

IAEA Board of Governors

Record of the 1179th Meeting
GOV/OR.1179

Nuclear verification: (c) Report by the Director General on the implementation of safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

(d) Report by the Director General on the implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Board of Governors

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Record of the 1179th Meeting

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¹ GOV/2007/12.

Attendance

(The list below gives the name of the senior member of each delegation who attended the meeting, as well as that of any other member whose statement is summarized in this record.)

Mr. PETRIČ	Chairman (Slovenia)
Mr. CURIA	Argentina
Mr. SHANNON	Australia
Mr. STELZER	Austria
Mr. MACKAY	Belarus
Mr. VALLIM GUERREIRO	Brazil
Ms. GERVAIS-VIDRICAIRE	Canada
Mr. SKOKNIC	Chile
Mr. TANG Guoqiang	China
Mr. ARÉVALO YÉPES	Colombia
Mr. HORVATIĆ	Croatia
Ms. GOICOCHEA ESTENOZ	Cuba
Mr. RAMZY	Egypt
Mr. KEBEDE	Ethiopia
Ms. KAUPPI	Finland
Mr. CARON	France
Mr. GOTTWALD	Germany
Mr. SOTIROPOULOS	Greece
Mr. SHARMA	India
Mr. WIBOWO	Indonesia
Mr. AMANO	Japan
Mr. KIM Sung-Hwan	Korea, Republic of
Mr. ALOBIDI	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
Mr. ZNIBER	Morocco
Mr. AAS	Norway
Mr. ALI	Pakistan
Mr. BERDENNIKOV	Russian Federation
Mr. STRITAR	Slovenia
Mr. MINTY	South Africa
Ms. MELIN	Sweden
Mr. OTHMAN	Syrian Arab Republic
Mr. PANUPONG	Thailand
Mr. MACGREGOR	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Mr. SCHULTE	United States of America
Mr. ELBARADEI	Director General
Mr. WALLER	Deputy Director General, Department of Management
Mr. ANING	Secretary of the Board

Representatives of the following Member States also attended the meeting:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Burkina Faso, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

Abbreviations used in this record:

CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EU	European Union
GRULAC	Latin American and Caribbean Group
HEU	high-enriched uranium
LEU	low-enriched uranium
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NWFZ	nuclear-weapon-free zone

* Speakers under Rule 50 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure are indicated by an asterisk.

7. Follow-up to decisions on personnel matters taken by the UN General Assembly (continued) (GOV/2007/9)

1. Mr. MONTEALEGRE (Philippines)*, speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, concurred with the recommended action in document GOV/2007/9 and noted that the estimated additional cost to the Agency in 2007 of utilizing the revised net base salary scale for repatriation grant and mobility allowance payments amounting to EUR 79 300 would be absorbed within available resources.
2. Mr. WALLER (Deputy Director General for Management) underscored the fact that the additional costs arising from the revisions to the salary scale were unavoidable, since revisions approved by the General Assembly applied to all organizations of the United Nations Common System.

5. Nuclear verification

(c) Report by the Director General on the implementation of safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (GOV/INF/2007/6)

3. The CHAIRMAN said that the Director General had described the current situation regarding the status of the Agency's safeguards activities in the DPRK in his introductory statement.
4. Also, he drew attention to document GOV/INF/2007/6 containing the text, agreed upon in Beijing on 13 February 2007, of the initial actions for the implementation of the six-party joint statement of 19 September 2005 on the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue.
5. Mr. TANG Guoqiang (China), said that the discussions among the parties during the third session of the fifth round of the six-party talks, held from 8 to 13 February 2007 in Beijing, had been serious, open and earnest and had facilitated in-depth exploration of issues relating to the implementation of the joint statement on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula adopted at the six-party talks on 19 September 2005 and of the specific measures to be taken.
6. China's good offices and the common efforts of all participants had enabled the parties to reach consensus on a joint document in which they had reaffirmed their common goal and will to achieve early and peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and to fulfil in earnest their commitments in the September 2005 joint statement.
7. The parties had agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the joint statement in a phased manner in line with the principle of 'action-for-action'. The DPRK would shut down and seal for the purpose of eventual abandonment the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility, and invite back Agency personnel to conduct all the necessary monitoring and verification as agreed between the Agency and the DPRK. The parties had agreed to cooperate in economic, energy and humanitarian assistance to the DPRK. In addition, they would establish five working groups to discuss

and formulate specific plans in the areas of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, normalization of DPRK-United States of America relations, normalization of DPRK-Japan relations, economic and energy cooperation, and a peace and security mechanism for north-east Asia.

8. The agreement represented a positive first step towards full implementation of the joint statement of September 2005 and a landmark in the six-party process, serving the interests of all parties. It would further the interests of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and in north-east Asia as a whole, by improving relations among the countries concerned. The six-party talks had proven to be a realistic and effective means of addressing the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue and an important platform for enhancing understanding and trust among the parties. The efforts by the parties to narrow their differences and achieve consensus gave hope that even more could be achieved in the future. As a next step, China would work with all the parties to put the working groups into operation as soon as possible and to translate the agreement into real action. China hoped that all the parties would honour their commitments by taking substantive steps towards implementation of the joint statement. It encouraged the international community to continue to support the six-party talks and play a constructive role in facilitating implementation of the initial actions.

9. China welcomed the DPRK's invitation to the Director General to visit that country and hoped that the visit would yield positive results.

10. As Chairman of the six-party talks, China would continue to maintain close contact and cooperation with the parties and undertake active efforts, through dialogue and consultation, to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and maintain long-term peace and stability both on the Peninsula and in north-east Asia as a whole.

11. Ms. GOICOCHEA ESTENOZ (Cuba), speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated the Movement's continued support for the early denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and for the role of the six-party talks in achieving a peaceful negotiated settlement of the nuclear issue.

12. NAM welcomed the agreement reached on 13 February 2007 at the six-party talks in Beijing and hoped that that agreement would constitute the basis for a definitive solution of the DPRK nuclear issue. NAM upheld the principled position that all such issues should be resolved through dialogue and negotiation and, in that regard, welcomed the invitation extended by the DPRK to the Director General.

13. Mr. GOTTWALD (Germany), speaking on behalf of the EU, the candidate countries Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey, the countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia, the EFTA countries Iceland and Liechtenstein, members of the European Economic Area, and Moldova and Ukraine, congratulated China and all the other participants in the six-party talks on their success in securing the agreement reached in Beijing on 13 February 2007. He expressed the hope that the agreement would be the DPRK's first step towards honouring its obligations under the NPT and complying fully with Security Council resolution 1718 (2006), particularly operative paragraph 6 thereof.

14. The EU supported efforts to achieve the early and peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and encouraged the States concerned to proceed expeditiously with the initial actions for implementation of the joint statement.

15. The EU welcomed the DPRK's willingness to shut down and seal for the purpose of eventual abandonment the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility, and to invite back Agency personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring and verification. The commitments set out in the September 2005 joint statement must be implemented swiftly and fully in order to ensure the

complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of the DPRK nuclear weapons programme. He expressed the hope that the Agency would soon be able to resume its activities in the DPRK in a transparent, comprehensive and substantial manner. The EU welcomed the invitation extended to the Director General to visit the DPRK and requested the Secretariat to keep the Board informed.

16. The EU would continue to give its active support to efforts to resolve the DPRK nuclear issue peacefully and to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.

17. Mr. HIGUERAS RAMOS (Peru)*, speaking on behalf of GRULAC, welcomed the outcome of the fifth round of the six-party talks in Beijing. It demonstrated the commitment of the parties to the joint statement of September 2005 in terms of agreed initial actions, including the invitation to the Agency to verify measures taken by the DPRK. He also welcomed the invitation extended to the Director General to visit the DPRK and looked forward to his report on that visit.

18. GRULAC looked forward to the implementation of the joint statement and to the early and peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the return of the DPRK to the Agency and the normalization of relations among the six parties concerned.

19. Mr. ZNIBER (Morocco) said that the agreement reached by the six parties paved the way for peaceful settlement of the DPRK nuclear issue and the resumption of high-level contacts with the Agency. It was testimony to the fact that peaceful resolution of such issues was always possible.

20. Morocco encouraged all parties, in particular the DPRK, to seize the new opportunity to promote nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. As an initial step, all nuclear activities and infrastructure in the DPRK should be placed under comprehensive Agency safeguards. In that regard, his delegation looked forward to the outcome of the forthcoming visit of the Director General to the DPRK.

21. Mr. AAS (Norway) welcomed the agreement reached in Beijing on 13 February 2007 and expressed the hope that it would expedite the early denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

22. His country, which had deplored the nuclear test announced by the DPRK in October 2006 and had welcomed Security Council resolutions 1718 and 1695, considered the DPRK's nuclear weapons programme to be a threat to regional stability and a fundamental challenge to the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Norway had consistently supported the six-party talks aimed at resolving the DPRK nuclear issue through dialogue and looked forward to the effective implementation of the September 2005 joint statement.

23. The Agency should play a crucial role in verifying, in a credible manner, the implementation progress. In that regard, Norway appreciated the Director General's readiness to visit the DPRK and looked forward to his report on the outcome of that visit.

24. Ms. GERVAIS-VIDRICAIRE (Canada) said that her country, which had condemned the DPRK's nuclear explosive test of October 2006 and had actively supported Security Council resolution 1718, continued to support the six-party talks as the best means of achieving denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Canada therefore looked forward to the early implementation of commitments undertaken in the joint statement of September 2005 and the agreement of February 2007.

25. She noted with satisfaction that the initial actions for the implementation of the joint statement envisaged a role for the Agency in monitoring at the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing plant. In that connection, Canada welcomed the invitation to the Director General to visit the DPRK in the near future.

26. Canada would continue to give its full support to bilateral discussions between the DPRK and the Agency in support of implementation of the joint statement.

27. Mr. OTHMAN (Syrian Arab Republic), having welcomed the Director General's introductory statement and document GOV/INF/2007/6, expressed satisfaction at the recent détente concerning the DPRK's long-standing nuclear file. His delegation stressed the importance of adopting the language of dialogue and not the language of threat in that and similar issues.

28. The recent agreement reached at the six-party talks was a diplomatic victory and his delegation considered that those efforts would in the end lead to a solution satisfying all parties and reassuring the international community. It demonstrated that constructive dialogue on a just and equal basis was the best way to resolve all disagreements. Similar steps should be undertaken to address the Iranian nuclear file, abandoning the policy of double standards in the Middle East.

29. Mr. KIM Sung-Hwan (Republic of Korea) commended all participants in the six-party talks, particularly China, on contributing towards the successful outcome reached on 13 February 2007.

30. In order to sustain the critical momentum generated by that agreement, it was essential to take concrete steps to implement in full the joint statement of September 2005. To that end, all parties must urgently implement the initial actions and the DPRK, in particular, must act promptly by shutting down and sealing its Yongbyon facility, including the reprocessing facility, for the purpose of eventual abandonment, and invite back Agency personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring and verifications.

31. He welcomed the invitation to the Director General to visit the DPRK as a positive step towards normalizing relations between that country and the Agency. Also, he expressed appreciation to the Secretariat for its abiding readiness to resume nuclear verification activities in the DPRK. The Republic of Korea looked forward to the results of the Director General's visit, which would contribute to early implementation of the initial actions envisaged. He underlined his country's confidence in the Agency's ability to carry out the task entrusted to it by the six parties.

32. The Republic of Korea would continue to make every effort, in cooperation with other participants in the six-party talks, to contribute to the peaceful settlement of the DPRK nuclear issue.

33. Mr. RAMZY (Egypt), reaffirming the strategic importance his country accorded to the NPT and the multilateral nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, welcomed the positive outcome of the latest round of six-party talks and the invitation to the Director General to visit the DPRK. His delegation commended the parties, especially China, on that success and looked forward to the Agency fulfilling its role in achieving a solution as soon as possible. The recent success reflected the importance of a number of principles which Egypt had always upheld.

34. Firstly, negotiations and direct dialogue between all the parties concerned were the only way to reach an internationally acceptable and peaceful solution to such issues. Escalation or confrontation after the DPRK's nuclear test of October 2006 would probably not have led to that outcome.

35. Secondly, the international community should address non-proliferation issues from the correct perspective of the ultimate objective of nuclear disarmament. The DPRK was the latest in a list of States that included Ukraine, Kazakhstan and South Africa which had obtained, manufactured or which possessed nuclear weapons.

36. Thirdly, the need to establish NWFZs as one effective way of achieving nuclear disarmament and universality of the NPT. In that regard, the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime, of which the Agency was a cornerstone, should shoulder its responsibilities vis-à-vis the Middle East, which currently represented a major gap in the non-proliferation regime as compared with other geographical regions. The other regions could be divided into two groups; the first, like

Latin America, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Central Asia and Africa, which were already covered by a relevant NWFZ treaty or where one was under negotiation, and to which it was hoped the Korean Peninsula would eventually belong; and the second, comprising regions where there was a nuclear balance, like North America and Europe, and South Asia. The Middle East, on the other hand, was a case unto itself. No efforts had been made to establish a NWFZ in that region, nor had a negotiating mechanism been established for that purpose. Egypt called upon the international community to establish such a mechanism in order to address the current nuclear threat posed by Israel.

37. Since the Agency was the only neutral international body technically capable of verifying nuclear programmes and activities and implementing safeguards, the information it provided was the only information that could be trusted and thus crucial to international disarmament efforts.

38. In conclusion, he called upon the international community, and in particular the six parties, to continue to build on the recent positive developments and work expeditiously towards denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and enhancement of the NPT regime.

39. Mr. SCHULTE (United States of America) welcomed the agreement reached by the six parties in Beijing on the initial actions for the implementation of the September 2005 joint statement as an important first step towards the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. He commended the Government of China on its important role in chairing the six-party talks.

40. Since the Agency would play a crucial role in conducting monitoring and verification activities in the initial phase in relation to the shutdown and sealing of the Yongbyong nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility, it was essential that Agency personnel should return to the DPRK as soon as possible. Having welcomed the invitation to the Director General to visit the DPRK, he said that discussions held during that visit should focus on the Agency's role in implementing the initial actions agreed on 13 February. He hoped that Agency inspectors would return to the DPRK shortly thereafter. The United States of America was prepared to work closely with the Secretariat, the Chinese Chairman of the working group on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the other parties to ensure that the Agency was able to initiate monitoring and verification activities within the 60-day time frame specified in the agreement.

41. The Agency would also have an essential role to play in the implementation of safeguards when the DPRK returned to the NPT and to Agency safeguards as it had committed to do as part of the 2005 joint statement. It was also important to bear in mind that Security Council resolution 1718 (2006) remained in effect and that all United Nations Member States should continue to implement fully and effectively its provisions.

42. The goal of complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and a more stable and peaceful north-east Asia remained a regional and global priority. The groundwork for a permanent solution had been laid through multilateral diplomatic efforts. The agreement of 13 February, while only a first step, was a good start towards achieving that goal.

43. Mr. SKOKNIC (Chile) said that he was pleased with the recent agreement reached during the six-party talks aimed at denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. Also, he welcomed the invitation extended by the DPRK to the Director General. It presented an opportunity to initiate greater cooperation between the DPRK and the Agency and his delegation looked forward to hearing the result of that meeting.

44. He commended all the parties involved in the talks, and particularly China, for their flexibility and perseverance which had borne fruit in the February agreement.

45. Mr. AMANO (Japan) welcomed the agreement at the six-party talks on 13 February on the initial actions for the implementation of the 2005 joint statement and expressed appreciation for China's efforts in chairing the talks.

46. The initial actions represented a big step towards the DPRK's abandonment of its nuclear programmes, as they stipulated that the DPRK shut down and seal the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility, and invite Agency personnel to return to conduct all the necessary monitoring and verification within 60 days. In the next phase, the DPRK should provide a complete declaration of all its nuclear programmes and disable all its existing nuclear facilities. It was crucial that the DPRK implement those measures promptly and fully.

47. The Agency's role in the forthcoming process was important and he welcomed the Director General's acceptance of the DPRK's invitation to visit the country. Japan hoped that the visit would lead to the early commencement of the Agency's activities in the DPRK and looked forward to the Director General's report upon his return.

48. The initial actions agreed on 13 February were only a first step, and Japan would continue to work with the other partners at the six-party talks toward implementation of the joint statement as a whole. The DPRK should comply with Security Council resolution 1718 and act strictly in accordance with its obligations under the NPT and the terms and conditions of its safeguards agreement. In addition, it should provide the Agency with transparency measures, including access to such individuals, documentation, equipment and facilities as deemed necessary by the Agency.

49. Japan would continue its active support of the Agency's activities with regard to the implementation of safeguards in the DPRK.

50. Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) said that his country, as a participant in the six-party talks, was pleased with the results of the third session of the fifth round of negotiations. He noted the importance of the 13 February agreement on initial actions for the implementation of the joint statement of 19 September 2005. A significant element of that agreement was the provision that the DPRK shut down and seal the nuclear facility at Yongbyon, including the reprocessing facility, with the goal of subsequently abandoning it, and that it invite Agency personnel to return for the purpose of conducting the necessary monitoring and verification. He hoped that the results of the most recent round of talks would provide additional momentum to the six-party process, which aimed — amongst other things — at denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

51. He thanked China for chairing the six-party talks and disseminating the information contained in document GOV/INF/2007/6.

52. Russia was pleased that the Director General had accepted Pyongyang's invitation to visit the DPRK in March. The visit should mark the start of a normalization of relations and renewal of the DPRK's full cooperation with the Agency, including the early commencement of verification activities. He underlined the Agency's central role in the process.

53. Russia called on the DPRK to renew its membership in the Agency, confirm its participation in the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State, resume implementation of its safeguards agreement and sign and ratify the CTBT.

54. Mr. SHANNON (Australia) welcomed the agreement of 13 February which committed the DPRK to moving quickly to begin resolving the serious international concerns over its nuclear programme. Those commitments offered the DPRK the opportunity to rejoin the international community. The willingness of the DPRK's partners in the six-party talks to provide substantial assistance in return for progress on the nuclear issue demonstrated that, by acting responsibly, the DPRK could secure the help it needed to alleviate the hardships of its long-suffering people.

55. Australia stood ready to support substantive progress towards a nuclear-weapon-free Korean Peninsula, including through energy assistance and bilateral development assistance for the DPRK. At the request of Australia's Minister of Foreign Affairs, a delegation of senior Australian officials was set to visit Pyongyang from 11 to 13 March to emphasize those points to the DPRK and urge it to implement fully its commitments under the 13 February agreement and the 2005 joint statement.

56. The international community would be monitoring progress closely with regard to the shutdown and sealing of the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility, for the purpose of eventual abandonment and as regards inviting Agency personnel to conduct all necessary verification. His delegation hoped that the Director General's impending visit would present an opportunity to settle the modalities for early re-application of Agency verification at Yongbyon and looked forward to hearing his report.

57. The DPRK would need to cooperate fully and openly in upholding its commitments in the second phase of the 13 February agreement, including by providing a complete declaration of all nuclear programmes and disabling all existing nuclear facilities.

58. Australia looked forward to a lasting resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue. So long as the DPRK continued to possess nuclear weapons, the international community must act to contain the threat posed. Australia supported the regime put in place by Security Council resolution 1718 (2006) and had implemented its obligations under that resolution. It encouraged all States to do likewise.

59. Australia hoped that the DPRK had made the strategic choice to give up nuclear weapons and it looked to the DPRK to match its commitments with practical action.

60. Mr. MINTY (South Africa) joined previous speakers in welcoming the joint agreement concluded in Beijing on 13 February 2007 and commended China and the other parties on their efforts. The agreement augured well for a sustainable peaceful resolution of the volatile situation on the Korean Peninsula. South Africa hoped that all parties would fulfil their commitments under the agreement and that the new time frame agreed upon would be followed by all. He urged members of the technical working groups to negotiate in good faith with a view to the earliest full implementation of the joint statement. The world was looking forward to successful deliberations, convinced that only dialogue in good faith and mutual trust could lead to a solution that was satisfactory to all parties concerned. The new framework could lead to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, thereby easing tensions in the region, and nothing must be done to damage or undermine the integrity of the agreement.

61. He welcomed the upcoming visit of the Director General to the DPRK and looked forward to the report which would follow.

62. He urged the DPRK to allow the immediate resumption of Agency monitoring and verification activities as agreed, leading to its verification of the irreversible termination of the DPRK's nuclear weapons programme.

63. South Africa also called upon nuclear-weapon States to comply with their disarmament commitments as spelled out in Article VI of the NPT and to renew their security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States in a legally binding instrument as a matter of urgency.

64. Nuclear brinkmanship must come to an end wherever it occurred worldwide to ensure a peaceful and secure future for the generations to come.

65. Mr. WIBOWO (Indonesia) recalled that the DPRK's unsafeguarded nuclear activities had been a matter of serious concern for many years and that the situation had worsened following its nuclear test on 9 October 2006. He therefore welcomed the encouraging breakthrough in the six-party talks

achieved on 13 February 2007. It provided fresh evidence that dialogue and negotiations, however painful and difficult, always proved to be the more effective and rewarding path.

66. Indonesia commended the considerable efforts undertaken by all parties to find a peaceful solution and hoped that all sides would adhere to the agreement. The support of the international community was also important for its implementation.

67. Indonesia was encouraged by the upcoming visit of the Director General to the DPRK as it would provide an excellent opportunity for discussion of the relationship between the Agency and the DPRK. Hopefully, that could eventually lead to the DPRK's return to the Agency, to the NPT and the family of nations.

68. Mr. ALOBIDI (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) said that the agreement reached on 13 February during the six-party talks showed once again that the only way to resolve any crisis was through direct negotiations and dialogue between the States concerned.

69. His country had always underlined the right of all States without exception to have access to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and also the need for the developed States to help developing States to address development-related problems in such areas as water management, health, the environment, electricity and food. The 13 February agreement was an effective contribution in that field requiring only transparency and movement away from a policy of escalation and confrontation.

70. Libya welcomed the latest six-party agreement and thanked all the parties involved in the talks, especially China, for their efforts to solve the Korean issue. It looked forward to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, a desire underlined in the final document of the 14th NAM summit held in Cuba in September 2006. In that connection, he welcomed the invitation extended to the Director General to visit the DPRK and stressed the importance of continued dialogue in a spirit of increasing confidence and transparency between all parties to obtain the best results.

71. He pointed to the need to adopt an international strategy to reward States which voluntarily renounced their nuclear weapons programmes following Libya's historic example in that regard.

72. The latest six-party agreement was an important step in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and would contribute to the realization of peace, security and prosperity in the region. Libya urged all parties to make the most of the current positive climate to promote regional development and achieve peace and security not only in the region but also in the world.

73. Mr. VALLIM GUERREIRO (Brazil) recalled that his country had vehemently condemned the nuclear test carried out by the DPRK in October 2006 and had urged it to reintegrate itself into the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State, to adhere to the CTBT at the earliest possible date and to observe the moratorium on nuclear explosive testing until the CTBT entered into force.

74. Brazil welcomed the agreement reached on 13 February during the six-party talks and looked forward to the forthcoming visit of the Director General to the DPRK, which would open the way to the full and effective resumption of Agency monitoring and inspection there.

75. Brazil supported the efforts being made to find a peaceful and lasting solution for the Korean Peninsula and was convinced that all issues concerning international peace and security should be resolved through diplomatic negotiations.

76. Mr. PANUPONG (Thailand) welcomed the initial actions for the implementation of the joint statement adopted on 13 February in Beijing. He commended the efforts of all the parties concerned in overcoming their differences so as to undertake concrete measures towards the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. He also welcomed the DPRK's recent invitation to the Director General to visit the

country; that was essential in preparing for the eventual return of Agency personnel to conduct monitoring and verification work.

77. Thailand fully subscribed to the sanctity of the NPT and the Agency safeguards system. The latest development concerning the DPRK was an important step towards building confidence in the non-proliferation regime in the Asia-Pacific region and establishing peace and security in north-east Asia. Thailand reaffirmed its support for the six-party process and stood ready to work closely with the international community to ensure the peaceful resolution of the Korean Peninsula issue in the long term.

78. Mr. ARÉVALO YÉPES (Colombia) reiterated his Government's position in welcoming the results of latest round of six-party talks regarding denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and acknowledging the efforts of all the parties involved.

79. His Government reaffirmed its own commitments under the main disarmament and non-proliferation instruments and was confident that the activities of the working groups which had been established would lead to the implementation of the commitments undertaken in the joint declaration of 2005.

80. Also, Colombia hoped that the forthcoming meetings would enable the normalization of relations among the parties, increased regional economic and energy cooperation and the resumption of Agency activities in the DPRK.

81. Colombia welcomed the invitation extended by the DPRK to the Director General and looked forward to the results of his visit.

82. Mr. LUMBANGA (United Republic of Tanzania)* said that his country, which attached great importance to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, welcomed the recent developments in the six-party talks. The DPRK had indicated that it would shut down its main nuclear facility and eventually give up its nuclear weapons programme in exchange for aid. That was a significant step in conformity with the principles of the NPT, which sought to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons technology, to foster the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to further the goal of general and complete disarmament.

83. He welcomed the recent invitation of the DPRK for the Director General to visit the country and, in conclusion, underlined that negotiations were the only means to achieve peace.

84. Ms. MACMILLAN (New Zealand)* added her voice to those welcoming the news that the DPRK had agreed to disable all of its nuclear facilities and make a complete declaration of all its nuclear programmes. She congratulated the countries participating in the six-party talks on their work. New Zealand had long believed that peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula could only be achieved through dialogue, undertaken in good faith, which was the key to finding a solution.

85. If the DPRK demonstrated a genuine commitment to implementing the agreement reached on 13 February by shutting down the Yongbyon nuclear facility and allowing the return of Agency inspectors within 60 days, the international community would be in a position to warm its relations with Pyongyang.

86. Many challenges still lay ahead, but if the DPRK continued to engage faithfully in the process, the recent agreement would pave the way for the full and effective implementation of the 2005 joint statement. New Zealand, which looked forward to continuing its discussions in the region on how best to bring peace and stability to the Korean Peninsula, called on all parties to work constructively to that end.

87. Ms. LACANLALE (Philippines)* said her country welcomed the agreement reached in the six-party talks in Beijing on 13 February 2007. It was an important first step towards a denuclearized Korean Peninsula and the eventual return of the entire north-east Asia region to the non-proliferation regime. It boded well for a more stable and secure Asia.

88. The Philippines commended the host of the six-party talks, China, and the other countries involved for having demonstrated the strength and resolve to engage the DPRK in the diplomatic arena for the cause of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

89. Her country welcomed the invitation made by the DPRK to the Director General to visit and hoped that it would pave the way for the DPRK's return to the non-proliferation regime. In that connection, it called on the DPRK to sign and ratify the CTBT.

90. The Philippines supported continued dialogue within the framework of the six-party talks for the implementation of the February 2007 agreement and looked forward to the eventual normalization of relations between key players in the region.

91. Mr. SCHALLER (Switzerland)* welcomed the agreement on initial actions for the implementation of the six-party joint statement reached in Beijing on 13 February 2007 by participants in the third session of the fifth round of the six-party talks. The agreement had broken a long-standing stalemate. Switzerland particularly welcomed the return of Agency inspectors and the invitation made to the Director General to visit the DPRK. It encouraged all parties to implement their commitments within 60 days of the agreement's conclusion, as envisaged.

92. Switzerland was convinced that the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue could be solved by diplomatic means, as could other questions that might arise and doubts relating to possible clandestine nuclear enrichment programme in the DPRK.

93. The next two months would be decisive. Switzerland hoped that the ongoing negotiation process would continue successfully and result in a return of the DPRK to the NPT. Since Security Council resolution 1718 (2006) remained in force, Switzerland would continue to apply it.

94. Mr. GARCÉS-BURBANO (Ecuador)* said that his delegation was satisfied with the results of the six-party talks in the form of the initial actions agreed on 13 February 2007 with a view to the shutdown and sealing of the Yongbyon nuclear facility. Ecuador was pleased at the invitation by the Government of the DPRK to the Director General to visit the country. That would certainly go a long way towards returning relations between the Agency and the DPRK to the track that they should never have left.

95. Ecuador had high hopes of seeing close monitoring and extensive verification of all nuclear activities in the DPRK in the near future.

96. His country maintained a clear position regarding the use of nuclear technology for non-peaceful purposes. It was consistent with its location in the first densely populated NWFZ on the planet and reflected in its foreign policy and its unwavering commitment to non-proliferation, to all of the Agency's statutory activities and to the obligations arising from its safeguards agreements. Ecuador supported the steadfast pursuit of a negotiated solution aimed at achieving denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Ecuador had full confidence in the Director General's management of the normalization of relations with the DPRK.

97. The CHAIRMAN, summing up, said his remarks would be very brief in view of the sensitive nature of the ongoing talks. The Board had recalled the September 2005 joint statement of the fourth round of the six-party talks in which, inter alia, the DPRK had expressed its commitment to

abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes and returning, at an early date, to the NPT and to the Agency's safeguards.

98. The Board had welcomed the agreement on the initial actions for the implementation of the six-party joint statement reached at the third session of the fifth round of the six-party talks held in Beijing on 13 February 2007. It had expressed its appreciation for the role of China as host and Chairman of the six-party talks and noted the steps being taken by the States concerned to proceed with the initial actions.

99. Some members had reiterated concern over the DPRK's nuclear activities, which were a serious challenge to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The DPRK had been urged to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear weapons programmes in a complete, prompt, transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1718 (2006), as well as the relevant General Conference and Board resolutions.

100. The Board had emphasized the importance of continued dialogue to achieve a peaceful and comprehensive resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue and early denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. It had expressed the view that a successfully negotiated settlement of the long-standing issue, maintaining the Agency's essential verification role, would be a significant accomplishment for international peace and security. In that regard, the Board had welcomed the invitation extended to the Director General by the DPRK to visit the DPRK with a view to developing relations between the DPRK and the Agency and for discussions on problems of mutual concern.

101. The Board had requested the Director General to keep it informed.

102. He trusted that that summing-up was acceptable.

103. It was so agreed.

(d) Report by the Director General on the implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran
(GOV/2007/8)

104. The CHAIRMAN said that on 23 December 2006, the Security Council had adopted resolution 1737 in which the Council had, inter alia, requested the Director General to report, within 60 days, on whether Iran had established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in the resolution as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the Board of Governors and with the other provisions of the resolution, to the Board and, in parallel, to the Security Council for its consideration. On 28 February 2007, the Secretariat had presented a technical briefing on the report by the Director General on the implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolution 1737 (2006) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, contained in document GOV/2007/8.

105. Ms. GOICOHEA ESTENOZ (Cuba), speaking on behalf of NAM, said she wished to recall the principles and positions of the Movement as reflected in its statement on the Iranian nuclear issue adopted at the 14th summit held in Havana, Cuba, on 15 and 16 September 2006. In that statement, the Heads of State or Government attending the summit had reaffirmed the basic and inalienable right of all States to develop research, production and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, without any discrimination and in conformity with their respective legal obligations and that, therefore, nothing should be interpreted in any way to inhibit or restrict the right of States to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes. They had furthermore reaffirmed that States' choices and decisions in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and fuel cycle policies must be respected. They had recognized the Agency as the sole competent authority for verification of the respective safeguards obligations of Member States and had stressed that there should be no undue pressure or interference

in the Agency's activities, especially its verification process, which would jeopardize the efficiency and credibility of the Agency. The Heads of State or Government had emphasized the fundamental distinction between the legal obligations of States to their respective safeguards agreements and any confidence-building measures voluntarily undertaken to resolve difficult issues and had stated their belief that such voluntary undertakings were not legal safeguards obligations.

106. The Heads of State or Government had reiterated their support for the establishment in the Middle East of a NWFZ and had demanded, pending its establishment, that Israel accede to the NPT without delay and promptly place all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive Agency safeguards. Any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities — operational or under construction — posed a great danger to human beings and the environment. The Heads of State or Government had accordingly recognized the need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks or threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. They strongly believed that diplomacy and dialogue must continue so as to find a long-term solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. They had expressed their conviction that the only way to resolve the issue was to resume negotiations without any preconditions and to enhance cooperation with the involvement of all necessary parties.

107. NAM noted that, in his report, the Director General had indicated that the Agency was able to verify the non-diversion of declared material in Iran and that there were no indications of ongoing reprocessing activities. In a letter addressed to him dated 19 February 2007 the Islamic Republic of Iran reiterated its full readiness and willingness to negotiate on the modality for the resolution of the outstanding issues with the Agency, subject to assurances for dealing with them in the framework of the Agency, without the interference of the Security Council.

108. Taking into account recent developments on the issue, NAM called on all parties concerned to exercise patience and restraint and not to resort to any action that might escalate tensions and lead to unnecessary confrontation. It recalled the various resolutions of the General Conference, in particular operative paragraph 3 of resolution GC(XXXIV)/RES/533 on the prohibition of all armed attacks against nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes whether under construction or in operation.

109. NAM welcomed the visit of the Troika of its Vienna Chapter to the Islamic Republic of Iran on 3 and 4 February 2007. During the visit, which had included some nuclear facilities, the Troika had received updated information on the Iranian nuclear programme. NAM viewed that invitation as a transparency and confidence-building measure by the Iranian authorities.

110. Mr. GOTTWALD (Germany), speaking on behalf of the EU, said that the candidate countries Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey, the countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia, the EFTA countries Iceland and Lichtenstein, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Moldova and Ukraine, associated themselves with his statement.

111. Since the Board's meetings in November 2006, Security Council resolution 1737 (2006) had reaffirmed as mandatory the suspension of enrichment-related activities in Iran and had rendered mandatory the Islamic Republic of Iran's cooperation with the Agency. The EU, having thanked the Director General and the Secretariat for their continuing impartial efforts to try to verify the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme, deplored the fact that Iran had not complied with Security Council resolution 1737 and noted in particular that Iran had failed to suspend all enrichment and enrichment-related activities and appeared determined to pursue them on an even larger scale. Since November 2006, Iran had several times fed UF₆ into cascades in the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and produced UF₆ enriched to levels below 5% uranium-235. It had informed the Agency about its intention to install 18 cascades and to bring them gradually into operation by May 2007. That was

unacceptable, as it would be another violation of Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006) and 1737 (2006) and would go against the numerous requests of the Board of Governors. Under the latter resolution, all enrichment-related activities in Iran, whether under surveillance or not, must be suspended. Iran must implement without delay all verification measures which the Agency deemed necessary. The EU regretted that to date only interim verification agreements could be implemented at the Fuel Enrichment Plant. It deplored the fact that civil construction at the IR-40 reactor in Arak and the operation of the heavy water production plant were continuing.

112. Additional information which the Agency had received with regard to the contamination of components did not fully explain the presence of some of the LEU and HEU particles. The EU called again on Iran to provide the Agency with all requested information and, in particular, to allow further environmental sampling of equipment and materials related to the Physics Research Centre and interviews with one of its former heads.

113. The EU noted with regret that Iran had provided no new information on its P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programmes had not provided a copy of the 15-page document describing the procedures for the reduction of UF₆ to uranium metal and had not provided sufficient information to verify the correctness and completeness of its declarations concerning its plutonium separation experiments.

114. The EU was concerned about Iran's decision to de-designate 38 inspectors for Iran and to refuse 10 new inspectors. It called on Iran to respond in a positive manner to the Director General's request to reconsider that decision.

115. The EU deplored the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran had not agreed to any of the transparency measures required to clarify the scope and nature of its nuclear programme, including information about alleged studies related to the so-called Green Salt Project, to high explosives testing and to the design of a missile re-entry vehicle.

116. Iran had reluctantly granted access to declared nuclear material and facilities and had provided some of the required nuclear material accountancy reports so that the Agency had been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in the country. Nevertheless, the Agency remained unable to make further progress in its efforts to verify fully the past development of Iran's nuclear programme. The EU called again on Iran to ratify the additional protocol and implement the necessary transparency measures in order to enable the Agency to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

117. The Director General's report clearly demonstrated the Islamic Republic of Iran's disregard of the international community's will, as expressed in the unanimous and legally-binding Security Council resolution 1737 (2006). The EU reaffirmed its support for the Security Council process and emphasized that, in resolution 1737, the Security Council had expressed its intention to adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter should Iran fail to comply.

118. At the same time, the EU reaffirmed its support for efforts to find a negotiated long-term solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. A comprehensive offer was still on the table and the door to negotiations remained open. The EU seized the opportunity to call once more on Iran to open the way for negotiations by complying with the requirements of Security Council resolution 1737 (2006).

119. Mr. MINTY (South Africa) commended the Director General and his staff for their continued unbiased approach to resolving the outstanding questions regarding Iran's nuclear programme. The Director General's proposal for a timeout — involving the suspension in Iran of nuclear fuel cycle activities, particularly enrichment activities, and the suspension of the application of sanctions against

the country — could provide the necessary neutral basis for renewed dialogue and merited serious consideration.

120. In his introductory statement, the Director General had remarked that the current situation remained somewhat of a stalemate. The Agency had been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, but remained unable to reconstruct fully the history of Iran's nuclear programme and some of its components because Iran had not provided the necessary level of transparency and cooperation. In South Africa's view, the matter could be resolved only in the context of the Agency with Iran's full cooperation. His delegation shared the Director General's disappointment at Iran's decision to link its readiness to resolve the outstanding safeguards issues to actions by the Security Council. South Africa encouraged Iran to provide the necessary assistance and cooperation to the Agency in its efforts to resolve the outstanding issues as soon as possible. Such cooperation would help to build the necessary confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear activities. South Africa hoped that nothing would be done to hamper in any way the smooth continuation of the Agency's verification activities. It appealed to all parties involved to refrain from any actions that could have a negative impact on the Agency's integrity and credibility.

121. South Africa took note of the technical cooperation projects with Iran that had been put on hold or partially suspended in the light of Security Council resolution 1737 (2006). It had every confidence that the Secretariat would continue to act strictly in accordance with its statutory mandate and international law.

122. Mr. AAS (Norway), having expressed appreciation for the Director General's latest report on the matter, underlined that the Agency must carry out its investigation and verification mandate. Norway regretted the lack of progress, despite three years of intensive investigation. As confirmed by the Director General in his introductory statement, the Agency was still not in a position to provide the required assurances about the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. Norway called on Iran to do its utmost to restore its international credibility in order to be able to exercise its full rights under the NPT in an international environment of trust.

123. While noting that Iran was giving some cooperation to the Agency, particularly with regard to its obligations under the comprehensive safeguards agreement, Norway urged Iran to enhance that cooperation to the fullest extent possible and without conditions. That was fundamental to finding a solution to outstanding issues relating to the scope and nature of its nuclear programme.

124. Norway regretted that the Director General's report had concluded that Iran, against the demands of the international community, was still pursuing enrichment-related activities. It urged the Iranian authorities to suspend as soon as possible those and other sensitive activities so that negotiations aimed at finding a comprehensive and durable solution could begin. Norway agreed with the Director General that the path of negotiation was the only way to achieve that goal.

125. The right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes applied to all States Party to the NPT without discrimination and, naturally, also to Iran. The need to reach a long-lasting politically negotiated solution was more urgent than ever. Security Council resolution 1737 (2006) had given the Agency the political backing for its efforts to resolve all outstanding issues relating to Iran's nuclear activities. Norway, which had frequently underlined the need for international unity in dealing with the matter, welcomed the consultations among the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany on how the Council should bring the matter forward. It hoped that further action would be guided by an understanding of the importance of maintaining a unified approach. Efforts must be intensified to reach a solution and all parties must contribute towards that end.

126. Mr. CURIA (Argentina) said the Agency must continue its work to reconstruct the history of Iran's nuclear programme over the past 20 years. Only then could the confidence of the international

community about its peaceful nature be restored. To that end, maximum cooperation and transparency from the Iranian authorities were essential. Argentina urged Iran to carry out the actions necessary to fulfil the resolutions of the Board and the Security Council.

127. Mr. RAMZY (Egypt) said that, thanks to the Agency's work over the past three years, the international community had gained wide knowledge of the Iranian nuclear programme. It was important that the Agency continue its verification work and for Iran to cooperate fully with the Agency so as to prove the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities.

128. It was necessary to create conducive conditions and allow sufficient time for finding a peaceful solution that preserved Iran's right under the NPT to develop its capacities for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy while ensuring that it met the requirements of the international community concerning verification and proliferation. Taking hasty decisions might lead to confrontation and escalation and undermine the chances of reaching a peaceful settlement. Good progress had been made in the international efforts to arrive at a solution which would dispel doubts surrounding the Iranian nuclear programme and its intentions. All parties needed to demonstrate a constructive and flexible spirit and, at the same time, Iran must make every effort to resolve all the outstanding issues referred to in the Director General's report.

129. The international efforts to verify the Iranian nuclear programme should be seen in the context of the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. The credibility of the international community and the Agency depended on implementation of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Conference on the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East. In that connection, Egypt reiterated its appeal for Israel to place all its nuclear installations under the comprehensive safeguards system, to accede to the NPT and to implement without delay the relevant Security Council resolutions and the resolution of the NPT Review Conference of 1995 on the Middle East. It was inconceivable that international efforts should focus on a country which did not possess nuclear weapons while at the same time turning a blind eye to a country whose Prime Minister himself had acknowledged that it possessed such weapons.

130. Mr. OTHMAN (Syrian Arab Republic), drawing attention to paragraphs 26 and 27 of the Director General's report, said that neither it nor any other report had provided evidence that Iran had diverted nuclear material for military purposes. Also, Iran remained committed to entering into any negotiations in order to reassure the international community, provided there were no preconditions. A diplomatic solution was still possible and the best way to achieve it was through dialogue avoiding intransigency and escalation. Lessons in gaining mutual confidence could be learned from the DPRK file. Syria called on the international community to give diplomacy and dialogue a chance on the Iran issue and avoid additional crises in the Middle East. In Syria's view, the solution lay within the Agency and not the Security Council.

131. It was unacceptable to the people of the Middle East that pressure should be brought to bear on Iran, a State that had acceded to the NPT and complied with its obligations, while a blind eye was turned to a number of countries with a nuclear capability greater than Iran's. The most flagrant example was Israel, which refused to accede to the NPT and submit its nuclear facilities to Agency inspection. International instruments, including the NPT, upheld the right of States to have access to peaceful nuclear technology and it was also a statutory function of the Agency to ensure that right. The best way of promoting non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was to work towards universality of the NPT through the Agency, the competent body in that regard. Syria called on the international community to reject any double standards and to make a serious commitment to universal non-proliferation.

132. Mr. ALOBIDI (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) said that the Director General's report indicated that Iran had to a large extent implemented its NPT safeguards agreement. Libya reaffirmed Iran's right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, a right anchored in the Agency's Statute as well as various international instruments. The bitter experience of Iraq had shown what miscalculations and disinformation could lead to. Rather than helping matters, the imposition of sanctions and military action would only promote instability and anarchy in the Middle East and help terrorism spread to other States. Those countries that opposed the Iranian nuclear energy programme, which continued to be under Agency safeguards, should take the same position about Israel's nuclear programme, which was a genuine threat to peace and security, but was not subject to Agency safeguards, Israel having also refused to accede to the NPT. The double standards of Western countries cast doubt on the true intentions behind their call for sanctions against Iran.

133. The Director General's report had acknowledged that Iran had not yet replied to a number of Agency questions and requests. He had expressed the hope in his introductory statement that conditions would be created soon for the resumption of negotiations. Libya considered that a more dispassionate approach would help the Director General to act appropriately. To achieve that, his delegation suggested that the Security Council should temporarily desist from adopting any resolutions on Iran's nuclear programme, that negotiations should begin between the Agency and Iran in order to establish a timetable under which Iran would respond to all the questions referred to in the Director General's report, that Iran should take all necessary measures to restore confidence and dispel the Agency's doubts about its nuclear programme, and that all parties should return to the negotiating table and try to resolve outstanding issues. The agreement recently concluded with the DPRK was an important precedent in that regard.

134. Mr. MACKAY (Belarus) said that his delegation continued to believe that the Iranian issue must be resolved through diplomacy and dialogue and by exclusively peaceful means. Belarus reiterated its commitment to the NPT, which inter alia upheld the right of all countries to legitimate peaceful nuclear activities.

135. His delegation was pleased to note from the Director General's report that, pursuant to its NPT safeguards agreement, Iran had been providing the Agency with access to declared nuclear material and facilities and had provided the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with such material and facilities. An escalation of tensions must be avoided and further dialogue should build on the positive experience of cooperation between Iran and the Agency.

136. The use of NPT mechanisms to interfere with peaceful nuclear programmes was unacceptable and jeopardized the non-proliferation regime itself. Member States pursuing peaceful nuclear energy programmes should act with maximum transparency, in keeping with the letter and spirit of their NPT commitments.

137. Ms. GERVAIS-VIDRICAIRE (Canada) said that her Government was very concerned that the Agency remained unable to ascertain whether Iran's declarations with regard to the implementation of its NPT safeguards agreement were complete. The Agency was still trying to reconstruct the history of Iran's nuclear programme, including its plutonium separation and centrifuge work and its interactions with clandestine supply networks. There were also a number of outstanding issues relating to HEU and LEU contamination found at various locations in Iran, including at one where there had not even been a declaration to connect the contamination to nuclear activities. Another matter of concern was plutonium that appeared to be missing from particles that Iran had declared to have come from spent fuel from the Tehran Research Reactor.

138. For several years, the Board had been urging Iran to take the necessary steps to resolve the outstanding questions that had arisen about its undeclared nuclear activities over two decades. While

the absence of a conclusion that all nuclear material and activities had been properly safeguarded was worrisome in the case of a State with a history of concealment, the inability even to progress towards such a conclusion was unacceptable. That situation had led the Board to seek confidence-building measures, including the suspension of enrichment activities, through the implementation of measures under the additional protocol, and increased transparency and access. As Iran had not responded positively, the matter had been referred to the Security Council.

139. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1737 (2006), the confidence-building measures required by the Board had become mandatory. However, rather than suspending enrichment, Iran had continued with the development and operation of centrifuge cascades at Natanz and instead of working proactively to resolve outstanding issues, it had de-designated a number of inspectors, a decision over which the Agency had expressed regret. Clearly, Iran had neither implemented the additional protocol nor had it provided the increased access and transparency measures required.

140. Iran's failure to cooperate and demonstrate transparency continued to be a matter of great concern to Canada and to the international community. Her delegation expressed its full support for the efforts of the Secretariat and the actions taken by the Security Council in reinforcing the important work of the Agency.

141. Ms. GOICOCHEA ESTENOZ (Cuba) said that, as far as her country was concerned, the real issue was not Iran's failure to comply, which in any case had not really been substantiated or demonstrated, but the sovereign decision of Iran's Government to continue its programme for the development of nuclear energy for peaceful means, which it had every right to do as a signatory of the NPT with a safeguards agreement with the Agency. A purely technical problem for which the Agency alone was competent had been turned into a political issue and was being used to exert pressure and blackmail the legitimate Government of Iran and its people for having taken a different path from that marked out for developing countries by those who sought to run the world and decide its destiny.

142. The so-called 'Iranian nuclear issue' had been used by the hegemonic powers to concoct theories designed to further impinge on the rights of peoples. Nor had there been any lack of new interpretations of Article IV of the NPT aimed at a selective application of the inalienable right of countries to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

143. It was clear to Cuba that, from the outset, the aim had been to decide the future of nuclear power for many countries. The issue transcended the purely nuclear dimension and was central to the hegemonic plans of the United States of America. Cuba had warned early on that that the United States might use the issue as a new pretext for its military and geopolitical adventures in the region. Right from the start, the objective had been to transform the issue into a 'threat to international peace and security' and take it from the Agency to the Security Council, where the interests and political positions of the United States were secured by the sacrosanct veto right.

144. Discussion had focused on the suspension of fuel cycle activities, which would pose great difficulties for Iran. It had all started with a seemingly innocuous request for Iran to suspend such activities on a voluntary and temporary basis as a confidence-building measure. NAM had issued repeated warnings that voluntary confidence-building measures must not be allowed to become legal obligations. The first step in that direction had been the imposition of a paragraph in the draft resolution put to the Board in November 2004 underlining that suspension was essential to addressing outstanding issues². That language, which was completely unwarranted, was pivotal to the purposes of

² See document GOV/2004/89, operative paragraph 1.

those who, although not visible protagonists in the negotiations, were directing them behind the scenes.

145. The suspension became the point on which all negotiations hinged. Iran failed to suspend and so the matter had been referred to the Security Council and sanctions imposed. Now, once again, it was being asserted that there could be no negotiations without prior suspension,. That was a dangerous vicious circle which could exacerbate the situation in the Middle East. It should be borne in mind that a number of international press agencies had referred to plans by the United States and Israel to attack Iran if there was no suspension.

146. The Board of Governors was being prevented from carrying out its statutory functions, the Security Council having usurped its rights, while acting in a selective manner on other issues. Only such double standards could explain the silence at the Israeli Government's admission that it possessed nuclear weapons, which was the real threat to peace in the Middle East.

147. Iran must not be prohibited from engaging in peaceful activities, which were subject to strict Agency safeguards, because of their alleged danger. It was precisely those safeguards that the international community acknowledged as valid in preventing diversion for military purposes. The Iranian nuclear issue should be returned to the framework of the Agency, which it should never have left. A solution must be sought through diplomacy and fair, unconditional and equitable negotiations conducted in good faith. Hence the need to do away with any precondition for a unilateral suspension by Iran of its nuclear fuel cycle activities. Peace should be given another chance through application of the principles of international law embodied in the United Nations Charter and Article IV.C of the Agency's Statute, which set forth the principle of sovereign equality. The use of force under Chapter VII of the Charter was an exceptional measure and a last recourse in order to protect international peace and security. The illegitimate threat or use of force would only make it more difficult to find a just and long-lasting solution to any problem.

148. Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) said that the Director General's report provided an objective picture of Iran's compliance with its safeguards commitments and the provisions of the relevant resolutions adopted by the Board of Governors and the Security Council. As stated in the report, Iran had not suspended its uranium enrichment-related activities. In fact, work was under way to step up existing capabilities, and projects related to heavy water were also ongoing.

149. It followed from the report that Iran was still not taking adequate measures to provide the necessary conditions for the Agency to make headway in its efforts to complete its verification of Iran's past nuclear programme. The international community had questions with regard to its scope and nature, and it was to be hoped that Iran would respond in a positive and constructive manner to those questions and to the proposals by the Director General for the resolution of all outstanding issues. That was above all in Iran's own interests as the long-standing uncertainty with regard to its nuclear activities was not conducive to full cooperation with Iran in the area of the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

150. The Russian Federation continued to have confidence in the ability of the Agency inspectors to make a professional evaluation of the nature of the Iranian nuclear programme and would support the Secretariat in its efforts. As noted in Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006) and 1737 (2006), the Agency had an important role to play in resolving all outstanding issues.

151. The Russian Federation was committed to resolving the Iranian nuclear issue through negotiations, which it considered the only viable approach. It called on all interested parties, including Iran, to work to bring about a resumption of negotiations without delay.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.