

IAEA Board of Governors

Record of the 1206th Meeting
GOV/OR.1206

Report of the Commission of Eminent Persons on the future of the Agency

The Annual Report for 2007

Board of Governors

GOV/OR.1206

Issued: June 2008

Restricted Distribution

Original: English

For official use only

Record of the 1206th Meeting

Held at Headquarters, Vienna, on Monday, 2 June 2008, at 10.45 a.m.

Contents

Item of the agenda ¹	Paragraphs
– Opening of the meeting	1–5
– Adoption of the agenda	6–7
1 Introductory statement by the Director General	8–40
2 Report of the Commission of Eminent Persons on the future of the Agency	41–81
3 The Annual Report for 2007	82–150

¹ GOV/2008/23.

Attendance

(The list below gives the name of the senior member of each delegation who attended the meeting, as well as that of any other member whose statement is summarized in this record.)

Mr SKOKNIC	Chairman (Chile)
Mr HORVATIC	Vice-Chairman (Croatia)
Mr HOXHA	Albania
Ms FEROUKHI	Algeria
Mr CURIA	Argentina
Mr SHANNON	Australia
Ms SELLNER	Austria
Ms ESPINOZA PATIÑO	Bolivia
Mr VALLIM GUERREIRO	Brazil
Ms GERVAIS-VIDRICAIRE	Canada
Mr LAGOS KOLLER	Chile
Mr TANG Guoqiang	China
Mr HORVATIC	Croatia
Mr MOREJÓN-ALMEIDA	Ecuador
Ms SINEGIORGIS	Ethiopia
Ms KAUPPI	Finland
Mr CARON	France
Mr GOTTWALD	Germany
Ms AMOAH	Ghana
Mr KUMAR	India
Mr AQRAWI	Iraq
Mr COGON	Ireland
Mr GHISI	Italy
Mr AMANO	Japan
Ms GREIČIUVIENĖ	Lithuania
Mr DÍAZ	Mexico
Mr ZNIBER	Morocco
Mr OSAISAI	Nigeria
Mr SHAHBAZ	Pakistan
Ms LACANLALE	Philippines
Mr BERDENNIKOV	} Russian Federation
Mr ZHGUTOV	
Mr AL-TAIFI	Saudi Arabia
Mr MINTY	South Africa
Mr STEINMANN	} Switzerland
Mr MARFURT	
Mr CHARANASOMBOON	Thailand
Mr DRAPER	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Mr SCHULTE	United States of America

Attendance (continued)

Professor ZEDILLO	Chairman, Commission of Eminent Persons
Mr ELBARADEI	Director General
Mr ANING	Secretary of the Board

Representatives of the following Member States also attended the meeting:

Afghanistan, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Eritrea, Estonia, Georgia, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Monaco, Mongolia, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

Abbreviations used in this record:

AIPS	Agency-wide Information System for Programme Support
BSS	International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources
CRP	coordinated research project
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GRULAC	Latin American and Caribbean Group
HEU	high-enriched uranium
INPRO	International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles
IPSAS	International Public Sector Accounting Standards
IRPA	International Radiation Protection Association
ITER	International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Abbreviations used in this record (continued):

NPT Review Conference	Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
PACT	Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy
PAHO	Pan American Health Organization
R&D	research and development
SAL	Safeguards Analytical Laboratory
SMR	small and medium-sized reactor
TCF	Technical Cooperation Fund
Transport Regulations	Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material
WHO	World Health Organization

* Speakers under Rule 50 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure are indicated by an asterisk.

– Opening of the meeting

1. The CHAIRMAN conveyed the Board's sympathies to the Governments and peoples of China and Myanmar, where recent natural disasters had claimed tens of thousands of lives.
2. Also, he informed the Board of the sudden death, on 1 June 2008, of Mr Matthai, who had served as Director of the Division of General Services for seven years and would be greatly missed by his colleagues, and requested that the Board's condolences be conveyed to Mr Matthai's family.

All present rose and stood in silence for one minute.

3. The CHAIRMAN welcomed Professor Ernesto Zedillo, former President of Mexico and currently Director of the Yale Centre for the Study of Globalization, who had served as Chairman of the Commission of Eminent Persons and would be presenting the Commission's report.
4. He also welcomed the new Governor, Mr Ghisi of Italy, and the new Resident Representatives, Mr Enkhsaikhan of Mongolia, Mr Ugokwe of Nigeria, Mr Nogués Zubizarreta of Paraguay and Mr Jaffeer of Sri Lanka.
5. He bade farewell to colleagues who had finished or would shortly be finishing their tours of duty in Vienna: two Governors — Mr Morejón-Almeida of Ecuador and Mr De Ceglie of Italy; and four Resident Representatives — Mr Sung-Hwan Kim of the Republic of Korea, Mr Enkhtaivan of Mongolia, Mr Owoseni of Nigeria and Mr Petrič of Slovenia.

– Adoption of the agenda (GOV/2008/20/Rev.1)

6. The CHAIRMAN invited the Board to adopt the revised provisional agenda contained in document GOV/2008/20/Rev.1.
7. The agenda was adopted.

1. Introductory statement by the Director General

8. The DIRECTOR GENERAL said that the agenda for the Board's current session related to all areas of Agency activity — safety and security, technology and verification.
9. Referring to the draft Annual Report for 2007, he said that it summarized the results of the Agency's programme of work in 2007, the year in which the 50th anniversary of the Agency's creation had been celebrated. It reflected the Agency's wide-ranging activities designed to assist Member States in the application of nuclear technologies for economic and social development while ensuring that such technologies were used in a safe, secure and peaceful manner. Moreover, it

highlighted the Agency's efforts to help Member States address significant challenges such as energy shortages, food and water scarcity and inadequate health care. Furthermore, it described the continuing efforts of the Agency and Member States to strengthen safety and security and highlighted the need for a strengthened safeguards and non-proliferation system.

10. In 2007, the TCF level had reached a record US \$83.6 million, while the rate of attainment had reached a new high of 95.6%. However, the steady decline in the value of the US dollar had had a negative impact, since a large proportion of the Agency's costs were incurred in other currencies. As the Agency moved towards the next technical cooperation programming cycle, it was essential that Member States pay their full TCF target shares and do so in a timely manner and that the resources for technical cooperation be sufficient, assured and predictable.

11. Key regional project activities in 2007 had included collaboration in sickle cell disease control in Africa, radiation-induced mutation activities to improve crops in Asia and the Pacific, a scientific investigation of pollution in the Mediterranean and activities to improve agricultural practices in Latin America.

12. Human health remained a top priority for Member States, and projects in that area continued to be the largest single component of the technical cooperation programme. Nuclear power was also a key area of Agency activity, and was expanding as a result of the increasing number of Member States that wanted to add nuclear power to their energy mixes. The Agency was focusing on ensuring that those States had the prerequisite safety, security and non-proliferation infrastructures.

13. Events of recent years had placed the nuclear non-proliferation regime under stress on multiple fronts and had made it clear that concrete steps to strengthen the regime were urgently required.

14. To date, 88 States had additional protocols in force, while safeguards agreements were in force in 163 States. More than half of the States with safeguards agreements also had additional protocols in force. That positive trend needed to be maintained as such protocols were central to the Agency's ability to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. All States that had not yet done so should bring additional protocols into force, without delay. Also, 30 non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT still did not have comprehensive safeguards agreements in force. For those States, the Agency could not perform any safeguards activities or draw any safeguards conclusions.

15. Referring to Safeguards Implementation Report for 2007, he said that for 47 States with both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force the Agency had in 2007 been able to conclude that all nuclear material had remained in peaceful activities. The Agency was working steadily to reach the same conclusion with respect to all other States with a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force. Also, the Agency was currently implementing integrated safeguards in 26 States, and it aimed to do so in all States with a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force.

16. As previously reported to the Board, the Agency had, at the request of the DPRK, been verifying and monitoring the shutting down and sealing of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities since July 2007. During its monitoring activities, the Agency had been able to observe and document the disabling activities that had been taking place. Just over one third of the spent fuel rods of the DPRK's 5 MW(e) Experimental Nuclear Power Plant had been discharged from the core, and all of them had been measured by the Agency. Those fuel rods, and also the two thirds remaining in the core, were under Agency containment and surveillance. The nuclear material produced during the disabling activities at the Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Plant were also under Agency containment and surveillance. Since the Agency had not been requested to participate in the disablement of those facilities, he was not in a position to update Board members on progress made, but he hoped that the parties concerned would do so.

17. As he had stated on 3 March 2008, funds to implement the ad hoc monitoring and verification arrangement in the DPRK had not been foreseen in the Agency's budget for 2008. Contributions since pledged by the European Union and the United States of America would enable the Agency to carry out monitoring and verification activities in the DPRK during the rest of 2008.

18. In July 2003, he had informed the Board that, until the legal status of the DPRK vis-à-vis the NPT was clarified, the Agency's safeguards responsibilities as regards the DPRK remained uncertain. If the DPRK was considered to still be a party to the NPT, then its comprehensive NPT safeguards agreement remained in force, its nuclear material and facilities should be declared to the Agency and the Agency should resume its verification of the correctness and completeness of the DPRK's declarations. However, if the DPRK was considered no longer to be a party to the NPT, the Agency's INFCIRC/66-type safeguards agreement with the DPRK would have to be implemented. He had not yet received guidance in the matter from the States parties to the NPT and, in view of recent developments, it was important that he receive such guidance at the earliest opportunity.

19. Regarding his latest report on the implementation of safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Agency had been able to continue verifying the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in that country. Regrettably, however, the Agency had not made the progress it had hoped for with respect to the one remaining major issue — namely, clarification of the cluster of allegations and Secretariat questions relating to possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme. The so-called alleged studies remained a matter of serious concern and were among the issues that the Security Council had directed the Agency to clarify. Following an initial period during which Iran had been reluctant to discuss the issue fully, it had finally agreed to address it. Iran maintained that it had never had a nuclear weapons programme and that the documents relating to the alleged studies were "forged" or "fabricated". Much of the information concerning the alleged studies had been received by the Agency only in electronic form, and the Agency had unfortunately not been authorized to provide copies to Iran. The release of documents that were not sensitive from a proliferation perspective, including those purportedly showing interconnections between the three categories of alleged studies, would clearly help the Agency in its investigations.

20. The Secretariat was continuing to assess the information and explanations provided by Iran, including additional information received on 23 May 2008. However, Iran had not yet agreed to implement all the transparency measures required in order that the Agency might clarify that cluster of allegations and questions. Iran had not provided the Agency with all the access to documents and to individuals requested by the Secretariat, nor had it provided the substantive explanations required to support its statements. Such clarifications were critical to an assessment of the past and present nature of Iran's nuclear programme. The Agency understood that Iran might have additional information, particularly about high explosives testing and missile-related activities, which could shed more light on the nature of the alleged activities. Meanwhile, the Agency would continue trying to clarify the authenticity of the documentation regarding the alleged studies and the related substantive issues.

21. It had been more than five years since the Agency had begun the intensive phase of verification of Iran's nuclear programme. Although substantial progress had been made in clarifying many of its aspects, particularly with regard to Iran's enrichment programme, it was essential that the Agency be able to reach a conclusion regarding the nature of Iran's nuclear programme at the earliest possible date. That depended primarily on Iran's demonstrating the necessary transparency and providing full disclosure. He would again urge Iran to be fully forthcoming in that regard.

22. To put things into perspective, it should be emphasized that the Agency currently had no information — apart from the uranium metal document — about the actual design or manufacture by Iran of nuclear material components, or other key components, of a nuclear weapon. Likewise, the

Agency had not seen indications of the actual use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies.

23. Besides clarifying all the questions and allegations mentioned in his latest report, Iran needed to implement the additional protocol, so as to enable the Agency to confirm the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. Assurances by the Agency about Iran's past and current nuclear activities were key to restoring confidence in the nature of Iran's nuclear programme. However, while the Agency could verify and provide assurances about Iran's past and present nuclear activities, concerns about Iran's future intentions went well beyond verification and required agreement on confidence- and security-building measures. He hoped that the necessary environment would be created soon for a substantive and comprehensive dialogue between Iran and the other relevant parties.

24. Following the disclosure by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya of its undeclared nuclear activities in December 2003, the Agency had continued its efforts to verify the correctness and completeness of Libya's declarations about its nuclear programme, including past undeclared activities.

25. Since his previous report, made on 30 August 2004, Libya had continued to be transparent and to provide the Agency with unrestricted access, beyond what was required under its comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol, to the locations, information and individuals deemed necessary by the Agency. Libya had recently provided additional information about the timeline of some of its earlier undeclared activities, which had helped the Agency to gain a full picture of Libya's past and present nuclear programme and would enable the Agency to resume verification in Libya on a routine basis. A detailed report on safeguards implementation in Libya would be submitted to the Board.

26. In April 2008, the Agency had been provided with information claiming that an installation destroyed by Israel in the Syrian Arab Republic in September 2007 had been a nuclear reactor. According to that information, the reactor had not yet been operational and no nuclear material had been introduced into it.

27. It was most regrettable that information concerning the installation had not been provided to the Agency in a timely manner and that force had been resorted to unilaterally before the Agency had had an opportunity to establish the facts, in accordance with its responsibilities under the NPT and Syria's safeguards agreement. It should be borne in mind by all that States parties to the NPT had unanimously reaffirmed that the Agency was the competent authority responsible for verifying and ensuring, in accordance with the Statute and the Agency's safeguards system, compliance by States with their safeguards agreements.

28. Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that Syria, like all States with comprehensive safeguards agreements, had an obligation to report the planning and construction of any nuclear facility to the Agency. The Agency was therefore treating the information with the seriousness it deserved. It had been in discussions with the Syrian authorities since the information had been provided to it with a view to arranging a visit to Syria at an early date in order to verify, to the extent possible, the veracity of the available information. It had been agreed that an Agency team would visit Syria during the period 22–24 June 2008. He looked forward to Syria's full cooperation in the matter.

29. Soaring global food prices had increased concern about food security and given additional importance to the use of nuclear techniques in helping to develop novel crop varieties that thrived under harsh conditions. In Kenya, for example, a variety of wheat introduced by the Agency was yielding 11% more, under drought conditions, than the best varieties previously available. The importance of that area of the Agency's work was likely to increase in the coming years.

30. The Agency had been cooperating in the ITER project, the largest endeavour in the area of nuclear fusion, since its inception. The ITER International Fusion Energy Organization had expressed the wish to enter into a formal cooperation agreement with the Agency for the exchange of information on scientific and technological aspects of fusion energy. A draft agreement had been prepared for the consideration of the Board.

31. PACT was becoming well recognized in the area of cancer prevention and treatment. In May 2008, the President of the United Republic of Tanzania had accepted the donation of a radiotherapy machine, made through PACT, by MDS Nordion, a Canadian company. WHO and the Agency were cooperating in efforts to establish a joint programme on cancer, and he hoped to be able to report to the Board shortly on the results of that welcome cooperation.

32. In April 2008, the Agency had hosted the 4th Review Meeting of Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Currently, there were 61 contracting parties, including all countries with operating nuclear power plants. He would like to see every Member State that was considering the use of nuclear power becoming a contracting party to the Convention as soon as possible. Many participants in the Review Meeting had expressed appreciation of the Agency's safety standards and safety review services and had stated that more countries should make use of them. At the Review Meeting it had been noted that, although progress was being made in ensuring that a nuclear safety culture took root worldwide, maintaining adequate staffing and competence levels for nuclear safety remained a significant challenge for operators and regulators.

33. The Agency had been coordinating preparations for a major test of radiation emergency plans, based on a simulated accident at Mexico's Laguna Verde nuclear power plant, due to take place in July 2008. The two-day exercise would be carried out with the cooperation of more than 60 Member States and ten international organizations in order to test national and international preparedness to respond to a nuclear or radiological emergency. He hoped for the active participation of Member States.

34. Regarding a subject that he had raised at the Board's March 2008 meetings, the introduction of an Agency-wide Information System for Programme Support (AIPS) and of IPSAS, he regretted that there had been few positive developments since.

35. In June 2007, the Board had decided that IPSAS should be introduced within the Agency in 2010 — a move strongly endorsed by the External Auditor and in keeping with a United Nations system-wide initiative to adopt those standards. As everyone acknowledged, IPSAS would bring greater transparency and improved internal control to the Agency's financial operations.

36. In close connection with the introduction of IPSAS, the Secretariat had in 2007 put forward proposals for the gradual introduction of AIPS, as the arguments for its introduction were compelling and widely accepted. Such a system was essential for greater efficiency in the delivery of all major programmes, from technical cooperation to safeguards. Independent consultants had estimated the efficiency gains from a fully implemented AIPS at nearly €6 million per annum. Moreover, the External Auditor had stated in his most recent report that completion of the first stage in introducing AIPS, upgrading the financial and procurement systems, was "indispensable" if the Agency wished to introduce IPSAS in an effective manner.

37. Despite the strong support for both AIPS and IPSAS, and prolonged efforts on the part of the Secretariat, funding had not been forthcoming. That was very discouraging. Although not a single Member State, to his knowledge, had questioned the need to introduce AIPS and IPSAS, only a few appeared ready to provide the necessary funding. Member States called for ever greater efficiency and transparency within the Agency, yet they appeared unwilling to provide the Secretariat with the essential tools. It should be emphasized that, unless adequate AIPS funding was secured very soon, not

only would it be impossible to introduce IPSAS in 2010, but there would be further delays in achieving the efficiency gains that everyone wanted.

38. He was concerned about the absence of agreement among Member States on the need to apply programme support costs to extrabudgetary resources as recommended by the External Auditor. Although the application of programme support costs to extrabudgetary resources was the norm throughout the rest of the United Nations system, the Agency had for many years been putting up with a system whereby extrabudgetary projects were supported from the Regular Budget, at the expense of its ability to effectively implement Regular Budget activities and TCF-funded projects. Without programme support costs, the Agency would not be able to effectively implement and manage the increasing number of projects funded by extrabudgetary resources. It might even find itself in the position of having to decline extrabudgetary funding, which would be a major setback for everyone.

39. Regarding the report on the future of the Agency produced by the Commission of Eminent Persons, a body which he had established in 2007 to reflect upon the nature and scope of the Agency's programme up to 2020 and beyond, he was grateful to all the very distinguished members of the Commission, which had performed its task under the inspiring leadership of Professor Zedillo. He was also grateful to Professor Zedillo for taking the time to appear before the Board at its current meeting and present the Commission's report.

40. The report was a compelling piece of work — thoughtful and profound. The Commission had made many recommendations, some of them bold and far-reaching, concerning all aspects of the Agency's activities. Not all of the recommendations would find favour with all Member States, but in his view the report succinctly encapsulated the challenges and opportunities facing the Agency in both the short and the medium term. He hoped that Member States' governments would give the recommendations the serious consideration they deserved and embark in the coming months on a structured discussion of the way ahead. He intended to include in the provisional agenda for the Board's September session an item designed to launch such a discussion. Decisions on the future of the Agency needed to be made urgently if the Agency was to continue to effectively fulfil its Atoms for Peace mandate. As the Commission itself stressed in the report, "Now is the time to choose."

2. Report of the Commission of Eminent Persons on the future of the Agency

(GOV/2008/22 - GC(52)/INF/4)

41. Professor ZEDILLO (Chairman of the Commission of Eminent Persons) said that the Commission had been asked to reflect on how the nuclear future might evolve during the period up to 2020 and beyond, on what the world was likely to demand of the Agency, and on what steps needed to be taken in order to enable the Agency to meet the demands made of it.

42. Introducing the Commission's report, entitled *Reinforcing the Global Nuclear Order for Peace and Prosperity: The Role of the IAEA to 2020 and Beyond*, he said that the Commission members had been very grateful for the respect for their independence displayed by the Secretariat and by Member States.

43. Given the Commission members' diverse national and professional backgrounds, there had been a wide range of perspectives on nuclear and related issues. Notwithstanding different — and sometimes opposing — views on several issues, the Commission members had all agreed on the need

for Member States to strengthen the Agency by providing it with additional authority, resources, personnel and technology. In their opinion, a stronger Agency was necessary in view of the probable increase in the need for crucial Agency services. With the spiralling costs of fossil fuels and the impending threat of climate change, nuclear power was likely to experience a renaissance in the near future. Accordingly, international cooperation should be strengthened immediately in order to ensure that any expansion of nuclear power generation took place under safe and secure conditions and did not contribute to nuclear weapons proliferation. The Agency should help States that were newcomers in the nuclear power field to establish the infrastructures necessary for the safe, secure and peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, and it should work together with Member States in coordinating research on the design of economical, safe and proliferation-resistant reactors.

44. The Agency should step up its efforts to assist States in developing safe and sustainable approaches to the management of nuclear waste and to build international public support for the implementation of such approaches. Also, it would have to develop international nuclear safety standards and promote the harmonization of certification processes for new reactor models.

45. Additional Agency responsibilities might arise in connection with — inter alia — the regional sharing of nuclear power plants, mechanisms for the assured supply of nuclear fuel (including international banks of enriched uranium), multinational management of the entire fuel cycle, the estimation of global uranium resources, R&D work on thorium fuel cycles.

46. Safeguards would continue to be a central aspect of the Agency's work. The Agency was being widely called upon to implement additional protocols and to adopt a country-level approach involving the examination by the Agency of a broad range of additional, more sophisticated types of information. The existing authority of the Agency should be interpreted as giving it responsibility for inspecting indicators of nuclear weaponization activities. As had become clear from recent events, sometimes transparency going well beyond that resulting from the measures called for in additional protocols was needed in order to provide confidence that a State's nuclear programme was entirely peaceful.

47. The Agency should work closely with Member States developing new fuel cycle processes so that effective safeguards and physical protection features were incorporated into the designs from the outset.

48. Although ensuring nuclear security was fundamentally the responsibility of individual States, the Agency had an important role to play in addressing the threat of nuclear terrorism, as it was the only global body with relevant competence and expertise.

49. States should conclude binding agreements to set effective global nuclear security standards, with the Agency being assigned an important role in developing those standards and assisting in and confirming their implementation. For its part, the Agency should develop model legislation that would help States to fulfil their obligations, under resolution 1540 (2004) of the United Nations Security Council, to enact effective national laws prohibiting acts related to nuclear terrorism and nuclear smuggling.

50. The Agency should expand its efforts to ensure effective security for the most dangerous radiological sources worldwide and increase the priority given by it to the prevention of nuclear smuggling. Also, it should continue its efforts to assist States in preparing to cope with the consequences of a radiological dispersal.

51. Although nuclear safety had improved enormously in recent decades, the risk of an accident at any given nuclear power plant should continue to be reduced. The Agency's role in steadily improving the global nuclear safety regime was critical and should be strengthened.

52. The Agency should lead an international effort to establish a global nuclear safety network and should ensure that critical safety knowledge, experience and lessons learned were widely exchanged. Over time, with the Agency's involvement, States should enter into binding agreements to adhere to effective global nuclear safety standards and to accept international peer reviews.

53. Member States and the Agency should strengthen their efforts to ensure that countries embarking on nuclear power programmes developed sound safety infrastructures, including effective and independent regulatory bodies. The Agency should expand its efforts to assist States in assessing and strengthening their nuclear safety culture.

54. The provision through the Agency of technical assistance to developing countries in support of nuclear applications in areas such as health, agriculture, environmental protection, hydrology, and biological and physical research was important both for its direct contribution to human well-being and because it helped to build broad support for the Agency itself and its larger energy, safety, security and non-proliferation missions. Consequently, the Agency's technical cooperation programmes should be expanded and diversified in order to keep pace with the growth in the Agency's other activities. The demand for Agency technical assistance would always exceed the resources allocated for it, but developing countries' expectations needed to be better satisfied in the future.

55. The Commission believed that, in order to enable the Agency to properly fulfil its various duties, Member States should provide it with considerably more resources. It recommended an immediate one-time Agency budget increase by an amount sufficient for, at least, refurbishing SAL and adequately funding the Incident and Emergency Centre.

56. In addition, it recommended annual increases in the Regular Budget so as to underpin an expansion of the Agency's safety and security activities, of activities in support of States embarking on nuclear power programmes and of activities relating to nuclear applications and technology transfer.

57. In the longer term, the Regular Budget would need to continue increasing so that the growing demand for Agency services might be met. A substantially larger Regular Budget — by 2020 perhaps twice as large as the present one — would permit the necessary expansion of work relating to nuclear reactors and the fuel cycle, safety and security, support for meeting basic human needs through nuclear applications, and technical cooperation.

58. A large majority of the Commission members believed that progress towards disarmament, or the lack of it, would greatly affect the Agency's non-proliferation mission.

59. Article VI of the NPT legally obligated the nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT to engage in good-faith negotiations directed towards nuclear disarmament, and those States had agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference that the NPT represented an "unequivocal undertaking" to "accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals". The commitment in question was an integral part of the 'NPT bargain'.

60. The need for the NPT to become universal could not be stressed enough, and States should recommit themselves to the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and take firmer steps towards the realization of that vision. A world free of nuclear weapons would not be achieved quickly, and there would have to be action, by many international actors, going far beyond the mandate and capabilities of the Agency. What was needed was an ambitious reinvigoration of the 'grand bargain' struck 40 years previously with the adoption of the NPT. The reinvigorated 'grand bargain' would have to combine steps that could be taken immediately with a vision for the longer term and draw in States that were not parties to the NPT.

61. New approaches to verifying compliance with NPT obligations, to providing for the security of States in the absence of nuclear weapons and to punishing States that violated the NPT regime would certainly be required, and new methods of controlling the sensitive elements of the nuclear fuel cycle would probably be required as well.

62. While the precise future role of the Agency in disarmament remained to be determined, international nuclear verification would certainly be essential as disarmament proceeded, and the existing capabilities and experience of the Agency made it well suited to play a central role. Moreover, it would be logical for States to assign to the Agency a central role in the monitoring of the huge stockpiles of fissile materials that would be released from nuclear weapons programmes. The activities in question would also justify the allocation of additional resources to the Agency.

63. As the world moved into the seventh nuclear decade, the international community could look forward to great opportunities but was also facing great challenges. The expanded use of nuclear technologies offered immense potential for meeting important development needs, but it also posed complex and broad-ranging safety and security challenges that would have to be addressed effectively.

64. Consequently, in order to reduce the risks while allowing rapidly growing contributions to human well-being from nuclear technologies, the Commission called for a stronger global nuclear order.

65. A stronger global nuclear order would emerge as a product of increased collective action and partnership, greater transparency, increasingly effective standards of safety and security worldwide, new non-proliferation measures, and progressive steps to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons.

66. If it could be created, that stronger global nuclear order might usher in an era of Atoms for Peace and Prosperity, as had been the hope in 1953, when the Agency had been conceived. Of course, the task was one that went far beyond the Agency's mandate and capabilities, but strengthening the Agency would be one of the most crucial steps towards the fulfilment of that task.

67. The CHAIRMAN thanked Professor Zedillo for his statement and expressed the Board's gratitude to him and the other commission members for producing such a comprehensive report.

68. Mr BERTONCELJ (Slovenia)*, speaking on behalf of the European Union, said that it had noted the following sentence in the preface to the Commission's report: "The members of the Commission endorse the report as a whole but do not each subscribe to every statement and recommendation in this text."

69. The European Union, which remained a strong supporter of the Agency, considered it extremely important that the Agency continue with its activities during the period up to 2020 and beyond within the framework of its statutory mandate.

70. The European Union looked forward to studying the recommendations contained in the Commission's report and to continuing its close interaction with the Secretariat in considering ways and means of increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency during the period up to 2020 and beyond.

71. Mr DÍAZ (Mexico), speaking on behalf of GRULAC, said that GRULAC took special pleasure in thanking Professor Zedillo, former President of Mexico, for presenting the Commission's report and was grateful to all the Commission members for their efforts.

72. In due course, GRULAC and individual GRULAC members would express their views regarding the ideas put forward in the report. Those ideas were enriched by the fact that the report

reflected the personal opinions of the Commission members and different — sometimes opposing — standpoints.

73. Mr BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) said that in its report the Commission had somewhat departed from the practical mandate given to it by the Director General — namely, to present specific programmatic and financial proposals in the light of the expected long-term development of the Agency. His delegation had no objection to the Board's taking note of the report, which was of a purely recommendatory nature, but did not concur with all the conclusions contained in it, especially those relating to matters which did not fall within the Commission's mandate or even within the Agency's statutory competence — for example, disarmament. At the same time, it welcomed what the report had to say about “medium and small reactors”.

74. His delegation looked forward to discussing the report in detail at the September session of the Board.

75. Mr SCHULTE (United States of America) thanking the Commission for its report, said that it contained many positive suggestions regarding nuclear safety, nuclear security, safeguards, nuclear energy and technical cooperation.

76. His delegation, which welcomed the Commission's recognition of the need for management reform, looked forward to discussing the report more fully during the forthcoming sessions of the Board and the General Conference.

77. Mr KUMAR (India) said that his delegation greatly appreciated the initiative of the Director General in setting up the Commission of Eminent Persons and was grateful to Professor Zedillo and all the other Commission members. The Commission's report would be studied carefully by his delegation.

78. For the present, in taking note of the report his delegation wished to emphasize that any discussion on the nature and scope of the Agency's work would have to be conducted strictly within the framework of the Agency's Statute.

79. Mr AMANO (Japan) thanked Professor Zedillo and the other Commission members for the report before the Board and said that his delegation, which would study the report in detail, looked forward to discussing its contents.

80. Mr SHAHBAZ (Pakistan), speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, commended the Commission of Eminent Persons for its report and said that the Group would present its views on the contents of the report at the forthcoming session of the Board.

81. The CHAIRMAN, on behalf of the Board, thanked Professor Zedillo once again for presenting the Commission's report and said that the Board clearly looked forward to having a substantive discussion of the report in September.

Mr Horvatić (Croatia) took the Chair.

3. The Annual Report for 2007

(GOV/2008/10, plus additional information available on GovAtom)

82. The CHAIRMAN, introducing document GOV/2008/10, urged Member States' representatives to disseminate the final version of the Annual Report for 2007 as widely as possible in their home countries.

83. Mr SHAHBAZ (Pakistan), speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, said that the Group was deeply saddened by the tragic loss of life and the devastation in China and Myanmar. Also, the Group would like its condolences to be conveyed to Mr Matthai's family and friends.

84. The Agency was to commended for its role, during the past 50 years, in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear technology in support of the socio-economic development of Member States and for its integrated approaches to the achievement of Millennium Development Goals.

85. The Group, in noting Agency publications *Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power* and *Considerations to Launch a Nuclear Power Programme*, would like to see the Agency continuing its efforts to increase the share of nuclear power in electricity generation worldwide while remaining vigilant in matters of safety and security.

86. The Group, which attached considerable importance to INPRO, welcomed the fact that INPRO Phase Two would focus on innovative approaches to infrastructure and institutional development for countries beginning nuclear power programmes and on the establishment by INPRO members of collaborative projects.

87. The Group would like the Secretariat to include references to all SMR designs, both proven and under development, in the relevant Agency reports.

88. The Group continued to be of the view that any proposal to establish a framework for multilateral nuclear fuel supply assurances under the aegis of the Agency should be preceded by a thorough analysis, in consultation with Member States, of all the technical, legal, political and economic issues involved.

89. The Group welcomed the Agency's activities relating to thorium-based fuels, atomic and nuclear data, research reactors, accelerators, nuclear instrumentation and spectrometry, and nuclear fusion.

90. The Group, which recognized the benefits derived by Member States from joint Agency-FAO activities, attached great importance to the activities relating to — inter alia — livestock production, the sustainable control of major insect pests, soil degradation, and food quality and safety. Also, in the Group's view it was certainly within the Agency's mandate to contribute to the achievement of Millennium Development Goals by — inter alia — helping to increase agricultural productivity. Accordingly, the Group remained firmly of the opinion that the Joint FAO/IAEA Division of Nuclear Techniques in Food and Agriculture should be retained — and indeed strengthened.

91. The Group greatly appreciated the Agency's efforts in addressing Member States' needs in the field of human health, particularly those relating to capacity-building and the enhancement of technical capabilities in areas such as nutrition, nuclear medicine and diagnostic imaging, and cancer treatment. It welcomed the expansion of collaboration between the Agency and several other international organizations and several Member States' national cancer institutes within the framework

of PACT. It also welcomed the training activities being supported from the IAEA Nobel Peace Prize Cancer and Nutrition Fund and organized by the PACT Programme Office, and it would like to see the PACT Programme Office continuing with its fundraising efforts.

92. The Group, which greatly appreciated the briefing on PACT given by the Secretariat on 28 May 2008, welcomed the formalization of the WHO/IAEA Joint Programme on Cancer Control and the progress made in recruiting additional staff for PACT in accordance with the relevant General Conference resolutions. It hoped that the PACT Programme Office would secure the funds necessary for the organization of imPACT missions to the 55 Member States — most of them developing countries — that had requested such missions. In that connection, the Group was opposed to the Secretariat's charging overhead costs and programme support costs in the case of extrabudgetary contributions for PACT activities.

93. The Agency was to be commended for its role in supporting global water resource management efforts and assessing the impacts of climate change through various isotope hydrology initiatives. Also, the Group greatly appreciated the assistance being provided by the Agency to Member States in their efforts to incorporate isotope hydrology into their water resource management programmes.

94. The Agency was playing a unique role in the assessment of the impacts of climate change, in the assessment and management of marine and terrestrial environments, and in helping to establish safety and quality standards for seafood. It was to be commended for the CRPs and technical cooperation activities being implemented in those areas in response to Member States' needs.

95. The Group was pleased with the Agency's support for the development of — inter alia — radiopharmaceuticals and radiation-processed natural polymers. It was also pleased with the way in which the Agency had responded to the needs of Member States that did not possess radioisotope production facilities by conducting CRPs on the development of radionuclide generators.

96. The Group, which continued to attach great importance to safety, welcomed the Agency's efforts in helping Member States to strengthen their safety-related infrastructures. It also welcomed the ongoing revision of the BSS. It hoped that the Secretariat would continue to assist developing countries with the application of Agency safety standards.

97. In view of the crucial role of Agency technical cooperation activities in more and more Member States' socio-economic development, the Group would like to see adequate Regular Budget resources being allocated to Major Programme 6 — Management of Technical Cooperation for Development.

98. Mr CURIA (Argentina), speaking on behalf of GRULAC, said it was important that the Agency continue its activities in support of Member States interested in the nuclear power option for electricity production, assisting them with the initiation of the necessary domestic institutional procedures. A number of countries in the region of Latin America and the Caribbean had embarked on studies with a view to the taking of political decisions regarding the use of nuclear power.

99. As regards non-power applications of nuclear techniques, GRULAC attached great importance to them as they had benefited millions of people in areas such as food and agriculture, environmental protection and human health. In that connection, it had been pleased to note that in 2007 more than 60 Member States had been supported through Agency technical cooperation projects and CRPs on the use of crop mutation induction facilitation by biomolecular techniques.

100. Regarding the commercial application of irradiation as a quarantine treatment for agricultural commodities, GRULAC welcomed the recommendation, resulting from an FAO/Agency regional workshop on the subject held in Mexico City in 2007, that regional activities relating to the phytosanitary use of irradiation be strengthened.

101. The Group was concerned about the negative impact that scarcity of water resources was having on the development of many countries, particularly as the situation stood to worsen owing to climate change. It therefore greatly appreciated the assistance being provided through the Agency in the area of water resources management. Also, it welcomed the progress made by the Agency in its efforts to bring isotope hydrology into the mainstream of national and international water resource-related programmes.

102. Regarding human health, GRULAC welcomed the decision of the Ministers of Health of Central America to establish a subregional cancer control programme with the assistance of the Agency, PAHO and WHO. It also welcomed the fact that, through a regional technical cooperation project in Latin America, 24 hospitals there had received equipment for the positioning and immobilization of patients undergoing radiotherapy.

103. GRULAC, which greatly appreciated the Agency's efforts relating to the safety and security of nuclear material and facilities, welcomed the ongoing revision of the BSS and attached great importance to the role of the Secretariat in assisting States with the application of Agency safety standards.

104. GRULAC also attached great importance to the Agency's Transport Regulations, which it would like to see being applied by all those engaged in the transport of radioactive material. As regards the transport of radioactive material by sea, it would like to see a continuation of the dialogue and consultations between coastal States and shipping States in the interests of improved intergovernmental communication.

105. GRULAC welcomed the holding in Montevideo, in July 2007, of a regional workshop on denials of shipment of radioactive material.

106. GRULAC also welcomed the holding in Santos, Brazil, of an international workshop on the management of the consequences of accidental releases of radioactivity to the environment, the participants in which had drawn on the experience gained during the 20 years since the tragic accident that had occurred in Goiânia, Brazil, in September 1987.

107. The Agency was to be commended for assisting Brazil with nuclear security at the 2007 Pan American Games, held in Rio de Janeiro. The Government of Peru had benefited from the experience gained at that event when hosting the Fifth Latin America and Caribbean–European Union Summit in Lima in May 2008.

108. GRULAC would continue to support the efforts of the Agency in combating nuclear and radiological terrorism, including its efforts to promote universal adherence to the international legal instruments on the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities and radioactive sources.

109. Ms GERVAIS-VIDRICAIRE (Canada), having commended the Secretariat for its work in all major programme areas during 2007, said that her country welcomed the upward revision of the Agency's medium-term projections for global growth in nuclear power. It also welcomed the Agency's efforts to help Member States launch nuclear power programmes; the publications *Considerations to Launch a Nuclear Power Programme* and *Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power* were very useful in that connection, and her country looked forward to the issuing of publications on the financing of nuclear power projects and the status and prospects of nuclear power development.

110. Canada, which was a very active member of INPRO, believed that INPRO would produce significant benefits for Member States that were current or future operators of nuclear power plants.

111. Her country, which welcomed the progress made during 2007 in the area of nuclear knowledge management, considered that events like the June 2007 International Conference on Knowledge Management in Nuclear Facilities — for which Canada had provided the Chairperson — were very useful mechanisms for helping the nuclear industry and nuclear regulators to understand the importance of knowledge management and of constant operational safety excellence at all nuclear facilities. It had benefited from knowledge management assistance visits to its Darlington and Bruce nuclear power plants, the operators of which had particularly appreciated the Secretariat's guidance with knowledge management self-assessments that had helped to identify risks associated with a loss of knowledge.

112. The Departments of Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Safety and Security, and Technical Cooperation had all been involved in knowledge management projects in 2007, and Canada therefore considered the one-house approach to be particularly important for knowledge management.

113. Canada, which welcomed the reported continuing high level of nuclear safety in 2007, greatly appreciated the Agency's work relating to the seismic safety of nuclear installations. It had contributed extrabudgetary funding in support of that work.

114. Referring to the "Safety and Security" section of the Overview contained in the draft report under consideration, she said that her delegation had noted with some concern that it did not include a summary of the Agency's activities in the areas of decommissioning and waste management. Some activities in those two areas were mentioned in the main part of the draft report, but as technology developments, and those activities had been undertaken mainly outside the Agency framework. The principal role of the Agency in the areas of decommissioning and waste management was to establish safety standards for application by Member States. It would be better if activities like those mentioned in the draft report as technology developments were reported on in the Agency's Nuclear Technology Reviews.

115. Canada welcomed the fact that support for the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and for the supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources had continued to grow during 2007. It had contributed extrabudgetary funding in order to facilitate greater Member State participation both in the June 2007 meeting of technical and legal experts on experience in implementing the Code and the supplementary Guidance and in a May 2008 technical meeting on lessons learned from implementing the supplementary Guidance. In its view, the outcomes of those two meetings would help to bring about international consistency and harmonized practices in an area that was important to Canada as a leading manufacturer and supplier of radioactive sources.

116. Canada, which was pleased that the safety record of nuclear and radioactive material transport had remained excellent during 2007, was participating very actively in the work of the International Steering Committee on Denials of Shipment of Radioactive Material. Following the regional workshop on radioactive material shipment denials held in Montevideo in July 2007, it was looking forward to the results of the workshops due to be held in the Mediterranean, Asian and African regions during 2008. It believed that such workshops would help to alleviate the shipment denials problem.

117. Her country would like the Secretariat to continue seeking ways of disseminating the Agency's Annual Reports widely, particularly to stakeholders and policy-makers.

118. Mr TANG GUOQIANG (China) thanked the Secretariat and Member States for their expressions of sympathy for the victims of the earthquake that had struck Sichuan Province on 12 May 2008. The Government of China was extremely grateful for the assistance that had been provided by many governments, international organizations and individuals. Following checks carried out since the earthquake, some of them with the help of equipment supplied through Agency technical

cooperation projects, he was able to inform the Board that all of China's nuclear facilities and radioactive sources were currently safe and secure.

119. Turning to the draft Annual Report for 2007, he said that China, whose nuclear power programme was progressing smoothly, was grateful to the Agency for its assistance in support of the programme and hoped to cooperate still closer with the Agency in that connection.

120. China greatly appreciated the work being done by the Agency in support of non-power applications of nuclear energy — for example, in the areas of cancer therapy, food security and insect pest control. The Agency's activities relating to such applications were helping to promote sustainable socio-economic progress in many developing countries.

121. China, which attached great importance to the role of the Agency in helping Member States to create strong nuclear safety infrastructures, was cooperating closely with the Agency in the formulation of national nuclear safety standards, the establishment of nuclear safety monitoring and management systems and the promotion of nuclear safety culture.

122. In the field of nuclear security, the Agency had done much to assist Member States in capacity-building. China was particularly grateful to the Agency — and also to a number of other Member States — for the nuclear security assistance provided to it ahead of the 2008 Olympic Games, due to be held in Beijing soon.

123. China had not only benefited from the Agency's technical cooperation activities. It had also supported them by receiving many Agency fellows and scientific visitors and by paying its full TCF target shares in a timely manner.

124. China would continue to support both the promotional activities and the safeguards activities of the Agency, which were mandated by the Statute, and it hoped that an appropriate balance would be achieved between the two activity types.

125. Mr MARFURT (Switzerland) said that the draft Annual Report for 2007 was very informative, comprehensive and readily understandable.

126. Referring to paragraph 23 of the Overview, he questioned the definition of HEU as “uranium enriched to 90% or greater”.

127. Mr ZHGUTOV (Russian Federation) welcomed the conclusions contained in the draft Annual Report for 2007 regarding the growing importance of nuclear power for meeting humankind's increasing energy needs, particularly in developing countries.

128. In the present world energy situation, it was essential to continue with the current efforts to create conditions whereby countries that fulfilled the relevant international obligations could fully exercise the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

129. That was the background to a Russian initiative aimed at creating a global nuclear power infrastructure that would ensure equal access to nuclear power for all interested countries consistently complying with the requirements of the non-proliferation regime. Within the framework of that initiative, an International Uranium Enrichment Centre had been established in Russia, with the participation of Kazakhstan, at the site of the Angarsk Electrolysis Chemical Complex — and Armenia was currently completing the process of joining the Centre. In accordance with decisions of the Government of the Russian Federation, both the International Uranium Enrichment Centre and the Angarsk Electrolysis Chemical Complex had been added to the list of Russian nuclear facilities to which Agency safeguards might be applied.

130. Wishing to help create the aforementioned global nuclear power infrastructure and also to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, the Russian Federation was placing great hopes in international cooperation in developing inherently safe and proliferation-resistant nuclear power systems. Accordingly, it was participating very actively in INPRO, which was contributing to the development of such innovative systems through the collaborative efforts of the INPRO member countries.

131. His country, which attached great importance to the Agency's activities directed against nuclear and radiological terrorism, welcomed the manner in which the Nuclear Security Plan for 2006–2009 was being implemented. It saw a major role for the Agency in the implementation of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism launched by the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States of America in July 2006. In particular, it envisaged the Agency's unique nuclear security expertise being drawn upon in the implementation of the work plan adopted at the third meeting of the Global Initiative participants, held in Astana, Kazakhstan, in June 2007.

132. The Russian Federation greatly appreciated the way in which the Agency was supporting non-proliferation by assisting with the return of fresh and spent HEU research reactor fuel to its country of origin.

133. With the growing interest and international cooperation in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, the importance of Agency safeguards was also growing. The international community needed to be absolutely sure about the peaceful nature of States' nuclear activities, and only the Agency was qualified to provide it with the necessary assurances. Against that background, the Russian Federation greatly appreciated the Agency's efforts regarding the conclusion of additional protocols to safeguards agreements — an area where significant progress had been made in 2007.

134. His delegation welcomed the efforts currently under way in the Secretariat to establish an international seismic safety centre. The need for such a centre had been highlighted by the recent strong earthquakes in China, where there were nuclear fuel cycle facilities in the affected zone.

135. The Secretariat, which was playing an important part in the implementation of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, was to be commended for its contribution to the success of the 4th Review Meeting of Contracting Parties to the Convention, held in April 2008.

136. The Russian Federation, which would continue to actively support the Agency, attached great importance to maintenance of the balance between the Agency's basic statutory functions — namely, promoting cooperation in the peaceful utilization of nuclear technologies, strengthening nuclear and radiation safety, and verifying the non-diversion of nuclear energy applications to military purposes.

137. Mr VALLIM GUERREIRO (Brazil), welcoming the draft Annual Report for 2007, said that the Annual Reports of the Agency should be considered in conjunction with its Nuclear Safety Reviews, Nuclear Security Reports, Nuclear Technology Reviews, Technical Cooperation Reports and Safeguards Implementation Reports in order to gain a holistic understanding of the Agency's role in the world at large.

138. The Overview at the beginning of the draft Annual Report for 2007 was very useful, but in his delegation's opinion the Overview paragraphs on activities relating to the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste should be in the Safety and Security section of the final version.

139. Mr CURIA (Argentina), having praised the quality of the draft Annual Report for 2007, said, with respect to paragraph 22 of the Overview (Assurances of supply of nuclear fuel), that his authorities were carefully studying the various proposals made with regard to the nuclear fuel cycle, but within the framework of the principle that all countries were entitled to develop their own fuel

cycle technologies and operate their own enrichment systems provided that they complied strictly with the provisions of the NPT.

140. His country attached great importance to the establishment of robust and sustainable radiation safety and transport safety infrastructures, including effective regulatory bodies, at the national and the regional level.

141. The efforts being made by various Member States and the Secretariat with regard to education and training in radiation protection and nuclear safety were particularly important given the likelihood of a rapid new expansion of nuclear power generation in the world at large. For its part, Argentina was continuing with the establishment of a regional centre for education and training in radiation protection and radioactive source safety.

142. In that connection, his Government considered regional networks for the exchange of radiation and nuclear safety information to be extremely useful, and during 2007 Argentina had continued to participate fully in the activities of the Ibero-American Forum of Radiological and Nuclear Regulatory Agencies.

143. His delegation had noted with concern that the Safety and Security section of the Overview did not provide any information about Agency activities related to decommissioning and radioactive waste management. Some activities in those two fields were described in the Technology section of the Overview, but they were activities conducted outside the framework of the Agency's regular programme. In those two fields, the Agency's principal role was — pursuant to the Statute — to establish safety standards and provide, at the request of States, for their application. The Agency's Annual Reports should describe what the Agency had done during the previous year in that regard. Perhaps the Safety and Security section of each Annual Report should remind readers of the Agency's safety and security related functions as spelled out in Article III.A.6 of the Statute.

144. His delegation, which greatly appreciated the information provided in paragraph 46 of the Overview, understood that the reconstituted Commission on Safety Standards had held its first meeting a few days previously and had dealt with a number of important issues — such as rationalization of the corpus of safety standards, co-sponsoring by other organizations belonging to the United Nations family and the integration of security documents into the safety document review and revision system established by the Board. It would like the Secretariat to prepare a document, for consideration by the Board at its next session, containing specific proposals regarding those issues.

145. As the Agency's Annual Reports were documents made available to the general public, particular care was necessary in the drafting of the section on Verification — a very sensitive subject. In Argentina's view, however, it should be possible to improve that section by making it more easily understandable, with an explanation of the benefits of safeguards — of the role of safeguards in building confidence among States and the value of efficient and effective safeguards in facilitating international cooperation in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy.

146. Argentina recognized the importance of adequately justifying the assurances provided by Agency safeguards with regard to countries' nuclear programmes, but it remained concerned about references, particularly in documents made available to the general public, to the limited nature of safeguards conclusions in the case of countries that did not have an additional protocol — a voluntary instrument — in force. In its opinion, such references might well be counterproductive as regards the perception of the effectiveness of the Agency's verification activities, detracting from the fact that the vast majority of countries having only comprehensive safeguards agreements in force fully respected their commitments to the use of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes. That fact was played down in the draft Annual Report for 2007.

147. Argentina felt that the approach to safeguards reflected in the draft Annual Report overlooked the role of safeguards in building confidence among States and facilitating international cooperation in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. His delegation would therefore like to see a more balanced approach in the final version.

148. Referring to the third IAEA Nobel Peace Prize Cancer and Nutrition Fund Special Event on Cancer, which had taken place in Buenos Aires in April 2007 and had coincided with the inauguration of Argentina's Centre for Nuclear Medicine, he said that his country attached great importance to PACT.

149. His delegation would like the final version of the Annual Report for 2007 to reflect the hard work done by the Secretariat, particularly the Department of Technical Cooperation and the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security, pursuant to the General Conference's request that it support the participation of developing countries in the 12th Congress of IRPA, to be held in Buenos Aires in October 2008. It would also like the General Conference to have before it, at its forthcoming session, a report by the Secretariat on its efforts to facilitate the holding of the Congress.

150. Mr SCHULTE (United States of America), having welcomed the draft Annual Report for 2007, noted that the customary list of facilities under Agency safeguards or containing safeguarded material on 31 December was not included in it, and requested that the list be included in the final version and be made available online.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.