## IAEA Board of Governors

### Record of the 1248<sup>th</sup> Meeting GOV/OR.1248

Measures to strengthen international cooperation in nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety



# Board of Governors

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# Record of the 1248<sup>th</sup> Meeting

Held at Headquarters, Vienna, on Monday, 7 September 2009, at 10.45 a.m.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> GOV/2009/67.

#### Attendance

(The list below gives the name of the senior member of each delegation who attended the meeting, as well as that of any other member whose statement is summarized in this record.)

Ms FEROUKHI		Chairperson (Algeria)	
Mr SHOOGUFAN		Afghanistan	
Mr GALANXHI		Albania	
MI GALANAHI Mr KHELIFI		Algeria	
Mr CURIA		Argentina	
Mr POTTS		Australia	
Mr VALLIM GUERREIRO		Brazil	
Mr DIALLO		Burkina Faso	
Mr BARRETT		Canada	
Mr HU Xiaodi		China	
Ms GOICOCHEA ESTENOZ	)		
Mr CODORNIU PUJALS	}	Cuba	
Mr STACEY MORENO	-	Ecuador	
Mr FAWZY	)		
Mr SIRRY	}	Egypt	
Mr RAAPPANA		Finland	
Mr ALBERT		France	
Mr LÜDEKING		Germany	
Ms AMOAH		Ghana	
Mr KUMAR		India	
Mr ALSHARIA		Iraq	
Mr COGAN		Ireland	
Mr ARSHAD		Malaysia	
Mr DÍAZ		Mexico	
Ms MACMILLAN	)	New Zeeland	
Ms CROWLEY	}	New Zealand	
Ms DELA ROSA		Philippines	
Mr FERUTĂ		Romania	
Mr BERDENNIKOV		Russian Federation	
Mr AL-SAUD		Saudi Arabia	
Mr MINTY		South Africa	
Mr MARTÍNEZ-CARO		Spain	
Mr MARFURT		Switzerland	
Mr FIDAN		Turkey	
Mr SMITH		United Kingdom of Great Britain and	
		Northern Ireland	
Mr DAVIES		United States of America	
Mr BARROS OREIRO		Uruguay	
Mr ELBARADEI		Director General	
Mr TANIGUCHI		Deputy Director General, Department	
		of Nuclear Safety and Security	
Mr ANING		Secretary of the Board	

#### **Representatives of the following Member States also attended the meeting:**

Angola, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Poland. Portugal. Oatar. Serbia. Singapore, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Sudan. Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

#### Abbreviations used in this record:

Assistance Convention	Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency			
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea			
Early Notification Convention	Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident			
GRULAC	Latin American and Caribbean Group			
INLEX	International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability			
INSAG	International Nuclear Safety Group			
IRRS	Integrated Regulatory Review Service			
LEU	low-enriched uranium			
MOX	mixed oxide			
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons			
OSART	Operational Safety Review Team			
РАСТ	Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy			
WHO	World Health Organization			

\* Speakers under Rule 50 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure are indicated by an asterisk.

## - Opening of the meeting

1. The <u>CHAIRPERSON</u> welcomed all participants, especially the new Governors: Mr Turdiu of Albania, Mr Potts of Australia, Mr Barrett of Canada, Mr Mondoloni of France, Mr Nakane of Japan and Mr Davies of the United States of America; and the new Resident Representatives: Mr Hu Xiaodi of China, Ms Kuchyňová Šmigolová of the Czech Republic, Ms Rasi of Finland, Mr Banai of Hungary, Ms Imanalieva of Kyrgyzstan, Mr Petersen of Norway, Mr García Revilla of Peru, Mr Peško of Slovakia and Ms Phetcharatana of Thailand.

2. She bade farewell to colleagues who had left or would shortly be leaving: the Governors Mr Hoxha of Albania, Ms Gervais-Vidricaire of Canada, Mr Caron of France and Mr Amano of Japan; and the Resident Representatives Mr Bazoberry of Bolivia, Mr Tang Guoqiang of China, Mr Počuch of the Czech Republic, Ms Kauppi of Finland, Ms Martin Zanathy of Hungary, Mr Björnsson of Iceland, Ms Prijivoit of Kygryzstan, Mr Johansen of Norway, Mr Shahbaz of Pakistan, Ms Damián Karekides of Panama, Mr Macháč of Slovakia and Mr Panupong of Thailand.

3. Three senior members of the Secretariat were also leaving: Mr Murakami, Director of the Division of Operations C in the Department of Safeguards; Mr Omoto, Director of the Division of Nuclear Power in the Department of Nuclear Energy; and Mr Hesling, Director of the Office of Procurement Services.

## Adoption of the agenda

(GOV/2009/58/Rev.1)

4. The <u>CHAIRPERSON</u> invited the Board to adopt the provisional agenda contained in document GOV/2009/58/Rev.1.

5. <u>The agenda was adopted</u>.

## 1. Introductory statement by the Director General

6. The <u>DIRECTOR GENERAL</u> said that the agenda for the current meeting covered many Agency activities.

7. The Board had before it requests for membership of the Agency from the Kingdom of Cambodia, which was asking to rejoin, and the Republic of Rwanda.

8. In the area of nuclear applications, good progress was being made in establishing comprehensive cancer control programmes at the six PACT Model Demonstration Sites. During his recent visit to one of the existing sites, in Tanzania, he had observed children with cancer being treated with a radiotherapy machine provided through the Agency. That had been a moving experience which

had reinforced his conviction that, with the Board's continuous support, and that of PACT partners, the Agency could effectively save lives and alleviate suffering. He was pleased that Ghana would become the host of the seventh PACT Model Demonstration Site in the coming months.

9. He had reported to the Board in June on the launch of the WHO-IAEA Joint Programme on Cancer Control. The Joint Programme Steering Committee had met for the first time in July to decide on a coordinated approach to combating cancer in developing countries. Two IAEA/WHO regional workshops had been organized in June and July for Member States from Africa and the Asia and Pacific region.

10. There were continuing concerns, following a number of reactor shutdowns, regarding shortages of supply of the isotope molybdenum-99, required for obtaining technetium-99m, which was used in diagnostic imaging. Hundreds of thousands of people had been denied key diagnostic procedures owing to those shortages. The Agency was working with Member States and partner organizations to try to improve supplies of molybdenum, including by providing detailed practical guidance to operators of ageing research reactors on optimal management of their facilities. During his recent visit to South Africa, he had been informed of its efforts to increase production of molybdenum-99 to meet the global shortfall.

11. Turning to nuclear power, he said that no new reactors had been brought online so far in 2009, but there had been six new construction starts as well as two restarts of suspended projects. As a result of the global economic crisis, there had been a few cases of countries delaying nuclear power decisions, and utilities revisiting their overall power expansion plans. However, the Agency's new projections for nuclear power generating capacity in the medium term had actually been revised upwards. The low projection was now for 511 GW(e) of generating capacity in 2030, compared to 370 GW(e) currently. The high projection was for 807 GW(e), i.e. more than double the current capacity. The expected growth reflected the urgent need for energy, especially in the developing world, concerns about energy security, fluctuations in fossil fuel prices, the need to address climate change vigorously, and the good performance and safety record of nuclear power.

12. The number of Member States considering, or already launching, new nuclear power programmes continued to increase, with a corresponding rise in demand for the Agency's assistance. The number of national and regional technical cooperation projects on the introduction of nuclear power had risen to 44 so far in 2009, from 15 in 2008.

13. In 2009, the Agency had launched its Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review service to provide peer review of Member States' development towards nuclear power. That followed the publication in 2007 of the Agency document entitled *Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power* (NG-G-3.1), which systematically outlined all the measures that needed to be put in place to set up and operate a nuclear power programme. In August, Jordan had become the first country to receive an Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review mission. It was to be hoped that such missions would become an integral element of a prudent approach to nuclear power. The Agency had also developed a variation of its knowledge management assist missions to conduct peer reviews of nuclear education and training systems and offer recommendations. The first such mission, to Malaysia, had been completed in July.

14. Growth in nuclear power also meant increased demand for uranium. Three new uranium mines had begun production in 2009 and more were expected to follow. The number of Agency technical cooperation projects on uranium exploration and production had increased from four to ten. The Agency had revived the Uranium Production Site Appraisal Team, a peer review service to compare current and proposed uranium operations with the world's best practice. The first mission would take place soon, to Brazil.

15. The Agency was responding to increased interest in decommissioning and waste management, both from countries retiring old nuclear facilities and from those already anticipating the full life cycle of nuclear power. It continued to expand its expert networks, in which countries relatively new to decommissioning and waste issues could learn directly from those with experience. The international decommissioning network, launched two years earlier, allowed countries without experience to witness decommissioning activities. Recent examples included the removal of graphite from the Moata reactor in Australia and the cutting of concrete structures at the reactor at the Research Centre for Energy, Environment and Technology (CIEMAT) in Spain. With respect to the disposal of high-level waste and spent fuel, he noted the progress that was being made in Sweden, Finland and France in developing deep geological repositories.

16. The Agency had encouraged countries with research reactors to improve regional coordination and to work together in areas such as strategic planning and marketing of irradiation products and services. For example, the Agency had been able to bring together a well utilized research reactor whose operators had needed additional capacity and an underutilized reactor which needed more business, to the benefit of both. Five such networks had been formed: in the Baltic, the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, Eurasia and the Mediterranean.

17. Over the preceding year, significant progress had been made on a major technical cooperation project on the repackaging and return to the Russian Federation of spent fuel from the research reactor at the Vinča Institute near Belgrade, Serbia. That had been a safety and security concern for a number of years. Thanks to major efforts by the Government of Serbia, supported by a number of international donors including the Agency, funding had finally been secured, which should allow shipment of the spent fuel to start in 2010. He expected the relevant agreements to be signed during the forthcoming General Conference.

18. As the Nuclear Security Report 2009 revealed, the Agency continued to receive reports about instances of unauthorized possession, movement and attempted sale of nuclear and other radioactive material, which showed that nuclear trafficking continued unabated. Up to June 2009, the Agency's illicit trafficking database had received reports of 215 incidents. It was troubling that the recovery rate of radioactive material reported lost or stolen remained low. As he had said many times, it was vital that all Member States did their utmost to ensure that nuclear and radioactive material was safe and secure. Seven additional countries had joined the illicit trafficking database programme in the past year, taking the total to 107. He asked all Member States to join.

19. In addition, the Agency had presented a new Nuclear Security Plan 2010–2013, setting out the Agency's programme. He hoped all Member States would support that important undertaking.

20. The Board had also received the report on measures to strengthen international cooperation in nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety. It showed that, while worldwide nuclear safety performance remained at a high level, there was a constant need for vigilance.

21. The Board had before it draft NPT safeguards agreements, small quantities protocols and additional protocols for the Republic of the Congo, the Republic of Kenya and the Republic of Vanuatu. With the conclusion of those instruments, there would still be 26 NPT non-nuclear-weapon States without comprehensive safeguards agreements, and more than 100 States yet to conclude or bring into force additional protocols.

22. As he had informed the Board in June, the Agency's inspectors had left the DPRK in April after the DPRK had ceased all cooperation with the organization. Since that date, the Agency had been unable to carry out any monitoring and verification activities in the DPRK. He therefore had nothing to report to the Board. He called, as always, on all parties to continue to work towards a

comprehensive solution that would bring the DPRK back to the NPT and address its security concerns and humanitarian needs, as well as other political and economic issues.

23. The Board had before it his report on the implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Since his last report, the Agency had continued to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran had cooperated with the Agency in improving safeguards measures at the Fuel Enrichment Plant and in providing the required access to the IR-40 reactor at Arak for the purposes of design information verification.

24. However, on all other issues relevant to Iran's nuclear programme there was stalemate. Iran had not suspended its enrichment-related activities or its work on heavy water-related projects as required by the Security Council, nor had Iran implemented the additional protocol. Likewise, It had not cooperated with the Agency in connection with the remaining issues — detailed fully and completely in the Agency's reports — which needed to be clarified in order to exclude the possibility of there being military dimensions to its nuclear programme.

25. In that connection, he repeated that all information made available to the Agency that was relevant to Iran's nuclear programme and had been critically assessed by the Agency in accordance with its standard practices had been brought to the attention of the Board. He was dismayed by the allegations of some Member States, which had been fed to the media, that information had been withheld from the Board. Those allegations were politically motivated and totally baseless. Such attempts to influence the work of the Secretariat and undermine its independence and objectivity were in violation of Article VII.F. of the Agency's Statute and should cease forthwith.

26. In his view, there were three key areas relevant to Iran's nuclear programme that needed to be addressed.

27. Firstly, Iran needed to respond fully to all the questions raised by the Agency in order to exclude the possibility of there being military dimensions to its nuclear programme. To that end, it was essential that Iran substantively re-engage with the Agency to clarify and bring to closure all outstanding issues, including the most difficult and important questions regarding the authenticity of information relating to the alleged weaponization studies, by granting the Agency access to persons, information and locations.

28. He also called on those who had provided the information to allow the Agency to share with Iran as much information as possible to assist the organization in moving forward with the verification process.

29. Secondly, Iran needed to implement the additional protocol. Without that instrument, the Agency would not be able to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran, especially given Iran's past record of failing to declare material and activities.

30. Thirdly, Iran's future intentions concerning its nuclear programme need to be clarified to respond to the concerns of the international community. That was essentially a question of confidence building between Iran and the international community through comprehensive dialogue and other measures. He called on all parties to begin that dialogue as soon as possible and urged Iran to respond positively to the recent United States initiative in that regard.

31. The Agency had continued to investigate allegations concerning the destroyed building on the Dair Alzour site in Syria.

32. Syria had cooperated with the Agency in its verification activities at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor in Damascus. However, it had not yet provided the necessary cooperation to permit the

Agency to determine the origin of the anthropogenic natural uranium particles found in samples taken at the Dair Alzour site. Syria had not cooperated with the Agency to enable it to confirm that country's statements regarding the non-nuclear nature of the destroyed building on the Dair Alzour site, nor had it provided the required access to information, locations, equipment or material.

33. He urged Syria to cooperate with the Agency in its verification activities related to the nature of the Dair Alzour site. It was in Syria's interest to enable the Agency to corroborate its statements. He also called on other States which might possess information relevant to the Agency's verification to make such information available to the Agency.

34. Pursuant to the mandate given to him by the General Conference, he had continued his consultations with States in the Middle East on the application of comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear activities in that region, and on the development of model agreements as a necessary step towards the establishment of a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone. As his report made clear, regrettably he had once again not made any progress on either front.

35. The General Conference had also asked him in 2000 to organize a forum on the relevance of the experience of other regions with existing nuclear-weapon-free zones (including with respect to confidence building and verification measures) for establishing such a zone in the Middle East. So far, however, consensus on the modalities and agenda of such a forum had remained elusive.

36. Plans to upgrade the Agency's analytical laboratories at Seibersdorf were progressing well. He was grateful for Austria's recent commitment to provide additional land. However, despite extrabudgetary contributions being made available, the Agency still remained considerably short of the funding target, particularly in relation to addressing safety and security issues associated with the nuclear material laboratory.

37. Since 2003, he had been highlighting the merits of a multilateral approach to assurance of supply of nuclear fuel. Reliance on nuclear energy was expected to increase in the coming decades and such assurances would increase the security of energy supply. As he had said many times, any such mechanism should be non-political, non-discriminatory and available to all Member States that were in compliance with their safeguards obligations. It should provide an added layer of assurance that every country that wanted nuclear energy had guaranteed access to a supply of nuclear fuel that would not be interrupted for political reasons.

38. At the Board's meetings in June, he had presented proposals for an IAEA-owned and -operated LEU bank and a reserve in Russia under Agency auspices. In addition, Germany had put forward a proposal for a new multilateral enrichment centre. Recently, the United Kingdom had circulated a conceptual document outlining its proposal for nuclear fuel assurance. He believed that none of those proposals would impact on the right of States to benefit fully from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, or limit in any way States' nuclear fuel cycle options. He was convinced that the time had now come for concrete steps towards a multilateral approach to the fuel cycle, particularly in the light of the new momentum in the field of nuclear disarmament. The Agency's ultimate aim should be the full multinationalization of the sensitive parts of the fuel cycle to guarantee the supply of nuclear fuel and consolidate efforts to achieve a world free from nuclear weapons.

39. With respect to the programme and budget for 2010–2011, as he had said at the June Board, the Agency's initial budget request had been based on priority needs. The budget agreed since then was significantly lower than had been proposed and would not be sufficient to fulfil priorities in all areas of the Agency's work, or rebuild the dilapidated Agency infrastructure. That would inevitably have consequences for the scope and quality of services which the Agency would be able to offer to Member States, consequences which would be outlined to them in due course.

# 2. Applications for membership of the Agency

(GOV/2009/66 and 70)

40. The <u>CHAIRPERSON</u> drew attention to documents GOV/2009/66 and 70, which contained applications for membership of the Agency by the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Republic of Rwanda respectively. She noted that Cambodia had been a member of the Agency from 1958 to 2003. In the event the Board decided to recommend that the General Conference approve the applications, the relevant documents contained draft reports and resolutions which it might wish to submit to the General Conference.

41. <u>Mr FAWZY</u> (Egypt), speaking on behalf of NAM, welcomed and supported the applications by the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Republic of Rwanda to become members of the Agency.

42. <u>Mr POTTS</u> (Australia) said that Australia, as a close neighbour of the Kingdom of Cambodia, welcomed its application to resume its membership of the Agency and noted the potential benefits for Cambodia of cooperation with the Agency in such areas as human health and securing radioactive sources. Australia likewise supported the Republic of Rwanda's application for membership.

43. <u>Mr MINTY</u> (South Africa) said that, as more and more countries considered enlarging the contribution of nuclear energy to their development, including through nuclear power generation, they looked to the Agency for technical and scientific assistance and recognized the important role the Agency played in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the benefits of membership. His country welcomed the applications by the Republic of Rwanda and the Kingdom of Cambodia for membership of the Agency. The growing number of members benefiting from the exchange of technical and scientific information, transfer of technology, assistance and cooperation in research and development, and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses, would contribute to the eradication of poverty, to sustainable social and economic development and to global peace.

44. The <u>CHAIRPERSON</u> took it that the Board wished to recommend to the General Conference that it approve the application by the Kingdom of Cambodia for membership and that it wished to submit to the General Conference the draft report attached to document GOV/2009/66.

45. <u>It was so decided</u>.

46. The <u>CHAIRPERSON</u> further took it that the Board wished to recommend to the General Conference that it approve the application by the Republic of Rwanda for membership and that it wished to submit to the General Conference the draft report attached to document GOV/2009/70.

47. <u>It was so decided</u>.

48. The <u>CHAIRPERSON</u>, speaking on behalf of the Board, welcomed the Kingdom of Cambodia back to membership of the Agency and extended her congratulations to the Republic of Rwanda.

# **3.** Measures to strengthen international cooperation in nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety

(GOV/2009/48; 2009/Note 38)

49. <u>Mr TANIGUCHI</u> (Deputy Director General for Nuclear Safety and Security), introducing the report contained in document GOV/2009/48, said it presented the Agency's activities pursuant to General Conference resolution GC(52)/RES/9.

50. The Agency had maintained its focus on continuous improvement of the global nuclear safety regime. On the whole, it believed that the international nuclear community had achieved a high level of safety performance. Nevertheless, and as often noted by the Director General, safety should always be considered work in progress.

51. There was much interest in new nuclear power programmes and rapid expansion of existing programmes throughout the world. Current estimates showed that nearly 80 countries were considering or had expressed interest in developing nuclear power programmes. Safe and reliable implementation of those programmes remained a significant challenge to the international nuclear community and the Agency. Thus, it was imperative that the Agency was well positioned and provided with sufficient and predictable resources to adapt and respond to the needs of those countries. High-quality Agency safety standards, services and capacity-building programmes facilitated sustainable and reliable nuclear power development throughout the world.

52. New and expanding nuclear power programmes were not the only challenge. Others, to name but a few, were the multinational nature of today's nuclear business, the more sophisticated and wider use of radioactive sources, the need to ensure internationally coordinated emergency preparedness and response, and transportation issues such as denial of shipments.

53. In addition to those thematic safety areas, the report covered a number of cross-cutting areas, such as support for Member States embarking on nuclear power programmes, regulatory effectiveness, knowledge networks, the Agency's safety standards and education and training. Furthermore, document 2009/Note 38 provided the Chairman's report from the technical meeting on implementation of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources with regard to long-term strategies for the management of sealed sources.

54. <u>Mr CURIA</u> (Argentina), speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, said that the Group encouraged the Agency to continue its welcome efforts to promote nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety in Member States through the dissemination of information, knowledge, training and databases, and it commended the Secretariat's work to strengthen international cooperation in that field pursuant to pertinent General Conference resolutions.

55. Nuclear safety was one of the important elements of any nuclear programme. While the Group noted with appreciation the high level of nuclear safety performance recorded worldwide, it stressed the need for vigilance and continuous improvement.

56. The Group noted with satisfaction the Secretariat's work to develop approaches to support nuclear power infrastructure in Member States wishing to introduce nuclear power, or those expanding their nuclear power programmes, and the assistance provided to some developing countries in that regard.

57. The Group noted with interest the work on a new Safety Guide on establishing a safety infrastructure for a national nuclear power programme which would provide guidance on the progressive application of the Agency's safety standards to ensure a high level of safety during the phases of any nuclear power programme. However, infrastructure issues could not be dealt with in isolation and safety remained an integral part of broader efforts to develop infrastructure. While such documents provided useful guidance, they should not be used as part of the Agency's safety standards or be considered the only reference for Member States embarking on a nuclear power programme. Furthermore, they were not binding and should not be used to restrict technical cooperation activities or interfere in the technical work of the Secretariat.

58. The Group took note of the Integrated Regulatory Review Service, which provided Member States upon request with advice and assistance in strengthening the effectiveness of their regulatory bodies, and noted the Secretariat's efforts to assist Member States by developing tailored versions of its safety review services and a holistic peer review service, the Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review service. The Group likewise took note of the Secretariat's efforts to develop a new methodology for self-assessment and tools to guide regulatory bodies in performing their own review.

59. Since the development of human resources was a key element for the sustainability of any nuclear project and programme, it was a source of satisfaction that efforts were being made to address the issue of capacity building, education and training through specific training programmes, while adopting a regional approach aiming at fostering the sharing of information and experience.

60. The Group commended the Agency's continued efforts, in particular through the technical cooperation programme, to promote capacity building in several Member States through postgraduate educational courses in radiation protection and the safety of radiation sources. The Group also noted with satisfaction the organization of several regional training events related to radiation, transport and waste safety within the framework of regional projects, national projects and regional cooperative agreements.

61. With regard to nuclear and radiological incidents and emergency preparedness and response, the Group strongly concurred with the view expressed in the report regarding the need to establish clear communication procedures to respond to any type of radiation emergency. Such procedures should apply in response to any type of incident, including maritime incidents. The Group noted with appreciation that the Agency was developing an emergency preparedness and response manual on communicating with the public during a nuclear or radiological emergency for better international communication and response. It commended the Agency's offering emergency preparedness review missions aimed at assessing and evaluating national preparedness and response programmes.

62. The ConvEx3 emergency exercise carried out in Mexico in July 2008 had revealed the need to strengthen the Agency's emergency preparedness and response capabilities. The Secretariat should take the appropriate measures to address that problem.

63. With regard to nuclear installation safety, the Group commended the Agency's initiative in addressing safety issues due to extreme natural events and welcomed the launching of two programmes in association with several Member States to address safety issues arising from tsunamis and seismic events.

64. In response to the findings in the INSAG series publication entitled *Improving the International System for Operating Experience Feedback*, the Secretariat was planning further enhancements to the international operating experience system, including the Incident Reporting System.

65. In response to the recommendations of an international meeting, held in October 2008, on the application of the Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors, the Secretariat had undertaken

various activities to improve networking between regulatory bodies and operating organizations, develop technical and safety infrastructures needed for research reactor new builds, and address common issues identified through Member State self-assessments.

66. Three new safety guides for uranium fabrication facilities, MOX fuel fabrication facilities and conversion and enrichment facilities would be published in 2009. The Group welcomed the launching of the international Fuel Incident Notification and Analysis System and hoped that the feedback obtained through it would further improve safety in fuel cycle facilities.

67. Regarding occupational radiation safety, the Group welcomed the conclusion drawn at the 12th International Congress of the International Radiation Protection Association, held in Argentina in October 2008, that more than 80% of the actions of the Action Plan for Occupational Radiation Protection had been attained. It urged the Agency to continue its efforts to complete the remaining actions and to assess the need for identifying and developing new ones. The Agency should also continue its efforts to promote occupational radiation safety in Member States through networking, information and sharing of experience. The Agency's Information System on Occupational Exposure in the Medical, Industrial and Research Areas could be a useful tool for identifying trends and needs, thereby assisting Member States in harmonizing national occupational radiation safety measures with the Agency's relevant safety standards without hampering national priorities and programmes.

68. Regarding the increase in medical radiation exposure, the Group remained concerned at the difficulties that developing countries encountered in managing and controlling medical exposure owing to poor equipment and insufficiencies in dosimetry and radiation protection guidelines, as well as lack of training. It welcomed the International Workshop on Justification of Medical Exposure in Diagnostic Imaging scheduled for September 2009 and hoped that it would be useful in exploring measures to improve safety with respect to medical radiation exposure of patients. The Group also welcomed the capacity building and training offered to health professionals in Latin America on avoidance of exposure in radiotherapy through risk analysis and probabilistic safety assessment, and it urged the Agency to continue expanding the programme to other regions.

69. The Group noted the Secretariat's initiatives to promote the implementation in Member States of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary Guidance. However, the codes of conduct and safety and security standards were recommendations and guidelines and should not be binding on Member States. It was noteworthy that, at a technical meeting on the management of sealed radioactive sources, especially orphan sources detected at borders or during transport, no common view had emerged on actions required in the event that an orphan source was detected. The Agency should continue its efforts to encourage further dialogue on such an important subject.

70. With regard to denials of shipments of radioactive material, the Group remained concerned that shipping restrictions continued to affect the delivery of radioactive material, which adversely impacted on project implementation in Member States. The Group looked forward to the implementation of the integrated action plan of the International Steering Committee on Denials of Shipment of Radioactive Material and regional networks to address that problem. The Group was pleased that improvements regarding use of the Agency's database on denials had resulted in specific cases of denials being resolved.

71. Turning to the safety of radioactive waste management and disposal, he said that the Group noted the Agency's ongoing support for the Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, in particular the 3rd review meeting held in May 2009, and it welcomed the use of a secure website to facilitate the peer review process among Contracting Parties. The Agency had developed the concept of a mobile hot cell

to ensure the safety of disused high-activity radioactive sources in an attempt to help countries, especially those that did not have adequate infrastructure, to process high-activity radioactive sources after termination of their application. The Group looked forward to the practical application of that concept, building on the first successful operation in Sudan.

72. The Group looked forward to the Agency's International Conference on Management of Spent Fuel from Nuclear Power Reactors, to be held in 2010, which would address issues related to high-level waste, including storage arrangements for spent fuel.

73. Paragraph 1 of the report referred to the open-ended process on the future of the Agency. The principles guiding the establishment of that process stated that it was an informal one with open-ended participation and that it was separate from the regular day-to-day work of the Board and not linked to or affecting it. Thus, the comments made in paragraph 1 were not appropriate for a formal document of the Board and the Secretariat should revise it accordingly.

74. With those comments, the Group took note of document GOV/2009/48.

75. <u>Mr FIGUEIREDO</u> (Angola)\*, speaking on behalf of the African Group, said that the Agency was in a unique position to observe global trends, issues and challenges in the area of nuclear safety through a wide variety of activities related to the establishment and application of safety standards. The Group shared the Agency's view that, while global nuclear safety performance remained high, the challenge posed by new and expanding nuclear power programmes and the wider use of radioactive sources imposed a need for vigilance and continuous improvement.

76. The Group commended the Agency on its enduring efforts to support Member States that were introducing nuclear power programmes for the first time or expanding existing programmes, and to enhance States' capacities and regulatory infrastructure in the area of safety.

77. The Group took note of the organization of the International Conference on Effective Nuclear Regulatory Systems: Further Enhancing the Global Nuclear Safety and Security Regime, to be hosted by South Africa from 14 to 18 December 2009. It was expected that the roadmap for the global nuclear safety and security network established by the Agency would be presented at the Conference. The enhancement of that network would help maintain and consolidate competence in nuclear safety and security matters and promote sharing of experience and best practices.

78. The Group commended the Agency on its organization of postgraduate courses in radiation protection and the safety of radiation sources in some Member States, including African countries. It also noted with satisfaction the holding of regional training events related to radiation, transport and waste safety in the context of regional and national projects and regional cooperative agreements.

79. The Group welcomed the establishment of the Forum of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa in South Africa in March 2009 and shared the view that the Forum would advance regional cooperation by promoting a common understanding of radiation and nuclear safety regulatory issues, facilitating information exchange, strengthening radiation and nuclear safety infrastructure across the region, addressing current and future nuclear safety challenges, and creating a uniform platform for coordinating support and partnership initiatives.

80. The Group shared the Director General's concern regarding the increasing number of medical radiation exposure incidents due to the popularity of medical technologies using radiation sources, and it took note of the Secretariat's efforts to develop practical measures to address that situation. It hoped that the planned workshop to be co-hosted by the Agency and the European Commission would help to forge a common solution the problem.

81. The Group commended the Secretariat on its assistance to Member States, in particular African countries, in developing national strategies and capacities to manage and control orphan radioactive sources through its Orphan Source Search and Secure Project. The Group was pleased to note that assistance had been granted to countries such as Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Namibia, and it encouraged the Secretariat to continue providing such support.

82. The Group welcomed the concept of a mobile hot cell developed by the Agency for the conditioning of disused high-activity radioactive sources and took note of plans to assist developing countries, especially those without appropriate infrastructure, in processing such sources. It hoped that the first field operation to test the concept, which had been successfully commissioned in Sudan in May 2009, would serve as a useful model, especially for developing countries.

83. <u>Mr VALLIM GUERREIRO</u>, speaking on behalf of GRULAC, noted with satisfaction that the global nuclear safety performance remained at a high level.

84. GRULAC attached great importance to Agency assistance to developing countries in strengthening their regulatory infrastructure and developing human resources. It urged the Secretariat to continued organizing international, regional, subregional and national training courses in radiation, nuclear and waste safety. In that context, the Group welcomed the long-term agreement in the area of education and training in radiation and nuclear safety concluded between the Agency and Argentina in September 2008.

85. GRULAC noted with satisfaction the activities aimed at supporting the development of the required safety infrastructure in Member States that were contemplating the introduction of nuclear power for the first time or expansion of an existing programme, in particular the assistance given to the Chilean authorities in 2008.

86. GRULAC also commended the Agency's review services, in particular Integrated Regulatory Review Service, highlighting the IRRS mission to Peru in April 2009 which had focused on radiation and nuclear safety, ascertaining regulatory effectiveness by assessing the country's regulatory structure in the light of international standards, contributing to regulatory harmonization, and promoting and sharing relevant experience.

87. GRULAC drew attention to the progress made by the Ibero-American Forum of Radiological and Nuclear Regulatory Agencies in maintaining high levels of nuclear safety in the region. In 2008, the Forum had completed a number of technical projects relating to safety and regulatory control of radiotherapy. Their results had been presented at the 12th International Congress of the International Radiation Protection Association. As a follow-up to those projects, the Agency, in cooperation with the Forum, had promoted a regional training course in Chile on prevention of accidental exposure in radiotherapy. In January 2009, the Forum had launched a project to elaborate technical advice concerning the regulation of plant ageing and safe life extension in the region.

88. The Group highlighted the work of the Ibero-American Nuclear and Radiation Safety Network established by the Forum. Regional safety networks were an important means of exchanging knowledge, experience and lessons learned in the area of nuclear safety. The Group noted with satisfaction that the Secretariat had set up a global nuclear safety and security network which provided a framework for existing networks, including the Ibero-American Network, within the global nuclear safety regime.

89. The Occupational Radiation Protection Appraisal Service was a useful mechanism for improving the radiation protection systems of developing countries. The support extended to Chile was a recent example.

90. Lastly, he pointed out that the process of reflection on the future of the Agency mentioned in paragraph 1 of the report was an informal exercise without official records and was as yet incomplete. As such, references to comments made during that process should not be included in official documents, and the Group recommended that the paragraph in question be amended.

91. <u>Ms HELLSTRÖM</u> (Sweden)\*, speaking on behalf of the European Union, the candidate countries Turkey, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the countries of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia, as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Armenia, said that the European Union attached the utmost importance to nuclear safety and commended the Agency on its efforts to strengthen the global nuclear safety regime.

92. On 25 June 2009, the Council of the European Union had adopted a nuclear safety directive that was binding on all 27 member States. It was based on the Agency's Safety Fundamentals and obligations under the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Member States were required to establish, maintain and continuously improve their national nuclear safety framework and to assign high importance to the independence, competence and powers of national regulatory authorities. They were also required to establish appropriate regulatory supervision mechanisms and to ensure a high level of transparency of regulatory actions. The directive clearly stated that the prime responsibility for nuclear safety lay with licence holders, who were required to carry out regular safety assessments. Member States were also required to undertake self-assessments of their national frameworks and regulatory authorities at least every 10 years and to invite international peer reviews. In that connection, the Agency's IRRS missions had gained broad international recognition. The European Union, which had the largest number of nuclear power plants in the world, had thus become the first region to introduce legally binding nuclear safety requirements based on international nuclear safety principles.

93. In December 2008, the Council of the European Union had also adopted a resolution on spent fuel and radioactive waste management, underlining the important progress made by the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group on that issue and identifying main principles for the safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste shared by all member States.

94. <u>Mr ARSHAD</u> (Malaysia) said that his country would spare no effort to strengthen its national nuclear and radiation safety competence and know-how. To that end, it participated in the work of the Agency's safety standards committees and in various regional nuclear and radiation safety activities. It would again be hosting the regional postgraduate training course on radiation protection in October 2009. It also participated in the Agency's Asian Nuclear Safety Network and regularly contributed to the information-sharing platform.

95. Any nuclear or radiological incident could endanger human life and harm the environment. Given the transboundary nature of such potential hazards, Malaysia called for greater international cooperation in handling such incidents and strongly urged the parties involved, including foreign nuclear-powered vessels that entered Malaysian waterways, to cooperate closely with its national nuclear authorities in accordance with prescribed emergency response procedures, from which no party should be exempt.

96. <u>Mr BARRETT</u> (Canada) said that Agency safety standards and related documents played a particularly important role in ensuring consistent safety approaches and uniform nuclear regulation worldwide. Canadian experts actively assisted in the development and review of those standards and requirements, which were then applied domestically by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission. The common global approach to safety standards boosted confidence in the sustainability of nuclear energy among Governments and the general public.

97. Canada welcomed the issue of publications TS-G-1.4, *The Management System for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material*, and TS-G-1.5, *Compliance Assurance for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material*, as well as the revisions to the 2009 edition of TS-R-1, *Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material*, and the accompanying *Advisory Material for the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material*, TS-G-1.1. The inclusion of those documents in the review cycle should ensure consistency between the regulations and the guidance material.

98. His country was pleased to note that the Agency continued to conduct IRRS missions, to which it regularly contributed senior experts from the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission. A broad-scope mission in Canada in June 2009 had determined that the country had a mature and well established nuclear regulatory framework and that the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission effectively protected the health, safety and security of Canadians and the environment. Canada looked forward to the publication of the final report on the mission and encouraged Member States that had not yet done so to avail themselves of that useful and important service.

99. Canada also welcomed the establishment of the Agency's International Seismic Safety Centre, to which it had made two extrabudgetary contributions. Canadian experts would continue to support the Centre's activities.

100. His country had participated actively and constructively in the third review meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management held in Vienna in May 2009. That event had provided an opportunity for Canada to review its legislative and regulatory approaches and its operational practices for the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste, and for all Contracting Parties to share best practices.

101. Canada viewed the Convention on Nuclear Safety as a cornerstone of the global safety regime and it looked forward to participating in the extraordinary and organizational meetings for the Convention at the end of the current month. He urged all countries with significant nuclear activities to accede to the Convention.

102. He stressed the importance of all countries committing themselves to the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the associated Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources, though those documents were not legally binding. His country had implemented stronger regulatory controls on the use, movement and tracking of high-risk sealed sources and had also strengthened its regulatory controls on the export and import of such sources. The controls in question were critical in sustaining the confidence of the Canadian public and Canada's international partners in the safe and secure use of radioactive material for peaceful purposes. Canada called on Member States to continue to work together in applying the Code and Guidance in a harmonized manner.

103. <u>Mr DAVIES</u> (United States of America) drew attention to the priority President Obama attached to seeking multilateral solutions to global challenges. He and his team were committed to working with all other Member States and the Secretariat in that manner and spirit. The United States supported the Agency in all facets of its work and was determined to cooperate with other Member States to strengthen its capabilities.

104. The Agency's efforts to promote excellence in safety and security practices were fundamental to the peaceful use of nuclear-related technologies and material. Expanding the peaceful use of nuclear technologies and techniques to promote human well-being and prosperity was a United States priority for the Agency. His country continued the largest supporter of Agency technical cooperation through pledges, extrabudgetary contributions and cost-free expertise. Projects promoting nuclear techniques in medicine, agriculture and water management contributed to attaining the Millennium Development

Goals, and innovative projects such as studies on coastal ocean acidification could also help scientists understand global warming trends. His Government applauded the fact that technical cooperation projects were being executed in a safe and secure manner, and that Member States availed themselves of technical cooperation with the specific aim of strengthening national and global safety and security frameworks.

105. The United States welcomed the draft Nuclear Safety Review for the Year 2008 (GOV/2009/2) and appreciated the update provided by the Director General on Agency activities undertaken pursuant to General Conference resolutions on measures to strengthen international cooperation in nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety. The importance of the Agency's continued focus on the global nuclear safety regime could not be overstated, particularly with regard to Member States embarking upon nuclear power programmes, for which a sound safety infrastructure was an essential prerequisite. The United States supported the Agency's safety programme through significant contributions of extrabudgetary resources and cost-free experts.

106. His country congratulated the Agency on hosting the third review meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. The review process was crucial for recognizing and disseminating best practices. The United States encouraged all countries planning or operating nuclear energy programmes to ratify the entire range of nuclear safety instruments.

107. The United States attached great importance to the global nuclear liability regime and held the view that universal membership of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage would send a clear, confidence-building signal about the responsible use of nuclear energy. A viable and strong nuclear liability regime was fundamental to any proposal for reliable access to nuclear fuel.

108. It had to be recognized that countries using nuclear power for the first time might comprise a significant portion of nuclear industry growth in the near future and those countries had to be supported and encouraged to develop strong safety infrastructures. Every country developing a nuclear power programme should have a strong and independent regulator, which had to be established and functional at an early stage. Regulatory infrastructures should not be limited to nuclear power generation but should apply to the safety and security of all nuclear material used in a country. The United States strongly encouraged the Agency to continue to expand its capacity-building and review services; OSART and IRRS missions were critical to ensuring compliance with safety standards. Successful implementation of safety and security regimes for radioactive sources required an integrated approach and the United States therefore welcomed the Agency's employment of a mobile hot cell to remove orphan and disused high-activity sources and process them locally. In addition, the Agency's development of Uranium Production Site Appraisal Team review missions could be expected to help Member States plan their mining programmes in a safe and environmentally friendly manner.

109. To deal with the unlikely event of a radiological emergency, the Agency had developed the capacity to marshal specialized response resources quickly from around the world. The United States welcomed the coordinating role of the Agency's Incident and Emergency Centre and encouraged Member States to register their capabilities with the Response Assistance Network.

110. With those comments, he took note of document GOV/2009/48 and agreed to its submission to the General Conference.

111. <u>Ms CROWLEY</u> (New Zealand) welcomed the update in document GOV/2009/48 on activities relating to transport safety. Noting that a new edition of the *Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material* had been issued in May 2009 and that the final action in the transport action plan

had been completed in July 2009, she said that her country looked forward to participating in discussions on the next phase of the plan.

112. New Zealand had also been pleased to see a reference in the document to the successful meeting of shipping and coastal States — with Agency involvement — during the General Conference in October 2008, which had provided a welcome opportunity to improve mutual understanding, confidence and communication regarding safe maritime transport of radioactive material. It looked forward to another such meeting during the forthcoming session. It also welcomed the fact that a conference on safety and security in transport was being planned for 2011.

113. Noting the conclusion in the document that more work was needed in the field of incident and emergency preparedness and response, including on communication with the public during an emergency, she said that her country was concerned that, despite growing recognition that national safety infrastructures should include resources and arrangements for responding to incidents and emergencies, only a few Member States had adequate capabilities to respond to a major radiological emergency. In that connection, New Zealand welcomed the Agency's development of the Response Assistance Network and encouraged Member States to register their assistance capabilities with it.

114. Referring to the information provided on the work of the ninth meeting of INLEX, she said that a key priority for New Zealand was to have an effective liability regime in place to protect against harm to human health and the environment, as well as possible economic loss due to an incident or accident during the maritime transport of radioactive material. Given the fragility of communities in the South Pacific, which were dependent on the environment for their economic livelihoods, that issue was of particular significance for the region. New Zealand valued the work of INLEX and looked forward to reports on its future work.

115. <u>Mr HU Xiaodi</u> (China), said that nuclear safety was of primary importance for the sustainable development of nuclear energy and nuclear technology, and it had become all the more important in the light of the global renaissance of nuclear power and expanding application of nuclear technology. China appreciated the Secretariat's efforts to enhance the global nuclear safety regime and to raise the level of nuclear safety worldwide and it encouraged the Secretariat to continue with those efforts.

116. China was actively and rapidly developing nuclear power. The Chinese Government had always attached great importance to nuclear safety and abided by the basic principle of 'safety first and quality first' in nuclear power plant construction and operation. The country had continuously improved its nuclear safety control system, formulating nuclear safety standards and building up regulatory institutions and technical capability, in order to ensure the safe, steady and orderly development of nuclear power. It stood willing to strengthen its cooperation in that area with the Agency and other Member States in order to ensure the safety and reliability of all nuclear power plants both in operation and under construction.

117. The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management had played a positive role since its entry into force. China had taken an active part in the third review meeting of the Contracting Parties held in May 2009. The national report it had submitted at that meeting had passed the review process. It would continue strictly to fulfil its obligations under the Convention and to make full use of the important results and experience derived from the review meeting.

118. China was eager to improve safety controls further and to enhance exchanges — in cooperation with other Member States — in the area of nuclear safety control and legislation, decommissioning of facilities and management of disused sealed sources. It had also supported and actively participated in various other activities related to nuclear safety, had contributed to the establishment of the International Seismic Safety Centre and had hosted workshops on denials of shipment.

119. With a view to enhancing further its nuclear safety regulatory system, China was engaging in consultations with the Agency concerning an IRRS mission.

120. His country would continue to support the Agency's efforts in the area of nuclear safety and stood ready to make its own contribution to enhancing nuclear safety standards worldwide together with the Agency and other Member States.

121. In conclusion, he took note of document GOV/2009/48 and agreed to its submission to the General Conference.

122. <u>Mr SIRRY</u> (Egypt) said that Egypt supported the Agency's activities aimed at developing nuclear safety guidelines and standards in order to keep Member States informed of best practices so that they could select whatever measures they deemed appropriate to strengthen nuclear safety at national level. Egypt also supported the Agency's efforts to promote radiation protection and safe disposal of nuclear waste.

123. He emphasized the voluntary nature of the Agency's guidelines, which should not be turned into binding standards. Moreover, technical cooperation activities should not be made conditional on the implementation of such guidelines. Measures to develop the basic infrastructure required to launch a nuclear power programme should be treated as an indivisible whole, since it was difficult to separate safety considerations from other aspects of infrastructure development. Furthermore, the building of institutional structures in the area of nuclear safety should be a gradual process, taking into account how advanced a country's nuclear programme was and the country's specific characteristics and legal system.

124. Egypt took note of the Agency's need for resources to enhance nuclear and radiological emergency preparedness and to fulfil its mandate under the Early Notification Convention and the Assistance Convention. It urged Member States and major donors to provide the necessary resources for those vital activities.

125. In view of the heavy shipping traffic in its territorial waters, Egypt urged all shipping States to comply with nuclear safety standards and relevant international instruments. Moreover, the States concerned should be held responsible for any accident that occurred while they were transporting nuclear material. His country stressed the importance of ensuring that the notification and assistance arrangements in which the Agency participated covered all types of nuclear accidents and emergencies, including those resulting from military activities.

126. In conclusion, he requested that the Agency clarify in its reports the safety risks posed by old reactors in the Middle East that were not subject to any form of international control.

127. <u>Mr CODORNIU PUJALS</u> (Cuba) reiterated his country's support for the Ibero-American Nuclear and Radiation Safety Network and expressed appreciation for the fact that, in 2008, the Ibero-American Forum of Radiological and Nuclear Regulatory Agencies had concluded technical projects on safety and regulatory control of radiotherapy through the application of risk identification and analysis techniques and on continuous improvement of the regulatory framework for the control of medical exposure in Ibero-America, the outcomes of which had been disseminated at the 12th International Congress of the International Radiation Protection Association held in October 2008. Regional safety networks were an important mechanism for exchange of knowledge, experience and lessons learned in the field of nuclear safety and Cuba welcomed the fact that the Secretariat had established a prototype of the global nuclear safety and security network.

128. His country appreciated the Agency's efforts to deal with the problem of denials and delays of shipment of radioactive material and it highly commended the work of the International Steering

Committee on Denials of Shipment of Radioactive Material. However, the difficulties continued to increase and Cuba urged the Secretariat to continue to intensify its efforts in that area.

129. In conclusion, he took note of document GOV/2009/48 and endorsed its submission to the General Conference.

130. <u>Mr CURIA</u> (Argentina) commended the Agency's efforts in support of Member States that were interested in embarking on nuclear power programmes and expressed the hope that they would be stepped up. His country offered to make available its experience, accumulated over four decades of developing and implementing a nuclear power programme.

131. With regard to the remediation and rehabilitation of contaminated sites, Argentina's National Atomic Energy Commission was implementing an environmental remediation programme to rehabilitate its uranium mining sites which was being partly funded by the World Bank.

132. As President of the Ibero-American Forum of Radiological and Nuclear Regulatory Agencies during the period under review in the report contained in document GOV/2009/48, his country thanked the Agency for its cooperation. Progress had been made in achieving synergies between the results obtained in projects of the extrabudgetary safety programme in Ibero-America and activities under other Agency programmes aimed at countries in the region that did not belong to the Forum. His Government had declared the Forum's activities a national priority, demonstrating its strong commitment to improving nuclear and radiation safety in the region.

133. The Ibero-American Nuclear and Radiation Safety Network was only one of the tools of the Forum. For that reason, his country proposed that the title of section D.3 of the report be changed to include the correct name of the Forum, and that its activities be reflected in the report. It was Argentina's understanding that the global nuclear safety and security network would provide an additional opportunity for synergy of efforts in support in nuclear and radiation safety and security in the Ibero-American region.

134. Argentina continued to believe that the efforts made by countries and the Secretariat in the area of education and training in nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety were essential. It was gratifying to be able to report that, following the signing of the long-term agreement between the Agency and Argentina, his country had formally become a regional training centre for nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety. Argentina hoped that the Secretariat would conclude similar agreements to establish centres in other regions and commended the Secretariat's efforts to assist countries in that regard.

135. His country noted the Secretariat's efforts to develop preventive actions in respect of possible seismic events and it appreciated the fact that the Agency was promoting the creation of a extrabudgetary programme to deal with tsunamis and earthquakes. However, it was concerned that, in working on that issue, new and excessive requirements were being elaborated for facilities located in areas not at all prone to earthquakes.

136. Argentina had participated actively in the review process under the Convention on Nuclear Safety, together with the other Contracting Parties, and would make its contribution to the preparatory meeting for the fifth review meeting, given the importance of that instrument for safety culture.

137. Turning to the Agency's safety standards programme, he said that safety of radiation sources, nuclear facilities and nuclear material were matters of priority importance for his Government, which was why it continued to be concerned by the approach taken to the relation between nuclear safety and nuclear security. He noted with satisfaction the statements in paragraphs 46 and 86 of the report which struck a better balance as regards the synergies, differences and common elements in the area of safety

and security. He expressed the hope that the Secretariat would adopt a similar attitude in drawing up the Nuclear Security Report, giving greater emphasis to synergy.

138. The report referred to the 12th International Congress of the International Radiation Protection Association, held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in October 2008. His country wished to thank the Agency for its cooperation in that connection, and in particular for facilitating the participation of specialists from various countries.

139. Argentina shared fully the Agency's concern that special attention should be given in uranium mining operations to environmental protection and to the remediation and rehabilitation of contaminated sites. It should be the policy of all stakeholders in the uranium mining sector to undertake their activities with remediation programmes in place approved by the relevant competent authorities. His country recommended that the Agency step up its assistance to Member States carrying out uranium prospecting and mining activities which lacked regulatory infrastructure capacity.

140. In conclusion, he took note of the report contained in document GOV/2009/48.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.