

IAEA Board of Governors

Record of the 1211th Meeting
GOV/OR.1211

Nuclear verification

(c) Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Board of Governors

GOV/OR.1211

Issued: July 2008

Restricted Distribution

Original: English

For official use only

Record of the 1211th Meeting

Held at Headquarters, Vienna, on Wednesday, 4 June 2008, at 3.25 p.m.

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¹ GOV/2008/23.

Attendance

(The list below gives the name of the senior member of each delegation who attended the meeting, as well as that of any other member whose statement is summarized in this record.)

Mr SKOKNIC		Chairman (Chile)
Mr GALANXHI	_____	Albania
Ms FEROUKHI		Algeria
Mr CURIA		Argentina
Mr SHANNON	}	Australia
Mr KRUSE		
Ms SELLNER		Austria
Mr BAZOBERRY		Bolivia
Mr VALLIM GUERREIRO		Brazil
Ms GERVAIS-VIDRICAIRE		Canada
Mr LAGOS KOLLER		Chile
Mr TANG Guoqiang		China
Mr HORVATIĆ		Croatia
Mr MOREJÓN-ALMEIDA		Ecuador
Ms SINEGIORGIS		Ethiopia
Ms KAUPPI		Finland
Mr CARON	}	France
Mr DENIAU		
Mr GOTTWALD		Germany
Ms AMOAH		Ghana
Mr KUMAR		India
Mr ALSHARIA	}	Iraq
Mr AYOUB		
Mr COGAN		Ireland
Mr GHISI		Italy
Mr AMANO		Japan
Ms GREIČIUVIENĖ		Lithuania
Mr CANCHOLA GUTIERREZ		Mexico
Mr ZNIBER		Morocco
Mr EDOKPA		Nigeria
Mr SHAHBAZ		Pakistan
Ms LACANLALE		Philippines
Mr BERDENNIKOV		Russian Federation
Mr AL-TAIFI		Saudi Arabia
Mr MINTY		South Africa
Mr MARFURT		Switzerland
Mr PANUPONG		Thailand
Mr SMITH		United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Mr SCHULTE		United States of America
Mr ELBARADEI	_____	Director General
Mr ANING		Secretary of the Board

Representatives of the following Member States also attended the meeting:

Afghanistan, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mongolia, Montenegro, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

Abbreviations used in this record:

EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EU	European Union
LEU	low-enriched uranium
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT Review Conference	Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
R&D	research and development
SIR	Safeguards Implementation Report

* Speakers under Rule 50 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure are indicated by an asterisk.

7. Nuclear verification (continued)

(c) Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (GOV/2008/15)

1. The CHAIRMAN, drawing attention to the Director General's report contained in document GOV/2008/15, said that it had been the subject of a technical briefing which had taken place on 29 May 2008.

2. Ms GOICOCHEA ESTENOZ (Cuba)*, speaking on behalf of NAM, said that the Movement's position regarding the Iranian nuclear issue was reflected in the statement adopted at its 14th summit, held in Havana, Cuba, on 15–16 September 2006.²

3. NAM took note that the Director General had once again stated that the Agency was able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and that Iran had provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material and the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material and activities. NAM also noted that the Agency had not found indications of ongoing reprocessing activities in Iran.

4. NAM appreciated Iran's cooperation in responding with regard to the alleged studies despite the fact that the six outstanding issues reflected in paragraphs I.2 and II of the work plan had been resolved. NAM noted with satisfaction that Iran had agreed to deal with the matter of the alleged studies, including additional questions, and to hold a series of technical meetings in Iran with the Agency's delegation headed by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards.

5. She took note that the Director General's report once again emphasized that the Agency had not detected the actual use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies.

6. NAM recalled that, regarding the alleged studies, the agreement reached in the work plan stipulated that upon receiving all related documents, Iran would review them and inform the Agency of its assessment. Also, NAM noted that, although the Agency had been unable to provide the related documents in many cases, Iran had nonetheless cooperated by providing information.

7. NAM took note of the fact that the Agency had received much information only in electronic form and had not been authorized to provide copies to Iran and that, in other cases, it was not in possession of the documents and was therefore unable to make them available to Iran. NAM was concerned that such situations could impede the verification process.

8. There could be concerns that issues related to the alleged studies were not a core competency of the Agency. However, NAM trusted that in clarifying the alleged studies, including issues such as high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle project, the Agency would act in accordance with its Statute.

9. Given that all outstanding issues had been resolved, as reported by the Director General to the Board in March 2008, and given the rounds of intensive discussions on the alleged studies that had

² See GOV/OR.1204 para. 3.

taken place in Iran, NAM expected that safeguards implementation in Iran should be conducted in a routine manner.

10. NAM reiterated its full confidence in the impartiality and professionalism of the Secretariat and the Director General and strongly opposed any undue pressure or interference in the Agency's activities, and especially in the verification process, which would jeopardize its efficiency and credibility.

11. NAM's principled position was that diplomacy and dialogue were the only way to achieve a long term solution of Iran's nuclear issue and it encouraged all Member States to contribute positively to that effect. NAM also expected all concerned parties to avoid taking any measures which put at risk the constructive process between Iran and the Agency.

12. Mr BERTONCELJ (Slovenia)* speaking on behalf of the EU, said that the candidate countries Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia, the EFTA countries Iceland and Liechtenstein, members of the European Economic Area, and Ukraine and Moldova aligned themselves with his statement.

13. The EU noted with concern that Iran had once again failed to take the steps required by Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008). It noted with growing concern that Iran continued to disregard the Board's request and the mandatory demands of the Security Council aimed at building confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. The latest Director General's report indicated that, on the contrary, Iran was further increasing its enrichment capacities, both quantitatively and with new types of centrifuge. The EU continued to urge Iran to implement the measures requested by the Board and required by the Security Council, particularly the suspension of all enrichment related activities and including R&D, as had been required for a long time.

14. The EU regretted that, despite the Agency's request to Iran to reconsider its decision to suspend implementation of the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1, no progress on the issue had been achieved. It reiterated that Iran could not unilaterally modify the Subsidiary Arrangements to its safeguards agreement and noted with concern that Iran had failed to inform the Agency within the timeframe envisaged in Code 3.1 of the revision of design information for the Fuel Enrichment Plant and the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant. Those changes were significant and should have been communicated to the Agency.

15. The EU remained seriously concerned that, despite more than five years of intense efforts, the Agency was still not in a position to determine the full nature of Iran's nuclear programme. It noted the Agency's concern regarding the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear programme and shared the Secretariat's view that the alleged studies on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle project — information on which had been presented to Iran — remained a matter of grave concern. The information presented had been derived from multiple sources, was detailed in content and was believed by the Agency to be generally consistent. Therefore a simple rejection by Iran of the information as inauthentic, forged or fabricated was neither credible nor acceptable. Moreover, the EU noted that Iran did not dispute the factual accuracy of some of the information.

16. While welcoming the fact that Iran was finally willing to engage in reviewing the Agency's questions, the EU regretted that Iran had not provided the Agency with all the information and access to documents and individuals necessary to support its statements. The EU noted with concern the Agency's view that Iran could have additional information, in particular on high explosives testing and

missile related activities, which could shed more light on those important questions. Iran should share that information with the Agency.

17. The Agency had clearly indicated that, in order to be able to provide assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, it needed Iran to implement its additional protocol, resolve questions related to the alleged studies, explain the circumstances of the acquisition of the uranium metal document, clarify procurement and R&D activities of military related institutes and clarify the production of nuclear equipment by companies belonging to defence industries. In addition, the EU underlined that, according to the Agency, clarification regarding the alleged studies was critical to an assessment of the nature of Iran's past and present nuclear programme.

18. The EU called on Iran to provide substantive and detailed explanations to answer the Agency's questions as contained in the Annex to the Director General's report, as well as other pertinent questions concerning its past and present nuclear programme. Clarifying those issues could constitute an important element in building confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

19. The EU recalled the conclusions adopted by the European Council in December 2007, whereby the EU reaffirmed its deep concern at Iran's nuclear programme and underlined that the acquisition by Iran of a nuclear military capability would be unacceptable. It reiterated its full support for the work of the Security Council to consider the adoption of further appropriate measures under Article 41, Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. In that context, the EU reiterated its support for the implementation of the additional measures contained in Security Council resolution 1803 (2008).

20. The EU noted the exchange of letters between the President of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and the Secretariat and underlined that any form of technical assistance provided to Iran should not contribute to proliferation activities. It recalled that exceptions to the suspension of technical cooperation had been made for nuclear safety projects. The EU was seriously concerned about information that Iran was considering commissioning the Bushehr nuclear power plant without acceding to the Convention on Nuclear Safety.

21. The EU reaffirmed its unequivocal support for efforts to find a negotiated long term solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. It supported the renewed offer by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, based on the far-reaching offer made in June 2006, that was expected to be made to Iran soon. The EU therefore urged Iran to create the environment necessary for negotiations to be launched and to comply with the requirements of the Security Council and the Board of Governors, including the suspension of enrichment related activities.

22. Ms GERVAIS-VIDRICAIRE (Canada) said that it was deeply troubling that much of the information shared by the Agency with Iran appeared to be relevant to the development of nuclear weapons. The Director General's report indicated that the information had been provided to the Agency by several Member States, appeared to have been derived from multiple sources over different periods of time, was detailed in content and seemed to be generally consistent. It was essential that Iran respond in a substantive manner without delay. In particular, Iran had to address the Secretariat's questions regarding the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle project. Also, Iran must provide all the information, clarifications and access requested in the Director General's reports, including with respect to the role of the uranium metal document and some procurement activities of institutions related to the military. That was essential if the Agency was to determine that Iran's declarations were both correct and complete and that Iran's nuclear programme was of an entirely peaceful nature.

23. The questions regarding projects with a possible military dimension in Iran were a cause for serious concern in their own right. In the light of Iran's history of concealment and the resulting lack of confidence in its nuclear programme expressed by the Board they were even more troubling. Full resolution of all outstanding questions would be a first step to restoring confidence, but Iran must also take additional steps. It must implement fully its NPT safeguards agreement, including the provisions of its Subsidiary Arrangements related to design information. Also, it must ratify without delay and implement fully its additional protocol and cooperate proactively with the Agency in its assessment of the correctness and completeness of all declarations made.

24. Canada fully endorsed the resolutions passed by the Board of Governors and the Security Council in relation to Iran's nuclear programme. It called on Iran to heed the requests of the Board and the requirements of the relevant Security Council resolutions by suspending enrichment related and reprocessing activities and its work on the heavy water research reactor at Arak and related projects.

25. In conclusion, she requested that the Director General continue to report on his verification efforts until such time as Iran had taken all the steps required of it and the Board had deemed that confidence in the peaceful nature of its programme had been established. Given the ongoing and broad interest in the issue, she requested that the report contained in document GOV/2008/15 be made public.

26. Mr BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) said that his delegation valued and supported the efforts of the Director General to implement the safeguards agreement with Iran and to carry out the work plan to resolve outstanding questions regarding Iran's nuclear activities, including clarification of the alleged studies. His delegation appreciated and supported the conclusions in the Director General's latest report.

27. He noted that Iran had agreed to discuss the issues related to its nuclear programme with the Agency. The Russian Federation believed that cooperation on such a sensitive issue should be based on reliable facts and objective, proven information. Iran should be given the opportunity to analyse thoroughly the information received by the Agency from several Member States relating to the alleged studies and to present its comments on them.

28. He underlined the importance of continued active cooperation between Iran and the Agency and of Iran taking measures to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme as had been called for by the Board and the Security Council. Concern remained that, in breach of Security Council resolutions, Iran had not taken steps to halt its uranium enrichment programme.

29. His delegation hoped that Iran would carefully study the new package of proposals from the six countries. Russia expected constructive steps on the part of Iran enabling the start of a substantive dialogue based on mutual respect with the aim of rapid resolution of the issues surrounding Iran's nuclear programme. He emphasized the Russian Federation's commitment to a political and diplomatic solution.

30. Ms LACANLALE (Philippines), having voiced her delegation's full confidence in the integrity, impartiality and professionalism of the Director General and the Secretariat, welcomed the Director General's statement that the Agency had been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. The one remaining unresolved major issue of the alleged studies was, however, a matter of serious concern.

31. The Philippines urged all parties concerned to cooperate with the Agency to clarify the authenticity of the documentation it had received on the alleged studies and related issues. Her country urged Iran to implement its additional protocol, to comply with the relevant Security Council and

Board resolutions and to continue providing the necessary access and transparency as confidence-building measures. It was vital to find a peaceful and comprehensive solution to the issue through continued dialogue.

32. Mr MOREJÓN-ALMEIDA (Ecuador) expressed his country's appreciation for the Agency's verification work to continue to confirm the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, for its intensive work to clarify the questions related to the alleged studies and for its overall evaluation of the nature of Iran's nuclear programme. Ecuador had confidence in the Agency's ongoing and meticulous work in fulfilment of its mandate.

33. He noted that Iran had provided the Agency with access to its declared nuclear material and had provided the required reports on nuclear accounting and on declared nuclear activities. It was regrettable that it had not applied the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1 related to the timely submission of design information.

34. Ecuador shared the concern expressed by the Director General in his report regarding the alleged studies and agreed that their clarification was fundamental to evaluating Iran's past and present nuclear programme. His delegation was pleased that Iran had agreed to address the alleged studies. Ecuador called on Iran to provide all the information requested by the Agency and to produce the relevant clarifications. On the one hand, it was encouraging that the Agency had not detected the actual use of nuclear material in relation to the alleged studies but, on the other, it was disappointing that essential elements of relevant Security Council resolutions had not been fulfilled.

35. Ecuador stressed that the inalienable rights of all States which met their obligations under the NPT could not be undermined. It was necessary to focus on the reduction of nuclear arsenals, the universalization of the nuclear non-proliferation system and on effective application of safeguards and verification in all countries. It was imperative to redouble efforts to achieve a more secure and just world in which nuclear technologies were used for human well-being and not destruction.

36. As Ecuador had repeatedly stated in various forums, it was necessary to support the requests of the Director General and the international community that Iran take all the necessary measures, including implementing its additional protocol, to build confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. Together with frank and open dialogue among all concerned parties, that would lead to a solution to the issue.

37. In conclusion, he reaffirmed his country's support for the professional and impartial work of the Agency on such a sensitive matter.

38. Mr KRUSE (Australia) said that, despite the Agency's hard work to clarify the scope and nature of Iran's past and present nuclear activities, his country's concerns had grown rather than diminished. Iran had continued and escalated its defiance of legally binding Security Council resolutions requiring it to suspend its proliferation-sensitive activities.

39. Rather than addressing the reasons for the lack of international confidence that led to such demands, Iran had continued its attempt to recast history by claiming that it had never been in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement.

40. Despite Iran's long record of undeclared nuclear activities, it had continued to deny the Agency the legal authority it needed to verify the absence of further such activities. Iran had rejected the Agency's requests for access to additional locations related to uranium mining, milling and enrichment and was not respecting its obligations with regard to the early provision of design information. Such lack of transparency and cooperation continued to render the Agency unable to verify the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

41. Confronted with a growing body of evidence pointing to possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme, Iran had responded by accusing the Agency of exceeding its mandate and of asking too many questions. It had dismissed information provided by several Member States, which the Agency had described as detailed and generally consistent. That information further diminished the international community's confidence in Iran's peaceful intentions. Iran had claimed that some of the information corresponded to activities of a civilian and conventional military nature but had prevented the Agency from corroborating those claims by withholding access to relevant sites, documents and individuals. For example, he noted that Iran had not provided any plausible evidence to support its claim that its experiments with exploding bridgewire detonators had been for civilian purposes.

42. Australia registered its profound concern that Iran now appeared to be turning its criticism against the nuclear inspectors themselves. It had blocked their investigation and was threatening a further reduction in cooperation and transparency. The Secretariat deserved the Board's strong and unequivocal support for the fulfilment of its verification mandate and the pursuit of its investigations in Iran.

43. Iran's actions did not look like the behaviour of a country with nothing to hide or of one seeking to restore confidence in its nuclear intentions. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya had demonstrated that a path of cooperation and transparency was open to Iran. That would build trust and lead to more normal relations with the international community.

44. The first step on such a path would be the suspension of all proliferation-sensitive activities. Given that it had no apparent capability to manufacture fuel from the LEU produced at Natanz and no reactors to use low enriched fuel, there was no credible civilian need for Iran to rush ahead with its enrichment programme. Suspending enrichment would build the confidence needed for diplomatic negotiations to commence.

45. A further step would be the full implementation by Iran of its additional protocol and any other transparency measures that the Agency might request owing to the special nature of Iran's verification case. If Iran wanted to build international trust, it would need to be proactive in helping the Agency verify the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.

46. The time had come for Iran to be completely transparent about its past nuclear activities. His delegation joined the Director General in calling on Iran to provide full disclosure and substantive explanations in connection with the extensive body of information pointing to possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme. Among many other open questions, the Agency needed a credible explanation as to why the uranium metal document had come into Iran's possession and a full understanding of the role of military related institutes in procurement and manufacturing for the nuclear programme.

47. Australia recognized that taking such steps would require a difficult and strategic decision for Iran, but appealed to Iran to take that path towards its rightful position in the international community.

48. Mr TANG Guoqiang (China) commended the impartial and professional work carried out by the Director General and the Secretariat to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue and said China would continue to support the Agency's constructive role in that regard.

49. China believed that a peaceful solution of the Iranian nuclear issue through dialogue and negotiation was still the best option as it would help to maintain the international non-proliferation regime as well as regional peace and stability, serving the interests of all countries.

50. The latest six-country offer for the resumption of talks was about to be transmitted to Iran which, in turn, had also put forward a proposed package showing its readiness to negotiate. Those initiatives would help to foster an appropriate solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and the parties

concerned should seize that hard-won opportunity and show flexibility in seeking an effective approach in order to break the deadlock and restart negotiations in search of a comprehensive long term solution.

51. China hoped that Iran would implement the relevant resolutions of the Board and the Security Council and continue to strengthen its cooperation with the Agency, clarifying outstanding issues and implementing positive measures, including the additional protocol, so as to build confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. China expected other parties to commit themselves to patient diplomatic efforts, creating a favourable environment for the resumption of talks.

52. China, which had always advocated reconciliation and negotiation between the parties concerned, would continue its tireless efforts to maintain the international non-proliferation regime, to safeguard regional peace and stability and to promote an appropriate and negotiated solution to the Iranian issue.

53. Mr VALLIM GUERREIRO (Brazil) said his delegation fully supported the endeavours of the Secretariat to bring the Iran nuclear issue to a successful conclusion. The mandates and dynamics of the Board of Governors and the Security Council were different and should remain so. Thus, the Security Council should respond to threats to the peace, acts of aggression and other breaches of the peace and the Agency should verify compliance with the obligations of non-nuclear-weapon States under the NPT.

54. Brazil had welcomed the work plan concluded in August 2007 by the Secretariat and the Government of Iran, providing an agreed timetable for addressing the specific questions causing concern about past Iranian nuclear activities. His delegation was satisfied that all the issues in the work plan had been resolved with the exception of the alleged studies and regretted that little progress had been made on that particular issue.

55. Brazil urged Iran to provide the Secretariat with all the information at its disposal to allow the latter to reach a satisfactory understanding of the different dimensions of the alleged studies and to settle once and for all the persistent doubts about possible militarization plans linked to previous Iranian nuclear activities. It was in the interest of Iran, the Agency and the international community as a whole to dispel all remaining misgivings in relation to that question.

56. Referring to the fact that a significant quantity of the information at the Secretariat's disposal had been provided by various Member States, his delegation urged Member States in possession of information relevant to the Agency's mandate to disclose it to the Agency in full and in a timely manner. The implementation of the Agency's verification mandate should not depend on when and what Member States wished the Agency to know.

57. He reiterated his Government's position that the question of Iran's nuclear activities should be resolved through negotiation and dialogue.

58. Mr CURIA (Argentina) said that his delegation supported and appreciated the efforts to move forward with the work plan agreed in August 2007 with a view to achieving a peaceful and long-lasting solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Argentina agreed with the Director General's assessment that the alleged studies on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle project were still matters of serious concern. Their clarification, receipt of the information requested and full access as required were essential in order to assess the nature of Iran's past and present nuclear programme.

59. Iran must promote confidence in the scope and nature of its current programme so that the Agency could provide assurances regarding not only declared nuclear materials but also the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. In view of the fact that Iran had conducted undeclared

activities for many years and the resulting lack of confidence, his delegation appealed to Iran to apply the additional protocol so that the Agency could make progress regarding the provision of credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities in Iran.

60. Iran must cooperate so that the Agency could carry out its verification activities, and also it must take the necessary actions to comply with the resolutions of the Board and the Security Council.

61. Mr LAGOS KOLLER (Chile), having thanked the Director General for his report, expressed concern that Iran was continuing its enrichment activities and activities relating to the heavy water reactor, thus failing to observe the relevant Security Council resolutions.

62. Referring to Iran's claim that the Security Council resolutions had no legitimate basis, Chile underscored their unquestionable validity for all United Nations Member States and the need to respect them. The Board had reported the matter to the Security Council specifically because of Iran's failure to cooperate with the Agency in clarifying the doubts about the nature of its nuclear programme. In that context, it was important for Iran to provide information regarding the alleged studies and clarify the points identified in the report as having possible military dimensions.

63. His delegation took note from the report of Iran's cooperation with the Agency and also of the fact that the expected progress had not yet been achieved.

64. Under Article IV of the NPT all countries had the right to develop peaceful nuclear programmes and he hoped that Iran would be able to exercise that right in the future. For that to happen all persisting doubts would have to be resolved and Iran should meet its obligations under the relevant Security Council and the Board resolutions, applying all of the confidence and transparency building measures required, including implementation of the additional protocol.

65. Chile stressed that the matter should be resolved through diplomacy and in accordance with international law and reiterated its appeal to all the parties involved, especially Iran, to seek a peaceful and negotiated solution to the crisis.

66. Mr PANUPONG (Thailand) noted that the Agency had been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran and that Iran had continued to provide access and accountancy reports related to its declared nuclear material and activities. He also noted that the Agency had found no indications of ongoing reprocessing activities in Iran.

67. Once the remaining issue of the alleged studies relating to the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle had been resolved, safeguards implementation in Iran could be conducted in a routine manner. In that connection, his delegation appreciated the good will and cooperation shown by Iran with regard to the alleged studies issue, including the holding of a series of technical meetings in Iran with an Agency delegation. Also, Thailand noted that the Secretariat had not detected the actual use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies.

68. His delegation was concerned that, in several cases, the Agency had not been able to provide the related documents to Iran to review and assess because much of the information was only in electronic form and it was not authorized to provide copies to Iran. That could impede the verification process, a process which needed to be transparent in all respects.

69. In the light of Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747 and 1803, Thailand hoped that Iran could raise the momentum of cooperation with the Agency so as to restore international confidence in the peaceful nature of its past and present nuclear activities. That would help reaffirm its inalienable right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and pave the way for the Agency to conduct safeguards implementation in Iran in a routine manner.

70. Dialogue and diplomacy remained the most appropriate and constructive way to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue and Thailand urged all the parties concerned to do their utmost to create an environment conducive to such dialogue whilst avoiding any measures that could lead to confrontation.

71. Mr CANCHOLA GUTIERREZ (Mexico) said that his delegation appreciated the Secretariat's professional and impartial work on the Iranian issue. It noted with concern that the Director General's latest report indicated that substantive explanations were required to determine the scope of Iran's nuclear programme.

72. Mexico regretted that, five years after the start of intensive verification in Iran, the Agency was still unable to clarify the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. His delegation urged the Iranian authorities to comply with the provisions of the relevant Security Council resolutions and to cooperate actively with a view to resolving the outstanding issues.

73. Mexico underscored the fundamental difference between Iran's obligations under its NPT safeguards agreement with the Agency, on the one hand, and the voluntary measures to build international confidence in its nuclear programme, on the other. All States should demonstrate objectively to the international community that their nuclear activities did not have a military purpose and those activities should fall under the Agency's verification procedures.

74. His delegation reiterated the importance of respect for and application of the rights and obligations incumbent on States in the context of international law, especially the inalienable right to undertake research into and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with Article IV of the NPT.

75. In conclusion, he restated Mexico's commitment to non-proliferation and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons as well as its support for diplomatic endeavours geared towards a negotiated solution to the Iranian issue.

76. Mr AMANO (Japan) said that it was a matter of serious concern that Iran had continued to conduct enrichment related activities and to work on heavy water related projects, as well as continuing its suspension of implementation of the additional protocol. Of particular concern were Iran's R&D activities regarding a new generation of centrifuges and expansion of its enrichment related activities at Natanz. Also, it was deeply regrettable that Iran was continuing its unilateral suspension of the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements. The current Iranian position was a barrier to restoration of the international community's confidence and to the Agency making further progress with its investigations.

77. Japan therefore called on Iran to suspend its enrichment related activities and its work on heavy water related projects, to implement and ratify the additional protocol, to take other transparency measures and to cooperate with the Agency in accordance with the relevant Board and Security Council resolutions. Further, his delegation urged Iran to cooperate with the Agency in providing substantive explanations regarding the alleged studies on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle, as well as the role of the uranium metal document and the procurement activities of military related institutions. That would help clarify the nature and scope of all Iran's past and present nuclear activities and enable it to exercise its right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

78. Japan continued to urge Iran to return without further delay to the negotiation process based on the comprehensive package proposed by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States.

79. Japan had taken every opportunity to encourage Iran to respond to the requirements of the international community, including at a meeting between the Japanese Prime Minister and the Iranian President on 3 June 2008, and would continue to do so.

80. Mr MARFURT (Switzerland) said the two most important points raised in the Director General's report were Iran's lack of cooperation relating to the alleged studies and its continued enrichment related activities.

81. The first was regrettable, especially since the Agency's work on the issue had intensified in recent months, particularly in terms of visits to Tehran. His delegation urged Iran to cooperate without further delay on all remaining issues so that the nature of Iran's past and present nuclear programme could be assessed. That included the provision of access to all relevant documents in order to resolve the issues with a potential military dimension as quickly as possible.

82. Regarding the second, his delegation again urged Iran to comply with the relevant Security Council resolutions and suspend its enrichment related activities.

83. A diplomatic solution to the Iran nuclear issue remained the best option and was still perfectly feasible. A comprehensive approach which covered all areas of cooperation between all the parties concerned would be the fairest way of proceeding and would represent a positive step towards essential dialogue on the matter. For such an approach to succeed, however, it would have to contain concrete and achievable confidence building measures.

84. Mr DENIAU (France), speaking on behalf of his own delegation and those of Germany and the United Kingdom, said that, since the previous session of the Board of Governors, Iran had not complied with the requirements of the Security Council and the Board of Governors. In particular, it had not suspended its enrichment activities. It had failed to implement its additional protocol and so the Agency's knowledge of Iran's undeclared activities continued to diminish. Iran had not provided the additional information that would have enabled the Agency to declare the open issues resolved. It had not backed up its allegations that the information put forward by the Agency on the possible military dimensions of its nuclear programme was false and fabricated. It had not implemented the modified Code 3.1 of its safeguards agreement; on the contrary, it had omitted to declare to the Agency the significant modifications to the Natanz plant. It had not allowed the Agency access to the persons, facilities and documents which it had requested. In short, Iran had not cooperated in a satisfactory manner.

85. Iran had refused to discuss even a temporary suspension of its enrichment programme, despite the fact that it would have provided the opportunity for dialogue. Instead, it had expanded its enrichment programme up to 3500 centrifuges and indicated a potential expansion of up to 15 000 machines, which would reduce even further the time necessary to produce fissile materials for a nuclear device. Also, Iran had introduced new generations of centrifuges.

86. Iran had written to the Secretary-General of the United Nations stating that all the outstanding questions at the Agency had been resolved. It had actively pursued its ballistic missile programme over which, according to information obtained by the Agency, there were serious nuclearization concerns and it had continued to threaten one country in the region with annihilation.

87. The Agency had continued to work in a calm and focused manner, sharing with Tehran new information on the alleged militarization of the Iranian nuclear programme and asking fresh questions on issues to which Iran had failed to reply or to give satisfactory answers. The Agency had tried, without success, to gain a better understanding of, and thus draw a conclusion on, the past and present nature of Iran's programme. If confirmed, the activities having a possible military dimension would constitute a violation of the NPT.

88. China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America had continued with their endeavours to reformulate a substantial offer, which they had asked Mr Solana, European Union High Representative, to put to the Iranian authorities in Tehran. France hoped that that would take place soon and that Iran would respond positively to it. The proposal recognized Iran's right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and even offered cooperation in that field, and it covered economic and political cooperation and questions of regional security.

89. For the time being, efforts to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis through dialogue and diplomacy were failing. Iran continued to insist that it would negotiate only on condition that the international community accept its enrichment programme although there was no convincing justification for its intended civilian use in the short or medium term. Not only were there serious doubts about that programme but also a lack of information relating to possible undeclared activities.

90. Far from there having been an improvement in the situation over the previous three months, Iran was continuing to violate international resolutions and to accumulate fissile materials. Moreover, the Agency's questions were increasing.

91. The international community could not abandon its principles of non-proliferation or the requirements deriving from them, as formulated by the Board of Governors and the Security Council. He called on Iran once again to fulfil all its international obligations without delay.

92. A responsible nuclear programme was not built in defiance of the non-proliferation regime and outside the framework of international conventions. Iran was the only country in the world to build a nuclear reactor without having acceded to the Convention on Nuclear Safety. It should do so before commissioning its nuclear reactor and take the opportunity to rethink its relationship with international nuclear conventions in general.

93. It was regrettable that Iran had accused the Agency of duplicity. The three countries on behalf of which he spoke restated their unwavering support for the Secretariat's and the Director General's impartial and professional work and called on the members of the Board to support the Agency in its endeavours with respect to the Iran issue.

94. Finally, France, Germany and the United Kingdom called on Iran to provide the necessary information and the access to persons, documents and facilities required by the Agency. That was the only way the Agency could determine the nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

95. Mr MINTY (South Africa), having thanked the Director General for his report, commended the professional and unbiased manner in which the Director General and the Secretariat continued to execute their mandate in relation to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

96. According to the report, Iran had continued to provide the Agency with access to declared nuclear material and had provided the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material and activities. The Agency had therefore been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran.

97. Within the context of building confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme, the Board had called on Iran to re-establish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities, and to reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water. Subsequently, those steps had been made a mandatory requirement by the Security Council and Iran needed to abide by them.

98. Although, regrettably, Iran had not implemented all of the steps required by the Board and the Security Council, the report stated that Iran's current enrichment related activities remained under Agency containment and surveillance. His country welcomed the results of the environmental samples

taken at the Fuel Enrichment Plant and the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, which indicated that the plants had been operated as declared.

99. Much progress had been made in resolving the questions identified in the work plan between Iran and the Agency. However, an issue that remained outstanding was the alleged studies on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle. South Africa shared the Director General's view that that was a matter of serious concern and that clarification of it was critical to an assessment of the nature of Iran's past and present nuclear programme.

100. His delegation had been encouraged by and welcomed Iran's decision to cooperate with the Agency on the issue of the alleged studies as it would enable Iran to build confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.

101. The Member States that had provided information to the Agency on the alleged high explosives studies and material relevant to the alleged missile re-entry vehicle also had a moral duty to ensure that the information was not manipulated in any way so as to cast false doubt on Iran's nuclear programme.

102. His delegation noted that the Agency had not detected the actual use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies.

103. Nevertheless, it remained a matter of concern that after so many years of verification activities in Iran, the Agency was still not in a position to conclude that there were no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran and that the Agency was not yet in a position to determine the full nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

104. It was important for Iran to intensify its cooperation with the Agency and provide the clarifications requested by the Agency. The foundation would then be laid for the adoption of a forward looking approach in relation to Iran's nuclear programme, which would not impact on its inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

105. It was for those reasons that South Africa believed that it was important for Iran to recommit itself to the implementation of the additional protocol.

106. The Agency remained the only international authority that could verify and provide the necessary assurances as to the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. It was critical that the Agency's verification process continued unhampered and that all States focused on how to support the Agency.

107. As a country that remained firmly committed to the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and to their non-proliferation, South Africa did not wish to see a nuclear-weaponized Iran. At the same time, however, it did not want to see the denial of the right of any State Party to the NPT to exploit nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

108. The call on Iran to suspend its enrichment activities was related to the issue of building confidence and should under no circumstances become a goal in itself. Neither should that call be used as a cover for those who wished to see an indefinite suspension or termination. If that were allowed to happen, whether in the case of Iran or any other State Party to the NPT, the very basis of the fundamental bargain of the NPT would unravel and disturb the carefully balanced rights and responsibilities of States Party.

109. Iran had a unique opportunity to demonstrate that it had the resolve to clarify the final outstanding question with the Agency. The Director General and the Secretariat had South Africa's full trust and confidence as they continued to discharge their responsibilities in that regard.

110. Mr AYOUB (Iraq) thanked the Director General for the report on the implementation of Agency safeguards in Iran contained in GOV/2008/15.

111. Iraq welcomed the Agency's endeavours concerning the Iranian nuclear dossier and stressed the need to give the Agency adequate time to arrive at results which could be relied upon in taking appropriate decisions concerning that important and sensitive issue.

112. Iraq reaffirmed the importance of all the parties concerned adopting a balanced policy on the Iranian question. The Agency's requests were legitimate and fully consistent with the resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council. All parties should seek a peaceful solution and avoid escalation, using dialogue and peaceful diplomatic action to resolve the Iranian issue.

113. All States had the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes provided they were committed to transparency and supplied the necessary non-diversion assurances to the international community. The best way to do that was through implementation of the additional protocol. His delegation appealed to Iran to return to voluntary implementation of the additional protocol until the ratification procedures had been completed in order to build confidence in its nuclear programme. His delegation further appealed to Iran to suspend enrichment activities so as to restore international confidence in the peaceful nature of its programme.

114. The Agency's latest report referred to links between the Iranian nuclear programme and Iranian missile manufacture. That was a serious issue unprecedented in the Agency. Iraq underlined the importance of exercising great caution and of relying only on authentic documentation.

115. All the parties had continued to ask Iran to deal with the Agency in a highly transparent way, but Iran was also entitled to the same transparency from the Agency and from the sources submitting intelligence information to the Agency. That would encourage Iran to submit documentary information on the so-called alleged studies issue raised against it. The fact that Iran was not able to view adequately all of the electronic documents detracted from their credibility.

116. His delegation urged Iran seriously to build confidence and called on the other parties not to withhold important information. Full exposure of the facts would assist the international community to make the correct decision.

117. Finally, Iraq stressed the need for international efforts in the overall context of non-proliferation in the Middle East. The credibility of the international community and of the Agency was directly linked to implementation of paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1981), Security Council resolution 1803 (2008), as well as General Assembly and Agency General Conference resolutions on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Failure to take serious steps in that respect was one of the most important factors affecting balance and stability in the region. Therefore, Iraq asked the international community to implement all relevant Security Council resolutions and the decisions and recommendations of the NPT Review Conferences, in particular that of 1995.

118. Ms AMOAH (Ghana) said that her country had taken note of the various requests addressed by the Agency to Iran, as outlined in document GOV/2008/15, and of Iran's responses to the Agency, especially its responses with respect to possible military dimensions of its nuclear programme. Ghana looked forward to the outcome of the Agency's assessment of those responses.

119. Her delegation was pleased to learn from the report that the Agency had been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. However, given the Agency's concern about the inadequate progress being made in clarifying outstanding issues, Iran should maintain an open and comprehensive dialogue at all times. That was essential if the Agency was to reach a conclusion regarding the nature of Iran's programme and provide assurances about its peaceful nature.

120. Her delegation urged Iran to allay the doubts regarding its intentions by continuing, through diplomacy and dialogue, to facilitate the provision of any responses required of it. It should implement the relevant Security Council resolutions and the additional protocol, thereby enabling the Agency to undertake the necessary verification and restore international confidence in Iran's nuclear activities.

121. Ms FEROUKHI (Algeria) said that the Agency had conducted its verification activities in Iran in accordance with the work plan agreed between them and had thus been able to resolve the outstanding questions concerning past activities under Iran's nuclear programme in a satisfactory manner. The Agency had been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and to conclude that no nuclear material was being used in connection with the alleged studies.

122. Algeria appreciated the decision of the Iranian authorities to cooperate with the Agency in connection with the alleged studies, on which a series of meetings had taken place in Iran. Cooperation between the Agency and Iran was continuing as shown by the information provided by Iran on 23 May 2008 which the Secretariat was in the process of assessing.

123. The Agency had not been authorized to provide Iran with copies of much of the information on the alleged studies, which the Agency had received only in electronic form. The Agency would need time to verify the authenticity of the documents, using its customary professionalism and impartiality. She reaffirmed Algeria's confidence in the Director General's leadership in that regard.

124. Her delegation urged Iran to intensify its cooperation with the Agency in order to restore confidence in its nuclear programme and to accelerate the achievement of a lasting and peaceful solution to the issue, within the framework of the Agency's mandate and relevant international nuclear conventions.

125. Mr SCHULTE (United States of America) commended the Director General on his comprehensive report on the Secretariat's efforts to address its "serious concern" about indications that Iran had engaged in clandestine nuclear activities with possible military dimensions.

126. There was no real progress to report. Despite several months of intense discussions between the Agency and Iran, which followed years of interactions on weaponization concerns, Iran had yet to provide any real answers to the Agency's questions. Instead, it had chosen to deride them as baseless allegations, a charge that the Secretariat and the Board could not accept.

127. The questions that remained unanswered strongly suggested that Iran had undertaken a significant, State-sponsored effort to develop nuclear weapons. Agency inspectors were not in a position to verify whether those efforts had been halted. The report also confirmed that Iran continued to refuse to comply with its legal obligation, included in three Chapter VII resolutions of the Security Council, to fully and verifiably suspend all uranium enrichment and heavy water related activities. Nor had Iran provided the level of transparency necessary, through the implementation of the additional protocol in particular, for the Agency to provide any assurances regarding the non-existence of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran, including with respect to reprocessing.

128. The Director General's latest report built on the extensive description of Iran's nuclear weapons related activities provided by the Secretariat in February 2008 (document GOV/2008/4) and beforehand. The report made it clear that Iran had failed to provide any substantive explanation for those activities or the documentation with which it had been confronted. Iran had also failed to provide "the Agency with all the information, access to documents, and access to individuals necessary to support Iran's statements".

129. In the absence of an explanation from Iran, the Board was left with the documentation made available to the Agency with descriptions inter alia of: work to design and develop an exploding bridgewire detonator and firing unit, including testing of "at least one full scale hemispherical,

converging, explosively driven shock system that could be applicable to an implosion-type nuclear device”; “efforts to engineer a new payload chamber for the Shahab-3 missile re-entry vehicle”, which the Agency had described in its February 2008 report as “quite likely to be able to accommodate a nuclear device”; and work to develop a capability to convert uranium dioxide into uranium tetrafluoride (a precursor to uranium hexafluoride, the feed material for gas centrifuges) additional to the established uranium conversion facility at Esfahan.

130. The Agency’s report made it clear that those activities also involved clandestine procurement efforts, including those conducted by military related institutions and personnel in a manner designed, by Iran’s own admission, to avoid international sanctions.

131. Previously, the Agency had also described in detail Iran’s interactions with the A.Q. Khan network and the inconsistencies and gaps between the information provided by the network and that provided by Iran. Those interactions had resulted in Iran’s acquisition of a document describing the casting of uranium metal into hemispheres, for which the only plausible use was nuclear weapons. As Deputy Director General Heinonen had noted in his technical briefing the previous week, Iran’s failure to provide a substantive explanation for that document and the manner in which it had been obtained remained an open question.

132. Even if they were disparate projects, given the context of the activities, the secrecy with which they were pursued and Iran’s persistent refusal to explain them, it was difficult to arrive at a legitimate purpose for that work. However, it was also known that those activities shared administrative interconnections and, taken in combination, it was impossible to avoid the conclusion that Iran had engaged in a dedicated effort to bring together several aspects of nuclear weapons development in order to acquire those arms.

133. Thus, his delegation echoed the Director General’s clear call for Iranian transparency and full disclosure and agreed that it was “essential that Iran provide all requested information, clarifications and access outlined in this report without further delay”. That was not only a request from the Director General, but also an obligation on Iran established by the Security Council when it had decided in its resolution 1737 that “Iran shall provide such access and cooperation as the IAEA requests to be able to verify the suspension ... and to resolve all outstanding issues, as identified in IAEA reports ... ”.

134. The Board of Governors had acted when necessary to address the collective concerns of Member States regarding Iran’s nuclear programme. In September 2005, the Board had found Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations. It had not immediately reported Iran to the Security Council but had given it the opportunity to build confidence by changing its confrontational course and return to suspension. Iran had responded by restarting its centrifuge programme at Natanz.

135. The Board had again acted in February 2006 by reporting to the Security Council Iran’s non-compliance with its safeguards obligations and questions that had arisen within its competence as the international organ responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security.

136. There had been some progress in clarifying outstanding issues in recent years. However, progress had been undermined by the existence of troubling questions about weapons related work and the connections that work had to Iran’s nuclear programme. Combined with Iran’s failure to take the confidence-building measures required by the Security Council and the Board, the Board had no choice but to remain seized of the matter of Iran’s nuclear programme.

137. The current investigation was essential, especially in the light of indications of a hidden weapons programme, to ensure that there was no nuclear material being used for weapons purposes. It was warranted because of the Agency’s mandate pursuant to its safeguards agreement with Iran and the requests of the Security Council.

138. Iran had not made the process easy. Each step along the way, it had denied the Agency essential information and answers to queries. It had done so in a manner that was entirely inconsistent with a State claiming to be in full compliance with its international obligations. The Agency's recent observation that Iran had failed to act in accordance with Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its safeguards agreement was a case in point. Iran had failed to provide in a timely manner revised design information regarding the installation and operation of centrifuges at Natanz.

139. The United States called on Iran to acknowledge its obligations under Code 3.1 and immediately adhere to its safeguards obligations, including declaring any activities that fell under the requirements of Code 3.1.

140. Iran's expanding installation and operation of centrifuges at Natanz also showed its failure to comply with the legally binding requirements of the Security Council. Iran's efforts to develop advanced gas centrifuge designs compounded its non-compliance, as did its continued construction of a heavy water research reactor at Arak.

141. Iran's failure to suspend its uranium enrichment and heavy water related activities as required by three Security Council resolutions demonstrated its blatant disregard of world concerns. Producing fissile material — whether highly enriched uranium or weapons-grade plutonium — was the most difficult and time-consuming aspect of a nuclear weapon programme. Iran was continuing that work apace while stalling the Agency with obfuscation. Every passing day led Iran closer to mastering the technology it needed to build a weapon.

142. Speaking recently in Washington, Secretary of State Rice had posed several relevant questions on Iran. She had asked why Iran had rejected, thus far, Russia's offer of uranium enrichment in Russia and why, as the Agency's most recent report showed, Iran was continuing to enrich uranium in violation of Security Council resolutions. She had also asked why parts of Iran's nuclear programme were under the control of the Iranian military and why Iran was continuing to deny international experts full access to its nuclear facilities. It was, in her opinion, hard to imagine that there were innocent answers to those questions.

143. The United Nations had responded appropriately to Iran's failure to meet its international nuclear obligations through the adoption of four resolutions by the Security Council, three of which imposing legally binding Chapter VII sanctions. The Security Council's actions did not undermine the Agency's search for a diplomatic solution, which the United States strongly favoured. The dual-track strategy of offering negotiations and increasing pressure continued to present Iran's leaders with a way forward that would provide both the nation and people of Iran with the international respect, civil nuclear technology, and economic benefits that they deserved.

144. To that end, Mr Javier Solana, would in the near future convey to Iran on behalf of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America an updated version of the package of incentives originally offered in June 2006. The package represented the commitment of the six countries to resolving the issue through negotiations and diplomacy. Iran could initiate negotiations through verified suspension of its uranium enrichment related and reprocessing activities.

145. The ultimate objective was for Iran to establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. That confidence could come only through Iran's complete cooperation with the Agency, full implementation of its safeguards agreement and additional protocol, and the suspension required by the Security Council. Otherwise, the Agency would remain unable to resolve its serious concern about activities with possible military dimensions or provide any assurance as to the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran.

146. If the Iranian Government had indeed stopped, and had no intention of resuming, its pursuit of nuclear weapons, it would be best served by admitting past work and allowing the Agency to verify that it had stopped, as other countries had done. Threats to limit cooperation with the Agency undermined Iran's argument that it had nothing to hide.

147. The strategic decision to abandon forever the pursuit of nuclear weapons was Iran's alone. Until such time, the Board of Governors, the Security Council, and individual Member States should continue to do their duty to hold Iran to its non-proliferation obligations.

148. Mr ZNIBER (Morocco) underlined the need to find a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and said that his country was very concerned about the continued questioning by the Agency about the nature of Iran's nuclear activities. Morocco called for close and full cooperation between Iran and the Agency with a view to clarifying all aspects that had not been resolved. Morocco also appealed to Iran to comply with the decisions adopted by the Board and the Security Council which aimed to put an end to the issue by means of negotiation and dialogue.

149. Mr KUMAR (India) welcomed the Agency's continuing progress in implementation of the work plan concluded with Iran, and Iran's enhanced cooperation. Momentum should be maintained in resolving the remaining issues, especially in the light of concerns over the alleged studies. Enquiries should focus on the supply side of proliferation.

150. All countries should abide by their international obligations when exercising their right to develop the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. India trusted that Iran would continue to cooperate with the Agency in a spirit of transparency and address the concerns mentioned in the Director General's latest report. The Agency provided the international community with the best forum for addressing the technical aspects of the issue by doing so professionally and impartially in accordance with its Statute. India urged all parties to continue to cooperate in finding a peaceful settlement of the issue through dialogue.

151. Mr CODORNIU PUJALS (Cuba)* said that, until recently, clarification of the so-called outstanding issues had been considered key to resolving the Iranian nuclear issue. Cuba had welcomed the adoption of the work plan between Iran and the Agency, which had made it possible to clear up the outstanding issues by February 2008. The case had, it seemed, been drawing to a close with many believing that the few remaining issues could be resolved via the normal safeguards route. Such an approach was perfectly possible, as shown by Appendix 1 of the SIR for 2007, contained in document GOV/2008/14. However, there had been new developments that had affected the momentum achieved thus far. Before the Director General had circulated his report for the Board meeting in March (contained in document GOV/2008/4), the United States of America and other countries had started to press for a new resolution against Iran at the Security Council. The United States had also submitted to the Agency new 'evidence' about the military connection of Iran's nuclear programme. At the same time, its officials had started to make statements to the press, expressing their 'serious concerns' over the issue. A few other Member States had unfortunately subscribed to the same clumsy tactic. Suddenly, resolution of the outstanding issues had ceased to be important, and the so-called alleged studies, which until then had been considered minor problems linked mainly to third-party accusations and unverified intelligence, had assumed unwonted importance. The provision to the Secretariat of intelligence linked to the alleged studies had not stopped there. After the March 2008 meeting of the Board, new documents and information had appeared, which Iran was being asked to clarify. To the surprise of many, part of that information could not be given to Iran because the 'source' had not authorized it. It was difficult to see how Iran could be expected to comment on the alleged proof if it had not even been able to analyse the documents in detail. The situation showed a lack of transparency and absolute hypocrisy on the part of the Member States which had submitted the documents and which were constantly trying to put the Islamic Republic of Iran on trial. Such actions also affected the

Secretariat's verification process. Rigorous and calm analysis of the events since March reconfirmed Cuba's belief that the United States and its main allies had no real interest in resolving the issue.

152. The Iranian issue was an excellent pretext for those who opposed nuclear disarmament and whose true interest lay in improving and expanding their own nuclear arsenals, regardless of the costs associated with such a dangerous venture. Time and again it could be seen that a strategy was being invoked in which the option of the use of force against Iran had not been ruled out. That was an important element of the geopolitical policies and tactics in the Middle East pursued by those in favour of referral of the Iranian nuclear issue to the Security Council.

153. Nevertheless, the Iranian authorities had once again demonstrated their political will to resolve the issue and had agreed to examine and clarify the alleged studies and other related matters.

154. Having studied the report carefully and having participated in the informal technical briefing held the preceding week, the Cuban delegation had a number of concerns about the process. Firstly, it was concerned about the authenticity of the documents and the fact they were being used to keep the case open. It should not be forgotten that the main source of information was the very same which, a few years previously, had presented to the world supposed evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq to justify a war that had killed hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians. That information had later been proven false. How could one be sure that history was not repeating itself?

155. Secondly, Cuba was concerned about the pressure being put on Iran to authorize access to facilities, people and documents related directly to its defence, national security and sovereignty. That was supposedly necessary to corroborate the information given by Iran in response to certain accusations and information, which Cuba believed to be of dubious origin. To Cuba that seemed unacceptable and set a very negative precedent for all Member States, especially taking into account the unilateralism and hegemony predominant in the international arena. Verification was not a process without limits. On the contrary, it was carried out under the relevant international agreements and the bilateral agreements that each country had concluded with the Agency. Respect for the sovereignty of States was an inviolable principle that remained valid even in the case of verification.

156. Thirdly, he expressed his country's concern about the Agency's involvement in activities that did not seem to be linked directly to its statutory mandate, for example related to explosives and missiles. Cuba would appreciate it if the Secretariat considered that sensitive aspect in more detail.

157. Fourthly, he highlighted the need to ensure the confidentiality of safeguards information. Leaking such information to the press had negative implications not only for the Agency and the States involved, but also for confidence-building among Member States, and between Member States and the Secretariat.

158. Cuba believed that resolution of the issue was dependent upon certain conditions, namely: the cessation of malicious interference in the verification process; desistance by the Security Council from taking further action; return of the Iranian nuclear issue to the Agency, from where it should never have left; and, implementation of the verification process in a routine manner.

159. Cuba was optimistic about the meeting to be held between the EU High Representative, Mr Javier Solana and the Iranian authorities and hoped that a negotiated, unconditional and realistic agreement could be reached meeting the expectations of the majority of the international community.

160. Ms MACMILLAN (New Zealand)* expressed her country's concern over the outstanding questions related to Iran's nuclear programme. The alleged studies on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle remained matters of serious concern to the Agency. Although the Agency had not detected the actual use of nuclear material with respect to the alleged studies, it was essential that Iran provide all the requested information and clarification without further

delay. Clarification of the nature and military dimension of the alleged studies, provision of information on the circumstances of the acquisition of the uranium metal document, clarification of procurement activities of military related institutions, and clarification of the production of nuclear equipment and components by companies belonging to defence industries were critical for assessing Iran's past and present nuclear programme. New Zealand hoped that, with Iran's active cooperation, the Agency's continuing efforts would result in the early resolution of all aspects of the outstanding issues.

161. New Zealand remained deeply concerned about Iran's failure not only to comply with the provisions of Security Council and Agency resolutions, particularly in relation to the calls to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities, but also to implement the additional protocol and to reconsider its decision to suspend implementation of the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements under modified Code 3.1.

162. Also, New Zealand noted that work on the construction of the IR-40 reactor and operation of the heavy water production plant was ongoing, and that Iran had begun the installation of a new generation centrifuge. It endorsed the Director General's call for Iran to comply with all Board decisions and Security Council resolutions without delay.

163. New Zealand recognized that the Agency had been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran and had accounted for its declared nuclear material and activities. Iran's efforts in that regard, however, were undermined by its lack of implementation of the additional protocol and its suspension of the implementation of the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements. That left the Agency unable to make progress towards credible assurances about the absence of undeclared material and activities in Iran. That was especially important in the light of the many years of undeclared activities and the confidence deficit created as a result. New Zealand urged Iran to implement all necessary measures called for by the Board of Governors and the Security Council in order to build confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.

164. New Zealand strongly supported a diplomatic solution of the issue based on Iran's compliance with Agency and Security Council requirements. Iran must play its part to realize that outcome.

165. Mr AAS (Norway)* said that his country had welcomed the work plan agreed between Iran and the Agency as an important step in the right direction. The key to further progress lay in Iran's willingness to implement the work plan fully and in a timely manner.

166. Norway was pleased to note that the Agency had received satisfactory answers from Iran to most of the questions in the work plan, thus bringing closer a resolution of past issues. It was in the interests of Iran and the international community to resolve the remaining issues, specifically those concerning the alleged studies, as quickly as possible. Unless the Agency could confirm that the alleged studies on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle project were baseless allegations, it would be difficult to move forward.

167. Norway was encouraged that the Agency could continue to verify the non-diversion of declared material in Iran. It would be even better if the Agency could provide assurances of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities there.

168. Norway strongly urged Iran to give substantive answers to all outstanding questions, undertake the confidence building measures called for by the Security Council, resume full implementation of the additional protocol and take additional transparency measures to clear up issues about the present as well as the past. That was the only way in which Iran's nuclear file could be returned to the Agency from the Security Council, as requested by Iran.

169. Norway, whose long-standing foreign policy approach was to solve problems through dialogue, was encouraged by Iran's continued dialogue with China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America to negotiate a long term solution to the issue. It looked forward to the renewed offer from those six countries and encouraged all parties to help create a positive climate for the negotiations.

170. Norway fully acknowledged Iran's right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and hoped to see the Agency and the international community supporting Iran's efforts to build a civilian nuclear industry based on sound safety principles, in line with the NPT.

171. Norway had the highest regard for the professional and impartial manner in which the Agency had been dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue and believed that it should continue to play a key role. In that regard, it was vital that the Agency was given the necessary financial and human resources to safeguard the peaceful use of nuclear energy, thus contributing to international peace and security.

172. Ms CALCINARI VAN DER VELDE (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela)* said it was her country's understanding, quoting variously from the report contained in document GOV/2008/15, that there had been no diversion in Iran's declared nuclear activities and that they were all under the Agency's control.

173. In light of that, Venezuela suggested that more concern should be felt over those nuclear programmes that were not under the Agency's control in countries known worldwide for their policies of resolving conflicts through war, bombardment and/or invasion. It was regrettable that some countries were pressurizing the Agency with information that was untruthful and which seemed to go beyond the Agency's mandate in order to continue the aggressive media campaign against Iran. It should not be forgotten that a similar situation had occurred before the invasion of Iraq.

174. Three months had elapsed since the Director General's preceding report on the Iranian nuclear issue. The topic previously entitled "Alleged Studies" was now called "Possible Military Dimensions", which had different connotations. That was despite the fact that doubt had been cast on the authenticity of the documents concerned and the Agency had "not detected the actual use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies".

175. It seemed to have become normal practice prior to a Board meeting for some Member States, seemingly not very committed to resolution of the issue, to introduce new conditions which, far from contributing to a swift and long term solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, questioned the progress already made.

176. The Islamic Republic of Iran had shown its commitment to the Agency through its responses to the outstanding issues and its willingness to clarify the alleged studies despite not having the necessary documents. Venezuela was pleased with those tangible actions and the positive approach taken by Iran, which it trusted would continue.

177. Venezuela was committed to non-proliferation and disarmament and welcomed initiatives aimed at peaceful and negotiated resolution of the Iranian issue without any preconditions and with no curtailment of the legitimate rights of Member States under the NPT and Agency's Statute.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.