

IAEA Board of Governors

Record of the 1198<sup>th</sup> Meeting  
GOV/OR.1198

Nuclear Verification: (c) Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran

# Board of Governors

**GOV/OR.1198**

Issued: January 2008

**Restricted Distribution**

Original: English

---

**For official use only**

## Record of the 1198<sup>th</sup> Meeting

*Held at Headquarters, Vienna, on Thursday, 22 November 2007, at 3.15 p.m.*

### Contents

Item of the agenda <sup>1</sup>	Paragraphs
4 Nuclear verification	1–138
(c) Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran	

---

<sup>1</sup> GOV/2007/68.



## Attendance

(The list below gives the name of the senior member of each delegation who attended the meeting, as well as that of any other member whose statement is summarized in this record.)

Mr. SKOKNIC	Chairman (Chile)
Mr. HOXHA	Albania
Ms. FEROUKHI	Algeria
Mr. CURIA	Argentina
Mr. SHANNON	Australia
Ms. GÖSTL	Austria
Mr. BAZOBERRY	Bolivia
Mr. FAGUNDES DO NASCIMENTO	Brazil
Ms. GERVAIS-VIDRICAIRE	Canada
Mr. LAGOS KOLLER	Chile
Mr. TANG Guoqiang	China
Mr. HORVATIĆ	Croatia
Mr. MOREJÓN-ALMEIDA	Ecuador
Ms. SINEGIORGIS	Ethiopia
Ms. KAUPPI	Finland
Mr. DENIAU	France
Mr. GOTTWALD	Germany
Mr. BAAH-DUODU	Ghana
Mr. SHARMA	India
Mr. AQRAWI	Iraq
Mr. CONLON	Ireland
Mr. DE CEGLIE	Italy
Mr. AMANO	Japan
Mr. DAINIUS	Lithuania
Mr. DÍAZ	Mexico
Mr. ABDERRAHIM	Morocco
Mr. OSAISAI	Nigeria
Mr. SHAHBAZ	Pakistan
Mr. MONTEALEGRE	Philippines
Mr. BERDENNIKOV	Russian Federation
Mr. AL-SUWAYIEL	Saudi Arabia
Mr. MINTY	South Africa
Mr. STEINMANN	Switzerland
Mr. PANUPONG	Thailand
Mr. SMITH	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Mr. SCHULTE	United States of America
Mr. ELBARADEI	Director General
Mr. ANING	Secretary of the Board

**Representatives of the following Member States also attended the meeting:**

Afghanistan, Angola, Armenia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Colombia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

**Abbreviations used in this record:**

DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
LEU	low-enriched uranium
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NWFZ	nuclear-weapon-free zone
R&D	research and development

\* Speakers under Rule 50 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure are indicated by an asterisk.

## 4. Nuclear Verification

### (c) Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (GOV/2007/58)

1. The CHAIRMAN, drawing attention to the Director General's report contained in document GOV/2007/58, said that it had been the subject of an informal technical briefing which had taken place on 16 November 2007.
2. Ms. GOICOCHEA ESTENOZ (Cuba)\*, speaking on behalf of NAM, said that its position regarding the Iranian nuclear issue was reflected in the statement adopted at its 14th summit, held in Havana, Cuba, on 15–16 September 2006.<sup>2</sup>
3. NAM welcomed the efforts being made by Iran and the Secretariat in the implementation of the work plan contained in document INFCIRC/711. Those steps would facilitate negotiations between Iran and the concerned parties aimed at a peaceful settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue.
4. In that regard, NAM was pleased to note that the report contained in document GOV/2007/58 established, inter alia, that under the work plan the Agency had been able to conclude that answers provided by Iran on the declared past P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programmes were consistent with its findings and also that Iran had provided sufficient access to individuals and had responded in a timely manner to questions and provided clarifications and amplifications on issues raised in the context of the work plan. In addition, on 8 November 2007 at the request of the Agency, Iran had provided the Agency with a copy of the 15-page document on uranium metal. NAM welcomed that substantive progress and was optimistic that the remaining questions would be resolved with the proactive cooperation of Iran with the Agency.
5. NAM welcomed the conclusion of the Facility Attachment for the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz, which had entered into force on 30 September 2007, and hoped that it would facilitate comprehensive safeguards verification by the Agency at that facility.
6. NAM noted that, in his report, the Director General stated once again that the Agency had been able to verify the non-diversion of declared material in Iran, that Iran had provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material and that it had provided the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material and activities.
7. Also, NAM noted that the Agency had found no indications of ongoing reprocessing activities.
8. She expressed NAM's full confidence in the impartiality and professionalism of the Secretariat and the Director General, and said it was strongly opposed to any undue pressuring of the Agency and interference in its activities, especially its verification activities, as that might jeopardize its efficiency and credibility. In particular, NAM fully supported the recent steps taken by the Director General to resolve the outstanding issues on Iran.

<sup>2</sup> See GOV/OR.1187, para. 53.

9. NAM recalled Article VII.F of the Agency's Statute which, inter alia, stipulated that "Each member undertakes to respect the international character of the responsibilities of the Director General and the staff and shall not seek to influence them in the discharge of their duties."

10. Finally, NAM encouraged all Member States to contribute positively to the path of diplomacy and dialogue, which was the only way to achieve a long-term solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. All concerned parties should avoid taking any measures which put at risk the constructive process between Iran and the Agency.

11. Mr. DUARTE (Portugal)\*, speaking on behalf of the European Union, said that the candidate countries Croatia, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey, the countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia, the EFTA country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area, as well as the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, associated themselves with the statement he was about to make.

12. The European Union was grateful to the Director General and the Secretariat for their continuing professional and impartial efforts in implementing verification activities in Iran and in trying to resolve the long-outstanding issues relating to the nature and history of Iran's nuclear programme as reflected in the report contained in document GOV/2007/58.

13. The European Union had welcomed the agreement of August 2007 between Iran and the Agency aimed at resolving all questions concerning Iran's past nuclear activities and noted that full and timely implementation by Iran of the Agency's work plan, as interpreted by the Director General, would constitute a significant step forward.

14. The European Union welcomed the progress described in the Director General's report which had been achieved in the implementation of the first elements of the work plan. The understanding reached by the Agency concerning the consistency of its findings about past aspects of the P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programme with Iranian declarations was a step in the right direction. The European Union also took note of the handing over by Iran of a copy of the long-requested document on casting of uranium metal into hemispheres. The European Union supported the Secretariat's efforts to continue to seek corroboration and to continue to verify the completeness of Iran's declarations.

15. The European Union was concerned about several other issues, including the source of the uranium particle contamination found at the Tehran Technical University and the role of the Physics Research Centre, as well as those which, according to the Agency, could have a possible military dimension, such as polonium experiments, alleged studies on green salt, high explosives and a missile re-entry vehicle. It urged Iran to provide clear and comprehensive answers to the Agency's questions in the coming weeks.

16. While welcoming the fact that Iran had provided some additional information to the Agency and had cooperated with the Agency in the implementation of the work plan, the European Union regretted that, as stated in the Director General's report, Iran's cooperation had been reactive rather than proactive. It fully supported the Director General's call on Iran for active cooperation and full transparency.

17. Reaffirming its support for Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007), the European Union noted with growing concern that Iran continued to disregard the mandatory demands of the Security Council aimed at building confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. As stated in the report, Iran had continued to expand its enrichment related activities by completing the installation of 18 cascades of 164 P-1 centrifuges and by feeding them with UF<sub>6</sub>, by pursuing R&D activities related to a "new generation of centrifuge design" and

construction activities at the Arak site. The European Union urged Iran to heed the Director General's call to implement the measures decided by the Security Council, particularly the suspension of all enrichment related activities, including R&D.

18. The European Union noted with concern that Iran had not reconsidered its decision unilaterally to suspend implementation of the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1. Iran could not unilaterally modify the Subsidiary Arrangements of its safeguards agreement and the European Union supported the Agency's request to Iran to resume implementation of the modified Code 3.1 in order for the Agency to be in a position to carry out verification at an early stage.

19. The European Union was concerned that, as stated by the Director General, the Agency's knowledge about Iran's current nuclear programme was diminishing. The European Union expressed its concern at the Secretariat's assessment that, in the absence of the full implementation of the additional protocol, the Agency was not in a position to provide credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, and that confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme could only be built through the implementation of the additional protocol and full cooperation and transparency by Iran. The European Union urged Iran to ratify the additional protocol and, pending ratification, to apply the measures of that protocol and, in addition, to implement other transparency and confidence-building measures, as requested by the Agency.

20. The European Union welcomed the statement on Iran made by the six Foreign Ministers with the support of the High Representative of the European Union on 28 September 2007 and underlined that, in resolutions 1737 and 1747, the Security Council had expressed its intention to adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, should Iran continue in its failure to suspend enrichment related activities. The European Union reaffirmed its support for the Security Council process as consistently emphasized by the European Union Council.

21. The European Union reaffirmed its continued support for efforts to find a negotiated long-term solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and its commitment to the comprehensive package proposed to Iran in 2006 which, among many elements, reaffirmed Iran's right to develop nuclear energy in conformity with its obligations under the NPT and included active support for building new light water power reactors using state-of-the-art technology. In his repeated contacts with Iran, the European Union High Representative had underlined and continued to stress those positive elements. The European Union thanked the High Representative for his continuing diplomatic efforts and looked forward to his forthcoming report. It therefore once again urged Iran to open the way for negotiations by implementing the measures required by the Security Council.

22. Mr. HOXHA (Albania) said that his country had full confidence in the Agency's handling of the Iranian nuclear issue and supported its efforts to resolve it.

23. The Director General's report clearly demonstrated how right the international community had been to treat Iran's nuclear programme very seriously. Once past nuclear activities had been clarified, Iran must continue to build confidence about the scope and nature of its current nuclear activities.

24. While resolving outstanding issues on the scope and nature of Iran's past nuclear activities was a major step towards reaching a politically negotiated solution, further steps were needed, including ratification and implementation of the additional protocol, as called for by the Security Council and the Board of Governors.

25. The Security Council had twice unanimously called on Iran to suspend sensitive nuclear activities, such as its enrichment activities and the building of a heavy water reactor. It was regrettable that the Director General had had to conclude yet again that those demands had not been met. Albania was seriously concerned that, contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, Iran had not suspended



its enrichment related activities, and that it had continued with the operation of the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and with the construction and operation of the Fuel Enrichment Plant. A halt in sensitive activities would greatly facilitate ongoing diplomatic efforts.

26. As stated in paragraph 43 of the Director General's report, confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme required that the Agency be able to provide assurances not only regarding declared nuclear material but, equally importantly, regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, through the implementation of the additional protocol and transparency measures. Like other delegations, Albania urged Iran to implement fully the provisions of its comprehensive safeguards agreement, to ratify and implement the additional protocol and to provide the Agency with all the information and cooperation it requested.

27. He urged Iran to respond to the long-standing requests related to the scope and history of its enrichment programme in a comprehensive and transparent manner so that the work plan could be implemented in full and without delay, providing answers to the Secretariat's questions on all the outstanding issues.

28. Iran must now live up to the requirements of the international community. It should offer full, unreserved, transparent and continued proactive cooperation to convince the world of the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.

29. Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) noted with appreciation the objectivity of the Director General's report on the Agency's efforts to implement the work plan on outstanding issues and other matters related to the implementation of the safeguards agreement. He also noted Iran's cooperation with the Agency in that regard. The positive progress confirmed that the Director General's approach was correct and the Russian Federation fully supported his work in that regard. It was important that all concerned Member States did their utmost to support efforts to seek resolution of the Iran nuclear issue by peaceful means.

30. The report's conclusions that the information provided by Iran on its past P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programmes was consistent with the Agency's findings were an important component of progress towards resolving the outstanding issues on the Iranian nuclear programme. In that context, the Russian Federation noted also that Iran had provided the Agency with a copy of the uranium metal document. In some cases, the work plan was even being implemented ahead of schedule. His delegation expected that it would continue to be implemented in a constructive and cooperative spirit, showing initiative. Ongoing implementation of the agreements between Iran and the Agency was required, and an expansion of the Agency's verification activities in Iran.

31. The Russian Federation endorsed the Director General's call on Iran to resume application of the additional protocol as soon as possible and to implement the confidence-building measures requested in the relevant Security Council and Board of Governors resolutions, including suspension of all enrichment related activities. That decision was justified because it did not make good economic sense to establish indigenous and expensive nuclear fuel cycle capabilities in States, like Iran, with a low nuclear power plant capacity. Proposals were being examined to establish international cooperation regarding uranium enrichment services on mutually beneficial and economically sound terms, for example within the framework of the International Uranium Enrichment Centre in Angarsk. The Russian Federation hoped that Iran would consider carefully the options for meeting its own nuclear fuel cycle production needs and make a balanced and logical decision.

32. Ms. GERVAIS-VIDRICAIRE (Canada) said that while full and timely implementation of the work plan would be one important step towards providing the necessary assurances that Iran's nuclear programme was entirely peaceful in nature, Iran must go further in order to establish international confidence. For more than two decades, Iran had misled the Board and the international community

with false and incomplete declarations. It was that behaviour, as much or more than the past outstanding issues, that was at the heart of Iran's credibility deficit.

33. The Director General had noted in his report that he was still not in a position to provide credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. Such assurances would require Iran to implement its additional protocol fully. In the report, the Director General urged Iran to implement all the confidence-building measures required by resolutions of the Board and of the Security Council, including the suspension of enrichment activities. Canada strongly supported those calls.

34. Canada remained deeply concerned about the Iran issue, which was further exacerbated by Iran's grudging cooperation with Agency inspectors, its failure to implement confidence-building measures and, as noted in the report, the "diminishing" knowledge of Iran's current nuclear programme.

35. Her country continued to view the work plan as a step in the right direction. The report noted some progress with regard to that plan. In particular, Iran had provided some of the additional information required by the Agency on the past P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programmes and had also provided a copy of the document related to the machining and casting of metal hemispheres.

36. Nevertheless, the level of transparency had been insufficient and Canada was disappointed with Iran's "reactive" rather than "proactive" cooperation with the Agency. Her country was deeply concerned that the Agency's knowledge was dwindling as a result of Iran's decision not to implement the additional protocol. As the report stated, the Agency continued to seek corroboration and to verify the completeness of Iranian declarations, including with respect to the past P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programmes. The report noted that outstanding issues such as the contamination at the technical university could have implications for the ongoing investigation in that regard.

37. Agency inspectors were now approaching more complicated and possibly more interconnected issues in the work plan. Only through proactive cooperation and full transparency would Iran be able to resolve the outstanding issues within the specified time frame. Some of those issues had been outstanding for several years, with little or no real effort to resolve them on the part of Iran. As the Director General had said in the past, full cooperation was overdue. Outstanding issues included determination of the source of the contamination at the technical university, understanding of Iran's uranium re-conversion programme and clarification concerning the alleged studies.

38. The report had come at a critical stage. The statement of the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, China, the Russian Federation and the United States of America had concluded that those countries would pursue a third Security Council resolution regarding sanctions unless the reports of both the Director General and the European Union High Representative showed positive outcomes. Accordingly, her delegation urged Iran to cooperate fully with the Agency to fulfil the requirements of the work plan in a timely fashion and to comply with Security Council resolutions 1696, 1737 and 1747 by suspending all enrichment activities and implementing its additional protocol. It also urged Iran to pursue the June 2006 'suspension for suspension' offer of the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany as a means of working towards a negotiated diplomatic solution.

39. She asked that, until such a time as the Board determined that confidence had been restored, the Director General continue to report on what was still a special verification case of international concern. She also requested that the report contained in document GOV/2007/58 be made public.

40. Mr. DENIAU (France), speaking on behalf of his own country, Germany and the United Kingdom, said that since the Board's September meetings the efforts of those three countries, either

bilaterally or with their United States, Chinese and Russian partners with the support of the European Union High Representative, Mr. Solana, had not dwindled. At the request of the Foreign Ministers of the six countries and pursuant to the declaration adopted by them on 28 September 2007 in New York, Mr. Solana had met Iranian negotiators in Rome on 23 October 2007. He had reiterated the offer made in 2006 by the six countries, with the support of the European Union, concerning political and commercial cooperation and civil nuclear cooperation. He had proposed a diplomatic process comprising a double freeze, then a short pause of some sort, quickly followed by a double suspension. Specifically the proposal was that, on the one hand, Iran would suspend its enrichment activities and, on the other, the Security Council would suspend its sanctions, with a view to engaging in negotiations. If Iran wanted, those negotiations could be of a limited duration. However, Iran had shown no inclination to accept the proposal, making it very difficult to set a date for another meeting. Notwithstanding the lack of progress, France, Germany and the United Kingdom thanked Mr. Solana for his diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the crisis.

41. The Agency had asked Iran for a full confession as regards the history, scope and purpose of its clandestine nuclear programme, which had been conducted in violation of its international obligations and its safeguards agreement and in association with networks that had contributed to the development of military nuclear programmes in several other countries. It had been almost six months since Iran had made a commitment to resolve the outstanding issues. While Iran had supplied additional information to the Agency on centrifuge related issues and had made some steps in the right direction to implement the work plan, it was disappointing that its cooperation had been partial and reactive. The Director General's report stated that Iran had received items destined for Libya, which had itself had a military nuclear programme. That was not reassuring. He called on Iran to improve its cooperation and to respond in the next few weeks to all the outstanding questions. A time limit should be set for the process with a view to achieving results. He thanked the Director General and his team for their continued and impartial efforts, which were essential in order to clarify the outstanding issues, verify facilities under safeguards and determine the nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

42. The present and the future were more important than the past. Immediate suspension by Iran of any nuclear activities posing a proliferation risk was essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. However, in violation of Security Council resolutions and Board requests, Iran was continuing enrichment and other sensitive nuclear activities. It now had 3000 centrifuges fed with UF<sub>6</sub> in the underground facility at Natanz, where no cascades had been installed at the beginning of the year. It was estimated that this number of centrifuges working at optimal capacity could theoretically produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon in one year. That did not even take into account the LEU in Iran's possession, the quantity of which would only be known upon completion of the physical inventory verification. The Director General's report also included the worrying statement that Iran was carrying out tests of a new generation centrifuge design.

43. Under those circumstances, it was unacceptable that the Agency's knowledge on Iran was diminishing and that Iran refused to comply with the Board's requests and the Security Council resolutions. He called on Iran to uphold its commitments, suspend its sensitive activities and implement the additional protocol and the transparency measures as requested by the Agency and Security Council. In that context, it was particularly important that the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1, remain in force and be fully implemented. The Secretariat should ask Iran to confirm that it had no project that should already be covered by Code 3.1, that is whose construction had already been decided.

44. It had been more than four years since the Board had unanimously requested Iran to suspend its sensitive nuclear activities and cooperate fully with the Agency. Despite Iran's recent efforts to cooperate, the net result was a decrease in the Agency's knowledge about its programme.

45. France, Germany and the United Kingdom were in favour of a negotiated solution, but a policy of wait and see was not an option. The conclusions had to be taken to the Security Council. On 15 October 2007, the three countries had declared that they would look into additional measures that could be taken by the European Union to support the process at the United Nations and the objectives shared by the international community.
46. Mr. STEINMANN (Switzerland) took note of the latest report by the Director General and said it was important to clarify past events in the Iran dossier as that would help to manage it better in the present and future.
47. He commended the Agency's efforts, which afforded the international community a better understanding of certain aspects of the Iranian nuclear programme. The Agency, however, had still not been able to close the dossier on P-1 and P-2 centrifuges within the timescale set under the work plan. Switzerland called on Iran to be more proactive in that regard so that the centrifuge issue could be settled once and for all during the discussions planned with the Agency for December.
48. Continuation of the current process between Iran and the Agency should be encouraged. With a view to helping Member States to follow the process, Switzerland requested the Secretariat to supply a document giving the dates when the other outstanding issues would be dealt with and closed.
49. Switzerland noted the Agency's concern over its diminishing knowledge of Iran's current nuclear programme. It was thus important that Iran implement the additional protocol prior to its ratification and other confidence-building measures.
50. Mr. DÍAZ (Mexico) welcomed the signs reported in document GOV/2007/58 that the Government of Iran had been cooperative and open with the Agency, which had allowed the Agency to conclude that the recent information provided by Iran was consistent with its own findings.
51. He noted that, in accordance with the work plan agreed between Iran and the Agency, the Iranian authorities would have to provide additional information and grant the Agency access to dispel doubts over the nature and scope of its nuclear programme. Mexico urged Iran to cooperate actively in the full and speedy implementation of the work plan and to take the necessary measures to resolve all outstanding issues in a transparent and expeditious manner. With a view to creating an atmosphere conducive to negotiation, Mexico reiterated the Board's request for Iran to renew its suspension of uranium enrichment related activities as a confidence-building measure and to implement the provisions of the additional protocol.
52. Mexico had always assigned high priority to disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and believed that a world free of the threat of nuclear weapons could be achieved only through universal application of the provisions of the NPT. He underlined that all countries, including developing countries, had the right to the development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes to benefit their people.
53. Mr. MOREJÓN-ALMEIDA (Ecuador) expressed optimism about the progress achieved thus far on the work plan agreed between Iran and the Agency, which provided an opportunity to clear up existing doubts about the Iranian nuclear programme and contribute to rebuilding international confidence. His delegation was pleased to read that the Agency had been able to confirm that Iran had not diverted its declared nuclear material and had provided the access to individuals and additional information which was required to resolve a number of outstanding issues. It hoped that Iran would continue to cooperate in a proactive rather than a reactive manner.
54. Ecuador had an uncompromising commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation. That commitment was confirmed by the fact that it belonged to the first densely populated NWFZ and also by its position in all international forums of rejecting any nuclear programme for non-peaceful

purposes. It had always defended the inalienable right of all countries to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, as long as they were in compliance with their obligations under the NPT and other relevant international instruments.

55. He emphasized the importance of multilateral efforts and diplomatic dialogue to find a consensual and timely solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and underlined the need for Iran to comply with its binding obligations. Ecuador called on Iran to reinforce its commitment to peace and dialogue through compliance with the resolutions of the Board and the Security Council. That would help to build a climate of transparency and confidence, dispelling the doubts that its nuclear programme had raised.

56. Ecuador urged all the countries involved to give the Agency time to resolve the issue under the work plan. Further, Ecuador was confident that, through the exercise of patience and perseverance and by taking a diplomacy-based approach aimed at frank, open and transparent dialogue, an integral solution could be reached. The situation could not go on indefinitely.

57. Mr. LAGOS KOLLER (Chile) took note of both the progress made in implementation of the work plan and Iran's collaboration in responding to the Agency's queries and providing access to specific individuals. Chile hoped that those steps, although regrettably still insufficient, would be followed by confidence-building measures to dispel doubts over the nature and scope of Iran's current nuclear programme.

58. It was worrying that the Agency's knowledge of Iran's programme had diminished and Chile hoped that the situation could be reversed through adoption by Iran of the required measures. Those must include implementation of the additional protocol and suspension of all enrichment related activities in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions.

59. Chile called for balanced consideration of the Director General's report, viewing positively those aspects that enabled progress on the work plan but also insisting on broader collaboration by Iran with the Agency. Chile hoped that in his next report the Director General would be able to state that Iran had displayed a proactive attitude and that more significant progress had been made in implementation of the plan.

60. The frustration expressed by some delegations expecting more progress in the process was understandable. Chile voiced its confidence in the perseverance and professionalism of the Secretariat and its Director General, which had led to some development of an otherwise stagnant issue. It was important to exercise prudence and not jump to premature conclusions as that would not facilitate the delicate work of the Agency in achieving the common objective of finding a solution that was peaceful, lasting and satisfactory to all.

61. Mr. TANG Guoqiang (China) noted that the Agency and Iran had made some progress in their efforts to address outstanding issues and that Iran had cooperated with the Agency. However, Iran had not suspended its uranium enrichment related activities as required by the relevant Security Council resolutions.

62. Peaceful resolution of the issue through diplomatic negotiation remained the best option and was in the interests of all parties. Although the diplomatic process had encountered some difficulties, the door had not closed on negotiations. The international community should continue in the same direction, which was conducive to preserving the effectiveness of the international non-proliferation regime and international peace and stability both in the Middle East and globally.

63. The international community should support the Agency and Iran in making rapid progress on the outstanding issues. Addressing those issues would contribute to clarifying Iran's nuclear programme and rebuilding confidence in that regard. China noted that the issue of the plutonium

experiments had been resolved and that Iran's answers on its P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programmes were consistent with the Agency's findings.

64. The dialogue between the European Union and Iran was an important component of the international community's diplomatic efforts. China supported continued diplomatic contact between the two sides with a view to understanding each other's concerns, clarifying outstanding issues and facilitating resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue. China hoped that further meetings would take place as early as possible and yield results.

65. Iran should implement in real earnest the resolutions of the Board and the Security Council. China hoped to see Iran not only continue to provide the Agency with proactive cooperation in comprehensively addressing outstanding issues, but also show flexibility in suspending its enrichment related activities so as to create conditions for the resumption of negotiations towards a diplomatic solution.

66. China had always been committed to preserving the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and opposed to the spread of nuclear weapons. It had worked with various parties through a variety of channels to promote a negotiated peaceful settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue. Recently China's Foreign Minister, Yang Jiechi, had visited Iran to encourage increased cooperation with the Agency and progress in its dialogue with the European Union. China called on all the parties concerned to remain patient, continue their diplomatic efforts and show flexibility in seeking a long-term, comprehensive and proper solution to the issue.

67. Mr. AMANO (Japan) welcomed the Director General's report contained in document GOV/2007/58 and the progress that had been made in implementation of the work plan agreed between the Agency and Iran in August 2007. Japan called upon Iran to provide proactive cooperation to the Secretariat in implementing that work plan and expected that the Secretariat would continue to do its utmost to resolve outstanding issues from a technical perspective. However, implementation of the work plan and resolution of outstanding issues were not sufficient in themselves to restore the international community's confidence.

68. Iran, in violation of Security Council resolutions 1737 and 1747, was continuing to conduct enrichment related activities and work on heavy water related projects. It was a matter of serious concern that Iran was expanding its enrichment related activities through its work at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant. Moreover, Iran had unilaterally suspended its implementation of the modified Code 3.1 and had not provided the Agency with proactive cooperation. It had also suspended its voluntary implementation of the additional protocol, the ratification of which was still outstanding. That would not help restore the international community's confidence in Iran and it would make it difficult for the Agency to progress in its investigations. To restore that confidence and exercise its indisputable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, Iran must suspend its enrichment related activities and its work on heavy water related projects. Furthermore, it should implement and ratify the additional protocol and undertake other transparency measures, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the Board and the Security Council. Security Council resolutions 1737 and 1747, adopted by consensus, clearly stated that the Security Council would adopt further appropriate measures if necessary.

69. Japan believed that the issue could and should be resolved through diplomacy and appreciated the efforts being made to achieve a diplomatic solution. It urged Iran to comply with all relevant resolutions and return promptly to the negotiation process based on the comprehensive package proposed by France, Germany, the United Kingdom, China, Russia and the United States in June 2006. The international community needed to send a unanimous and clear message to Iran.

70. Mr. CURIA (Argentina) expressed recognition for the professional work being carried out on the Iranian nuclear issue by the Secretariat and the Director General and the efforts towards reaching a negotiated multilateral solution.

71. Argentina supported the work plan agreed between the Secretariat and Iran on 21 August 2007 and noted the progress made thus far. The Agency needed to continue working to reconstruct the history of Iran's nuclear programme over the preceding 20 years in order to restore the international community's confidence in its peaceful nature. It was therefore essential for Iran to provide maximum cooperation and transparency. Iran should comply with the requirements of the Board and the Security Council and be proactive in building confidence so that the work plan could be implemented in full and without delay.

72. Mr. SHARMA (India) expressed appreciation for the Secretariat's sincere endeavours to work together with the Iranian authorities to carry forward the process laid out in the agreed work plan. The Director General's report provided a hopeful account of progress made in that regard.

73. India believed that the Iranian nuclear issue could and should be resolved through peaceful diplomacy and that the Agency provided the international community with the best forum to address technical aspects related to that issue. While there were grounds for cautious optimism for eliciting further fruitful cooperation in addressing the outstanding questions, it was important that the concerns mentioned in the report over the Agency's diminishing knowledge be addressed.

74. Amongst other things, the report gave an insight into the activities of the international nuclear supply network, which appeared to be still active, even in the face of international alarm. The Agency should provide a full and transparent picture of that supply network to the international community and of actions to stop it.

75. Ms. FEROUKHI (Algeria), noting the report contained in document GOV/2007/58, underlined that cooperation between Iran and the Agency under the agreed work plan had led to concrete results on the following issues: the Agency had concluded that its information and that provided by Iran on its P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programme were consistent; Iran had provided access to individuals and replies and clarifications to the Agency's questions; and, Iran had provided the Agency with a 15-page document on uranium metal. She expected that, by the end of 2008, Iran would provide further information requested of it to resolve matters still outstanding.

76. It was important to note that the Agency had been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear materials and the absence of reprocessing activities in Iran. In addition, the conclusion of a Facility Attachment for the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz would facilitate the Agency's verification role in respect of that plant.

77. Her delegation urged Iran to cooperate actively with the Agency to restore confidence, given that the Director General's report stated that no assurance could be provided concerning the absence of undeclared activities or activities of a military nature.

78. Algeria was in favour resolving the issue of the Iranian nuclear dossier through dialogue and negotiation, which would contribute to consolidating the cooperation process under way under Agency auspices.

79. As the Chairman had said earlier in the day<sup>3</sup>, General Assembly resolution A/RES/62/2 on the Agency's Annual Report for 2006 had been adopted unanimously. The large number of sponsors for the resolution, including Algeria, bore witness to the widespread support for the Agency as an

---

<sup>3</sup> See GOV/OR.1197, para. 6.

independent body mandated to undertake verification activities and promote the safe use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In her capacity as President of the Council of Arab Ambassadors to Vienna, she expressed confidence in the professionalism and impartiality of the Secretariat and the Director General.

80. Mr. FAGUNDES DO NASCIMENTO (Brazil), noting that the report contained in document GOV/2007/58 was informative and comprehensive, commended the Director General and his staff for their efforts. Brazil urged them to continue their work with a view to implementing the work plan agreed between the Secretariat and the Islamic Republic of Iran within the agreed time frame. Brazil also urged Iran to cooperate fully with the Agency and adopt all possible transparency measures in order to restore the international community's confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. That could only be achieved by increasing the Agency's knowledge of Iran's current nuclear activities. Brazil supported the pursuit of negotiation and dialogue as the only avenue available to the international community.

81. Mr. SCHULTE (United States of America) commended the Secretariat for its thorough and professional efforts to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. He recalled that the Security Council had twice adopted resolutions under Chapter VII, Article 41 of the United Nations Charter imposing sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran.

82. In September 2007, when the Secretariat had presented the Board with a plan to address Iran's outstanding verification issues, he had expressed both hope and scepticism. The United States had hoped that it would mark a turning point in Iran's relationship with the Agency and that Iran's leadership would make the strategic decision to engage proactively with the Agency in the execution of its safeguards mandate to verify the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. It had also been sceptical, remembering how many times Iran had pledged to provide the Agency with the full, necessary transparency and cooperation but had failed to do so. Citing just one such example he said that, in November 2003, the Board had adopted the resolution contained in document GOV/2003/81 acknowledging Iran's intention to provide a full picture of its nuclear activities and its decision to implement a policy of cooperation and full transparency. Less than a year later, the Board had been faced with a report by the Director General indicating Iran's refusal to answer all of the Agency's questions and to cooperate fully with its investigation. As before, that promise of full cooperation made under international pressure had been only selectively fulfilled once the pressure was relaxed.

83. Having read the Director General's report, the Board could only be disappointed in Iran's incomplete cooperation. While some cooperation had been provided and some clarifications made, several areas remained unresolved and Iran's overall cooperation had been selective. Among other things, Iran had failed to provide access to or information on its work with advanced centrifuge designs; closure had not been achieved on issues associated with the Physics Research Centre at Lavizan; the Agency was unable to confirm Iran's version of events with regard to the 1993 offer of additional assistance with its centrifuge pursuits; and, Iran had refused to acknowledge its continuing obligation to provide early declaration of any intent to construct new nuclear facilities or modify existing ones, as required by Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its safeguards agreement, which had direct relevance to the concern that Iran might seek to develop new nuclear facilities without adequate and timely declaration to the Agency.

84. The Director General had reported that Iran had failed to suspend its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, as required by the Security Council, and to implement the additional protocol. Despite four years of intensive investigations and the launch of the work plan four months previously, the Agency remained unable to confirm the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran. Most



disturbingly, the Agency had stated that, as a direct result of Iran's failure to implement its additional protocol, its knowledge of Iran's nuclear programme was diminishing.

85. His delegation had always said that Iran should be judged by its actions, not by its words. The Iranian leadership said it wanted to resolve the outstanding questions and restore confidence in its nuclear programme, but a government determined to do so would have been proactive in providing information to Agency inspectors, giving them immediate access to all its files, to all the people involved in the programme and to all the relevant facilities. It would not have made distinctions between past and present activities.

86. Instead, Iran's approach to explaining the past had been reactive, and the Secretariat's understanding of Iran's current programme continued to diminish. The Director General remained unable to resolve questions regarding the intent of Iran's nuclear programme, including whether it was for exclusively peaceful purposes. In particular, the Agency remained unable to draw any conclusions as to the original underlying nature of parts of Iran's nuclear programme, including its centrifuge work. Moreover, the Agency was not in a position to assure the Board that Iran's declarations were correct and complete.

87. Under international pressure, Iran had shed more light on its activities in the 1980s and 1990s, but the Agency knew less and less about its current activities, other than the fact that it was expanding its capacity for uranium enrichment in violation of Security Council resolutions. That situation did not constitute full disclosure. The latest report stated that Iran had promised future transparency "in the next few weeks", but the United States feared that the next few weeks would yield little more than the last few months or the last five years. Iran's consistent policy of selective cooperation and delaying tactics suggested that it meant only to distract the world from its continued development, in violation of Security Council resolutions, of fissile material production capabilities, from uranium enrichment to the production of plutonium.

88. Security Council resolution 1747 (2007) had established the Council's intent to adopt additional measures should Iran fail to comply with its demands. Such measures had been delayed pending reports in November 2007 from the Director General and the High Representative of the European Union, Javier Solana. It had been agreed by the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States that, in the absence of reports of positive outcomes from both, a third sanctions resolution would be tabled in the Security Council. Specifically, Iran had needed to implement its additional protocol, resolve all outstanding issues about its centrifuge programme and suspend its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities in order to avoid such action. The Director General's report clearly stated that Iran had failed to meet those conditions.

89. The Security Council process was designed to persuade Iran to negotiate on the basis of the generous six-country offer of June 2006, which promised Iran significant technical assistance, economic advantages and an end to its increasing isolation. The offer remained on the table.

90. Despite continued disappointments, he expressed his country's hope that Iran's leaders would finally decide to make a full disclosure concerning Iran's past and present nuclear activities. He urged Iran to heed the Director General's call to implement its additional protocol and suspend enrichment related activities. He urged it to take advantage of the opportunity to resolve all outstanding issues with the Agency, to build confidence its nuclear programme through suspension, and to enter into negotiations aimed at a political settlement. Only in that way could the interests of the Iranian people be satisfied and the serious concerns of the international community be fully addressed.

91. Mr. ABDERRAHIM (Morocco) expressed satisfaction at the progress made in implementing the work plan agreed between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Agency, which he saw as an important confidence-building measure with respect to the Iranian nuclear programme. That said, he

encouraged Iran to comply with all the necessary conditions to bring the process to a rapid and peaceful conclusion, taking into account the need to maintain and strengthen the credibility of the non-proliferation regime. Morocco urged Iran to cooperate with the Agency. The only way to resolve the issue was through diplomacy and through strict respect by Iran for the decisions of the Security Council and commitments made to the Agency.

92. Mr. MONTEALEGRE (Philippines), underlining the basic and inalienable right of all Member States to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, welcomed the progress described in the Director General's report. His delegation encouraged continued cooperation between Iran and the Agency to clarify outstanding issues.

93. The Director General had concluded that the Agency had been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. However, since early 2006, it had not received the type of information that Iran had previously been providing under its additional protocol and as a transparency measure. The Philippines therefore urged Iran to ratify its additional protocol, provide the necessary transparency requested by the Director General and comply with the Security Council resolutions as confidence-building gestures.

94. He emphasized the importance of dialogue to find a diplomatic solution to the issue and expressed full confidence in the impartiality and professionalism of the Director General and the Secretariat.

95. Mr. MINTY (South Africa) expressed appreciation for the highly professional, objective and unbiased approach of the Director General and his staff in resolving the few outstanding issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme. Since September 2007, Iran had continued its cooperation with the Agency in accordance with the agreed work plan. The Director General's latest report noted that the Agency continued to be able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran and that Iran had provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material, also providing the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material and activities.

96. It was further encouraging that, in accordance with the time frame agreed in the work plan, Iran had concluded a Facility Attachment for the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz, which had entered into force on 30 September 2007. South Africa welcomed Iran's cooperation in providing additional supporting documentation, written amplifications and interviews with Iranian officials involved in nuclear activities in the 1980s and 1990s in relation to the centrifuge enrichment programme. The information gained would provide a better picture of Iran's past nuclear activities.

97. Iran had demonstrated its commitment to resolve outstanding issues in accordance with the work plan. South Africa welcomed Iran's cooperation with the Agency and encouraged Iran to intensify that cooperation in a proactive manner to ensure that all the issues identified were resolved. Resolving outstanding issues would contribute to building confidence in Iran's past nuclear activities. It was essential that Iran also build confidence in its present and future programme. The Agency must be able to provide assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. It was therefore important that Iran implement transparency measures extending beyond the formal requirements of its safeguards agreement and additional protocol. Given the special history of its nuclear programme, Iran must ratify and bring into force its additional protocol.

98. On 10 October 2007, the second ministerial troika of the South African-European Union Strategic Partnership had been held in South Africa, co-chaired by South Africa's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Portugal's Minister of State and Foreign Affairs. In their joint communiqué, the ministers had expressed their commitment to finding a diplomatic solution to the Iranian crisis, guided by the decisions taken by the Board of Governors and in line with relevant Security Council resolutions. They had also recalled the six-country offer of June 2006 and encouraged all parties concerned to

enter into a dialogue and negotiations in order to seek a comprehensive solution. They had supported calls for a double timeout of all enrichment related activities and of sanctions, thereby providing a window of opportunity for the resumption of negotiations. South Africa had encouraged all parties to refrain from any actions that would hinder the implementation of the understanding reached and the continuation of cooperation between the Agency and Iran.

99. The Board was fully aware of the relevant Security Council resolutions outlining certain corrective measures to be taken by Iran to address the outstanding questions related to its nuclear programme. Iran had a unique opportunity to demonstrate to the international community the truly peaceful nature of its nuclear programme through the full implementation of those measures. The innovative leadership of the Director General had placed the Agency on the right path to resolve the outstanding issues, and a last opportunity was being presented to make important progress in the coming weeks. It was important that the Agency be allowed to finalize its work in accordance with the work plan without undue interference and artificial deadlines. His delegation urged Iran to utilize the window of opportunity provided by the work plan to resolve all outstanding issues without delay, choosing the path of peace and reconciliation.

100. Mr. SHANNON (Australia) said that his country had consistently supported the Secretariat's efforts to implement safeguards and clarify outstanding verification issues in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The report contained in document GOV/2007/58 reflected much hard work on the part of the Secretariat. During the Board's discussion in September 2007, his delegation had welcomed Iran's stated willingness finally to begin clarifying the many unresolved questions arising from its past clandestine nuclear activities. His delegation had expressed the hope that that shift represented a strategic decision to offer full cooperation and transparency to the Agency, not just a tactical move to gain time or avoid further Security Council sanctions. Now, his delegation was not so sure.

101. The Agency had had some welcome, if overdue, success in obtaining further information from Iran. Nevertheless, the account of progress made under the work plan did not fulfil the hopes held in September 2007. The Agency was still seeking corroboration of Iran's answers on the P-1 and P-2 issue. The involvement of the Physics Research Centre on a former military site remained a notable exception to the Agency's ability to reconcile Iran's statements with other information, and the Agency was still not in a position to draw conclusions about the original underlying nature of parts of the programme. There remained serious concerns about possible military involvement in Iran's nuclear programme, including the fabrication of centrifuge components at military related workshops and evidence of administrative links between the Green Salt Project and studies on high-explosive testing and the design of a missile re-entry vehicle.

102. Equally troubling was the Director General's observation that Iran's cooperation had been reactive rather than proactive. The fact that the Agency had had to make repeated requests for access to documents, individuals and sites was unduly delaying and complicating its investigation. He recalled Iran's announcement in late 2003 that it would henceforth pursue a policy of active cooperation, openness and full disclosure. That had been followed up with a series of declarations which were expected to form a correct, complete and final picture of its past and present nuclear programme, but which were subsequently found to be incorrect, incomplete and subject to continuous amendment. Iran had yet to demonstrate that it had finally made a serious decision to meet the Agency's requests for active cooperation and full transparency, which would be in Iran's own interests.

103. Iran should move forward without further delay to resolve all outstanding issues in the next few weeks and provide further clarification on P-1 and P-2 issues if requested by the Agency. He requested the Director General to inform the Board, in advance of its next regular session in March 2008 if necessary, of any further progress or failure to cooperate on the part of Iran.

104. The Director General had warned that the Agency's knowledge of Iran's current nuclear programme was diminishing. While all declared nuclear material had been accounted for, the Agency was unable to provide any assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. The Director General had rightly underscored the need for such assurances and for transparency measures by Iran that went beyond the legal requirements of its safeguards agreement in order for the Agency to reconstruct two decades of undeclared activities. Contrary to the assertions of Iran's leaders and representatives, the Agency had not certified that Iran's nuclear programme was exclusively peaceful in nature.

105. Despite Iran's claim earlier in November 2007 that it had informed the Agency about its development of an advanced centrifuge design, Australia remained concerned that relevant information might not have been provided. Iran should provide that information and give the Agency access to relevant sites without delay. It was important that Iran revisit its decision to delay the provision of design information on new nuclear facilities until just before the introduction of nuclear material, and come into line with the standards observed by all other States with comprehensive safeguards agreements. Australia urged Iran to implement its additional protocol at the earliest possible date and to offer all other transparency measures requested by the Agency.

106. The Director General's report made clear that Iran was continuing to pursue its enrichment related and heavy water related activities in violation of its legally binding obligations under Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007), which was a matter of grave concern to Australia. It was not open to Iran or any other State selectively to implement obligations under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. All Agency Member States had a common stake in ensuring that the compliance mechanisms set out in the Statute worked as intended.

107. Australia urged Iran to suspend its proliferation-sensitive activities, as required by the Security Council, noting that Security Council resolution 1747 foreshadowed further measures should Iran fail to suspend its enrichment activities. It again urged Iran to take the steps necessary to build confidence in its nuclear programme and to consider carefully the impact of its actions on access to the political and economic benefits of constructive international relationships.

108. Mr. BAAH-DUODU (Ghana) was encouraged that some progress had been made in implementing the work plan and was hopeful that Iran would continue to cooperate with the Agency and implement the necessary confidence-building measures. Ghana underlined the importance of all States having the right to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with legal obligations.

109. The statement in the Director General's report that the Agency's knowledge about Iran's nuclear programme was diminishing was worrisome and should be addressed. Ghana joined others in urging Iran to cooperate to resolve all outstanding issues with a view to promoting confidence and achieving a peaceful resolution.

110. Ghana affirmed its confidence in the impartiality and professionalism of the Secretariat and the Director General and urged Iran to heed the Director General's appeals, the Board's decisions and the relevant Security Council resolutions in order to avoid punitive measures.

111. In the context of commitment to the NPT, Ghana urged all Member States which had not yet done so to ratify an additional protocol.

112. Mr. PANUPONG (Thailand) said that the work plan between the Agency and Iran provided, for the first time, a basis for resolving all outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme within a definite timeline. The ongoing dialogue had produced positive developments as detailed in the Director General's latest report.

113. Despite that progress, the Director General also reported that the Agency's knowledge about Iran's nuclear programme was diminishing and that Iran's cooperation had been only reactive. He had emphasized that Iran's active cooperation was indispensable and stressed the importance of assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Thailand agreed that Iran could and should do more to restore the confidence of the international community and hoped that it would accelerate its cooperation with the Agency and implement the work plan fully and in a timely manner. Iran should resolve the outstanding issues and comply with the provisions of the relevant Security Council resolutions.

114. Thailand, which was committed to the inalienable right of all States to develop research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, supported Iran's right to do so provided it complied with international safeguards and transparency measures.

115. His delegation reiterated its full confidence in the integrity, impartiality and professionalism of the Secretariat and the Director General in carrying out their verification functions. An international environment conducive to enhancing the Agency's capability to resolve all issues related to Iran's nuclear programme should be forged, as dialogue and diplomacy were the only way to avoid potential confrontation. Thailand urged all parties to exercise restraint.

116. Mr. SHAHBAZ (Pakistan) said that the work plan provided a good basis to reach a negotiated settlement on Iran's nuclear issue. Pakistan welcomed the progress made and did not believe that any additional deadlines should be imposed upon the Secretariat for the completion of the process.

117. Pakistan maintained that Iran's right to peaceful nuclear applications should be respected and, at the same time, that Iran should fulfil its international commitments.

118. Pakistan believed that dialogue and diplomacy were the only way to reach a long-term solution. It did not want another crisis in the region, particularly as Iran was its neighbour. Thus, Pakistan urged all parties to continue making efforts to reach a peaceful resolution.

119. Mr. BAZOBERRY (Bolivia) said that the positive steps taken by Iran to clarify its nuclear programme should continue, since they would be in the interests of both Iran and the international community and would facilitate a return to negotiations by the parties concerned, creating more possibilities for resolving the crisis.

120. Mr. AQRAWI (Iraq) welcomed the progress outlined in the Director General's report on the work plan agreed upon by the Agency and the Islamic Republic of Iran. His country encouraged Iran to continue its positive cooperation with the Agency with the goal of resolving all outstanding issues. The report indicated that the Agency required more time to verify the correctness of information provided by Iran on certain matters and to reach its final conclusions and Iraq believed that it should be granted.

121. However, his delegation noted that the Agency's knowledge regarding Iran's current nuclear programme was diminishing and that Iran's cooperation had been reactive rather than proactive. Iraq supported the Agency's calls on Iran to build confidence concerning the scope and peaceful nature of its programme.

122. Nobody denied that Iran had the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes but, in order to restore the confidence of the international community and States of the region, Iraq urged Iran and concerned States to accept the Director General's proposal, which included the suspension of uranium enrichment by Iran. Also, Iraq urged Iran to return to voluntary implementation of its additional protocol until such time as Iran's legislative authorities ratified it.

123. An escalation by all parties in dealing with the report would, Iraq believed, lead only to an intensification of tensions and would not help reach a solution. Dialogue and calm diplomacy offered the best means to achieve a peaceful resolution, as the recent success in the case of the DPRK's nuclear programme had shown. Any action involving the use of force would have dire consequences for the region, which already had innumerable problems.

124. In conclusion, his delegation commended the Director General and the Secretariat on their professional and impartial role.

125. Ms. ESTENOZ (Cuba)\*, speaking on behalf of her own country, took note from the Director General's report that, following the introduction of the work plan, there had been a substantial increase in Iran's cooperation with the Secretariat, Iran's cooperation had gone beyond that required under its safeguards agreement and, only 90 days after the adoption of the work plan, most of the outstanding issues had been clarified. Cuba appreciated those developments and was optimistic that the Secretariat would be able to clarify all the issues and close the file. In so doing, it was important not to impose artificial deadlines and for the work plan sequence to be maintained.

126. The results achieved under the work plan demonstrated the fallacious nature of the argument that resolution of the situation should be conditional on suspension of enrichment. Suspension should only be a voluntary measure to build confidence, not a condition of negotiation. Unfortunately, the unipolar situation in current international relations had enabled the imposition of that condition and referral of the case to the Security Council, a sad example of diplomacy, simply echoed the position of the United States of America and others.

127. Cuba was confident that the international community, in particular Member States, had learned that if multilateralism had prevailed over hegemony, if the Agency had been allowed to fulfil its verification mandate and if there had been no pressure to refer the case to the Security Council, then it would by now be close to closure and Iran and the Agency would be interacting within the framework of a normal verification process.

128. Her delegation rejected the positions of those who called into question the results of the work plan. The aim of those obsessed with political aims, who artificially created tension and who did not really seek a just solution was to undermine the credibility, impartiality and professionalism of the Secretariat and the Director General. Cuba opposed any attempt to disrupt the positive process of cooperation between Iran and the Agency.

129. To achieve a definitive solution to the issue of Iran's nuclear programme, several conditions should be guaranteed to allow the verification process to proceed satisfactorily: the Security Council should abstain from further action; the issue should be returned totally to the Agency; the demand that Iran cease enrichment, which was in violation of its rights, should be withdrawn; and all Member States should support the work plan.

130. The language of force and threats of sanctions should not be allowed to prevail over reason, dialogue and cooperation. The new opportunity for peace should be seized.

131. Ms. MACMILLAN (New Zealand)\* said that her country shared the concerns of the international community about the questions that remained regarding Iran's nuclear programme. Some of the developments noted in the Director General's report were encouraging and New Zealand hoped that, with Iran's active cooperation, the Agency's ongoing efforts would result in resolution of outstanding issues within the agreed time frame.

132. Nonetheless, New Zealand remained deeply concerned regarding Iran's failure to comply with the provisions of Security Council and Agency resolutions, particularly in relation to the suspension of all enrichment and reprocessing activities. New Zealand endorsed the Director General's call for Iran

to comply without delay. New Zealand was also concerned to note that the Agency's knowledge about Iran's current nuclear programme was diminishing and agreed that Iran needed to build confidence about the nature of its programme.

133. New Zealand urged Iran to implement its additional protocol at the earliest possible date and called on Iran to reconsider its suspension of implementation of the modified text of Code 3.1 of its Subsidiary Arrangements.

134. New Zealand's strong preference remained for a peaceful, negotiated solution, in which Iran would have to play its part.

135. Ms. CALCINARI VAN DER VELDE (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela)\* reaffirmed her country's support for the inalienable right of all States to develop technologies, including nuclear technologies, to improve their socio-economic well-being.

136. The Agency was the body competent to deal with Iran's nuclear programme and Venezuela was concerned to see that the Security Council had assumed responsibilities which were reserved to the Agency. Such interference affected the authority and credibility of the Agency, undermining its mandate and the independence which should characterize all agencies and bodies in the United Nations system. Venezuela continued to believe that the Agency was the appropriate body to negotiate a peaceful solution with Iran and appreciated the Director General's insistence on the diplomatic option.

137. Her country supported the work plan agreed between Iran and the Agency to resolve outstanding issues and commended Iran's continuing and broadening cooperation with the Agency, enabling the Agency to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of indications of reprocessing activities.

138. Venezuela rejected any discriminatory measures which threatened the principle of equality before the law for all States. It was firmly opposed to the imposition of further sanctions by the Security Council and any other measure likely to hinder the progress of the work plan towards its objectives.

**The meeting rose at 6 p.m.**