

IAEA Board of Governors

Record of the 1204<sup>th</sup> Meeting  
GOV/OR.1204

Nuclear verification

(c) Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran

# Board of Governors

**GOV/OR.1204**

Issued: March 2008

**Restricted Distribution**

Original: English

---

**For official use only**

## Record of the 1204<sup>th</sup> Meeting

*Held at Headquarters, Vienna, on Wednesday, 5 March 2008, at 10.10 a.m.*

### Contents

Item of the agenda <sup>1</sup>	Paragraphs
4 Nuclear verification ( <i>continued</i> )	
(c) Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran	1–111

---

<sup>1</sup> GOV/2008/8.



## Attendance

(The list below gives the name of the senior member of each delegation who attended the meeting, as well as that of any other member whose statement is summarized in this record.)

Mr. SKOKNIC		Chairman (Chile)
Ms. GJIKA	_____	Albania
Mr. KHELIFI		Algeria
Mr. CURIA		Argentina
Mr. SHANNON		Australia
Ms. GÖSTL		Austria
Mr. MARCA PACO		Bolivia
Mr. VALLIM GUERREIRO		Brazil
Ms. GERVAIS-VIDRICAIRE		Canada
Mr. LAGOS KOLLER		Chile
Mr. TANG Guoqiang		China
Mr. HORVATIĆ		Croatia
Mr. KEBEDE		Ethiopia
Ms. KAUPPI		Finland
Mr. CARON		France
Mr. GOTTWALD		Germany
Mr. BEKOE		Ghana
Mr. KUMAR		India
Mr. ALSHARIA	}	Iraq
Mr. AYOUB		
Mr. COGAN		Ireland
Mr. BAIANO		Italy
Mr. AMANO		Japan
Mr. PAULAUSKAS		Lithuania
Mr. DÍAZ		Mexico
Mr. ZNIBER		Morocco
Mr. OSAISAI		Nigeria
Mr. SHAHBAZ		Pakistan
Mr. MONTEALEGRE		Philippines
Mr. BERDENNIKOV		Russian Federation
Mr. AL-TAIFI		Saudi Arabia
Mr. MINTY		South Africa
Mr. STEINMANN		Switzerland
Mr. PANUPONG		Thailand
Mr. SMITH		United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Mr. SCHULTE		United States of America
Mr. ELBARADEI	_____	Director General
Mr. ANING		Secretary of the Board

**Representatives of the following Member States also attended the meeting:**

Afghanistan, Angola, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Georgia, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Montenegro, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

**Abbreviations used in this record:**

EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EU	European Union
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT Review Conference	Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
R&D	research and development

\* Speakers under Rule 50 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure are indicated by an asterisk.

## 4. Nuclear verification (continued)

### (c) Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (GOV/2008/4)

1. The CHAIRMAN, drawing attention to the Director General's report contained in document GOV/2008/4, said that it had been the subject of an informal technical briefing which had taken place on 25 February 2008.

2. Ms. GOICOCHEA ESTENOZ (Cuba)\*, speaking on behalf of NAM, welcomed the efforts made by Iran and the Agency to implement the work plan on outstanding issues set forth in document INFCIRC/711, and the Director General's visit to Tehran on 11–12 January 2008 during which the decision had been taken to accelerate implementation of the work plan. She noted with appreciation that, during that visit, the Iranian leadership had stated that the country's nuclear programme had always been exclusively for peaceful purposes and that there had never been a nuclear weapons development programme.

3. NAM's position regarding the Iranian nuclear issue was reflected in the following statement adopted at its 14th summit, held in Havana, Cuba, on 15–16 September 2006:

"The Heads of State or Government reaffirmed the basic and inalienable right of all States, to develop research, production and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, without any discrimination and in conformity with their respective legal obligations. Therefore, nothing should be interpreted in a way as inhibiting or restricting this right of States to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes. They furthermore reaffirmed that States' choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear technology and its fuel cycle policies must be respected.

"The Heads of State or Government recognised the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the sole competent authority for verification of the respective safeguards obligations of Member States and stressed that there should be no undue pressure or interference in the Agency's activities, especially its verification process, which would jeopardise the efficiency and credibility of the Agency.

"The Heads of State or Government welcomed the cooperation extended by the Islamic Republic of Iran to the IAEA including those voluntary confidence-building measures undertaken, with a view to resolve the remaining issues. They noted the assessment of the IAEA Director-General that all nuclear material declared by Iran had been accounted for. They noted, at the same time, that the process for drawing a conclusion with regard to the absence of undeclared material and activities in Iran is an ongoing and time-consuming process. In this regard, the Heads of State or Government encouraged Iran to urgently continue to cooperate actively and fully with the IAEA within the Agency's mandate to resolve outstanding issues in order to promote confidence and a peaceful resolution of the issue.

"The Heads of State or Government emphasised the fundamental distinction between the legal obligations of States to their respective safeguards agreements and any confidence building measures voluntarily undertaken to resolve difficult issues, and believed that such voluntary undertakings are not legal safeguards obligations.

“The Heads of State or Government considered the establishment of nuclear-weapons-free zones (NWFZs) as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and reiterated the support for the establishment in the Middle East of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, in accordance with relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. Pending the establishment of such a zone, they demanded Israel to accede to the NPT without delay and place promptly all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

“The Heads of State or Government reaffirmed the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities -operational or under construction- poses a great danger to human beings and the environment, and constitutes a grave violation of international law, principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and regulations of the IAEA. They recognised the need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument, prohibiting attacks, or threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

“The Heads of State or Government strongly believed that all issues on safeguards and verification, including those of Iran, should be resolved within the IAEA framework, and be based on technical and legal grounds. They further emphasised that the Agency should continue its work to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue within its mandate under the Statute of the IAEA.

“The Heads of State or Government also strongly believed that diplomacy and dialogue through peaceful means must continue to find a long term solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. They expressed their conviction that the only way to resolve the issue is to resume negotiations without any preconditions and to enhance cooperation with the involvement of all necessary parties to promote international confidence with the view to facilitating Agency’s work on resolving the outstanding issues.”

4. NAM was pleased to note that, as a result of the joint endeavours of the Agency Secretariat and Iran, significant achievements had been made in the implementation of the work plan. All six outstanding issues reflected in paragraphs I.2. and II of the work plan had been resolved. As a result of the proactive cooperation of Iran with the Agency in the implementation of the plan, the outstanding issues had been resolved earlier than expected, which was commendable. Given such substantive progress, NAM expected that safeguards implementation in Iran would henceforth be conducted in a routine manner.

5. She noted that the Agency had not detected the use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies, and that it did not have credible information in that regard. NAM was of the view that briefings organized by the Secretariat should serve to explain the contents of the official documents circulated beforehand. However, the technical briefing held on 25 February 2008 on the agenda item under discussion had gone beyond the Director General’s report on the matter. The work of the Board of Governors should only be based on official, credible, verifiable, factual and timely information.

6. NAM took note that the Director General had once again stated that the Agency had been able to verify the non-diversion of declared material in Iran, and that Iran had granted the Agency access to declared nuclear material and had provided the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material and activities. It also took note that the Agency had not found indications of ongoing reprocessing activities in Iran. Furthermore, the report stated that the Agency’s knowledge of Iran’s current declared programme had become clearer.

7. Maintaining the impartiality and professionalism of the Secretariat was crucial and there should be no undue pressure on or interference in the Agency’s activities, especially the verification process, that would jeopardize its efficiency and credibility. Diplomacy and dialogue were the only way to find a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and all Member States should contribute positively to that end.

The parties concerned should avoid taking any measures that put at risk the constructive process between Iran and the Agency.

8. Mr. PETRIČ (Slovenia)\*, speaking on behalf of the European Union, the candidate countries Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the countries of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia, the EFTA country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area, as well as the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, welcomed the progress made with regard to the outstanding issues and noted that the Agency regarded the contamination at a technical university, the polonium-210 experiments and the Gchine mine issue as no longer outstanding at the current stage, but that it would continue to seek corroboration of its findings and continue to verify the issue as part of the verification of the completeness of Iran's declaration.

9. The EU strongly supported those efforts but remained seriously concerned that, despite over four years of intense efforts, the Agency remained unable to determine the full nature of Iran's nuclear programme. One major remaining issue was the alleged studies relating, inter alia, to the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle. Those were matters of serious concern and critical to an assessment of a possible military dimension to Iran's nuclear programme. Iran should engage actively with the Agency in a more detailed examination of the documents available about the alleged studies, and of the role and activities of the Physics Research Centre in connection with them. Iran should also grant the Agency access to all persons required and provide answers about the role of the uranium metal document and the reasons why Iran had kept the documents, whose existence in Iran was in itself a matter of concern.

10. The EU noted with concern that Iran had once again failed to implement United Nations Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007), and that it continued to disregard requests by the Agency's Board of Governors and mandatory demands of the United Nations Security Council for confidence-building measures. Iran had expanded its enrichment-related activities and was continuing with the construction of the heavy water reactor and operation of the heavy water production plant. He urged Iran to implement the measures requested by the Board and the Security Council, particularly the long-standing call for suspension of all enrichment-related activities, including R&D.

11. The EU noted that Iran had recently provided additional information and updated design information for the pilot fuel enrichment plant, as a result of which the Agency's knowledge about Iran's current declared nuclear programme had become clearer. However, the information had been provided on an ad hoc basis and not in a consistent and complete manner. Without full implementation of the additional protocol, the Agency was unable to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material. It had also not been able to draw conclusions on the nature of Iran's past and present nuclear activities. He called Iran to provide full, clear and credible answers to the Agency to resolve all questions concerning its nuclear activities, to ratify and implement the additional protocol and to implement fully the provisions of its comprehensive safeguards agreement and its Subsidiary Arrangements. Those actions and the transparency measures requested by the Agency would help build confidence in its nuclear programme.

12. No progress had reportedly been achieved with regard to the unilateral suspension by Iran of the implementation of the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1. Iran could not unilaterally modify its Subsidiary Arrangements and the EU supported the Agency's request that Iran resume implementation of the modified Code 3.1.

13. In December 2007, the European Council had affirmed its deep concern over Iran's nuclear programme and had underlined that the acquisition by Iran of a nuclear military capability would be



unacceptable. The EU fully supported the work in the Security Council to adopt further measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. It also supported the implementation of the additional measures contained in Security Council resolution 1803 (2008).

14. Efforts should be pursued to find a negotiated long-term solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. The EU was still committed to the comprehensive package which had been proposed in June 2006 and which included active support to build new light-water power reactors using state-of-the-art technology and reaffirmed Iran's right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, provided that the obligations set forth in Articles I, II and III of the NPT were met. It was regrettable that Iran had not taken up that offer yet and he called on that country to engage in negotiations.

15. Ms. GERVAIS-VIDRICAIRE (Canada) said that the Agency's efforts pursuant to the work plan, while inconclusive, had facilitated notable progress and demonstrated that a robust verification system could produce results. However, the technical briefing held in the preceding week had also revealed a number of matters of serious concern that needed to be addressed.

16. Her country was deeply concerned by the possible linkages identified between Iran's nuclear and military programmes, including administrative connections between projects related to uranium conversion, high explosives testing and the design for a missile re-entry vehicle. The report of the Director General also made it clear that some of those possible linkages might have some bearing on issues considered no longer outstanding, including the role and activities of the Physics Research Centre prior to the razing of that facility. All of the Agency's questions regarding those linkages had to be completely resolved for it to verify that Iran's nuclear programme was exclusively peaceful in nature. The information at the Agency's disposal regarding the linkages came from multiple sources and was consistent with findings of its own investigations. Iran should therefore take note of the scope, nature and gravity of the information presented and respond in a meaningful way.

17. The Director General's latest report confirmed again that many years of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran had resulted in a confidence deficit. To restore confidence, assurances were required with regard to both the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Gaining a full understanding of the linkages between Iran's military and nuclear programmes was a first step. Iran should fully implement its NPT safeguards agreement, including its obligations under the modified Code 3.1., and also the additional protocol and all other transparency and access measures requested by the Director General.

18. Her Government fully endorsed the resolutions of the Board and the Security Council on the Iranian nuclear issue, including the recently adopted resolution 1803 (2008). Iran should heed the requests of the Board and the requirements of Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 by suspending all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and its work on the heavy water reactor at Arak and related projects.

19. Reiterating her Government's deep concern, she requested the Director General to continue reporting on his verification efforts until Iran had taken all the steps required of it and the Board had deemed that confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of that country's nuclear programme had been established. She also requested that the report contained in document GOV/2008/4 be made public.

20. Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) thanked the Director General and the Secretariat for the very detailed information contained in the report, which he felt confident reflected the current status of verification activities in Iran. It showed that cooperation between Iran and the Agency had been stepped up. Iran had provided additional information which went beyond its obligations under its safeguards agreement. It had granted access to the experts whom the Agency wished to contact, had provided answers to most of the questions which had been raised in connection with the work plan,

had resolved almost all the outstanding issues relating to its past nuclear activities and had provided clearer information about its current activities. The one major remaining issue related to the so-called alleged studies. He noted that the Agency intended to continue to seek clarification regarding the authenticity of the documents relating to those studies and pursue the substantive issues involved.

21. The resolution adopted by the Security Council on 3 March sent a serious signal to Iran that it needed to cooperate with the Council and comply with the resolutions of the Agency's Board of Governors. The joint statement of the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States on Security Council resolution 1803 (2008) expressed the willingness of those States to engage in negotiations and renew their proposals, which offered substantial opportunities for political, security and economic benefits to Iran and the region. Once Iran restored confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, it would be treated in the same manner as any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT.

22. Iran should heed the opinion of the international community and intensify its cooperation with the Agency with a view to resolving the outstanding issues relating to its nuclear programme and restoring confidence in that programme. That would be facilitated if Iran implemented the confidence-building measures stipulated in the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the Agency's Board of Governors, including the suspension of its uranium enrichment activities. It was also important that Iran implement the additional protocol.

23. Mr. STEINMANN (Switzerland) said that the Director General's report revealed that the Agency was satisfied with the answers provided by Iran to nearly all questions concerning its past nuclear activities and thus considered those issues resolved. On the other hand, the Agency had so far not received satisfactory responses concerning the alleged studies, which issue was causing grave concern. Also, Iran had not suspended its enrichment-related activities and had started to develop a new generation of centrifuges.

24. Those findings showed that, although the process had taken longer than planned, given that it should have been completed in December 2007, the dialogue on Iran's past nuclear activities had borne fruit. He thanked the Director General and his team and urged the continuation of the dialogue between Iran and the Agency.

25. Iran should resume implementation of the provisions of the additional protocol and other confidence-building measures the Director General might deem necessary to restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. Welcoming Iran's efforts to cooperate, he noted that, nevertheless, the Director-General had considered those efforts insufficient.

26. Currently, Iran was engaged in the development of a new generation of centrifuges which, given the current situation, was likely to heighten rather than ease tensions. He therefore called on Iran to act on its responsibility to create a climate conducive to negotiations by exercising the utmost restraint with regard to enrichment.

27. It was important that the Agency be in a position to comment as soon as possible on all the data relating to the alleged studies. The support of Member States was crucial in that regard. A distinction had to be made between data relating to civilian nuclear applications and data relating to military applications. It was particularly with respect to the latter that any non-compliance by Iran with its NPT obligations would be most harmful and require remedial measures.

28. It was in the interest of the Agency and its Member States to ensure that the process whereby the Agency had come to use certain data was as transparent as possible. All States in possession of

specific information on the Iranian nuclear programme should make it available to the Agency without delay and without restrictions. Agency Member States had the duty to facilitate the Agency's work.

29. The Agency had been confronting Iran with information relating to the alleged studies since 2005 without receiving any answers, which prompted his country to ask what might be the reasons for such lack of cooperation.

30. After five years of efforts, the file on the Iranian nuclear issue was still not closed. That would not change as long as the parties concerned had no prospect of finding a diplomatic solution. The Director General had noted in his introductory statement that building confidence was a matter that went beyond inspection. Switzerland urged the parties involved to consider seriously a new approach which offered the prospect of a diplomatic solution and took account of the fears and the needs of all.

31. Mr. TANG Guoqiang (China) said that the report of the Director General indicated that the Agency had been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran but that it had no concrete information about possible current undeclared nuclear material or activities. It had also been able to clarify a number of outstanding issues. His country welcomed the cooperation shown by Iran. However, Iran had not suspended its uranium enrichment activities as required by Security Council resolutions. It was developing a new generation of centrifuges and was continuing with the construction of the heavy water reactor and the production of heavy water. It had also not yet clarified certain issues related to possible military dimensions of its programme.

32. A peaceful solution through negotiations was the best option for maintaining the authority and effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime, and for preserving peace and stability in the region. Resolution 1803 (2008) which had been recently adopted by the Security Council reflected the concern of the international community and the expectation that the problem would be resolved through diplomacy. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of six countries had issued a joint statement reiterating their commitment to diplomatic efforts with a view to achieving the resumption of negotiations with Iran. China hoped that all parties would seize the opportunity to step up diplomatic efforts to resume talks, with a view to achieving a comprehensive long-term solution. For its part, Iran should implement the relevant resolutions of the Board and the Security Council, resume implementation of the additional protocol and increase its cooperation with the Agency. China appreciated the constructive role played by the Agency in endeavouring to implement the safeguards regime.

33. Mr. VALLIM GUERREIRO (Brazil) said that his country had welcomed the conclusion of the work plan between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Secretariat, which it saw as essential to restoring Iran's credibility and promoting international confidence in Iran's nuclear programme. It noted with satisfaction from the Director General's report that some issues were no longer considered to be outstanding and looked forward to receiving clarification regarding the so-called alleged studies. It also urged Iran to cooperate fully in providing the necessary information to the Agency in that respect. With regard to current activities, Brazil welcomed the fact that Iran had given the Agency access to installations where there was no nuclear material and urged it to provide regular and systematic information on activities other than those foreseen in its comprehensive safeguards agreement. It also held to its long-standing position that a solution could only be achieved through dialogue and negotiation.

34. Mr. SHANNON (Australia) said that, over the preceding six months, having declined for several years to answer the Agency's questions, Iran had helped the Agency clarify the technical scope of several of its past undeclared procurements and experiments, although the Agency had not yet reached any firm conclusions about their underlying nature and purpose. His country noted that the Agency considered a number of issues no longer outstanding at the current stage.

35. It was however clear from the Director General's report that Iran had not provided the transparency and cooperation the Agency required to verify that country's claim that its nuclear programme had been and continued to be for peaceful purposes. In particular, Iran had yet to enter into serious discussions with the Agency about evidence of past military involvement in its nuclear programme, and of studies apparently relating to the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices and nuclear warheads. The Agency possessed a significant body of such evidence, derived from its own investigations since 2003 and from information provided by several Member States. The Agency had been raising those matters with Iran for several years, and the Security Council had requested it to pursue its investigation. Australia agreed with the judgement in paragraph 54 of the report that "this is a matter of serious concern and critical to an assessment of a possible military dimension to Iran's nuclear programme". It was completely unacceptable for Iran to adopt a dismissive attitude about a matter of such grave concern. It had to engage actively with the Agency in a more detailed examination of the information, and provide access to relevant people, places and records.

36. As the Director General had confirmed, Iran continued to act in violation of its legally binding Security Council obligations to suspend all its proliferation-sensitive activities relating to enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water. Moreover, it had escalated its defiance by pursuing R&D on more advanced centrifuge technology. Its continuing development of an indigenous enrichment capability, for which there was no apparent civilian purpose in the foreseeable future, further diminished international confidence in its nuclear intentions. Australia therefore welcomed the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 1803 (2008) which reaffirmed the serious concerns of the international community regarding Iran's nuclear activities.

37. While his country welcomed the clearer knowledge the Agency now had of Iran's nuclear programme, it remained concerned at the Director General's finding that the Agency was not yet in a position to determine the full nature of that programme. Iran should cooperate with the Agency's efforts to verify not only the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, but also the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Australia called once again on Iran to implement the additional protocol, to take any additional transparency measures requested by the Agency, and to implement its obligations with respect to design information under the modified Code 3.1.

38. Mr. AMANO (Japan), welcoming the progress made in the implementation of the work plan, noted with concern the statement in paragraph 54 of the Director General's report that "The one major remaining issue relevant to the nature of Iran's nuclear programme is the alleged studies on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle". Iran had an obligation under the Board resolution contained in document GOV/2006/14, and under United Nations Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007), to address the question of the alleged studies, which could have a military nuclear dimension. He urged Iran to cooperate with the Agency in order to clarify the nature and scope of all its past and present nuclear activities.

39. Contrary to the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 and 1747, Iran was continuing to conduct enrichment-related activities and work on heavy water-related projects. It had suspended implementation of the additional protocol and had yet to ratify that instrument. Of even more concern, it was conducting R&D on a new generation of centrifuges. Furthermore, it was still declining to implement the modified Code 3.1 of its Subsidiary Arrangements. Without changes in Iran's current position, it could not be expected that the confidence of the international community would be restored and it would be difficult for the Agency to make progress in its investigations.

40. Japan welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 1803 (2008) and urged Iran to comply with its requirements. Iran needed to suspend its enrichment-related activities and its work on heavy water-related projects, to implement and ratify the additional protocol, take other transparency measures and cooperate with the Agency in line with the relevant Board and Security Council

resolutions put forward. It should also return to the negotiation process based on the comprehensive package proposal by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States without further delay, with a view to achieving a peaceful diplomatic solution to the issue.

41. Mr. KHELIFI (Algeria) welcomed the progress made on the work plan thanks to the active cooperation of Iran, which had allowed the outstanding issues to be resolved in the Agency's view. With regard to the alleged studies, the report of the Director General stated that the Agency had not detected the use of nuclear material in connection with those studies and did not have credible information in that regard. He noted that it was only in February 2008, just before the Board's current series of meetings, that the Agency had been authorized to show to Iran documents relating to the alleged studies. As for Iran's enrichment activities, the report indicated that they were being monitored and verified by the Agency, which had not found any diversion of declared nuclear material or any reprocessing activities. It was encouraging to note, from paragraph 55 of the report, that the Agency now had a clearer picture of Iran's current declared nuclear programme.

42. He emphasized the need for continuing dialogue and cooperation with Iran, not least in view of the security problem in the sensitive Middle East region. In that connection, Algeria was continuing its efforts to promote the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region and it urged the international community to pursue that goal resolutely.

43. Mr. CURIA (Argentina) welcomed the efforts made to achieve progress in the work plan agreed with Iran in August 2007. It was the duty of Iran to promote confidence in the nature and scope of its current nuclear programme so that the Agency could provide assurances not only with regard to declared nuclear material but also the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Iran should clarify the nature of its studies on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle. Those activities raised serious concerns because of their relevance to a possible military dimension of Iran's nuclear programme. He urged Iran to implement the additional protocol, to cooperate with the Agency's verification efforts and to take the necessary steps to comply with the resolutions of the Board and the Security Council.

44. Mr. LAGOS KOLLER (Chile) said his country had supported the work plan from the outset and had joined the Director General in calling on Iran to collaborate fully and actively in its implementation. Chile acknowledged Iran's collaboration in resolving many of the outstanding issues. However, Iran still had to dispel the doubts regarding the alleged studies which might be intended for other than peaceful purposes. It should also suspend its uranium enrichment and heavy water-related activities, which ran counter to the resolutions of the Security Council, and strive to create confidence in the nature and scope of its current nuclear programme by implementing the additional protocol. It should take all the steps required to comply with the resolutions of the Agency and the Security Council. In conclusion, he expressed the hope that a diplomatic solution could be found to the issue.

45. Mr. DÍAZ (Mexico) noted with satisfaction that the Agency had been able to clarify a number of outstanding issues and classify them as resolved, especially since the adoption of the work plan. However, his country remained concerned that information had been provided by Iran on an ad hoc basis and not in a consistent and complete manner. Furthermore, some sensitive issues still needed to be addressed.

46. He urged the Government of Iran to cooperate actively on the work plan set out in document INFCIRC/711 and to take all necessary measures to resolve all outstanding issues promptly and transparently. As a confidence-building measure, and to comply with Security Council resolutions, Iran should resume the suspension of its uranium enrichment activities.

47. His country believed that conflicts could only be resolved through dialogue and negotiation and it therefore urged the parties involved to resume their negotiations, in the hope that progress would be made and a lasting solution found in the near future.

48. Mexico had always placed a high priority on disarmament and nuclear proliferation in its foreign policy. Under the NPT, all countries, including developing countries, had the right to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. However, the Treaty also imposed obligations to ensure that nuclear technology was not used for military purposes. States had to be able to demonstrate to the international community that their nuclear activities did not have a military dimension, and it was for that reason that such activities had to be subject to Agency verification.

49. Mr. MONTEALEGRE (Philippines) said that his country recognized the basic and inalienable right of all Member States to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. It welcomed the progress made in the implementation of the work plan, as a result of which certain issues were now considered no longer outstanding.

50. In paragraph 57 of his report, the Director General stated that “With the exception of the issue of the alleged studies, which remains outstanding, the Agency has no concrete information about possible current undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran”. The Agency and Iran should continue to cooperate to address the outstanding issue of the alleged studies.

51. He urged Iran to implement the additional protocol in order to provide the necessary transparency, including access; and to comply with the resolutions of the Security Council and the Board as confidence-building measures.

52. The Philippines attached great importance to finding a diplomatic solution through consultations and dialogue and it had full confidence in the impartiality and professionalism of the Director General and the Secretariat of the Agency.

53. Mr. KUMAR (India) welcomed the progress reported by the Director General and expressed the hope that the momentum gained would be maintained in respect of the remaining questions and concerns mentioned in that report and in the Director General’s introductory statement. All Member States should abide by the obligations and commitments they had undertaken when exercising their right to exploit nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The focus should not be just on the end use of nuclear material, equipment and technologies, but equally on the supply side of proliferation. With regard to the uranium metal document, the Agency should aim to get to the bottom of what had been euphemistically described as “the network”, in order to understand not just “the offer” referred to in paragraph 19 of the report but all its linkages and the entire range of such clandestine activities, both past and present.

54. Mr. SCHULTE (United States) said that, two days earlier, the Security Council had adopted a fourth resolution on Iran’s nuclear programme, the third imposing Chapter VII sanctions. That was not the action of one or two countries, as the Iranian authorities asserted; it was a resolution adopted by fourteen votes in favour and one abstention. It was action taken by the world’s principal body for maintaining international peace and security.

55. In resolution 1803 (2008), the Security Council reinforced the authority of the Agency and the role of the Board. The resolution reaffirmed that Iran should without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in February 2006, steps that were essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. It underscored the importance of the additional protocol and reiterated Iran’s obligation to implement Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its safeguards agreement. Moreover, it emphasized the need for Iran to answer all the questions the Agency asked so that, through the implementation of required

transparency measures, it could verify the correctness and completeness of Iran's declaration. It also commended the IAEA for its efforts to resolve outstanding issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme.

56. The Board could join the Security Council in thanking the Director General and the Secretariat for their professional investigation and reports. The Director General's latest report was thorough and instructive, but on the core issue of whether Iran's programme was exclusively peaceful it was quite troubling. It described some progress in clarifying Iran's declarations, which was encouraging, though the information provided by Iran was long overdue and still to be verified. It was hard to be fully confident when some of the information provided by Iran was merely "not inconsistent with the data currently available to the Agency".

57. While the Director General had declared some issues to be no longer outstanding at the current stage, he had also reported that one major issue remained outstanding: indications that Iran had engaged in weapons-related activities. It was not surprising that the Iranian authorities had pushed that issue to the end of the work plan, or that they were now trying to claim that that issue was not even part of the work plan, because the information gathered by the Agency suggested the existence, not long ago, of a significant State-sponsored effort to develop nuclear weapons. That was an effort that would have further violated Iran's treaty obligations, that Agency inspectors had to verify fully had halted, and that Iran's leaders could choose to restart at any moment, or hold in abeyance until their uranium enrichment capabilities were sufficiently advanced.

58. In January 2006, the Deputy Director General for Safeguards had first told the Board of the Secretariat's concerns about Iranian activities with a military nuclear dimension. In the Director General's latest report and at the recent technical briefing, the Agency's very competent inspectors had presented a troubling mosaic of weapon-related activities. Those involved: flow sheets for a uranium conversion process different from Iran's declared activities; a document whose origins were yet to be fully explained describing the procedures for casting and machining of uranium metal into hemispheres; testing of high-voltage detonator firing equipment; development of an exploding bridgewire detonator and the capability to fire multiple detonators simultaneously; procurement of spark gaps, shock wave software, neutron sources, special steel parts and radiation measurement equipment; training courses on neutron calculations, the effect of shock waves on metal, enrichment and isotope separation, and ballistic missiles; a schematic layout of a Shahab 3 missile re-entry vehicle modified in such a way that, in the judgement of the Agency, it was "quite likely to be able to accommodate a nuclear device"; and an explosive testing arrangement involving a 400-metre shaft and a firing capability 10 kilometres away. As the Director General had reported, those various activities were "relevant to nuclear weapon R&D", and uranium metal hemispheres were "components of nuclear weapons."

59. The overall effort described by the Secretariat — involving personnel and institutes throughout Iran — strongly suggested an organized programme conducted under the direction of Iran's leadership. That was consistent with his country's own National Intelligence Estimate which had concluded with high confidence that, until late 2003, Iran had been pursuing covert weapons-related activities including weapon design, weaponization and secret uranium conversion and enrichment. Iran's refusal to disclose those activities was also consistent with the conclusion in the National Intelligence Estimate that, at a minimum, Iran was keeping open the option of developing a nuclear weapon.

60. Iran had dismissed much of that information as baseless allegations since the Agency had first confronted it in December 2005. In some cases, Iran had admitted the activities, claiming they were for non-nuclear purposes, but had then refused to let the Secretariat verify those claims. At the recent technical briefing, the Deputy Director General for Safeguards had carefully explained how the

information had been assembled over a period of years, having come from multiple Member States and the Agency's own investigations. He had carefully explained the administrative connections between the activities and the possible connection to nuclear material. His elaboration of the details provided in the Director General's report graphically illustrated why the Board could not accept Iran's claim of baseless allegations as its final answer. The Deputy Director General for Safeguards had been very careful not to draw conclusions on the basis of that information. However, he had made two critical points. Firstly, the Secretariat was not prepared to conclude that the allegations were baseless. Secondly, the Secretariat could not make progress in verifying the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear activities until Iran clarified the indications of weapons-related work. The Agency's investigations had to continue. It needed to understand Iran's past weapons-related work in order to have confidence in verifying its current declarations, and to be able to detect and deter a resumption of those activities.

61. Everyone wanted to see progress. Unfortunately, the main progress reported by the Director General related to Iran's uranium enrichment programme. Suspension of those activities, and of work on a heavy water reactor, was a legally binding requirement imposed by the Security Council. Producing fissile material — whether highly enriched uranium or weapons-usable plutonium — was the most difficult and time-consuming aspect of a nuclear weapons programme. Iran's continued operation of existing centrifuges, and its development and testing of advanced centrifuges, constituted a continuing and deepening violation of Security Council resolutions and the calls of the Board. Those violations were yet another reason for international mistrust in the nature of Iran's nuclear activities and the intentions of its leadership, particularly since there was no technical need for Iran to have an enrichment capability or a heavy water reactor in order to enjoy the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Iran's insistence on developing an enrichment capability and building a heavy water reactor, despite the lack of any obvious civil requirement, was particularly worrisome combined with the indications of past weapons-related work.

62. In September 2005, the Board had found Iran to be in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations under the NPT. In February 2006, the Board had reported Iran to the Security Council, firstly for its non-compliance and secondly because the absence of confidence about the nature of its nuclear programme gave rise to questions within the competence of the Security Council, the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Despite some progress in clarifying outstanding issues, the troubling questions that remained about weapons-related work, combined with Iran's failure to take confidence-building measures required by the Board and Security Council, showed the continued validity of the Board's decisions. Those troubling questions and violations explained why Iran's nuclear programme had to remain on the agenda of both the Security Council and the Board.

63. The United Nations had shown its justified concern about Iran's nuclear activities via four resolutions of the Security Council, three imposing sanctions. The latest, like those before it, showed the world's continuing desire to achieve a diplomatic solution through a dual-track strategy. That strategy of backing diplomacy with sanctions while offering negotiations had been reaffirmed in the statement by the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, released in conjunction with Security Council resolution 1803 (2008). The dual-track strategy offered Iran's leaders a path forward that would provide the people of Iran with the international respect, civil nuclear technology and economic benefits they deserved. Iran's leaders could start down that path by fully disclosing Iran's weapons-related work, allowing IAEA inspectors to verify it had ceased, and taking the confidence-building measures specified by the Board and the Security Council.

64. Mr. AYOUB (Iraq) commended the Agency on the professionalism and impartiality of its work to resolve all outstanding issues that posed obstacles to a resolution of the Iranian nuclear question. He welcomed the cooperation provided by the Government of Iran in furnishing the Agency with



information to resolve those outstanding issues. The Agency should be given sufficient time to arrive at definitive results that would provide a basis for appropriate decisions on that sensitive issue. Iraq hoped that Iran would continue cooperating on the matter of the alleged studies referred to in paragraphs 35–42 of the report, answer all the questions that remained outstanding and provide the information requested, so that the case could be closed and all matters resolved in a definitive manner. Iran should react positively to all the Agency's requests and should implement the additional protocol.

65. The Agency's requirements and demands were legitimate and in conformity with the relevant resolutions of the Board and the international community. All parties should work together in order to reach a peaceful solution, avoid escalation and focus on dialogue and diplomacy with a view to resolving all outstanding issues. Iraq supported the right of all States to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, but it was also committed to the obligation to act in a spirit of transparency and provide the necessary assurances to the international community so as to rule out any diversion of nuclear material or activities. Implementation of the additional protocol should be resumed by Iran on a voluntary basis pending its ratification, as that would be a way to restore international trust in the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. He called on Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment activities until such time as the international community's trust in the peaceful nature of the Iranian programme was restored.

66. The Agency and the international community should work within the framework of efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, in line with a number of resolutions of the Security Council. The absence of serious efforts by some States to move towards a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was nothing less than a policy of double standards and continued to destabilize that sensitive region. He called on the international community to make serious efforts to implement the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the decisions of the NPT Review Conference.

67. Mr. SMITH (United Kingdom), speaking on behalf of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, said that the recently adopted Security Council resolution 1803 (2008) underlined the continuing and profound concern of the international community over Iran's nuclear activities. As the European Council had stated in December 2007, the acquisition by Iran of a nuclear military capability would be unacceptable. The three European countries, together with colleagues from China, Russia and the United States, had asked the Director General to circulate as an INFCIRC document the statement which had been agreed upon by those six countries and read to the Security Council following the adoption of resolution 1803. That resolution reaffirmed the Security Council's strong support for the role of the Agency's Board of Governors and for the continuing role of the Agency in clarifying all outstanding issues concerning Iran's nuclear programme, as well as the need for Iran to take without further delay the steps required of it by the Board's resolutions.

68. Against that background of deep and continuing international concern, the Director General's latest report was timely and important. The three European countries noted the progress made in the implementation of the work plan but remained concerned and dissatisfied with the picture presented in the Director General's report. None of their concern and dissatisfaction was a reflection on the work of the Director General and the Secretariat, who had continued to address a difficult task with determination and skill. However, the product of their objective professionalism was a report that left many questions without adequate answers.

69. Over a wide range of issues on which the Agency had asked for clarification, the answers were less than satisfactory. The Agency had been able to conclude that some of Iran's answers were "consistent" with information it already had and that it needed to continue its work on verifying the correctness and completeness of the answers. On some issues, the Agency had come to the conclusion that Iran's answers were merely "not inconsistent" with information which was already known to the

Agency, i.e. they were not necessarily implausible but also not necessarily the truth. For these issues too, the Secretariat had to continue the painstaking work of verification. Then there was a further major outstanding issue concerning weaponization activities that covered a range of questions now grouped under the heading “Alleged Studies”. Iran had stated that the information in question was baseless, but at the same time it had acknowledged that part of it related to conventional weapons.

70. The three European countries had welcomed the initiative taken by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards in briefing the Board on those issues. He had made clear that the Agency had — from a variety of sources and over a number of years — collected a body of information pointing to the existence of work on developing nuclear weapons in Iran. The issues in question were ones on which the Agency had been seeking a substantive response from Iran for some time. However, Iran’s response, now as in the past, had been dismissive. In the light of Iran’s record of delay and obfuscation in addressing the Agency’s questions, and in view of its continuing disrespect for the requirements of the Board and the Security Council, those dismissive responses were wholly unsatisfactory.

71. Members of the Board were entitled to expect a great deal more from Iran in terms of willing cooperation. The Director General should continue to report on his verification efforts in Iran until such time as Iran had taken the steps required of it by the Security Council and the Board deemed that confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme had been established.

72. While progress had been made on clarifying some issues, where was the evidence that Iran had made any unprompted and proactive effort to address the questions? Where was the evidence that Iran had sought with any genuineness to add to the knowledge and understanding that the Agency already had? The Director General’s report stated that some information provided by Iran similar to that previously provided pursuant to the additional protocol had brought some more clarity to the Agency’s knowledge of Iran’s declared nuclear programme. However, it further noted, disappointingly, that the information had been provided by Iran on an ad hoc, incomplete and inconsistent basis. It was against that background that the Security Council had voted overwhelmingly to deplore Iran’s refusal to take the steps required of it by the Council and by the Board. Resolution 1803 was a further expression of the international community’s determination to bring home to Iran that there was a cost to its choice of a non-cooperative approach on the issue.

73. The three European countries had on repeated occasions made it clear that the non-cooperative path was not the only choice for Iran. They wanted to see Iran choose the cooperative path and had gone to great lengths to illustrate in some detail what cooperative measures they were prepared to support. The proposals presented in June 2006 would offer Iran everything it needed to develop a civil nuclear power industry while addressing international concerns. In order to see that process begin on the proper basis of confidence and trust, the three European countries had fully supported and continued to support the calls of the Board and of the Security Council for Iran to suspend all enrichment-related, reprocessing and heavy water-related activities. They had fully supported and continued to support the call on Iran to implement in full its safeguards agreement, including the reporting obligations specified in the modified Code 3.1, and also the additional protocol. The Director General’s report left no doubt that Iran’s record in complying with those requirements remained abysmal. It had so far chosen the non-cooperative path. As long as that remained its choice, the three European countries would remain determined to demonstrate the costs and consequences of that choice.

74. Mr. MINTY (South Africa) noted with satisfaction that, with the exception of one issue, the Director General’s report indicated significant progress in resolving the issues relevant to Iran’s past activities. He welcomed the news that the Agency had been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, and that the Agency had been able to conclude that the answers provided by Iran in accordance with the work plan were consistent with its findings in the

case of the polonium-210 experiments and the Gchine mine, or were not inconsistent with its findings in the case of the contamination at the technical university and the procurement activities of the former Head of the Physics Research Centre. He commended Iran for its cooperation in implementing the agreed work plan and encouraged it to continue on that path and to intensify its cooperation. While the issue related to the alleged studies required further attention, the pursuit of an enhanced cooperative relationship between Iran and the Agency in a spirit of transparency and trust would contribute noticeably towards building further confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

75. The major remaining issue relevant to the nature of Iran's past nuclear programme was the alleged studies on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle. Those were indeed serious allegations and it was imperative that Iran work closely with the Agency in clarifying all issues related to those alleged activities. More time was needed for Iran to respond and for the Agency to consider its response, owing to the fact that the Agency had only in February 2008 been authorized to show Iran actual documentation on the alleged high explosive studies and material relevant to the alleged missile re-entry vehicle. To date, the Agency had not detected the use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies, nor did it have credible information in that regard. However, his country remained concerned that the Agency was not yet in a position to conclude that there were no undeclared nuclear material or activities, or to determine the full nature of Iran's nuclear programme. Iran should come up with the necessary additional information to enable the Agency to determine the full nature of its nuclear programme. The Agency remained the only international authority that could verify, and provide the necessary assurances as to the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. It was essential that the verification process continue and that the Agency was not hampered in any way.

76. South Africa welcomed the Director General's recent visit to Tehran to discuss ways and means of accelerating the implementation of safeguards in Iran, as well as additional confidence-building measures. The visit had resulted in agreement on a timeline for the implementation of all the remaining verification issues specified in the work plan.

77. On 3 March 2008, the Security Council had adopted a further punitive resolution on Iran for not complying with the obligations set forth in its resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007). When the co-sponsors had provided the non-permanent members of the Council with the elements of that new resolution, South Africa had expressed concern about sequencing. The resolution had been drafted prior to the release of the Agency's report but purported to be based on the Agency process. Moreover, it was not clear why the Security Council should adopt a further punitive resolution against Iran at a time when it was cooperating with the Agency and significant progress was being made in resolving the outstanding issues and completing the agreed work plan. South Africa had expressed concern that the Security Council might jeopardize that progress and undermine the Agency's integrity. It regretted that the sponsors of the resolution had persisted with the original text and that the resolution, accordingly, appeared not to take adequate account of the progress made in resolving the outstanding issues. It further regretted that the adoption of the new resolution could apparently not be postponed until the Board had had the opportunity to consider the matter. That created the impression that the Agency's verification work and the important progress made were virtually irrelevant. The rationale for bringing the Iranian issue to the Security Council in the first place had been to reinforce the Agency's decisions and enhance its authority, yet the most recent resolution did not accurately reflect developments at the Agency. Despite those serious concerns, South Africa had voted in its favour in order to preserve previous decisions of the Security Council, which Iran had not fully implemented. Significantly, most members of the Security Council continued to emphasize the need for and commitment to a negotiated solution. Whatever the contents of the latest resolution, it should not be allowed to jeopardize the important gains made during the preceding few months. It was now necessary to build on the progress achieved through the Agency's continued verification work.

78. As a country that remained firmly committed to the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and to their non-proliferation, South Africa did not wish to see an Iran with nuclear weapons. At the same time, it did not wish to see any State party to the NPT denied the right to exploit nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The call on Iran to suspend its enrichment activities was related to the issue of building confidence and could under no circumstances become a goal in itself. Neither should it be used as a cover for those who wished to see an indefinite suspension or termination. If that was allowed to happen, whether in the case of Iran or of any other State party to the NPT, it would unravel the very basis of the fundamental bargain of the NPT and disturb the carefully balanced rights and responsibilities of State Parties.

79. At the same time, more credible assurances were needed to build and restore confidence and Iran should therefore recommit itself to implementing the additional protocol and to clarifying all remaining issues pertaining to its past programme. It was significant that, in the process of clarifying all outstanding issues, Iran had provided the Agency with cooperation that went beyond the requirements of its safeguards agreement and, in a sense, had moved towards a de facto implementation of the additional protocol. South Africa encouraged Iran to implement the additional protocol as though it had ratified it.

80. It was essential to avoid unnecessary rhetoric, provocative statements and actions that could merely escalate a spiralling conflict. The world could not afford another crisis in the Middle East region. Iran had taken substantial steps towards resolving the final outstanding issues with the Agency. As with all conflicts, finding a peaceful resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue would require restraint and flexibility on all sides.

81. Mr. PANUPONG (Thailand) welcomed the progress made by Iran and the Secretariat in the implementation of the work plan, which had received fresh impetus through the Director General's visit to Tehran in January 2008. He noted with satisfaction from paragraph 3 of the Director General's report that the Iranian leadership had stated that the country's nuclear programme had always been exclusively for peaceful purposes and that there had never been a nuclear weapons development programme. He also noted that the Agency had been able to verify non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran and that Iran had continued to provide access and accountancy reports related to declared nuclear material and activities. Furthermore, as reflected in the Director General's introductory statement, the Agency had confirmed its technical judgement that all outstanding issues were no longer outstanding. Thailand was pleased that Iran had taken proactive steps towards resolving those issues in an expeditious manner. With the Agency's knowledge about Iran's current declared programme becoming clearer, his country hoped that safeguards implementation in Iran could be conducted in a routine manner.

82. However, in keeping with the relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007), it was incumbent upon Iran to build confidence about the peaceful scope and nature of its nuclear programme. According to the Agency, the issue of the alleged studies was still a matter of serious concern. His country hoped that Iran would continue to intensify its cooperation with the Agency with a view to clarifying that issue.

83. Thailand supported the inalienable right of all States to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as provided for in Article IV of the NPT. It therefore supported the inalienable right of Iran to do so as long as the exercise of that right was consistent with international safeguards obligations and transparency measures.

84. His country had full confidence in the integrity, impartiality and professionalism of the Director General and his able staff in carrying out their safeguards and verification functions as mandated by the Agency's Statute. Iran and the Agency had come a long way towards building a constructive

dialogue. Indeed, it was continued dialogue and diplomacy that had contributed positively to the resolution of all outstanding issues in the work plan. All parties concerned should allow the dialogue to take its course and should refrain from other measures that ran counter to it.

85. Ms. MACMILLAN (New Zealand)\* added her country's voice to those that had expressed concern about the situation described in the Director General's report and about the remaining questions regarding Iran's nuclear programme.

86. Her country appreciated the Agency's ongoing efforts to clarify all outstanding issues and noted the progress made on the question of contamination at the technical university, polonium-210 and the Gchine mine. However, it noted that, even for those issues which the Agency had classified as no longer outstanding at the current stage, it would continue to seek corroboration of its findings and would verify those issues as part of its overall verification of the completeness of Iran's declarations.

87. The one issue which the Agency had noted as still outstanding, the alleged studies, had been identified as a matter of serious concern that was critical to an assessment of a possible military dimension to Iran's nuclear programme. New Zealand urged Iran to work with the Agency to clarify the many questions now grouped under that item and to allow the Agency the greatest degree of transparency in its work. Her country hoped that, with Iran's active cooperation, the Agency's continuing efforts would result in the early resolution of every aspect of all the outstanding issues.

88. New Zealand remained deeply concerned about Iran's failure to comply with the provisions of Security Council and Agency resolutions, particularly with regard to the calls for Iran to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities, and its failure to implement the additional protocol and reconsider the decision to suspend implementation of the modified text of Code 3.1 of its Subsidiary Arrangements. Her country noted that work on the construction of the IR-40 reactor and operation of the heavy water production plant had continued, and that Iran had begun development of a new-generation centrifuge. It endorsed the Director General's call for Iran to comply with all Board and Security Council resolutions without delay.

89. The Director General observed in his report that Iran had provided some information on current activities similar to that previously made available pursuant to the additional protocol, as well as updated design information, and that, as a result, the Agency's knowledge of Iran's current declared nuclear programme had become clearer than it had been at the time of the preceding report. That was encouraging, but the Director General had also stated that that information had been provided on an ad hoc basis and not in a consistent and complete manner, and that the Agency would not be in a position to make progress towards credible assurances about the absence of undeclared material and activities in Iran before receiving some clarification about the nature of the alleged studies and without implementation of the additional protocol. Her country agreed with the Director General that those steps were especially important in the light of the many years of undeclared activities in Iran and the resulting confidence deficit, and it joined the Director General in urging Iran to implement all necessary measures called for by the Board of Governors and the Security Council to build confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.

90. New Zealand strongly supported a diplomatic solution to the issue based on Iran's compliance with Agency and Security Council requirements. Iran had to play its part in realizing that goal.

91. Mr. KHALIL (Egypt)\* welcomed the fact that all six outstanding issues outlined in the work plan had been resolved thanks to the positive cooperation between Iran and the Agency. The information provided by Iran on those issues had either been consistent with, or not inconsistent with the findings of the Agency. Thus, the determination of the international community, the persistence of the Agency's safeguards team and, above all, the positive cooperation of Iran, which had provided

information that in some instances even exceeded its legal obligations, had all helped to shed light on Iran's nuclear programme.

92. The Agency had received information about alleged studies relating to military nuclear applications, but it had not detected the use of nuclear material in connection with those studies, nor had it received credible information in that regard.

93. Egypt urged the Secretariat to pursue its efforts in good faith based on solid, credible and verifiable information, and it called upon Iran to continue its cooperation with the Agency and provide the necessary information to clarify the final outstanding issue. The questions relating to the Iranian nuclear programme could only be addressed successfully through peaceful means and negotiations. The Agency was the sole competent international body in the area of nuclear safeguards and verification. Its efforts in that field should not affect the inalienable right of all parties to the NPT to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination in accordance with Article IV of the Treaty.

94. Egypt stressed the importance of addressing the Iranian nuclear issue as part of the broader international effort to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, which effort had been acknowledged in the resolution adopted by the Board of Governors in February 2006 and had been clearly reflected in Security Council resolution 1803 (2008) adopted two days earlier, as well as in other Security Council resolutions and countless General Conference and General Assembly resolutions.

95. The determination of the international community and the cooperation of Iran had contributed to clarifying many outstanding issues relating to that country's nuclear programme. Unfortunately, the international community had not shown the same resolve and determination when addressing the nuclear capabilities of another State in the Middle East. That unbalanced approach to the nuclear proliferation threat in the Middle East, as a result of which the nuclear capabilities of Israel were completely overlooked, was not conducive to any progress in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region and had serious implications for regional security and stability. It might also lead to a non-conventional arms race, to which Egypt was categorically opposed.

96. Egypt therefore urged the Agency, the five nuclear powers party to the NPT and the international community as a whole to assume their collective responsibility and address in a concrete manner the urgent need to apply Agency comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear facilities in the Middle East. It called upon Israel to join the NPT, refrain from engaging in nuclear military activities, and open unconditionally all its nuclear facilities and activities to Agency inspections and safeguards in order to clarify the extent of its past and present nuclear activities. Only then could the goal of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East be achieved.

97. Ms. GOICOCHEA ESTENOZ (Cuba)\* said that her country recognized the efforts made and the cooperation shown by Iran in implementing the work plan.

98. At the September 2007 meetings of the Board, her country had praised the efforts of Iran and the Secretariat in concluding the work plan, which reflected the political determination of both sides to clarify outstanding issues, build confidence, and bring the issue back to Vienna, which it should never have left. Less than six months later, the so-called outstanding issues had been clarified. That was heartening for the great majority of the international community who believed in the peaceful solution of conflicts, non-interference in the internal affairs of States and respect for State sovereignty, including the sovereign right of States to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in full compliance with Article IV of the NPT.

99. If the Board were to act in a manner consistent with its previous decisions, it would adopt a clear and unequivocal resolution calling for the issue to be brought back to Vienna. That would be the logical result of the clarification of the issues related to contamination and the P-1 and P-2 centrifuges, i.e. precisely the elements that had prompted the referral of the matter to the Security Council.

100. Unfortunately, some Member States had sought to adopt a draft resolution whose practical implications would have had an irreversible impact on the spirit of cooperation and confidence building that prevailed between the Secretariat and Iran. Her country had to question the real motivation behind that draft. Was the aim to block any possibility of future cooperation, thus keeping the Iranian case in the political sights of the international community? Iran could hardly be expected to continue cooperating with the Agency when new areas of confrontation were being created. A country's honour and dignity could not be flouted. On no account could her country endorse such a course of action. It would continue to reject any attempt to exploit the issue to impose the hegemonic positions and interests of certain Member States. Such a course of action would be a significant disservice to the cause of world peace and international law. Fortunately for the Board's credibility, political wisdom, balanced positions and a spirit of cooperation had prevailed. Those who believed in multilateralism, the role of the Agency and the need for it to remain impartial welcomed that outcome.

101. Confidence building was a two-way street. It should be recalled that unilateral approaches had dashed the efforts of the majority to preserve peace. She urged caution in the face of those who sought to use the so-called alleged studies to continue to keep Iran in the dock.

102. Following the briefing on 25 February and the hue and cry that the representatives of certain Member States had raised in an attempt to create confusion and a climate of opinion in favour of their political views, it was important to recall how information had been manipulated in another case, which, despite opposition by the majority, had led to a war, the deaths of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians and the destruction of an age-old heritage. The international community was duty-bound to prevent a recurrence of such mistakes. Cuba rejected the use — including in technical briefings — of information of dubious origin and authenticity in an attempt to push through resolutions which would impair the cooperation between Iran and the Agency.

103. The Iranian nuclear file should return to Vienna and should be dealt with in a routine manner. Equally, the interference of certain Member States in the Agency's work, which could jeopardize its credibility, had to be rejected. The Agency should pursue its statutory verification activities in an impartial, objective and reliable manner.

104. Mr. MANZOOR HUSSAIN (Malaysia)\* said that, since the Board's meetings in November 2007, the Islamic Republic of Iran had been cooperating with the Agency to resolve the outstanding issues in accordance with the work plan. As reported by the Director General, the Iranian authorities had agreed to accelerate the implementation of the work plan. Malaysia noted with satisfaction that the six outstanding issues had been resolved and hoped that safeguards implementation in Iran could now proceed in a routine manner.

105. He noted that the Agency had not detected the use of nuclear material in connection with the so-called alleged studies, and that it did not have credible information in that regard. His country was of the view that the work of the Agency should be based solely on verifiable and factual information.

106. Malaysia recognized the role of the Agency as the sole competent authority for issues pertaining to verification and safeguards compliance. It relied on the professionalism and technical ability of the Agency to provide credible assurances with regard to Iran's nuclear programme. Any undue pressure on the Agency could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility. The organization should be allowed to conduct its verification activities on the Iranian nuclear programme without undue interference from other parties.

107. Diplomacy and dialogue should continue with a view to finding a durable solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. The only way to resolve that issue was to resume negotiations and seek to reconcile existing differences.

108. Malaysia believed that a comprehensive approach was needed to the issue of proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. It was essential to implement in a sincere manner all resolutions adopted by the General Conference and the Board of Governors, especially those relating to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Unfortunately, little seriousness had been shown in implementing previous resolutions, resulting in imbalance and instability in the region. He called upon Israel to accede to the NPT and to provide full transparency by placing all its nuclear programme and capabilities under Agency safeguards. The international community should not turn a blind eye to the one State in the Middle East that had not acceded to the NPT and was believed to have acquired nuclear weapons capabilities while Iran, which was party to the NPT, was being put in the dock although there was no evidence of any diversion of declared nuclear material or activities.

109. Malaysia hoped that all parties concerned would avoid taking any measures which might put at risk the ongoing constructive process between Iran and the Agency and the considerable achievements to date.

110. Mr. KHATTAB (Syrian Arab Republic)\* said that confidence building was not a one-way street. Numerous demands had been made upon Iran to take confidence-building measures, some of them even going beyond its international legal obligations. It was incumbent on the international community to respond to Iran's efforts with corresponding actions, so as to build confidence. At the very least, it was essential to refrain from taking additional measures which would undermine trust and have an adverse impact on Iran's cooperation with the Agency. Any parties that had real proof in support of their suspicions about the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme should make it known without delay, so that the Agency and Iran could finally close the matter and so that efforts could be redirected towards achieving greater cooperation on the peaceful and humanitarian uses of nuclear energy.

111. His country reiterated its call to make the Middle East region a zone completely free of all weapons of mass destruction. To achieve that, Israel would have to accede to the NPT, it being the only country in the region that had not yet done so.

**The meeting rose at 1 p.m.**