IAEA Board of Governors

Record of the 1181st Meeting
GOV/OR.1181

Any other business
Record of the 1181\textsuperscript{st} Meeting

\textit{Held at Headquarters, Vienna, on Thursday, 8 March 2007, at 10.15 a.m.}

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\(^1\) GOV/2007/12.
Attendance

(The list below gives the name of the senior member of each delegation who attended the meeting, as well as that of any other member whose statement is summarized in this record.)

Mr. PETRIČ

Ms. WILKINSON DE VEXINA
Mr. SHANNON
Mr. STELZER
Mr. MACKAY
Mr. BAZOBBERRY
Mr. MOURAO
Ms. GERVAIS-VIDRICAIRE
Mr. SKOKNIC
Mr. TANG Guoqiang
Mr. ARÉVALO YÉPES
Mr. HORVATIČ
Ms. GOICOCEA ESTENOZ
Mr. RAMZY
Mr. KEBEDE
Ms. KAUPPI
Mr. CARON
Mr. GOTTWALD
Mr. SOTIROPOULOS
Mr. SHARMA
Mr. WIBOWO
Mr. AMANO
Mr. KO Han-Suk
Mr. EL-DEEN EL-MISLATTI
Mr. ZNIBER
Mr. OSAISAI
Mr. AAS
Mr. ALI
Mr. BERDENNIKOV
Mr. KRIŽ
Mr. MINTY
Mr. LUNDBORG
Mr. OTHMAN
Mr. ARTHAKAIVALVATEE
Mr. MACGREGOR
Mr. SCHULTZE

Chairman (Slovenia)
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belarus
Bolivia
Brazil
Canada
Chile
China
Colombia
Croatia
Canada
Egypt
Ethiopia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
India
Indonesia
Japan
Korea, Republic of
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
Morocco
Nigeria
Norway
Pakistan
Russian Federation
Slovenia
South Africa
Sweden
Syrian Arab Republic
Thailand
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
United States of America

Mr. ELBARADEI
Ms. CETTO
Mr. ANING

Director General
Deputy Director General, Department of Technical Cooperation
Secretary of the Board
Representatives of the following Member States also attended the meeting:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Holy See, Hungary, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Vietnam, Zimbabwe.

Abbreviations used in this record:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>CTBT</td>
<td>Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFTA</td>
<td>European Free Trade Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPT Review Conference</td>
<td>Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPT Review and Extension Conference</td>
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* Speakers under Rule 50 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure are indicated by an asterisk.*

1. Mr. MOURÃO (Brazil) said that his country had full confidence in the impartiality and professionalism of the Director General in assessing how the Agency was to comply with paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1737 (2006). It could therefore endorse document GOV/2007/7 in full confidence that the Secretariat would act judiciously with respect to the projects that required case-by-case decisions.

2. The Board should not lose sight of the fact that the Iranian situation was very particular, both because the item had been on the Board’s agenda for some time and because the Security Council had adopted a mandatory resolution enjoining the Agency to review its technical cooperation programmes with Iran. It should be made quite clear that the Board’s aim should not be to micromanage the technical cooperation activities sponsored or supported by the Agency on a worldwide basis.

3. He requested clarification from the Secretariat regarding the use of the word “strategic” in the document which had too broad a meaning and could include many fields of human activity.

4. One of the reasons mentioned for discontinuing some projects was that they were of a “strategic” nature. If the word “strategic” was intended to imply that a project could have military implications, that should perhaps be made clear in a footnote in the final version.

5. Mr. ARTHAKAIVALVATEE (Thailand) said that the Agency’s technical cooperation activities were essential to sustainable socio-economic development in Member States, particularly developing countries. His country supported the Agency’s technical cooperation programme for 2007–2008, which had been approved by the Board in November 2006, and it had confidence in the high standard of professionalism, integrity and impartiality of the Agency in preparing and delivering its technical cooperation programmes.

6. With regard to Security Council resolution 1737 (2006), he commended the Secretariat for its untiring efforts in evaluating all technical cooperation projects for Iran which, in its judgment, could be continued, or should be discontinued or examined on a case-by-case basis. His country supported the Secretariat’s view that technical cooperation could continue to be provided to Iran only if it was for food, agricultural, medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes, or where it related to light-water reactors as specified in operative paragraphs 3(b)(i) and (ii) of the resolution.

7. The Secretariat should continue to keep its technical assistance activities with Iran under review to ensure that none contributed to the proliferation of sensitive nuclear activities, as specified in the resolution, and it should keep the Board informed of the matter. Thailand remained hopeful that there would be positive developments that could re-energize the cooperation between Iran and the Agency and resolve outstanding issues concerning its nuclear programme.

8. With those comments, he took note of document GOV/2007/7 and its recommended action.

9. Mr. BAZOBERRY (Bolivia) noted that the Director General had gone to great lengths to preserve the impartiality and objectivity of the Agency in considering the issue of cooperation between Iran and the Agency in the light of Security Council resolution 1737 (2006). As he understood it, there
was a basis for consensus. The Agency’s technical cooperation activities relating to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in support of sustainable development for developing countries were greatly valued by Bolivia.

10. Further measures against Iran would not ipso facto lead to a consensus solution of the Iranian nuclear issue, and insisting that Iran renounce a peaceful nuclear programme which was in accordance with the NPT was a complicated matter. Continuing to cooperate fully with the Agency and implement confidence-building measures which would restore confidence in the peaceful intentions of its nuclear programme was also a complicated issue of which Iran should take due account. Those two topics were parts of an equation which needed to be considered in striving to find a peaceful solution which was satisfactory to all parties involved.


12. Ms. GOICOCHEA ESTENOZ (Cuba), commended the professionalism with which document GOV/2007/7 had been prepared. Nevertheless, Cuba was greatly concerned by the political and manipulative use that was being made of the so-called Iranian nuclear issue and the negative precedents which had been created by it, in the current instance with regards to technical cooperation, one of the three pillars of the Agency’s activities.

13. Cuba complied fully with its international obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and would therefore comply with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1737 (2006). However, it was concerned by the elements which infringed the statutory norms of the Agency in both letter and spirit.

14. The references to technical cooperation in the resolution violated the Agency’s Statute in several respects. Article III.C of the Statute stated that “the Agency shall not make assistance to members subject to any political, economic, military, or other conditions incompatible with the provisions of this Statute”. Resolution 1737 breached that principle by making the Agency’s technical cooperation subject to a purely political consideration. Article XII.C of the Statute established that curtailing technical cooperation was the exclusive right of the Agency. If it was assumed that the curtailment of technical cooperation with Iran was a suspension of its privileges for alleged repeated non-compliance, which was an extreme hypothesis, Article XIX.B of the Statute stipulated that such a decision required a two-thirds majority vote by the General Conference acting upon the recommendation of the Board of Governors.

15. Furthermore, the resolution specified the type of cooperation which could be provided, going beyond aspects which might be related to the alleged proliferation of nuclear weapons. In Cuba’s opinion, that constituted a regrettable and inadmissible manipulation of technical cooperation as an element of political pressure.

16. The resolution left no margin of decision to the Secretariat or the Board, which went beyond the letter and spirit of the provisions governing the relations between the Security Council and international organizations. In the case at hand, a questionable and biased interpretation of those relations had been applied.

17. Her country was also troubled by the suggestions made by several speakers that the Board should be kept constantly informed about the implementation of technical cooperation with Iran. Such meticulous and detailed monitoring of the Secretariat’s work was not necessary and went beyond what was stipulated in the resolution. The great confidence in the Director General expressed by the majority of delegations should be reflected in leaving it to him to decide when to report to the Board on the issue.

19. Mr. SAMUEL (Malaysia)* said that the promotion of nuclear science and technology through technical cooperation activities that were in line with Member States’ development priorities and needs was one of the main pillars of the Agency’s activities.

20. Malaysia had full confidence in the Secretariat’s professionalism and impartiality in preparing, appraising, implementing and evaluating technical cooperation activities in accordance with the provisions of the Statute, the Technical Cooperation Strategy and INFCIRC/267, and in accordance with the relevant directives of the General Conference and the Board of Governors.

21. Article III.C of the Statute stated that “the Agency shall not make assistance to members subject to any political, economic, military or other conditions incompatible with the provisions of this Statute”. Subjecting or linking the technical cooperation programme to political conditions would seriously undermine the Agency’s authority and role as the world’s focal point in mobilizing peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology to address critical needs in developing countries.

22. Ms. GARCÍA DE PÉREZ (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela)* commended the Director General for maintaining balance and impartiality in compiling his report on technical cooperation between Iran and the Agency. With regard to the technical cooperation projects affected by the imposition of sanctions through Security Council resolution 1737 (2006), it was regrettable that use was being made of the sanctions mechanism to place conditions on the international assistance provided by the Agency with the implementation of peaceful nuclear projects. Such a situation affected the autonomy of the Agency and its ability to fulfil its mandate, which was to promote the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes through international cooperation. The Security Council could not use resolutions to impose on States or the Agency additional obligations differing from those enshrined in the international instruments governing the matter in question, such as the NPT and the Agency’s Statute.

23. Venezuela was concerned that the Agency’s Secretariat had taken a decision based on the resolution to suspend technical cooperation with Iran in certain areas. Such measures were contrary to the spirit and intention of international cooperation. Venezuela requested that the situation be reversed and that Iran be allowed to continue receiving Agency assistance.

24. Mr. SOLTANIEH (Islamic Republic of Iran)* thanked the Group of 77 and China and NAM for their support for his country’s peaceful nuclear programme over the preceding three years, and for reiterating the principles enshrined in the Agency’s Statute and expressing their concern over the political approach being taken to technical cooperation.

25. For the first time in the history of the Agency, its promotional statutory pillar had been put in serious jeopardy and the authority of the Agency as the sole competent technical international organization in nuclear matters had been seriously undermined. The Agency was an autonomous international organization which had a working relationship with the United Nations through a mutual agreement. The professionalism and impartiality of the Agency should not be undermined through politically motivated decisions taken by the Security Council, which was attempting to dictate to the Agency how and when it should deprive a developing Member State of technical cooperation for humanitarian and peaceful purposes.

26. All Iran’s projects with the Agency had been proposed by the Secretariat after an in-depth study, a thorough elaboration and an in-house screening. They had subsequently been considered and approved by the Board in accordance with the provisions of the Statute and the appropriate guidelines contained in document INFCIRC/267. Revising such decisions could only damage the credibility and
integrity of the Agency. Security Council resolution 1737 (2006) contravened the letter and spirit of the Agency’s Statute, in particular of Articles III, XII.C and XIX.

27. The sponsors of the punitive measures against Iran’s peaceful activities stipulated in the resolution either had no knowledge of the technical aspects of the matter and the procedures and guidelines for the approval of technical cooperation projects, or they were acting with ill intention to deprive Iran of its inalienable rights. The adoption of the resolution opened up the possibility of instrumental use of the Security Council to interfere with the Agency’s technical activities.

28. All of Iran’s projects were devoted to peaceful purposes and putting any of them on hold under the pretext of proliferation concerns was futile. He expressed the hope that the Secretariat would fulfil its responsibilities in the field of technical cooperation for peaceful and humanitarian purposes and resist outside political interference.

29. Given the important role of nuclear energy and the increasing demand for it, it was regrettable that politically motivated decisions were exerting outside pressure on the Agency to put on hold projects in a developing country which were related to infrastructure planning for a power plant and sustainable development, when the Agency was mandated by its Statute to assist Member States, in particular developing countries, in that area.

30. The curtailment of Iran’s participation in some regional projects would only deprive neighbouring countries of the opportunity to benefit from Iran’s useful experience. Other projects put on hold had purely humanitarian goals and, in the long term, would help not only Iran but the entire region. They had nothing to do with proliferation concerns.

31. Over the preceding three decades, developing Member States had repeatedly expressed concern over the voluntary nature of the technical cooperation funding policy. The new and unprecedented measure of imposing further restrictions on technical cooperation projects was an alarming sign for developing countries and indicated that the Agency was losing its promotional incentive for developing countries, which undermined its credibility.

32. Those few countries which had used their political and economic leverage to deprive Iran of its inalienable rights had failed to recognize the great nation of Iran, which was peace-loving but would never tolerate pressure or intimidation.

33. Ms. CETTO (Deputy Director General for Technical Cooperation) thanked speakers for their supportive comments, all of which had been noted. With regard to the request of the representative of Brazil for clarification on the use of the word “strategic” in document GOV/2007/7, the phrase “strategic purposes” was used in the context of the technical cooperation projects listed in the Annex, in line with the description of the objectives, to mean capacity-building and planning activities for the future.

34. The CHAIRMAN, summing up the discussions, said that the Board had commended the Secretariat for its comprehensive examination of technical cooperation provided to the Islamic Republic of Iran by the Agency contained in document GOV/2007/7.

35. Strong support had been expressed for the Agency’s technical cooperation programme, and the need for adequate, predictable and assured resources for the programme had been re-emphasized.

36. Several members had recalled the basic and inalienable right of all Member States to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with their respective legal obligations.
37. Several members had underlined the need to remain vigilant to ensure that Agency assistance to Iran was fully consistent with the resolutions of the Board and the Security Council and had requested the Secretariat to keep the Board informed as appropriate.

38. Several members had underlined that the promotion of peaceful applications of nuclear energy constituted a fundamental element of the statutory activities of the Agency. They had stressed that technical cooperation should not be subject to any political conditions.

39. Several members had noted that the technical cooperation projects already included in the technical cooperation programme had been formulated in accordance with the Agency’s Statute and document INFCIRC/267.

40. With those comments, he took it that the Board wished to take the action recommended in document GOV/2007/7, namely to take note of Security Council resolution 1737 (2006) and to concur with the Secretariat’s understanding of the actions required of the Agency by Member States in respect of the cooperation between Iran and the Agency as contained in paragraphs 10 to 13 of the document.

41. It was so decided.

42. The CHAIRMAN noted that there had been a request to make public the report of the Director General contained in document GOV/2007/7. He asked if that was agreeable to the Board.

43. It was so decided.

8. Any other business

44. The CHAIRMAN invited Governors to take up matters arising out of the Director General’s introductory statement or any other matters of concern to them.

45. Mr. GOTTWALD (Germany), speaking on behalf of the European Union, the candidate countries Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey, the countries of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia, the EFTA countries Iceland and Lichtenstein, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Moldova and Ukraine, welcomed the recommendation by the Board that the General Conference approve the application for membership by the Republic of Burundi and the Republic of the Congo. The European Union invited those future members of the Agency to sign, ratify and implement at their earliest convenience a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol and it looked forward to close and fruitful cooperation with them.

46. Ms. GOICOCEA ESTENOZ (Cuba), speaking on behalf of the Vienna Chapter of NAM, expressed grave concern at the statement made by the Prime Minister of Israel on 11 December 2006 in which he had publicly admitted that Israel possessed nuclear weapons. She reaffirmed NAM’s principled positions on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, reflected in a number of texts including the final document of the XIV Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of NAM held in Havana, Cuba, in September 2006.

47. NAM supported the establishment of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region, in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and the relevant General Assembly resolutions.
48. The NAM Vienna Chapter was greatly concerned over the acquisition of nuclear capability by Israel, which posed a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States. It condemned Israel for its action and aforementioned statement and for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear weapons. The members of the NAM Vienna Chapter that were party to the NPT demanded that Israel, the only country in the region that had not joined the NPT or declared its intention to do so, renounce the possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the NPT without delay, place promptly all its nuclear facilities under Agency full-scope safeguards in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 and conduct its nuclear-related activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime.

49. Mr. RAMZY (Egypt) said that the Agency was the lead international organization for dealing with nuclear non-proliferation and verification of the peaceful nature of the nuclear activities of countries throughout the world. Its fulfilment of its designated role depended essentially on the fulfilment by member countries of their responsibilities vis-à-vis to the Agency without bias or double standards. At the very least, that meant applying General Conference and Board resolutions and resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly. Every year, the General Conference adopted resolutions on the application of safeguards in the Middle East which pointed out that all countries of the Middle East except Israel had joined the NPT and placed their nuclear facilities and activities under Agency safeguards.

50. The statement made by the Israeli Prime Minister in December 2006 had prompted grave concern and alarm owing to the references to Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons. Such statements reinforced international doubts about Israel’s nuclear activities and justified the calls by Arab countries for the threat posed by Israeli nuclear capabilities to be addressed by the Agency’s decision-making bodies. The mere suggestion that Israel possessed military nuclear capabilities was a clear challenge to the will of the international community as expressed in General Conference resolutions on the application of safeguards in the Middle East, to the provisions and objectives of the NPT, to Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and to the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. It confirmed the need for all international fora, foremost among them the Agency, to discharge pragmatically and expeditiously their responsibility to confront that serious threat to international and regional security. That required the five nuclear-weapon States to discharge their duties in line with relevant international decisions. The Permanent Missions of the Arab countries to the IAEA had addressed a letter to the Director General on 23 February 2007, circulated in document INFCIRC/697, pointing out the need for the Agency to take practical steps on the issue.

51. The continued provision by a number of countries of moral protection and political cover for Israel’s position, and the double standards that were being applied regarding the nuclear threat in the Middle East, as had been seen recently in the obstruction of the discussion at the fiftieth session of the Agency’s General Conference of a draft resolution on Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat submitted by Arab States that were members of the Agency, were unacceptable. They undermined the NPT regime and encouraged certain countries to continue with their premeditated disregard for that regime. The reluctance of nuclear powers that were party to the NPT, in particular the three depositary States, to implement the decision to rid the Middle East of nuclear weapons simply furnished direct and indirect support for the nuclear programmes of certain countries. Hence the urgent need to achieve universality of the NPT and address the serious situation caused by the existence in some countries of well developed military nuclear capabilities that remained outside the comprehensive safeguards system.

52. A meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference was soon to be held in Vienna. That placed additional responsibilities on the Board and the Agency to deal in an appropriate manner with countries that represented a real threat to the non-proliferation regime. The
Agency’s decision-making bodies should take up that serious problem, and such action should be supported by all countries that sought to reinforce the credibility of Agency and its capacity to implement its objectives.

53. **Mr. OTHMAN** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that the Middle East was currently one of the most tense and volatile regions in the world. Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons posed a serious threat to the region. The admission in a recent statement by that country’s Prime Minister regarding its nuclear weapons capabilities threatened peace and security not only in the Middle East but throughout the world. The threat posed by Israeli nuclear capabilities made it impossible to establish a truly universal and equitable non-proliferation regime in the region. It fomented a non-conventional and dangerous arms race. The possibility of use of nuclear weapons in the Middle East perpetuated instability in the region and exposed it and the world to untold dangers.

54. The timorous attempts by the international community to restrict Israel’s nuclear capabilities were dependent on actions by certain countries. A number of international resolutions had been adopted addressing the volatile situation and calling for Israel to place its nuclear facilities under comprehensive Agency safeguards. Some dated back a quarter century: for example, Security Council resolution 487 (1981). The General Assembly had likewise adopted many resolutions on the threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, and the General Conference and other fora had adopted resolutions calling on States in the region to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. In 2003, on behalf of the Arab States, his country had submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council on the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The draft had remained a dead letter owing to resistance by certain States on the Security Council that supported Israel and, while affirming acceptance for the establishment of such a zone, had immediately started imposing prohibitive conditions.

55. His country shared the concerns expressed by Arab and other States at the fact that a country in the Middle East that was not a party to the NPT had nuclear weapons capabilities which it refused to place under the Agency’s monitoring regime. With the support of some other States, that country had even prevented the fiftieth session of the General Conference from adopting a resolution that had clearly and unambiguously outlined the danger existing in the region and the need to deal with it.

56. At the same time, pressure was being brought to bear on Iran. A Security Council resolution imposed sanctions on that country, which was a signatory of the NPT under which it was exercising its right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Iran had placed its facilities under Agency safeguards, allowed Agency inspectors access to its facilities, agreed to the installation of cameras and even allowed visits to military facilities, unlike other countries. The final decision on Iran should be taken by the Agency and the Agency alone. The international community should set aside any double standards and demand that Israel accede to the NPT and place all its facilities under Agency safeguards.

57. **Mr. EL-DEEN EL-MISSLATTI** (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), referring to the interview on German television in December 2006 in which the Israeli Prime Minister had spoken publicly of Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons, said that for the past thirty years the Arab States had been seeking to make the Middle East a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. In various regional and international fora, they had spoken about Israel’s weapons of mass destruction and the danger they posed for States in the region. Numerous resolutions had been passed by the General Assembly, the Agency and the NPT Review and Extension Conference, all calling for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and condemning Israeli nuclear capabilities. His delegation was puzzled at the international community’s failure to take action to implement those resolutions. All calls and appeals to Israel had gone unheeded. Israel’s possession of
nuclear weapons showed its disregard for the basic tenets of the Charter of the United Nations and the NPT and its disdain for international appeals.

58. The States of the Middle East were frustrated to see that universal adherence to the NPT had not yet been achieved. The nuclear powers were still in possession of thousands of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. Some military strategies and doctrines relied on nuclear weapons and justified their use against non-nuclear States. Israel’s strategies fell into that category. All States were duty-bound to continue to strive to ensure that all members of the Agency assumed their responsibilities. He called for the implementation of all international resolutions with a view to realizing the principle that the Middle East should be free of weapons of mass destruction.

59. His country’s initiative in giving up programmes and equipment that could have led to the production of weapons of mass destruction was a significant step towards that objective. At its 4949th meeting held on 22 April 2004, the Security Council had recognized that initiative as a step towards the realization of the goal of an Africa and a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction and at peace. Failure to take any measures against Israel’s nuclear capabilities only exacerbated concern over the double standards that were being applied by some major powers in applying the provisions of international law.

60. Mr. ZNIBER (Morocco) said that the credibility of the Agency’s safeguards system and of the non-proliferation regime was founded not only on technical viability but also, and above all, on their equitable and universal application. The fact that there were countries with major nuclear capabilities not subject to Agency comprehensive safeguards constituted a weakness in the non-proliferation regime that had to be remedied. It was time for the international community to assume its responsibilities regarding Israeli nuclear capabilities, which had been the subject of past resolutions by the General Conference. The statements made recently, which had reinforced fears about the presence of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, made it all the more urgent for Israel to accede to the NPT and submit all its nuclear facilities and activities to Agency comprehensive safeguards so as to promote the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region in conformity with the relevant international decisions and resolutions.

61. Ms. GOICOCHEA ESTENOZ (Cuba) said that, during the fiftieth session of the General Conference, Cuba had sponsored the resolution on Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat. Unfortunately, that resolution had not been given substantive consideration, sending the wrong message to the international community and to the Government of Israel. The response to that inaction had not been long in coming: in December 2006, the Israeli Prime Minister had acknowledged his country’s nuclear capabilities. Cuba had steadfastly denounced the double standards that were being applied to the handling of such sensitive issues. It had expressed concern on that point and at the acknowledgement by the Israeli Government of its nuclear capabilities, and had endorsed all statements made by NAM in various fora on the subject.

62. Mr. KABALAN (Lebanon)* expressed his country’s concern regarding the statement made in December 2006 by the Prime Minister of Israel on Israel’s military nuclear capabilities. For almost six decades Israel had been refusing or delaying the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions. No one, not even Israel, could deny that, in the preceding summer, Lebanon had suffered the massacre by Israel of more than 1200 civilians, mostly women and children, and the aggressive destruction of its infrastructure as a result of Israel’s excessive use of force. Lebanon was still suffering daily breaches of its sovereignty by the Israeli air force and occupation forces, and the destructive effect of tens of thousands of cluster bombs which were prohibited by international law yet had been fired at civilian quarters even after the Security Council had declared a halt to military actions.
63. Those actions by Israel clearly defied the international community. They were one example among many of how Israel’s irrational behaviour constituted a threat to other countries in the region. The statements made by the Israeli Prime Minister were additional proof of Israel’s hidden intentions and a clear threat to other countries in the Middle East. The international community was expected to act firmly and promptly by condemning Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat and by taking action — not based on double standards — to make the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Lebanon called upon the international community and the international bodies concerned to request Israel to place all its nuclear facilities and activities under comprehensive safeguards.

64. Mr. MANZOOR HUSSEIN (Malaysia)* said that his country viewed with great concern the recent announcement by the Israeli Prime Minister regarding Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons. Israel’s acquisition of nuclear weapons capability posed a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States in an already volatile region. Where massive imbalances in military capabilities existed and were maintained through the possession of nuclear weapons, stability could not be achieved.

65. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones constituted a significant step towards enhancing global and regional peace, strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament. Malaysia fully supported the speedy establishment of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), and the relevant United Nations General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus.

66. Pending the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East, Malaysia called on Israel, the only country in the region that had neither joined the NPT nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons and to accede to the NPT without delay. It urged Israel to place promptly all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive Agency safeguards and to conduct its nuclear-related activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime. The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the use by a State of nuclear weapons in armed conflict established that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict. The specific arguments in the advisory opinion lent powerful support to the moral and political arguments calling for total nuclear disarmament.

67. He called on all parties concerned to take urgent and practical steps towards the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and urged Israel to abide by the relevant Security Council resolutions in order to ensure the prompt establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

68. Mr. SOLTANIEH (Islamic Republic of Iran)* expressed appreciation to NAM for its unflagging support for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. As a State party to all international instruments banning weapons of mass destruction, Iran had initiated the idea of establishing such a zone in the Middle East in 1974.

69. Despite repeated calls by the international community and numerous General Assembly resolutions, the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, and resolutions and decisions adopted by the Agency, NAM and by the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Israeli regime, which was confident of receiving political and military support and technical assistance from the United States of America, had neither acceded to the NPT nor placed its nuclear facilities under Agency full-scope safeguards. The only non-party to the NPT in the region, Israel had not even declared its intention of abandoning its weapons of mass destruction programmes. Its clandestine and prohibited nuclear activities, supported by the United States, were a serious threat to regional peace and security and endangered the non-proliferation regime.
70. The United States and the United Kingdom, which had pushed the Security Council into taking unwarranted punitive measures against Iran’s safeguarded peaceful nuclear programme, had systematically prevented the Security Council from taking any action to persuade the Israeli regime to accede to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. That had encouraged Israel to pursue its clandestine development and prohibited possession of nuclear weapons in defiance of the international community and in violation of international law, even publicly announcing the fact with impunity.

71. Nuclear weapons in the hands of the Israeli regime, which had an unparalleled record of non-compliance with United Nations and Agency resolutions and had committed countless crimes and atrocities, including military aggression and occupation, state terrorism, apartheid and crimes against humanity, posed a uniquely grave threat to regional and international peace and security.

72. The failure of the Security Council to act in the face of the real threat posed by Israel’s nuclear weapons to international peace and security had emboldened Israeli officials to make public threats to attack Iran’s safeguarded peaceful nuclear facilities.

73. In view of the public announcement by the Israeli Prime Minister, it was shameful that the Western countries in the Board had not even expressed concern. Iran called on the Agency to condemn the Israeli regime and fulfill its responsibilities and obligations by suspending all technical assistance to Israel, in order to prevent any assistance from being used for its nuclear weapons programme. Given the seriousness of the Israeli threat, the matter should be considered at the Board’s next series of meetings.

74. Mr. AL-JASEM (Kuwait)* said that Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons was cause for grave concern. Its refusal to accede to the NPT or to open its nuclear facilities to Agency inspectors confirmed the military nature of its nuclear programme. To achieve peace and stability in the region, the Middle East must become a region free of weapons of mass destruction. Israel must accede to the NPT, open its nuclear facilities to Agency inspectors and implement all relevant international resolutions.

75. Ms. GARCÍA DE PÉREZ (Venezuela)* said that her Government was deeply concerned at the events in the Middle East in recent months, in particular Israel’s military aggression against Palestine and Lebanon, and that concern had increased as a result of the recent statement by the Israeli Prime Minister regarding his country’s possession of nuclear weapons.

76. That the Security Council should have remained silent on the matter also gave cause for concern, but even more alarming was the fact that the world powers were making every effort to halt the nuclear programme of a country that was a member of the NPT while at the same time they shielded the real threat posed by Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons.

77. Her country joined with others in calling upon Israel to accede to the NPT and to place its entire nuclear arsenal and installations under Agency safeguards.

78. Mr. MICHAELI (Israel)* said that he was obliged to respond in order to put matters in their proper perspective. Most of the statements just heard had been made by States which did not recognize Israel’s right to exist. Those States were thus in no position to pass judgement on Israel’s efforts to defend itself.

79. Anyone who had taken the time to read the interview given by the Israeli Prime Minister would have noticed that the statement attributed to him was untrue and that he had really been talking about the responsible behaviour of some States as against the reckless behaviour of a certain nuclear aspirant in the Middle East.
80. In view of the sudden interest in statements on the nuclear issue by prominent officials, he drew attention to the statement by the Israeli Prime Minister on Iran at the recent Herzliya Conference, the statement by President Mubarak on Egypt’s nuclear policy and the statements by the President of Iran calling for the elimination of Israel and even for a renewed genocide against the Jewish people. Israel currently saw no need to introduce any changes to its long-standing policy in the nuclear domain. In January, the President of Egypt, referring to Iran’s nuclear ambitions, had said that once Iran had nuclear weapons Egypt would have to acquire them as well. He had been quoted as saying that it was irrational that Egypt should sit and watch from the sidelines when it could be attacked and Israel wholeheartedly endorsed that approach. However, it should be noted that that statement had been made by the leader of a country which, even if Iran could pose a threat to its interests, would not find its very existence or that of its people at stake.

81. States in the region should focus their efforts on more useful matters. In that context, he announced that the preceding week Israel had made an in-kind contribution to the value of US $30,000 to the Nuclear Security Fund.

82. Ms. FEROUKHI (Algeria)* said that the statement by the Israeli Prime Minister, which had confirmed Algeria’s suspicions, gave cause for deep concern. All members of the Board should make every effort to achieve the Agency’s objective: the use of nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes. States, including Israel, should demonstrate complete transparency. The Agency should work to ensure that the decisions taken on that sensitive subject could begin to be implemented.

83. It was worth noting that, at the Beirut Summit in 2005, the Heads of State and Government of Arab countries had offered to recognize Israel in exchange for that country’s withdrawal from all occupied territories. Unfortunately, that historic offer had been totally ignored.

84. Much needed to be done by Israel in terms of ensuring its own security. The Arab Heads of State and Government had not been acting in a one-sided manner: security was a shared concern. It was in that spirit that Algeria was acting and, as a member of the Agency, adhering to all instruments for weapons control. The Agency should do everything in its power to ensure that due consideration was taken of the Israeli military threat.

85. Mr. MINTY (South Africa) said that the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference would be meeting in Vienna in April and May 2007 and various issues discussed in the Board would also be discussed at that meeting, owing to the special relationship between the Agency and NPT States Party based on the organization’s central role under the Treaty.

86. Given the renewed emphasis on nuclear power globally, the Agency should redouble its efforts in all three areas of its mandate. The Board should respond appropriately to challenges that prevented the Agency from fulfilling its responsibilities.

87. Despite the many problems that South Africa faced as a developing country, his Government recognized the importance of ensuring that adequate resources were placed at the disposal of the Agency to enable it to fulfil its statutory mandate and it urged the Board to give positive consideration to the Agency’s draft programme and budget for 2008–2009.

88. States with a capability for developing nuclear weapons had a special responsibility to dispel any concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation and to ensure that the Agency was able to verify, including through the mechanisms available under the additional protocol, that that capability was being used for peaceful purposes only.

89. South Africa was committed to the continuous review and strengthening of measures aimed at preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including the Agency’s safeguards
system, but real progress towards a world free from the threat of nuclear weapons could only be achieved through concomitant progress on nuclear disarmament.

90. The NPT was not an instrument that stood alone. It was the centrepiece of a treaty regime that encompassed an interlocking network of obligations, commitments and undertakings designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, achieve nuclear disarmament and allow the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Agency remained a key institution of that regime.

91. In 1995 and 2000, significant progress had been made in reaching consensus agreements on obligations and commitments that not only improved the effectiveness of the NPT regime but also served to entrench the central NPT bargains. The challenge stemming from the 1995 and 2000 consensus agreements was to reinforce the NPT bargains and build on the undertakings and commitments entered into.

92. Recent decisions on the modernization of nuclear weapons systems and the development of new types of nuclear weapons were incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. South Africa took note of the announcement by the United Kingdom that it intended to build a new class of ballistic missile-carrying submarines as a delivery system for its nuclear weapons and was disappointed that that country had missed an opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to the irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons. As the Director General had repeatedly pointed out, to achieve a peaceful world the nuclear-weapon States need to commit to nuclear disarmament. Any presumption of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons would only lead to increasing insecurity and a continuing arms race. The systematic and progressive elimination of all nuclear weapons and the assurance that they would never be produced again remained the only guarantee against their use.

93. Mr. AAS (Norway) said that Member States’ expectations of the Agency were great and it had to be given the political support, and sufficient and predictable funding, to fulfil all parts of its mandate. The provision of additional resources should go hand in hand with a streamlining of its work.

94. The twin objectives of disarmament and non-proliferation served the purpose of enhancing common security. Norway advocated a comprehensive approach in which disarmament and non-proliferation mutually reinforced one another. Lack of progress in one area should not be used as an excuse for not moving forward in the other.

95. Nuclear disarmament was a priority area for Norway. Despite important achievements, more substantial cuts in nuclear arsenals were needed. New reductions should be carried out on the basis of irreversibility and transparency. Negotiations should commence as soon as possible and without preconditions on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. States should work towards the early entry into force of the CTBT, and greater efforts should be made to promote nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of United Nations guidelines.

96. His country appreciated the efforts of the Director General to promote both non-proliferation and disarmament and looked forward to the Agency’s constructive involvement in the upcoming NPT review cycle.

97. Mr. SOLTANIEH (Islamic Republic of Iran)* said that he felt compelled to respond to the assertion by an earlier speaker that the statement by the Prime Minister of Israel had been misinterpreted. The best way to ascertain whether Israel had nuclear weapons would be for that country to place its nuclear programme under Agency safeguards and to invite Agency inspectors to verify the nature of that programme.
98. Iran had excellent relations with all the countries in the region, including Egypt, as well as with countries throughout the world. Both Egypt and Iran had been calling for an immediate Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories since 1974. Furthermore, Iran was against discrimination, aggression, genocide, apartheid and Zionism. Thus, when the Islamic Republic of Iran had been established, it had broken off relations with the apartheid regime of South Africa and the Zionist regime of Israel. Ever since the apartheid regime had been overthrown, Iran had had excellent relations with South Africa. The issue was simple: the Zionist mentality had to disappear. Indeed, as had been stressed by Iran’s Supreme Leader in a statement more than two years earlier (which the Western media had ignored), if Jews, Christians and Muslims and homeless Palestinians decided on a government in a democratic referendum, Iran would support it, because it wanted peace throughout the region.

99. The Islamic Republic of Iran was a unique example of coexistence between Jews, Christians, Muslims and members of other religions. All religions were represented in the Iranian Parliament. Jews living in Iran were not discriminated against in any way. Indeed, Iran had nothing but respect for the Jewish religion.

100. Mr. RAMZY (Egypt) expressed support for the comments made by South Africa and Norway on the need to strengthen the Agency’s role as a key player in the international non-proliferation regime. Although the Agency did not serve as the NPT secretariat, the close link between the three pillars of the Agency’s mandate and the three main objectives of the NPT could not be overlooked. The Agency was the only international body responsible for nuclear verification activities under Article III of the Treaty, and for promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy under Article IV. It was also usually entrusted with the task of verifying nuclear disarmament under Article VI or other provisions.

101. The strengthening of the Agency’s role had become particularly urgent in view of the upcoming official launch of the new NPT review cycle in April 2007. Moreover, the five nuclear-weapon States were continuing to build up their arsenals in both quantitative and qualitative terms in flagrant breach of their disarmament obligations under Article VI of the NPT. Some had announced the development of new generations of nuclear warheads and others new means of delivery. Still others were seeking to legitimize the use of nuclear weapons.

102. The growing use of nuclear energy for electricity generation by both industrialized and developing countries had increased the demand for Agency technical assistance and for the application of safety and security standards. It was important to prevent the exhaustion of global supplies of natural uranium and of the nuclear material and fuel required by States that complied with their obligations under the NPT and Agency safeguards agreements.

103. The world continued to ignore the urgent regional challenge posed by Israel’s failure to ratify the NPT and place its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards, in defiance of resolutions adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly and the Agency’s General Conference. Israel was able to do so because of the protection afforded it by certain countries. Those countries should bear in mind that the Middle East was the only region which had made no serious effort to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone and that the possession by one country in the region of a military nuclear programme that was not subject to international control created a serious security imbalance.

104. All the challenges he had described underscored the need to restore balance between the three pillars of the Agency’s mandate, namely nuclear verification, technical cooperation and nuclear safety and security, and the three principal goals of the NPT, namely non-proliferation, disarmament and
promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He stressed above all the indissociable link between disarmament and non-proliferation.

105. The representative of Israel had drawn false inferences from a statement made by the Egyptian President in January 2007 in order to divert attention from his own country’s disregard of the non-proliferation regime. President Mubarak had not signalled any change in Egypt’s principled opposition to the possession of nuclear weapons by any country in the Middle East. Egypt was a party to the NPT and had launched an initiative aimed at ridding the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction.

106. Ms. GOICOCHEA ESTENOZ (Cuba) endorsed the comments made by the representative of South Africa, which deserved close analysis, particularly within the context of the upcoming meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Cuba shared the view that the Agency should play a unique role in that process and that, unless specific measures on disarmament were discussed during the new NPT review cycle, global efforts towards peace and security would not progress. The nuclear powers had to assume their crucial responsibility to make concrete compromises on disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. In that regard, her country shared the concerns expressed regarding the development of new and increasingly sophisticated nuclear weapons, an issue which should receive greater attention from the international community.

107. Mr. WIBOWO (Indonesia), associating himself with the comments made by earlier speakers, said that while the Agency’s continued efforts in the areas of nuclear non-proliferation, comprehensive safeguards, peaceful uses of nuclear technology and the establishment of mechanisms to regulate the production and supply of nuclear fuel were to be commended, it was regrettable that other issues deserving of attention in view of their potential to give rise to dangerous situations had not yet been the focus of comparable efforts. One clear example of that was that the Director General remained unable to make progress in meeting the requests made by a number of General Conference resolutions on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East. In recent years, a number of countries had attempted to raise that issue at sessions of the General Conference with a view to seeking a fair and just solution, but so far they had been impeded in their efforts by political considerations and double standards which continued to characterize the deliberations of the Board and the General Conference, allowing powerful countries to succeed repeatedly in enforcing their views and agenda.

108. The forthcoming meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference would provide a fresh opportunity to seek a balance between the three pillars of the NPT. The disarmament commitments of nuclear-weapon States which continued to fund and modernize their nuclear arsenals should receive the same attention, and be addressed in the same spirit, as non-proliferation issues in non-nuclear-weapon States.

109. He questioned whether the international community should continue to allow a single country to impede the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, which had been acknowledged by all countries in the region as desirable in the interests of peace and security, and whether Member States were ready to provide the Agency with the necessary support and adequate resources to enable it to perform its duties as mandated under its Statute. He expressed the hope that politics would not stand in the way of that goal.

110. Mr. SHARMA (India), referring to the introductory statement by the Director General, said that the Agency had a unique role in, and responsibility for, cooperative and inclusive multilateralism in the nuclear field, particularly given the uncertain times facing the international community.

111. The Board’s discussion of agenda items 5(d) and 6 had highlighted the great value which the Board attached to the reports of the Director General on the Iranian nuclear issue. Those reports served an exemplary purpose, supporting ongoing multilateral diplomacy on the subject, and were notable for
their forthright professionalism and impartiality. Moreover, they upheld the Agency’s technical credibility worldwide. It was on that perspective that the Director General’s message in his opening statement regarding the Agency’s financial predicament needed to be seen. He therefore urged all Member States to make a concerted effort to respond in a systematic and regular manner to the Agency’s programme and budget priorities.

112. Mr. MOURÃO (Brazil), endorsing the statement made by the representative of South Africa, highlighted the importance of the new NPT review cycle which would give the international community a special opportunity to strengthen the disarmament and non-proliferation regime, in particular the three pillars of the NPT, and to work towards universalization of the Treaty. In engaging in that exercise, it was important to bear in mind that disarmament and non-proliferation were interrelated and mutually reinforcing processes. It was impossible to structure a coherent and sustainable strategy of non-proliferation without parallel efforts, in the form of concrete and verifiable steps, in the area of disarmament. Brazil trusted that the nuclear-weapon States would take advantage of the opportunity to fulfil their unequivocal commitment to nuclear disarmament, inter alia by reducing the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrine and security policies and by providing non-nuclear-weapon States with legally binding security assurances.

113. Mr. MACGREGOR (United Kingdom), responding to the comments made by the representative of South Africa regarding his country’s nuclear weapons, pointed out that the announcement of December 2006 referred to by that delegation related to the modernization of a submarine delivery system rather than to warheads. It had been made clear at the time of the announcement that no decision on warheads would be taken by the current Government. Moreover, the United Kingdom had simultaneously issued an announcement that it would reduce the number of its operationally available warheads and nuclear stocks by 20%. The United Kingdom was now the only nuclear-weapon State with only one weapon delivery system. The fact that those announcements highlighted a reduction rather than an increase in nuclear arms underscored the continuing firm commitment of the United Kingdom to the NPT.

114. Mr. MANZOOR HUSSAIN (Malaysia)* said that, in view of the expected growth of nuclear power in countries with existing nuclear power programmes, and plans for the introduction of nuclear power in neighbouring countries to Malaysia, document GOV/INF/2007/2 provided useful guidance and reference material for Malaysia as it considered whether to launch its own nuclear power programme, particularly given the transboundary and political nature of such a programme.

115. Endorsing the comments made by the representatives of South Africa and Indonesia regarding nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, he said that, while it was important to focus international attention on concrete short-term steps towards nuclear disarmament, it was equally important to consider, in parallel, requirements for a comprehensive long-term nuclear disarmament regime. The development of an incremental comprehensive approach would assist with the implementation of the programme of action agreed upon at the 2000 NPT Review Conference and would ensure progress towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. That was particularly important in view of the fundamental NPT bargain whereby non-nuclear-weapon States were assured of their basic and inalienable right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in exchange for forfeiting any right to possess nuclear weapons, while nuclear-weapon States committed themselves to pursuing negotiations, in good faith, on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. However, developments in recent years and deliberations at previous NPT Review Conferences and meetings of the preparatory committees for them had often focused more on increasing the verification responsibilities of non-nuclear-weapon States, whose rights of access to peaceful nuclear technology were increasingly subject to conditions, without any commensurate increase in commitment to nuclear disarmament on the part of the nuclear-weapon States. The success of the 2010 NPT Review
Conference would depend on a spirit of cooperation and compromise among all States Party and, more importantly, on commitment and strong political will to ensure full adherence to the NPT and to the implementation of the recommendations and decisions made at previous NPT Review Conferences.

116. Recalling the remarks made by the Director General in his introductory statement regarding the critical financial situation of the Agency, he associated himself with the comments made by the representatives of South Africa and Norway and emphasized the need to provide the organization with adequate financial resources in order to ensure delivery of an expanded range of high-quality services to meet the increasing demands of Member States. It was also important that the Agency should have the capability to validate its own analytical work, in order to maintain its independence and credibility as a neutral organization serving Member States whose development and security needs continued to grow.

117. Ms. FEROUKHI (Algeria)* endorsed the comments made by the representatives of South Africa and Norway regarding the forthcoming meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference. In that regard, Algeria reaffirmed its commitment to achieving a balance among the three pillars of the NPT on the basis of the measures agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and underscored the indissociable link between non-proliferation and disarmament. In that context, efforts should be made to strengthen the role of the Agency as the only international institution tasked with promoting and verifying the safe and peaceful use of nuclear energy, specifically by providing it with the necessary financial resources to accomplish its mission in conformity with its Statute.

118. The CHAIRMAN noted that discussions under the item had touched upon the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and concerns regarding the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament and other related nuclear arms control measures.

119. Ms. GOICO CHEA ESTENOZ (Cuba) said that the Chairman’s summing-up should refer to the discussions under the agenda item concerning the acknowledgement by the Government of Israel of its nuclear capabilities, which had provided the context for the broader discussion of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

120. The CHAIRMAN said that, since delegations had not been aware in advance of issues that would be raised under agenda item 8 and had therefore been unable to prepare for those issues or react to the statements made, it was only fair that the Chairman should not make a detailed summing-up. Such a summing-up would raise numerous questions and set an undesirable precedent for future deliberations, since it would allow any Member State to raise any issue under the item and request that its comments be reflected in the Chairman’s summing-up. While he had referred only to the main issues addressed, all statements made under the item would be duly reflected in the summary records of the meeting.

– Tributes

121. The CHAIRMAN bade farewell to colleagues who were due to leave Vienna or had recently departed: the Resident Representatives Rev. Monsignor Leo Boccardi of the Holy See, Mr. Kuanyshiev of Kazakhstan, Mr. Chamma of Lebanon and Ms. Espinosa Cantellano of Mexico. He wished them all well in their future endeavours.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.