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¹ GC(60)/20.

Abbreviations used in this record:

CSA	comprehensive safeguards agreement
EU	European Union
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NWFZ	nuclear-weapon-free zone
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America
WMDs	weapons of mass destruction

– Report on the Scientific Forum 2016

1. The PRESIDENT, recalling that the theme of the Scientific Forum 2016 had been “Nuclear Technology for the Sustainable Development Goals”, invited the Rapporteur of the Scientific Forum 2016, Ms Emorn Udomkesmalee, to report on the Forum.
2. Ms UDOMKESMALEE (Rapporteur of the Scientific Forum 2016) read the report, which is annexed hereto.
3. The PRESIDENT thanked Ms UDOMKESMALEE for the report and commended her and the Secretariat on the success of the Scientific Forum 2016.

19. Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East (GC(60)/14/Rev.1; GC(60)/L.1)

4. The PRESIDENT said that item 19 had been included in the agenda pursuant to resolution GC(59)/RES/15 and that the Director General had accordingly submitted the report contained in document GC(60)/14/Rev.1, which had been considered by the Board. Document GC(60)/L.1 contained a draft resolution submitted by Egypt.
5. Mr YOUSSEF (Egypt) said that Egypt attached importance to achieving the universality of the comprehensive safeguards regime as a basic legal means of supporting the Agency’s verification of the peaceful nature of nuclear material and facilities and as an indispensable step towards achieving the universality of the NPT in the endeavour to establish an NWFZ in the Middle East.
6. Member States had been fully aware of Egypt’s decades-long efforts to establish such a zone through initiatives, draft resolutions and ideas that had been submitted at the Agency and other international bodies, but never implemented. Many excuses had been given for not implementing adopted resolutions, with States raising unrelated issues and attaching strings to the implementation of the resolutions.
7. The efforts of Egypt and other Arab States to ensure implementation of the consensus resolution on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMDs, adopted at the 1995 NPT Review Conference, in return for agreement on the indefinite extension of the NPT, had come to naught, owing primarily to the lack of political will. Egypt considered that the failure of the 2015 NPT Review Conference to review and agree on an outcome document had exacerbated matters by hindering and undermining the credibility of the non-proliferation regime and would compromise past agreements and decisions. Egypt nonetheless wished the Agency to implement comprehensive safeguards in the Middle East and had accordingly resubmitted the same draft resolution at the current session in the hope that all Member States would support it because it upheld the non-proliferation regime as a shared international community goal and was a confidence-building measure in furtherance of international peace and security and the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East.
8. Inasmuch as the draft resolution called on all States in the region to abstain from measures likely to impede the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East, and inasmuch as universality of

the NPT and implementation of the Agency's safeguards regime in the Middle East would contribute to the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East, Egypt considered that a vote against the resolution would conflict with the international community's efforts and would not resolve current challenges to the non-proliferation regime generally.

9. Egypt would spare no effort to support the Director General in his efforts to implement the resolution and to report on progress achieved in 2017 and it therefore called on the Agency and all Member States to take practical and specific steps to implement the resolution immediately. It also called on the Agency to implement the resolution gradually, for it was no longer acceptable that there were nuclear installations in the Middle East that were not subject to any verification system, as such a state of affairs threatened regional security and heightened tension in the region.

10. Mr CHACÓN ESCAMILLO (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela), speaking on behalf of NAM, welcomed the report contained in document GOV/2016/14/Rev.1 and said that NAM was still committed to its principled position on the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East. It strongly believed that stability could not be achieved in a region in which one State threatened neighbouring and other States owing to the massive continuing imbalance in military capabilities caused by its possession of nuclear weapons.

11. NAM, considering that an NWFZ in the Middle East would be a positive step towards global nuclear disarmament, reiterated its support for the establishment of such a zone in accordance with the relevant UNGA and UNSC resolutions.

12. NAM considered that achieving universality of comprehensive Agency safeguards in the Middle East was the first practical step towards confidence building among States in the region, and was a necessary step towards the establishment of an NWFZ there. It was pleased that its Members that were Parties to the NPT had concluded CSAs with the Agency as non-nuclear-weapon States.

13. All States in the Middle East, except Israel, were Parties to the NPT and had undertaken to accept comprehensive Agency safeguards. NAM highlighted the accession of Palestine as a Party to the NPT, and welcomed its expressed wish to conclude a CSA with the Agency under NPT Article III. NAM regretted Israel's continued insistence that the issue of comprehensive Agency safeguards could not be addressed in isolation from the regional peace process; there was no automatic sequence making the application of comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East dependent on a peace settlement there — in fact, the former would contribute to the latter.

14. NAM also regretted that the Director General had not been able to fulfil his mandate under resolutions GC(59)/RES/15 and GC(59)/RES/16 on the application of comprehensive Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East. Considering that all Member States should cooperate in rectifying an unacceptable situation, NAM called on them to participate actively in, and give priority to, achieving the universality of comprehensive Agency safeguards in the Middle East.

15. Noting that the Director General would continue consultations in accordance with his mandate on the early application of comprehensive Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East, NAM welcomed the Director General's efforts to encourage relevant new ideas and approaches that might help to move his mandate forward, and requested the Director General to continue to brief Member States regularly thereon.

16. NAM Members that were Parties to the NPT, mindful of the consensus decision to convene, in 2012, a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other WMDs, had been profoundly disappointed that the conference had still not been convened, contrary to the letter and spirit of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the collective agreement of the Parties to the NPT enshrined in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. They had

strongly rejected the conveners' allegations of impediments to the convening of the conference on schedule. They urged the UN Secretary-General, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation to convene the conference without any further delay in order to avoid any negative repercussions on the relevance and credibility of the NPT, on the preparations for the NPT Review Conference, on the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime as a whole and on the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East.

17. NAM Members that were Parties to the NPT feared that the failure of the 2015 NPT Review Conference to agree on the draft final document would have a negative impact on the NPT regime.

18. NAM requested the Director General to continue to consult Member States on arrangements for establishing an NWFZ in the Middle East and hoped that all Member States of the Agency would support his efforts to implement resolutions GC(59)/RES/15 and GC(59)/RES/16.

19. NAM seconded the draft resolution submitted by Egypt on the item under discussion.

20. Mr CHACÓN ESCAMILLO (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) said that his country had called for general, comprehensive and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament and had voiced concern repeatedly at the situation of injustice, instability and conflict that had prevailed for decades in the Middle East, stemming from interfaith disputes and the geopolitical ambitions of some Western powers in particular.

21. Considering that an NWFZ in the Middle East would be an effective means of contributing to peace and stability there and that its establishment should no longer be delayed, Venezuela regretted that the substantive conference had still not been convened, latterly owing to some States' strong opposition to such a conference being held before March 2016. Many States nonetheless did give high priority to that conference, as exemplified by the Heads of State or Government of NAM, who had resolved at their Summit on Margarita Island, Venezuela, on 18 September 2016, to establish an NWFZ in the Middle East, in accordance with the commitments made at the 1995 NPT Conference and subsequent meetings, and in UNGA resolution 70/24.

22. All States in the Middle East that were Parties to the NPT had undertaken to accept comprehensive Agency safeguards. Venezuela had stressed in various international bodies the urgent need for Israel to accede to the NPT immediately, place its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards and contribute to the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East.

23. Venezuela, too, supported the draft resolution submitted by Egypt.

24. Mr NAJAFI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that more than 40 years had passed since the introduction of the Iranian initiative for the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East. The related UNGA resolutions, adopted without a vote since 1980, had reflected the importance of the issue in the volatile Middle East. Iran had, moreover, demonstrated its determination to help to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons by acceding to the NPT and placing its peaceful nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards.

25. Iran's Supreme Leader had stated at the 16th NAM Summit in Tehran in August 2012 that nuclear weapons threatened both security and political power. Iran had proposed, and was committed to, a Middle East free of nuclear weapons; it had ratified all major treaties banning WMDs, it was determined to comply with its international commitments, and it considered that the universal accession to the NPT and universal application of the Agency's safeguards would be instrumental in establishing an NWFZ in the Middle East and, ultimately, a world free of nuclear weapons.

26. Iran welcomed the accession of Palestine to the NPT and Palestine's wish to conclude a CSA with the Agency, but voiced strong reservations about the list of Middle East States contained in footnote 1 to document GC(60)/14/Rev.1, considering that such a list could not be used in any other context or body.

27. It regretted that the NWFZ had still not been established in the Middle East, owing to Israel's refusal to accede to the NPT and to subject its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities to the Agency's verification regime, and might not be established in the near future owing to Israel's intransigence. It considered that Israel had ignored repeated calls by the international community because it knew that it would be supported politically and militarily by certain permanent UNSC Members. It regretted, moreover, the inaction imposed on the UNSC, which had failed to address Israel's well-documented nuclear programme. It further regretted that the 2012 conference on the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMDs had been postponed unilaterally by a convener only to shield Israel from international condemnation and that three delegations had opposed the consensus achieved at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, thus scuppering the 2015 NPT Review Conference, with the sole aim of safeguarding the interests of Israel, a non-Party that had endangered the peace and security of the region

28. Iran therefore called on the international community to exert sustained pressure on Israel to accede promptly and unconditionally to the NPT and to place all of its clandestine nuclear activities and installations under full-scope safeguards as the only means of establishing an NWFZ in the Middle East and of ensuring universal application of the Agency's safeguards there.

29. Iran supported the draft resolution on the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East submitted by Israel.

30. Ms GUILLÉN CAMPO (Cuba) said that the achievement of nuclear disarmament had been and would remain a priority for most States, including Cuba. Practically no progress had been made in nuclear discrimination, however, despite the repeated calls by the international community for steps to be taken to that end. Cuba reaffirmed its support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other WMDs, considering that it would be conducive to regional and world peace and stability and that that it could be achieved if the only State that was not Party to the NPT acceded thereto and placed all of its nuclear facilities under the Agency's safeguards. Cuba regretted that no final document had been adopted at the 2015 NPT Review Conference on account of one State that was not a Party and, stressing that there was no justification for not holding the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other WMDs, urged all concerned to strive to convene it without further delay.

31. Mr SEOKOLO (South Africa) said that South Africa warmly welcomed the accession of Palestine to the NPT in 2015. South Africa had consistently reiterated full support for NPT objectives and for a balance between the three NPT pillars. It strongly advocated the universalization of the NPT with a view to achieving and maintaining a world free of nuclear weapons, and therefore called on Israel to accede to the Treaty and to place all of its nuclear facilities under full-scope Agency safeguards. South Africa stressed that the 1995 resolution would remain in force until its goals and objectives had been achieved, which would contribute significantly to the achievement of regional peace and security to which the international community had long aspired.

32. Mr BUDIMAN (Indonesia) said that his country deeply regretted that resolution GC(59)/RES/15 had not yet been implemented and urged the Middle East States to strive to implement comprehensive Agency safeguards unconditionally for all nuclear activities in the Middle East. Seriously concerned that little progress had been achieved in establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other WMDs, which would strongly bolster

regional and international peace, security and stability, Indonesia urged all Middle East States to agree on the substance and procedures for the establishment of the zone.

33. Ms ZAFARY-ODIZ (Israel) said that, until 2006, the resolution under consideration had been adopted by consensus, reflecting a shared vision for regional stability and security. Israel hoped to re-establish a dialogue with the sponsors of the resolution in order to restore such a vision.

34. Israel attached importance to the non-proliferation regime and endorsed its goals. Accession to the NPT was not a goal in itself: the goal was to ensure a safe and secure regional environment for all. Calls for universal accession to the NPT must therefore be judged against the specific characteristics and security challenges of the Middle East and weighed in terms of their ability to address those characteristics adequately. The NPT could not provide an answer to the unique security challenges of a region in which the NPT had been repeatedly violated by its Parties.

35. Israel had always conducted a responsible policy of restraint in the nuclear domain. Its approach to all aspects of regional security and, noting that experience in other regions had shown that comprehensive and lasting peace and full compliance with non-proliferation obligations by all relevant States were key prerequisites for the establishment of a zone free of all WMDs and their means of delivery, stressed that those criteria had not yet been met in the Middle East, where Arab States and the Islamic Republic of Iran did not even to recognize the State of Israel. Israel believed that the path to a Middle East free of all WMDs began with the building of confidence and trust between regional States. Direct dialogue on the broad range of regional security challenges was fundamental for the establishment of that zone, otherwise it would prove impossible to initiate the gradual change from confrontation to cooperation. Israel had repeatedly expressed its willingness to engage in sincere and open dialogue with its neighbours on all regional security-related issues, such as the five rounds of multilateral consultations in Switzerland which had ground to a halt when the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Arab States generally had declined to proceed with further consultations.

36. Inasmuch as lessons learned from other regions had shown a regional security framework could only stem from the shared political will of all regional parties to engage directly with each other and to take into consideration the security concerns of each and every State on the basis of consensus, Israel hoped that the sponsors of the resolution under consideration would take Israel's views into account and work to find an agreed text likely to lead to the reinstatement of consensus. Until such time, Israel was obliged to vote against paragraph 2 of the draft resolution and to abstain on the draft resolution as a whole. Israel accordingly requested that separate votes be taken on paragraph 2 and on the draft resolution as a whole.

37. The PRESIDENT recalled that Israel had requested that a separate vote be taken on paragraph 2 of the draft resolution set out in document GC(60)/L.1.

38. At the request of Egypt, a roll-call vote was taken.

39. Denmark, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

40. The result of the vote was as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho,

Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: Israel

Abstaining: Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, India, Rwanda, United States of America.

41. There were 119 votes in favour and 1 against, with 5 abstentions. Paragraph 2 of the draft resolution was adopted.

42. Mr KHAN (India), speaking in explanation of vote, said that his delegation had abstained because it believed that paragraph 2 of the draft resolution contained elements that were extraneous to the Agency.

43. The PRESIDENT noted that Israel had requested a vote on the whole of the draft resolution contained in document GC(60)/L.1.

44. At the request of Egypt a roll-call vote was taken.

45. Cameroon, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

46. The result of the vote was as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Abstaining: Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Israel, Rwanda, United States of America.

47. There were 122 votes in favour and none against, with 6 abstentions. The draft resolution was adopted.

48. Mr STUART (Canada), speaking in explanation of vote, said that his country continued to urge all Member States that had not already done so to sign and bring promptly into force a CSA and an additional protocol. It had consistently supported the establishment of a verifiable NWFZ in the Middle East.

49. The resolution did not address serious non-compliance issues in the Middle East, thus ignoring a critical aspect of the application of safeguards. Canada could not support a resolution that did not address such fundamental concerns and made erroneous connections between NPT ratification and safeguards applications. Moreover, it was disappointed that wording had been introduced into the resolution at recent sessions of the General Conference that prevented its adoption by consensus. Canada had therefore abstained on paragraph 2 and on the resolution as a whole.

50. Mr YOUSSEF (Egypt) expressed regret at the decision taken by some Member States to abstain in the vote on paragraph 2 and/or on the draft resolution as a whole.

51. As paragraph 2 called on all States in the Middle East region to accede to the NPT, the abstention of an NPT depository State in the vote on that paragraph was anomalous because it undermined the credibility of the non-proliferation regime and the NPT at a time when preparations were under way for the 2020 NPT Review Conference. As such abstentions constituted a serious setback to the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, Egypt urged abstaining Member States to reconsider their stance.

52. Ms HOLGATE (United States of America) said that her country strongly supported the goal of NPT universality and of a Middle East free of WMDs and their delivery systems. It would continue to cooperate with the States in the region to advance those shared goals. Direct engagement among the States concerned was a prerequisite for meaningful progress. As a co-convenor of the conference on the establishment of an NWFZ, the USA stood ready to meet its commitments. It regretted that efforts to advance towards a WMD-free Middle East had been pursued without seeking consensus among the States of the region, for that approach had undermined trust and confidence and had diminished the prospect of resuming dialogue on the issues involved. It hoped that the General Conference would take a consensus-based approach in future so that the issues could be addressed more collaboratively and productively.

53. Ms ZAFARY-ODIZ (Israel), referring to the statement by the representative of Egypt, pointed out that, according to Rule 74 of the Rules of Procedure, sponsors of resolutions were prohibited from explaining their votes.

54. The PRESIDENT said that the delegate of Egypt had made a general statement and had not delivered an explanation of vote.

20. Israeli nuclear capabilities

(GC(60)1/Add.1; GC(60)15)

55. The PRESIDENT said that item 20 had been included in the agenda at the request of Arab States that were Members of the Agency. It was covered by an explanatory memorandum in document GC(60)1/Add.1 and by document GC(60)15.

56. Mr CHACÓN ESCAMILLO (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela), speaking on behalf of NAM, said that NAM strongly believed that stability could not be achieved in a region in which one

State threatened neighbouring and other regional States, owing to a massive continuing imbalance in military capabilities, due to its possession of nuclear weapons.

57. NAM was pleased that its Members that were Parties to the NPT had concluded CSAs with the Agency as non-nuclear-weapon States, under Article III.1 of the NPT. NAM noted that all States in the Middle East, except Israel, were Parties to the NPT and had undertaken to accept comprehensive Agency safeguards.

58. NAM considered that the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East would be a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and reiterated its support for the establishment of such a zone in accordance with relevant UNGA and UNSC resolutions. It also considered that the selective approach to the issue of nuclear capabilities in the Middle East had undermined the viability of the Agency's safeguards regime and had resulted in the preservation of unsafeguarded Israeli nuclear facilities and activities, despite repeated calls on Israel to place them under comprehensive Agency safeguards.

59. NAM was gravely concerned about the dire consequences for international security of Israel's nuclear capabilities, which posed a serious threat to neighbouring and other States, and about the continuing provision to Israeli scientists of access to the nuclear facilities of one nuclear-weapon-State.

60. It called on all Member States to cooperate in rectifying that unacceptable situation and in achieving the universality of comprehensive Agency safeguards in the Middle East by implementing resolution GC(53)/RES/17 as a first step to that end. NAM regretted Israel's continued insistence that the issue of Agency safeguards could not be addressed in isolation from the regional peace process. There was no automatic sequence rendering the application of comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East dependent on a peace settlement; in fact, the former would contribute to the latter.

61. NAM reiterated its call for the transfer to Israel of nuclear-related equipment, information, material, facilities, devices and other resources, and for the provision to Israel of other assistance in nuclear-related scientific or technological fields to be totally and completely prohibited.

62. Referring to past statements by Israel to the effect that it valued the non-proliferation regime, acknowledged its importance and had conducted a responsible policy of restraint in the nuclear domain, NAM regretted that Agency documents dating back to 1994 attested to the contrary.

63. Mr AL HUSSEINI (Jordan), speaking on behalf of the Arab Group, said that the Arab States had striven for more than four decades to seek a solution to their concerns about nuclear material, programmes and facilities that were not under international safeguards and thus posed a threat to their security and stability. The Arab States had preferred to join the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime rather than join a regional arms race that could be disastrous for international peace and security.

64. Desiring to promote dialogue and cooperation with the international community, the Arab States had ratified the NPT, believing that all other Parties were seriously committed to achieving universality of the Treaty and to mutual security for all States without discrimination. They had welcomed Palestine's request to sign a CSA with the Agency following its ratification of the NPT.

65. As Israel was the only State in the region that declined to accede to the NPT and to place its nuclear programmes and facilities under comprehensive Agency safeguards, the Arab States had appealed to the NPT Review Conferences, the Agency and UNGA to take action to promote Israel's accession to the NPT and to ensure compliance with the Agency's norms and regulations in

furtherance of international peace and security, while reaffirming their aspiration to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMDs in the Middle East.

66. The Arab Group regretted that the support wrested in the various international bodies that had adopted dozens of supporting resolutions, had proven to be merely rhetorical owing to the lack of genuine international will to take effective action. None of the resolutions had been implemented, which had undermined the credibility of the non-proliferation regime that had been further sapped by the unprecedented protection provided to Israel by certain international powers, thus enabling it to flout international law without fear of being called to account, while also providing it with technical and military support that was denied to Parties to the NPT.

67. The Arab States considered that such treatment of an issue that adversely affected Arab security and the stability of the Middle East was totally unacceptable and they were indignant that the 2015 NPT Review Conference had been scuppered in order to preserve of the interests of a non-Party to the NPT. They stressed that it was a core responsibility of the Agency's General Conference to request a State to accede to the NPT and to place its nuclear facilities and programmes under comprehensive international safeguards and warned that attempts to stifle such requests had undermined the credibility of the NPT and the non-proliferation and disarmament regime and had eroded many States' confidence in the regime's ability to achieve the aims of related international treaties to which they had acceded.

68. Faced with continuous attempts to thwart their efforts to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMDs in the Middle East, the Arab States had decided to consider all conceivable alternatives and to take the most appropriate means of maintaining security in a region that could not endure any further imbalance of power.

69. In the light of such clear-cut positions adopted jointly by senior decision-makers in the Arab States, the Arab Group, by refraining at the current session from submitting a draft resolution on Israeli nuclear capabilities, were delivering a clear message, namely that the Arab States could not allow the status quo to persist and that responsibility for the next stage lay with the international community, which would also have to handle the fallout. Continuous attempts to procrastinate, stall and reinterpret agreed decisions would lead to the collapse of the entire regime.

70. Mr ALFASSAM (Kuwait) said that his country attached great importance to the universalization of the Agency's comprehensive safeguards regime in the Middle East and stressed that the Agency was the only authority mandated to enforce regional States' compliance with their safeguards agreements. Kuwait stressed that Israel's continued refusal to accede to the NPT and to place its nuclear installations under the Agency's comprehensive safeguards constituted a major obstacle to all efforts to establish an NWFZ in the Middle East and adversely affected security and stability.

71. Noting that the Middle East still faced major challenges to the establishment of an NWFZ, Kuwait pointed out that the road map for convening the conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMDs in the Middle East had highlighted the importance of ensuring that Israel acceded to the Treaty and placed all of its nuclear installations under Agency safeguards, as well as the importance of initiating a process for the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. Vigorous action taken by the Arab States to those ends had come to naught. Kuwait therefore called on the international community to shoulder its responsibilities and to urge Israel to accede to the NPT and to sign a CSA with the Agency with a view to establishing an NWFZ in the Middle East.

72. Mr NAJAFI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that Israeli nuclear capabilities had always caused serious concern to the international community. In the Final Document of the NAM summit meeting

held in Tehran in August 2012, the Heads of State or Government of the NAM Member States had expressed great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capability by Israel, which posed a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States. They had condemned Israel for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear weapons and had supported the efforts of the Arab Group in Vienna to keep the issue of Israeli nuclear capabilities under consideration by the Agency's General Conference.

73. Since 1982, the General Conference had repeatedly called on Israel to accede promptly to the NPT and place all of its nuclear facilities under comprehensive Agency safeguards and the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference had recalled the importance of Israel's accession to the NPT and the placement of all of its nuclear facilities under comprehensive Agency safeguards. Israel had, however, ignored legitimate international concerns and had continued to advance its nuclear capabilities with the assistance of certain States, in flagrant contravention of all international norms, thereby not only jeopardising regional and global security but also seriously undermining the Agency's verification mechanism.

74. Iran called for the transfer of nuclear-related equipment, information, material, facilities, devices, other resources and scientific and technological assistance to Israel to be totally and completely prohibited. Iran was particularly concerned that Israeli scientists were being granted access to the nuclear facilities of certain nuclear-weapon States, while nuclear scientists of Parties to the NPT were being assassinated.

75. Iran considered that it was reasonable to keep the issue of Israeli nuclear capabilities on the agenda of the General Conference until such time as the international community had called on Israel to accede unconditionally to the NPT and to place all of its nuclear facilities under comprehensive Agency safeguards.

76. Mr SANTANA NUÑEZ (Cuba) welcomed the initiative taken by the Arab Group to place the important and sensitive issue of Israeli nuclear capabilities that had serious negative implications for regional and international peace and security on the agenda of the General Conference. Cuba hoped that a resolution establishing Israeli nuclear capabilities as a standing agenda item until such time as Israel had acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon State and placed all its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards would soon be adopted.

77. Israel was the only non-NPT Party in the Middle East and it had not stated that it intended to accede to the treaty, despite repeated demands by the peoples of the region, thus impeding the establishment of a zone in the Middle East free of nuclear weapons and other WMDs, and the achievement of nuclear disarmament and peace in the Middle East.

78. Considering that real political will and the elimination of double standards on nuclear issues were of the essence if the Middle East were to become a zone of peace and security for all, Cuba called on States to be consistent in their approach to the issue, forgo their permissive stance towards Israel and have its nuclear arsenal destroyed under international control.

79. Mr BUDIMAN (Indonesia) said that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation remained high on his country's agenda. The ultimate aim was general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Furthermore, efforts to achieve nuclear non-proliferation should be made in parallel to nuclear disarmament efforts. The universality of the NPT was an important element in that regard.

80. Indonesia strongly supported the speedy establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMDs in the Middle East, in accordance with UNGA and UNSC resolutions. The establishment

of such a zone would enhance peace and stability in the region and contribute to the achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons.

81. Indonesia considered that permitting a country to develop nuclear weapons capabilities outside the NPT and to keep its nuclear material and facilities outside the Agency's comprehensive safeguards regime was tantamount to betrayal of the commitment to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation in general and, in particular, the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East, while endangering peace and stability in the region.

82. Mr HAMZE (Lebanon) said that Israel's nuclear capabilities had been included in the agenda because the Arab Group was committed to the principles of non-proliferation and the peaceful application of nuclear energy. Israel's nuclear capabilities had impeded meaningful discussion on the establishment of a zone in the Middle East free of nuclear weapons and were a growing threat.

83. Lebanon regretted that certain States had believed Israel's fallacious and flimsy protestations and accepted the status quo, with Israel's nuclear material and activities remaining outside the scope of Agency safeguards in the Middle East. Furthermore, the failure to implement the 1995 resolution on the Middle East had damaged the international community's credibility. The resolutions on the NWFZ in the Middle East adopted at the various NPT Review Conferences had all come to naught. The inherent hypocrisy was quite stark, for the States that professedly abided strictly by the principle of non-proliferation, did not hold Israel to account at all and the States that championed the universality of the NPT for a particular region did not do so for the Middle East. Welcoming, in that regard, Palestine's accession to the NPT, Lebanon noted that all Arab States were Parties to the Treaty. It considered that the selective approach to non-proliferation, epitomised by the continued failure to implement the resolution on the Middle East, undermined the system's effectiveness and sapped States' confidence in its ability to keep them safe from the threat of nuclear weapons. Lebanon warned that an imbalance could jeopardise all NPT achievements to date.

84. Noting that the States and people of the Middle East were beset by crises that threatened their existence and thus looked to the international community to restore some hope for the future, Lebanon stressed that the international community's indifference to the issue of Israeli nuclear capabilities had only exacerbated that sense of despair and the impression that the world had turned its back on the Middle East. Lebanon appealed to the international community to take meaningful action to establish a zone in the Middle East free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

85. Mr AL HUSSEINI (Jordan) said that his country attached great importance to the comprehensive safeguards regime as the cornerstone of international endeavours to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to confine the use of nuclear energy to peaceful applications.

86. Pointing to the scale of the threat posed by nuclear weapons and WMDs to world peace and security and to stability in the Middle East, which continued to suffer from the failure to implement resolutions on the establishment of an NWFZ in the region, Jordan stressed the need for Israel to accede to the NPT and to place all of its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards, thus universalizing the NPT in the region and facilitating the establishment of an NWFZ. Such action would contribute to peace and security and create an incentive for States to focus on economic and social development rather than on an arms race that would hinder development and exacerbate tensions.

87. Jordan gave maximum priority to the universalization of the NPT in the Middle East and considered that Israel's refusal to accede to the Treaty and place its nuclear facilities and military programmes under international control fuelled distrust, threatened regional and international peace and security and endangered the region's people and environment. Jordan also considered that the time

had come for the international community to take affirmative action on the Middle East NWFZ initiative.

88. Mr COUNTRYMAN (United States of America), welcoming the Arab Group's constructive decision not to table a resolution on Israeli nuclear capabilities, said that the item had no place on the General Conference's agenda, as Israel had not violated any agreements with the Agency and was a significant contributor to its technical work. Rather than politicizing the issue, specific measures should be pursued, including discreet, direct dialogue among neighbours, which was key to improving regional security in furtherance of the goal of a zone in the Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction. The USA, which had long supported the universality of the NPT, would continue to work to convene the conference on the establishment of such a zone, including through cooperation with regional States in order to draw on recent experience and pursue constructive approaches.

89. Ms ZAFARY-ODIZ (Israel), noting that the draft resolution on the so-called Israeli nuclear capabilities had been rejected by a growing majority of Member States in previous years, said that the divisive and politically motivated agenda item had served no other aim but to single out Israel, was completely outside the Agency's mandate and had no place at the General Conference. While Israel welcomed the Arab Group's decision not to table a resolution under the item, it was regrettable that the item had been placed on the agenda at the Arab Group's request.

90. Israel valued the non-proliferation regime and acknowledged its significance. It considered that the greatest threat of proliferation was posed by States, mostly in the Middle East, that had pursued nuclear weapons programmes under cover of NPT membership, for Iraq, Libya, Iran and Syria — all proponents of that anti-Israel agenda item — had all been found to be in flagrant violation of their international non-proliferation obligations.

91. Israel considered that meaningful steps to address regional security concerns must be based on direct dialogue and confidence-building measures between regional parties. Lessons learned from other regions had shown that a regional security framework must be built on the shared political will of all regional parties to engage with each other, take into consideration the wide-ranging security concerns of each and every State and be based on consensus. Accordingly, Israel called on the Arab Group to enter into such direct dialogue on regional security and to desist from including the item in the agenda of future sessions of the General Conference.

92. Ms ALGAYEROVÁ (Slovakia), speaking on behalf of the EU, said that the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Norway, Georgia and San Marino aligned themselves with the EU statement.

93. While welcoming the decision of the Arab States not to table a resolution on Israeli nuclear capabilities at the 60th session of the General Conference, the EU was, nonetheless, disappointed that the issue had again been included in the Conference's agenda.

94. A consensus approach was the only way forwards in implementing the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and, to achieve a lasting solution, arrangements must be arrived at freely among all States of the region. Accordingly, the EU called on those States to engage constructively in the process.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.

IAEA Scientific Forum 2016

Nuclear Technology for the Sustainable Development Goal

Report to the 60th IAEA General Conference

Ms Emorn Udomkesmalee

Mr President, Director General, Distinguished Delegates,

I am pleased and honoured to be given this opportunity to present to the General Conference the report on the IAEA Scientific Forum 2016, whose theme was Nuclear Technology for the Sustainable Development Goals.

Mr President,

As you know, the annual IAEA Scientific Forums are organized parallel to the General Conference and seek to showcase and advance the peaceful application of nuclear science and technology to contemporary challenges.

This year the Director General gave priority to the role nuclear science and technology could play in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030, following their adoption by the United Nations in September 2015.

The Forum held during the past two days covered a wide range of topics that proved to be of great interest and relevance, as could be seen from the extensive participation of Member State representatives.

The Forum was structured into five thematic sessions and was opened by IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano, who remarked that nuclear science and technology can have a major contribution to improving health, achieving zero hunger, boosting prosperity, ensuring access to clean and affordable energy, combatting climate change, and protecting our natural resources.

The keynote speakers gave an insight into the various ways nuclear science and technology help achieve the SDGs both in their own countries and in the world. His Serene Highness Prince Albert II of Monaco highlighted the role science, including nuclear applications, play in protecting the environment and the oceans in particular. Prince Albert also emphasized that Monaco, which hosts the IAEA's Environmental Laboratories, strongly supports the work of the IAEA. Mr Andrew Wheatley, Minister of Science, Energy and Technology of Jamaica, gave an insight into the uses of nuclear technology in industry, medicine, agriculture, education and research. Mr Yiren Wang, Vice Chairman of the China Atomic Energy Authority, underlined that in China nuclear science has always been closely related to development and that nuclear science and

technology will play a crucial role in achieving the SDGs by 2030.

Mr Said Mouline, Director General of Morocco's National Agency for the Development of Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, spoke on behalf of the organizers of the COP22 and highlighted that nuclear science and technology could play a significant role in achieving the goal of keeping the mean global temperature increase to below 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels. Mr Alan Finkel, Australia's Chief Scientist and President of the Australian Academy of Sciences and Engineering, stressed also that nuclear energy is needed to cut greenhouse gas emissions.

The first session entitled 'Health and Well-being: Global Access to Radiation Medicine' addressed what is needed in the field of radiation medicine to help achieve the SDG 3 target of reducing deaths from non-communicable diseases by one third by 2030. In this session, Ms Mary Gospodarowicz from Canada talked about key findings of the Lancet Commission Report on global access to radiotherapy, followed by Mr Kenji Shibuya from Japan who explained the opportunities and challenges in universal health coverage. Ms Ntokoza Ndlovu from Zimbabwe highlighted how the challenges with implementation of radiotherapy services in her own country were overcome and the lessons to be learnt from this experience. Ms Jamila Al-Suwaidi talked about international cooperation in the field of radiation medicine, giving examples from her country, the United Arab Emirates. Mr Carlos Alberto Buchpiguel from Brazil talked about the role of nuclear medicine in combatting cardiovascular diseases. The session was concluded by Mr Alistair McGuire from the United Kingdom who addressed to topic of sustainable financing for medical infrastructure.

The second session 'Zero Hunger: Atoms for Food, Agriculture and Nutrition' showcased how nuclear technology is successfully deployed to boost food security and tackle agricultural challenges to achieve SDG 2. Mr Kostas Stamoulis from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) talked about comprehensive and holistic approaches needed for achieving Zero Hunger by 2030. Mr Mohammad Shamsheer Ali from Bangladesh explained how to use nuclear and plant breeding technologies to address agricultural challenges. Ms Chandapiwa Marobela-Raborokgwe talked about Botswana's experience in fighting animal diseases to boost food security. Mr Daniel Wunderlin from Argentina explained how nuclear technology can help improve food safety. I was the last speaker in this session and I explained how nuclear technology can help to successfully enhance diet quality with nutrition, based on the experience of Thailand.

The third session 'Energy for the Future: The Role of Nuclear Power' discussed how innovation, technological advances and new economic models can help increase nuclear power's contribution to the areas covered by SDG 7 (affordable and clean energy), SDG 9 (industry, innovation and infrastructure), and SDG 13 (climate action). Ms Agneta Rising from Sweden gave an overview of how nuclear power can further play a significant role in boosting industries and prosperity and at the

same time help mitigate climate change. Ms Fiona Reilly from the United Kingdom explained how smart financial models can make nuclear power a more affordable option in the future, addressing the issue of high capital cost. Mr Leonid Bolshov from the Russian Federation stressed the progress made in terms of nuclear safety over the past years, stressing the integration of the lessons learnt from the past accident. Ms Leslie Dewan from the United States gave an overview of current and future innovations in the field of nuclear reactors.

The fourth session ‘Isotopes for the Environment: Managing Our Natural Resources’ showcased examples of how nuclear and isotopic techniques can help manage our planet's natural resources and address SDG 6 (clean water and sanitation), SDG 14 (life below water), and SDG 15 (life on land). Minister for Fisheries and Forests of Fiji, Mr Osea Naiqamu opened the session by explaining the environment challenges being faced in Fiji. He was followed by Ms Simone Richter from Australia, who showcased how nuclear technology can help protect the environment. Mr Lalit Varshney from India highlighted how radiation technology can be used to treat waste water and reuse sludge in industry and farming. The session was closed by Mr Imad-eldin Ahmed Ali Babiker from Sudan, who showcased how nuclear technology can fight land degradation, make the best of water scarcity, boost food production and ultimately help communities step out of poverty.

The last session entitled ‘Partnerships for Progress: Transferring Nuclear Science and Technology’ focused on SDG No 17 “Partnership for the Goals” which targets relates to the means of implementation of the goals, and technology transfer in particular. The session showed that building partnerships and capacity in developing countries, sharing knowledge and transferring science and technology will be crucial in achieving development in a sustainable manner. Mr Djarot Sulistio Wisnubroto from Indonesia spoke about the benefits nuclear science and technology cooperation have brought in his own country. Mr Joanes Atela from Kenya discussed key success factors for sustainable transfer of nuclear technology, taking the example of Africa. Mr Marco Ripani from Italy emphasized successful cases of transferring nuclear science across sectors and gave examples of related strategies and initiatives which were implemented in Italy. Mr. Kenneth L. Peddicord from the United States spoke about how to transfer transferring skills in the field of nuclear power and the importance of capacity building.

In the closing session, IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano, together with Ms Simone Richter from Australia and Ms Emorn Udomkesmalee from Thailand, highlighted the contribution nuclear science and technology could have in achieving the SDGs in all Member States and the role IAEA could play in this, reminding also of the forthcoming IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme International Conference, to be held in May 2017.

Mr President, Director General, Distinguished Delegates,

In summary, the Forum has contributed to a better understanding of the great contribution that nuclear technology can make to achieving the SDGs in the areas of health, food security, agriculture, energy, the environment and in building partnerships.

Thank you for your attention.