

IAEA Board of Governors

Record of the 1186<sup>th</sup> Meeting  
GOV/OR.1186

Report of the Advisory Committee on Safeguards and Verification within the  
Framework of the IAEA Statute

Report by the Director General on the implementation of safeguards in the  
Democratic People's Republic of Korea

# Board of Governors

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## Record of the 1186<sup>th</sup> Meeting

*Held at Headquarters, Vienna, on Wednesday, 13 June 2007, at 10.05 a.m.*

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<sup>1</sup> GOV/2007/33.



## Attendance

(The list below gives the name of the senior member of each delegation who attended the meeting, as well as that of any other member whose statement is summarized in this record.)

Mr. PETRIČ		Chairman (Slovenia)
Mr. CURIA	_____	Argentina
Mr. SHANNON		Australia
Mr. STELZER		Austria
Mr. GAISENAK		Belarus
Mr. BAZOBERRY		Bolivia
Mr. VALLIM GUERREIRO		Brazil
Ms. GERVAIS-VIDRICAIRE		Canada
Mr. SKOKNIC		Chile
Mr. SUN Qin	}	China
Mr. TANG Guoqiang		
Ms. QUINTERO CORREA		Colombia
Mr. HORVATIĆ		Croatia
Ms. GOICOCHEA ESTENOZ		Cuba
Mr. KASSEM		Egypt
Mr. KEBEDE		Ethiopia
Ms. KAUPPI		Finland
Mr. CARON		France
Mr. GOTTWALD		Germany
Mr. CRICOS		Greece
Mr. MUDGAL		India
Ms. LISTYOWATI		Indonesia
Mr. AMANO		Japan
Mr. KIM Sung-Hwan		Korea, Republic of
Mr. ALOBIDI	}	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
Mr. EL-DEEN EL-MISSLATTI		
Mr. ELOUMNI		Morocco
Mr. OSAISAI		Nigeria
Mr. AAS	}	Norway
Mr. LANGELAND		
Mr. SHAHBAZ		Pakistan
Mr. BERDENNIKOV		Russian Federation
Mr. GRILICAREV		Slovenia
Mr. MINTY		South Africa
Mr. PETERSSON		Sweden
Mr. OTHMAN		Syrian Arab Republic
Mr. PANUPONG		Thailand
Mr. MACGREGOR	}	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Mr. DRAPER		
Mr. SCHULTE		United States of America
Mr. ELBARADEI	_____	Director General

## **Attendance (continued)**

Mr. HEINONEN	Deputy Director General, Department of Safeguards
Mr. ANING	Secretary of the Board

## **Representatives of the following Member States also attended the meeting:**

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Islamic Republic of Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Montenegro, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Switzerland, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Ukraine, Uruguay, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Yemen.

## **Abbreviations used in this record:**

ABACC	Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
Committee 25	Advisory Committee on Safeguards Verification within the Framework of the IAEA Statute
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EU	European Union
Euratom	European Atomic Energy Community
GIF	Generation IV International Forum
GUAM	Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova
HEU	high-enriched uranium
INPRO	International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT Review Conference	Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NUTRAN	Nuclear Trade Analysis Unit
PDI	person-day of inspection
Pelindaba Treaty	African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

**Abbreviations used in this record (continued):**

RSAC	regional system of accounting for and control of nuclear material
SAGSI	Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation
SAL	Safeguards Analytical Laboratory
SIR	Safeguards Implementation Report
SQP	small quantities protocol
SSAC	State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material
Tlatelolco Treaty	Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean



## 6. Nuclear verification

### (a) The Safeguards Implementation Report for 2006 (continued) (GOV/2007/21)

1. Mr. PETTERSSON (Sweden) said that his country was pleased that the Safeguards Statement for 2006 concluded that nuclear materials and other items placed under safeguards had remained in peaceful nuclear activities or had been otherwise adequately accounted for, with the specific exception of the DPRK. However, it was concerned at the only modest decline since the previous year in the number of non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT that had not yet brought comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency into force as required by Article III of the NPT.
2. Sweden had for some time been expressing concern about the apparent lack of progress in the development of a safeguards approach for geological repositories for spent fuel. It therefore welcomed the fact that SAGSI had in 2006 addressed the issue of integrated safeguards for such repositories. Progress on that front would not only benefit Member States with advanced geological repository programmes, including Sweden, but also underpin the Agency safeguards related to the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle.
3. His country regretted the fact that as of the end of 2006 only ten States had responded to the Agency's request regarding the amendment or rescinding of SQPs. It hoped that many SQP States would avail themselves of the training and assistance being offered by the Secretariat with a view to rapid implementation of the modified SQP.
4. Given the major increase since 2005 in the number of delayed nuclear material accountancy reports and the Agency's inability to establish SSAC-related contact points in some 50 States with safeguards agreements in force, it was important that those concerned take seriously the notion that the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards implementation depended on the effectiveness of SSACs.
5. His country, which considered that non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT which did not have comprehensive safeguards agreements in force should remedy the situation without undue delay, looked forward to the conclusion of comprehensive safeguards agreements — and of additional protocols — with Burundi and Montenegro.
6. Mr. SHANNON (Australia) said that the Agency's SIRs were the principal means by which the Secretariat informed Member States of its conclusions about the correctness and completeness of the declarations of States relating to their holdings of nuclear materials and to their nuclear activities. The process of drawing such conclusions had evolved in recent years with the introduction of State evaluation reports and annual implementation plans and with the clear re-articulation of the underlying technical objectives of each safeguard measure applied.
7. The Secretariat should continue its efforts to make the Agency's SIRs more user-friendly and more accessible to persons without a technical background, but in doing so it should take care to maintain their technical rigour.
8. It was completely appropriate for the Agency to base its conclusions for a State on the safeguards obligations undertaken by that State, the confidence of the Agency in its conclusions depending on the safeguards measures that it had been able to apply.



9. The Agency's ability to draw conclusions relating both to the correctness and to the completeness of the declarations made by non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT was greatest when such States had both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force — a combination rightly described as an 'enhanced verification standard'. When the Agency could not apply the full range of safeguards measures, it could draw useful conclusions relating only to the correctness of States' declarations. His delegation welcomed the manner in which the Agency's SIRs differentiated between the two types of conclusion.

10. Mr. VALLIM GURREIRO (Brazil) said that the SIR for 2006 was a considerable improvement over the SIR for 2005. It was factual and objective, it was free of potentially controversial value judgements and the conclusions in it were differentiated on the basis of the types of obligation entered into by States. Clearly, some comments made by his delegation during the June 2006 session of the Board had been taken into account by the Secretariat.

11. His delegation was pleased that the Safeguards Statement for 2006 contained the conclusion that in all States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force all declared nuclear material placed under safeguards had remained in peaceful nuclear activities.

12. Also, his delegation noted that for 32 of the States with both comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force there had been no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities, so that the Secretariat had concluded for those States that all nuclear material had remained in peaceful activities.

13. In addition, his delegation noted that for 43 States with comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force the conclusion on the absence of undeclared nuclear activities still depended on ongoing evaluations, the conclusion drawn for those States being that all declared nuclear material had remained in peaceful activities.

14. His delegation was pleased to note that, in the case of 78 States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force but without additional protocols in force, the Secretariat had found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities, so that the conclusion drawn for those States had been that all declared nuclear material had remained in peaceful activities.

15. However, his delegation regretted the fact that 31 non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT had not yet brought comprehensive safeguards agreements into force as required by Article III of the NPT.

16. Section D.1.3 of the SIR for 2006 contained information regarding the implementation of voluntary offer agreements, but it had nothing to say about the status of additional protocols thereto. According to the foreword to the report of Committee 24 (the Committee on Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System), which had been approved by the Board, the Model Additional Protocol, with appropriate modifications, was applicable to all three categories of safeguards agreement. Naturally, the conclusion of an additional protocol was as voluntary an act for States with voluntary offer agreements and States with INFCIRC/66/Rev.2-type agreements as it was for States with comprehensive safeguards agreements.

17. Brazil would continue supporting the efforts of the Secretariat to increase the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of safeguards. As regards safeguards implementation in Brazil, the cooperation between the international safeguards system (the Agency's system), the regional system of ABACC and the system of Brazil's National Nuclear Energy Commission had greatly increased its effectiveness and improved its efficiency.

18. There was a need for increased integration of safeguards implementation at the international and regional levels, as had been repeatedly stressed by his authorities, which attached great importance to close cooperation between ABACC and the Agency with a view to avoiding duplication of effort in the application of safeguards in Argentina and Brazil.

19. Mr. SCHULTE (United States of America) said that the Agency's verification activities were critical to the continuing development of nuclear power and technology, the goal of those activities being an official conclusion that all nuclear material had been accounted for and had remained in peaceful use.

20. His delegation welcomed the format of the SIR for 2006, which provided additional useful information on the implementation of safeguards on a State-by-State basis, and it was pleased that the number of States for which the Agency was able to draw broader conclusions was continuing to grow.

21. However, much remained to be done in order to achieve the global implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. As reported in the SIR for 2006, at the end of that year 78 States with comprehensive safeguards agreements had not yet brought an additional protocol into force and 31 States party to the NPT had not yet brought a comprehensive safeguards agreement into force. Also as reported in the SIR for 2006, not much progress had been made in eliminating the old version of the SQP, which provided the Agency with little substantive means of verification, so that the Agency's conclusions for States with SQPs of the old kind did not have a strong basis.

22. His delegation understood that the Secretariat was addressing those issues, and the United States remained committed to working with it and with other Member States in encouraging the widest possible adherence to the Agency's strengthened safeguards system.

23. The number, size and complexity of facilities under safeguards were growing, and the Secretariat was being called upon to provide broader and more reliable conclusions based on more advanced methods. A foreseeable resurgence in the nuclear power industry would, in the not too distant future, increase verification needs. The world community would have to be completely sure that the Agency's safeguard's conclusions were sound and credible.

24. Consequently, the transparency provided by the Agency's SIRs and related documents remained critical. However, the necessary level of transparency had not been achieved as far as integrated safeguards were concerned. Only a few generic, State-level objectives had been described in the case of integrated safeguards — not the detailed analysis of quantity and timeliness goal attainment provided in the case of conventional safeguards. His delegation therefore endorsed SAGSI's advice that the Secretariat elaborate the general objectives identified in the SIRs into more specific, technical objectives that might serve to justify safeguards activities.

25. For example, according to the SIR for 2006, in each State with an additional protocol in force but where integrated safeguards were not being implemented, an average of one-and-a-half complementary access inspections had been carried out, almost all at locations with declared nuclear material or uranium ore. His country would like to see complementary access inspections used consistently and broadly where credible conclusions regarding the absence of undeclared activities needed to be reached.

26. The SIR did not mention the fact that in 2006 the Agency had verified the down-blending in his country of 50 metric tons of HEU that had once been in military stockpiles or the fact that the Agency had effectively implemented the remote monitoring of approximately two tons of excess plutonium at the KAMS facility in the United States, reducing inspection efforts by 50%.

27. His delegation welcomed the progress made as regards safeguards equipment reliability and capability. It also welcomed the greater use being made of remote surveillance equipment and radiation monitoring equipment.

28. His delegation agreed that many advances in safeguards approaches that should improve efficiency and effectiveness — for example, short-notice inspections based on ‘mailbox declarations’ — depended on close cooperation with highly reliable SSACs or RSACs. It would like to see States addressing SSAC performance problems and providing the Agency with timely declarations. The United States would continue to support SSAC training.

29. His country, which reported annually to the Agency regarding neptunium and americium, would like all States to report on their exports, imports and inventories of separated neptunium and americium in support of the monitoring scheme approved by the Board in 1999.

30. His delegation agreed that there was a need to accelerate the analysis of samples, but it had noted the call made at a recent workshop for a careful study to determine the most effective way of doing that. The important questions included how to upgrade SAL, how to expand the Network of Analytical Laboratories and how to apportion the analytical workload among laboratories. His delegation, which looked forward to the results of the recommended study, would like to see more countries qualifying laboratories for participation in the Network.

31. Maintaining the technical knowledge needed in order to support upgraded capabilities was important for the Agency’s safeguards operations as a whole, not just for SAL. The Director General should review the Agency’s retirement and rotation policies for safeguards staff with a view to the retention of critical expertise.

32. Ms. KAUPPI (Finland) expressed appreciation of the safeguards implementation activities of the Agency in 2006 and of the further development of safeguards approaches by the Agency.

33. Referring to section E (Problem Areas in Safeguards Implementation) of the SIR for 2006, she said that all Member States should study it carefully and do their best to fulfil their responsibilities vis-à-vis the safeguards system.

34. It was important to ensure that the Agency continued its highly professional and impartial work in the area of safeguards implementation and had sufficient financial and other resources for its verification activities. The inadequacies in the area of environmental sample analysis were a cause for concern.

35. As well-functioning safeguards were a prerequisite for the acceptability of the use of nuclear energy and as the mechanisms of safeguards must be implemented effectively worldwide, comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols, the current verification standard, should be brought into force and implemented in all States.

36. Her Government, which welcomed the cooperation between the Agency and the European Union in establishing a sound combination of integrated safeguards systems, was planning, together with the Agency, the introduction of integrated safeguards in Finland and a safeguards system for Finland’s future underground disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel.

37. Mr. STELZER (Austria) said that, while the slow pace of ratification of additional protocols was regrettable, the progress made during the ten years since the Model Additional Protocol had been approved should not be underestimated. Additional protocols were now in force for the vast majority of States with significant nuclear activities, and the number of States for which the Agency had been able to draw the broader safeguards conclusion had increased by a third during the past year. His

delegation was particularly pleased that Austria was one of those States for which — for the first time — the Agency had recently drawn the broader conclusion.

38. His delegation welcomed the fact that the implementation of integrated safeguards had been extended to additional States, permitting significant human resources to be transferred to other necessary inspection activities. In view of the heavy budgetary constraints under which the Department of Safeguards was operating and the Department's ever-increasing workload, it hoped for a continuation of such trade-offs.

39. The safeguards system was most effective and efficient when safeguards activities were conducted on the basis of State-level approaches in States with a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force.

40. His country, which welcomed the two additional protocols currently before the Board for approval, hoped for their early entry into force. It would like to see all States that had not yet done so concluding additional protocols without delay, since the conclusion of additional protocols not only contributed to nuclear non-proliferation but also constituted an obligation for non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT under its Article III.

41. Mr. SKOKNIC (Chile) said that his delegation was particularly pleased with the conclusion that the declared nuclear material in all countries of the Latin American and Caribbean region had in 2006 remained in exclusively peaceful activities. That conclusion, coinciding with the fortieth anniversary of the Tlatelolco Treaty, demonstrated the region's commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

42. For its part, Chile had ratified an additional protocol in 2004, and the Agency had confirmed that all Chilean nuclear activities were serving exclusively peaceful purposes.

43. Mr. DRAPER (United Kingdom) said that his delegation welcomed the increase since 2005 in the number of States with both comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force.

44. His delegation also welcomed the increase in the number of States for which the broader conclusion had been drawn — that all nuclear material in those States had remained in peaceful activities. If the broader conclusion became the norm, that would make not only for greater assurance in the international community regarding the peaceful nature of States' nuclear programmes but also for greater efficiency of safeguards implementation through the wider introduction of integrated safeguards. However, it was somewhat disappointing that, although the broader conclusion had been drawn for 24 States in the SIR for 2005, integrated safeguards had been implemented in only nine of those States during 2006. The Secretariat should try to increase the rate of introduction of integrated safeguards in States for which the necessary conclusions had been drawn, particularly those with significant nuclear activities.

45. His country, which welcomed the Agency's good working relationship with Euratom, had been cooperating with other EU members and the European Commission on the establishment of a reliable framework for the future conduct of safeguards under the Euratom Treaty — a framework that took account of the relationship between the Agency and Euratom and of all relevant safeguards agreements. In its view, that framework had now been established and should form a sound basis for future cooperation among all parties.

46. Mr. AMANO (Japan) welcomed the conclusion that in 2006 all declared nuclear material had remained in peaceful nuclear activities or had been otherwise adequately accounted for in 32 States with both comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force.

47. As regards Japan, his delegation welcomed the conclusion that the Agency had found no indication of any diversion of nuclear material or of undeclared nuclear material. It greatly appreciated the efforts of the Agency's staff concerned with safeguards in Japan.

48. Given Member States' requests for budgetary stringency and the expected increase in the Agency's safeguards activities, Japan believed that those activities should be reviewed continuously, with a view not only to maintaining effectiveness but also to improving efficiency through rationalization. It attached great importance to the adoption of safeguards methods that would improve efficiency to the benefit both of the Agency and of Member States where integrated safeguards were introduced.

49. His delegation would like the Secretariat to explain clearly to Member States that had not yet ratified an additional protocol the benefits of ratification and of moving to integrated safeguards, perhaps by presenting numbers showing how the application of integrated safeguards in Japan had increased effectiveness and improved efficiency there.

50. Mr. CARON (France) said that his country, which attached great importance to the principle of universality of safeguards, congratulated those States which had taken steps in 2006 to bring a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol into force, and it would like to see their example followed by all States that had not yet taken such steps.

51. France would also like to see all SQP States that had not yet done so bringing their SQPs into line with the modified SQP text approved by the Board in September 2005.

52. Through its safeguards support programme, France would continue assisting the Secretariat with the organization of seminars designed to bring home to States the importance of the universality principle and of strengthening safeguards through, in particular, the conclusion of additional protocols and the modification of SQPs.

53. France's safeguards support programme, which had now been in existence for 25 years, was based on close cooperation with the Secretariat at various levels. Within the framework of that programme, his country was —inter alia— making financial contributions, providing expertise and advanced equipment and carrying out analyses. It was — and hoped to remain — one of the main supporters of Agency safeguards, but it would like the Secretariat to reduce the administrative constraints on the safeguards support programmes of Member States.

54. France was pleased with the reported improvements regarding cooperation between the Agency and the European Commission, which was continuing to operate an RSAC and to provide assistance — when necessary — to the Agency. It would like to see a continuation of the current joint activities, especially the holding of senior-level and other meetings.

55. His delegation welcomed the progress made in the implementation of integrated safeguards, which had led to PDI reductions despite constant safeguards workloads. It looked forward to further progress in that regard contributing to the rationalization of safeguards as the Agency performed its statutory tasks at an increasing number of facilities.

56. Also important for the Agency in responding to the safeguards challenges of the future would be the development of new approaches, the modernization of equipment and the introduction of a new information management system, together with the work of Committee 25, of SAGSI and of NUTRAN and the IAEA SSAC advisory service (ISSAS).

57. As regards international cooperation in strengthening the non-proliferation regime, France attached great importance to the work being done within the framework of INPRO and the GIF. In its

view, further Agency participation in the GIF's Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Expert Group would lead to closer coordination between GIF and INPRO.

58. In October 2006, the tenth Agency symposium on international safeguards, attended by many experts from France, had demonstrated the international community's determination to strengthen the safeguards regime. Also, it had highlighted the areas on which future efforts should be focused, and it was now up to the international community to respond.

59. Mr. LANGE LAND (Norway) said that safeguards were essential for demonstrating the peaceful nature of States' nuclear programmes and thereby creating international confidence. As the SIR for 2006 showed, the Agency and Member States had gone a long way in that respect, but not far enough. It was the firm view of his delegation that a comprehensive safeguards agreement together with an additional protocol constituted the verification standard, yet only 75 States had both comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force, and 31 States party to the NPT had not even concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency. Those 31 States should conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements without delay, and then sign and ratify additional protocols thereto.

60. The implementation of additional protocols enabled the Agency to verify not only the non-diversion but also the non-production of nuclear material, paving the way for the introduction of integrated safeguards and for more cost-effective verification. In other words, integrated safeguards meant better safeguards for less money. So far, however, only a dozen countries had qualified for the introduction of integrated safeguards. Norway, which was one of those countries, stood ready to share its experience of integrated safeguards implementation.

61. Norway, which attached great importance to the ongoing dialogue between the Secretariat and States with SQPs, hoped that those States would in due course amend their SQPs in accordance with the modified criteria established by the Board.

62. It was of great importance to verify declared nuclear activities of nuclear-weapon States, and Norway therefore welcomed the fact that the Agency had been able to draw conclusions for four of the nuclear-weapon States.

63. The Agency should continue its safeguards efforts in States not party to the NPT, which Norway would like to see acceding to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States.

64. It was an obligation of Member States to ensure that the Agency had the resources necessary for carrying out its safeguards mandate. In that connection, Norway regretted the fact that Committee 25 had not been able to come up with any recommendations to the Board — a lost opportunity. Safeguards were essential for preserving the authority of the NPT and reaching the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. There had been progress in recent years, but much more could be done by all.

65. Mr. EL-DEEN EL-MISSLATTI (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) said that the conclusion that no nuclear material had been diverted and that all such material had been accounted for and used for peaceful purposes reflected the activities only of those States which had safeguards agreements with the Agency. The SIR for 2006 showed that the Agency had been unable to reach any conclusions regarding States which did not have safeguards agreements with it. That would always be the case while there was the distinction in the application of safeguards between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. The Agency's safeguards should be applied to all States without distinction; that was essential if the safeguards regime was to enjoy the necessary credibility.

66. The safeguards regime would be truly effective only if all States adhered to the NPT and had comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency and if there were no double standards as between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States.

67. For its part, the Agency should continue supporting the development of proliferation-resistant nuclear technologies and help countries, through the provision of training and legal advice, to establish competent SSACs.

68. Mr. CURIA (Argentina) said that his delegation was pleased with the positive safeguards conclusions drawn for the vast majority of countries having comprehensive safeguards agreements in force and with the high levels of inspection goal attainment. It was also pleased with the more precise formulation of the scope and relative value of the conclusions drawn for countries having safeguards agreements other than comprehensive safeguards agreements.

69. The movement towards a State-level approach and, in particular, the performance targets which were being established for each State meant that the Agency's safeguards must be objective, of high technical quality and, above all, non-discriminatory. Accordingly, it was important how objectives for each State were defined, how the "other factors" referred to in paragraph 106 of the SIR for 2006 were taken into account and, in particular, how evaluations were carried out. Only with objectivity, high technical quality and non-discrimination would the credibility of the Agency's safeguards be preserved over time.

70. Argentina would like future SIRs to contain more information about generic objectives and examples of specific objectives, so that readers might gain a better understanding of safeguards at the State level and of the evaluation methodology. Also, his country considered it essential that future SIRs describe in greater detail the evaluation methodology for State-level approaches.

71. Referring section B.1 (The Safeguards Conclusions) of the SIR for 2006, he said that Argentina welcomed the additional information and greater precision regarding, in particular, the way in which the Agency reached its safeguards conclusions and the basis for the application and evaluation of safeguards.

72. Regarding section B.2 (Factors affecting the Effectiveness of the Safeguards System), Argentina considered it necessary to point out once again that references to the "limited" ability of the Agency to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities in States with a comprehensive safeguards agreement but no additional protocol in force detracted from the importance of comprehensive safeguards agreements.

73. Argentina welcomed the Agency's efforts to develop approaches, procedures and technologies making for more efficient safeguards and ensuring minimum intrusion into States' nuclear activities, as described in paragraphs 63–65 and 80 of the SIR.

74. As regards short-notice random inspections at conversion and fuel fabrication plants, greater efforts on the part of the Secretariat and of States were needed in order to minimize their impact on the normal operations of such facilities. In that connection, Argentina did not fully understand the significance of the reference in paragraph 171 to the fact that in some States with which discussions on randomized procedures were continuing inspections at short notice might not be achievable.

75. Regarding section D.1 and State-level evaluation for countries with comprehensive safeguards agreements, the generic objectives should be studied further and refined with a view to reflecting the synergies and interconnections between them. That was essential for judicious management with clear guidelines ensuring that there was no duplication of verification activities in pursuit of the attainment of the generic and specific objectives.

76. Argentina, which was concerned about the continuing delays in the analysis of environmental samples, stood ready to cooperate with the Agency in addressing that issue.

77. Argentina, like Brazil, attached great importance to closer cooperation between ABACC and the Agency with a view to reducing duplication of effort.

78. The Secretariat should step up its efforts to ensure that safeguards were not only effective but also efficient. The efficiency of safeguards was particularly important, both for the Agency and for the Member States, at a time of resurgence of nuclear power.

79. Mr. MINTY (South Africa) said that his delegation was concerned about the fact that at the end of 2006 the Secretariat had been unable to draw any safeguards conclusions for the 31 non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT that still had no comprehensive safeguards agreements in force as required under NPT Article III. In that connection, it attached great importance to the obligation of Member States to provide the Agency with the support necessary for the exercise of its safeguards mandate.

80. His delegation regarded additional protocols as indispensable for enabling the Agency to provide the necessary assurances that nuclear capabilities were being used solely for peaceful purposes, and it was concerned about the fact that 84 of the 162 States with safeguards agreements had not had additional protocols in force or being otherwise applied at the end of 2006.

81. Countries with access to advanced technologies bore a greater responsibility as regards building confidence in the peaceful nature of their nuclear programmes. Such countries needed to ensure that the Agency was able, by means of — inter alia — the mechanisms provided by additional protocols, to verify that their capabilities were being used for peaceful purposes only.

82. South Africa shared the view that illicit trafficking in nuclear material posed a serious challenge to the NPT regime. Between 30 and 40 countries were known to have been affected by the activities of illicit trafficking networks, and it was only through the full cooperation of all those countries with the Agency that such activities could be curbed and the networks eliminated. So far, there had been few prosecutions and, in South Africa's opinion, only uneven cooperation. States had moved very fast to cooperate in the fight against terrorism, but there had not been the same sense of urgency in addressing the threat posed by illicit trafficking networks. That threat should not be underestimated.

83. South Africa, which would continue to support activities aimed at strengthening verification capabilities and thereby providing assurances of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements, with a view to the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world, was concerned about the lack of progress since the unequivocal undertaking by nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 NPT Review Conference to completely eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

84. Mr. HERASYMENKO (Ukraine)\*, speaking on behalf of the GUAM countries, welcomed the progress made in 2006 as regards the entry into force of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. In the opinion of the GUAM countries, the Agency could provide the highest assurances only for States where comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols were being implemented; additional protocols together with comprehensive safeguards agreements should become the de facto safeguards standard.

85. Ukraine, where an additional protocol was being successfully implemented, was satisfied with the way in which the Agency was verifying its declaration and would continue cooperating the Agency in the implementation of the additional protocol.

86. Mr. PAULAUSKAS (Lithuania)\* said that his delegation was pleased that for 32 States, including Lithuania, the Agency had in 2006 been able to draw a safeguards conclusion regarding no



indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities.

87. In 2006, Lithuania had hosted a regional technical meeting for EU Member States on the implementation of additional protocols at which the participants had gained a better understanding of the relevant Agency policies and practices. The Lithuanian authorities were grateful to the Secretariat for the confidence in them demonstrated by its request that Lithuania host the meeting. Lithuania, which considered implementation of the provisions of the Model Additional Protocol to be essential for strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system, welcomed the Secretariat's efforts in implementing the Plan of Action to Promote the Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols.

88. Lithuania, which welcomed the fact that in 2006 integrated safeguards had been implemented in 11 States, believed that the implementation of integrated safeguards — with optimum combinations of the measures provided for by comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols — resulted in greater cost-effectiveness and savings of inspection effort.

89. On 1 June 2007, the Agency had started to apply integrated safeguards in Lithuania, which would cooperate fully with the Agency in their application.

90. Mr. HEINONEN (Deputy Director General for Safeguards), responding to the discussion, said that many constructive comments had been made and that they would be taken into account by the Secretariat when it prepared the SIR for 2007.

91. The Secretariat would analyse the development of verification costs in recent years and try to clearly reflect in future SIRs the savings achieved through the implementation of integrated safeguards.

92. As to the introduction of integrated safeguards at the State level, the Secretariat would work closely with States so that State-level approaches might be implemented as soon as the broader safeguards conclusions had been drawn.

93. The SIR for 2007 would contain more information about objectives and evaluation methodologies.

94. The CHAIRMAN, summing up, said that the Board had welcomed the revised SIR format, which it had felt was concise and represented a substantial improvement as regards clarity and readability. Some suggestions had been made for further improving the Agency's SIRs.

95. Some members had requested clarifications regarding certain issues dealt with in the SIR for 2006. The Board had noted the Secretariat's responses.

96. The Board had noted the conclusions drawn for various categories of States in accordance with their safeguards undertakings vis-à-vis the Agency.

97. States party to the NPT that had not yet done so had been urged to conclude safeguards agreements with the Agency. Some members had expressed disappointment at the slow rate of conclusion and entry into force of additional protocols and had expressed the view that States, particularly States with significant nuclear activities, which had not yet done so should conclude and bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible. Support had been expressed for the Agency's outreach activities in that regard.

98. Some members had emphasized that the Agency's safeguards system could provide credible assurances about the non-diversion of nuclear material from peaceful activities and about the absence of undeclared activities only for States with comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional

protocols in force. In that regard, the view had been expressed that additional protocols should become a non-proliferation standard in the Agency's safeguards system.

99. Some members had expressed the view that the conclusion of additional protocols was a voluntary act.

100. Some members had expressed the view that achieving universality of the Agency's safeguards system was important.

101. Concern had been expressed about the slow rate of adherence to the modified SQP, and the relevant States had been encouraged to take steps towards its rapid implementation, including by taking advantage of training and other forms of assistance offered by the Secretariat.

102. Several members had expressed the view that efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament should be equal to and simultaneous with efforts aimed at nuclear non-proliferation. They had recalled in that regard Objective C.2 of the Agency's Medium Term Strategy for 2006–2011.

103. Several members had drawn attention to the major challenges which the Agency had faced in the field of verification during 2006. Concern had been expressed at the delays encountered by the Secretariat with regard to the analysis of environmental samples, and members had emphasized that the problems in that area needed to be addressed. Several members had requested the Secretariat to assist interested Member States in enhancing their analytical capabilities, which might help to expand the Agency's analytical resources.

104. The Board had noted the progress made in increasing the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system. Some members had expressed the view that safeguards activities should be reviewed continuously so as to promote efficiency through rationalization of the system. Several members had noted with appreciation that the Secretariat had begun to assist States in establishing SSACs and had called on the Secretariat to continue doing so. Also, they had expressed appreciation of the training courses and seminars organized for the purpose of helping States to fulfil their safeguards obligations.

105. The Board had welcomed the implementation of integrated safeguards in a number of States and the reports of savings in verification effort that were beginning to be achieved. The Secretariat had been urged to do all in its power to introduce integrated safeguards as quickly as possible in States with significant nuclear activities in order to improve the efficiency of the safeguards system.

106. Several members had expressed the view that, in elaborating safeguards approaches, the Secretariat needed to consult with Member States so as to ensure that the approaches addressed their concerns.

107. Appreciation had been expressed of the cooperation between the Agency and SSACs and RSACs (including Euratom's system and ABACC), and it had been requested that that cooperation be strengthened.

108. Members had welcomed the efforts of the Agency to strengthen its capabilities for investigating and analysing illicit nuclear supply and procurement networks and had called on all States to cooperate further with the Agency in that regard.

109. He assumed that the Board wished to take note of the SIR for 2006 and authorize the release of the Safeguards Statement for 2006 and of the Background to the Safeguards Statement.

110. It was so decided.

**(b) The conclusion of safeguards agreements and of additional protocols**  
(GOV/2007/29, GOV/2007/30, GOV/2007/31, GOV/2007/32)

111. Ms. GOICOCHEA ESTENOZ (Cuba), speaking on behalf of NAM and referring to documents GOV/2007/29 and 30, said that NAM took note of the decision of the Government of Burundi to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency, together with an additional protocol to that agreement.

112. Mr. KIM Sung-Hwan (Republic of Korea) said that his country welcomed the decisions of the Governments of Burundi and Montenegro to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols.

113. The number of countries with additional protocols in force had been increasing steadily since the adoption of the Model Additional Protocol, ten years previously, and the Secretariat was to be commended for its efforts in promoting wider acceptance of a strengthened safeguards system.

114. Mr. AMANO (Japan) said that his country greatly appreciated the efforts being made by the Director General and the Secretariat to ensure the effectiveness of the Agency's safeguards system.

115. Japan, which welcomed the decisions of the Governments of Burundi and Montenegro, was promoting the universalization of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and it was pleased that 82 States now had additional protocols in force. It was committed to continuing its efforts to help strengthen the Agency's safeguards system by encouraging further States to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols.

116. Mr. MINTY (South Africa), welcoming the decisions of the Governments of Burundi and Montenegro, said that the Agency was the only authority responsible for verifying the compliance of States party to the NPT with the comprehensive safeguards agreements concluded by them in fulfilment of their obligations under NPT Article III. It was therefore of the utmost importance that all States party to the NPT which had not yet done so conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements — and additional protocols — with the Agency.

117. Mr. ABILKAIROV (Kazakhstan)\* said that his country had on 9 May 2007 submitted to the Secretariat a letter of ratification of the additional protocol to its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency.

118. Mr. GARČEVIĆ (Montenegro)\* said that his country had acceded to the NPT on 3 June 2006, when its Parliament had adopted Montenegro's Declaration of Independence, in which it was stated, inter alia, that Montenegro would accede to all international treaties to which Serbia and Montenegro had been a party.

119. His delegation hoped that the Board would authorize the Director General to conclude the safeguards agreement and the additional protocol which were before it in documents GOV/2007/31 and 32 respectively. The Government of Montenegro would sign them within a few months, as soon as the necessary domestic legal procedures had been completed.

120. Montenegro stood ready to support the efforts of the Secretariat in implementing the NPT regime and the Agency's safeguards system.

121. The CHAIRMAN said he assumed that the Board wished to take the actions recommended in the cover notes of documents GOV/2007/29 and GOV/2007/30 and authorize the Director General to conclude with the Republic of Burundi, and subsequently implement, the safeguards agreement and the additional protocol which were, respectively, the subjects of those documents.

122. It was so decided.

123. The CHAIRMAN said he assumed that the Board wished to take the actions recommended in the cover notes of documents GOV/2007/31 and GOV/2007/32 and authorize the Director General to conclude with the Republic of Montenegro, and subsequently implement, the safeguards agreement and the additional protocol which were, respectively, the subjects of those documents.

124. It was so decided.

**(c) Report of the Advisory Committee on Safeguards and Verification within the Framework of the IAEA Statute**  
(GOV/2007/27)

125. Ms. FEROUKHI (Chairperson, Advisory Committee on Safeguards and Verification within the Framework of the IAEA Statute), introducing the Committee's report, said that it faithfully reflected the Committee's discussions on procedural matters and on technical matters relating to various aspects of the Agency's safeguards system.

126. The Member States that had participated in the Committee's deliberations had been unable to arrive at recommendations for submission to the Board.

127. She was grateful to those Member States for their participation, to the Secretariat for its assistance and to the current Chairman of the Board and his two predecessors for their support.

128. Ms. GOICOCHEA ESTENOZ (Cuba), speaking on behalf of NAM, said that it had greatly appreciated the efforts of the Chairperson of the Advisory Committee and the assistance provided by the Secretariat to the Committee.

129. NAM had participated very actively in the Committee's work, in keeping with its readiness to support all efforts to strengthen all activities of the Agency falling within the scope of its statutory responsibilities and legal authority.

130. The Advisory Committee had not submitted any recommendations to the Board, which had in June 2005 given it a mandate of two years. That mandate had now expired, and NAM was of the view that it should not be extended.

131. Mr. GOTTWALD (Germany), speaking on behalf of the European Union, said that the candidate countries Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey, the countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia, the EFTA countries Iceland and Liechtenstein, members of the European Economic Area, and Moldova and Ukraine associated themselves with the statement which he was about to make.

132. The European Union commended the well-balanced, comprehensive report of the Advisory Committee. Exchanges of views within the Committee and its extensive substantive deliberations on the recommendations suggested by the Secretariat had been particularly helpful in increasing the awareness and understanding of Member States of key issues related to the strengthening of safeguards.

133. Despite the efforts of the Secretariat and the constructive engagement of Member States during the meetings of the Committee, no agreement had been reached on the formulation of recommendations for submission to the Board.

134. Against that background, the European Union reaffirmed its commitment to strengthening the Agency's safeguards system as an essential tool for meeting nuclear non-proliferation challenges. Recognizing the Agency's key role in verifying non-diversion of nuclear material, the European Union called on all States to actively support the Agency's efforts and to fully cooperate with the Agency in a

timely and transparent manner, particularly through the implementation of additional protocols. Comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols represented the present verification standard. The universal application of them would help to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system.

135. The European Union noted with concern that 31 non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT had, as of the end of December 2006, still not brought comprehensive safeguards agreements into force and that more than 100 countries remained without an additional protocol in force. It would like all States to cooperate in closing that gap in the international non-proliferation system.

136. In that connection, it might be recalled that the European Union was supporting the implementation of safeguards agreements and additional protocols in non-EU countries through a 'Joint Action' project.

137. Mr. SCHULTE (United States of America) said that his country, along with almost all other Member States, had for a long time been supporting efforts to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system by increasing both its effectiveness and its efficiency. Now more than ever, the confidence provided by the system was essential to accelerating and enlarging the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world as envisaged in the Statute. An effective safeguards system created confidence and, in so doing, strengthened the Agency in the fulfilment of all its core functions.

138. The Agency's safeguards system faced unprecedented challenges, from covert nuclear facilities to illicit trafficking in sensitive nuclear technology. The Advisory Committee had done important work in identifying and discussing measures required in order to address those challenges.

139. The report of the Committee, and also the SIR for 2006, made it clear that strengthening the Agency's safeguards system must be a continuous process. That idea was not new; the Secretariat had a long history of making significant improvements to the system. At the present critical juncture, the international community could not rest on its laurels; it must be on the lookout for new ways of improving the system and must adjust it to new circumstances. The report of the Committee provided many examples of technical measures and activities that would help.

140. His delegation was grateful to the Chairperson of the Committee for her diligence in eliciting the views of Member States on the Secretariat's recommendations for strengthening the safeguards system. In its opinion, the Committee's deliberations had been constructive, particularly during informal sessions. They had been facilitated by the Secretariat's many substantive recommendations, its thorough compilation of decisions and resolutions of the General Conference and the Board and its insightful interventions. The Secretariat's thoughtful analysis of the safeguards system had increased the Committee members' understanding of that system and had pointed to measures needed in order to strengthen it.

141. His country, which approved the Committee's report, would like to see all Member States working to further strengthen the safeguards system and thereby enhance the Agency's ability to provide assurances that all nuclear material remained in peaceful uses.

142. The Secretariat had made important recommendations relating to three areas: safeguards-strengthening actions within the existing legal framework; voluntary steps that would strengthen the safeguards system; and expanding the Agency's technical capabilities. The United States agreed with the Director General's assessment of the importance of additional protocols for the Agency in reaching strong safeguards conclusions. Additional information on exports and non-nuclear material and other additional information provided voluntarily could also be useful. In addition, SAL and other technical facilities supporting the Agency's safeguards system needed to be strengthened.

143. The Committee's report was a useful product, and the Agency should move forward in all the areas mentioned.

144. Mr. OTHMAN (Syrian Arab Republic) said that his delegation was grateful to the Chairperson of the Advisory Committee for her professional approach, to the Secretariat for the documentation provided by it and to the countries that had in the Committee proposed ways of strengthening the Agency's safeguards system.

145. During the Committee's two-year mandate, it had unfortunately been impossible to agree on recommendations, and no consensus had been reached on many issues because of difficulties in distinguishing between mandatory and voluntary measures. In his delegation's opinion, no benefit would be derived from extending the mandate of the Committee, especially given the financial constraints that had affected the Committee's work.

146. Mr. KIM Sung-Hwan (Republic of Korea) said that his delegation was grateful to the Chairperson of the Advisory Committee for the way in which she had guided the Committee's work and to the Secretariat for its efforts in support of the Committee.

147. His country attached great importance to increasing the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system, and for that reason his delegation had participated constructively in the Committee's deliberations. In its opinion, those deliberations had led to a better understanding of key safeguards-strengthening issues and to the identification of areas where further in-depth study was necessary.

148. His delegation hoped that the Committee's report would serve as a good basis for further constructive discussions and looked forward to participating in them.

149. Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) said that the Advisory Committee had been able to have objective and thorough discussions on the basis of the documentation which the Secretariat had submitted in support of the recommendations suggested by it. With time, many of those recommendations might, partly or fully, be reflected in the Agency's safeguards system.

150. Regrettably, the Committee had not agreed on recommendations for submission to the Board regarding practical steps to strengthen the safeguards system, but that did not mean that there was no need for the safeguards system to be strengthened. In his delegation's view, the discussions in the Committee had, despite the disparity of the opinions expressed, shown that there was a need, and the efforts being made within the Agency framework to increase the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system should not stop or slow down owing to the lack of agreement in the Committee on recommendations for submission to the Board. His country still wanted the Agency's safeguards system to be further strengthened through — inter alia — the universalization of additional protocols.

151. His delegation agreed with the statement in the report under consideration that "Constructive discussion and useful exchange of views among Member States took place throughout the Committee's work." In its opinion, the discussion and exchange of views had led to a better understanding of the concerns of many States and had yielded information that would be valuable in the elaboration of proposals for strengthening the Agency's safeguards system.

152. His delegation was grateful to the Chairperson of the Committee for the way in which she had organized the work and guided the deliberations of the Committee.

153. Mr. SKOKNIC (Chile) thanked the Chairperson of the Advisory Committee for her efforts in guiding the Committee's deliberations and the Secretariat for its support through, in particular, the provision of documents explaining the complexities of Agency safeguards.

154. His delegation had hoped that concerted efforts within the Committee would result in progress towards the goal of strengthening the safeguards system. However, despite the support voiced by a large number of delegations, including his own, for the approval of those Secretariat recommendations which had a sound legal basis and whose implementation would undoubtedly help to strengthen the safeguards system, it had proved impossible to reconcile divergent views, and the Committee's work had not yielded the desired results.

155. Chile would nevertheless continue to press for increases in the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system.

156. Mr. AMANO (Japan), having thanked the Chairperson of the Advisory Committee and the Secretariat for their efforts, said that his country would like there to be further discussions among Member States on — inter alia — the recommendations suggested by the Secretariat. In its opinion, however, such discussions did not need to take place within the Committee.

157. Mr. VALLIM GUERREIRO (Brazil) said that his delegation was grateful to the Chairperson of the Advisory Committee for the inspiration that she had provided throughout the Committee's meetings and to the Secretariat for its useful inputs.

158. Brazil, which fully agreed with the conclusion contained in paragraph 13 of the report before the Board, considered that the Committee had been successful in fulfilling the two-year mandate assigned to it. All participants in the Committee's deliberations had emerged with a better understanding both of the technical and legal aspects of the safeguards mechanisms available to the Agency and of one another's positions.

159. Some might feel that, since the Committee had not adopted any recommendations to the Board, it had failed in its task. Brazil did not agree with such an evaluation; success or failure could not be judged exclusively on the basis of whether recommendations were adopted. The issues involved were complex, and the participants in the Committee's work deserved credit for having had the courage to probe them without hesitation.

160. Brazil was committed to strengthened, effective and efficient safeguards and was convinced that the present evolving safeguards system would enable the international community to meet the challenges that might lie ahead.

161. Mr. MINTY (South Africa) thanked the Chairperson of the Advisory Committee for her dedication in guiding the Committee's deliberations and the Secretariat for the helpful documentation prepared by it.

162. In the Committee, South Africa had reiterated its belief that Member States had a duty to protect the integrity of the Agency — the sole competent authority in the field of nuclear safeguards and verification — and its position with regard to the mutually reinforcing processes of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament: collective efforts to strengthen nuclear safeguards and verification should be paralleled by collective efforts to achieve irreversible and verifiable complete nuclear disarmament leading to the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

163. The Agency's safeguards system needed to be adapted to changing circumstances, and South Africa was in favour of strengthening it. The issue should be kept under continuous consideration, as events in the past had demonstrated the dangers of the belief that the safeguards system was perfect.

164. Countries that possessed advanced nuclear and related dual-use technologies had a special responsibility to ensure that the safeguards system kept pace with developments, as it was the only tool available to the Agency for reaching conclusions about the peaceful nature of nuclear activities

and thereby helping to build confidence and avert confrontation. In the face of challenges such as those posed by networks for illicit trafficking in nuclear material and equipment, Member States could not afford to neglect the safeguards system, depriving it of sufficient resources or allowing it to become outdated.

165. Mr. TANG Guoqiang (China), having thanked the Chairperson of the Advisory Committee and the Secretariat for their efforts, said that the Committee had had very useful discussions thanks to which the participating Member States had gained a better understanding of one another's positions and of the challenges currently facing the Agency's safeguards system.

166. China, which was fully complying with its non-proliferation obligations, had decided to join the Member State Support Programme and the Network of Analytical Laboratories as a means of helping to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system. At the same time, it attached great importance to the balance between safeguards and the promotional activities of the Agency.

167. Mr. OSAISAI (Nigeria) said that, although the work of the Advisory Committee had been inconclusive in many respects, some progress had been made.

168. All of Nigeria's nuclear activities were exclusively for peaceful purposes and subject to Agency safeguards. Also, in concert with other countries Nigeria was endeavouring to bring about the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty, and it greatly appreciated the Agency's role in that connection.

169. Against that background, his country was concerned that certain core NPT provisions, including Article IV, which enshrined the inalienable right of all parties to the NPT to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I, II and III, were being subjected to redefinition and reinterpretation.

170. His country, which believed that proliferation concerns were best addressed in a transparent, comprehensive and non-discriminatory manner, considered the absence of a demonstrated commitment to nuclear disarmament on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to be an impediment to full compliance with NPT obligations, which could erode confidence in the Agency's safeguards system.

171. Mr. SHANNON (Australia), having thanked the Chairperson of the Advisory Committee for her efforts, said that some of the safeguards challenges facing the Agency could be addressed through technical measures, while others called for policy decisions, which were for the Board to take.

172. The Advisory Committee had provided the members of the Board with a mechanism for examining a number of technical and political issues surrounding those challenges more thoroughly than was possible at Board meetings and to elicit the views of Member States not serving on the Board.

173. The exercise had been a useful one, and Member States should continue examining the recommendations suggested by the Secretariat.

174. Mr. EL-DEEN EL-MISLATTI (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), having commended the Chairperson of the Advisory Committee on her efforts, said that there had been disagreement on most of the recommendations contained in 2006/Note 45 because of — inter alia — concern about the burdens which their implementation would impose on States, particularly ones with no significant nuclear activities. Consequently, the Committee had become deadlocked, and clearly it would not be able to make any further progress. In any case, its two-year mandate had expired.



175. The effectiveness of the safeguards system could be enhanced only if the system was fully implemented in all countries without exception. The legal instruments necessary for that to happen already existed.

176. Mr. CURIA (Argentina), having thanked the Chairperson of the Advisory Committee for her efforts, said that the Agency's safeguards system, in so far as it was based on clear legal norms, was efficient and effective, but improvements could be made as the need arose.

177. The failure of the Committee to reach a consensus was a challenge to the Agency, but Argentina stood ready to help bring about necessary improvements.

178. Ms. QUINTERO CORREA (Colombia), having thanked the Chairperson of the Advisory Committee for her efforts, said that it was important to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system, and for that reason her delegation had welcomed the establishment of the Committee and had participated constructively in its deliberations.

179. Colombia would continue to support initiatives aimed at strengthening the safeguards system, either within the Agency or within other multilateral forums.

180. Mr. MUDGAL (India), having commended the efforts of the Chairperson of the Advisory Committee, said that the deliberations of the Committee had been timely, their outcome reflecting the approaches of Member States to the issues considered by it.

181. Mr. HERASYMENKO (Ukraine)\*, speaking on behalf of GUAM, said that recent developments had clearly demonstrated the need to make additional efforts to ensure compliance with safeguards agreements and address new proliferation challenges.

182. The GUAM countries regretted the fact that the Advisory Committee had not achieved more substantive results, but the recommendations contained in 2006/Note 24, 2006/Note 45 and — in particular — 2006/Note 23 would be a good basis for further deliberations, primarily at the expert level. GUAM stood ready to participate in such deliberations.

183. Mr. SOLTANIEH (Islamic Republic of Iran)\* said that his country was grateful to the Chairperson of the Advisory Committee for the competent and impartial manner in which she had guided the Committee's deliberations.

184. The Agency had been entrusted with promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy throughout the world. Contrary to much mistaken publicity, it was not mandated by its Statute to play the role of 'United Nations watchdog'.

185. According to the letter and spirit of the Statute, the Agency was required to fulfil its mandate in an effective manner and on the basis of mutual trust, and where safeguards were concerned it had to take the national security of Member States seriously into account. The Agency would be successful in fulfilling its statutory mandate only if there was mutual trust among its Member States.

186. Those non-nuclear-weapon States which were party to the NPT had acceded to it and had accepted additional obligations, such as those arising out of comprehensive safeguards agreements, in the expectation of being able to exercise the inalienable right provided for in NPT Article IV, and they demanded a balanced and non-discriminatory approach to the implementation of the NPT. As long as certain nuclear-weapon States systematically refused to meet their obligations under NPT Article VI, additional obligations could not be imposed on the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT. Moreover, additional obligations due to the strengthening of safeguards were unacceptable if they detracted from the Agency's promotional activities.

187. Given the disappointing lack of universality of safeguards, with more than 30 States not yet having a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force and with the Zionist regime, which was engaging intensively in nuclear weapon activities and had acknowledged its possession of nuclear weapons, refusing to conclude such an agreement and place all of its nuclear material and facilities under Agency's safeguards, no further recommendations calling for the imposition of additional obligations on non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT would be justified. Rather, the Board should be encouraging the nuclear-weapon States to pursue nuclear disarmament as a top priority and to accept the full application of safeguards to their nuclear activities. There was an urgent need for an international mechanism for verifying the implementation of Article VI of the NPT, with a view to the total elimination of the nuclear warheads of the nuclear-weapon States.

188. Although the Model Additional Protocol had been adopted ten years previously, there were still more than 100 States without an additional protocol in force. Moreover, it took a long time for a legal instrument — such as an additional protocol — that had a direct impact on national security to prove its effectiveness, and it would therefore be premature to take further steps before the results of implementing additional protocols were known. Once any shortcomings had been identified, measures could, if necessary, be proposed for the strengthening of safeguards.

189. In the Advisory Committee, which had benefited from the provision by the Secretariat of up-to-date information on safeguards implementation, participating Member States had, in a transparent and constructive manner, expressed their concerns regarding the legal, financial and security aspects of additional safeguards measures. The Committee's mandate had now expired, however, and it should not be extended. That having been said, his delegation was concerned about the risk of losing sight of the real obstacles to the strengthening of Agency safeguards. During the past decade, many decisions had been taken with a view to the strengthening of Agency safeguards, and the legal authority of the Agency in the safeguards area had been substantially increased, but full confidence was still lacking for the following reasons: an imbalance between rights and obligations; an imbalance between the obligations of nuclear-weapon States and those of non-nuclear-weapon States; discriminatory policies and double standards; and the non-accession to the NPT of a member of the Agency in the Middle East whose nuclear weapon activities and facilities were not subject to comprehensive Agency safeguards or to any other form of international surveillance.

190. The CHAIRMAN, summing up, said that the Board had noted the extensive deliberations conducted by the Advisory Committee with a view to strengthening the Agency's safeguards system, which had been helpful in increasing Member States' awareness and understanding of key issues related to the strengthening of safeguards.

191. The Board had expressed its appreciation to the Chairperson of the Committee for her diligent and skilful efforts in chairing the Committee.

192. Several members had expressed the view that the Committee had discharged its mandate and that there was no need to extend it. Several members had expressed the view that efforts to strengthen the safeguards system should be an ongoing process and that the Agency should continue to work actively towards strengthening the system. Several members had expressed the view that some of the issues and recommendations discussed by the Committee could be taken up in the future for further consideration, as appropriate.

193. He assumed that the Board wished to take note of the report of the Advisory Committee on Safeguards and Verification within the Framework of the IAEA Statute contained in document GOV/2007/27.

194. It was so decided.

**(d) Report by the Director General on the implementation of safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea**

195. Mr. TANG Guoqiang (China) said that his country had been working tirelessly to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue through dialogue and consultation, and thereby achieve denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and maintain peace and stability in the region.

196. The parties to the Six-Party Talks which had been taking place in China had on 19 September 2005 adopted a Joint Statement, and on 13 February 2007 they had agreed on "Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Six-Party Joint Statement on the Korean Peninsula Nuclear Issue", thereby demonstrating their political will to achieve early denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through peaceful means. That had been an important step in the Six-Party Talks process.

197. Currently, the main difficulty being encountered in that process was a financial issue involving Banco Delta Asia. It was encouraging, however, that, despite that issue, all the parties were committed to implementing the Joint Statement, and that the DPRK authorities had stated on many occasions that they would take steps to abandon the DPRK's nuclear programme and invite Agency personnel to visit the DPRK pending settlement of the financial issue. His country believed that, once that issue had been settled, the initial actions for the implementation of the Joint Statement could be taken in full.

198. The Six-Party Talks had become an important forum in which the parties could increase mutual understanding and trust through dialogue and consultations on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, contributing to the normalization of relations among the countries of Northeast Asia.

199. As a next step, the parties must fulfil their commitments in earnest and find appropriate solutions, based on consideration of one another's concerns, by taking the initial actions expeditiously. At the same time, China would like the international community to continue to play a constructive role by promoting full implementation of the Joint Statement.

200. Since the Director General's visit to the DPRK in March 2007, the channels of communication between the DPRK and the Agency had remained open. It was therefore to be hoped that the Agency would help in ensuring that the Joint Statement was fully implemented.

201. Ms. GOICOCHEA ESTENOZ (Cuba), speaking on behalf of NAM, said that NAM's position of principle continued to be that all issues should be resolved through dialogue and negotiation. NAM had therefore welcomed the agreement reached on 13 February 2007 in Beijing and hoped that it would be implemented expeditiously. In that connection, NAM was encouraged by the positive results of the Director General's visit to the DPRK in March 2007.

**The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.**