

IAEA Board of Governors

Record of the 1190th Meeting
GOV/OR.1190

Strengthening the Agency's activities related to nuclear science,
technology and applications

Board of Governors

GOV/OR.1190

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Record of the 1190th Meeting

Held at Headquarters, Vienna, on Monday, 10 September 2007, at 10.40 a.m.

Contents

Item of the agenda ¹	Paragraphs
– Opening of the meeting	1
– Adoption of the agenda	2–3
1 Introductory statement by the Director General	4–33
2 Applications for membership of the Agency	34–40
3 Measures to strengthen international cooperation in nuclear, radiation and transport safety and waste management	41–132

¹ GOV/2007/49.

Attendance

(The list below gives the name of the senior member of each delegation who attended the meeting, as well as that of any other member whose statement is summarized in this record.)

Mr. PETRIČ		Chairman (Slovenia)
Mr. CURIA	_____	Argentina
Mr. SHANNON		Australia
Ms. POLTE		Austria
Mr. SYCHOV		Belarus
Mr. MOLLINEDO CLAROS		Bolivia
Mr. VALLIM GUERREIRO		Brazil
Ms. GERVAIS-VIDRICAIRE		Canada
Mr. SKOKNIC		Chile
Mr. SUN Qin		China
Mr. ARÉVALO YÉPES		Colombia
Mr. HORVATIĆ		Croatia
Ms. GOICOCHEA ESTENOZ		Cuba
Mr. FAWZY		Egypt
Ms. SINEGIORGIS		Ethiopia
Ms. KAUPPI		Finland
Mr. CARON		France
Mr. GOTTWALD	}	Germany
Mr. SANDTNER		
Mr. ZOGRAFOS		Greece
Mr. SHARMA		India
Mr. WIBOWO		Indonesia
Mr. AMANO		Japan
Mr. PARK Chung-Taek		Korea, Republic of
Mr. ALNEAMI		Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
Mr. ZNIBER		Morocco
Mr. OSAISAI		Nigeria
Mr. JOHANSEN		Norway
Mr. ALI		Pakistan
Mr. BERDENNIKOV		Russian Federation
Mr. STRITAR		Slovenia
Mr. MINTY		South Africa
Ms. MELIN		Sweden
Mr. OTHMAN		Syrian Arab Republic
Mr. PANUPONG		Thailand
Mr. DRAPER		United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Mr. SCHULTE		United States of America
Mr. ELBARADEI	_____	Director General
Mr. TANIGUCHI		Deputy Director General, Department of Nuclear Safety and Security
Mr. ANING		Secretary of the Board

Representatives of the following Member States also attended the meeting:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Spain, Sudan, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

Abbreviations used in this record:

Basic Safety Standards	International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources
CPPNM	Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
CRP	coordinated research project
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GRULAC	Latin American and Caribbean Group
ICRP	International Commission on Radiological Protection
INLEX	International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability
INSAG	International Nuclear Safety Group
INSSP	Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan
IRPA	International Radiation Protection Association
IRRS	Integrated Regulatory Review Service
IRS	Incident Reporting System
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NEA	Nuclear Energy Agency (of OECD)
NPCs	national participation costs
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OSART	Operational Safety Review Team

Abbreviations used in this record (continued):

PSA	Probabilistic safety analysis/assessment
RaSSIA	Radiation Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources Infrastructure Appraisal
SALTO	Extrabudgetary Programme on Safety Aspects of Long Term Operation of Water Moderated Reactors
SEDO	Safety Evaluation During Operation of Fuel Cycle Facilities
TCF	Technical Cooperation Fund
TECDOC	IAEA Technical Document
UNSCEAR	United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation
WHO	World Health Organization

* Speakers under Rule 50 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure are indicated by an asterisk.

– Opening of the meeting

1. The CHAIRMAN welcomed participants, including the new Governors: Mr. Fawzy of Egypt, Mr. Zografos of Greece and Mr. Smith of the United Kingdom; and the new Resident Representatives: Mr. Bamba of Côte d'Ivoire, Mr. El-Khoury of Lebanon, Mr. Menesi of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Ms. Conzemius of Luxembourg, Mr. Díaz y Pérez Duarte of Mexico, Ms. Beham of Serbia and Mr. Khattab of the Syrian Arab Republic.

– Adoption of the agenda (GOV/2007/38/Rev.1)

2. The CHAIRMAN invited the Board to adopt the revised provisional agenda contained in document GOV/2007/38/Rev.1.

3. The agenda was adopted.

1. Introductory statement by the Director General

4. The DIRECTOR GENERAL said that the Agency continued to explore ways and means of enabling Member States to make full use of nuclear technology to meet their socio-economic needs. Thus, many countries had been interested in finding better methods for safely disposing of spent high-activity radioactive sources. Working with the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation, the Agency had developed and pilot tested a mobile hot cell used to condition such sources for disposal. Conditioning operations were planned in several African countries. Depending on progress there, the initiative would be expanded to Latin America and Asia.

5. The Agency effort had also assisted more Member States to become self-reliant in isotope hydrology. It had published an atlas of isotope hydrology for Africa that provided an overview of the nature of aquifers and river hydrology in 26 countries. It had also helped to adapt a new machine for isotope analysis that used laser spectroscopy. The machine would cost about 75% less than existing mass spectrometers and would perform equivalent analyses with very low operation and maintenance costs.

6. The need for early, rapid and sensitive diagnosis of avian influenza had received special attention in recent years because of the potential for widespread devastation if an uncontrolled outbreak were to occur. Nuclear-related technologies limited handling and direct exposure to the live virus and enabled bird flu to be diagnosed in one or two days, as compared to over a week with conventional methods. In addition, stable isotope techniques were being used to help Member States trace infected migratory birds to their place of origin. The Agency, together with other key players such as WHO and FAO, had coordinated research on the topic and conducted training courses at relevant laboratories.

7. The safety and security of nuclear activities around the globe remained key components of the Agency's mandate. It was essential that countries embarking on nuclear power programmes become part of the global nuclear safety regime and share responsibility for its sustainability. Technology could be transferred, but safety culture could not; it had to be learned and embedded.

8. In the preceding year, the Agency had begun offering an Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) which combined a broad range of previous services. The first full-scope IRRS mission had been conducted in France in November 2006 and had covered all regulated nuclear and radiation facilities, activities and practices, including nuclear power plants, research reactors, fuel cycle facilities, medical practices, industrial and research activities, waste facilities, decommissioning, remediation and transport. The French Nuclear Safety Authority had requested that the mission also cover public information practices. In March, the French Government had hosted a workshop, attended by representatives from over 30 countries, so that operators and regulators from other Member States could learn more about the IRRS and experience gained during the mission. The Agency had also conducted IRRS missions to Australia and Japan in June 2007. Future missions were scheduled to Canada, Germany, Mexico, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Spain, Ukraine and the United States of America. The Spanish Nuclear Safety Council had offered to organize the next workshop, in late 2008 or early 2009, to disseminate information on the results of IRRS missions conducted in 2007 and 2008.

9. Following the recent earthquake that had affected the Kashiwazaki Kariwa nuclear power plant in Japan, the Agency had dispatched a team of international experts at the request of the Japanese Government. The team's review had supported the Japanese conclusions, namely: that plant safety features had performed as required during the event, including the automatic shutdown of the reactor; that the amount of radioactivity released had been very small and well below the authorized limits for public health and environmental safety; and that damage from the earthquake appeared to be limited to those sections of the plant that would not affect the reactor or systems related to reactor safety. The earthquake had significantly exceeded the level of seismic activity for which the plant had been designed. However, as with most nuclear plants, additional robustness had been incorporated into the plant design, which likely accounted for the damage being less than could have otherwise been expected. The observations and conclusions relating to the behaviour of the plant structures, systems and components still required validation through the ongoing investigations. The mission's preliminary findings and the Japanese analyses of the event included important lessons learned — both positive and negative — that would be relevant to other nuclear plants worldwide. The public response to the team's findings also plainly illustrated the importance and value of transparency and international collaboration in response to such events.

10. Revision of the Basic Safety Standards had begun early in the year. As cautioned by the General Conference in the preceding year, the revision process was avoiding changes that were not clearly warranted and necessary. A first draft had been reviewed in July by a technical meeting with participation from professional technical associations and potential co-sponsor organizations, in addition to Member State experts. The involvement of all stakeholders throughout the process would be key to the success of the review.

11. The Agency's nuclear security programme had maintained its rapid pace of programme delivery. Implementation of activities in 2006 had increased considerably over the preceding year, and the indications were that implementation would again be high in 2007.

12. Over the preceding 12 months, the Agency had continued to expand Member State participation in the illicit trafficking database. Nuclear security training had been provided to roughly 1650 individuals from 90 countries. The Agency had assisted with the improvement of physical protection at facilities in nine States. More than 900 items of security-related equipment had been supplied to

Member States, including border detection equipment for 29 countries. INSSPs had been completed in 38 countries and the agreed activities had been planned or were being implemented in each of the States concerned. Expertise had been provided in support of the security of major public events, including preparations in July in Brazil for the Pan American Games and ongoing preparations for the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing.

13. The Agency's nuclear security work had clearly improved overall nuclear security. However, much remained to be done in shaping the nuclear security framework, building up-to-date security systems and dealing with the legacy of past lax security. That was not a problem that could be solved overnight. It took time and resources to achieve a sustainable, internationally acceptable baseline level of nuclear security.

14. The international community had taken on board a variety of international instruments relevant to nuclear security. The rapid entry into force of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was a welcome step forward. However, progress on ratifying the amendment to the CPPNM remained slow. Only 11 out of 128 States Parties so far had accepted the amendment.

15. The Agency was foreseen as playing an important role in the implementation of those instruments. To that end, it had launched an effort to provide nuclear security guidance that would facilitate implementation. That and other programme changes entailed a transition from a situation in which strengthening nuclear security had been addressed as an ad hoc reaction to the prevailing threat of nuclear terrorism to a situation in which nuclear security would be addressed in a normative, sustainable manner.

16. The Board had before it for approval NPT safeguards agreements for the Kingdom of Bahrain and the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, plus an additional protocol for Timor-Leste.

17. It was now more than ten years since the Model Additional Protocol had been approved by the Board of Governors and additional protocols were in force for 83 States, just over half of the 162 States with safeguards agreements. More than 100 States had yet to bring into force additional protocols, and 31 States party to the NPT had not even brought into force their required comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency. He called on all States to take urgent action to remedy that situation. Without safeguards agreements, the Agency could not provide any assurance about a State's nuclear activities, and without the additional protocol the Agency could not provide credible assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activity.

18. The Board had before it a report on the application of safeguards in the DPRK. Following the special meeting of the Board in July, the Agency had maintained a continuous presence in the DPRK to implement the agreed verification and monitoring arrangements related to the shutdown and sealing of the Yongbyon nuclear facility. It had been able to verify the DPRK's shutdown of that facility, including the nuclear fuel fabrication plant, the radiochemical laboratory, the 5 MW experimental nuclear power plant, and the 50 MW nuclear power plant, as well as the 200 MW nuclear power plant in Taechon. That was a positive step forward and he particularly welcomed the active cooperation the Agency team was continuing to receive from the DPRK. The Agency looked forward to continuing to work with the DPRK as the verification process evolved.

19. The report contained in document GOV/2007/48 provided an update on the implementation of Agency safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The report made four main points.

20. Firstly, the Agency had been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran had continued to provide the access and reporting needed for Agency verification in that regard.

21. Secondly, Iran had provided the Agency with additional information and the access needed to resolve a number of long-outstanding issues. In particular, Agency questions regarding past plutonium experiments in Iran had been satisfactorily answered and that issue had been resolved. Questions about the presence and origin of high-enriched uranium particles at the Karaj Waste Storage Facility had also been resolved.

22. Thirdly, contrary to the decisions of the United Nations Security Council calling on Iran to take certain confidence-building measures, Iran had not suspended its enrichment-related activities and was continuing with the construction and operation of the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant. Iran was also continuing with its construction of the heavy water reactor at Arak. That was regrettable.

23. Fourthly, despite repeated requests by the Board and the Security Council to Iran, the Agency had so far been unable to verify certain important aspects relevant to the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear programme. It had been that situation that had triggered a crisis of confidence about the nature of Iran's nuclear programme, which had led to a series of actions by the Security Council. However, during a meeting he had had with the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, Dr. Larijani, it had been agreed that Iran would work with the Agency to develop a work plan for resolving all outstanding verification issues. A copy of that work plan was attached to his report.

24. That was the first time that Iran had agreed on a plan to address all outstanding issues with a defined timeline. It was therefore an important step in the right direction. Naturally, the key to gauging Iran's commitment would be its willingness to implement that work plan fully and in a timely manner. That would require active cooperation on the part of Iran and its undertaking of all the transparency measures needed to reconstruct the history of its nuclear programme, measures that were provided for in the additional protocol and went beyond it, and which included access to locations, documents and individuals, as well as answers to all questions the Agency might need to ask in order to reach a technical conclusion on a particular issue. Resolving all outstanding verification issues within the coming two to three months, after a long deadlock, would go a long way towards building confidence in the international community in the peaceful nature of Iran's past nuclear programme.

25. Equally important, Iran obviously needed to continue to build confidence in the scope and nature of its current nuclear programme, which would require renewed access by the Agency to information relevant to ongoing advanced centrifuge research. To that end, and given the special history of Iran's nuclear programme, it would be indispensable for Iran to ratify and bring into force an additional protocol, as called for by the Security Council and the Board. That would enable the Agency to provide assurances not only regarding declared nuclear material but also regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

26. Finally, he expressed the hope that conditions would be created soon that would allow the resumption of negotiations between Iran and all relevant parties. He still believed it was only through negotiations that a durable solution could be achieved, a solution that provided the international community with the required level of assurance and enabled Iran to exercise its rights under the NPT. With that in mind, he reiterated that a 'double timeout' for all enrichment-related activities and for sanctions could provide a breathing space for negotiations to be resumed. The earlier it became possible to move from confrontation and distrust to dialogue and confidence-building, the better for Iran and for the international community.

27. Pursuant to the mandate given to him by the General Conference, he had continued his consultations with the States of the Middle East region on the application of full-scope safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East, and on the development of model agreements as a necessary step towards the establishment of a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone. However, as in the past, he regrettably had no progress to report on either front.

28. The General Conference had also asked him to organize a forum on the relevance of the experience of other regions with existing nuclear-weapon-free zones for establishing such a zone in the Middle East, including confidence-building and verification measures. Consultations with concerned States in the region had not produced an agreement on the agenda for such a forum, a forum which, in his view, could be a positive step forward towards the initiation of dialogue among the concerned parties on that important issue. He naturally remained ready to convene such a forum if and when the concerned States were able to reach agreement on how to move forward, and he would continue to encourage them to do so.

29. Technical cooperation programme resources and delivery had both shown robust growth in 2006. Contributions to the TCF had reached a record level. The rate of attainment had reached its highest level ever, exceeding 93% by the end of the year. That demonstrated increased commitment by a growing number of Member States to paying their full share of the TCF target. He urged all Member States to pay their target share in full and on time.

30. Initial implementation of a number of projects had been held back by non-payment of NPCs. So far in 2007, six countries regrettably had not paid the minimum NPCs required to allow the initiation of important new projects. He urged those countries to pay those small amounts to enable the Agency to provide them with the full benefits of their national technical cooperation programmes.

31. Over the preceding two years, the Agency had given special attention to applicants from developing, unrepresented and under-represented Member States. It had expanded its outreach efforts by providing regular forecasts of upcoming vacancies, conducting recruitment missions and establishing recruitment booths at major Agency and other meetings. It would continue with those efforts and trusted that Board members would assist it.

32. The Agency continued to face difficulties in recruiting suitably qualified women in the Professional and higher categories, particularly in scientific and engineering fields. That was largely a result of the low percentage of women in such fields in most Member States. However, a number of initiatives had been taken to help improve the gender balance in the Agency. A comprehensive gender policy had been developed and policies related to work-life balance put in place. Each Member State had been asked to designate a point of contact to support the Agency's efforts to recruit women. By those and other means, the Agency had been able to increase the representation of women in the Professional and higher categories from about 18% to 22.5% in four years. However, it was still far from where it would like to be.

33. The Agency continued to assume growing and critical responsibilities in all areas of its work. The support of Member States remained key to its success. He trusted that support would continue to be forthcoming.

2. Applications for membership of the Agency (GOV/2007/56)

34. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to the application for membership of the Agency submitted by the Republic of Cape Verde which was contained in document GOV/2007/56.

35. Ms. GOICOCHEA ESTENOZ (Cuba), speaking on behalf of NAM, welcomed the decision by the Government of Cape Verde to join the Agency. NAM supported the recommended action.

36. Mr. VALLIM GUERREIRO (Brazil) said that his country supported the recommended action and looked forward to working with Cape Verde within the Agency, with which country his own had close cooperation links.

37. Mr. DIYEZWA (Angola)* welcomed the decision by Cape Verde to join the Agency. His country was convinced that Cape Verde would contribute to the Agency's activities and it therefore supported the recommended action.

38. The CHAIRMAN took it that the Board wished to recommend to the General Conference that it approve the application of the Republic of Cape Verde for membership and that it wished to submit to the General Conference the draft report attached to document GOV/2007/56.

39. It was so decided.

40. Mr. DUARTE (Portugal)* said that his Government welcomed the recommendation by the Board of Governors to the General Conference to approve the application for membership by Cape Verde.

3. Measures to strengthen international cooperation in nuclear, radiation and transport safety and waste management (GOV/2007/25 and 35; 2007/Note 36)

41. Mr. TANIGUCHI (Deputy Director General for Nuclear Safety and Security) said that document GOV/2007/25 provided the Secretariat's response to General Conference resolution GC(50)/RES/10. The Board was being asked to consider and take note of that report. The supporting document, 2007/Note 36, provided additional information on international conferences, education and training activities and the chairman's report from the open-ended meeting for sharing of information regarding the implementation by Member States of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.

42. Document GOV/2007/35 had been prepared in response to the need for the early publication of international guidance on the safety of fuel cycle facilities and had been developed in extensive consultation with Member States. Many experts from Member States had made a valuable contribution to that process and the Board was now being invited to establish the draft safety requirements contained in the document as an Agency safety standard and authorize the Director General to promulgate and issue them as a publication in the IAEA Safety Standards Series.

43. Principle 1 of the Fundamental Safety Principles approved by the Board the preceding year stated that the prime responsibility for safety rested with the person or organization responsible for facilities and activities that gave rise to radiation risks. It was important to note that that responsibility could not be delegated or outsourced. Principle 2 stated that an effective legal and governmental framework for safety, including an independent regulatory body, had to be established and sustained. In order to comply with those two principles and achieve excellence in safety, strong leadership and global networking of safety knowledge and experience were essential.

44. The Secretariat had been very encouraged by the appreciation shown for the IRRS. Following recent reviews in Australia, France, Japan, Romania and the United Kingdom, an increasing number of countries were requesting or considering IRRS missions, including Canada, Germany, Mexico,

Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Spain, Ukraine and the United States, and the IRRS phase 2 mission to the United Kingdom was currently being discussed.

45. Changes in world markets and technology were having a greater impact on the nuclear industry than ever before. Both the industry and regulators had traditionally been rather conservative when it came to embracing change and a key challenge for the future was to assess properly and address the safety implications of such changes.

46. The need to enhance utilization of operating and other safety experience, including the impact of natural events such as earthquakes, and to learn from each other remained high on the list of challenges. Although the nuclear industry generally had a high level of safety performance, nuclear and radiation-related incidents continued to make the headlines and posed a challenge to operators and regulators. Even where the implications for nuclear safety were technically minimal, public perception was influenced. Therefore, every effort needed to be made to ensure that lessons learned were shared internationally, as weak links in the safety chain affected everyone.

47. The list of those wishing to take advantage of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy continued to grow. Not only were more Member States announcing intentions or plans regarding nuclear power, others were announcing expanded fuel cycle activities or expanded medical applications of advanced nuclear technology. The Agency would continue to emphasize the importance of a sound nuclear safety infrastructure as a prerequisite for the adoption or expansion of nuclear technology.

48. As expectations of the use of nuclear technology rose, exploration, mining and milling, and transport activities also increased. It was essential to ensure that any new activities were subject to proper regulatory oversight and that due attention was paid to public concerns over safety and the environment.

49. Mr. ELDIN ELAMIN (Sudan)*, speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, commended the work of the Secretariat in 2006 to strengthen nuclear, radiation and transport safety and waste management pursuant to the relevant General Conference resolutions.

50. The Group welcomed the establishment by the Director General of the Nuclear Power Support Group, which would be of great help to those Member States considering the nuclear option and would assist them in implementing current safety standards.

51. The Group welcomed the pilot SEDO mission to the Brazilian Nuclear Industries uranium fuel fabrication facilities in Resende, Brazil, and encouraged the Agency to hold similar missions in other developing countries.

52. The Group welcomed the fact that the Agency had convened an international workshop on a common framework for the safety of radioactive waste management and disposal in Cape Town, South Africa, in July 2007, and appreciated South Africa's efforts to promote awareness of the importance of the safe management and disposal of radioactive waste.

53. The Group firmly believed in the concept of a common framework linking radioactive waste types to disposal options in a manner that respected international safety standards and took account of local circumstances. In that regard, a comprehensive system of radioactive waste classification was essential and the Agency's safety standards in that area were currently being revised. It was also important to arrive at an international consensus on methodological approaches to safety demonstrations in order to ensure compliance with safety standards.

54. Due attention needed to be given to the financial and regulatory implications of raising safety standards, particularly in developing countries, and to providing appropriate support for their implementation. The Agency had an important role to play in promoting education and training in

nuclear safety, and it should continue its efforts in that area so as to ensure the safe use of nuclear energy.

55. One of the major challenges facing Member States was the establishment, maintenance and improvement of technical competence in regulatory bodies and technical support organizations. The Group looked forward to cooperating with the Agency in establishing comprehensive and multi-faceted approaches to succession planning, educational and training programmes and quality management programmes.

56. The Group supported the work of INLEX and welcomed the Secretariat's reports on its activities. It looked forward to discussing the lessons learned from the outreach activities conducted in 2007, particularly those relating to adherence to the international nuclear liability regime.

57. The Group welcomed the preparation of document GOV/2007/35 and supported the recommended action on it. The purpose of the publication was to establish requirements that had to be met in order to ensure safety at all stages in the lifetime of a nuclear fuel cycle facility. The Group attached great importance to the Agency's safety standards and appreciated the progress that had been made in implementing the Action Plan for the Development and Application of IAEA Safety Standards. The Group welcomed the efforts of the Secretariat to enhance implementation of those standards through information and promotional materials.

58. Mr. QUIÑONES (Dominican Republic)*, speaking on behalf of GRULAC, stressed the importance of assisting developing Member States with the strengthening of their national regulatory infrastructures. In that connection, he recalled the recommendation formulated by the International Conference On Effective Nuclear Regulatory Systems, held in Moscow in 2006, regarding the need to expand programmes to assist developing Member States with human resources development by organizing international, regional, subregional and national training courses in radiation protection, waste safety and nuclear safety and security,.

59. The Group noted with satisfaction the positive response to the workshop on the IRRS held in France in 2007 with Agency support. That service was making a valuable contribution to improving regulation of nuclear safety and provided an opportunity for exchange of experience.

60. He drew attention to the work of the Ibero-American Forum of Radiological and Nuclear Regulatory Agencies, which promoted exchange of experience in the fields of safety regulation, the import and export of radioactive sources, patient protection, safety of nuclear installations, and training and education, and thanked the Agency for its ongoing support. He also drew attention to the progress that had been made in developing the Ibero-American Radiation Safety Network and welcomed the fact that version 1.0 of the network was now fully operational. Moreover, he thanked Spain for the financial support it had provided for the translation of Agency safety guides into Spanish. These guides would be disseminated within the network.

61. The Group attached particular importance to the efforts being made by Member States and the Secretariat with respect to training and education in radiation protection and nuclear safety. In that connection, it welcomed the proposal made by Argentina to create a regional centre for training in radiation protection and safety around its traditional postgraduate course.

62. Another area of importance was emergency response. The Agency's Incident and Emergency Centre had a significant role to play in that regard. He noted the preparations under way in Mexico for a large-scale ConvEx-3 exercise, scheduled to take place in 2008, which should help improve planning and analysis of the results of such exercises.

63. The Group attached great importance to radiation protection of patients undergoing diagnostic tests and treatment employing ionizing radiation, particularly since such practices were in widespread

use in the region. The Secretariat should continue to support technical cooperation activities in that field. The website on radiation protection of patients set up in the preceding year had produced positive results.

64. With regard to control of radiation sources, the Group valued the support provided by the Agency with the recovery of disused sources.

65. It also appreciated the Agency's activities related to denials of shipments of radioactive material. A regional workshop on that topic had been held in Uruguay in July 2007 at which a regional action plan had been developed.

66. The Latin American and Caribbean region had made a significant contribution to the issue under discussion through the pan-American meeting on strengthening implementation of international instruments in the Americas for enhanced nuclear and radiological security, held in Quito, Ecuador, on 3–4 April 2006, with Agency support. Mechanisms to raise awareness of the need to strengthen nuclear and radiological security through the application of international instruments in force and through greater cooperation between States in the region had been discussed.

67. Turning to document GOV/2007/35, he said that the new requirements for all stages of the fuel cycle would help improve safety standards in nuclear activities, specifically at fuel cycle facilities.

68. The Group shared the view expressed in the document that everyone working in fuel cycle facilities should be aware of and committed to safety standards, and that the operator should adopt and apply the principles and processes necessary to create an effective safety culture.

69. Mr. SCHULTE (United States of America) commended the Secretariat for establishing the new IRRS. His country strongly supported that programme and had recently requested that an IRRS mission be conducted in the United States in 2010. It encouraged other countries to do likewise.

70. The Secretariat had undertaken important work in the area of nuclear power operational safety, which was especially important in light of the new interest in nuclear power. His country was very supportive of efforts to increase communication and understanding regarding operational performance issues, for example through the technical meeting to be held in Japan in October 2007 and through the creation of the Nuclear Power Support Group. All such activities would help increase the safety of current and future nuclear reactors.

71. The Secretariat had also made commendable efforts to encourage Member States to make a political commitment to the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. In particular, it had hosted a meeting of technical experts on the matter in June 2007. In that connection, it was disappointing that the chairman's report from the June meeting had not been attached to the Director General's report.

72. Mr. SHARMA (India) said that, as had been highlighted in the INSAG report on strengthening the global nuclear safety regime, several nuclear safety networks comprising organizations working in the area of design, operation and regulation of nuclear power plants had come into existence over the years. However, there was a need to strengthen those networks in order to ensure that safety was not only maintained but continuously enhanced. The Agency's proposal to develop an international regulatory network for exchange of regulatory experience and practices was thus entirely appropriate.

73. He noted the Agency's proposal to restructure the Agency's safety standards and to maintain a manageable number of safety guides. However, it was important that safety guides on important topics were not deleted in the process. The same applied to TECDOCs as, together with the safety guides, they were the documents most often used by practising professionals.

74. It was encouraging that nuclear power plant operational safety had generally remained at a high level throughout the world. It was clear that an important means of improving safety performance was through exchange of operating experience. The IRS operated by the Agency and the NEA was a highly appropriate mechanism for the purpose. It was therefore vital to ensure that adequate financial and manpower resources were provided for the IRS so that it was able to fulfil its mandate as effectively as possible.

75. He welcomed the idea of establishing an Internet-based collaboration system under the Centre for Advanced Safety Analysis Tools, and using the CRP on uncertainties in best estimate safety analysis as the pilot project for use of the collaboration features offered by the Centre. An Indian team of experts was participating in that CRP.

76. Radiation protection of patients was an important topic and the Agency should endeavour to find funding for an international conference on that issue, as requested at the 50th session of the General Conference. India had taken several steps in that area, such as ensuring the availability of quality assurance kits, periodic quality assurance of individual X-ray units, and assessment of patient doses and dose optimization in various types of X-ray examinations. The regulatory body in India was also conducting radiation safety and quality assurance programmes for the suppliers and operators of X-ray units.

77. It was heartening to note that the Agency's laboratory for radiation monitoring and protection had been granted accreditation by the Austrian Accreditation Council, the first ever accreditation granted to an agency or a laboratory in the United Nations system. In India, the regulatory body had recently granted accreditation to three regional laboratories for the provision of a personnel monitoring service and it was planning to accredit several more such units in the near future.

78. In view of the current security situation, enhancement of regulatory infrastructure for the control of radiation sources was acquiring increasing importance. In that context, the Agency's Regulatory Authority Information System programme assumed added importance. India had contributed substantially to the development of that system and had also participated in the recent meeting for exchange of information on implementation of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. It was also a member of the Radiation Safety Regulators Network.

79. The eighth meeting of INSAG had been held in Mumbai in March 2007. Several member of INSAG had made technical presentations on a number of topics that had been highly appreciated by the nuclear community in India. His country would also be hosting the IAEA International Conference on Topical Issues in Nuclear Installation Safety in March 2008 in Mumbai, and looked forward to enhanced cooperation with the Agency on such activities.

80. Mr. SANDTNER (Germany) said that his country regarded the IRRS as an effective tool and had requested an IRRS mission to take place in the summer of 2008. Networking for nuclear and radiation safety was becoming increasingly important, in particular against the background of scarce resources, and was an essential factor in effective cooperation; Germany therefore welcomed and supported the Agency's activities relating to a global nuclear and radiation safety network. With regard to the Agency's safety standards programme, his country supported the efforts to limit the number of standards and to give priority to maintaining the up-to-dateness and applicability of a manageable set of standards.

81. Turning to the issue of emergency preparedness, he said that Germany continued to favour a code of conduct on international emergency management. Although there were apparently differing opinions on the usefulness of such an instrument, there was broad agreement on the goals to be attained. That agreement should be reflected in the relevant General Conference resolution.

82. Mr. AMANO (Japan) said that, for more than 30 years, his country had engaged safely in the transport of radioactive material jointly with France and the United Kingdom. Japan had also, together with those countries, engaged in constructive dialogue with coastal States. A communication meeting hosted by shipping States would be held with coastal States during the forthcoming General Conference, at which Japan hoped a well balanced resolution on transport safety would be adopted.

83. Japan's nuclear regulatory authorities and nuclear power producers had been eager to ensure safety and to enhance the international transparency of their activities. Thus, in June 2007 Japan had received an IRRS mission. A few weeks later, following an earthquake off the coast of Japan, his country's nuclear safety regulatory body had conducted a prompt examination of its impact on the Kashiwazaki Kariwa nuclear power plant. Examinations carried out by the Government of Japan and a special team of Agency inspectors and experts were expected to enhance further the international transparency of nuclear safety in his country. Japan believed that other Member States could benefit from the lessons learned from examinations of seismic effects on nuclear power plants. Japan had a wealth of experience in that particular area, and in the area of nuclear safety in general, and was willing to contribute to enhancing the safety of nuclear installations worldwide.

84. Mr. STRITAR (Slovenia) expressed appreciation for the IRRS and welcomed the idea of establishing a safety network for exchange of regulatory experience and practice. IRRS mission results should be included in that network.

85. In the area of radiation protection, one of the most challenging tasks was the revision of the Basic Safety Standards. The preparation of the latest ICRP recommendations had taken around seven years. His country hoped that, with the cooperation of all stakeholders, a document could be produced that would attract a broad consensus.

86. A vital feature of the international incident and emergency response system was its long-term sustainability. Thus, his country had made a financial contribution in 2006 towards the modernization of the Incident and Emergency Centre.

87. Slovenia also attached great importance to safe radioactive waste management and would be incorporating in its procedures and practices the conclusions of the international workshop on that topic held in Cape Town, South Africa, in July 2007.

88. Mr. SUN Qin (China) noted with satisfaction that, over the preceding year, the Agency had adopted a number of measures to strengthen international cooperation in nuclear and radiation safety, transport safety and the safety of waste management, including promotion of the IRRS, the safety standards programme, the setting up of radiological networks and the improvement of the Incident and Emergency Centre and Response Assistance Network. Positive results had been achieved in all those areas. The Agency had also established the Nuclear Power Support Group and his country welcomed the progress made in that regard.

89. An increasing number of developing countries were looking to develop nuclear energy and therefore had urgent requirements in respect of safety regulatory systems and training. The Agency should offer support and assistance in that area that was more focused on the needs of developing countries.

90. China supported the recommendation that the Board establish the draft safety requirements on safety of fuel cycle facilities contained in document GOV/2007/35 as an Agency safety standard and authorize the Director General to promulgate and issue them as a publication in the IAEA Safety Standards Series. China also supported the recommendation that the Board and the General Conference consider and take note of the report contained in document GOV/2007/25.

91. Mr. ALI (Pakistan) welcomed the establishment of the Nuclear Power Support Group. As a Member State with a nuclear power expansion programme, Pakistan looked forward to greater assistance with the development of nuclear safety infrastructure to support that expansion. In that regard, there was a need to remove restrictions on the acquisition of safety-related equipment. There was a collective responsibility to help those operators who needed assistance to incorporate safety-related improvements in their plants.

92. Pakistan had greatly benefited from Agency regulatory guides and standards in formulating its national nuclear safety regulations. One set of regulations, based on the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, established requirements for the transport of radioactive material by land, water and air. Pakistan had allocated adequate resources for the safe management of radioactive waste and for dealing with plant decommissioning. A national policy on radioactive waste management had been drawn up which also ensured the provision of funds for safe and secure radioactive waste management. Another set of regulations established strict requirements for radioactive waste processing, so that the resulting waste could be safely stored and retrieved from the storage facility for disposal. Environmental monitoring was undertaken according to an established programme.

93. Pakistan had a policy of transparency, openness, continuous learning and improvement, and sharing of its experience with others. Its nuclear installations had received peer review missions and it had requested a full-scope IRRS mission which was scheduled for March–April 2008.

94. His country greatly benefited from Agency activities on education and training in the nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety field and would welcome greater international cooperation in that regard.

95. Mr. ARÉVALO YÉPES (Colombia) noted the assistance the Agency provided to regional nuclear and radiation safety networks and welcomed the long-term intention to create a global nuclear safety network. It was important to establish a safety network for exchange of regulatory practices and experience.

96. In the area of nuclear and radiological emergency preparedness and response, the Incident and Emergency Centre played an important role. He welcomed the publication of the third edition of the document entitled *IAEA Response Assistance Network* and of the *Manual for First Responders to a Radiological Emergency*, as well as the creation of a website based on the manual.

97. Turning to radiation safety, he welcomed the launching of the Agency's website on radiation protection of patients, the launching of the web-based version of the Agency's database on discharges of radionuclides to the atmosphere and the aquatic environment, and the accreditation of the quality management system of the Agency's laboratory for radiation monitoring and protection to ISO standard 17025.

98. At the beginning of 2006, Colombia had received a RaSSIA mission and had decided to implement the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources, in which endeavour it hoped to receive Agency support. He noted the non-binding nature of those instruments. His country fully supported the Agency's efforts to improve the safety and security of radioactive sources.

99. In the field of transport safety there was a need to strengthen the legal regime. His country welcomed the continuing work of INLEX.

100. As a coastal State, Colombia attached great importance to the issue of safety of transport. The Agency should pursue its work in that area and, in particular, should support dialogue and consultation among coastal States and shipping States on the maritime transport of radioactive material and waste.

It would be appropriate to establish a binding legal instrument with broad adherence by coastal and shipping States.

101. Finally, he commended the positive response the Agency had given to the request made by the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space for support for the development of a safety framework for nuclear power sources in outer space.

102. Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) said that his country had no objection to the Board taking note of the report by the Director General contained in document GOV/2007/25 or to it approving the draft safety requirements on fuel cycle facilities contained in document GOV/2007/35.

103. Mr. CURIA (Argentina) welcomed the progress made by the Ibero-American Forum of Radiological and Nuclear Regulatory Agencies and the important results it had achieved with respect to radiation protection of patients and application of PSA in radiotherapy, as well as the implementation of the Ibero-American Radiation Safety Network developed within the framework of an Agency extrabudgetary programme. Argentina felt honoured to host the headquarters of the Forum secretariat in Buenos Aires.

104. With respect to the Agency's safety standards programme, his country had repeatedly expressed concern regarding the revision of the Basic Safety Standards. It agreed with the statement in paragraph 19 of document GOV/2007/25 regarding the importance of maintaining stability in international standards and cautioning against making changes that were not warranted.

105. Paragraph 9 of UNSCEAR's report on its fifty-fourth session, contained in United Nations General Assembly document A/61/40, contained a statement of vital importance for the revision not only of the Basic Safety Standards but of all Agency standards, to the effect that the data it had reviewed for its 2006 report did not necessitate changes in its current risk estimates for the cancer and the hereditary effects of radiation. In March 2007, the ICRP had approved new recommendations on the protection of man and the environment against ionizing radiation which made no fundamental changes. Revising the Basic Safety Standards was a serious matter which could affect legislation and regulations in the majority of Member States and an exhaustive report should be submitted to the Board on that matter. He expressed the hope that, as the Director General had implied in his introductory statement, the review process would avoid unnecessary changes.

106. The efforts of Member States and the Secretariat in the area of education and training in radiation protection and nuclear safety were of vital importance. Argentina continued to work on consolidating its position as a regional centre for training in radiation protection and safety through its traditional postgraduate course. The General Conference had approved a number of important resolutions in support of international education programmes sponsored by the Agency, namely resolutions GC(48)/RES/10, GC(49)/RES/9 and GC(50)/RES/10. In accordance with those resolutions, Argentina's Nuclear Regulatory Authority had requested the Secretariat to carry out a pioneering Education Training and Appraisal mission to Argentina. The mission's final report had confirmed that Argentina's postgraduate safety course provided adequate instruction in the correct application of the Agency's safety standards; it also included an action plan which the Government had implemented. Inter alia, the action plan recommended that a long-term agreement be signed between Argentina and the Agency to plan education and training activities. His Government was keen to sign such an agreement, as recommended by the General Conference, so that it could continue to make the benefits of postgraduate courses available to the whole region, and introduce other specialized courses and training and education activities.

107. Argentina was not in favour of the elaboration of a code of conduct on international emergency management for radiation events. The number of codes of conduct should not increase as they had

been approved in cases where there was no consensus on negotiating a binding convention. In the case of emergency management, binding conventions did exist and a code of conduct would only serve to weaken the obligations assumed by countries party to them. A mechanism to implement those conventions already existed but should be formalized through an instrument other than a code of conduct.

108. He welcomed the implementation of SEDO missions and the transparency and openness displayed by the Government of Brazil, the first country to receive such a mission.

109. In 2006, Argentina had carried out its own evaluation of the application of the Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors, identifying areas in which action needed to be strengthened. His country was willing to host the Latin American regional meeting to be held prior to the planned international meeting on application of the Code of Conduct mentioned in paragraph 43 of document GOV/2007/25.

110. Expressing support for the Agency's efforts to establish management systems, he reported that Argentina's National Atomic Energy Commission was organizing a workshop, to be held in 2008 at the Balseiro Institute, a training centre for nuclear engineers, which it was hoped would facilitate the establishment of management systems.

111. His country shared the Agency's concern over environmental protection and remediation of sites in uranium mining operations. In Argentina, the relevant organizations and companies were working towards that goal and the National Atomic Energy Commission dedicated a significant part of its programme to the remediation of mining sites. It was essential that mining companies, many of which were from developed countries, take responsibility for environmental protection, irrespective of the regulatory framework in the countries where they operated. The Agency should increase assistance to Member States where uranium prospecting and mining activities were carried out which had weaknesses in their regulatory infrastructure.

112. Noting that there was no mention in document GOV/2007/25 of the actions taken by the Director General and the Agency to implement the provision of resolution GC(50)/RES/10 relating to the IRPA 12 Congress, he requested that the Secretariat urgently prepare an addendum to the document so that the matter could be discussed at the fifty-first session of the General Conference.

113. Mr. FAWZY (Egypt) welcomed all efforts to strengthen cooperation on nuclear safety, which was a major pillar of the Agency's mandate. Interest in nuclear power was growing, with many countries expressing an interest in building nuclear power plants, but such developments had to be accompanied by international safety standards and national legislation on nuclear safety, safe transport of nuclear material and proper disposal of radioactive waste. Increased preparedness for nuclear incidents and emergencies was also essential. He commended the Secretariat's efforts in the area of safety, as reflected in the documents under discussion, which showed tangible progress in developing Agency safety standards and assisting national regulatory authorities, particularly through the IRRS.

114. As a coastal State with a major international waterway running through its territory, Egypt attached great importance to transport safety. Transporting nuclear material posed risks to human health, the environment and economic development, and strict regulations were needed to minimize those risks. All countries should adhere to international instruments in that area and fulfil their responsibilities under those instruments. He expressed support for the Agency's efforts to ensure radiation protection of individuals employed in transport services, and to protect the environment and non-human species. Proper disposal of radioactive waste was also of great importance.

115. Increasing the safety of nuclear installations required that training and education be strengthened. The Agency should encourage its Member States to exchange information, particularly

on transport safety and the strict application of safety measures for the protection of patients and those working in dosimetry. Greater cooperation with other international organizations in that regard was required, along with proper training of staff and identification of best practices in disposing of disused radioactive sources. He welcomed the Agency's efforts related to decommissioning but highlighted the dangers associated with radioactive waste and old reactors, which constituted a serious problem for all countries in the Middle East. He requested that the Secretariat report on the dangers posed by such facilities, especially if they were not subject to Agency safeguards, since in such cases information was not available regarding what safety standards were being applied.

116. Mr. PARK Chung-Taek (Republic of Korea) said that his country had recently received OSART and SALTO missions which had identified several good practices and made various recommendations. Agency peer review services, including the IRRS, made a significant contribution to maintaining and enhancing nuclear safety in Member States and worldwide, and could also improve public confidence levels.

117. He commended the Agency on its efforts to improve radiation protection through the continuous development of relevant safety standards and guidelines, and highlighted the importance of revising the Agency's Basic Safety Standards to reflect new ICRP recommendations, which could result in changes to national regulatory standards and implementation activities. His country would participate actively in that exercise.

118. The attention given to infrastructure for radiation protection of patients was growing rapidly worldwide as the use of medical technology employing radiation increased. The Agency should support Member States in developing programmes for education, training and exchange of information in that area.

119. The reclassification of all types of radioactive waste based on appropriate disposal options was a reasonable approach to systematic and safe waste management. His country welcomed the Agency's decision to modify the classification system, which it hoped would be undertaken in close cooperation with Member States. He also welcomed the initiation of the international project on demonstrating the safety of geological disposal of high-level waste, including spent nuclear fuel. He urged the Agency to ensure that as many Member States as possible participated in that project.

120. The draft safety requirements contained in document GOV/2007/35 would contribute greatly to improving the safety of fuel cycle facilities. His country was keen to cooperate with the Agency and other Member States in that area, and planned to apply the safety requirements to its national fuel cycle facilities and evaluate the outcomes. The Republic of Korea remained committed to strengthening the global nuclear safety regime and to international cooperation in the area of nuclear safety.

121. Mr. SKOKNIC (Chile), endorsing the comments made by the representative of Colombia concerning section G.3 of document GOV/2007/25 and the need for dialogue between coastal and shipping States, stressed the need to strengthen assistance to developing countries with the aim of improving their national regulatory infrastructure. The human resources development seminars and courses organized for Member States at international, regional, subregional and national level, covering radiological protection, waste safety and nuclear safety and security, had been of great use and should continue. The Ibero-American Forum of Radiological and Nuclear Regulatory Agencies had allowed countries to share experience in the areas of safety regulation, import and export of radioactive sources, patient protection, the safety of nuclear installations, and training. He expressed appreciation to the Agency, especially the Incident and Emergency Centre, for the valuable assistance given to his country in the fields of radiation protection and safety.

122. Chile welcomed the draft safety requirements contained in document GOV/2007/35 which it hoped would contribute to improving safety at nuclear installations, allowing a true safety culture to be established. It would be useful to include a section on communications issues which should be borne in mind when launching a major project. Facilities should have a crisis communications manual to prevent technological crises becoming communications crises.

123. Mr. VALLIM GUERREIRO (Brazil) recalled that his country was party to the six international conventions in the area of nuclear safety and security of which the Agency was the depositary. It had expressed to the Director General its political commitment to the Agency's Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources, which supplemented the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.

124. The Ibero-American Radiation Safety Network, developed within the framework of the Ibero-American Forum of Radiological and Nuclear Regulatory Agencies, was an efficient instrument which contributed to enhancing nuclear safety in the region. In 2007, version 1.0 of the network, hosted and operated by Brazil, had become fully operational. Brazil was participating actively in the implementation by the Forum of two important projects related to radiotherapy: on probabilistic safety assessment and safety recommendations.

125. While his country recognized the need for the Secretariat to improve safety standards constantly, they should not be modified too often. The accurate application of safety standards depended on operators' knowledge and awareness of them and frequent changes could hamper assimilation. He therefore welcomed reference in paragraphs 19 of document GOV/2007/25 to the importance of maintaining stability in international standards and to the process to be applied in justifying changes to the Basic Safety Standards.

126. A SEDO pilot mission to the uranium fuel fabrication facilities of Brazilian Nuclear Industries had taken place in April and May 2007. The results of that mission had proved beneficial both for Brazil and the Agency in identifying and prioritizing safety improvements in facilities of that type.

127. Brazil supported the Agency's activities related to strengthening radiation protection of patients, workers, the public and the environment and participated actively in several projects in that area developed under the technical cooperation programme.

128. His country shared the Agency's view that the RaSSIA programme was improving Member States' understanding of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, leaving them better equipped to take effective measures under their own control in order to achieve compliance with the latest international standards and guidance. He welcomed the positive results of the RaSSIA mission to Brazil in November 2006.

129. Brazil supported the Agency's efforts related to the development and release of the Regulatory Authority Information System, despite the fact that Brazil had developed its own compatible system for the control of radioactive sources.

130. His country had participated in the open-ended meeting of technical and legal experts held in Vienna from 25 to 29 June 2007, on sharing of information on States' implementation of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. That meeting had provided an opportunity for fruitful exchange of information and the Agency should hold similar meetings on a triennial basis.

131. In October 2007, to mark the twentieth anniversary of the Goiânia accident, Brazil would be holding an international workshop on remediation strategies and long-term management of radioactive waste after accidental releases into the environment.

132. His country had often stressed the need for the Agency to develop specific standards related to nuclear fuel cycle facilities and it therefore welcomed the draft safety requirements contained in document GOV/2007/35. Bearing in mind the broad range of installations and operations covered, it was important for the draft requirements to be applied in a graded manner to ensure that the safety of each facility was adequate throughout its lifetime. Due consideration also needed to be given to chemical and industrial hazards. Though the decision as to how the draft requirements would be applied rested with individual Member States, it was essential that safety review programmes be conducted with a view to harmonizing the safety standards proposed in the document.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.