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**Statement by**

**The Delegation of the Republic of Indonesia  
on behalf of the Group of the Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty  
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

**At the 10<sup>th</sup> Review Conference of the  
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  
Main Committee II**

**New York, August 2022**

**Madam Chair,**

1. I am honored to speak on behalf of the Group of Member States of the Non-Aligned Movement Parties to the NPT, and we congratulate you for your chairmanship and assure you of our full cooperation.
2. The Group's detailed positions under this cluster are contained in the Working Papers submitted to the meeting.
3. We stress the importance of ensuring that efforts aimed at nuclear non-proliferation are parallel to simultaneous efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament. We reiterate our determination to promote multilateralism as the core principle of negotiations in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation.
4. In the view of the Group, any horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon-sharing by States Parties constitutes a clear violation of non-proliferation obligations undertaken by those Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) under Article I and by those Non Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) under Article II of the Treaty. The Group therefore urges these States parties to put an end to nuclear weapon-sharing with other States under any circumstances and any kind of security arrangements, including in the framework of military alliances.

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5. The Group believes that the establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free zones (NWFZs) created by the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba, the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone treaty as well as Mongolia's Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Status represents significant positive steps and important measures towards strengthening global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
6. Underlining the need for enhancing the effectiveness of such zones, the Group calls for the ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the above mentioned treaties, the removal of all related reservations and interpretative declarations incompatible with the object and purpose of treaties establishing such zones, as well as the provision of unconditional, non-discriminatory and legally binding assurances by the NWS to all States of NWFZs against the threat or use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances.
7. Calling for the establishment of such zones where they do not exist, the Group once again expresses its longstanding strong support for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, in accordance with the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which is an integral and essential part of the package of decisions reached without a vote that enabled the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995. The resolution remains valid until its objectives are achieved. In this regard, the Group welcomes United Nations General Assembly Decision 73/546 entitled "Convening a Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction", as well as the convening of its two sessions, and calls upon the Review Conference to support its implementation. The Group, stresses that the 1995 resolution and other decisions on the subject adopted within the context of the NPT Review Conferences remain valid until the objectives are achieved, and the implementation of Decision 73/546 is without prejudice to their validity and shall not also be construed as their replacement

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8. The Group underlines that the multilateral mechanism established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the most appropriate way to address verification and safeguards issues. At the same time, the Group emphasizes that the work of the Agency with regard to safeguards and verification has to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of its statute and safeguards agreements.
9. The Group also calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards.
10. The Group confirms that the obligation under article III of the Treaty to verify the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology for peaceful purposes, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restrictions or limitations on the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements. The Group is of the view that any such restrictions or limitations are inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Treaty.
11. The Group underlines the necessity of the reporting by the IAEA on the implementation of safeguards to be factual, technically based and reflecting appropriate reference to the relevant provisions of safeguards agreements, while ensuring the protection of confidential information.

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12. The Group has submitted working papers on Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (Document NPT/CONF.2020/WP.59), on Middle East (Document NPT/CONF.2020/WP.41), as well as on Verification (Document NPT/CONF.2020/WP.24). Furthermore, in our working paper on substantive recommendation (Document NPT/CONF.2020/WP.26), we propose that the RevCon also include specific wording in the outcome documents in these matters.
13. Allow me to highlights some of our recommendations.

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14. On Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones:

- 1) To call for further efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones particularly in the Middle East. (Recommendation 48)
- 2) To urge the nuclear-weapon States, to withdraw reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations and to fulfil their obligations to achieve the objectives of the treaties to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and their protocols. (Recommendation 51)

15. On Safeguards and Verifications:

- 1) To call upon all nuclear-weapon States and all States not party to the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards. (Recommendation 62)
- 2) To call upon the nuclear-weapon States to accept IAEA full-scope safeguards to ensure full compliance with their obligations assumed under Article I of the Treaty. (Recommendation 64)

Thank you, Madam Chair.