

**Statement by the delegation of the Republic of Indonesia
on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement State Parties to the NPT
Cluster 2: Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-
weapon-free zones**

**First Preparatory Committee for the
2020 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons**

Vienna, 2-12 May 2017

Mr. Chairman,

1. I am honored to speak on behalf of the Group of Member States of the Non-Aligned Movement Parties to the NPT.
2. The Group reiterates its continued concern over the current difficult and complex situation in the field of disarmament and international security. In this regard, the Group calls for renewed efforts to resolve the current impasse in achieving nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects.
3. The Group reaffirms its principled positions on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects. The Group believes that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing and are essential for strengthening international peace and security. Non-proliferation derives its legitimacy from the larger objective of nuclear disarmament. Pursuing non-proliferation alone while ignoring nuclear disarmament obligations is both counterproductive and unsustainable. We emphasize that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements.
4. In the view of the Group, any horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon-sharing by States Parties constitutes a clear violation of non-proliferation obligations undertaken by those

Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) under Article I and by those Non Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) under Article II of the Treaty, and could have serious consequences on the effectiveness, relevance and credibility of the Treaty. The Group therefore urges these States parties to put an end to nuclear weapon-sharing with other States under any circumstances and any kind of security arrangements, including in the framework of military alliances. In this context, the Group underlines the special responsibility of NWS.

Mr. Chairman,

5. The Group reaffirms the importance and calls for the strict observance of Article III (3) of the Treaty, by which the required safeguards “shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or the international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the preamble of the Treaty.”
6. The Group fully recognizes that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for verification of the fulfillment of safeguard obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.
7. The Group, while supporting the verification activities of IAEA, underlines the importance of strict observance of the IAEA statute and relevant comprehensive safeguards agreements in conducting verification activities.
8. In that connection, the Group, while stressing the importance of safeguards, underlines the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of

safeguards in accordance with the Agency's statute and safeguards agreements. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on the nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidences of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime, for its protection, needs to be significantly strengthened.

9. The Group calls upon the nuclear weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of:
(a) Ensuring full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Treaty; (b) Providing baseline data regarding the fulfillment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (c) Strictly observing the prohibition of the transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, object and purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.
10. The Group stresses the statutory role of IAEA on nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the Agency's capability of verifying nuclear disarmament agreements.
11. The Group supports the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Group further urges the Conference to examine such legally binding verification arrangements and the means of making them operational, with the aim of ensuring the realization of that objective.

Mr. Chairman,

12. We believe that the establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free zones (NWFZs) created by the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba, the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone treaty as well as Mongolia's Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Status are positive steps and important measures towards strengthening global nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. We reiterate that in the context of NWFZs, it is essential that NWS should provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the zone.
13. We urge States to conclude agreements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned with a view to establishing new NWFZs in regions where they do not exist, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-I) and the Principles and Guidelines adopted by the UN Disarmament Commission in 1999.
14. The Group calls upon all the nuclear-weapon States to ratify related protocols to all treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, withdraw any reservations or interpretative declarations incompatible with their object and purpose, and respect the denuclearization status of these zones.
15. In this context, the Group strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and calls for the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which is an integral and essential part of the package of decisions reached without a vote that enabled the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995. The resolution remains valid until its objectives are achieved.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.