat on the recommendations under consideration by the Committee. The Board had requested the Chairperson of the Committee to report to it, as appropriate, on progress achieved in the Committee's work.

156. The Chairman's summing up was accepted.

**(f) Report by the Director General on the implementation of safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea**

157. The CHAIRMAN said that the Director General had last reported to the Board on the matter of the DPRK at the March meetings of the Board and had also referred to the Agency's position with regard to the issue in his introductory statement to the present meetings of the Board.

158. Ms. HUSSAIN (Malaysia)\*, speaking on behalf of NAM, said that the Foreign Ministers of the Movement had met in Putrajaya, Malaysia, for the Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of NAM from 27 to 30 May 2006 with the primary objective of reviewing the preparation for the 14th Conference of Heads of State or Government of NAM to be held in Cuba from 15 to 16 September 2006. The final document of that Ministerial Meeting had stated that while acknowledging the importance of guaranteeing durable peace and security on the Korean Peninsula for the sake of the common prosperity of the Korean people, as well as the peace and security of North East Asia and the rest of the world, the Ministers had expressed their support for efforts to reunify the Korean Peninsula through the genuine aspirations and concerted efforts of the Korean people themselves, as stated in the North-South Joint Declaration issued at the historic North-South summit talks held in Pyongyang on 15 June 2000. The final document also stated that the Ministers had expressed their desire for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and their continued support for the resumption of the six-party talks at the earliest possible date, stressing the latter's vital role in achieving a peaceful negotiated resolution to the nuclear issue. In that regard, they had further expressed their support for the joint statement of principles on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula of 19 September 2005 and for its expeditious and faithful implementation.

159. Mr. STELZER (Austria)\*, speaking on behalf of the EU, said that the acceding countries Bulgaria and Romania, the candidate countries Turkey, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates

Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine and Moldova associated themselves with his statement.

160. The EU remained seriously concerned by the fact that the DPRK's nuclear activities had been outside Agency verification since December 2002. The EU therefore urged the DPRK anew to comply with all its relevant international commitments fully, unconditionally and without delay, in particular with its NPT safeguards agreement. Such a step would re-establish the required containment and surveillance measures at the DPRK's nuclear facilities, and thus the full implementation of all required safeguards measures at all times, including the return of Agency inspectors.

161. The EU strongly urged the DPRK to abandon and dismantle fully any nuclear weapons related programme in a prompt, transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner. It renewed its call for the early resumption of the six-party talks as the most useful framework for negotiations.

162. Mr. TANG Guoqiang (China) said the six-party talks had made progress in 2005 and the fourth round had concluded in September with the adoption of the first joint statement made since the talks had begun. In that statement, the DPRK had made a commitment to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, to return promptly to the NPT and to accept Agency safeguards monitoring. During the first phase of the fifth round of talks in November 2005, the parties had explored in a serious and pragmatic manner ways of implementing that joint statement.

163. Currently, the six-party talks were experiencing difficulties, with the financial issue becoming a new stumbling block. To resume the talks as swiftly as possible, China had been engaging in active mediation. It had conducted an in-depth exchange of views with both the United States of America and the DPRK. The DPRK had repeatedly reiterated that it was ready to implement the joint statement, but that it would not talk about abandoning its nuclear programmes under the shadow of the threat of sanctions.

164. The difficulties encountered by the talks highlighted the importance of bridging differences and building mutual trust through dialogue. They also showed that the parties needed to put into action their political commitments in a constructive manner so that the talks could make steady progress.

165. The Korean Peninsula nuclear issue was crucial to peace and stability in North East Asia. China hoped that the concerned parties would focus on the major issues, deal with problems in an appropriate way and bring about the prompt denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

166. Mr. KIM Sung-Hwan (Republic of Korea) expressed disappointment that the six-party talks had not been resumed since November 2005 to discuss the implementation of the joint statement of September 2005. The parties participating in those talks had exerted various diplomatic efforts to overcome the present situation and resume the talks. His Government hoped that the DPRK would respond positively to those efforts by making a realistic and well-considered decision to return to the negotiating table at the earliest possible date.

167. The Government of the Republic of Korea would continue in its endeavours to resume the six-party talks and to make substantial progress in resolving the DPRK nuclear issue in consultation with the other parties concerned, based on confirmed support for the talks and determination to implement the joint statement. In that regard, the Republic of Korea counted on the continued support and advice of the international community, including the Agency.

168. Mr. SUMI (Japan) said that the DPRK's nuclear weapons and nuclear programmes posed a direct threat to peace and stability in North East Asia. They also posed a serious challenge to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. In spite of a number of General Conference resolutions

on the issue, the DPRK was still not implementing comprehensive Agency safeguards and had been refusing to cooperate with the Agency to that end.

169. In the joint statement adopted after the fourth round of six-party talks, the DPRK had made a commitment to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes and to return at an early date to the NPT and Agency safeguards. It was now essential to achieve concrete agreement on verification issues and specific procedures for the prompt and verifiable dismantlement of all nuclear weapons and nuclear programmes by the DPRK. In that regard, Japan stressed the importance of the Agency's essential verification role.

170. Although, at the first session of the fifth round of the six-party talks, held in November 2005, the parties had agreed to formulate concrete plans, measures and steps to give effect to the joint statement, the DPRK had not upheld its side of the agreement. Japan strongly urged the DPRK to fulfil the commitments it had made in the joint statement and comply with all international agreements related to nuclear issues, including the NPT, and implement fully and promptly the comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency.

171. Like China, Japan had been making efforts to bring about an early resumption of the six-party talks. It had held intensive discussions with the other parties concerned in April 2006, when most of the heads of delegation to the six-party talks had been in Tokyo to attend a conference on North East Asia cooperation dialogue. Despite such efforts, the DPRK had refused to return to the negotiating table, raising a matter which was not related to the talks — an attitude that Japan deemed unconstructive. The DPRK should return to the six-party talks without any preconditions. Japan would continue to make every effort, both within the framework of the six-party talks and through other diplomatic channels, to resolve the issue.

172. Mr. PROUDFOOT (Canada) said that the six-party talks, which had yielded a joint statement in September 2005, represented the best path towards the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. However, the talks could not achieve their objective if they were interrupted by issues extraneous to the central problem. Canada therefore hoped that the DPRK would return to the negotiating table without preconditions.

173. The DPRK's nuclear activities and the lack of safeguards pursuant to the NPT continued to be a cause for concern. Canada was disappointed that the SIR for 2005 reported that the Secretariat was unable to draw any conclusions about the State's nuclear material or activities. The DPRK's declaration in February 2005 to the effect that it possessed nuclear weapons had only deepened Canada's concerns.

174. Canada hoped that the DPRK would start as soon as possible to fulfil the commitments it had undertaken in the joint statement to dismantle its nuclear weapons and its existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. Canada also hoped that the DPRK would return to the NPT and comply fully with the safeguards obligations pursuant thereto.

175. Mr. SCHULTE (United States of America) said that, in the joint statement of principles adopted at the fourth round of the six-party talks in September 2005, the DPRK had made a commitment to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes and to return at an early date to the NPT and Agency safeguards. The fifth round of talks had begun the following November. All the parties had agreed to meet again at the earliest possible date and work on an implementation arrangement to achieve the objectives of the joint statement, the most important of which was the complete and verifiable elimination of the DPRK's nuclear programmes. While all other parties were prepared to return to the table, the DPRK had thus far refused, on a number of pretexts unrelated to the six-party talks. That country's sustained unwillingness to return to the talks raised a serious question as to whether it had decided to eliminate its nuclear programmes. Meanwhile, the DPRK continued to

pursue such programmes. The continued production of fissile material, including the operation of the 5 MW reactor at Yongbyon, was inconsistent with the substance and purpose of the joint statement and the six-party talks.

176. The joint statement had provided a desirable outcome of the six-party process, whereby all parties stood to benefit. In return for the commitments made by the DPRK, the other parties had offered to provide security assurances and had undertaken to promote economic cooperation in energy, trade and investment. There would also be steps towards the normalization of relations, consistent with bilateral policies. The implementation of the joint statement would provide a new and better future for the North Korean people, as well as new-found security and opportunities for the East Asia region and beyond.

177. The international community continued to have serious concerns about the DPRK's nuclear programmes. Resolution GC(48)/RES/15 had urged the DPRK to completely dismantle any nuclear weapons programme in a prompt, transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner, maintaining the essential verification role of the Agency. The United States noted that any transfer of nuclear material or nuclear weapons or a long-range missile test would undermine the basis for the negotiated settlement desired from the six-party talks. While the nuclear issue was critical, the DPRK would also need to address other issues that divided it from the international community. It must abandon such criminal activities as currency counterfeiting and smuggling, illicit financial transfers and narcotics trafficking. It must also end its proliferation of weapons, particularly missile delivery systems and of the material, components, equipment and technology to develop them. It must cease all illicit and proliferation activities if it was to receive the benefits of normalized relations and the economic assistance that its people so desperately needed. Relevant United States regulatory matters in the financial realm as they pertained to the DPRK had been discussed directly with the DPRK in New York in March 2006. The United States was prepared to continue discussions on all issues of concern in the context of the six-party talks.

178. The United States envisioned a key role for the Agency in verifying the implementation of any denuclearization agreement for the DPRK and in the implementation of safeguards, including the additional protocol. It was prepared to work closely with the Agency to ensure that it was able to carry out those responsibilities and was confident that the Agency, would be able to do so. The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula continued to be a regional and global priority. The DPRK must realize that the pursuit of nuclear programmes had not made it more secure and they must be abandoned.

179. It was essential to move quickly to implement the goals outlined in the joint statement. They offered a comprehensive resolution to the concerns of all parties. The United States looked forward to working with all parties, including the DPRK, to achieve the complete, verifiable and irreversible elimination of all North Korean nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes and for a new, peaceful and prosperous future for all the countries in North East Asia. The DPRK had the opportunity to participate fully in that process. The alternative was continued international isolation.

180. Mr. MINTY (South Africa) thanked all parties engaged in efforts to continue with the implementation of the steps agreed in the joint statement of September 2005. His country urged them to explore all avenues of dialogue and diplomacy to establish durable peace and security in that part of the world.

181. Early resumption of the six-party talks to discuss the practicalities of the necessary actions by all parties was essential with a view to guaranteeing security and safety for future generations in a world free of nuclear weapons.



182. South Africa called upon the DPRK to terminate in a full and verifiable manner any nuclear weapons programme, to return to the NPT and to open all its nuclear facilities and material to comprehensive Agency safeguards. It encouraged all parties urgently to seek coordinated measures in accordance with the agreed “commitment for commitment, action for action” principle.

183. Ms. STOKES (Australia) expressed concern at the DPRK’s ongoing refusal to re-engage in the six-party process. Australia strongly urged that country to return immediately and unconditionally to the six-party talks. The DPRK’s nuclear activities posed a serious threat to regional and international security and to the integrity of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The talks were the most viable mechanism for the DPRK to gain international confidence in its commitment to denuclearization and to achieve normalized relations with the international community, gain security assurances and maximize its economic potential.

184. Her country called on the DPRK to work towards the implementation of its commitments under the joint statement, most notably to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes and return at an early date to compliance with the NPT and its Agency safeguards obligations.

185. Australia stood ready to contribute to any assistance package negotiated through the six-party talks, including through energy assistance, bilateral development assistance and safeguards expertise.

186. Mr. GAFOOR (Singapore) expressed deep concern that the Agency was still unable to draw any conclusions regarding the DPRK’s nuclear programme. The situation in the DPRK threatened regional and international security and also the integrity of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Singapore strongly urged the DPRK to return to the NPT, resume cooperation with the Agency, accept full Agency safeguards and abandon any nuclear weapons programme in a prompt, transparent and verifiable manner.

187. The six-party talks offered the possibility of finding a comprehensive solution to the DPRK issue through peaceful and diplomatic means. In that connection, Singapore urged the DPRK to return to negotiations as soon as possible without imposing any conditions and to work towards the objective of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula.

188. Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) said that his country hoped for a just settlement of the nuclear problem on the Korean Peninsula by political and diplomatic means. Implementation of the joint declaration of September 2005 was crucial. It was highly significant that, at the first session of the fifth round of talks in November 2005, all the parties had not only confirmed their adherence to the agreement reached, but also made new constructive proposals for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

189. Unfortunately, the six-party talks had been stalled. Russia hoped that the concerned parties could find a speedy resolution to the problems standing in the way of resumption and that the talks would continue until all matters related to ensuring the DPRK's nuclear-weapon-free status had been completely resolved. In so doing, full use should be made of the Agency’s unique verification experience and technical resources.

190. Ms. BRIDGE (New Zealand)\* recalled that it had been three and a half years since the Agency had been able to draw any conclusions regarding the DPRK’s nuclear activities. The situation continued to be of concern to her country. New Zealand urged all those involved in the six-party talks not to lose the opportunity created by the joint statement of September 2005 and to resume the talks in order to work towards an enduring negotiated solution to the issue.

191. The CHAIRMAN, summing up, said that several members had stated that they regarded the DPRK nuclear issue as a serious challenge to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and had urged the DPRK to dismantle completely any nuclear weapons programme in a prompt,

transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner, maintaining the essential verification role of the Agency.

192. Concern had been expressed that the DPRK had not permitted any Agency verification activities since December 2002, and thus the Agency was still not in a position to provide any assurances about nuclear material and activities in the DPRK.

193. The Board had emphasized the importance of continued dialogue to achieve a peaceful and comprehensive resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue.

194. In that regard, the Board had recalled the joint statement of the fourth round of the six-party talks, in which, inter alia, the DPRK had expressed its commitment to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes and to returning at an early date to the NPT and Agency safeguards. The Board looked forward to the resumption of the six-party talks at the earliest possible date, as well as to the early implementation of the commitments contained in the joint statement.

195. The Board had expressed appreciation for the efforts of those involved in the six-party talks, in particular China, as Chair of those talks.

196. The Board had also expressed the view that a successfully negotiated settlement of that long-standing issue, maintaining the essential verification role of the Agency, would be a significant accomplishment for international peace and security.

197. The Board had requested the Director General to keep it informed of future developments.

198. The Chairman's summing up was accepted.

**The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.**