

**IAEA Board of Governors**

Record of the 1310<sup>th</sup> Meeting  
GOV/OR.1310

Implementation of the NPT safeguard agreement and relevant provisions of  
United Nations Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran

# Board of Governors

**GOV/OR.1310**

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## Record of the 1310<sup>th</sup> Meeting

*Held at Headquarters, Vienna,, on Wednesday, 14 September 2011, at 10 a.m.*

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<sup>1</sup> GOV/2011/60.



## Attendance

(The list below gives the name of the senior member of each delegation who attended the meeting, as well as that of any other member whose statement is summarized in this record.)

Mr PARVEZ	Chairman (Pakistan)
Mr CURIA	Argentina
Mr POTTS	Australia
Mr RECKER	Belgium
Mr VALLIM GUERREIRO	Brazil
Mr GABCHE	Cameroon
Mr BARRETT	Canada
Mr LABBÉ VILLA	Chile
Mr CHENG Jingye	China
Ms BOZENHARDOVÁ	Czech Republic
Mr BERNHARD	Denmark
Mr ROSENBERG GUERRERO	Ecuador
Mr MONDOLONI	France
Mr LÜDEKING	Germany
Mr ASHRAF	India
Mr GHISI	Italy
Mr NAKANE	Japan
Mr QUEISI	Jordan
Ms OKOTH	Kenya
Mr CHO Hyun	Korea, Republic of
Mr ENKHSAIKHAN	Mongolia
Mr HAMER	Netherlands
Mr ILLO	Niger
Mr MUMTAZ	Pakistan
Mr GARCÍA CASTILLO	Peru
Mr MARCELO CURTO	Portugal
Mr BERDENNIKOV	Russian Federation
Ms TAN	Singapore
Mr MABHONGO	South Africa
Ms MYKOLAICHUK	Ukraine
Mr ALKAABI	United Arab Emirates
Mr SMITH	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Mr DAVIES	United States of America
Mr UZCÁTEGUI DUQUE	Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of
Mr AMANO	Director General
Mr CSERVENY	Secretary of the Board

**Representatives of the following Member States also attended the meeting:**

Albania, Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Austria, Belarus, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Vietnam, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

**Abbreviations used in this record:**

CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
FEP	Fuel Enrichment Plant
FFEP	Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant
FMP	Fuel Manufacturing Plant
HEU	high-enriched uranium
LEU	low-enriched uranium
LOFs	locations outside facilities
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT Review Conference	Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
PFEP	Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant
R&D	research and development

\* Speakers under Rule 50 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure are indicated by an asterisk.

## 5. Nuclear Verification

### (a) Staff of the Department of Safeguards to be used as Agency inspectors

(GOV/2011/47; Note to Governors dated 22 August 2011)

1. The CHAIRMAN said that document GOV/2011/47 contained proposals by the Secretariat regarding the staff of the Department of Safeguards to be used as inspectors. The curricula vitae of the staff members in question had been circulated to all Board members by the Secretariat under cover of a letter dated 22 August 2011. An updated summary, by nationality, of staff of the Department of Safeguards to be used as inspectors had also been circulated by the Secretariat under cover of a Note to Governors dated 22 August 2011.

2. He took it that the Board wished to take the action recommended in document GOV/2011/47 and authorize the Director General to use the staff members referred to in paragraph 1 of that document as Agency inspectors.

3. It was so decided.

### (b) Application of safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

(GOV/2011/53)

4. The CHAIRMAN noted that document GOV/2011/53 contained a report by the Director General on the sub-item.

5. Mr CHENG Jingye (China) said that it was his country's consistent and unswerving position to promote the peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula through dialogue and consultation, and the denuclearization of the Peninsula and the maintenance of peace and stability both there and throughout north-east Asia. Taking a long-term view of the overall situation, his country had continued to work for peace and negotiations and had urged all parties to work together to further the six-party talks process so that a solution that met the concerns of all parties could be found.

6. China welcomed the recent communications and coordination among the parties through active engagement and dialogue with a view to the resumption of the six-party talks. It hoped that the parties would maintain the momentum towards the creation of favourable conditions for the preservation of peace and stability on the Peninsula and the early resumption of the talks

7. Experience had shown that the six-party talks were an effective mechanism for denuclearization and for the maintenance of peace and stability in the region, as well as an important platform for improving relations between the parties concerned through dialogue. An early resumption of the talks was in the interest of all parties and the relevant bilateral dialogues had opened up a new window of opportunity in that regard. All parties should seize the opportunity by maintaining the current momentum, thereby creating favourable conditions for the early resumption of the six-party talks and a turnaround of the situation.

8. His country would pursue its close communication and coordination with all relevant parties and the international community in the joint efforts to further the denuclearization process and achieve and preserve long-term stability and security in north-east Asia.

9. Mr WYGANOWSKI (Poland)\* speaking on behalf of the European Union, the candidate countries Turkey, Croatia, Iceland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Montenegro, the

countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia, the EFTA countries Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, said that the Director General's report confirmed that, from 2002 until 2007, and from April 2009 onwards, the Agency had been unable to apply any safeguards measures in the DPRK and was therefore unable to draw any safeguards conclusions regarding that country. The European Union once again expressed its grave concern at the decision by the Government of the DPRK to cease all cooperation with the Agency. The report also stated that the DPRK's nuclear programme remained a matter of serious concern and that the construction of a uranium enrichment facility and a new light water reactor were deeply troubling developments.

10. The European Union underscored that the DPRK continued to be bound by its international obligations, as set out in United Nations Security Council resolutions 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), and by its comprehensive safeguards agreement, and it urged the DPRK to comply with them fully, unconditionally and without delay. The European Union reaffirmed its strong support for the application of safeguards and called upon the DPRK to resume dialogue and permit the early return of Agency inspectors. It urged the DPRK to take all necessary steps to restore confidence. The General Conference had decided, in its resolution GC(54)/RES/12 on the implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement between the Agency and the DPRK, that the Agency should remain seized of the matter.

11. Taking into account the fact that, in recent years, Agency inspectors had not been in a position to enter the DPRK, the European Union reconfirmed its main concerns.— The developments regarding the uranium enrichment programme implied that the DPRK could enrich uranium on a significant scale. Such activities represented another violation of that country's obligations under Security Council resolutions 1718 and 1874, as well as a violation of the September 2005 Joint Statement from the six-party talks. The European Union attached great importance to a peaceful resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue and to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. It reaffirmed its full support for the efforts via the six-party talks to achieve the complete, irreversible and verifiable disablement and dismantlement of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in the DPRK. It once again strongly urged the DPRK to honour the commitments contained in the September 2005 Joint Statement, to implement fully relevant Security Council resolutions and to take the necessary steps to achieve peace and stability in a future nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. It also urged the DPRK to refrain from taking any further action that would increase tension in the region. The November 2010 report by the panel of experts to the Security Council had also noted that certain countries such as Syria and Iran continued to be associated with the DPRK in connection with nuclear and ballistic missile-related activities and had indicated that special attention should be given by all Member States to the prevention of such activities.

12. The application of Agency safeguards, the disablement and dismantlement of all nuclear weapons, existing nuclear programmes and related installations in the DPRK, the implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions and the termination of nuclear and ballistic missile activities were mandatory and constituted indispensable steps towards maintaining stability and peace in the region.

13. The European Union requested the Director General to keep the Board of Governors informed of developments and to maintain the item on the Board's agenda.

14. Mr EL-KHOURY (Lebanon)\*, speaking on behalf of the Arab Group, emphasized the importance of the Agency's role in the monitoring and verification of nuclear activities in the DPRK, since it was the only body to which such a mandate had been entrusted.

15. The Arab Group supported international efforts to achieved universality of the NPT, nuclear disarmament and the placement of all nuclear facilities under comprehensive safeguards. It drew attention to the statement in the final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference reaffirming the importance of achieving universality of the NPT, and of commitment to the Agency's comprehensive safeguards regime.

16. The Group therefore urged the parties concerned, especially those involved in the six-party talks, to take all necessary political steps to reach a peaceful solution that would help reduce tension on the Korean Peninsula. It also urged them to involve the Agency in such efforts in view of the pivotal nature of its role.

17. The Arab Group's support for the efforts to contain the Korean crisis was motivated by its unwavering belief in the need to pursue serious action to achieve universality of the NPT. It reminded the Board of resolution GC(53)/RES/17, adopted by the General Conference at its fifty-third regular session, on Israeli nuclear capabilities, and pointed out that the region was still the scene of nuclear activities that were not subject to comprehensive safeguards, a situation that posed a clear threat to regional and international stability and peace.

18. Mr CHO Hyun (Republic of Korea) commended the Director General's comprehensive report, which was the first of its kind in the history of the Agency's dealings with the DPRK nuclear issue. It contained an objective overview and basic factual information on the scope of the DPRK's nuclear programme and an update on recent developments, including new information on elusive aspects such as the DPRK's uranium enrichment programme, proliferation activities and the acquisition of sensitive technology from a clandestine supply network, and it should help to generate the momentum required for the Agency to strengthen further its role and activities in the application of safeguards in the DPRK.

19. It was regrettable that the efforts of the international community and the participants in the six-party talks had not yet led to the successful denuclearization of the DPRK. The latter had not shown any sincere change in its attitude towards denuclearization, and the threat posed by its nuclear capabilities had grown more serious than ever.

20. The uranium enrichment facility revealed by the DPRK in 2010 constituted a flagrant violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) which urged the DPRK to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. His country strongly believed that the international community should not tolerate the DPRK's illegitimate and deceptive actions and that it should maintain its united and firm position that the DPRK should immediately cease its uranium enrichment activities.

21. The Director General's report also underlined the illegality of the enrichment programme by emphasizing that the DPRK's failure to abandon its nuclear programme breached the provisions of relevant Security Council resolutions. The DPRK had claimed that it was exercising its right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, but that right was accorded only under the NPT regime and subject to full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the Agency. The international community should be mindful of the fact that the Agency had not been able to conduct all necessary safeguards activities under that agreement since 1994 and not just since 2003 or 2009.

22. The DPRK had severely undermined the international non-proliferation regime. As shown by the Director General's report, it had been a leading culprit in the area of nuclear proliferation and was deeply involved in the international clandestine supply network. According to the report, the planned Syrian nuclear reactor that had been destroyed in September 2007 had been built with the assistance of the DPRK. In addition, the three UF<sub>6</sub> cylinders that Libya had imported from the clandestine supply network had been present in the DPRK prior to their transfer to Libya, and the UF<sub>6</sub> in the largest



cylinder had probably originated in the DPRK. The report on the connection between the DPRK and Libya's UF<sub>6</sub> was even more troubling, since it implied that the DPRK had developed its uranium enrichment programme much earlier than had been thought. Thus, the DPRK nuclear issue was not simply a matter of regional security in north-east Asia but a threat to the international community as a whole.

23. The Republic of Korea would continue to adopt a principled approach to the resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue, faithfully implementing sanctions under Security Council resolutions while leaving the door open for dialogue. It urged the DPRK to demonstrate its sincerity with respect to denuclearization through concrete actions so that appropriate conditions for the resumption of the six-party talks could be created. The immediate suspension of its uranium enrichment programme was a matter of the utmost urgency.

24. The Republic of Korea urged the DPRK to comply fully with its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions, to come into full compliance with the NPT and to cooperate promptly with the Agency in the full and effective implementation of its safeguards agreement. It looked forward to closer cooperation with the Agency and its Member States with a view to achieving the common goal of denuclearization of the DPRK.

25. Mr NAKANE (Japan) said that the Director General's report reminded Member States of how serious the DPRK nuclear issues were. Regrettably, no inspection activities had been implemented since the Agency inspectors had been required to leave the DPRK in April 2009. Since then, violations of the safeguards agreement and United Nations Security Council resolutions had continued. Furthermore, a nuclear test had been conducted and an enrichment facility had been built. Those developments could not be disregarded. His country hoped that the Agency would continue to play an important role in resolving the DPRK nuclear issue.

26. Japan was seriously concerned at the public statement by the DPRK that it had begun to construct a light water reactor and that a uranium enrichment facility had been operating. Such nuclear-related activities violated Security Council resolutions and the Joint Statement issued pursuant to the six-party talks pursuant to which the DPRK was required to refrain from conducting any further nuclear tests, abandon all its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes — including any uranium enrichment activities — in a verifiable and irreversible manner, cease immediately all related activities, retract its announcement of withdrawal from the NPT, and act strictly in accordance with its safeguards agreement. In addition, the DPRK was required to implement transparency measures vis-à-vis the Agency in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions. With the aim of preventing further nuclear development and addressing the threats of procurement and proliferation by the DPRK, the international community should maintain a united stand on implementation of the measures set forth in the relevant Security Council resolutions.

27. With regard to the six-party talks, the dialogue between the Republic of Korea and the DPRK, and the preliminary meeting between the United States and the DPRK held in July 2011, were welcome steps aimed at resolving the issues through dialogue. However, as the DPRK had not taken any concrete steps towards denuclearization, the situation remained serious. It was important to ensure that the dialogue produced tangible outcomes, including measures relating to uranium enrichment activities. The DPRK needed to express its determination to implement its commitments under the six-party talks, including denuclearization, in accordance with the September 2005 Joint Statement.

28. It was important to express the concerns of the international community in appropriate terms so that the issues could be resolved through the six-party talks. The Agency should also send a strong and united message to the DPRK, including with regard to its uranium enrichment activities, at the forthcoming General Conference and should urge it to take concrete action.

29. Mr BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) said that his country was concerned that Agency safeguards were not being applied in the DPRK, that there were no Agency inspectors in the country and that the necessary equipment was not in place.

30. It was essential to resume the six-party talks as soon as possible in order to resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. The Russian Federation urged the DPRK to declare a moratorium on the production and testing of nuclear weapons, to return to the NPT and to resume application of its safeguards agreement with the Agency. It was also important to allow Agency inspectors with the requisite professional experience and expertise to verify the DPRK's compliance with its obligations under its safeguards agreement, particularly with respect to its uranium enrichment activities.

31. The progress achieved in the recent high-level talks between the Russian Federation and the DPRK should be taken advantage of to relaunch the six-party talks in the interests of achieving a comprehensive settlement of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. He urged all parties to the talks to adopt a positive approach and to focus on the common quest for creative ideas that would enable them to exploit the existing opportunities.

32. Mr LABBÉ VILLA (Chile) said that the Director General's report placed the issue in its historical context, allowing all dimensions of the situation to be assessed. The DPRK was continuing to develop its nuclear programme in violation of its obligations pursuant to the six-party talks and relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. The information regarding the construction of a light water reactor and ongoing enrichment activities were a particular source of concern.

33. The lack of inspection activities since April 2009 prevented the Director General from providing the Board with credible information as to the nature and scope of the activities currently being undertaken. Chile looked forward to the early resumption of Agency inspections of DPRK nuclear facilities. It welcomed the fact that talks had been held in recent months between the Republic of Korea and the DPRK, and between the United States and the DPRK. It hoped that the dialogue would lay the basis for further progress, including the implementation of concrete measures.

34. The situation was nevertheless very serious and his country joined the international community in urging the DPRK to halt all its nuclear activities forthwith and to comply fully with its international obligations, including under Security Council resolutions. It attached special importance to the maintenance of the item on the Board's agenda.

35. Mr GARCÍA CASTILLO (Peru) commended the Director General's report but expressed regret over the lack of substantive progress in the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

36. As the Agency had been unable to apply safeguards in the DPRK since December 2002, it could not provide conclusive information regarding the nature of activities in the country. It was also regrettable that, since 2009, the DPRK had suspended all forms of cooperation with the Agency relating to the monitoring and verification of the Yongbyon nuclear facility.

37. Peru shared the international concern regarding the current situation and called on the DPRK to comply with its international obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions, and deriving from its membership of the Agency, by taking steps to facilitate the resumption of the Agency's work in a climate of cooperation and transparency so that all outstanding issues relating to its nuclear programme could be clarified.

38. His country also urged the DPRK to continue with the six-party talks with a view to reaching a satisfactory agreement through dialogue and negotiations aimed at the definitive denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

39. Ms TAN (Singapore) said that a Korean Peninsula that was stable and free of nuclear weapons was vital for international and regional peace, prosperity and security. It was therefore a matter of grave concern that the problem of the DPRK's nuclear programme remained unresolved. The Agency's ability to apply safeguards effectively in the DPRK had been severely hampered on several occasions since the DPRK had acceded to the NPT in 1985 and since the entry into force of its safeguards agreement in 1992. Regrettably, the DPRK had ceased all cooperation with the Agency since April 2009.

40. Her country urged all parties concerned to refrain from provocative actions and to work sincerely towards the resumption of the six-party talks as soon as possible. In the meantime, it strongly urged the DPRK to take concrete steps to address the international community's concerns, including through full compliance with relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, a return to the NPT and the immediate resumption of cooperation with the Agency. It hoped that the resolution on the implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement between the Agency and the DPRK would be adopted at the General Conference the following week by consensus. That had been the practice until the preceding session when it had been adopted by a vote, although no Member State had voted against it.

41. Mr BARRETT (Canada) commended the Agency's efforts to continue to monitor the nuclear situation in the DPRK through analysis of satellite imagery and other information available to it, despite its being unable to implement any safeguards measures in that country since April 2009.

42. His country remained deeply concerned at the threat posed by the DPRK to regional and international security and strongly agreed with the Director General's assessment that reports of a new uranium enrichment programme and construction of a light water reactor in the DPRK were deeply troubling. Such activities clearly contravened binding decisions of the United Nations Security Council.

43. Canada continued fully to support the NPT Review Conference conclusion which urged the DPRK to return at an early date to the Treaty, adhere to its Agency safeguards agreement, and implement fully all relevant nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament obligations. The DPRK did not and could not have the status of a nuclear-weapon State under the NPT.

44. His country once again called on the DPRK to comply immediately and fully with its obligations under all relevant Security Council resolutions, and to fulfil its commitments under previous six-party talks agreements. It strongly urged the DPRK to take concrete steps towards denuclearization and to refrain from any further nuclear tests or other provocative actions. It remained deeply concerned that the DPRK had ceased cooperation with the Agency and called upon it to cooperate with the organization, as called for in Security Council resolution 1874 (2009). It encouraged the Secretariat to continue to maintain the capability to re-establish implementation of safeguards-related activities in the DPRK.

45. Canada urged all members of the Agency to support fully and implement Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) and it encouraged efforts to achieve a diplomatic resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue. It was strongly in favour of maintaining the item on the Board's agenda and requested the Director General to continue to monitor developments closely and to report to the Board as appropriate. The Agency and its Member States must remain seized of the matter. It was Canada's hope that the importance of the issue could be reflected through a consensus resolution at the forthcoming session of the General Conference.

46. Mr DAVIES (United States of America) said the Director General's report was testimony to the long history of the DPRK's lack of cooperation with the Agency and its continued defiance of its international obligations and commitments. His country shared the Director General's serious concern

regarding the DPRK's nuclear activities, in particular its disclosure in November 2010 of a uranium enrichment programme and the construction of a light water reactor, which were clear violations of United Nations Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) and of the DPRK's commitments under the 2005 Joint Statement pursuant to the six-party talks. Those developments were deeply troubling, particularly in light of the DPRK's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability and its long track record of proliferation. The report's assessment of the DPRK's enrichment-related procurements was consistent with his country's belief that the DPRK had been pursuing enrichment for an extended period of time. It was unlikely that the DPRK had only begun work on its programme in April 2009, when it claimed to have started construction of its Yongbyon enrichment facility.

47. The United States also noted the Agency's assessment that the DPRK was the likely source of UF<sub>6</sub> recovered by Agency inspectors in Libya in 2004. The Agency's conclusion was consistent with his country's long-standing concern regarding the existence of undeclared nuclear activities in the DPRK that were either linked to the development of weapons-related nuclear technologies or to the advancement of its proliferation activities.

48. His country seconded the Director General's call on the DPRK to comply fully with Security Council resolutions 1718 and 1874. The information and assessments contained in his report regarding the DPRK's nuclear activities also underscored the critical need for the international community to close all avenues for the DPRK to circumvent United Nations sanctions. The United States called on all States to increase their vigilance against DPRK proliferation activities and to prevent those activities from taking place in their territories through full and transparent implementation of Security Council resolutions.

49. The United States believed that a dual-track approach offered the best prospects for achieving denuclearization. His country continued to implement fully national and multilateral sanctions, at the same time remaining open to dialogue with the DPRK. However, the United States was not interested in negotiations for the sake of simply talking. The intention of the bilateral talks held in New York in July 2011 had been to explore the DPRK's willingness to take concrete and irreversible steps towards denuclearization. The message had been consistent and clear: the DPRK must abide by its commitments under the Joint Statement, cease all nuclear activities, including enrichment, and demonstrate its seriousness with regard to denuclearization through substantive action prior to the resumption of the six-party talks.

50. His country commended the Agency on its comprehensive report and supported its efforts to maintain readiness to re-establish implementation of verification activities in the DPRK. The Agency had an important role to play as attempts were made to seek an immediate halt to all nuclear activities in the DPRK, leading to irreversible steps towards complete and verifiable denuclearization, and to the DPRK's return at an early date to the NPT and Agency safeguards. The path to reintegration with the international community and greater security remained open to the DPRK should it choose to comply fully with its international obligations and commitments, help strengthen rather than undermine the global non-proliferation regime, and advance rather than endanger international peace and security.

51. Mr POTTS (Australia) said his country remained deeply concerned at revelations that the DPRK had a uranium enrichment capability and was building an unsafeguarded reactor. Such activities were a clear breach of United Nations Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009). Furthermore, those unsafeguarded activities were in defiance of calls by the Board and the General Conference for the DPRK to come into full compliance with the NPT and cooperate fully with the Agency in implementing comprehensive safeguards. The DPRK's continued failure to abide by Security Council resolutions, and its failure to meet its previous commitments to denuclearize, had serious implications for regional security and the non-proliferation regime.

52. Australia urged the DPRK to resume cooperation with the Agency, to implement its commitments to denuclearize, and to help create the climate of confidence required for a return to constructive dialogue, including in the six-party talks. Given the importance of the issue for global security and for the non- proliferation regime, his country requested the Director-General to continue to report to the Board on the implementation of safeguards in the DPRK.

53. Mr MABHONGO (South Africa) expressed regret at the lack of progress on the Agency's verification mandate in the DPRK and at the fact that, since April 2009, the organization had not been in a position to carry out its monitoring and verification activities under the DPRK's safeguards agreement. His country called upon the DPRK once again to rescind its announced withdrawal from the NPT and to come into full compliance with the Treaty as soon as possible, and urged it to terminate fully and verifiably any nuclear weapons programme, to refrain from further nuclear tests or any launch using ballistic missile technology, and to sign and ratify the CTBT. It was important that the DPRK placed all its nuclear facilities and material under Agency safeguards. Finally, South Africa called for an early resumption of the six-party talks.

54. Mr ALKAABI (United Arab Emirates) said it was unfortunate that there had been no progress with regard to safeguards implementation in the DPRK. The fact that the Agency continued to have no access to nuclear facilities in the DPRK was cause for deep concern. The nuclear tests conducted by the DPRK in 2006 and 2009, and more recent unfortunate events, continued to pose a threat to regional and international security. The revelation by the DPRK that it had a uranium enrichment programme that could also contribute to the production of nuclear weapons further increased concern.

55. His country was deeply concerned at the DPRK's association with certain countries in the Middle East in connection with nuclear and ballistic missile-related activities, which was contributing to further proliferation in that region. The international community must remain seized of the ongoing nuclear activities in the DPRK and ensure the DPRK's compliance with its obligations and commitments. It must also cooperate to prevent further proliferation from the DPRK to other countries, including in the Middle East.

56. The United Arab Emirates called on the DPRK to return to the NPT at an early date, abandon all its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear-related programmes, implement Agency safeguards and meet its denuclearization commitments pursuant to the six-party talks.

57. Mr GRIFFITHS (New Zealand)\* said his country supported the Agency's efforts to remain cognizant of the DPRK's nuclear programme to the fullest extent possible, consistent with the General Conference's call for the Secretariat to maintain its readiness to re-establish implementation of safeguards-related activities in that country.

58. New Zealand remained deeply concerned by reports that the DPRK continued to develop its nuclear capabilities outside the Agency's safeguards system. Of particular concern were reports of a centrifuge enrichment facility at the Yongbyon site. Although the Agency had not been given the access necessary to verify those reports, information available to it apparently indicated that the DPRK had acquired some of the technology and know-how required for a uranium enrichment programme through a clandestine supply network. New Zealand noted with concern that the DPRK had attempted to procure from a wide range of suppliers material and equipment suitable for use within an enrichment programme. It further noted with concern the DPRK's possible construction of a prototype light water reactor.

59. The Director General had included in his latest report a section on nuclear assistance to other States, and his country had been concerned to note the reference to the Syrian Arab Republic in that section, as well as the Agency's clear conclusions regarding historical clandestine network connections between the DPRK and Libya.

60. New Zealand continued to regret the fact that the DPRK had not re-engaged with the Agency since ceasing cooperation in April 2009, and that it had taken further backward steps since that time. His country urged the DPRK leadership to refrain from further destabilizing acts and to refocus its efforts on peace and dialogue, including by fulfilling its six-party talks commitment to abandon its existing nuclear programme. It joined the Director General in encouraging the DPRK to comply fully with its obligations under relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, to come into full compliance with the NPT, to cooperate promptly with the Agency in the full and effective implementation of its safeguards agreement, and to resolve any outstanding issues that might have arisen owing to the long interruption of Agency safeguards.

61. Finally, his country welcomed the Agency's efforts to remain prepared for a resumption of safeguards activities in the DPRK at short notice, and supported the continued maintenance of the item on the Board's agenda.

62. Ms YPARRAGUIRRE (Philippines)\* said the Director General's report not only enhanced understanding of the current status of the DPRK nuclear issue but also affirmed its importance. Her country regretted the fact that, from the end of 2002 until July 2007, and since April 2009, the Agency had not been able to implement any safeguards measures in the DPRK. However, that was not a reason for the Agency not to remain cognizant of the issue. Otherwise, any State which had outstanding unresolved issues relating to safeguards application might simply not cooperate with the Agency so as to compel the Board to forego consideration of its case.

63. The Agency had an essential role to play in verifying the DPRK's nuclear programme and it should continue to maintain the requisite capabilities to resume safeguards implementation, evaluate the status of the DPRK's nuclear programme based on all available information, and resolve any issues that might have arisen owing to its continuing inability to implement safeguards in that State, in accordance with the resolution adopted by the preceding session of the General Conference on the issue.

64. The Philippines regretted the continued lack of progress since the preceding meetings of the Board in addressing the outstanding issues relating to the DPRK nuclear issue. The reported construction of a new uranium enrichment facility and a light water reactor remained matters of serious concern. The DPRK's nuclear activities constituted a clear violation of its commitments under the 2005 Joint Statement pursuant to the six-party talks and under United Nations Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009). The Philippines had consistently advocated a peaceful and just solution to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and it continued to stress the critical role of the six-party talks in attaining a peaceful and comprehensive resolution of the issue. It reiterated the call made by States party to the NPT during the 2010 NPT Review Conference for the DPRK to fulfil its commitments under the six-party talks, including the complete and verifiable abandonment of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in accordance with the September 2005 Joint Statement. It also joined other Member States in requesting the Director General to keep the Board informed on the issue and to maintain the item on the Board's agenda. Finally, it urged the DPRK to return to the NPT and to allow the Agency to resume implementation of its comprehensive safeguards agreement.

65. Mr MARSÁN AGUILERA (Cuba)\* said there were constant references throughout the report to historical elements despite the fact that no safeguards were being applied in the DPRK. In his introductory statement to the Board, the Director General had indicated that his report contained those elements at the request of a group of Member States. His country could not accept such an approach. The Secretariat should respond to a mandate and not to requests of Member States or groups of Member States. The Secretariat could have made savings in terms of translation and printing costs if it

had strictly adhered to its mandate, which would have been welcome at a time of financial constraints and budget cuts.

66. Both in the report and in the Director General's introductory statement, statements were made that were political in nature, which was inappropriate for the Secretariat. Neither the report nor the introductory statement made any reference to the readiness expressed by the authorities of the DPRK to return to the six-party talks, which seemed an unfortunate omission that undermined the spirit of dialogue and cooperation that should prevail if such negotiations were to be resumed.

67. Cuba supported the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and believed that diplomacy and dialogue should continue with a view to achieving a final, lasting and viable solution.

68. His country reaffirmed its position of principle with regard to nuclear disarmament and its concern at the threat to mankind resulting from the continued existence of nuclear weapons and their possible use or threat of use. It was deeply concerned at the slow progress in nuclear disarmament owing to the lack of progress on the part of the nuclear-weapon States in eliminating their nuclear arsenals. It reaffirmed its support for the action plan adopted by NAM at the most recent NPT Review Conference aimed at eliminating and banning nuclear weapons at the latest by 2025, as well as its support for the statement on the total elimination of nuclear weapons adopted at the XVI Ministerial Conference of NAM held in Bali in May 2011 which called for the convening of a high-level conference on that subject.

69. Cuba renewed its appeal to all nuclear-weapon States to comply immediately and unconditionally with the obligations emanating from Article VI of the NPT and to step up implementation of the outcomes of the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences calling for the total elimination of nuclear weapons via systematic and progressive efforts, in particular the 13 practical steps contained in the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Only the total elimination of nuclear weapons and nuclear tests would contribute to ensuring international peace and security.

70. Finally, on a note of hope, he said that Cuba had been heartened by the recent statements by the DPRK authorities expressing willingness to resume the six-party talks, which his country was confident could contribute to the finding of a long-term solution to the Korean nuclear issue through diplomacy and dialogue.

71. Mr SOLTANIEH (Islamic Republic of Iran)\* said he had to place on record a number of concerns. The Secretariat could only prepare or distribute a report if unanimously requested to do so by Member States. The Director General's new approach of digging up old history, which in almost all cases revived political tensions and increased polarization between Member States, was not justified. That damaging approach, which had been adopted in the past in reports on his own country, creating much misunderstanding and debate by reopening past issues that had already been closed, had to be stopped. With regard to the Director General's report on the DPRK, the question was whether there had been any safeguards implementation since his preceding report. Past documents could be read on the Agency's website.

72. He wished to place on record the fact that, with due respect for countries' sovereign decisions, his country was strongly against nuclear weapons and deplored activities to promote them by nuclear-weapon States. Iran called upon all peace-loving peoples to demonstrate against that threat to the peace and prosperity of the whole world.

73. Furthermore, States party to the NPT were continuously placed under pressure and subjected to sanctions, paying the price of their membership of that Treaty, while States outside the NPT benefited from nuclear cooperation and received sensitive nuclear technology outside any Agency control. The most worrisome aspect of that situation was the full cooperation of nuclear-weapon States in the

Western bloc — in particular the United States of America — with the nuclear weapon activities of the Zionist regime of Israel. He expressed full support for the concerns expressed by the representative of Lebanon on behalf of the Arab Group and reminded the Board of the demands expressed by the majority of Agency Member States in General Conference resolutions regarding Israeli nuclear capabilities. His own country had requested the Director General on a number of occasions to send a fact-finding mission to Israel to ascertain the facts concerning its possession of nuclear weapons, in light of contradictory statements made by a former Prime Minister of Israel and Israel's representative to the Agency. The Director General was expected to adopt a balanced, non-discriminatory approach: if he reported on the DPRK's possession of nuclear weapons, even though it was no longer a Member State of the Agency, he should also report on the possession of nuclear weapons by Israel, which claimed to be a member of the Agency. Iran looked forward to such a report being issued as soon as possible before the impartiality and professionalism of the Agency and its Secretariat were further damaged. In that connection, his country deplored the total silence of the European Union regarding the threat from Israel's nuclear weapons capabilities and that country's continuous violation of the Agency's Statute and General Conference decisions, and the European Union's destructive reference to his own country in the statement delivered on its behalf during the current meeting.

74. The CHAIRMAN, summing up the discussion, said that the Board had expressed its appreciation to the Director General for preparing his report contained in document GOV/2011/53, which also included a historical overview of the DPRK nuclear issue.

75. Several members had underlined that the Director General's report contained new information on important aspects of the DPRK nuclear issue, such as its uranium enrichment programme and nuclear proliferation activities. Some members had expressed concern in that regard about cooperation between the DPRK and other countries in weapons-related activities, as noted in the Director General's report.

76. Several members had expressed the view that the report should contribute towards generating the necessary momentum for the Agency to strengthen its role and activities in the DPRK.

77. Several members had expressed regret that there was no progress to be reported since the preceding meeting of the Board. They had also regretted the fact that, as reported by the Director General, the Agency had not been able to implement safeguards in the DPRK since 2002 and, therefore, could not draw any safeguards conclusions regarding that country.

78. Several members had strongly condemned the DPRK's actions in violation of relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the Agency, and had urged it to abandon and dismantle any nuclear weapons and nuclear programmes in a prompt, complete, transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner. Several members had urged the DPRK to comply with its international obligations as set out in the relevant Agency and Security Council resolutions. They had also urged the DPRK to refrain from taking any actions that would aggravate the situation.

79. Several members had expressed their serious concern regarding revelations about the existence of a uranium enrichment programme and the construction of a new light water reactor in the DPRK, which implied that the DPRK could enrich uranium on a significant scale and could open a second path for military ends. They had considered such activities a violation of the DPRK's obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions and its commitments under the 2005 Joint Statement from the six-party talks. They had emphasized that the international community should send a unified message to the DPRK that such a uranium enrichment programme was illegitimate, could not be tolerated and should cease immediately, and that the DPRK should take all necessary steps to restore confidence, including by reversing its decision to restore the nuclear facilities which had been disabled and by allowing an early return of the Agency's inspectors.



80. Several members had underlined the importance of swift and full implementation of the commitments contained in the 2005 Joint Statement, leading to the full disablement and dismantlement of the nuclear weapons programme of the DPRK in a verifiable manner, including the DPRK's provision of a correct and complete declaration to the Agency of all its nuclear material and activities. They had urged the DPRK to return to the NPT and to Agency safeguards at an early date.

81. Several members had emphasized the importance of achieving universality of the NPT, of Agency comprehensive safeguards and the adoption of a non-discriminatory approach, and had referred to the 2010 NPT Review Conference's final document in that connection.

82. The Board had regarded the DPRK nuclear issue as a serious threat to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and regional and international peace and stability.

83. The Board had expressed the view that a successfully negotiated settlement of the long-standing issue, maintaining the essential verification and monitoring role of the Agency in all stages of the process, was important for regional and international peace and security and for maintaining the global non-proliferation regime.

84. The Board had emphasized the importance of continued dialogue to achieving a peaceful and comprehensive resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue and early denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

85. The Board had also emphasized the importance of the early resumption of the six-party talks and had welcomed in that regard the recent high-level contacts among the parties concerned to that end. The Board had appealed to all parties concerned to seize that opportunity in a constructive manner. A view had also been expressed on the importance of a dual-track approach in that regard.

86. The Board had expressed its appreciation for the key role of China in the process and as Chair of the six-party talks.

87. Members had requested the Director General to maintain the item on the agenda of the Board of Governors and to report to it as appropriate in a professional manner.

88. He asked whether his summing-up was acceptable.

89. The Chairman's summing-up was accepted.

**(c) Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of United Nations Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran (GOV/2011/54)**

90. The CHAIRMAN noted that document GOV/2011/54 contained a report by the Director General on the sub-item.

91. Mr SHAMAA (Egypt)\*, speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated NAM's principled positions on the matter. NAM reaffirmed the basic and inalienable right of all States to the development, research, production and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, without any discrimination and in conformity with their respective legal obligations. Therefore, nothing should be interpreted in such a way as to inhibit or restrict the right of States to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes. States' choices and decisions, including those of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear technology and fuel cycle policies must be respected. NAM recognized the Agency as the sole competent authority for verification of the respective safeguards obligations of Member States and stressed that there should be no undue pressure on or interference in the Agency's activities, especially its verification process, which would jeopardize the efficiency and credibility of the Agency. NAM emphasized the fundamental distinction between the legal obligations of States in accordance with

their respective safeguards agreements and any confidence-building measures undertaken voluntarily that did not constitute a legal safeguards obligation. NAM considered the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and reiterated its support for the establishment of such a zone in accordance with relevant United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. NAM reaffirmed the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities, and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities — whether operational or under construction — posed a serious danger to human beings and the environment and constituted a grave violation of international law, the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and Agency regulations. NAM recognized the need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks or threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. NAM strongly believed that all safeguards and verification issues, including those related to Iran, should be resolved within the framework of the Agency on sound technical and legal grounds. NAM further emphasized that the Agency should continue its work to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue within its mandate under its Statute. NAM stressed that diplomacy and dialogue through peaceful means, as well as substantive negotiations without any preconditions among the concerned parties, must remain the means whereby a comprehensive and lasting solution to the Iranian nuclear issue was found.

92. NAM took note that the Director General had stated once again that the Agency had been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran at nuclear facilities and locations outside facilities where nuclear material was customarily used, as declared by Iran under its safeguards agreement.

93. NAM welcomed the clear distinction made by the Director General between obligations emanating from Iran's safeguards agreement and other requests by the Security Council. It noted that the Director General had stated in his report that Iran was not implementing a number of its obligations emanating from relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions. It recalled that the Director General had previously reported Iran's assertion that some of the Agency's requests had no legal basis since they did not fall under Iran's safeguards agreement, an assertion elaborated upon by Iran in document INFCIRC/810. NAM encouraged Iran to enhance its cooperation with the Agency in order to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the country in accordance with international law.

94. NAM encouraged the Secretariat to continue to refrain from including in the report of the Director General extensive technical details pertaining to sensitive proprietary information.

95. NAM welcomed the continued cooperation between the Agency and Iran, as elaborated upon in the latest report of the Director General, and noted in that regard that: (a) Iran had declared to the Agency under its safeguards agreement 15 nuclear facilities and 9 locations outside facilities and the Agency continued to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at those facilities and locations outside facilities; (b) the nuclear material production activities, in particular those related to enrichment, remained under Agency containment and surveillance and, to date, the FEP in Natanz and the PFEP had been operating as declared; (c) the Agency had confirmed that the FFEP corresponded to the design information provided by Iran, that the facility was at an advanced stage of construction, that Iran and the Agency had agreed on a safeguards approach for the FFEP and that Iran had installed one of the cascades designated in the design information questionnaire for the production of  $UF_6$  enriched up to 20% in  $^{235}U$ , and the results of the environmental samples taken at the FFEP up to 29 December 2010 had not indicated the presence of enriched uranium; (d) the Agency had continued to monitor the use and construction of hot cells at the relevant nuclear facilities in Iran and had confirmed that Iran was not conducting reprocessing activities in any of the facilities declared under its safeguards agreement; (e) Iran had provided the Agency with access to the IR-40 heavy water reactor at Arak, at which time the Agency had been able to carry out a design information verification

and the Agency had verified that construction of the facility was ongoing, and that the coolant heat exchangers had been delivered to the site, and, according to Iran, operation of the IR-40 reactor was planned to commence by the end of 2013; and (f) the Agency had also carried out an inspection and a design information verification at the FMP and had confirmed that Iran had not yet started to install equipment for fuel fabrication for the Tehran research reactor.

96. NAM noted the standing requests by the Secretariat for further information regarding the design, and scheduling of the construction of new nuclear facilities and it continued to encourage Iran to provide design information regarding its nuclear facilities in accordance with its full-scope safeguards agreement with the Agency.

97. The report of the Director General referred to possible activities involving military-related organizations for which clarifications remained necessary in some areas of concern to the Agency. NAM encouraged the prompt resolution of that issue by Iran and the Agency in accordance with the work plan contained in INFCIRC/711.

98. The Director General had mentioned in his report that he had reiterated to Iran his position regarding the need to take steps towards full implementation of its safeguards agreement and its other relevant obligations in order to establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. NAM noted with appreciation that Iran had responded by extending an invitation to the Deputy Director General for Safeguards to visit its nuclear facilities, and that the question of possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear programme had been discussed during that visit. NAM welcomed that invitation and the fact that, as a confidence-building measure, Iran had allowed the Agency to visit an installation where R&D on advanced centrifuges was taking place, had granted access to extensive information on its current and future R&D work on advanced centrifuges and, for the first time since 2005, had allowed the Agency to visit the Heavy Water Production Plant, at which time the Agency had observed that the plant was operating. NAM welcomed the continuation of that positive dialogue and cooperation between Iran and the Agency.

99. NAM fully supported the previous requests made by the Director General to those Member States that had provided the Secretariat with information related to the alleged studies to agree that the Agency make all related documents available to Iran. It reiterated its concerns regarding the creation of obstacles in that regard which hindered the Agency's verification process. It also recalled that the Director General had previously reported that the Agency had limited means to authenticate independently the documentation that formed the basis of the alleged studies and that the constraints placed by some Member States on making information available to Iran were making it more difficult for the Agency to conduct detailed discussions with Iran on the matter.

100. Bearing in mind the aforementioned recent developments, as well as previous reports by the Director General on implementation of the work plan, NAM looked forward to safeguards implementation in Iran being conducted in a routine manner.

101. NAM reiterated its principled position that diplomacy and dialogue were the only way to achieve a long-term solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and it encouraged all Member States to contribute positively to that goal.

102. Mr WYGANOWSKI (Poland)\*, speaking on behalf of the European Union, the candidate countries Croatia, Iceland, Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia, the EFTA countries Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as the Republic of Moldova, said that the European Union noted with grave concern the continued absence of real progress in Iran's cooperation with the Agency since the preceding report contained in document GOV/2011/29.

103. The European Union reiterated its call on Iran to comply with its international obligations and implement the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the Board of Governors. Iran must suspend its enrichment activities and heavy water-related projects, including R&D, implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its safeguards agreement, bring its additional protocol into force and cooperate fully with the Agency in order to clarify all outstanding issues, in particular those which gave rise to concerns about possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme.

104. The European Union also noted with particular concern that Iran had increased its capacity to enrich LEU to 20%, thereby further violating its obligations under the relevant Security Council and Board of Governors resolutions. The installation of a new cascade — to be used for enrichment to 20% — in the FFEP, as well as several announcements by Iran regarding its intentions to triple capacity, were a provocative violation of Security Council and Board requirements. According to the Director General's report, as of August 2011 Iran had produced 4543 kg of 4% enriched uranium and 70.8 kg of 20% enriched uranium, i.e. 439 kg and 14.1 kg more, respectively, than three months earlier. The European Union remained extremely concerned by Iran's nuclear enrichment activities and its growing stocks of both 20% and 3.5% enriched uranium.

105. The European Union shared the Agency's increasing concern about the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed nuclear activities involving military-related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile, about which the Agency continued to receive new information that was extensive, comprehensive and broadly consistent and credible in terms of technical details, the time frame in which the activities had been conducted and the people and organizations involved. A disturbing list of examples of activities for which clarifications were necessary had been provided in the attachment to the February report contained in document GOV/2011/7. The European Union encouraged the Agency to intensify its efforts with a view to submitting to the Board at the earliest possible date a comprehensive and conclusive analysis of the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear programme.

106. The European Union took note of the visit to Iran by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards. Iran must cooperate fully with the Agency in order to resolve all outstanding issues.

107. The European Union urged the Secretariat to continue its verification activities in Iran and to resolve all outstanding questions, including those which gave rise to concerns about possible military dimensions of that country's nuclear programme. It called on Iran to respond positively, and through concrete actions, to the Agency's request for engagement on all issues of concern, and to grant prompt access to relevant locations, equipment documentation and persons.

108. The European Union stood by its commitment to work towards a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. The objective continued to be a comprehensive long-term settlement which would restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme while respecting Iran's legitimate right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The European Union High Representative together with China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States remained united in their efforts to engage Iran in a meaningful process aimed at building confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme based on concrete and practical proposals and without preconditions. The European Union High Representative, on behalf of those six countries and the European Union, had repeatedly set out those ideas in detail to the Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council.

109. Mr LABBÉ VILLA (Chile), noting that conversations had been held between Iran and the Agency during the period covered by the Director General's report, and the visit by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards to the Bushehr nuclear plant, the Natanz and Fordow enrichment

plants, the IR-40 reactor and the Arak heavy water plant, said that his country encouraged Iran to broaden the dialogue to include aspects of its nuclear programme that continued to cause concern to the international community. Although Iran had cooperated with the Agency on a number of aspects, the report made it clear that that cooperation was insufficient to be able to conclude that all nuclear material present in the country was solely for peaceful activities.

110. Iran must comply with the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council, which were legally binding under international law, as well as the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its safeguards agreement, and the additional protocol. The additional protocol would help improve substantially the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system and, in the case under discussion, could help dispel legitimate doubts about the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. Chile called on Iran to cooperate with the Agency to clarify the concerns about possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme as a matter of priority.

111. His country upheld the inalienable right of all States to develop research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with their legal obligations. However, rights came with obligations, and there was a collective responsibility to protect and promote the relevant international regimes. Chile was fully aware of the regional complexities involved, but it again appealed to Iran to broaden its cooperation with the Agency, bearing in mind the requirements and transparency imposed by safeguards.

112. Mr DAVIES (United States of America) said that the conclusion of the Director General's report was as clear as it was familiar: the Agency was unable to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran was in peaceful activities. The Director General had also informed the Board that the Agency was increasingly concerned about the possibility of military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme. The Deputy Director General for Safeguards had stated at the 6 September technical briefing on Iran that the information available to the Agency on possible military dimensions was extensive, came from multiple sources and was broadly consistent in its technical details, timing, and the personnel and organizations involved. Nevertheless, Iran continued casually to dismiss the international community's concerns. At the briefing, Iran had proclaimed its transparency, but it had not taken any concrete steps to address the central concerns of Agency inspectors, especially with regard to possible military dimensions. Iran's obligations were clear and simple, as spelled out in the NPT, its safeguards agreement and United Nations Security Council resolutions, and the Director General's report set them out for Iran yet again: Iran must implement the additional protocol and the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its safeguards agreement, it must suspend its enrichment-related and heavy water-related activities, and address the Agency's — and the international community's — concerns about the possible military dimensions of its nuclear programme.

113. Iran claimed to be striving to be a responsible player in the field of peaceful nuclear energy, and the international community recognized its right, as a member of the NPT, to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but its actions showed that it continued to reject the responsibilities that came with that right.

114. Of particular concern was Iran's decision to begin the installation and operation of centrifuges at the FFEP near Qom. Iran had stated that Fordow was now intended to produce near-20% enriched uranium for research reactors, while also engaging in R&D on advanced centrifuges. That story was the latest in Iran's constantly changing rationalization of why it had built that facility, which it had only belatedly declared to the Agency. Iran claimed that it needed the near-20% enriched uranium to fuel the Tehran research reactor and other reactors for which ground had yet to be broken and which

Iran had yet to declare to the Agency for safeguards purposes. However, the amount of near-20% enriched uranium already produced at Natanz was sufficient for any first instalment of fuel that Iran might produce, though that country so far lacked the technical capability actually to fabricate the fuel. It was therefore worth asking what purpose Iran might have in expanding its production of near-20% enriched uranium now and moving it deep underground. It was important to bear in mind that production of near-20% LEU completed 90% of the work necessary for the production of HEU.

115. Given the unanswered questions about Iran's nuclear intentions, and its unwillingness or inability to resolve questions concerning possible military dimensions to its programme, it was difficult to see Iran's actions at Fordow as anything but a provocation. His country was confident that the Board would not be diverted from recognizing that fact by Iran's new-found willingness to show slightly more transparency at declared facilities for one visit. Current Agency safeguards in Iran might well provide some warning, should Iran choose to renege on all of its non-proliferation obligations and use its stockpile of 20% LEU in pursuit of an expedited nuclear weapons capability. However, that would be too late.

116. Iran could and must do more if it wished to provide real and enduring assurances to the international community about its nuclear programme. Adhering to its Agency obligations would be a start but, given Iran's long history of violations, it would not be sufficient. What was necessary was full Iranian compliance with all that country's international obligations.

117. The Director General's latest report deepened the already serious concern regarding Iran's continued refusal to resolve the issue of the possible military dimension to Iran's nuclear programme. Most disturbingly, the Director General reported that the Agency was increasingly concerned about the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed nuclear-related activities involving military-related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile. The Director General noted that the Agency continued to receive new information in that regard which he deemed consistent and credible. Iran's well worn rhetoric that that information was baseless or fabricated did nothing to address the issues or alleviate the international community's concerns. As noted by the Security Council and the Board of Governors, the resolution of those issues, which could only be achieved through Iran's complete, immediate and extensive cooperation, was essential for determining and verifying the extent of the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

118. By now, Iran should have no illusions about the seriousness with which the international community viewed those issues. Iran had had years to address the Agency's growing concerns about the possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme. In the light of the growing quantity of information received by the Agency about those activities, and the Director General's conclusion that that information was extensive, comprehensive and credible, his country again called for the Director General to provide the Board with a full assessment of the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear programme as soon as possible. If Iran was truly sincere in its intentions, it would immediately take the steps outlined by the Security Council and Board of Governors, including providing full cooperation and promptly addressing the possible military dimensions of its nuclear programme. The United States looked forward to the Director General's next report to the Board to learn whether Iran was finally living up to its words.

119. Mr BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) said that it was essential that the Agency continue to monitor fully Iran's declared nuclear activities and verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in the country. His country welcomed the steps mentioned in the report which Iran had recently taken to expand access for Agency experts to its nuclear installations. It was important that Iran had heeded the appeals of the Director General and the Board by affording Agency experts an opportunity to visit the IR-40 heavy water reactor that was under construction and the Heavy Water Production Plant in Arak, as well as a new-generation centrifuge production firm. It was also not

without significance that Iran had provided the Agency with additional information on further R&D work to improve centrifuge technologies and on the history of the construction and the initial purpose of the uranium enrichment facility in Qom.

120. Those transparency measures went beyond Iran's obligations under its safeguards agreement. The Russian Federation trusted that Iran would continue the course it had embarked upon of taking additional transparency measures, thus putting interaction with the Agency on a new, broader footing and allowing for practical steps towards a comprehensive settlement of the issue of its nuclear programme. To achieve that end, it was important for Iran to resume application of the additional protocol, to inform the Agency in good time of the construction of nuclear facilities, to clarify the questions related to the alleged studies which might have a military purpose, and to implement the provisions of relevant United Nations Security Council and Board of Governors resolutions.

121. There was no alternative to a political and diplomatic resolution of the issue of Iran's nuclear programme. That was in the interest of all countries involved in the negotiating process and the international community as a whole. The most viable option for making progress towards a mutually acceptable solution was the step-by-step, reciprocal approach set out in the joint statements made on behalf of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States at the meetings of the Board of Governors in March and June 2011.

122. The Bushehr nuclear power plant had begun operating on 12 September. Construction of the plant had started in 1975 and, as of 1992, had been continued with Russian assistance. That project was instructive in many respects. Under a bilateral agreement, Russia had pledged to supply fuel for the plant throughout its lifetime; the spent nuclear fuel would be sent back to Russia. Operation of the plant and the supply and return of fuel would be fully monitored by the Agency.

123. In the course of the construction of the plant, the Russian-designed process equipment had been integrated into the German construction design. Priority had been given to ensuring the plant's safety and reliability. At the commissioning ceremony, Russia and Iran had signed protocols on the conduct of stress tests by the State Atomic Energy Corporation "Rosatom" and on the participation of Russian personnel in operation of the plant during the initial phase.

124. The Bushehr nuclear power plant was an example of the successful reconciliation of the practical realization of the inalienable right of non-nuclear-weapon NPT State parties to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and respect for nuclear non-proliferation goals.

125. Mr CHENG Jingye (China) said that his country hoped that the Agency and its Director General would continue to be objective and impartial, and play a constructive role in implementing safeguards in Iran and promoting a proper solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.

126. China welcomed the Agency's recent active interaction with Iran. In June and July 2011, the Director General had met separately in Vienna with Iran's Vice-President and Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and with Iran's Minister of Foreign Affairs. In August, the Deputy Director General for Safeguards had visited Iran's nuclear facilities at the invitation of Iran. Furthermore, the Agency had agreed with Iran on the safeguards approach for the FFEP. His country had also noted that the Agency was able to continue to verify the non-diversion of Iran's declared nuclear material but was not able to conclude that all nuclear material in the country was in peaceful activities.

127. As a signatory to the NPT, Iran was entitled to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy while fulfilling its relevant international obligations. China encouraged Iran to implement fully the relevant resolutions adopted by the Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council, to step up further its cooperation with the Agency and to clarify outstanding issues related to possible military

dimensions to its nuclear programme, with a view to enhancing the confidence of the international community in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, which was an effective way of guaranteeing Iran's right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

128. His country believed that dialogue and negotiation were the right way to reach a proper solution to the Iranian nuclear issue in the fundamental interests of all parties. Since the Istanbul meeting in January 2011, the international and regional situation had undergone profound changes. Under the current circumstances, it was even more important to promote the process of dialogue and negotiation in pursuit of a peaceful solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. China hoped that all parties concerned would further strengthen their diplomatic efforts and resume dialogue and negotiation as soon as possible, and that, by observing the principle of reciprocity and taking a step-by-step approach, concrete measures could be taken to enhance mutual confidence and create the conditions necessary for a comprehensive, lasting and proper solution.

129. His country had been making unremitting efforts to promote peace and negotiation and facilitate a diplomatic solution, in the interests of maintaining the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and peace and stability in the Middle East. It intended to continue to play a constructive role in finding a solution.

130. Ms TAN (Singapore) said her country fully supported the inalienable and sovereign right of States to the peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology. The corollary to the enjoyment of that right was that States were expected to abide by their international obligations. Quite some time had elapsed since the Iranian nuclear dossier had been brought to the attention of the United Nations Security Council and the Board of Governors. There appeared to be a continuous stream of new data on the possible military dimensions of past or current undisclosed Iranian nuclear activities. That and Iran's refusal to implement the provisions of Security Council and Board resolutions continued to be a source of concern. Iran needed to take concrete steps to reduce the confidence deficit in the international community in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.

131. Singapore therefore noted with interest Iran's invitation to the Deputy Director General for Safeguards to visit in August 2011. During the visit, the Agency had been given access to several installations in Iran, inter alia the Heavy Water Production Plant and a facility where R&D on advanced centrifuges had been taking place. Her country cautiously welcomed the recent meetings between the Agency and the Iranian authorities. It hoped that that signalled a new chapter of transparency and openness in Iran's cooperation with the Agency and it continued to urge Iran to comply fully with the relevant Security Council and Board resolutions without further delay.

132. Mr CURIA (Argentina) said that Iran's active cooperation in providing information on its nuclear programme was essential. His country called on Iran once again to comply with the decisions of the United Nations Security Council and pointed out that, in contravention of Security Council decisions, Iran had not suspended its enrichment-related activities.

133. Iran should adopt all necessary measures to create confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.

134. Mr CHO Hyun (Republic of Korea) commended the Secretariat for the professional and impartial manner in which it had conducted verification activities in Iran in accordance with Iran's safeguards agreement and the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and United Nations Security Council.

135. While his country welcomed Iran's continued engagement with the Agency on issues related to the implementation of its safeguards agreement, it remained gravely concerned by the Director General's findings that Iran was still not implementing a number of its obligations. The Director



General continued to report that the Agency was unable to provide credible assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran and therefore could not conclude that all nuclear material in that country was in peaceful activities. Iran's enrichment-related activities, and possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme, were of particular concern in that regard.

136. His country noted with deep concern that, contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran had not suspended enrichment-related activities. On the contrary, it was further strengthening its enrichment activities, was installing advanced centrifuges at the PFEP at Natanz and had effectively repurposed the FFEP: what had initially been an R&D facility had become a fully fledged production facility for UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 20%. In addition, Iran had yet to provide the Agency with a substantive response concerning the construction of ten new uranium enrichment facilities and the possession of laser enrichment technology.

137. The issue of Iran's failure to suspend enrichment-related activities had been compounded by the possible existence of past or current undisclosed nuclear-related activities involving military-related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile. It was a matter of concern that the Agency continued to receive new information about such activities, and that the information available to the Agency was extensive, comprehensive and broadly consistent and credible in terms of technical detail.

138. The Republic of Korea believed it was of crucial importance for Iran to implement fully all of its obligations and engage with the Agency to resolve all outstanding issues in order to establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. The Republic of Korea remained convinced that Iran's full cooperation and the implementation of all its binding obligations, including suspension of enrichment-related activities and addressing the Agency's concerns about possible military dimensions, were necessary conditions to address international concerns over Iran's nuclear programme.

139. In that context, his country took note of the information provided by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards during the technical briefing held the preceding week to the effect that Iran had expressed its readiness to discuss the issue of possible military dimensions with the Agency in a substantive manner. The Republic of Korea expected a proactive response from Iran to the requests from the Agency to facilitate progress in establishing international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.

140. Mr GARCÍA CASTILLO (Peru) said that his country upheld the right of all States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the obligation to cooperate on transfer of nuclear technology that was useful for development. It supported the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and efforts to halt uranium enrichment activities which were not strictly within the agreed international regime. It also fully endorsed the actions by the Director General with respect to the Iranian nuclear issue.

141. Two new developments were included in the Director General's latest report: the meetings between the Agency and the Iranian authorities in June and July 2011, and the visit of the Deputy Director General for Safeguards to a number of nuclear installations in Iran in August 2011 in response to an invitation from the Iranian Government. In his introductory statement, the Director General had also pointed out that Iran had been demonstrating greater transparency than previously.

142. Bearing that in mind, Peru urged Iran to continue, and to step up its cooperation with the Agency in order to allow the organization to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and conclude that all Iranian nuclear material was in peaceful activities. Iran should also provide information which would help clarify the doubts which existed with respect to possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme.

143. Lastly, his country urged Iran to comply fully with its agreements with the Agency and the obligations and requirements emanating from the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the Board of Governors by taking the necessary steps to achieve a climate of sustained dialogue with the Agency and a satisfactory agreement on the outstanding issues pertaining to its nuclear programme.

144. Mr NAKANE (Japan) took note of the conclusion that the FEP and the PFEP had been operating as declared by Iran in the design information questionnaires. It also noted that Iran had continued to work on improving its measurement system through the implementation of an improved weighing system and better sampling procedures at the PFEP.

145. However, his country was deeply concerned that Iran had continued its enrichment-related activities and, since the preceding report by the Director General, had also increased its stores of both LEU and uranium enriched up to 20%. In particular, Japan was concerned that Iran had decided to transfer the centrifuges for 20% uranium enrichment to the FFEP and triple its production capacity. Since neither the chronology of the design and construction of the FFEP nor that facility's original purpose had been confirmed, those recent decisions gave rise to further concerns about the nuclear activities at the FFEP.

146. Japan noted with concern that the Director General's report stated that the Agency was increasingly concerned about the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed nuclear-related activities involving military-related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile, about which the Agency continued to receive new information. It was important to resolve all issues which had raised concerns with respect to the seven points mentioned in the Director General's preceding report, contained in document GOV/2011/29, regarding the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear programme. The Director General's report stated that the Deputy Director General for Safeguards had visited nuclear facilities in Iran between 14 and 19 August 2011 at that country's invitation. During that visit, the Vice-President of Iran and Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran had apparently stated that Iran was ready to talk with the Agency about the possible military dimensions of its nuclear programme. His country also noted that the Director General had discussed relevant issues, including possible military dimensions, with the Vice-President of Iran and with the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Japan urged Iran to provide substantive cooperation in a sincere manner.

147. His country was concerned that the summary in the Director General's report stated that Iran was not implementing a number of its obligations. It also noted with concern that the Director General's report stated that, while the Agency continued to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and LOFs declared by Iran under its safeguards agreement, as Iran was not providing the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its additional protocol, the Agency was unable to provide credible assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the country and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran was in peaceful activities.

148. Japan called upon Iran to meet the requirements of the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and to comply fully with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council in a prompt manner. In order to enjoy fully the inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Iran should first rebuild the confidence of the international community. Japan strongly hoped that Iran would take the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council seriously, and would make a sensible decision to allow for a peaceful and diplomatic solution of the nuclear issue in that country.

149. Mr SMITH (United Kingdom), speaking on behalf of his own country, France and Germany, said that the Director General's report provided an emphatic reminder that Iran continued to defy multiple United Nations Security Council and Board of Governors resolutions. It recalled that the steps required by the Board of Governors in those resolutions were binding on Iran, and that all members of the United Nations agreed to accept and implement the decisions of Security Council. The report confirmed that Iran's cooperation with the Agency was not sufficient to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material in the country, and therefore not sufficient to enable the Agency to conclude that all nuclear activities in Iran were for peaceful purposes.

150. Most significantly, the latest report demonstrated that the Iranian nuclear programme was advancing in an extremely worrying direction. In that connection, he drew the attention to two important points: Iran's expansion of enrichment to almost 20%, and the Agency's increasing concerns about possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme. The report confirmed that, as of 20 August, Iran had installed centrifuges in one of the cascades at the FFEP for the production of near-20% enriched uranium. That was a significant and alarming development. Iran had stated publicly that it intended to triple its production capacity for near-20% enriched uranium. He could see no credible explanation for such a move if Iran's programme was, as it claimed, peaceful.

151. He questioned why Iran was planning to produce so much material at that enrichment level. It had claimed that it had already produced enough to fuel the Tehran research reactor. The aforementioned tripled capacity was vastly in excess of what could be required for the production of fuel for that reactor. Indeed, it would provide more than four times as much 20% enriched uranium as that reactor needed each year. In addition, that reactor was already capable of producing enough radioisotopes for up to one million medical investigations per year — a level comparable to that in United Kingdom, France or Germany.

152. Once enrichment to 20% had been achieved, the further enrichment required to produce weapons-grade material was a comparatively straightforward step. The Director General had reported that the issue of possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme had been the subject of discussion between the Agency and Iranian representatives. The report and the subsequent technical briefings made it clear that Iran had yet to make a substantive contribution to those discussions, still less address the significant and growing body of evidence held by the Agency pointing to military dimensions to its nuclear programme. The Director General had described that as a matter of increasing concern to the Agency, and France, Germany and the United Kingdom welcomed his intention, expressed in his introductory statement, to set out the basis for those concerns in greater detail. They also took note that the Agency had extensive and comprehensive information on those issues, and that it considered the information credible and consistent.

153. The absence of a plausible economic or commercial rationale for so many of the nuclear activities that were being carried out in Iran, and the growing body of evidence of a military dimension to those activities, gave grounds for grave concern about Iran's intentions. France, Germany and the United Kingdom noted the Director General's observation in his introductory statement that Iran, during the recent visit by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards, had shown greater transparency than on previous occasions. However, they believed that a visit was not enough, amounting only to selective and insufficient transparency. They shared the Director General's conviction that the transparency provided needed to extend across the full range of Iran's nuclear activities, and include a commitment by Iran, without preconditions, to implement and ratify the additional protocol.

154. Iran continued to choose a path of non-cooperation with the international community in its persistent violation of its legally binding obligations under relevant United Nations Security Council

resolutions, as well as the requirements imposed upon it by the Board of Governors. France, Germany and the United Kingdom remained determined to show that there was a cost to choosing that path.

155. However, they remained just as determined, as part of their commitment to a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, to point to the path of cooperation which was still open for Iran to choose. Working together with China, Russia and the United States, with the support of the European Union High Representative, they remained committed to playing their part in delivering the benefits of that path, if Iran chose it. They once again called upon Iran to seize that opportunity and to engage fully and seriously with the international community.

156. Mr POTTS (Australia) noted that, while the Director General's report stated that the Agency was unable to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, it also identified those areas where Iran continued to meet some of its obligations. It noted that the Agency continued to be able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at Iran's declared nuclear facilities. His country encouraged Iran's continued cooperation with the Agency in that regard.

157. While meetings and visits were important in themselves, his country saw no grounds for optimism that they were leading to progress on any of the substantive issues that continued to cause concern to the international community with regard to Iran's nuclear programme. Since 2003, the Board of Governors had adopted ten resolutions in connection with the implementation of safeguards in Iran. The United Nations Security Council had adopted six resolutions on Iran since 2006. Iran continued to defy those resolutions.

158. Australia registered its concern regarding the installation of centrifuges at the FFEF. While the Director General's report stated that the purpose thereof was to transfer the 20% enrichment capacity from Natanz, the centrifuges that were being installed at Fordow were in fact new units. Despite the Agency's statement that it had agreed upon a safeguards approach for Fordow with Iran, the decision to increase production of 20% enriched uranium inside a long tunnel inside a mountain did nothing to enhance the confidence of the international community in the motives for, or transparency of, Iran's nuclear activities. His country continued to be deeply concerned by the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear activities.

159. In his preceding report, the Director General had stated that the Agency remained concerned about the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed nuclear-related activities involving military-related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile. In his latest report, he stated that the Agency was increasingly concerned about those past or current undisclosed activities. The Director General had supported that statement by adding that the information available to the Agency regarding Iran's activities was extensive and comprehensive, had been acquired both from many Member States and through its own efforts, and was broadly consistent and credible in terms of technical detail, time frame, and the people and organizations involved. The information available to the Agency on the subject amounted to over 1000 pages, was in various formats and media, and covered the period up to and including 2010.

160. The Director General had given the assessment that Iran's responses to the Agency's questions on those activities had not been substantive in the past. In his report in February 2011 (GOV/2011/7), he had described Iran's 2008 response to the Agency on those issues as focused on form rather than substance. In his May report (GOV/2011/29), he had stated that Iran's substantive and proactive engagement on issues related to the possible military dimensions of its programme was essential to enable the Agency to make progress in its verification of the correctness and completeness of Iran's declarations. There was nothing in the Director General's latest report to suggest that substantive and proactive engagement had been provided by Iran. Australia noted that the Director General reported

only that the question of possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme had been discussed in recent meetings.

161. In previous statements to the Board on the subject under discussion, his country had emphasized that Iran must reassure the international community about its nuclear programme, including possible military dimensions. Given the Agency's increasing concern about the subject, based on the extensive and comprehensive information it continued to accumulate, Australia looked forward to the Director General assisting the Board of Governors by providing it with an assessment of the possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear programme and whether such activities had ceased.

162. Iran continued to ignore the clear and consistent concern of the international community about its nuclear programme, and the increasing concern of the Agency about the possible military dimensions of its nuclear programme. It continued to defy Board of Governors and Security Council resolutions. It must meet all its obligations under those resolutions, and must cooperate fully with the Agency and implement its safeguards agreement and other obligations, including the additional protocol.

163. In conclusion, his country supported the public release of the Director General's report on Iran.

**The meeting rose at 1 p.m.**