IAEA Board of Governors

Record of the 1175th Meeting
GOV/OR.1175

# Measures to strengthen international cooperation in nuclear, radiation and transport safety and waste management

IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency

# Board of Governors

**GOV/OR.1175**
Issued: March 2007

**Restricted Distribution**
Original: English

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# Record of the 1175th Meeting

*Held at Headquarters, Vienna, on Monday, 5 March 2007, at 10.40 a.m.*

## Contents



[1] GOV/2007/12.

## Attendance

(The list below gives the name of the senior member of each delegation who attended the meeting, as well as that of any other member whose statement is summarized in this record.)

| | |
|---|---|
| Mr. PETRIČ | Chairman (Slovenia) |
| | |
| Mr. CURIA | Argentina |
| Mr. SHANNON | Australia |
| Mr. STELZER | Austria |
| Mr. GAISENAK | Belarus |
| Mr. BAZOBERRY | Bolivia |
| Mr. VALLIM GUERREIRO | Brazil |
| Ms. GERVAIS-VIDRICAIRE | Canada |
| Mr. SKOKNIC | Chile |
| Mr. TANG Guoqiang | China |
| Mr. ARÉVALO YÉPES | Colombia |
| Mr. HORVATIĆ | Croatia |
| Ms. GOICOCHEA ESTENOZ | Cuba |
| Mr. RAMZY | Egypt |
| Mr. KEBEDE | Ethiopia |
| Ms. KAUPPI | Finland |
| Mr. CARON | France |
| Mr. GOTTWALD | Germany |
| Mr. SOTIROPOULOS | Greece |
| Mr. SHARMA | India |
| Mr. WIBOWO | Indonesia |
| Mr. AMANO | Japan |
| Mr. KIM Sung-Hwan | Korea, Republic of |
| Mr. GASHUT | Libyan Arab Jamahiriya |
| Mr. ZNIBER | Morocco |
| Mr. OWOSENI | Nigeria |
| Mr. JOHANSEN | Norway |
| Mr. ALI | Pakistan |
| Mr. BERDENNIKOV | Russian Federation |
| Mr. KRIŽ | Slovenia |
| Mr. MINTY | South Africa |
| Ms. MELIN | Sweden |
| Mr. OTHMAN | Syrian Arab Republic |
| Mr. PANUPONG | Thailand |
| Mr. MACGREGOR | United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland |
| Mr. SCHULTE | United States of America |
| | |
| Mr. ELBARADEI | Director General |
| Mr. TANIGUCHI | Deputy Director General, Department of Nuclear Safety and Security |
| Mr. ANING | Secretary of the Board |

**Representatives of the following Member States also attended the meeting:**

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Montenegro, Mongolia, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

**Abbreviations used in this record:**

| | |
|---|---|
| BSS | International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources |
| CANDU | Canada deuterium-uranium [reactor] |
| DPRK | Democratic People's Republic of Korea |
| GRULAC | Latin American and Caribbean Group |
| IATA | International Air Transport Association |
| ICAO | International Civil Aviation Organization |
| ICRP | International Commission on Radiological Protection |
| ILO | International Labour Organization |
| IMO | International Maritime Organization |
| INLEX | International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability |
| INPRO | International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles |
| INSAG | International Nuclear Safety Group |
| IRRS | Integrated Regulatory Review Service |
| Joint Convention | Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management |
| NEPAD | New Partnership for Africa’s Development |
| NPP | nuclear power plant |
| NPT | Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons |
| OECD/IEA | International Energy Agency of the OECD |

**Abbreviations used in this record** (continued):

| | |
|---|---|
| OECD/NEA | Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development |
| SAL | Safeguards Analytical Laboratory |
| SIT | sterile insect technique |
| SMR | small and medium-sized reactor |
| Transport Regulations | Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material |
| TranSAS | Transport Safety Appraisal Service |
| UNSCEAR | United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation |
| WANO | World Association of Nuclear Operators |
| WHO | World Health Organization |

* Speakers under Rule 50 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure are indicated by an asterisk.

# – Opening of the meeting

1. The CHAIRMAN welcomed participants, including the new Governors (Mr. Vallim Guerreiro of Brazil , Mr. Ali of Pakistan and Mr. Macgregor of the United Kingdom), the new Resident Representatives (Rev. Monsignor Michael W. Banach of the Holy See, Mr. Garčević of the Republic of Montenegro, Ms. Damían Karekides of Panama, Mr. Higueras Ramos of Peru, Mr. Zmeyevskiy of the Russian Federation, Mr. Sylla of Senegal and Mr. Al-Alwani of Yemen) and the new Chargé d'Affaires of Uzbekistan, Mr. Yusupov.

# – Adoption of the agenda
(GOV/2007/6/Rev.1)

2. The CHAIRMAN invited the Board to adopt the revised provisional agenda contained in document GOV/2007/6/Rev.1.

3. The agenda was adopted.

# 1. Introductory Statement by the Director General

4. The DIRECTOR GENERAL said that the agenda for the Board's meetings related to all three of the Agency's areas of activity — nuclear technology, safety and verification.

5. Referring to the draft *Nuclear Technology Review 2007* (GOV/2007/3) and an information document entitled *Considerations to Launch a Nuclear Power Programme* (GOV/INF/2007/2), he said that the former reported on developments in the past year in nuclear power and non-power applications, while the latter was part of the Agency's response to those developments.

6. Nuclear power remained on a plateau in terms of installed capacity. Expansion in some regions had been balanced by the retirement of nuclear power reactors in others. In 2006, eight nuclear power reactors had been retired (in Bulgaria, Slovakia, Spain and the United Kingdom), while two new reactors had been connected to the grid (in China and India) and construction had begun on another five (in China, the Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation).

7. Expectations for future growth remained high, as reflected in: the ambitious expansion plans of countries like China, India, the Russian Federation and South Africa; more moderate plans in countries such as Argentina, Finland and France; licence application work for new plants in the United States; more favourable policies towards nuclear power in several countries with nuclear power programmes; plans for new construction in some newcomer countries, such as Indonesia, Turkey and Vietnam; and announcements by some other countries that they were moving in the direction of a nuclear power programme. That picture contrasted sharply with the nuclear power scene of only a few years earlier.

8. According to the *World Energy Outlook 2006*, an analysis of global energy trends published by OECD/IEA in November 2006, if current consumption trends and government policies continued, there would be a 53 per cent increase in global energy consumption by 2030.

9. Two aspects of that analysis were especially interesting. The first was that 70 per cent of the coming growth in energy demand was expected to be from developing countries. The second was that, for the first time ever, OECD/IEA had stated that the increased use of nuclear power would help to meet the increase in energy demand, enhance the security of energy supply and mitigate carbon emissions.

10. Nuclear energy alone was obviously not a panacea, but the indicated trends suggested that it would have an increasing role as part of the global energy mix.

11. For the Agency, one result of those trends was an increase in requests from Member States for guidance and advice. The latest technical cooperation cycle had produced a substantial increase in requests for Agency energy assessment and planning services. Through those services, which treated all energy sources equally, the Secretariat provided energy planning models tailored to each country's special circumstances. It trained local experts to forecast energy demand, identify least-cost options and bring those and other factors together into a national decision-making process. To date, the Secretariat had been able to accommodate all of the requests made by Member States.

12. To provide a focal point for assistance with subsequent steps in nuclear power planning, the Secretariat had established an interdepartmental nuclear power support group. Also, it had produced, with inputs from Member States, information document GOV/INF/2007/2, which summarized key considerations from all perspectives — safety, security, infrastructure development, technical cooperation, legal, etc. — for countries contemplating the launch of a nuclear power programme.

13. INPRO was moving to Phase 2, as agreed by the INPRO Steering Committee. Member States were submitting proposals for collaborative projects, to be coordinated within the INPRO framework, relating to the development or analysis of specific features of innovative reactor systems. Also, as requested by the General Conference, common user requirements for SMRs were being developed.

14. Nuclear applications were continuing to be used around the world in improving human and animal health, in aiding food production, in managing groundwater more effectively, in protecting marine and terrestrial environments and in providing other societal benefits.

15. For example, with Agency support, the Southern Tsetse Eradication Project in Ethiopia was to move later in 2007 from the preparatory to the operational phase of applying the SIT. Tsetse population suppression activities had been initiated in some areas in preparation for the first pilot releases of sterile flies, currently scheduled for the second half of 2007. Such suppression activities had already reduced the prevalence of nagana disease in livestock in the areas treated.

16. Also, the Agency was continuing to assist Member States in building capacity to produce food crops with improved characteristics. In Peru, for example, nine mutant varieties of barley developed with Agency support now covered 90 per cent of the barley-producing area. The crops were being planted in the Andes, in harsh climatic conditions. Since gaining access to the improved varieties of barley, the Andean population had experienced a sustained improvement in food and economic security.

17. The draft *Nuclear Safety Review for the Year 2006* provided an overview of current and emerging nuclear safety trends and issues. Nuclear power plant safety, and also radiation, waste and transport safety in both power and non-power nuclear activities, had continued to show strong performance worldwide.

18. As the draft document pointed out, it was essential that plans for new nuclear power development and other uses of nuclear technology be complemented with equally ambitious plans for sustainable safety infrastructures.

19. The recently established Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) was intended to help Member States enhance their legislative and regulatory infrastructures and to harmonize regulatory approaches in all areas of safety. Also, it would be one of the most effective feedback tools on the application of Agency standards. The first full-scope IRRS mission had been conducted in 2006, in France.

20. In December 2006, a conference held in Athens had provided a forum for an exchange of information on all aspects of the decommissioning of nuclear facilities. It had highlighted the importance of incorporating insights gained from decommissioning into facility design, operation and maintenance. Participants had stressed the need to improve decommissioning funding and cost estimates and the advantages of immediate dismantling as a decommissioning strategy.

21. In recent years, the safety record of the transport of radioactive material had been strong. However, denials of shipments of radioactive material continued to occur. The Secretariat had established an international steering committee to help address that issue. Two workshops, for Latin America and Asia, were scheduled for the coming months. They would focus on sensitizing persons involved in transport operations — both from industry and from regulatory bodies — to the need to resolve local issues such as overlapping regulations, perception problems and training requirements. The Secretariat had used new communication channels to ensure that IMO was involved in solving particular cases.

22. The nuclear non-proliferation regime continued to face challenges. He was concerned about the fact that 30 countries had still not fulfilled their legal obligations under the NPT to conclude and bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements. He was also concerned about the comparatively slow progress in the conclusion and entry into force of additional protocols, there being more than 100 countries still without an additional protocol in force. The Agency could provide no assurance with regard to countries that had no safeguards agreement in force and only limited assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in countries that did not have an additional protocol in force.

23. On 23 February 2007, he had received from the DPRK an invitation to visit that country in order to "develop the relations between the DPRK and the Agency, as well as to discuss problems of mutual concerns". Also, he had been notified by China, in its capacity as Chairman of the Six-Party Talks, of the "initial actions for the implementation of the joint statement" adopted in Beijing on 13 February 2007. As indicated in document GOV/INF/2007/6, those actions envisioned, inter alia, the DPRK shutting down and sealing, for the purposes of eventual abandonment, its Yongbyon nuclear facilities, including the reprocessing facility, and the return of Agency personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring and verification. He welcomed the Beijing agreement and the invitation to visit the DPRK as positive steps towards the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the normalization of the DPRK's relationship with the Agency. He would report to the Board on developments and any required action.

24. The Board had before it, in document GOV/2007/8, a report on the *Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006) in the Islamic Republic of Iran* and, in document GOV/2007/7, a report on *Cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Agency in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006)*. As could be seen from document GOV/2007/8, Iran had suspended neither its enrichment related

activities nor its heavy water related projects, as required by the Security Council as a confidence-building measure.

25. Pursuant to the aforementioned Security Council resolution, the Secretariat had reviewed the Agency's cooperation with Iran and made the necessary adjustments to that cooperation. Also, it had put mechanisms in place to monitor its ongoing activities in Iran, in order to ensure continuing compliance with the resolution.

26. The Agency had been verifying Iran's nuclear programme for the past four years, with the aim of providing the required assurances that all nuclear material in Iran had been declared to it and was under safeguards.

27. The present situation was something of a stalemate. The Agency had been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. However, it remained unable to reconstruct fully the history of Iran's nuclear programme and some of its components, because Iran had not provided it with the necessary level of transparency and cooperation. The Agency had not seen concrete proof of the diversion of nuclear material, nor the industrial capacity to produce weapon-usable nuclear material — an important consideration in assessing the risk. However, quite a few uncertainties remained about experiments and procurement and other activities relevant to the Agency's understanding of the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear programme. That rendered the Agency unable to provide the required assurance about the peaceful nature of that programme.

28. The Iranian verification case was *sui generis.* The confidence of the Agency about the nature of Iran's nuclear programme had been shaken because of two decades of undeclared activities. Its confidence would be restored only when Iran took the long-overdue decision to answer all the Agency's questions about its past nuclear activities in an open and transparent manner. Until that time, the Agency would have no option but to reserve its judgement about Iran's nuclear programme, and as a result the international community would continue to express concern.

29. The decision of Iran to link its readiness to resolve the Agency's concerns to actions by the Security Council was difficult to understand. Only through full cooperation with the Agency as the independent verification body, and irrespective of any progress or lack thereof in its negotiations with other relevant parties, could Iran dispel the doubts about its nuclear programme. Assurances given by the Agency about Iran's nuclear programme would undoubtedly facilitate a solution to the Iranian issue that would, on one hand, take full account of Iran's right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and, on the other, provide the necessary level of confidence to the international community about Iran's nuclear programme and its future direction.

30. He hoped that conditions would be created soon for the resumption of negotiations between Iran and all relevant parties. Only through negotiations could a comprehensive and durable solution to the Iranian nuclear question and related issues be attained.

31. The Programme and Budget Committee had considered the Agency's *Draft Programme and Budget 2008–2009* at an informal session on 15 February 2007. In formulating the draft programme and budget, the Secretariat had done considerable reshaping within programmes, reprioritizing and retiring activities where appropriate, and had captured efficiency gains where possible.

32. In document GOV/2007/1, the Secretariat identified, as a separate category, 'essential investments' — extraordinary, unavoidable expenses needed in order, inter alia, to shore up the ageing infrastructure of the Agency's laboratories, to purchase special equipment and services for new facilities coming under safeguards and to enable the Agency's financial, procurement and other systems to comply with the International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS).

33. The Agency's role was continuing to expand, with Member States demanding more and better services. The Secretariat could do more, but it needed adequate resources. He had a duty to present the Board with budget estimates and essential investments that he considered necessary for effectively responding to the requests of Member States. Even with the budget estimates presented, the ability of the Agency to meet its responsibilities would remain in a precarious state.

34. For example, the particle analysis of environmental samples was one of the cornerstones of modern safeguards, but SAL had never had the equipment necessary for performing the most sensitive analyses and had to depend on a few Member States, and it was unable to independently validate the results through its own measurements. Also, for performing particle analyses at 'normal sensitivity' levels SAL's 'workhorse' instrument was now some 28 years old and urgently needed to be replaced.

35. There were several other examples he could have cited in demonstrating how critical the Agency's financial situation had become.

36. Security and development continued to be among the most daunting challenges facing humanity, and the Agency's work remained central to those intertwined challenges. The Secretariat needed the support of Member States in order to carry out its mission effectively.

## 2. Applications for membership of the Agency (GOV/2007/11 and 14)

37. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to the applications for membership of the Agency submitted by the Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Burundi in documents GOV/2007/11 and 14 respectively.

38. Mr. TANG Guoqiang (China), welcoming those applications for membership, said that his Government looked forward to working with the Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Burundi in pursuing the Agency's goals.

39. Ms. GERVAIS-VIDRICAIRE (Canada), welcoming the two applications, urged the Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Burundi to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in a timely manner.

40. Mr. MINTY (South Africa) said that, after many years of restraint and caution, a nuclear renaissance appeared to be occurring. With growing energy requirements worldwide and the need for safe, environmentally friendly and more cost-effective energy production options, more and more States wished to draw on the Agency's experience in the interests of socio-economic development and energy supply security.

41. On the African continent in particular, the Agency was contributing to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, and South Africa, which welcomed the Agency's interaction with NEPAD, regarded the applications of the Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Burundi as an indication of the growing importance of nuclear energy for Africa.

42. The CHAIRMAN took it that the Board wished to recommend to the General Conference that it approve the Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Burundi for membership of the Agency.

43. It was so decided.

# 3. Measures to strengthen international cooperation in nuclear, radiation and transport safety and waste management
(GOV/2007/2, GOV/INF/2007/1, 2007/Note 4, 2007/Note 5)

44. The CHAIRMAN, introducing the agenda item, recalled that the draft *Nuclear Safety Review for the Year 2006* (document GOV/2007/2) had been the subject of a Secretariat briefing for Member States on 26 February.

45. Mr. TANIGUCHI (Deputy Director General for Nuclear Safety and Security), introducing the draft *Nuclear Safety Review for the Year 2006*, said that — as in previous Nuclear Safety Reviews — the main theme was the increasingly global nature of nuclear safety issues. Everyone had been 'in the same boat' since the Chernobyl accident, and, as indicated in the draft document before the Board, it was essential that plans for new and reinvigorated nuclear power development be complemented by equally ambitious plans for effective and sustainable safety infrastructures.

46. Comments on the draft document and on 2007/Note 4 and 2007/Note 5 would be duly reflected in the final version of the *Nuclear Safety Review for the Year 2006*, to be submitted to the General Conference in September, if the Secretariat received them before 1 June 2007.

47. Referring to document GOV/INF/2007/1, on the main outcomes of the International Conference on Lessons Learned from the Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities and the Safe Termination of Nuclear Activities, held in December 2006 in Athens, he said that the Secretariat would be proposing adjustments to the International Action Plan on the Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities and reporting those outcomes to — among others — the Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention.

48. Referring to the International Conference on the Challenges faced by Technical and Scientific Support Organizations in Enhancing Nuclear Safety that was due to take place from 23 to 27 April in France, he said that technical and scientific support organizations (TSOs) played a vital role in supporting national regulators and safety infrastructures. The International Conference — the first to address TSO issues in a comprehensive manner — would focus on developing a global vision with regard to TSOs and on formulating recommendations for future action.

49. Mr. ECHAVÁRRI (Director-General, OECD/NEA), thanking the Board for the opportunity to describe NEA activities relevant to the draft *Nuclear Safety Review for the Year 2006*, said that he would also describe activities relevant to the *Nuclear Technology Review 2007*.

50. OECD's new Secretary-General, Mr. Angel Gurría, who had taken office in June 2006, had underlined the importance of objectively assessing nuclear power as a component of sound energy policies and had expressed support for the activities of the NEA within OECD.

51. Later during the current month, the Russian Federation and NEA would be signing a joint declaration on cooperation. Within the framework of the envisaged cooperation, the Russian Federation would become a regular observer in all NEA standing technical committees and working groups and a key partner in the future work of NEA.

52. The Agency and NEA had continued to cooperate closely during the past twelve months, with many activities carried out jointly and with well-balanced mutual representation in committees and working groups. The latest annual coordination meeting, held early in February, had resulted in a good understanding of how to approach future activities of common interest. NEA considered the cooperation between the two organizations to be very important.

53. In the area of nuclear safety, operating experience feedback was a key element in maintaining and improving the safety of nuclear power plants. Recognizing that fact, NEA had — together with the Agency and WANO — organized a conference on improving nuclear safety through operating experience feedback that had taken place in May 2006, hosted by Germany's Gesellschaft fuer Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) and the German electricity utilities.

54. In an NEA Regulatory Forum that was to be held in June 2007, in Paris, top-level representatives of regulatory authorities and government agencies, nuclear industry leaders and other stakeholders would examine how regulatory bodies might systematically collect and analyse all available safety-related information with a view to arriving at integrated judgements regarding the acceptability of the safety levels at the nuclear facilities regulated by them.

55. The number of ageing nuclear power plants was increasing, and all NEA member countries concerned had launched ageing management programmes based on state-of-the-art technology. With financial and technical support from Japan, NEA had initiated a programme for the establishment of databases on stress corrosion cracking and the ageing of cable insulation, the ultimate goal being recommended ageing management practices.

56. Regarding the safety of nuclear fuel cycle facilities, NEA was organizing an international workshop, to be held in October in the United States, on how to ensure safety at present and future facilities, considering issues such as fire, human factors and ageing.

57. NEA was participating in the Multinational Design Evaluation Program (MDEP) that had been launched by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the purpose of which was to improve the efficiency of design safety reviews of new nuclear power plants. MDEP Stage 1, being carried out under a trilateral agreement between the regulatory authorities of the United States, France and Finland, was focusing on the design review of the European Pressurized Water Reactor (EPR). MDEP Stage 2, in which the Agency was participating and that was aimed at achieving multinational convergence of safety codes, standards and goals and common regulatory practices, involved ten countries that had already made commitments to 'new build' or had firm plans to make such commitments in the near future. The heads of the regulatory authorities of the participating countries had agreed to launch two pilot projects, one on the licensing basis and scope of design safety reviews and the one on component manufacturing oversight, and it was expected that the pilot projects would be completed within a year. In MDEP Stage 3, the results of Stage 2 would be drawn on with a view to facilitating the licensing of new reactors, including ones being developed within the framework of the Generation IV International Forum.

58. In the field of radiation protection, NEA was continuing direct collaborative interactions with ICRP in the form of workshops and expert group assessments of draft ICRP reports.

59. NEA was committed to helping with the updating of the BSS to reflect the latest developments in the radiation protection field, including those addressed in recent ICRP recommendations. It would contribute to the revision of the BSS in all areas, but particularly emergency management.

60. Co-sponsorship of the revised BSS by international organizations representing different interests in the field of radiation protection would be of utmost importance for their broad acceptance, and he was therefore pleased that a BSS Secretariat had been established under Agency leadership to facilitate collaboration among co-sponsoring organizations. He hoped that all involved would work together efficiently and effectively in developing the new BSS on the basis of the consensual views of a wide range of experts representing the various constituencies of the participating international organizations. The expertise available in the relevant NEA committees and expert groups would undoubtedly contribute to revision of the BSS within an appropriate time frame.

61. The 2005 edition of the 'Red Book', the NEA/Agency reference publication on *Uranium: Resources, Production and Demand*, had been issued in June 2006. A joint press conference given in Paris by Agency Deputy Director General Sokolov and himself on that occasion had helped to ensure that the key message of the 'Red Book' — that there was plenty of uranium available to fuel an expansion of nuclear power — had been widely reported in the general press as well as in the specialized press. Work was well under way on the joint preparation of the 2007 edition of the 'Red Book'.

62. NEA, which was participating in the work of the INPRO Steering Committee, was supporting the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) by acting as its Technical Secretariat. China and the Russian Federation had joined the GIF, and it was expected that they would accede to the intergovernmental framework agreement launching the cooperation phase of the GIF before the end of 2007.

63. He was grateful to the Director General and Secretariat of the Agency for their continuous cooperation with the NEA. Close coordination between the Agency and NEA was a key element in enhancing the efficiency of the two organizations.

64. Mr. ELDIN ELAMIN (Sudan)*, speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, said that the Group, which had greatly appreciated the Secretariat briefing on the draft *Nuclear Safety Review for the Year 2006*, was pleased that implementation of the Action Plan for the Development and Application of IAEA Safety Standards had led to their improvement and to an increase in their utilization by Member States.

65. Referring to paragraph 41 of the draft, he said that the Group noted with satisfaction that INSAG's conclusion that "the existing Global Nuclear Safety Regime is functioning at an effective level today". At the same time, it had noted with interest the recommendations made by INSAG increasing the impact of that safety regime.

66. Referring to paragraph 46 of the draft document, where it was stated that more than 100 Member States receiving technical assistance from the Agency in radiation safety "had made progress towards achieving the necessary sustainable radiation safety", he urged the Secretariat to continue with its financial and technical assistance to Member States in the radiation safety area, to increase its financial support for training activities, particularly postgraduate training courses, and to consider concluding long-term agreements with institutions hosting such courses.

67. The Group remained of the view that, notwithstanding the good record in the field of nuclear safety and radiation protection, there was no room for complacency. Member States should continue to strengthen their national infrastructures in line with improved Agency safety standards and with technological developments.

68. The Group, which shared the view expressed in the first sentence of paragraph 57 of the draft *Nuclear Safety Review for the Year 2006*, looked forward to cooperating with the Secretariat in devising comprehensive and multifaceted approaches to succession planning and to the establishment of education and training programmes and of quality management programmes.

69. Referring to the first sentence of paragraph 58 of the draft document, he said that the Group would like strong emphasis to be placed on providing appropriate responses to the needs of developing Member States.

70. The Group, which had noted with concern the information about nuclear and radiological incidents given in the draft document, would like the Secretariat to help identify areas where training was needed in order to prevent the occurrence of such incidents. Also to that end, Member States should exchange information about emergency-related experiences within the framework of the

relevant conventions and the Secretariat should further strengthen the Agency's Incident and Emergency Centre and help to enhance Member States' capabilities for responding to emergencies and security incidents.

71. The Group, which had taken note of the assistance being provided by the Secretariat through its activities relating to effective application of the non-legally-binding Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors, looked forward to the completion of the corpus of safety standards for research reactors.

72. The Group also looked forward to the completion of the corpus of safety standards for fuel cycle facilities. In that connection, it would like to have more information about the Safety Evaluation During Operation of Fuel Cycle Facilities (SEDO) service.

73. The Secretariat was to be commended for its efforts in connection with the review of the BSS and for launching a website on the radiological protection of patients. It welcomed the idea of extending the website so that it would be useful not only to regulatory bodies and medical professionals but also to patients themselves.

74. While regretting the refusals to ship radioactive materials — particularly medical radioisotopes — that had occurred in 2006, the Group attached great importance to strict conformity with the relevant international instruments and standards. It hoped that the action plan developed at the first meeting of the steering committee on denials of shipments of radioactive material would prove useful.

75. The Group, which welcomed the work being done by INLEX, looked forward to considering the lessons learned from INLEX's outreach activities aimed at fostering adherence to the international nuclear liability regime. It had taken note of the fact that, as stated in paragraph 198 of the draft *Nuclear Safety Review for the Year 2006*, INLEX had considered "possible future action of the Board of Governors with regard to the establishment of maximum limits for the exclusion of small quantities of nuclear material from the scope of application of the relevant nuclear liability instruments", and it looked forward to discussing the exclusion issue later in the year.

76. Mr. HIGUERAS RAMOS (Peru)*, speaking on behalf of GRULAC, said that the GRULAC attached great importance to the Agency's work in developing, disseminating, promoting and updating international standards in the areas of nuclear, radiation, transport and waste management safety and emergency preparedness. It would like the Secretariat to continue providing safety-related assistance to Member States.

77. GRULAC welcomed the Board's approval of revised and consolidated Safety Fundamentals as a basis for the Agency's safety standards. Harmonized application of those standards by the entire nuclear community, however, would be achieved only with the Agency's support.

78. GRULAC attached importance to all aspects of safety and security and to the Agency's role in promoting a holistic safety and security culture. It also attached great importance to the Agency's work in the areas of radioactive source safety and security, radiation protection, radioactive waste management, emergency preparedness and response, nuclear safety infrastructure development, knowledge management and network creation.

79. GRULAC welcomed the decision to strengthen the Agency's Emergency and Incident Centre. It also welcomed the work being done on developing "a common web platform covering the incident reporting systems for NPPs (IRS), research reactors (IRSRR) and fuel cycle facilities (FINAS)".

80. Referring to paragraph 102 of the draft *Nuclear Safety Review for the Year 2006*, where mention was made of regional meetings on the Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors held for

Member States in Africa and in Eastern Europe, he called on the Secretariat to organize such meetings in other regions as well.

81. GRULAC would closely follow the process of revising the BSS referred to in paragraph 121 of the draft document.

82. GRULAC welcomed the education and training materials being produced in the course of implementation of the Action Plan for Occupational Radiation Protection, It also welcomed the launching of an Agency website on the radiological protection of patients.

83. Referring to paragraph 191 of the draft *Nuclear Safety Review for the Year 2006*, he requested more information about the action plan developed by the steering committee on denials of shipments of radioactive material.

84. GRULAC, which attached great importance to safety in the transport of radioactive material, would like to see those involved in the transport of such material complying with the Transport Regulations and the related Agency safety standards. It looked forward to receiving the revised draft safety guide on compliance assurance for the safe transport of radioactive material referred to in paragraph 188 of the draft *Nuclear Safety Review for the Year 2006*.

85. Referring to paragraph 192 of the draft document, he said that GRULAC welcomed the continuing dialogue and consultations between coastal States and shipping States regarding the safe maritime transport of radioactive material.

86. In that connection, GRULAC attached great importance to the work of INLEX. It welcomed the Regional Workshop on Liability for Nuclear Damage held in Lima in December 2006 and would like to see further efforts being made to establish an effective and genuinely universal compensation regime for damage resulting from radiation accidents or incidents.

87. Referring to paragraph 18 of 2007/Note 4, he said that the members of GRULAC shared the concern of other Agency Member States regarding the legal and financial aspects of the envisaged formal mechanism for periodic exchanges of information on implementation of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. The legally-non-binding nature of the Code of Conduct should not be forgotten. In that connection, GRULAC attached great importance to the December 2006 meeting of senior experts from Latin America on experiences in implementing the Code of Conduct.

88. Referring to paragraph 94-96 of 2007/Note 4, he said that GRULAC welcomed the completion of version 1.0 of the Ibero-American Radiation Safety Network, which would cover — inter alia — the most relevant aspects of the regulatory practices of countries of the region of Latin America and the Caribbean in areas such as the radiological protection of patients and the safety of radioactive sources.

89. Ms. GERVAIS-VIDRICAIRE (Canada) said that a highlight of 2006 had been the Board's approval of Safety Fundamentals establishing that — as stated in paragraph 28 of the draft *Nuclear Safety Review for the Year 2006* — prime responsibility for safety rested with "the person or organization responsible for facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks". Her country, which had contributed through participation in the Commission on Safety Standards, to the development of the fundamental safety principles contained in the Safety Fundamentals, believed that they would facilitate the application of international safety standards and provide a basis for greater consistency among Member States.

90. Canada, which, in its Nuclear Safety and Control Act of 2000, already had modern legislation governing the regulation of nuclear activities, was developing a regulatory framework that would draw

on the fundament safety principles, on the entire suite of Agency safety standards, on domestic operating experience and on best science. Its aim was to seek safety outcomes equivalent or superior to any sought elsewhere in the world.

91. Canada agreed with the Secretariat that the challenge was now to ensure that the Agency's safety standards were applied in a harmonized manner by the entire nuclear community.

92. Her country had participated very actively in — and had learned from —the Second Review Meeting of Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention. It would soon be publishing a first report on progress made since that meeting and begin preparing for the Third Review Meeting. As in the case of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, its approach was a transparent one — and it would like to see all Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention being similarly transparent.

93. Canada was pleased that all countries with operating nuclear power plants were now Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Having chaired the Third Review Meeting of Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, held in 2005, it had been making great efforts to ensure continuity between that meeting and the Fourth Review Meeting — efforts highlighted at the International Conference on Effective Nuclear Regulatory Systems held in Moscow early in 2006. With the Fourth Review Meeting due to take place in 2008, her country was looking forward to the organizational meeting, which would be taking place in September, immediately after the 2007 session of the Agency's General Conference.

94. Canada, which had provided experts for IRRS missions in the United Kingdom and France and would soon be participating in the IRRS mission planned for Japan, welcomed the fact that, later in the current month, the Government of France would be hosting a workshop on the lessons learned from the IRRS missions which had already taken place. It hoped that the workshop would help it in preparing to receive an IRRS mission in mid-2008.

95. Significant incidents were caused not only by system failures but also by human errors. Accordingly, following the Third Review Meeting of Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission was placing greater emphasis on integrated safety management, in order to promote a strong safety culture and achieve good safety performance. In future, the operating licences for Canadian power reactors would require the development of integrated safety management programmes that would have to be fully implemented by the operators.

96. The nuclear regulatory bodies of many Member States were facing challenges due — among other things — to the retirement of experienced personnel at a time when the use of nuclear technology was growing; in some cases, they would have to compete with operating organizations for technical staff, and the competition might well cross borders. Also, in many Member States the regulatory body was in effect not independent. Her delegation, which would like the Secretariat to focus on such problems in future Nuclear Safety Reviews, hoped that some Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety would come forward with solutions in their national reports prepared for the Fourth Review Meeting.

97. In paragraph 33 of 2007/Note 4, reference was made to the 2006 meeting of senior regulators from countries operating CANDU-type nuclear power plants. Canada hoped that the Secretariat would continue to support such meetings.

98. In April 2007, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission would start implementing a strengthened regulatory programme for the import and export of risk-significant radioactive sources — a programme including the control measures required by the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. With that step, following the introduction of a sealed source tracking system

in 2006, Canada would be fully honouring its commitment to implement the provisions of the supplementary Guidance.

99. Canada would be contributing 140 000 Canadian dollars in support of the technical meeting on the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources due to be held in June 2007.

100. Mr. AMANO (Japan), having commended the Secretariat on the draft *Nuclear Safety Review for the Year 2006*, said that in 2006 the Japanese nuclear regulatory authorities and nuclear power industry had maintained high safety levels at Japan's nuclear facilities.

101. In the interests of increased transparency, Japan would be hosting an IRRS mission in June 2007.

102. Japan, with its exemplary nuclear safety regulations, was a leading country in the field of nuclear safety, and it wished to continue playing an active role in enhancing global nuclear safety through cooperation with the Agency.

103. Regarding transport safety, Japan recognized the importance of building confidence between shipping States and coastal States. In parallel with the previous session of the General Conferences there had been an "Information Discussion on Communication" between shipping States and coastal States, and it had demonstrated that communication between the two groups of States was proceeding smoothly.

104. Japan endorsed the view — expressed in paragraph 194 of the draft *Nuclear Safety Review for the Year 2006* — that "The IAEA Safety Standards related to transport need to be understood, accepted and used by all those involved in the transportation of radioactive material." Those standards were being complied with fully by France, the United Kingdom and Japan, which had excellent safety records that deserved to be recognized by all other Member States.

105. In the report on the December 2005 TranSAS mission to Japan, it was concluded that Japan's regulations governing the transport of radioactive materials were being enforced in accordance with Agency requirements. Japan was nevertheless endeavouring to further improve safety in the radioactive material transport area, in full cooperation with all other countries concerned.

106. The Agency was playing an important role with regard to safety in the transport of radioactive material, and the representatives of shipping States and coastal States were cooperating harmoniously in Vienna. Japan would like that to be recognized and appreciated by other international organizations, including the United Nations.

107. Referring to paragraph 198 of the draft *Nuclear Safety Review for the Year 2006*, he requested the Secretariat to provide written clarification of the phrase "possible gaps in the scope and coverage of the liability instruments". Referring to paragraph 200, he requested clarification regarding the relationship between, on one hand, the work of INLEX and, on the other, discussions between shipping States and coastal States.

108. Mr. KIM Sung-Hwan (Republic of Korea), welcoming the outcome of the Second Review Meeting of Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention, urged the Secretariat to help make the implementation of the Joint Convention a 'living process' by continuing to promote follow-up activities between review meetings.

109. Since revision of the BSS might affect the radiation protection regulations and activities of most Member States, his country hoped that the Secretariat would give Member States ample time to examine and agree on the proposed changes to the BSS.

110. With the rapidly increasing use of radioactive materials in the medical field, it was important that the Secretariat developing education and training and information exchange programmes relating to the radiological protection of patients.

111. His country would like to see the Agency cooperating with organizations such as ICRP, OECD/NEA and UNSCEAR in the development of safety standards for the radiation protection of non-human species — standards that would include detailed guidance for their implementation by States.

112. His country would also like to see the Agency intensifying its cooperation with IMO and ICAO in an effort to resolve the issue of denials of shipments of radioactive materials.

113. The Republic of Korea stood ready to continue participating in international cooperation aimed at strengthening nuclear safety worldwide.

114. Mr. SCHULTE (United States of America) said that the fiftieth year of Agency service to the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy was coinciding with a resurgence of interest in nuclear power generation in many countries and that the Agency was well equipped to ensure safety in any future expansion of nuclear power generation. Moreover, the Agency could help countries to develop infrastructures not only for the regulation of nuclear power generation but also for ensuring the safety and security of all radioactive material. That was important, as the issues of nuclear safety and nuclear security were inextricably linked and must be addressed in tandem through a coordinated approach. His delegation hoped that the revised BSS — based on a solid consensus — would facilitate the development of such infrastructures.

115. His Government welcomed the creation of the international steering committee on denials of shipments of radioactive material and also the Agency's strong focus on training medical professionals to minimize the overexposure of patients to ionizing radiation.

116. Mr. TANG Guoqiang (China) said that his country, which was pleased with the nuclear safety situation worldwide, welcomed the progress made in the area of safety standards in 2006, particularly the approval of Safety Fundamentals by the Board. It would like to see the Secretariat further promoting the Agency's safety standards through IRRS missions and outreach activities.

117. In parallel with its vigorous development of nuclear power generation, China was strengthening its nuclear safety infrastructure. To that end, it was drawing on the Agency's safety standards. Also, it was receiving Agency technical support in the area of nuclear safety training, and it hoped that such support would continue to be provided.

118. In 2006, China had completed the necessary legal procedures for acceding to the Joint Convention and had participated in the Second Review Meeting of Contracting Parties. China had now signed and ratified all nuclear safety-related conventions, and it was strictly fulfilling the obligations arising out of them.

119. His country, which had further strengthened its security arrangements for the radioactive sources within its territory, was pleased that the Secretariat had started elaborating nuclear security guidance for major public events. It hoped to cooperate closely with other countries and the Secretariat in ensuring a high level of nuclear security during the 2008 Olympic Games, which it would be hosting.

120. China, which welcomed the fact that more and more countries were demonstrating a positive attitude towards nuclear power generation, considered it important that Member States, particularly developing ones, continue to receive, through the Agency, technical support in the area of nuclear safety.

121. Mr. ARÉVALO YÉPES (Colombia) said that his country, which attached great importance to the Agency's work in the safety area, recognized the value of the relevant binding legal instruments, of the Agency's safety standards and best practice guides and of the Agency's safety appraisal services. At the same time, in its view the non-binding nature of the various safety-related codes of conduct should not be forgotten and the purpose of Agency support in the safety area was to strengthen national safety infrastructures and create the necessary teams of safety experts in Member States. Safety appraisals should help Member States' regulatory bodies to identify safety infrastructure weaknesses and to eliminate them.

122. In paragraph 3 of the draft *Nuclear Safety Review for the Year 2006*, it was stated that "The challenge now is to ensure that the IAEA Safety Standards are applied in a harmonized manner by the entire international community." Meeting that challenge would take much time and effort, and the Secretariat's advice and support would be extremely important.

123. His country, which welcomed the establishment of a steering committee on denials of shipments of radioactive material, hoped that the action plan developed by the steering committee would help solve the problem of shipment denials.

124. Referring to paragraph 79 of the draft *Nuclear Safety Review for the Year 2006*, he said that his country looked forward to participating in future work on developing a code of conduct on international emergency management. Referring to paragraph 80, he welcomed the work being done to establish a portal for reporting and disseminating information about incidents and emergencies.

125. Colombia, as a coastal State, considered safety in the maritime transport of radioactive materials to be a matter of fundamental importance and would like the legal regime relating to it to be strengthened. It hoped that the Secretariat would continue supporting the dialogue between coastal States and shipping States. That dialogue had resulted in a better mutual understanding, thanks in part to efforts made by France and the United Kingdom.

126. In the opinion of Colombia, which was supporting the work of INLEX, it was important to further develop the nuclear liability regime by — inter alia — closing any gaps in the scope and coverage of the liability instruments.

127. Colombia agreed that — as stated in paragraph 39 of the draft *Nuclear Safety Review for the Year 2006* — "partnership for global nuclear safety and security supported with appropriate legal instruments is the only way to ensure that the signs of renaissance by nuclear power will lead to the global implementation of the most modern technologies for the benefit of all." In its view, therefore, the legal regime relating to the maritime transport of radioactive materials should include a legal instrument that provided for comprehensive liability in the event of nuclear damage and to which the coastal States and the shipping States might accede.

128. A requirement regarding the notification of coastal States of transit when maritime shipments of radioactive materials were due to take place should be an integral part of the legal regime. Also, the legal regime should respond to the financial and technical problems encountered by developing coastal States in maintaining their preparedness for possible incidents or accidents — over and about the problems due to radioactive contamination if an incident or accident should occur.

129. Mr. SHARMA (India) said that his delegation was pleased that, in parallel with the ongoing expansion of nuclear power, legislative and regulatory reform was under way in a number of Member States to conform to current international standards.

130. Referring to paragraph 81 of the draft *Nuclear Safety Review for the Year 2006*, he said that the fact that in 2006 no incidents leading to a release of radioactivity that would cause harm to the

environment had occurred at any nuclear power plant was a testimony to the substantial progress made by Member States in the nuclear safety areas.

131. Welcoming the publication of unified Safety Fundamentals by the Agency, he said that experts from India were participating in the work of the Agency's safety standards committees and of the Commission on Safety Standards and had made important contributions to the drafting and review of Agency safety standards.

132. Given the growing use of ionizing radiation in medicine, there was a need to provide medical practitioners with information on controlling patient exposures.

133. His delegation welcomed the outputs being generated through implementation of the Action Plan for Occupational Radiation Protection in collaboration with ILO, WHO and other international bodies.

134. His delegation also welcomed the progress made with regard to safety in the transport of radioactive materials and the attention being paid to the management and disposal of radioactive waste by Member States. At the same time, it was very conscious of the challenges that still needed to be addressed by the nuclear industry.

135. India, which would like the Secretariat to do more to promote the establishment of national regulatory infrastructures for the control of radioactive sources, had conducted a regional training course on the use of the Regulatory Authority Information System and stood ready to conduct further such courses and to offer the services of its experts for such courses held elsewhere.

136. In December 2006, India had hosted an Agency regional seminar on 'Safety Analysis in Support of Event Investigations'.

137. In the view of his delegation, emergency preparedness and response measures should be such as to ensure the safety of workers at nuclear installation and of the public living in the vicinity, and they should be adequate for dealing with any radiological emergency at the national level.

138. Although the safety record of the nuclear industry was very good, there was no room for complacency. Constant vigilance was essential, and lessons learned should be drawn on with a view to further raising safety levels. Also essential were a continuing availability of qualified human resources and the sharing of best practices among Member States.

139. Mr. CURIA (Argentina) said that his country welcomed the continuing improvement in the safety of nuclear facilities and that international exchanges of information on operational experience were making an important contribution to that improvement.

140. His Government would be providing the Secretariat with written comments on the draft *Nuclear Safety Review for the Year 2006*. Meanwhile, he hoped that the Secretariat would take account of his preliminary oral comments when preparing the final version of that document.

141. It was important that the Agency's Nuclear Safety Reviews not be regarded as documents promoting nuclear power. Their purpose was to present objective and independent technical analyses of the global nuclear safety situation.

142. The question of stakeholder involvement in decision-making with regard to nuclear power was a highly complex one, and the approach to it differed from country to country. Great care should therefore be taken in the formulation of references to that question.

143. At its March 2006 session, the Board had approved safety requirements in which reference was made to stakeholders. His Government had not blocked a consensus in favour of Board approval

despite concerns about the treatment of the stakeholder involvement question in various Agency documents.

144. The wording of paragraph 25 of the draft *Nuclear Safety Review for the Year 2006* only intensified those concerns. In particular, the link made in the first sentence between "safety" and "public acceptance" was, in his Government's view, an erroneous one — public acceptance did not guarantee safety. His delegation would therefore like that paragraph to be reformulated.

145. Despite comments made in the Board on previous occasions, paragraph 21 of the draft document referred to "the interfaces between safety and security" and to "the need for a harmonized and synergistic approach so that both safety and security are adequately addressed" as if they were the fundamental problems relating to safety and security.

146. The safety and security of radioactive sources, nuclear facilities and nuclear materials were matters of very great importance for his Government, which had in December 2000 hosted the first international conference of national authorities with regulatory responsibility for their safety and security. It would therefore like the Agency's Nuclear Safety Reviews to treat the subject of safety and security appropriately.

147. Security — the control of sources, facilities and materials such as to prevent them from being used for unauthorized, including malicious, purposes — was a *sine qua non* of safety. The two concepts were intimately linked, and the Agency's Nuclear Safety Reviews should not be calling for "interfaces" or for "a harmonized and synergistic approach", but rather for a genuine symbiosis. That was in effect what the Board had done in 1998 when approving the BSS, and it was in line with the approach of Argentina and most other Member States.

148. Moreover, the Agency's Nuclear Safety Reviews should consider the global security situation as an integral and inseparable part of the global safety situation.

149. The current year marked the fiftieth anniversary not only of the Agency but also of the first international safety standard established by the Agency, which had a statutory responsibility for establishing such standards in collaboration with specialized agencies of the United Nations system. The international safety standards established by the Agency were important for Argentina, whose safety standards had always conformed to them.

150. The Agency was entering a new era of international safety standards. The draft *Nuclear Safety Review for the Year 2006* spoke of the Board's approval of "the Safety Fundamentals upon which the IAEA Safety Standards are based." The Safety Fundamentals contained fundamental safety principles that covered all aspects of ionizing radiation safety (nuclear safety, the safety of radioactive waste, safety in the transport or radioactive materials and radiation safety) and also security-related activities, which did not require separate principles. The time had therefore come to be clear and explicit, with the final version of the *Nuclear Safety Review for the Year 2006* stating that the Board should now approve basic safety standards that were consistent with those fundamental safety principles. The final version should also make it clear that the existing BSS were not going to be drastically revised. As the structure of the BSS was very similar to that of the fundamental safety principles, it was to be hoped that, in the revision exercise, account would be taken of the Board-approved standards relating to subjects such as regulatory infrastructures, facility management and emergencies. In other words, the final version should state that there was no need to establish new generic standards — it was necessary only to revise the existing ones. Many countries, including Argentina, had made great efforts to ensure that their safety standards were consistent with the BSS, and any experimental changes might have very serious consequences for them. The issue should be described with precision and in detail in documents like 2007/Note 5 and also covered adequately in the final version of the *Nuclear Safety Review for the Year 2006*.

151. Argentina appreciated the Secretariat's organization of the Second Review Meeting of Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention and the efforts of the Secretariat to promote the Joint Convention, thanks to which there had been eight new Contracting Parties at that meeting.

152. Argentina attached great important to the international efforts being made to ensure the security of radioactive materials. An effective tool for addressing new scenarios associated with the malicious use of such sources was the application of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. However, the non-binding nature of those instruments should always be borne in mind. It was for each State to apply elements of the Code of Conduct in line with its national legislation.

153. Regarding paragraph 44 of the draft *Nuclear Safety Review for the Year 2006*, on knowledge management, the National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) of Argentina had stepped up education and training at its three specialized university-level institutions in response to the reactivation of the country's nuclear plan, and Argentina had recently reiterated to the Agency its offer of CNEA's Balseiro Institute for the training of personnel from other Member States in nuclear engineering.

154. Regarding the emergency exercise in Argentina mentioned in paragraph 68, periodic exercises of that kind were required by Argentina's regulations not only at nuclear power plants but also at other nuclear facilities, such as research reactors. There was a long tradition of cooperation in the field of emergency preparedness and response between the Nuclear Regulatory Authority and other competent bodies in Argentina, which, thanks to its experience, was in a position to offer assistance with the establishment or improvement of emergency preparedness and response regimes in other Member States, especially in the Latin American and Caribbean region.

155. Regarding paragraph 99 of the draft document, Argentina believed that there was a need to update the project and supply agreements relating to research reactors and to cancel them in cases where the materials which had given rise to the agreements no longer existed.

156. As regards the application of the Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors, the extent to which it was being implemented was still very limited in less developed countries. The safety of research reactors was an international concern, and consideration should therefore be given to the participation of more developed countries in the relevant regional activities organized by the Secretariat. Also, perhaps the Secretariat should investigate the possibility of developing an assistance mechanism, linked to the Agency's technical cooperation programmes, for addressing the problems connected with the research reactor safety missions of the Agency.

157. Welcoming draft Safety Guide TS-G-1.5, *Radiation Protection Programmes for the Transport of Radioactive Material*, he urged that it be translated from English into the other official languages of the Agency as soon as possible.

158. Referring to paragraph 190 of the draft *Nuclear Safety Review for the Year 2006*, he welcomed the production by IATA of a DVD explaining the importance of the prompt air transport of radioisotopes for use in medicine, and, referring to paragraph 191, commended the Secretariat on organizing the first meeting of the steering committee on denials of shipments of radioactive material.

159. Regarding paragraph 115, Argentina would be following with interest the activities carried out within the framework of the Safety Evaluation During Operation of Fuel Cycle Facilities (SEDO) peer review service. It stood ready to participate in the development of a body of fuel cycle facility safety standards and to make its relevant experts and facilities available for training activities.

160. In September 2006, the General Conference, in paragraph 35 of resolution GC(50)/RES/10, had noted the forthcoming XIIth Congress of the International Radiation Protection Association

(IRPA 12), which was to be held, under the patronage of his Government and with the title 'Strengthening Radiation Protection Worldwide' in Buenos Aires in October 2008 and had encouraged the Secretariat to "support the dissemination of information arising from this event and to support the participation of developing countries". The General Conference's interest in IRPA 12 was understandable, since IRPA 12 would be an exceptional event offering the Agency an opportunity to intensify the activities carried out by it pursuant to its statutory radiation protection-related mandate of providing for the application of its safety standards, fostering exchanges of scientific information and encouraging the training of experts. IRPA 12 should be mentioned in the final version of the *Nuclear Safety Review for the Year 2006*.

161. Lastly, his delegation welcomed the mention of the Ibero-American Forum of Nuclear Regulators in the draft document and hoped that its work would be described in future Nuclear Safety Reviews.

**The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.**