



**2014 Preparatory Committee to the 2015 NPT Review Conference**  
**Working Papers Submitted by the NAM**  
**Thematic Summaries**

<b>Working Paper submitted by members of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.1)</b>	
<b>General Views on NPT</b>	
<b>General views on NPT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3)...strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty are a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls on all States not parties to the Treaty to accede, without any further delay and any preconditions and as non-nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such agreement would be concluded with the aim to: (a) Ensure full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.</li> </ul>
<b>Institutional Issues</b>	
<b>Reporting</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the necessity of reporting of IAEA on the implementation of safeguards being factual and technically based and reflecting appropriate reference to the relevant provisions of safeguards agreements, while ensuring the protection of confidential information.</li> </ul>
<b>Disarmament</b>	
<b>General Views on Disarmament</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons expresses its strong concern at the growing resort to unilateralism and unilaterally imposed prescriptions and, in this context, strongly underlines and affirms that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5, b) In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such agreement would be concluded with the aim to: Provide baseline data regarding fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and prevent further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the statutory role of IAEA in nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the capability of the Agency to verify nuclear disarmament agreements.</li> </ul>
<b>Safeguards and Verification</b>	
<b>General views on Safeguards and Verification</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) ...expresses its strong concern at the growing resort to unilateralism and unilaterally imposed prescriptions and, in this context, strongly underlines and affirms that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues.</li> </ul>

In this regard, the Group underlines that the multilateral mechanism established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the most appropriate way to address verification and safeguards issues. At the same time, the Group emphasizes that the work of the Agency with regard to safeguards and verification has to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of its statute and safeguards agreements.

- (Page 1, para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the IAEA safeguards system and urges all States that have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible, in order to achieve the universality of the comprehensive safeguards. The 2000 Review Conference considered the universality of the comprehensive safeguards as a main objective in order to consolidate and enhance the verification system for the non-proliferation regime. However, in the view of the Group, additional measures related to the safeguards shall not affect the rights of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, which are already committed to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and have renounced the nuclear-weapon option. The Group also expresses its strong rejection of attempts by any member State to use the technical cooperation programme of IAEA as a tool for political purposes in violation of its statute.
- (Page 1, para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty are a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.
- (Page 2, para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls on all States not parties to the Treaty to accede, without any further delay and any preconditions and as non-nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group also calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under this Treaty.
- (Page 2, para 5) In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such agreement would be concluded with the aim to: (a) Ensure full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
- (Page 2, para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty confirms that all States parties to the Treaty shall refrain from the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to States not parties to the Treaty unless they are placed under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards.
- (Page 2, para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty fully recognizes that IAEA, an independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for the verification of the fulfilment of safeguard obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty.
- (Page 2, para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that it is fundamental to make a clear distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures and that such voluntary undertakings shall not be turned into legal safeguards obligations. In this regard, the Group also emphasizes that IAEA shall ensure avoiding any ultra vires acts that would jeopardize its integrity and credibility. The Group urges States parties to the Treaty to maintain and strengthen the technical character of IAEA consistent with its statute.

- (Page 3, para 9) With respect to financial aspects of the safeguards, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the differentiated nature of the financial obligations undertaken by member States of IAEA should be recognized and respected by the Agency in its work.
- (Page 3, para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores also that the principle of balance between the promotional and other statutory activities of the Agency, in particular verification and safeguards-related activities, needs to be strictly observed.
- (Page 3, para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards, including reporting, in accordance with the Agency's statute and safeguards agreements. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on the nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidents of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime, for its protection, needs to be highly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency.
- (Page 3, para 12) In this context, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the implementation of IAEA resolution GC(57)/RES/13, on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system, adopted by the General Conference of the Agency at its fifty-seventh session, in which the General Conference, "Stressing the importance of maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the Agency's statute and safeguards agreements", acknowledged "the concerns expressed by the Director General on the need to protect safeguards confidential information within the secretariat and his announcement of additional measures to protect such information", accordingly urged the Director General "to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of safeguards confidential information", and requested that he "continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of safeguards confidential information.
- (Page 3, para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the necessity of reporting of IAEA on the implementation of safeguards being factual and technically based and reflecting appropriate reference to the relevant provisions of safeguards agreements, while ensuring the protection of confidential information.
- (Page 3, para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the need to strictly observe the provisions of the IAEA statute, including article XII, which outlines the mandate of the Agency in verifying compliance with safeguards agreements and, in particular, that any non-compliance has first to be reported by the Agency's inspectors.
- (Page 3, para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the statutory role of IAEA in nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the capability of the Agency to verify nuclear disarmament agreements.
- (Page 4, para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern about certain unilateral politically motivated attempts to hamper exercising the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes in this regard that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall

	<p>not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be “in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing ...”</p>
<p><b>IAEA</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons expresses its strong concern at the growing resort to unilateralism and unilaterally imposed prescriptions and, in this context, strongly underlines and affirms that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues. In this regard, the Group underlines that the multilateral mechanism established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the most appropriate way to address verification and safeguards issues. At the same time, the Group emphasizes that the work of the Agency with regard to safeguards and verification has to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of its statute and safeguards agreements.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the IAEA safeguards system and urges all States that have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible, in order to achieve the universality of the comprehensive safeguards. The 2000 Review Conference considered the universality of the comprehensive safeguards as a main objective in order to consolidate and enhance the verification system for the non-proliferation regime. However, in the view of the Group, additional measures related to the safeguards shall not affect the rights of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, which are already committed to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and have renounced the nuclear-weapon option. The Group also expresses its strong rejection of attempts by any member State to use the technical cooperation programme of IAEA as a tool for political purposes in violation of its statute.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty are a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls on all States not parties to the Treaty to accede, without any further delay and any preconditions and as non-nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group also calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under this Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such agreement would be concluded with the aim to: (a) Ensure full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty confirms that all States parties to the Treaty shall refrain from the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to States not parties to the Treaty unless they are</li> </ul>

placed under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards.

- (Page 2, para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty fully recognizes that IAEA, an independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for the verification of the fulfilment of safeguard obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty.
- (Page 2, para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that it is fundamental to make a clear distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures and that such voluntary undertakings shall not be turned into legal safeguards obligations. In this regard, the Group also emphasizes that IAEA shall ensure avoiding any ultra vires acts that would jeopardize its integrity and credibility. The Group urges States parties to the Treaty to maintain and strengthen the technical character of IAEA consistent with its statute.
- (Page 3, para 9) With respect to financial aspects of the safeguards, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the differentiated nature of the financial obligations undertaken by member States of IAEA should be recognized and respected by the Agency in its work.
- (Page 3, para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores also that the principle of balance between the promotional and other statutory activities of the Agency, in particular verification and safeguards-related activities, needs to be strictly observed.
- (Page 3, para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards, including reporting, in accordance with the Agency's statute and safeguards agreements. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on the nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidents of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime, for its protection, needs to be highly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency.
- (Page 3, para 12) In this context, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the implementation of IAEA resolution GC(57)/RES/13, on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system, adopted by the General Conference of the Agency at its fifty-seventh session, in which the General Conference, "Stressing the importance of maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the Agency's statute and safeguards agreements", acknowledged "the concerns expressed by the Director General on the need to protect safeguards confidential information within the secretariat and his announcement of additional measures to protect such information", accordingly urged the Director General "to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of safeguards confidential information", and requested that he "continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of safeguards confidential information.
- (Page 3, para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the necessity of reporting of IAEA on the implementation of safeguards being factual and technically based and reflecting appropriate reference to the relevant provisions of safeguards agreements, while ensuring the protection of confidential information.
- (Page 3, para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses

	<p>the need to strictly observe the provisions of the IAEA statute, including article XII, which outlines the mandate of the Agency in verifying compliance with safeguards agreements and, in particular, that any non-compliance has first to be reported by the Agency’s inspectors.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the statutory role of IAEA in nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the capability of the Agency to verify nuclear disarmament agreements.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern about certain unilateral politically motivated attempts to hamper exercising the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes in this regard that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be “in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing....</li> </ul>
<b>Nonproliferation</b>	
<b>General Views on Nonproliferation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) The 2000 Review Conference considered the universality of the comprehensive safeguards as a main objective in order to consolidate and enhance the verification system for the non-proliferation regime.</li> <li>• Page 2, Para 5, a) In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such agreement would be concluded with the aim to ensure full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty</li> </ul>
<b>States Not Party to the NPT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls on all States not parties to the Treaty to accede, without any further delay and any preconditions and as non-nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards.</li> </ul>
<b>Peaceful Uses</b>	
<b>General views on peaceful uses</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 5, b) In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such agreement would be concluded with the aim to: Provide baseline data regarding fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and prevent further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5, c) In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such agreement would be concluded with the aim to: Strictly observe the prohibition of transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, the object and the purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, materials and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not parties to the Treaty, without exception.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty confirms that all States parties to the Treaty shall refrain from the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to States not parties to the Treaty unless they are placed under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards. In this connection, the Group confirms that the obligation under article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology for peaceful purposes, in accordance with article IV of the</li> </ul>

	<p>Treaty. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restrictions or limitations on the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty fully recognizes that IAEA, an independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for the verification of the fulfilment of safeguard obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern about certain unilateral politically motivated attempts to hamper exercising the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes in this regard that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be “in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing...”</li> </ul>
<p><b>Access to/transfer of equipment, materials scientific and technological information</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty are a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5, a) In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such agreement would be concluded with the aim to ensure full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5, b) In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such agreement would be concluded with the aim to provide baseline data regarding fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and prevent further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5, c) In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such agreement would be concluded with the aim to: Strictly observe the prohibition of transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, the object and the purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, materials and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not parties to the Treaty, without exception.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty confirms that all States parties to the Treaty shall refrain from the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to States not parties to the Treaty unless they are placed under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards. In this connection, the Group confirms that the obligation under article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology for peaceful purposes, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty.</li> </ul>

	<p>Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restrictions or limitations on the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty fully recognizes that IAEA, an independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for the verification of the fulfilment of safeguard obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern about certain unilateral politically motivated attempts to hamper exercising the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes in this regard that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be “in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing ...”</li> </ul>
<p><b>Transfer to States Not Party to the NPT</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, Para 5, c) In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such agreement would be concluded with the aim to: Strictly observe the prohibition of transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, the object and the purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, materials and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not parties to the Treaty, without exception.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty confirms that all States parties to the Treaty shall refrain from the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to States not parties to the Treaty unless they are placed under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards. In this connection, the Group confirms that the obligation under article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology for peaceful purposes, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restrictions or limitations on the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.</li> </ul>
<p><b>IAEA</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) The Group also expresses its strong rejection of attempts by any member State to use the technical cooperation programme of IAEA as a tool for political purposes in violation of its statute.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty confirms that all States parties to the Treaty shall refrain from the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to States not parties to the Treaty unless they are placed under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty fully recognizes that IAEA, an independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for the verification of the fulfilment of safeguard obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy</li> </ul>



	<p>from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern about certain unilateral politically motivated attempts to hamper exercising the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes in this regard that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be “in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing ...</li> </ul>
--	--

<b>Working Paper submitted by members of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP2)</b>	
<b>General views on NPT</b>	
<b>General views on NPT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be a contribution towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines furthermore that the 2010 Review Conference also reaffirmed the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recalled the affirmation of its goals and objectives by the 2000 Review Conference. The Conference also stressed that the Resolution remains valid until the goals and objectives are achieved, and that the Resolution is an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 24) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty urges the Conveners — the United Nations Secretary-General, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Russian Federation — in accordance with the mandate entrusted to them by the Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty, to convene the Conference without any further delay in order to avoid any negative repercussions on the credibility of the Treaty, its 2015 Review process and the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime as a whole. The Group calls on the facilitator to intensify consultations with all capitals in the region and to exert maximum efforts to that end.</li> <li>• (Page 6, para 26) The Group is also of the view that the Conference should lead, without further delay, to the universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East and the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, and to preserve the credibility of the Treaty.</li> </ul>
<b>Institutional Issues</b>	
<b>Strengthen Review Process</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, para 16) It is essential that the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference conduct substantive discussions on the above-mentioned reports and evaluate the fulfilment of the commitments on the Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, as</li> </ul>

	<p>contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted by consensus at the 2010 Review Conference.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, para 18) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the establishment of a standing committee comprising members of the Bureau of the 2015 Review Conference to follow up intersessionally on the implementation of the recommendations by the Review Conference concerning Israel’s prompt accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, and to report to the 2020 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 19) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that, as clearly stipulated by the 2010 Review Conference, the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction should have been convened in the year 2012. In the First and Second Sessions of the Preparatory Committee in 2012 and 2013, the Group warned that any further delay in convening the 2012 conference would seriously jeopardize the overall implementation of the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions and would represent a major setback in this regard. Likewise, the Group underscored that the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and the convening of a successful 2012 conference are integral and essential parts of the implementation of the consensus “conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 20) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also emphasizes, as it did in the First and Second Sessions of the Preparatory Committee, the importance of the mandated responsibility of the Secretary-General and the commitments and special responsibility of the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution regarding the convening of the 2012 conference. Accordingly, the Group calls upon them to accelerate their efforts to ensure the convening, without any further delay, of a successful conference. Furthermore, the Group calls upon the facilitator to exert maximum efforts for more intensive and regular consultations and coordination, in accordance with the mandate of the 2010 Review Conference, with all States of the region on all aspects of the 2012 conference.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 23) The failure to convene the conference in 2012 contradicts and violates the collective agreement of the States parties contained in “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty and contravenes the letter and spirit of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. Furthermore, the Group strongly rejects the alleged impediments cited by Conveners for not convening the conference on schedule, and expresses serious concern that the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Treaty is meeting while the Conference has not been convened yet.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Universality</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 4) The Conference also reaffirmed the urgency and importance of achieving universality of the Treaty and called on all States in the Middle East that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States so as to achieve its universality at an early date.</li> <li>• (Page 3, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty demands that Israel, the only country in the region that has neither joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons nor declared its intention to do so, renounce possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the Treaty without any precondition or further delay as a non-nuclear-weapon State, place promptly all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and conduct all its nuclear-related activities in full conformity with the non-proliferation regime, in</li> </ul>

	<p>realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty, in particular in the Middle East.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•</li> </ul>
<b>Subsidiary Bodies</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, para 17) ... the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty requests the establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the 2015 Review Conference to assess the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and reaffirmed by the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, as well as the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty.</li> </ul>
<b>Disarmament</b>	
<b>General views on Nuclear Disarmament</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be a contribution towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. However, the Group is of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon free zones does not substitute legal obligations and unequivocal undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States for the total elimination of nuclear weapons</li> </ul>
<b>Role of NWS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) ... the establishment of nuclear-weapon free zones does not substitute legal obligations and unequivocal undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> </ul>
<b>Nuclear Weapons Free Zones</b>	
<b>General Views on NWFZs</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be a contribution towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. However, the Group is of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon free zones does not substitute legal obligations and unequivocal undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The Group further welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and, in this regard, strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern that no progress has been achieved with regard to Israel's accession to the Treaty, and placing all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, and over the delay in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, all of which are objectives and priorities that were stressed in Review Conferences of the Treaty in 1995, 2000 and 2010.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further expresses great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by Israel, which pose a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States, and condemns Israel for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals. The Group also reaffirms that stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are maintained, particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allows one party to threaten its neighbours and the region, and constitutes a threat to international peace and security.</li> </ul>
<b>NWFZ in Middle East</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) The Group further welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and, in this regard, strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern that no progress has been achieved with regard to Israel's accession to the Treaty, and placing all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, and over the delay in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, all of which are objectives and priorities that were stressed in Review Conferences of the Treaty in 1995, 2000 and 2010.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further expresses great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by Israel, which pose a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States, and condemns Israel for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals. The Group also reaffirms that stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are maintained, particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allows one party to threaten its neighbours and the region, and constitutes a threat to international peace and security.</li> </ul>
<b>Regional Issue: Middle East</b>	
<p><b>General Views on NWFZ in Middle East</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) The Group further welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and, in this regard, strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines furthermore that the 2010 Review Conference also reaffirmed the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recalled the affirmation of its goals and objectives by the 2000 Review Conference. The Conference also stressed that the Resolution remains valid until the goals and objectives are achieved, and that the Resolution is an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995. The Group recalls also that, at the Conference, States parties renewed their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at its prompt implementation.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further recalls that the 2010 Review Conference, by taking note of the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, recalled the reaffirmation by the 2000 Review Conference of the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5)...the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty welcomes the adoption by consensus of a detailed plan of action on the Middle East, particularly the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference, and urges the Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, to convene and exert utmost efforts in ensuring the success of a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. While recalling that the 2010 Review Conference emphasized the importance of a process leading to full implementation of the objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, the Group stresses the importance of the full implementation of the plan of action and the active and constructive engagement by all parties concerned to allow for the success of the conference in leading to the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.</li> </ul>

- (Page 2, para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses deep concern over the long delay in the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and urges the three co-sponsors of the Resolution to fulfil their responsibility in taking all necessary measures to fully implement it without any further delay.
- (Page 2, para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern that no progress has been achieved with regard to Israel's accession to the Treaty, and placing all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, and over the delay in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, all of which are objectives and priorities that were stressed in Review Conferences of the Treaty in 1995, 2000 and 2010.
- (Page 2, para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further expresses great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by Israel, which pose a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States, and condemns Israel for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals. The Group also reaffirms that stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are maintained, particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allows one party to threaten its neighbours and the region, and constitutes a threat to international peace and security.
- (Page 3, para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms once again its determination to extend fullest cooperation and to exert utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons.
- (Page 3, para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines that the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on the Middle East by devoting sufficient time within the indicative timetable and giving all speakers the full opportunity to thereby engage in a substantive debate. The Group further recalls that the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences stipulated that all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, should report through the Secretariat to the President of the Review Conference, as well as the Chairs of its Preparatory Committee meetings, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such a zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. The Group further recalls that the 2010 Review Conference requested the facilitator to report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings.
- (Page 4, para 16)...the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes the importance of submitting required reports by all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, as well as the facilitator of the 2012 conference. It is essential that the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference conduct substantive discussions on the above-mentioned reports and evaluate the fulfilment of the commitments on the Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, as contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted by consensus at the 2010 Review Conference.
- (Page 4, para 17)...the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty requests the establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the 2015 Review Conference to assess the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and reaffirmed by the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, as well as the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty.
- (Page 4, para 20) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also

emphasizes, as it did in the First and Second Sessions of the Preparatory Committee, the importance of the mandated responsibility of the Secretary-General and the commitments and special responsibility of the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution regarding the convening of the 2012 conference. Accordingly, the Group calls upon them to accelerate their efforts to ensure the convening, without any further delay, of a successful conference. Furthermore, the Group calls upon the facilitator to exert maximum efforts for more intensive and regular consultations and coordination, in accordance with the mandate of the 2010 Review Conference, with all States of the region on all aspects of the 2012 conference.

- (Page 5, para 21) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses once again the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States, in particular the obligations and commitments of the three depositary States of the Treaty that co-sponsored the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, to implement the Resolution. Moreover, the Group considers the implementation of the practical steps adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Middle East as a collective responsibility, since the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference had clearly stipulated that the States parties renew their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at its prompt implementation, and also underlined the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.
- (Page 5, para 23) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while appreciating the efforts made by the facilitator, Mr. Jaakko Laajava, and the host Government of the 2012 conference, Finland, expresses profound disappointment over the failure of Conveners to convene the conference in 2012 as scheduled. The failure to convene the conference in 2012 contradicts and violates the collective agreement of the States parties contained in “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty and contravenes the letter and spirit of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. Furthermore, the Group strongly rejects the alleged impediments cited by Conveners for not convening the conference on schedule, and expresses serious concern that the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Treaty is meeting while the Conference has not been convened yet.
- (Page 5, para 24) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty urges the Conveners — the United Nations Secretary-General, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Russian Federation — in accordance with the mandate entrusted to them by the Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty, to convene the Conference without any further delay in order to avoid any negative repercussions on the credibility of the Treaty, its 2015 Review process and the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime as a whole. The Group calls on the facilitator to intensify consultations with all capitals in the region and to exert maximum efforts to that end.
- (Page 5, para 25) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores that efforts by the Conveners and the Facilitator, related to the Conference should be undertaken in accordance with the mandate contained in “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty, and should be focused on convening the Conference at the earliest date in 2014 and on seeking out in advance, by the Conveners and the Facilitator of the Conference, credible assurances regarding the unconditional participation of Israel, the only country of the region that has not declared its participation in the Conference.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 6, para 26) The Group is also of the view that the Conference should lead, without further delay, to the universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East and the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, and to preserve the credibility of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 6, para 27) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty is determined to continue pursuing, as a matter of high priority, the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and section IV of the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty. In this regard, the Group urges all States parties, in this session of the Preparatory Committee, to shoulder their responsibility in order to prevent further negative repercussions of not implementing the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and section IV, including the convening of the Conference, as mandated by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty.</li> </ul>
<b>Israel</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) The Group recalls that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel’s accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further recalls that the 2010 Review Conference, by taking note of the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, recalled the reaffirmation by the 2000 Review Conference of the importance of Israel’s accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern that no progress has been achieved with regard to Israel’s accession to the Treaty, and placing all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, and over the delay in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, all of which are objectives and priorities that were stressed in Review Conferences of the Treaty in 1995, 2000 and 2010.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern that no progress has been achieved with regard to Israel’s accession to the Treaty, and placing all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, and over the delay in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, all of which are objectives and priorities that were stressed in Review Conferences of the Treaty in 1995, 2000 and 2010..</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty remains gravely concerned by the statement made by the then Prime Minister of Israel on 11 December 2006, in which he publicly admitted the possession of nuclear weapons by Israel. In this regard, the Group reaffirms the continued validity of the statement of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement on this subject, as contained in document <i>NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/19</i>.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further expresses great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by Israel, which pose a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States, and condemns Israel for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals. The Group also reaffirms that stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are maintained, particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allows one party to threaten its neighbours and the region, and constitutes a threat to international peace and security.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty demands that Israel, the only country in the region that has neither joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons nor declared its intention to do so, renounce possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the Treaty without any precondition or further delay as a non-nuclear-weapon State, place promptly all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and conduct all its nuclear-related activities in full conformity with the non-proliferation regime, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty, in particular in the Middle East.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that the nuclear-weapon States, in conformity with their legal obligations under article I of the Treaty, shall solemnly undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly to Israel, and further undertake not, in any way, to assist, encourage or induce Israel to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices under any circumstances whatsoever.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, in conformity with the Treaty, hereby declares its commitment to the effective prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 18) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the establishment of a standing committee comprising members of the Bureau of the 2015 Review Conference to follow up intersessionally on the implementation of the recommendations by the Review Conference concerning Israel's prompt accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, and to report to the 2020 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 22) While appreciating the constructive engagement and the positive reactions from all Arab countries and the Islamic Republic of Iran towards the Conference, including the announcement of their willingness to participate in the Conference, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty deplores that Israel continues to undermine the convening of the Conference by not declaring its intention to participate in it.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 23) ... should be focused on convening the Conference at the earliest date in 2014 and on seeking out in advance, by the Conveners and the Facilitator of the Conference, credible assurances regarding the unconditional participation of Israel, the only country of the region that has not declared its participation in the Conference.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 25) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores that efforts by the Conveners and the Facilitator, related to the Conference should be undertaken in accordance with the mandate contained in "Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions" adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty, and should be focused on convening the Conference at the earliest date in 2014 and on seeking out in advance, by the Conveners and the Facilitator of the Conference, credible assurances regarding the unconditional participation of Israel, the only country of the region that has not declared its participation in the Conference.</li> </ul>
<b>1995 Resolution on the</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses</li> </ul>



ME	<p>the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which reaffirmed the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines furthermore that the 2010 Review Conference also reaffirmed the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recalled the affirmation of its goals and objectives by the 2000 Review Conference. The Conference also stressed that the Resolution remains valid until the goals and objectives are achieved, and that the Resolution is an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995. The Group recalls also that, at the Conference, States parties renewed their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at its prompt implementation.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further recalls that the 2010 Review Conference, by taking note of the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) ... the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty welcomes the adoption by consensus of a detailed plan of action on the Middle East, particularly the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference, and urges the Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, to convene and exert utmost efforts in ensuring the success of a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. While recalling that the 2010 Review Conference emphasized the importance of a process leading to full implementation of the objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, the Group stresses the importance of the full implementation of the plan of action and the active and constructive engagement by all parties concerned to allow for the success of the conference in leading to the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses deep concern over the long delay in the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and urges the three co-sponsors of the Resolution to fulfil their responsibility in taking all necessary measures to fully implement it without any further delay.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 15) The Group further recalls that the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences stipulated that all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, should report through the Secretariat to the President of the Review Conference, as well as the Chairs of its Preparatory Committee meetings, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such a zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 16)... the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes the importance of submitting required reports by all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, as well as the facilitator of the 2012 conference. It is essential that the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference conduct substantive discussions on the above-mentioned reports and evaluate the fulfilment of the commitments on the Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, as contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on</li> </ul>
----	--

actions adopted by consensus at the 2010 Review Conference.

- (Page 4, para 17)...the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty requests the establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the 2015 Review Conference to assess the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and reaffirmed by the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, as well as the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty.
- (Page 4, para 19) Likewise, the Group underscored that the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and the convening of a successful 2012 conference are integral and essential parts of the implementation of the consensus “conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty.
- (Page 4, para 20) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also emphasizes, as it did in the First and Second Sessions of the Preparatory Committee, the importance of the mandated responsibility of the Secretary-General and the commitments and special responsibility of the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution regarding the convening of the 2012 conference.
- (Page 5, para 21) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses once again the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States, in particular the obligations and commitments of the three depositary States of the Treaty that co-sponsored the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, to implement the Resolution. Moreover, the Group considers the implementation of the practical steps adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Middle East as a collective responsibility, since the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference had clearly stipulated that the States parties renew their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at its prompt implementation, and also underlined the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.
- (Page 5, para 23) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while appreciating the efforts made by the facilitator, Mr. Jaakko Laajava, and the host Government of the 2012 conference, Finland, expresses profound disappointment over the failure of Conveners to convene the conference in 2012 as scheduled. The failure to convene the conference in 2012 contradicts and violates the collective agreement of the States parties contained in “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty and contravenes the letter and spirit of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.
- (Page 5, para 24) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty urges the Conveners — the United Nations Secretary-General, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Russian Federation — in accordance with the mandate entrusted to them by the Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty, to convene the Conference without any further delay in order to avoid any negative repercussions on the credibility of the Treaty, its 2015 Review process and the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime as a whole. The Group calls on the facilitator to intensify consultations with all capitals in the region and to exert maximum efforts to that end.
- (Page 6, para 26) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty is determined to continue pursuing, as a matter of high priority, the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and section IV of the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty. In this regard, the Group urges all States parties, in

	<p>this session of the Preparatory Committee, to shoulder their responsibility in order to prevent further negative repercussions of not implementing the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and section IV, including the convening of the Conference, as mandated by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty.</p>
<p><b>Safeguards and Verification</b></p>	
<p><b>General Views on Safeguards and Verification</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) The Group recalls that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further recalls that the 2010 Review Conference, by taking note of the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, recalled the reaffirmation by the 2000 Review Conference of the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern that no progress has been achieved with regard to Israel's accession to the Treaty, and placing all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, and over the delay in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, all of which are objectives and priorities that were stressed in Review Conferences of the Treaty in 1995, 2000 and 2010.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further expresses great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by Israel, which pose a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States, and condemns Israel for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals. The Group also reaffirms that stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are maintained, particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allows one party to threaten its neighbours and the region, and constitutes a threat to international peace and security.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty demands that Israel, the only country in the region that has neither joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons nor declared its intention to do so, renounce possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the Treaty without any precondition or further delay as a non-nuclear-weapon State, place promptly all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981).</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, in conformity with the Treaty, hereby declares its commitment to the effective prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer, by any State, of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear-related scientific or technological fields to Israel. In this regard, the Group expresses its serious concern over Israeli scientists' continued access to the nuclear facilities of one nuclear-weapon State, which has potentially serious negative implications on the security of the region as well as the reliability of the global non-proliferation</li> </ul>

	<p>regime.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, para 18) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the establishment of a standing committee comprising members of the Bureau of the 2015 Review Conference to follow up intersessionally on the implementation of the recommendations by the Review Conference concerning Israel's prompt accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, and to report to the 2020 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee.</li> </ul>
<b>IAEA</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) The Group recalls that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further recalls that the 2010 Review Conference, by taking note of the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, recalled the reaffirmation by the 2000 Review Conference of the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern that no progress has been achieved with regard to Israel's accession to the Treaty, and placing all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, and over the delay in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, all of which are objectives and priorities that were stressed in Review Conferences of the Treaty in 1995, 2000 and 2010.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty demands that Israel, the only country in the region that has neither joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons nor declared its intention to do so, renounce possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the Treaty without any precondition or further delay as a non-nuclear-weapon State, place promptly all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and conduct all its nuclear-related activities in full conformity with the non-proliferation regime, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty, in particular in the Middle East.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, in conformity with the Treaty, hereby declares its commitment to the effective prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 18) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the establishment of a standing committee comprising members of the Bureau of the 2015 Review Conference to follow up intersessionally on the implementation of the recommendations by the Review Conference concerning Israel's prompt accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, and to report to the 2020 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee.</li> </ul>
<b>Peaceful Uses</b>	
<b>General views on</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty</li> </ul>

<p><b>peaceful uses</b></p>	<p>reaffirms that the nuclear-weapon States, in conformity with their legal obligations under article I of the Treaty, shall solemnly undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly to Israel, and further undertake not, in any way, to assist, encourage or induce Israel to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices under any circumstances whatsoever.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, in conformity with the Treaty, hereby declares its commitment to the effective prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer, by any State, of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear-related scientific or technological fields to Israel. In this regard, the Group expresses its serious concern over Israeli scientists' continued access to the nuclear facilities of one nuclear-weapon State, which has potentially serious negative implications on the security of the region as well as the reliability of the global non-proliferation regime.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Access to/transfer of equipment, materials scientific and technological information</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that the nuclear-weapon States, in conformity with their legal obligations under article I of the Treaty, shall solemnly undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly to Israel, and further undertake not, in any way, to assist, encourage or induce Israel to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices under any circumstances whatsoever.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, in conformity with the Treaty, hereby declares its commitment to the effective prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer, by any State, of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear-related scientific or technological fields to Israel. In this regard, the Group expresses its serious concern over Israeli scientists' continued access to the nuclear facilities of one nuclear-weapon State, which has potentially serious negative implications on the security of the region as well as the reliability of the global non-proliferation regime.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Transfer to States Not Party to NPT</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, in conformity with the Treaty, hereby declares its commitment to the effective prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear</li> </ul>

	facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards.
<b>Other Fora</b>	
<b>United Nations</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(Page 6, para 26) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus</li> </ul>
<b>Working Paper submitted by members of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.5)</b>	
<b>Institutional Issues</b>	
<b>Strengthen Review Process</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(Page 3, para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for the establishment by the Review Conference of a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreements by the nuclear-weapon States.</li> </ul>
<b>Disarmament</b>	
<b>General Views on Disarmament</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(Page 3, para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the statutory role of IAEA on nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the Agency's capability of verifying nuclear disarmament agreements.</li> <li>(Page 3, para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for the establishment by the Review Conference of a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreements by the nuclear-weapon States.</li> </ul>
<b>Role of NWS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(Page 3, para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly believes that the nuclear-weapon States, in implementing their unequivocal undertaking to totally eliminate their nuclear arsenals, should undertake further efforts, in a transparent, irreversible and internationally verifiable manner, to eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, as well as their nuclear weapon-related materials, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. Furthermore, the Group calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to dismantle or convert for peaceful uses facilities and related equipment for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</li> <li>(Page 3, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for the establishment by the Review Conference of a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreements by the nuclear-weapon States.</li> </ul>
<b>Fissile Material/FMCT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(Page 3, para 11) ...the Group calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to dismantle or convert for peaceful uses facilities and related equipment for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</li> </ul>
<b>Safeguards and Verification</b>	
<b>General views on safeguards and verification</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(Page 1, para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that, under article III (1) of the Treaty, each non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards "for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</li> <li>(Page 1, para 2) In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also reaffirms the importance and calls for strict observance of article III (3) of the Treaty, by which the required safeguards "shall be implemented in a</li> </ul>

manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the preamble of the Treaty”.

- (Page 1, para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty fully recognizes that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an independent intergovernmental, science- and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for verification of the fulfilment of safeguard obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.
- (Page 1, para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while supporting the verification activities of IAEA, underlines the importance of strict observance of the IAEA statute and relevant comprehensive safeguards agreements in conducting verification activities.
- (Page 1, para 5) In this connection, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while stressing the importance of safeguards, underlines the essential responsibility of the IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the Agency’s statute and safeguards agreements. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on the nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidences of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime, for its protection, needs to be significantly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency. The Group recalls IAEA General Conference resolution GC(57)/RES/13, paragraph 27, in which the IAEA Director General is urged to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of classified safeguards information and is requested to continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of classified safeguards information within the secretariat.
- (Page 2, para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that all States members of IAEA shall strictly observe its statute and that nothing should be done to undermine its authority. Furthermore, the Group calls upon all States to avoid any pressure or interference in the Agency’s activities, especially its verification process, that could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility.
- (Page 2, para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes the need to achieve worldwide application of the comprehensive safeguards system and calls upon all nuclear-weapon States and all States not parties to the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under the Treaty.
- (Page 2, para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, mindful of the importance of article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes, reiterates that obligations under that article provide credible assurances for States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes. Therefore, States

	<p>parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to other States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the statutory role of IAEA on nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the Agency’s capability of verifying nuclear disarmament agreements.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 12) In this regard, the Group supports furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide nuclear disarmament and the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Group further urges the Review Conference to examine such legally binding verification arrangements and the means of making them operational, with the aim of ensuring the realization of that objective.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls action 16 of the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty and urges the nuclear-weapon States to commit to declaring to IAEA all weapon-grade fissile material and to place such material, as soon as practicable, under the supervision of IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes. The Group calls upon the Conference to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the fulfilment of these commitments through the establishment of an international mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the action, which should be made mandatory for the nuclear-weapon States.</li> </ul>
<b>IAEA</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that, under article III (1) of the Treaty, each non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also reaffirms the importance and calls for strict observance of article III (3) of the Treaty, by which the required safeguards “shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the preamble of the Treaty”.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty fully recognizes that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an independent intergovernmental, science- and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for verification of the fulfilment of safeguard obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while supporting the verification activities of IAEA, underlines the importance of strict observance of the IAEA statute and relevant comprehensive safeguards</li> </ul>



agreements in conducting verification activities.

- (Page 1, para 5) In this connection, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while stressing the importance of safeguards, underlines the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the Agency's statute and safeguards agreements. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on the nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidences of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime, for its protection, needs to be significantly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency. The Group recalls IAEA General Conference resolution GC(57)/RES/13, paragraph 27, in which the IAEA Director General is urged to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of classified safeguards information and is requested to continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of classified safeguards information within the secretariat.
- (Page 2, para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that all States members of IAEA shall strictly observe its statute and that nothing should be done to undermine its authority. Furthermore, the Group calls upon all States to avoid any pressure or interference in the Agency's activities, especially its verification process that could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility.
- (Page 2, para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes the need to achieve worldwide application of the comprehensive safeguards system and calls upon all nuclear-weapon States and all States not parties to the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under the Treaty.
- (Page 2, para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, mindful of the importance of article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes, reiterates that obligations under that article provide credible assurances for States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to other States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.
- (Page 3, para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the statutory role of IAEA on nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the Agency's capability of verifying nuclear disarmament agreements.
- (Page 3, para 12) In this regard, the Group supports furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide nuclear disarmament and the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Group further urges the Review Conference to examine such legally binding verification arrangements and the means of making them operational, with the aim of ensuring the realization of that objective.
- (Page 3, para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls action 16 of the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review

	<p>Conference of the Parties to the Treaty and urges the nuclear-weapon States to commit to declaring to IAEA all weapon-grade fissile material and to place such material, as soon as practicable, under the supervision of IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes. The Group calls upon the Conference to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the fulfilment of these commitments through the establishment of an international mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the action, which should be made mandatory for the nuclear-weapon States.</p>
<b>Peaceful Uses</b>	
<p><b>General views on peaceful uses</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that, under article III (1) of the Treaty, each non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards “for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also reaffirms the importance and calls for strict observance of article III (3) of the Treaty, by which the required safeguards “shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the preamble of the Treaty”.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty fully recognizes that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an independent intergovernmental, science- and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for verification of the fulfilment of safeguard obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of: (a) Ensuring full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; (b) Providing baseline data regarding the fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (c) Strictly observing the prohibition of transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, object and purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Access to/transfer of equipment, materials scientific and technological information</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also reaffirms the importance and calls for strict observance of article III (3) of the Treaty, by which the required safeguards “shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the</li> </ul>

	<p>preamble of the Treaty”.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty fully recognizes that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an independent intergovernmental, science- and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for verification of the fulfilment of safeguard obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of: (a) Ensuring full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; (b) Providing baseline data regarding the fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (c) Strictly observing the prohibition of transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, object and purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.</li> </ul>
--	--

<b>Working Paper submitted by members of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.14)</b>	
<b>Disarmament</b>	
<b>General Views on Nuclear Disarmament</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty continues to consider the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), Bangkok (Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone), Pelindaba (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty) and Semipalatinsk (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia) to be a positive step and important measure towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons</li> </ul>
<b>Nonproliferation</b>	
<b>General Views on Nonproliferation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty continues to consider the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), Bangkok (Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone), Pelindaba (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty) and Semipalatinsk (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia) to be a positive step and important measure towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons</li> </ul>
<b>Security Assurance</b>	
<b>General Views on Security Assurances</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reiterates that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons and in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, it is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable and legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Group reaffirms that, in the context of the nuclear-weapon free zones, it is also essential that all the nuclear-weapon States provide unconditional, non-discriminatory and concrete legal assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all non-nuclear-weapon States of the zone that are</li> </ul>

	<p>parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In this regard, the Group strongly calls for the withdrawal of any related reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of such treaties.</p>
<p><b>Legally Binding Security Assurances</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reiterates that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons and in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, it is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable and legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Group reaffirms that, in the context of the nuclear-weapon free zones, it is also essential that all the nuclear-weapon States provide unconditional, non-discriminatory and concrete legal assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all non-nuclear-weapon States of the zone that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In this regard, the Group strongly calls for the withdrawal of any related reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of such treaties.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Nuclear Weapons Free Zones</b></p>	
<p><b>General Views on NWFZs</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be an important step towards strengthening nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regimes. The Group is, therefore, of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is not a substitute for nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group underlines the importance of the early fulfilment of the legal obligations of and unequivocal undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate all their nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty continues to consider the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), Bangkok (Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone), Pelindaba (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty) and Semipalatinsk (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia) to be a positive step and important measure towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing other nuclear-weapon-free zones worldwide and calls for cooperation and broad consultation among the States of the regions concerned to conclude agreements establishing such zones.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reiterates that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons and in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, it is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable and legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Group reaffirms that, in the context of the nuclear-weapon free zones, it is also essential that all the nuclear-weapon States provide unconditional, non-discriminatory and concrete legal assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all non-nuclear-weapon States of the zone that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In this</li> </ul>

	<p>regard, the Group strongly calls for the withdrawal of any related reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of such treaties. The Group further calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations to achieve the objectives of the treaties to establish nuclear weapon-free zones and their protocols.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes the need to strengthen the integrity of the statute of denuclearization provided for in the Treaty of Tlatelolco by reviewing the declarations that were formulated by the nuclear weapon States parties to Additional Protocols I and II thereto, for possible withdrawal or modification.</li> <li>• (Page 2, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty urges States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist, in accordance with the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. In this context, the Group considers that the further institutionalization of Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status would be an important step towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while noting with satisfaction the convening of the first preparatory meeting for the Third Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, which was held in Vienna on 27 April 2012, calls upon the States parties and signatories to those treaties to put in place further forms of cooperation among themselves, their treaty agencies and other interested States.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Semipalatinsk and Bangkok in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the territories of the States parties to those treaties, as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Treaty of Tlatelolco</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty continues to consider the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), Bangkok (Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone), Pelindaba (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty) and Semipalatinsk (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia) to be a positive step and important measure towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing other nuclear-weapon-free zones worldwide and calls for cooperation and broad consultation among the States of the regions concerned to conclude agreements establishing such zones.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes the need to strengthen the integrity of the statute of denuclearization provided for in the Treaty of Tlatelolco by reviewing the declarations that were formulated by the nuclear weapon States parties to Additional Protocols I and II thereto, for possible withdrawal or modification</li> </ul>
<p><b>Treaty of Pelindaba</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty continues to consider the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty),</li> </ul>

	<p>Bangkok (Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone), Pelindaba (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty) and Semipalatinsk (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia) to be a positive step and important measure towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing other nuclear-weapon-free zones worldwide and calls for cooperation and broad consultation among the States of the regions concerned to conclude agreements establishing such zones.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Semipalatinsk and Bangkok in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the territories of the States parties to those treaties, as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</li> </ul>
<b>Mongolia as a NWFZ</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty continues to consider the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), Bangkok (Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone), Pelindaba (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty) and Semipalatinsk (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia) to be a positive step and important measure towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing other nuclear-weapon-free zones worldwide and calls for cooperation and broad consultation among the States of the regions concerned to conclude agreements establishing such zones.</li> </ul>
<b>Bangkok Treaty</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty continues to consider the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), Bangkok (Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone), Pelindaba (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty) and Semipalatinsk (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia) to be a positive step and important measure towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing other nuclear-weapon-free zones worldwide and calls for cooperation and broad consultation among the States of the regions concerned to conclude agreements establishing such zones.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Semipalatinsk and Bangkok in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the territories of the States parties to those treaties, as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</li> </ul>
<b>Semipalatinsk Treaty</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty continues to consider the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), Bangkok (Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone), Pelindaba (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty) and Semipalatinsk (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia) to be a positive step and important measure towards attaining the objective of global nuclear</li> </ul>

	<p>disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing other nuclear-weapon-free zones worldwide and calls for cooperation and broad consultation among the States of the regions concerned to conclude agreements establishing such zones.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Semipalatinsk and Bangkok in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the territories of the States parties to those treaties, as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</li> </ul>
<b>Treaty of Rontonga</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty continues to consider the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), Bangkok (Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone), Pelindaba (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty) and Semipalatinsk (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia) to be a positive step and important measure towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing other nuclear-weapon-free zones worldwide and calls for cooperation and broad consultation among the States of the regions concerned to conclude agreements establishing such zones.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Semipalatinsk and Bangkok in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the territories of the States parties to those treaties, as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</li> </ul>
<b>Role of NWS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 4) The Group reaffirms that, in the context of the nuclear-weapon free zones, it is also essential that all the nuclear-weapon States provide unconditional, non-discriminatory and concrete legal assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all non-nuclear-weapon States of the zone that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In this regard, the Group strongly calls for the withdrawal of any related reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of such treaties. The Group further calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations to achieve the objectives of the treaties to establish nuclear weapon-free zones and their protocols</li> </ul>
<b>NWFZ and Security Assurances</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reiterates that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons and in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, it is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable and legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.</li> </ul>
<b>NWFZ in Middle East</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) In this context, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and calls for the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which is an integral and essential part of the package of decisions reached without a vote that enabled the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995. The resolution remains valid until its objectives are achieved.</li> </ul>
<b>Regional Issue: Middle East</b>	

<b>General Views on NWFZ in Middle East</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) In this context, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and calls for the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which is an integral and essential part of the package of decisions reached without a vote that enabled the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995. The resolution remains valid until its objectives are achieved.</li> </ul>
<b>1995 Resolution on the ME</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) In this context, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and calls for the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which is an integral and essential part of the package of decisions reached without a vote that enabled the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995. The resolution remains valid until its objectives are achieved.</li> </ul>
<b>Other Fora</b>	
<b>SSOD-1</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty urges States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist, in accordance with the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session.</li> </ul>

<b>Working Paper submitted by members of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.15)</b>	
<b>General views on NPT</b>	
<b>General views on NPT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emphasizes that the Treaty is an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and a key instrument in the efforts to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses deep concern at the continued lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, which could undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 23) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals and considers, in that regard, that any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 24) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further reaffirms that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, it is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States that, by becoming parties to the Treaty, have given up the nuclear weapon option, inter alia, to receive effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances.</li> <li>• (Page 6, para 29) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls its working paper entitled “Elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons”, which was submitted to the 2010 Review</li> </ul>



	Conference in document NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47 and expresses its determination to present an updated version of this plan to the 2015 Review Conference.
<b>Institutional Issues</b>	
<b>Strengthen Review Process</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that, in pursuit of the full, effective and urgent implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, and building upon the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, the 2010 Review Conference agreed on an action plan on nuclear disarmament that includes concrete steps for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the Group strongly calls for prompt and full implementation of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 9) In this connection, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes in particular the prime importance of and the urgent need for full and prompt implementation of the commitments by the nuclear-weapon States under action 5 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 10) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to submit a comprehensive substantive report about their undertakings under action 5 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament to the Preparatory Committee in 2014, in order to enable the 2015 Review Conference to take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of article VI of the Treaty in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 6, para 30) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reiterates its call for the establishment, as a matter of priority, of a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament in Main Committee I, mandated to focus on the issue of fulfilment of the obligations under article VI of the Treaty and on further practical measures required to achieve progress in that regard.</li> <li>• (Page 6, para 31) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty notes with concern the lack of agreement on a number of its key priorities and expresses its determination to continue collective efforts in pursuing the realization of its aforementioned priorities in the 2015 review process of the Treaty.</li> </ul>
<b>Reporting</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Page 3, para 10) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to submit a comprehensive substantive report about their undertakings under action 5 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament to the Preparatory Committee in 2014, in order to enable the 2015 Review Conference to take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of article VI of the Treaty in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> </ul>
<b>Subsidiary Bodies</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 6, para 30) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reiterates its call for the establishment, as a matter of priority, of a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament in Main Committee I, mandated to focus on the issue of fulfilment of the obligations under article VI of the Treaty and on further practical measures required to achieve progress in that regard.</li> <li>• (Page 6, para 31) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty notes with concern the lack of agreement on a number of its key priorities and expresses its determination to continue collective efforts in pursuing the realization of its aforementioned priorities in the 2015 review process of the Treaty.</li> </ul>
<b>Disarmament</b>	

**General views on Nuclear Disarmament**

- (Page 1, para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emphasizes that the Treaty is an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and a key instrument in the efforts to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.
- (Page 1, para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms the principled positions of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries on nuclear disarmament, which remains its highest priority, and on the related issue of nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects and stresses the importance that efforts aimed at nuclear non-proliferation should be parallel to simultaneous efforts aiming at nuclear disarmament. The Group stresses its concern at the threat to humanity posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and of their possible use or threat of use. The Group also reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
- (Page 1, para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also remains deeply concerned at the strategic concept for the defence and security of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which justifies the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and maintains unjustifiable concepts on international security based on promoting and developing nuclear military alliances and nuclear deterrence policies.
- (Page 2, para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reiterates its strong call for the full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking given by the nuclear weapon States at the 2000 Review Conference to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, which has also been reaffirmed by the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. That undertaking should be implemented without further delay through an accelerated process of negotiations and through the full implementation of the 13 practical steps to advance systematically and progressively towards a nuclear-weapon-free world as agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference, as well as in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference, which reaffirmed the continued validity of that undertaking.
- (Page 2, para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that, in pursuit of the full, effective and urgent implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 € of the 1995 decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, and building upon the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, the 2010 Review Conference agreed on an action plan on nuclear disarmament that includes concrete steps for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the Group strongly calls for prompt and full implementation of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament.
- (Page 2, para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that in implementing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the nuclear-weapon States have committed to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. In this regard, the Group calls for full compliance of the nuclear-weapon States with such undertakings.
- (Page 2, para 9) ... the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes in particular the prime importance of and the urgent need for full

and prompt implementation of the commitments by the nuclear-weapon States under action 5 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament. In this context, the Group further recalls that the nuclear-weapon States committed to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, inter alia, through (a) rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons; (b) addressing the question of all nuclear weapons, regardless of their type or their location, as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process; (c) further diminishing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies; (d) discussing policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons; (e) considering the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security; (f) reducing the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and (g) further enhancing transparency and increase mutual confidence.

- (Page 3, para 10) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to submit a comprehensive substantive report about their undertakings under action 5 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament to the Preparatory Committee in 2014, in order to enable the 2015 Review Conference to take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of article VI of the Treaty in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
- (Page 3, para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty welcomes the convening of the first-ever high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament on 26 September 2013 and underlines that the strong support, expressed at that meeting, for taking urgent and effective measures to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons demonstrated that nuclear disarmament remains the highest priority of the international community.
- (Page 3, para 12)... the Group calls for the full implementation of General Assembly resolution 68/32 on the follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament, which: (i) calls for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction; (ii) decides to convene, no later than 2018, a United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to review the progress made in this regard; and (iii) declares 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons devoted to furthering this objective, including through enhancing public awareness and education about the threat posed to humanity by nuclear weapons and the necessity for their total elimination, in order to mobilize international efforts towards achieving the common goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.
- (Page 3, para 13) The Group further underscores the importance of the resolution, which also: (i) underlines the strong support expressed at the high-level meeting on nuclear disarmament for taking urgent and effective measures to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons; (ii) calls for urgent compliance with the legal obligations and the fulfilment of the commitments undertaken on nuclear disarmament; (iii) endorses the wide support expressed at the high-level meeting for a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons; (iv) requests the Secretary General to seek the views of Members States with regard to achieving the objective of the total elimination

	<p>of nuclear weapons, in particular on the elements of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, and to submit a report thereon to the General Assembly at its sixty-ninth session, and also to transmit the report to the Conference on Disarmament; (v) calls upon Member States, the United Nations system and civil society, including non-governmental organizations, academia, parliamentarians, the mass media and individuals, to commemorate and promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, through all means of educational and public awareness-raising activities.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses deep concern at the continued lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, which could undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty. The Group also deeply regrets the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. Negotiation of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame is necessary and should commence without any further delay. In that regard, the Group reiterates its call to establish, as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament and recalls action 6 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament, through which all States have agreed that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.</li> <li>• (Page 4, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly supports banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and eliminating all the past production and existing stockpiles of such materials, in an irreversible and verifiable manner and taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives.</li> <li>• (Page 6, para 29) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls its working paper entitled “Elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons”, which was submitted to the 2010 Review Conference in document NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47 and expresses its determination to present an updated version of this plan to the 2015 Review Conference.</li> <li>• (Page 6, para 30) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reiterates its call for the establishment, as a matter of priority, of a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament in Main Committee I, mandated to focus on the issue of fulfilment of the obligations under article VI of the Treaty and on further practical measures required to achieve progress in that regard.</li> </ul>
<p><b>NWC (Time Bound Elimination)</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 13) The Group further underscores the importance of the resolution, which also: (iii) endorses the wide support expressed at the high-level meeting for a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 14) Negotiation of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame is necessary and should commence without any further delay. In that regard, the Group reiterates its call to establish, as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament and recalls action 6 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament, through which all States have agreed that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 17) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty remains deeply concerned by the lack of progress towards achieving the total</li> </ul>

elimination of nuclear weapons, despite some reports of bilateral and unilateral reductions. Any such reductions are undermined by the modernization of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and related infrastructure by the nuclear-weapon States. In order to comply with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, as well as with their commitments under the 13 practical steps and 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament, the nuclear-weapon States must immediately cease their plans to further invest in modernizing, upgrading, refurbishing or extending the lives of their nuclear weapons and related facilities. The Group is also concerned about the existence and continued deployment of tens of thousands of such weapons, whose exact number remains unconfirmed, owing to the lack of transparency in various nuclear weapons programmes.

- (Page 4, para 19) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons and, accordingly, calls on the nuclear-weapon States to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability to all such cuts, to further reduce their nuclear arsenals, both warheads and delivery systems, thus contributing to the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations and facilitating the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest date. The Group also recalls the commitment by the Russian Federation and the United States under action 4 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament for the full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and strongly urges them to adopt all required measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
- (Page 5, Para 20) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group remains concerned that the deployment of national and strategic missile defence systems could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 68/29, the Group emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.
- (Page 5, para 21) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also believes that the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes and the lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies further undermine disarmament commitments.
- (Page 5, para 22) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.
- (Page 5, para 23) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals and considers, in that regard, that any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal, and with the

	<p>broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 6, para 27) ...the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty is of the view that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States shall seriously refrain, at any circumstances, from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. In the view of the Group, any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular international humanitarian law. The Group further believes that the mere possession of nuclear weapons is inconsistent with the principles of international humanitarian law. In this regard, the Group strongly calls for the complete exclusion of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from military doctrines.</li> <li>• (Page 6, para 29) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls its working paper entitled “Elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons”, which was submitted to the 2010 Review Conference in document NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47 and expresses its determination to present an updated version of this plan to the 2015 Review Conference.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Role of NWS</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also remains deeply concerned at the strategic concept for the defence and security of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which justifies the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and maintains unjustifiable concepts on international security based on promoting and developing nuclear military alliances and nuclear deterrence policies.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reiterates its strong call for the full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking given by the nuclear weapon States at the 2000 Review Conference to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, which has also been reaffirmed by the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. That undertaking should be implemented without further delay through an accelerated process of negotiations and through the full implementation of the 13 practical steps to advance systematically and progressively towards a nuclear-weapon-free world as agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference, as well as in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference, which reaffirmed the continued validity of that undertaking.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that in implementing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the nuclear-weapon States have committed to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. In this regard, the Group calls for full compliance of the nuclear-weapon States with such undertakings.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 9) ... the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes in particular the prime importance of and the urgent need for full and prompt implementation of the commitments by the nuclear-weapon States under action 5 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament. In this context, the Group further recalls that the nuclear-weapon States committed to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, inter alia, through (a) rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons; (b)</li> </ul>

addressing the question of all nuclear weapons, regardless of their type or their location, as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process; (c) further diminishing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies; (d) discussing policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons; € considering the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security; (f) reducing the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and (g) further enhancing transparency and increase mutual confidence.

- (Page 3, para 10)... the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to submit a comprehensive substantive report about their undertakings under action 5 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament to the Preparatory Committee in 2014, in order to enable the 2015 Review Conference to take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of article VI of the Treaty in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
- (Page 3, para 14) The Group also deeply regrets the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament.
- (Page 4, para 17) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty remains deeply concerned by the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons, despite some reports of bilateral and unilateral reductions. Any such reductions are undermined by the modernization of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and related infrastructure by the nuclear-weapon States. In order to comply with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, as well as with their commitments under the 13 practical steps and 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament, the nuclear-weapon States must immediately cease their plans to further invest in modernizing, upgrading, refurbishing or extending the lives of their nuclear weapons and related facilities. The Group is also concerned about the existence and continued deployment of tens of thousands of such weapons, whose exact number remains unconfirmed, owing to the lack of transparency in various nuclear weapons programmes.
- (Page 4, para 18) ... the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while noting the conclusion and entry into force of the New START Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America, confirms the validity of its position delivered at the time of adoption of General Assembly resolution 65/61, entitled “Bilateral reductions of strategic nuclear arms and the new framework for strategic relations”. The Group further expresses concern that domestic commitments to nuclear weapon modernization in exchange for ratification of this Treaty undermine the minimal reductions agreed upon in it.
- (Page 4, para 19) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons and, accordingly, calls on the nuclear-weapon States to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability to all such cuts, to further reduce their nuclear arsenals, both warheads and delivery systems, thus contributing to the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations and facilitating the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest date. The Group also recalls the commitment by the Russian

	<p>Federation and the United States under action 4 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament for the full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and strongly urges them to adopt all required measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 5, para 21) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also believes that the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes and the lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies further undermine disarmament commitments.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 25) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.</li> <li>• (Page 6, para 27) Accordingly, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty is of the view that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States shall seriously refrain, at any circumstances, from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. In the view of the Group, any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular international humanitarian law. The Group further believes that the mere possession of nuclear weapons is inconsistent with the principles of international humanitarian law. In this regard, the Group strongly calls for the complete exclusion of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from military doctrines.</li> <li>• (Page 6, para 28) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the significance of achieving the universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and realizing its entry into force through its ratification by the remaining States whose ratification is required for its entry into force, including, in particular, by two nuclear-weapon States, thus contributing to the process of nuclear disarmament and the enhancement of international peace and security. The Group underlines that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to take the lead in this regard.</li> <li>• (Page 6, para 29) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls its working paper entitled “Elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons”, which was submitted to the 2010 Review Conference in document NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47 and expresses its determination to present an updated version of this plan to the 2015 Review Conference.</li> </ul>
<p><b>FMCT/Fissile Material</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly supports banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and eliminating all the past production and existing stockpiles of such materials, in an irreversible and verifiable manner and taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 16) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines that non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have already agreed to a legally binding commitment not to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</li> </ul>



	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 6, para 29) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls its working paper entitled “Elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons”, which was submitted to the 2010 Review Conference in document NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47 and expresses its determination to present an updated version of this plan to the 2015 Review Conference.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Humanitarian Approach to Nuclear Disarmament</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) The Group stresses its concern at the threat to humanity posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and of their possible use or threat of use.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 12) the Group calls for the full implementation of General Assembly resolution 68/32 on the follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament, which (iii) declares 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons devoted to furthering this objective, including through enhancing public awareness and education about the threat posed to humanity by nuclear weapons and the necessity for their total elimination, in order to mobilize international efforts towards achieving the common goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 22) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 25) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.</li> <li>• (Page 6, para 26) ... the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons that “there is in neither customary nor conventional international law any specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons” and that “the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.</li> <li>• (Page 6, para 27)... the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty is of the view that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States shall seriously refrain, at any circumstances, from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. In the view of the Group, any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular international humanitarian law. The Group further believes that the mere possession of nuclear weapons is inconsistent with the principles of international humanitarian law. In this regard, the Group strongly calls for the complete exclusion of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from military doctrines.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Outer Space</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 5, para 20) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group remains concerned that the deployment of national and strategic missile defence systems could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced</li> </ul>

	<p>missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 68/29, the Group emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.</p>
<b>Bilateral Agreements</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, para 18) ... the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while noting the conclusion and entry into force of the New START Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America, confirms the validity of its position delivered at the time of adoption of General Assembly resolution 65/61, entitled “Bilateral reductions of strategic nuclear arms and the new framework for strategic relations”. The Group further expresses concern that domestic commitments to nuclear weapon modernization in exchange for ratification of this Treaty undermine the minimal reductions agreed upon in it.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 19) The Group also recalls the commitment by the Russian Federation and the United States under action 4 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament for the full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and strongly urges them to adopt all required measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> </ul>
<b>Nuclear Testing</b>	
<b>General Views on Testing</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 6, para 28) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the significance of achieving the universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and realizing its entry into force through its ratification by the remaining States whose ratification is required for its entry into force, including, in particular, by two nuclear-weapon States, thus contributing to the process of nuclear disarmament and the enhancement of international peace and security.</li> <li>• (Page 6, Para 29) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls its working paper entitled “Elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons”, which was submitted to the 2010 Review Conference in document NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47 and expresses its determination to present an updated version of this plan to the 2015 Review Conference.</li> </ul>
<b>CTBT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 6, para 28) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the significance of achieving the universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and realizing its entry into force through its ratification by the remaining States whose ratification is required for its entry into force, including, in particular, by two nuclear-weapon States, thus contributing to the process of nuclear disarmament and the enhancement of international peace and security. The Group underlines that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to take the lead in this regard.</li> <li>• (Page 6, para 29) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls its working paper entitled “Elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons”, which was submitted to the 2010 Review Conference in document NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47 and expresses its determination to present an updated version of this plan to the 2015 Review Conference.</li> </ul>
<b>Security Assurance</b>	
<b>General Views on Security Assurances</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 5, para 24) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further reaffirms that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, it is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States that, by becoming parties to the Treaty, have given up the nuclear weapon option, inter alia, to</li> </ul>

	<p>receive effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 6, para 29) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls its working paper entitled “Elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons”, which was submitted to the 2010 Review Conference in document NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47 and expresses its determination to present an updated version of this plan to the 2015 Review Conference.</li> </ul>
<b>Legally Binding Security Assurances</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 5, para 24) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further reaffirms that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, it is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States that, by becoming parties to the Treaty, have given up the nuclear weapon option, inter alia, to receive effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances.</li> <li>• (Page 6, para 29) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls its working paper entitled “Elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons”, which was submitted to the 2010 Review Conference in document NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47 and expresses its determination to present an updated version of this plan to the 2015 Review Conference.</li> </ul>
<b>Safeguards</b>	
<b>General views on safeguards and verification</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly supports banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and eliminating all the past production and existing stockpiles of such materials, in an irreversible and verifiable manner and taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, without prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including their past production, existing stockpiles and future production of fissile materials under the International Atomic Energy Agency Agenda comprehensive safeguards.</li> </ul>
<b>IAEA</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly supports banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and eliminating all the past production and existing stockpiles of such materials, in an irreversible and verifiable manner and taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, without prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including their past production, existing stockpiles and future production of fissile materials under the International Atomic Energy Agency Agenda comprehensive safeguards.</li> </ul>
<b>Peaceful Uses</b>	
<b>General views on peaceful uses</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly supports banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and eliminating all the past production and existing stockpiles of such materials, in an irreversible and verifiable manner and taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, without prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including their past production, existing stockpiles and future production of fissile materials under the International Atomic Energy Agency Agenda comprehensive safeguards.</li> </ul>
<b>Access to/transfer of</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty</li> </ul>

<b>equipment, materials and scientific and technological development</b>	strongly supports banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and eliminating all the past production and existing stockpiles of such materials, in an irreversible and verifiable manner and taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, without prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including their past production, existing stockpiles and future production of fissile materials under the International Atomic Energy Agency Agenda comprehensive safeguards.
<b>Regional Issue: Middle East</b>	
<b>General Views on NWFZ in Middle East</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 6, para 29) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls its working paper entitled “Elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons”, which was submitted to the 2010 Review Conference in document NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47 and expresses its determination to present an updated version of this plan to the 2015 Review Conference.</li> </ul>
<b>1995 Resolution on the ME</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 6, para 29) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls its working paper entitled “Elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons”, which was submitted to the 2010 Review Conference in document NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47 and expresses its determination to present an updated version of this plan to the 2015 Review Conference.</li> </ul>
<b>Other Fora</b>	
<b>United Nations</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 12)... the Group calls for the full implementation of General Assembly resolution 68/32 on the follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament, which: (i) calls for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction; (ii) decides to convene, no later than 2018, a United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to review the progress made in this regard; and (iii) declares 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons devoted to furthering this objective, including through enhancing public awareness and education about the threat posed to humanity by nuclear weapons and the necessity for their total elimination, in order to mobilize international efforts towards achieving the common goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 20) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group remains concerned that the deployment of national and strategic missile defence systems could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 68/29, the Group emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.</li> </ul>
<b>Conference on</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 12)... the Group calls for the full implementation of General</li> </ul>

<p><b>Disarmament</b></p>	<p>Assembly resolution 68/32 on the follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament, which: (i) calls for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 13) ... requests the Secretary General to seek the views of Members States with regard to achieving the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, in particular on the elements of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, and to submit a report thereon to the General Assembly at its sixty-ninth session, and also to transmit the report to the Conference on Disarmament;</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses deep concern at the continued lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, which could undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty. The Group also deeply regrets the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament.</li> <li>• (Page 4, para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly supports banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and eliminating all the past production and existing stockpiles of such materials, in an irreversible and verifiable manner and taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives.</li> <li>• (Page 5, para 20) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group remains concerned that the deployment of national and strategic missile defence systems could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 68/29, the Group emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.</li> </ul>
---------------------------	--

<p><b>Working Paper submitted by members of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.16)</b></p>	
<p><b>General views on NPT</b></p>	
<p><b>General views on NPT</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that negative security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty would fulfil the undertaking to the States that have voluntarily given up the nuclear weapons option by becoming parties to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals and considers, in that regard, that any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.</li> <li>• (Page 6, Recommendation 27) To strongly support a comprehensive ban on all forms of nuclear-weapon tests without exception, as well as any nuclear</li> </ul>

	explosion, and reaffirm the importance of such ban in the realization of objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
<b>Institutional Issues</b>	
<b>Subsidiary Bodies</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 13) In keeping with the above-mentioned position and in accordance with the decision at the 2000 Review Conference, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances for further work to consider legally binding, unconditional, irrevocable and non-discriminatory negative security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty</li> </ul>
<b>Disarmament</b>	
<b>General Views on Nuclear Disarmament</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals and considers, in that regard, that any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. While recalling the advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the Group believes that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as the only absolute guarantee against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States shall seriously refrain, in any circumstances, from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty firmly believes that the mere possession or any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular, international humanitarian law.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 9) In this regard, while deploring the strategic doctrines of the nuclear-weapon States and the strategic concept for the security of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which are based on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and maintain unjustifiable concepts on international security based on promoting and developing military alliances and nuclear deterrence policies, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to exclude completely the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from their military and security doctrines.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 11) The Group, therefore, calls on the 2015 Review Conference, in addition to nuclear disarmament being its highest priority, to fully address this legitimate right as a matter of priority.</li> </ul>
<b>Role of NWS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals and considers, in that regard, that any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 9) ...while deploring the strategic doctrines of the nuclear-weapon States and the strategic concept for the security of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which are based on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and maintain unjustifiable concepts on international security</li> </ul>

	<p>based on promoting and developing military alliances and nuclear deterrence policies, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to exclude completely the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from their military and security doctrines.</p>
<b>Humanitarian Approach to Nuclear Disarmament</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. While recalling the advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the Group believes that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as the only absolute guarantee against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States shall seriously refrain, in any circumstances, from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty firmly believes that the mere possession or any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular, international humanitarian law.</li> </ul>
<b>Nuclear Testing</b>	
<b>General Views on Testing</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) It has further been reaffirmed that these improvements and the development of new types of such weapons violate the commitments undertaken by the nuclear weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.</li> </ul>
<b>CTBT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, para 5) It has further been reaffirmed that these improvements and the development of new types of such weapons violate the commitments undertaken by the nuclear weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.</li> </ul>
<b>Security Assurance</b>	
<b>General Views on Security Assurance</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Group is of the firm belief that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, it is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States that, by becoming parties to the Treaty, have given up the nuclear-weapon option, inter alia, to receive effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that the granting of such assurances by all five nuclear-weapon States parties to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties is a commitment, the fulfilment of which is necessary to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty notes the unilateral statements by each of the nuclear-weapon States, in which they give very limited, conditional and insufficient “security assurances” against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such unilateral statements fail to meet any of the requirements of universal, legally binding, effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that negative security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty would fulfil the undertaking to the States that have voluntarily given up the nuclear weapons option by becoming parties to the Treaty. The Group further believes that legally binding negative security assurances within the</li> </ul>

context of the Treaty would provide an essential benefit to the States parties to the Treaty and to the credibility of the Treaty regime.

- (Page 2, para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that, at successive conferences of Heads of State or Government of the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries and ministerial conferences of the Movement, it has been reiterated that improvements in existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, as envisaged in the Nuclear Posture Review of the United States of America, contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient unilateral statements made by each of the nuclear-weapon States. It has further been reaffirmed that these improvements and the development of new types of such weapons violate the commitments undertaken by the nuclear weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
- (Page 2, para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty is also of the view that, pending the conclusion of negotiations on universal, legally binding, effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, all nuclear-weapon States shall fully respect their existing commitments with regard to negative security assurances and shall extend these assurances, without any condition and discrimination, to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.
- (Page 3, para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that the 2010 Review Conference “reaffirms and recognizes that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances from nuclear-weapon States which could strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime”. The Group, therefore, calls on the 2015 Review Conference, in addition to nuclear disarmament being its highest priority, to fully address this legitimate right as a matter of priority.
- (Page 3, para 12) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses concern that, despite long-standing requests by non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive legally binding negative security assurances, no tangible progress has been made in this regard. The Group therefore stresses that the negotiations on the provision of the effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable, universal, legally binding security assurances by all the nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances should be pursued as a matter of priority and without further delay.
- (Page 3, para 13) In keeping with the above-mentioned position and in accordance with the decision at the 2000 Review Conference, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances for further work to consider legally binding, unconditional, irrevocable and non-discriminatory negative security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.
- (Page 3, para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses concern over the lack of agreement on a number of its key priorities, including, inter alia, the early commencement of negotiations on the provision of effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable, universal, legally binding security assurances by all the nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances, and expresses its determination to continue its collective efforts in pursuing the realization of the aforementioned



	priority in the 2015 review process of the Treaty.
<p><b>Legally Binding Assurances</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Group is of the firm belief that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, it is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States that, by becoming parties to the Treaty, have given up the nuclear-weapon option, inter alia, to receive effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that the granting of such assurances by all five nuclear-weapon States parties to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties is a commitment, the fulfilment of which is necessary to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty notes the unilateral statements by each of the nuclear-weapon States, in which they give very limited, conditional and insufficient “security assurances” against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such unilateral statements fail to meet any of the requirements of universal, legally binding, effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that negative security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty would fulfil the undertaking to the States that have voluntarily given up the nuclear weapons option by becoming parties to the Treaty. The Group further believes that legally binding negative security assurances within the context of the Treaty would provide an essential benefit to the States parties to the Treaty and to the credibility of the Treaty regime.</li> <li>• (Page 2, para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty is also of the view that, pending the conclusion of negotiations on universal, legally binding, effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, all nuclear-weapon States shall fully respect their existing commitments with regard to negative security assurances and shall extend these assurances, without any condition and discrimination, to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 3, para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that the 2010 Review Conference “reaffirms and recognizes that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances from nuclear-weapon States which could strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime”. The Group, therefore, calls on the 2015 Review Conference, in addition to nuclear disarmament being its highest priority, to fully address this legitimate right as a matter of priority.</li> <li>• (Page 3, Para 12) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses concern that, despite long-standing requests by non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive legally binding negative security assurances, no tangible progress has been made in this regard. The Group therefore stresses that the negotiations on the provision of the effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable, universal, legally binding security assurances by all the nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances should be pursued as a matter of priority and without</li> </ul>

	<p>further delay.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses concern over the lack of agreement on a number of its key priorities, including, inter alia, the early commencement of negotiations on the provision of effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable, universal, legally binding security assurances by all the nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances, and expresses its determination to continue its collective efforts in pursuing the realization of the aforementioned priority in the 2015 review process of the Treaty.</li> </ul>
--	---

<p align="center"><b>Working Paper submitted by members of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.17)</b></p>	
<p align="center"><b>General views on NPT</b></p>	
<p><b>General views on NPT</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emphasizes that the Treaty is an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and the key instrument in the efforts to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses, once more, the fundamental importance of the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of the obligations under the Treaty, in particular on nuclear disarmament.</li> <li>• (Page 2, Recommendation 1) To emphasize that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the key international instrument aimed at achieving nuclear disarmament, halting the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and promoting international cooperation and assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.</li> <li>• (Page 2, Recommendation 2) To reaffirm that the full, non-discriminatory and balanced implementation of the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty remains essential for promoting its credibility and effectiveness and in realizing its objectives.</li> <li>• (Page 2, Recommendation 5) To reaffirm that each article of the Treaty is binding on all States parties without exception, and that States parties are required to comply strictly with their legal obligations under the Treaty and to implement those commitments agreed by consensus at the Review Conferences of the Treaty, including, in particular, the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences.</li> <li>• (Page 3, Recommendation 8) To reaffirm the integrity of article IX, paragraph 3, of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the obligation of all States parties not to accord any status or recognition in any form contrary to the provisions of the Treaty to any State not party to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 4, Recommendation 14) To acknowledge that the development of new types of nuclear weapons and the lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies run counter to the letter and spirit of the Treaty and undermine the realization of its objectives.</li> <li>• (Page 8, Recommendation 41) To stress the importance of the early ratification of the existing treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, by all States whose ratification is required for the entry into force of such treaties, as well as the early ratification, by all the nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so, of the relevant protocols to those treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the respective territories of parties to such treaties, as envisaged in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 9, Recommendation 44) To reaffirm that the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East is an essential element and integral part of the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and of the basis on which the Non-Proliferation Treaty was indefinitely extended, without a vote, as well as that the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences reaffirmed the importance of the Resolution and emphasized that the Resolution remains valid until its goals and objectives are achieved.</li> <li>• (Page 10, Recommendation 48) To urge in particular the three co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East to fulfil their responsibility in taking all necessary measures to fully implement it without any further delay and to urge also the conveners of the 2012 Conference — the United Nations Secretary-General, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Russian Federation — in accordance with the mandate entrusted to them by the 2010 Review Conference, to convene the Conference without any further delay in order to avoid further negative repercussions on the credibility of the Treaty, its Review process and the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime as a whole.</li> <li>• (Page 14, Recommendation 69) To underscore that nothing in the Non-Proliferation Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination, including the development of a full national nuclear fuel cycle, and their right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as well as technical cooperation among themselves or international organizations, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world, and that the realization of these rights constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 14, Recommendation 70) To reaffirm that any measure aiming at hampering, fully or partly, the fullest exercise of the inalienable rights under article IV of the Treaty, would seriously jeopardize the delicate balance between rights and obligations of the States parties, in contravention with the Treaty's object and purpose, and would widen the gap between developed and developing countries in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.</li> <li>• (Page 15, Recommendation 75) To reaffirm that any interpretation that is used as a pretext to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Treaty.</li> </ul>
<p><b>States Not Party to the NPT</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 14, Recommendation 67) To call upon all nuclear-weapon States and all States not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards, in order to ensure, inter alia, preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities and resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not parties to the Treaty without exception.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Institutional Issues</b></p>	
<p><b>Strengthen Review Process</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 3) Building on the working papers presented by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the first, second and third sessions of the Preparatory Committee, the Group submits the following recommendations on the implementation of the Treaty as well as the commitments and undertakings agreed by consensus at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, for incorporation into the final document of the 2015 Review Conference. At the same time, the Group may propose further recommendations during the Review</li> </ul>

	<p>Conference.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 11, Recommendation 55) To recommend the establishment of a standing committee composed of members of the Bureau of the 2015 Review Conference to follow up intersessionally the implementation of the recommendations by the Review Conference concerning Israel's prompt accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards, and to submit its reports thereon to the 2020 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings.</li> <li>• (Page 11, Recommendation 56) To recall that the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences stipulated that all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, should report to the President of the Review Conference, as well as the Chairs of its Preparatory Committee meetings, on the steps that they have taken to promote the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution, and accordingly to emphasize the importance of submitting the required reports by all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, as well as that required of the facilitator of the 2012 conference.</li> <li>• (Page 5, Recommendation 24) To establish a standing committee to monitor and verify the fulfilment by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty, as well as the implementation of their unequivocal undertakings agreed at the Review Conferences of the Treaty, and to make recommendations to the Review Conference on the next steps for the full implementation of article VI of the Treaty in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Universality</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, Recommendation 5) To reaffirm that each article of the Treaty is binding on all States parties without exception, and that States parties are required to comply strictly with their legal obligations under the Treaty and to implement those commitments agreed by consensus at the Review Conferences of the Treaty, including, in particular, the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences.</li> <li>• (Page 2, Recommendation 6) To underline that the immediate and unconditional accession to the Treaty by all States not party, as non-nuclear-weapon States, is essential for the full realization of its objectives. All States parties should make every effort to achieve the universality of the Treaty and refrain from taking any actions that could negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 3, Recommendation 7) To strongly call on all States that are not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to accede, without any further delay and precondition, to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Disarmament</b></p>	
<p><b>General Views on Nuclear Disarmament</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses, once more, the fundamental importance of the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of the obligations under the Treaty, in particular on nuclear disarmament. In this context, the Group calls for the full implementation of all commitments and the unequivocal undertakings assumed by the nuclear-weapon States, at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament.</li> <li>• (Page 2, Recommendation 1) To emphasize that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the key international instrument aimed at achieving nuclear disarmament, halting the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.</li> </ul>

- (Page 2, Recommendation 3) To reiterate that the continued existence of nuclear weapons represents a grave threat to humanity and that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as the risk of their unauthorized, unintentional or accidental use.
- (Page 2, Recommendation 4) To stress that the full and effective implementation of all obligations under the Treaty on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, including in particular by the nuclear-weapon States, as well as the implementation of commitments and unequivocal undertakings assumed by them to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, is crucial in promoting international peace and security.
- (Page 3, Recommendation 9) To acknowledge that the strong support for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, expressed at the first-ever high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament, on 26 September 2013, demonstrated that nuclear disarmament remains the highest priority of the international community.
- (Page 3, Recommendation 10) To emphasize that the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States, and that any such assumption is incompatible with the object and purpose of the Treaty, with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.
- (Page 3, Recommendation 11) To express deep concern at the continued lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, which could undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty, as well as at the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament.
- (Page 3, Recommendation 12) To strongly call for the prompt and full implementation of the action plan on nuclear disarmament adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty, particularly the commitments made by the nuclear-weapon States under action 5 to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament.
- (Page 3, Recommendation 13) To stress that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons and that such reductions are undermined by the modernization of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and related infrastructure by the nuclear-weapon States, accordingly, to call upon the nuclear-weapon States to accelerate the reduction in their nuclear arsenals, weapons and their delivery systems, which should involve dismantling them in the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations.
- (Page 4, Recommendation 14) To acknowledge that the development of new types of nuclear weapons and the lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies run counter to the letter and spirit of the Treaty and undermine the realization of its objectives.
- (Page 4, Recommendation 15) To urge the nuclear weapon-States to undertake to prohibit completely nuclear weapons research, and to immediately cease all plans to further invest in modernizing, upgrading, refurbishing or extending the lives or other measures regarding the qualitative improvement of their nuclear weapons and related facilities and to end the production of new types of nuclear weapons in compliance with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, as well as with their commitments under the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty and the action plan on nuclear disarmament, agreed in 2000 and 2010, respectively.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, Recommendation 16) To reaffirm the importance of the application of the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility by nuclear-weapon States in all measures relating to nuclear disarmament.</li> <li>• (Page 4, Recommendation 19) To reaffirm that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular international humanitarian law and that the mere possession of nuclear weapons is inconsistent with the principles of international humanitarian law.</li> <li>• (Page 5, Recommendation 20) To urge the nuclear-weapon States to fully comply with their nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty and completely implement their unequivocal nuclear disarmament commitments, including the 13 practical steps, that were agreed and reaffirmed by consensus at the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Treaty, in order to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 5, Recommendation 21) To reaffirm that all parties have a legal obligation under article VI of the Treaty to pursue in good faith, and to bring to a conclusion, negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.</li> <li>• (Page 5, Recommendation 22) To fully support and call for the full implementation of resolution 68/32 on the follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament, through which the Assembly: (i) called for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction; (ii) decided to convene, no later than 2018, a United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to review the progress made in this regard; and (iii) designated 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons devoted to furthering this objective, including through enhancing public awareness and education about the threat posed to humanity by nuclear weapons and the necessity for their total elimination, in order to mobilize international efforts towards achieving the common goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.</li> <li>• (Page 5, Recommendation 24) To establish a standing committee to monitor and verify the fulfilment by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty, as well as the implementation of their unequivocal undertakings agreed at the Review Conferences of the Treaty, and to make recommendations to the Review Conference on the next steps for the full implementation of article VI of the Treaty in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 5, Recommendation 25) To call for the complete exclusion of the use and the threat of use of nuclear weapons from all the military and security policies, concepts and doctrines, including the “Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization”, which not only set out rationales for the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, but also maintain unjustifiable concepts on international security based on promoting and developing military alliances that pursue nuclear deterrence policies.</li> <li>• (Page 6, Recommendation 26) To underscore the necessity of the full and non-discriminatory implementation of articles I and II of the Treaty by all States parties, in particular nuclear-weapon States, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, including through nuclear weapon-sharing with other States under any kind of security and military arrangements or alliances.</li> </ul>
<b>Role of NWS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, Para 2) In this context, the Group calls for the full implementation of</li> </ul>

all commitments and the unequivocal undertakings assumed by the nuclear-weapon States, at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament.

- (Page 2, Recommendation 4) To stress that the full and effective implementation of all obligations under the Treaty on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, including in particular by the nuclear-weapon States, as well as the implementation of commitments and unequivocal undertakings assumed by them to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, is crucial in promoting international peace and security.
- (Page 3, Recommendation 11) To express deep concern at the continued lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, which could undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty, as well as at the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament.
- (Page 3, Recommendation 12) To strongly call for the prompt and full implementation of the action plan on nuclear disarmament adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty, particularly the commitments made by the nuclear-weapon States under action 5 to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament.
- (Page 3, Recommendation 13) To stress that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons and that such reductions are undermined by the modernization of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and related infrastructure by the nuclear-weapon States, accordingly, to call upon the nuclear-weapon States to accelerate the reduction in their nuclear arsenals, weapons and their delivery systems, which should involve dismantling them in the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations.
- (Page 4, Recommendation 15) To urge the nuclear weapon-States to undertake to prohibit completely nuclear weapons research, and to immediately cease all plans to further invest in modernizing, upgrading, refurbishing or extending the lives or other measures regarding the qualitative improvement of their nuclear weapons and related facilities and to end the production of new types of nuclear weapons in compliance with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, as well as with their commitments under the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty and the action plan on nuclear disarmament, agreed in 2000 and 2010, respectively.
- (Page 4, Recommendation 16) To reaffirm the importance of the application of the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility by nuclear-weapon States in all measures relating to nuclear disarmament.
- (Page 5, Recommendation 20) To urge the nuclear-weapon States to fully comply with their nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty and completely implement their unequivocal nuclear disarmament commitments, including the 13 practical steps, that were agreed and reaffirmed by consensus at the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Treaty, in order to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.
- (Page 5, Recommendation 21) To reaffirm that all parties have a legal obligation under article VI of the Treaty to pursue in good faith, and to bring to a conclusion, negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.
- (Page 5, Recommendation 24) To establish a standing committee to monitor and verify the fulfilment by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty, as well as the implementation of

	<p>their unequivocal undertakings agreed at the Review Conferences of the Treaty, and to make recommendations to the Review Conference on the next steps for the full implementation of article VI of the Treaty in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 5, Recommendation 25) To call for the complete exclusion of the use and the threat of use of nuclear weapons from all the military and security policies, concepts and doctrines, including the “Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization”, which not only set out rationales for the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, but also maintain unjustifiable concepts on international security based on promoting and developing military alliances that pursue nuclear deterrence policies.</li> <li>• (Page 6, Recommendation 26) To underscore the necessity of the full and non-discriminatory implementation of articles I and II of the Treaty by all States parties, in particular nuclear-weapon States, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, including through nuclear weapon-sharing with other States under any kind of security and military arrangements or alliances.</li> </ul>
<b>Fissile Material/FMCT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, Recommendation 17) To support the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, including all practical measures to eliminate the past production and existing stockpiles of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, in an irreversible and verifiable manner, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives, without prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including their past production, existing stockpiles and future production of fissile materials under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comprehensive safeguards.</li> </ul>
<b>NWC (Time bound total elimination)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 5, Recommendation 22) To fully support and call for the full implementation of resolution 68/32 on the follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament, through which the Assembly: (i) called for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction.</li> <li>• (Page 5, Recommendation 23) To emphasize the necessity to start negotiations without further delay on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time</li> </ul>
<b>Outer Space</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, Recommendation 18) To voice concern about the potential for an arms race in outer space and further nuclear proliferation which the implementation of missile defence systems could trigger.</li> </ul>



<p><b>Humanitarian Approach to Disarmament</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● (Page 2, Recommendation 3) To reiterate that the continued existence of nuclear weapons represents a grave threat to humanity and that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as the risk of their unauthorized, unintentional or accidental use.</li> <li>● (Page 4, Recommendation 19) To reaffirm that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular international humanitarian law and that the mere possession of nuclear weapons is inconsistent with the principles of international humanitarian law.</li> <li>● (Page 5, Recommendation 22) To fully support and call for the full implementation of resolution 68/32 on the follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament, through which the Assembly: (iii) designated 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons devoted to furthering this objective, including through enhancing public awareness and education about the threat posed to humanity by nuclear weapons and the necessity for their total elimination, in order to mobilize international efforts towards achieving the common goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.</li> <li>● (Page 7, Recommendation 35) To reaffirm that the mere possession or any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular international humanitarian law, and that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as the only absolute guarantee against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States shall refrain, under all circumstances, from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty, including, inter alia, by the complete exclusion of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from all their military and security concepts, doctrines and policies.</li> <li>● (Page 7, Recommendation 37) To reaffirm that the mere possession or any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular international humanitarian law, and that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as the only absolute guarantee against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States shall refrain, under all circumstances, from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty, including, inter alia, by the complete exclusion of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from all their military and security concepts, doctrines and policies.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Nonproliferation</b></p>	
<p><b>General Views on Nonproliferation</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● (Page 14, Recommendation 67) To call upon all nuclear-weapon States and all States not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards, in order to ensure, inter alia, preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities and resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not parties to the Treaty without exception.</li> <li>● (Page 14, Recommendation 68) To reiterate the commitment of all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to prohibit the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities and resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to</li> </ul>

	<p>the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards.</p>
<b>Export Control</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 15, Recommendation 75) To reaffirm that any interpretation that is used as a pretext to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Treaty, and, therefore, to strongly call for the fulfilment of the obligations under article 4 (2) of the Treaty with regard to exports, to other States parties, of nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes.</li> </ul>
<b>Nuclear Testing</b>	
<b>General Views on Testing</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 6, Recommendation 27) To strongly support a comprehensive ban on all forms of nuclear-weapon tests without exception, as well as any nuclear explosion, and reaffirm the importance of such ban in the realization of objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 6, Recommendation 28) To support the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which is intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all nuclear test explosions, and to stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons and to stress that while the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a practical step on the road to nuclear disarmament, it cannot substitute for the objective of complete elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 6, Recommendation 29) To stress the significance of achieving the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, through its ratification by the remaining States whose ratification is required for its entry into force, including, in particular, by two nuclear-weapon States, thus contributing to the process of nuclear disarmament and towards the enhancement of international peace and security.</li> <li>• (Page 6, Recommendation 30) To stress that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to take the lead in realizing the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and to underline in this regard the commitments of the nuclear-weapon States under the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is envisaged as the first of 13 practical steps, and accordingly calls for the early ratification of this Treaty, in particular by the remaining nuclear-weapon States and those that are not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 6, Recommendation 31) To strongly call for the immediate and unconditional cessation of all nuclear weapon tests and nuclear explosions and to close and dismantle, in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner, any remaining sites for nuclear test explosions and their associated infrastructure.</li> <li>• (Page 7, Recommendation 32) To call upon the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from conducting nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, or nuclear-weapon tests in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapons system, as they would undermine the object and purpose of both the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.</li> </ul>
<b>CTBT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 6, Recommendation 28) To support the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which is intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all nuclear test explosions, and to stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons and to stress that while the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a practical step on the road to nuclear disarmament, it cannot substitute for the objective of complete elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 6, Recommendation 29) To stress the significance of achieving the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, through its ratification by the remaining States whose ratification is required for its entry into force, including, in particular, by two nuclear-weapon States, thus contributing to the process of nuclear disarmament and towards the</li> </ul>

	<p>enhancement of international peace and security.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 6, Recommendation 30) To stress that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to take the lead in realizing the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and to underline in this regard the commitments of the nuclear-weapon States under the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is envisaged as the first of 13 practical steps, and accordingly calls for the early ratification of this Treaty, in particular by the remaining nuclear-weapon States and those that are not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</li> <li>• (Page 6, Recommendation 31) To strongly call for the immediate and unconditional cessation of all nuclear weapon tests and nuclear explosions and to close and dismantle, in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner, any remaining sites for nuclear test explosions and their associated infrastructure.</li> <li>• (Page 7, Recommendation 32) To call upon the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from conducting nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, or nuclear-weapon tests in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapons system, as they would undermine the object and purpose of both the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.</li> </ul>
<b>Security Assurance</b>	
<b>General Views on Security Assurance</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 7, Recommendation 33) To reaffirm that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as well as the risk of their unauthorized, unintentional or accidental use. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, the provision of effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances by all five nuclear-weapon States to all the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances, is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear weapons States parties to the Treaty. The provision of such assurances is a commitment, the early fulfilment of which is necessary to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.</li> <li>• (Page 7, Recommendation 34) To reiterate that military and security policies, concepts and doctrines that allow the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons contravene the existing insufficient negative security assurances provided through unilateral statements made by each of the nuclear-weapon States.</li> <li>• (Page 7, Recommendation 36) To express concern that, despite longstanding requests by non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive universal legally binding negative security assurances, no tangible progress has been made in this regard.</li> <li>• (Page 8, Recommendation 37) To strongly support the immediate commencement of negotiations on effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances, by all nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, pending the realization of the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> </ul>
<b>Legally Binding Security Assurances</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 7, Recommendation 33) To reaffirm that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as well as the risk of their unauthorized, unintentional or accidental use. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, the provision of effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances by all five nuclear-weapon States to all the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances, is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear weapons States parties to the Treaty. The provision of such assurances</li> </ul>

	<p>is a commitment, the early fulfilment of which is necessary to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 7, Recommendation 34) To reiterate that military and security policies, concepts and doctrines that allow the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons contravene the existing insufficient negative security assurances provided through unilateral statements made by each of the nuclear-weapon States.</li> <li>• (Page 7, Recommendation 36) To express concern that, despite longstanding requests by non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive universal legally binding negative security assurances, no tangible progress has been made in this regard.</li> <li>• (Page 8, Recommendation 37) To strongly support the immediate commencement of negotiations on effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances, by all nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, pending the realization of the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons.</li> </ul>
<b>Nuclear Weapons Free Zones</b>	
<p><b>General Views on NWFZs</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 8, Recommendation 38) To reaffirm that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free-zones by the Treaties of Bangkok, Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Semipalatinsk and Tlatelolco, as well as Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status, represent a positive step towards attaining the objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and enhancing international peace and security.</li> <li>• (Page 8, Recommendation 39) To call for further efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in the regions where they do not exist, in particular in the Middle East.</li> <li>• (Page 8, Recommendation 40) To reaffirm that the fulfilment of the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States to provide to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances, is essential in the realization of the objectives of treaties establishing such zones.</li> <li>• (Page 8, Recommendation 41) To stress the importance of the early ratification of the existing treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, by all States whose ratification is required for the entry into force of such treaties, as well as the early ratification, by all the nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so, of the relevant protocols to those treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the respective territories of parties to such treaties, as envisaged in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 8, Recommendation 42) To urge the nuclear-weapon States that, having signed or ratified some of the relevant protocols to a treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, have done so with reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of such treaties and affect the denuclearization status of that zone, to withdraw such reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations and to fulfil their obligations to achieve the objectives of the treaties to establish nuclear weapon-free zones and their protocols.</li> </ul>
<p><b>NWFZ and security assurances</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 8, Recommendation 40) To reaffirm that the fulfilment of the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States to provide to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances, is essential in the realization of the objectives of treaties establishing such zones.</li> </ul>
<p><b>NWFZ in Middle East</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 8, Recommendation 39) To call for further efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in the regions where they do not exist, in particular</li> </ul>

	<p>in the Middle East.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 9, Recommendation 43) To reaffirm the longstanding strong global support for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East without any further delay, as it would greatly enhance international peace and security and contribute to the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world and, in this context, to reaffirm once again the determination of the State parties to the Treaty to extend fullest cooperation and to exert utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment of such a zone.</li> </ul>
<b>Regional Issue: Middle East</b>	
<p><b>General views on NWFZ in Middle East</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 9, Recommendation 43) To reaffirm the longstanding strong global support for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East without any further delay, as it would greatly enhance international peace and security and contribute to the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world and, in this context, to reaffirm once again the determination of the State parties to the Treaty to extend fullest cooperation and to exert utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment of such a zone.</li> <li>• (Page 9, Recommendation 44) To reaffirm that the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East is an essential element and integral part of the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and of the basis on which the Non-Proliferation Treaty was indefinitely extended, without a vote, as well as that the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences reaffirmed the importance of the Resolution and emphasized that the Resolution remains valid until its goals and objectives are achieved.</li> <li>• (Page 9, Recommendation 45) To underscore the importance of the adoption by consensus of a detailed plan of action on “the Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East”, at the 2010 Review Conference, including the convening of a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.</li> <li>• (Page 9, Recommendation 46) To stress the importance of the prompt and full implementation of the 1995 Resolution and the 2010 plan of action on the Middle East, and to underline that, at the 2010 Review Conference, the States parties renewed their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at the prompt implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.</li> <li>• (Page 9, Recommendation 47) To express deep concern over the long delay in the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, and also at the lack of progress in the implementation of the plan of action on the Middle East adopted by the 2010 Review Conference, in particular over the failure of the conveners to convene the conference in 2012 as scheduled, which contradicts and violates the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty, contravenes the letter and spirit of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and has negative repercussions on the credibility of the Treaty, its review process and the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime as a whole, and to express deep concern, in this context, that Israel continues to undermine the convening of the Conference by not declaring its intention to participate in it.</li> <li>• (Page 10, Recommendation 48) To urge in particular the three co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East to fulfil their responsibility in taking all necessary measures to fully implement it without any further delay and to urge also the conveners of the 2012 Conference — the United Nations Secretary-General, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Russian Federation — in accordance with the</li> </ul>

	<p>mandate entrusted to them by the 2010 Review Conference, to convene the Conference without any further delay in order to avoid further negative repercussions on the credibility of the Treaty, its Review process and the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime as a whole.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 10, Recommendation 49) To underscore that efforts related to the 2012 Conference, by its conveners and the Facilitator should be undertaken in accordance with the mandate adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty, and should be focused on convening the Conference at the earliest date in 2014 and on seeking out in advance, by the conveners and the Facilitator of the Conference, credible assurances regarding the unconditional participation of Israel, the only country of the region that has not declared its participation in the Conference and that the Conference should lead, without further delay, to the universality of the Treaty in the Middle East and the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Israel</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 9, Recommendation 47) To express deep concern over the long delay in the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, and also at the lack of progress in the implementation of the plan of action on the Middle East adopted by the 2010 Review Conference, in particular over the failure of the conveners to convene the conference in 2012 as scheduled, which contradicts and violates the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty, contravenes the letter and spirit of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and has negative repercussions on the credibility of the Treaty, its review process and the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime as a whole, and to express deep concern, in this context, that Israel continues to undermine the convening of the Conference by not declaring its intention to participate in it.</li> <li>• (Page 10, Recommendation 49) To underscore that efforts related to the 2012 Conference, by its conveners and the Facilitator should be undertaken in accordance with the mandate adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty, and should be focused on convening the Conference at the earliest date in 2014 and on seeking out in advance, by the conveners and the Facilitator of the Conference, credible assurances regarding the unconditional participation of Israel, the only country of the region that has not declared its participation in the Conference and that the Conference should lead, without further delay, to the universality of the Treaty in the Middle East and the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.</li> <li>• (Page 10, Recommendation 50) To express great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by Israel, which poses a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States, and the fact that Israel continues to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals, and to reaffirm that stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are maintained, particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allows one party to threaten its neighbours and the region, and constitutes a threat to international peace and security; as well as to stress also that the adoption, by the IAEA General Conference, of resolution GC(57)/RES/15 on application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East and resolution GC(53)/RES/17 on Israeli nuclear capabilities is another manifestation of the threat posed by such capabilities to regional and international peace and security, and that Israeli nuclear capabilities remain the main obstacles to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.</li> <li>• (Page 10, Recommendation 51) To reaffirm the call, by the States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and</li> </ul>

	<p>the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, on Israel to accede to the Treaty and to place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards; and, while expressing deep concern that Israel has not yet acceded to the Treaty, to underscore the necessity of the immediate and unconditional accession of Israel to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State, which remains an essential prerequisite for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 11, Recommendation 52) To demand that Israel renounce possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the Treaty without any precondition or further delay as a non-nuclear-weapon State, place promptly all its nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and conduct all its nuclear related activities in full conformity with the non-proliferation Treaty, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty, in particular in the Middle East.</li> <li>• (Page 11, Recommendation 53) Recommendation 53 To stress the need for an unequivocal commitment by each State party to the Treaty to strictly abide by its legal obligations to prohibit the transfer of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material, facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance to and cooperation with Israel in the nuclear fields, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards. States parties to the Treaty should also undertake to disclose all information available to them on the nature and scope of Israeli nuclear capabilities, including information pertaining to previous nuclear transfers to Israel.</li> <li>• (Page 11, Recommendation 54) To reaffirm that the nuclear-weapon States, in conformity with their legal obligations under article I of the Treaty, shall solemnly undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly to Israel, and further undertake not, in any way, to assist, encourage or induce Israel to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices under any circumstances whatsoever.</li> <li>• (Page 11, Recommendation 55) To recommend the establishment of a standing committee composed of members of the Bureau of the 2015 Review Conference to follow up intersessionally the implementation of the recommendations by the Review Conference concerning Israel's prompt accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards, and to submit its reports thereon to the 2020 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings.</li> <li>• (Page 14, Recommendation 68) To reiterate the commitment of all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to prohibit the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities and resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards.</li> </ul>
<p><b>1995 Resolution on the ME</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 9, Recommendation 44) To reaffirm that the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East is an essential element and integral part of the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and of the basis on which the Non-Proliferation Treaty was indefinitely extended, without a vote, as well as that the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences reaffirmed the importance of the Resolution and emphasized that the Resolution remains valid until its goals and objectives are achieved.</li> <li>• (Page 9, Recommendation 45) To underscore the importance of the adoption by</li> </ul>

	<p>consensus of a detailed plan of action on “the Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East”, at the 2010 Review Conference, including the convening of a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 9, Recommendation 46) To stress the importance of the prompt and full implementation of the 1995 Resolution and the 2010 plan of action on the Middle East, and to underline that, at the 2010 Review Conference, the States parties renewed their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at the prompt implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.</li> <li>• (Page 10, Recommendation 48) To urge in particular the three co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East to fulfil their responsibility in taking all necessary measures to fully implement it without any further delay and to urge also the conveners of the 2012 Conference — the United Nations Secretary-General, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Russian Federation — in accordance with the mandate entrusted to them by the 2010 Review Conference, to convene the Conference without any further delay in order to avoid further negative repercussions on the credibility of the Treaty, its Review process and the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime as a whole.</li> <li>• (Page 11, Recommendation 56) To recall that the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences stipulated that all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, should report to the President of the Review Conference, as well as the Chairs of its Preparatory Committee meetings, on the steps that they have taken to promote the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution, and accordingly to emphasize the importance of submitting the required reports by all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, as well as that required of the facilitator of the 2012 conference.</li> </ul>
--	--

**Safeguards and Verification**

<p><b>General Views on Safeguards and Verification</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, Recommendation 17) To support the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, including all practical measures to eliminate the past production and existing stockpiles of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, in an irreversible and verifiable manner, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives, without prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including their past production, existing stockpiles and future production of fissile materials under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comprehensive safeguards.</li> <li>• (Page 10, Recommendation 50) To express great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by Israel, which poses a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States, and the fact that Israel continues to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals, and to reaffirm that stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are maintained, particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allows one party to threaten its neighbours and the region, and constitutes a threat to international peace and security; as well as to stress also that the adoption, by the IAEA General Conference, of resolution GC(57)/RES/15 on application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East and resolution GC(53)/RES/17 on Israeli nuclear capabilities is another manifestation of the</li> </ul>
--	---



threat posed by such capabilities to regional and international peace and security, and that Israeli nuclear capabilities remain the main obstacles to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

- (Page 10, Recommendation 51) To reaffirm the call, by the States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, on Israel to accede to the Treaty and to place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards; and, while expressing deep concern that Israel has not yet acceded to the Treaty, to underscore the necessity of the immediate and unconditional accession of Israel to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State, which remains an essential prerequisite for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.
- (Page 11, Recommendation 52) To demand that Israel renounce possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the Treaty without any precondition or further delay as a non-nuclear-weapon State, place promptly all its nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and conduct all its nuclear related activities in full conformity with the non-proliferation Treaty, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty, in particular in the Middle East.
- (Page 11, Recommendation 53) To stress the need for an unequivocal commitment by each State party to the Treaty to strictly abide by its legal obligations to prohibit the transfer of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material, facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance to and cooperation with Israel in the nuclear fields, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards. States parties to the Treaty should also undertake to disclose all information available to them on the nature and scope of Israeli nuclear capabilities, including information pertaining to previous nuclear transfers to Israel.
- (Page 11, Recommendation 55) To recommend the establishment of a standing committee composed of members of the Bureau of the 2015 Review Conference to follow up intersessionally the implementation of the recommendations by the Review Conference concerning Israel's prompt accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards, and to submit its reports thereon to the 2020 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings.
- (Page 12, Recommendation 57) To reaffirm that safeguards are accepted for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of obligations assumed under the Non-Proliferation Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and accordingly, they shall be implemented without affecting the inalienable rights under article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes.
- (Page 12, Recommendation 58) To stress the importance of achieving the universality of the comprehensive safeguards and to call upon all States parties that have not yet done so to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements as soon as possible with a view to consolidating and enhancing the verification system for the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, through the universalization of comprehensive safeguards and, in this context, to urge all States not parties to the Treaty to accede, without any further delay

and any preconditions and as non-nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements as soon as possible in order to place all their nuclear facilities and activities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards.

- (Page 12, Recommendation 59) To acknowledge that it is fundamental to make a distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures, in order to ensure that such voluntary undertakings should not be considered as legal safeguard obligations.
- (Page 12, Recommendation 60) To reaffirm that IAEA is the sole competent authority responsible for verifying the fulfilment of safeguards obligations assumed by States parties under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation and that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of IAEA, and in this context to reject attempts by any IAEA member State to use the technical cooperation programme of the Agency as a tool for political purposes in violation of its statute and to call upon all States to avoid any pressure or interference in the Agency's activities, especially its verification process, that could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility.
- (Page 12, Recommendation 61) To confirm that article III of the Treaty on verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes in accordance with article IV and, therefore, States parties to the Treaty shall refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.
- (Page 13, Recommendation 62) To emphasize that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented, without exception, through the strict observance of and adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.
- (Page 13, Recommendation 63) To underscore that the principle of balance between the promotional and other statutory activities of the Agency, in particular verification and safeguards-related activities, needs to be strictly observed and that IAEA shall ensure avoiding any ultra vires acts that would jeopardize its integrity and credibility.
- (Page 13, Recommendation 64) To underline the importance of and the need for strict observance by IAEA of its statute and relevant comprehensive safeguards agreements in conducting verification activities and the necessity of IAEA reporting on the implementation of safeguards being factual and technically based and reflecting appropriate reference to the relevant provisions of safeguards agreements.
- (Page 13, Recommendation 65) To reiterate the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards, including reporting, in accordance with the Agency's statute and safeguards agreements and the need for the regime for the protection of such confidential information to be significantly strengthened; and to urge, in this regard, the IAEA Director General to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of classified safeguards information and to continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of classified safeguards information

	<p>within the secretariat.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 13, Recommendation 66) To support furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide nuclear disarmament and the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to stress the statutory role of IAEA on nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons; to recognize, in this context, the Agency capability of verifying nuclear disarmament agreements; and to call for the full implementation of action 16 of the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference and urge the nuclear-weapon States to commit to declaring to IAEA all weapon-grade fissile material and to place such material, as soon as practicable, under the supervision of the Agency or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the use of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.</li> <li>• (Page 14, Recommendation 67) To call upon all nuclear-weapon States and all States not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards, in order to ensure, inter alia, preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities and resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not parties to the Treaty without exception.</li> <li>• (Page 14, Recommendation 68) To reiterate the commitment of all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to prohibit the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities and resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards.</li> </ul>
IAEA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 4, Recommendation 17) To support the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, including all practical measures to eliminate the past production and existing stockpiles of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, in an irreversible and verifiable manner, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives, without prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including their past production, existing stockpiles and future production of fissile materials under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comprehensive safeguards.</li> <li>• (Page 10, Recommendation 50) To express great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by Israel, which poses a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States, and the fact that Israel continues to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals, and to reaffirm that stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are maintained, particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allows one party to threaten its neighbours and the region, and constitutes a threat to international peace and security; as well as to stress also that the adoption, by the IAEA General Conference, of resolution GC(57)/RES/15 on application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East and resolution GC(53)/RES/17 on Israeli nuclear capabilities is another manifestation of the</li> </ul>

threat posed by such capabilities to regional and international peace and security, and that Israeli nuclear capabilities remain the main obstacles to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

- (Page 10, Recommendation 51) To reaffirm the call, by the States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, on Israel to accede to the Treaty and to place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards; and, while expressing deep concern that Israel has not yet acceded to the Treaty, to underscore the necessity of the immediate and unconditional accession of Israel to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State, which remains an essential prerequisite for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.
- (Page 11, Recommendation 52) To demand that Israel renounce possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the Treaty without any precondition or further delay as a non-nuclear-weapon State, place promptly all its nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and conduct all its nuclear related activities in full conformity with the non-proliferation Treaty, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty, in particular in the Middle East.
- (Page 11, Recommendation 53) Recommendation 53 To stress the need for an unequivocal commitment by each State party to the Treaty to strictly abide by its legal obligations to prohibit the transfer of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material, facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance to and cooperation with Israel in the nuclear fields, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards. States parties to the Treaty should also undertake to disclose all information available to them on the nature and scope of Israeli nuclear capabilities, including information pertaining to previous nuclear transfers to Israel.
- (Page 11, Recommendation 55) To recommend the establishment of a standing committee composed of members of the Bureau of the 2015 Review Conference to follow up intersessionally the implementation of the recommendations by the Review Conference concerning Israel's prompt accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards, and to submit its reports thereon to the 2020 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings.
- (Page 12, Recommendation 57) To reaffirm that safeguards are accepted for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of obligations assumed under the Non-Proliferation Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons.
- (Page 12, Recommendation 58) To stress the importance of achieving the universality of the comprehensive safeguards and to call upon all States parties that have not yet done so to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements as soon as possible with a view to consolidating and enhancing the verification system for the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, through the universalization of comprehensive safeguards and, in this context, to urge all States not parties to the Treaty to accede, without any further delay and any preconditions and as non-nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements as soon as possible in order to place all their nuclear facilities and activities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards.
- (Page 12, Recommendation 59) To acknowledge that it is fundamental to make a distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building

measures, in order to ensure that such voluntary undertakings should not be considered as legal safeguard obligations.

- (Page 12, Recommendation 60) To reaffirm that IAEA is the sole competent authority responsible for verifying the fulfilment of safeguards obligations assumed by States parties under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation and that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of IAEA, and in this context to reject attempts by any IAEA member State to use the technical cooperation programme of the Agency as a tool for political purposes in violation of its statute and to call upon all States to avoid any pressure or interference in the Agency's activities, especially its verification process, that could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility.
- (Page 13, Recommendation 62) To emphasize that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented, without exception, through the strict observance of and adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.
- (Page 13, Recommendation 63) To underscore that the principle of balance between the promotional and other statutory activities of the Agency, in particular verification and safeguards-related activities, needs to be strictly observed and that IAEA shall ensure avoiding any ultra vires acts that would jeopardize its integrity and credibility.
- (Page 13, Recommendation 64) To underline the importance of and the need for strict observance by IAEA of its statute and relevant comprehensive safeguards agreements in conducting verification activities and the necessity of IAEA reporting on the implementation of safeguards being factual and technically based and reflecting appropriate reference to the relevant provisions of safeguards agreements.
- (Page 13, Recommendation 65) To reiterate the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards, including reporting, in accordance with the Agency's statute and safeguards agreements and the need for the regime for the protection of such confidential information to be significantly strengthened; and to urge, in this regard, the IAEA Director General to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of classified safeguards information and to continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of classified safeguards information within the secretariat.
- (Page 13, Recommendation 66) To support furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide nuclear disarmament and the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to stress the statutory role of IAEA on nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons; to recognize, in this context, the Agency capability of verifying nuclear disarmament agreements; and to call for the full implementation of action 16 of the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference and urge the nuclear-weapon States to commit to declaring to IAEA all weapon-grade fissile material and to place such material, as soon as practicable, under the supervision of the Agency or other relevant international verification and

	<p>arrangements for the use of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 14, Recommendation 67) To call upon all nuclear-weapon States and all States not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards, in order to ensure, inter alia, preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities and resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not parties to the Treaty without exception.</li> <li>• (Page 14, Recommendation 68) To reiterate the commitment of all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to prohibit the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities and resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards.</li> </ul>
<b>Peaceful Uses</b>	
<p><b>General Views on Peaceful Uses</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 1, para 1) The Group further underscores that the realization of the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 2, Recommendation 1) To emphasize that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the key international instrument aimed at achieving nuclear disarmament, halting the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and promoting international cooperation and assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.</li> <li>• (Page 4, Recommendation 17) To support the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, including all practical measures to eliminate the past production and existing stockpiles of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, in an irreversible and verifiable manner, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives, without prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including their past production, existing stockpiles and future production of fissile materials under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comprehensive safeguards.</li> <li>• (Page 11, Recommendation 54) To reaffirm that the nuclear-weapon States, in conformity with their legal obligations under article I of the Treaty, shall solemnly undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly to Israel, and further undertake not, in any way, to assist, encourage or induce Israel to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices under any circumstances whatsoever.</li> <li>• (Page 12, Recommendation 57) To reaffirm that safeguards are accepted for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of obligations assumed under the Non-Proliferation Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and accordingly, they shall be implemented without affecting the inalienable rights under article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or</li> </ul>

international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes.

- (Page 12, Recommendation 61) To confirm that article III of the Treaty on verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes in accordance with article IV and, therefore, States parties to the Treaty shall refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.
- (Page 14, Recommendation 67) To call upon all nuclear-weapon States and all States not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards, in order to ensure, inter alia, preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities and resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not parties to the Treaty without exception.
- (Page 14, Recommendation 68) To reiterate the commitment of all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to prohibit the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities and resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards.
- (Page 14, Recommendation 69) To underscore that nothing in the Non-Proliferation Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination, including the development of a full national nuclear fuel cycle, and their right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as well as technical cooperation among themselves or international organizations, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world, and that the realization of these rights constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty.
- (Page 14, Recommendation 70) To reaffirm that any measure aiming at hampering, fully or partly, the fullest exercise of the inalienable rights under article IV of the Treaty, would seriously jeopardize the delicate balance between rights and obligations of the States parties, in contravention with the Treaty's object and purpose, and would widen the gap between developed and developing countries in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
- (Page 15, Recommendation 71) To reaffirm the sovereign right of each State party to define its national energy and fuel-cycle policies that, inter alia, includes an inalienable right to develop, for peaceful purposes, a full national nuclear fuel cycle, and that such rights of State parties, including expanding their own production capacity in the nuclear fuel cycle, shall not, in any way, be compromised or diminished, including as a result of any possible decision in the context of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.
- (Page 15, Recommendation 72) To underline that concerns related to nuclear proliferation shall not, in any way, restrict the inalienable right of any State party to develop all aspects of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, without discrimination, as stipulated in article IV of the Treaty, and,

accordingly, to call upon the States parties to refrain from any action that would limit certain peaceful nuclear activities on the grounds of their “sensitivity”, as the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology, equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their sensitivity but stipulates only that such technology, equipment and material must be subject to IAEA comprehensive safeguards.

- (Page 15, Recommendation 73) To express concern that certain unilateral, politically motivated restrictions and/or limitations seriously hamper the exercise by developing States parties of their inalienable rights to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
- (Page 15, Recommendation 74) To express concern that some States parties have set conditions that limit the export of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to developing States parties, such as concluding and bringing into force an additional protocol. Any such conditions contravenes article IV of the Treaty, which is explicit in that regard, leaving no room for reinterpretation or setting conditions for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by non-nuclear-weapon States.
- (Page 15, Recommendation 75) To reaffirm that any interpretation that is used as a pretext to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Treaty, and, therefore, to strongly call for the fulfilment of the obligations under article 4 (2) of the Treaty with regard to exports, to other States parties, of nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes.
- (Page 15, Recommendation 76) To emphasize that non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States and should ensure and facilitate, to the fullest extent possible, the access by developing countries parties to the Treaty to nuclear material, equipment or technology for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
- (Page 16, Recommendation 77) To express deep concern over the ability of certain States not party to the Treaty to obtain, in particular from some nuclear-weapon States, nuclear materials, technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons, and to strongly call for the enforcement, without exception or further delay, of the total and complete prohibition, as stipulated in the Treaty, of the transfer of nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty.
- (Page 16, Recommendation 78) To underscore the importance of IAEA assistance in particular to its developing member States in planning for and using nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, and the need for strengthening this role of the Agency, and, in this regard, to call on IAEA to ensure a balance between technical cooperation and its other activities.
- (Page 16, Recommendation 79) To stress that the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, as the main vehicle for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, should continue to be formulated and implemented in accordance with the statute of IAEA and the agreed guiding principles as contained in INFCIRC/267 and the decisions of IAEA policymaking organs, as well as under preferential and concessional terms; and to underline that the current guidelines and criteria for the selection of technical cooperation projects are robust and effective, and that no additional criteria should be imposed for fulfilling the above-mentioned objectives.
- (Page 16, Recommendation 81) To stress the importance of full compliance, by



	<p>the developed countries parties to the Treaty, with the obligations under article IV (2) of the Treaty, which stipulates that parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world, and to underscore, in this regard, that, as a fundamental principle, in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment shall be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, particularly taking into account the needs of developing countries.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 17, Recommendation 84) To emphasize that measures and initiatives aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and nuclear security must not be used as a pretext or leverage to violate, deny or restrict the inalienable right of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.</li> <li>• (Page 17, Recommendation 85) To strongly emphasize that any decision in the context of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle must be consistent with the IAEA statute and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, without any prejudice to the inalienable right of each State party to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy and sciences, in all their aspects, for peaceful purposes, and, if it so decides, to develop a full national nuclear fuel cycle, according to article IV of the Treaty; to underscore that such decisions shall be made by consensus following wide, integral, comprehensive and transparent multilateral consultations, with the participation, and taking into account the interests of all IAEA member States, as well as all technical, legal, political and economic implications and complexities surrounding this sensitive matter; and to underline that every effort should be made to ensure that any related mechanism is sustainable, non-discriminatory, predictable, transparent and economically viable, under the auspices of IAEA.</li> <li>• (Page 18, Recommendation 85) To reaffirm the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities — operational or under construction — poses a great danger to human lives and the environment, and constitutes a grave violation of international law, the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and resolutions of IAEA; to recognize the need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument prohibiting attacks and the threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and, pending the conclusion of such an instrument, to strongly urge all States to refrain from attacks or the threat of attacks on such facilities.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Access to/transfer of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 2, Recommendation 1) To emphasize that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the key international instrument aimed at achieving nuclear disarmament, halting the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and promoting international cooperation and assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.</li> <li>• (Page 12, Recommendation 57) To reaffirm that safeguards are accepted for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of obligations assumed under the Non-Proliferation Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and accordingly, they shall be implemented without affecting the inalienable rights under article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes.</li> </ul>

- (Page 12, Recommendation 61) To confirm that article III of the Treaty on verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes in accordance with article IV and, therefore, States parties to the Treaty shall refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.
- (Page 14, Recommendation 67) To call upon all nuclear-weapon States and all States not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards, in order to ensure, inter alia, preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities and resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not parties to the Treaty without exception.
- (Page 14, Recommendation 68) To reiterate the commitment of all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to prohibit the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities and resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards.
- (Page 14, Recommendation 69) To underscore that nothing in the Non-Proliferation Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination, including the development of a full national nuclear fuel cycle, and their right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as well as technical cooperation among themselves or international organizations, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world, and that the realization of these rights constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty.
- (Page 14, Recommendation 70) To reaffirm that any measure aiming at hampering, fully or partly, the fullest exercise of the inalienable rights under article IV of the Treaty, would seriously jeopardize the delicate balance between rights and obligations of the States parties, in contravention with the Treaty's object and purpose, and would widen the gap between developed and developing countries in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
- (Page 15, Recommendation 72) To underline that concerns related to nuclear proliferation shall not, in any way, restrict the inalienable right of any State party to develop all aspects of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, without discrimination, as stipulated in article IV of the Treaty, and, accordingly, to call upon the States parties to refrain from any action that would limit certain peaceful nuclear activities on the grounds of their "sensitivity", as the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology, equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their sensitivity but stipulates only that such technology, equipment and material must be subject to IAEA comprehensive safeguards.
- (Page 15, Recommendation 73) To express concern that certain unilateral, politically motivated restrictions and/or limitations seriously hamper the exercise by developing States parties of their inalienable rights to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including

	<p>to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 15, Recommendation 74) To express concern that some States parties have set conditions that limit the export of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to developing States parties, such as concluding and bringing into force an additional protocol. Any such conditions contravenes article IV of the Treaty, which is explicit in that regard, leaving no room for reinterpretation or setting conditions for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by non-nuclear-weapon States.</li> <li>• (Page 15, Recommendation 75) To reaffirm that any interpretation that is used as a pretext to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Treaty, and, therefore, to strongly call for the fulfilment of the obligations under article 4 (2) of the Treaty with regard to exports, to other States parties, of nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes.</li> <li>• (Page 15, Recommendation 76) To emphasize that non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States and should ensure and facilitate, to the fullest extent possible, the access by developing countries parties to the Treaty to nuclear material, equipment or technology for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 16, Recommendation 77) To express deep concern over the ability of certain States not party to the Treaty to obtain, in particular from some nuclear-weapon States, nuclear materials, technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons, and to strongly call for the enforcement, without exception or further delay, of the total and complete prohibition, as stipulated in the Treaty, of the transfer of nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty.</li> <li>• (Page 16, Recommendation 78) To underscore the importance of IAEA assistance in particular to its developing member States in planning for and using nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, and the need for strengthening this role of the Agency, and, in this regard, to call on IAEA to ensure a balance between technical cooperation and its other activities.</li> <li>• (Page 16, Recommendation 81) To stress the importance of full compliance, by the developed countries parties to the Treaty, with the obligations under article IV (2) of the Treaty, which stipulates that parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world, and to underscore, in this regard, that, as a fundamental principle, in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment shall be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, particularly taking into account the needs of developing countries.</li> <li>• (Page 17, Recommendation 84) To emphasize that measures and initiatives aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and nuclear security must not be used as a pretext or leverage to violate, deny or restrict the inalienable right of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.</li> </ul>
<p><b>States Not Party to the NPT</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 16, Recommendation 77) To express deep concern over the ability of certain States not party to the Treaty to obtain, in particular from some nuclear-weapon States, nuclear materials, technology and know-how to develop nuclear</li> </ul>

	<p>weapons, and to strongly call for the enforcement, without exception or further delay, of the total and complete prohibition, as stipulated in the Treaty, of the transfer of nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty.</p>
<p><b>IAEA</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 16, Recommendation 78) To underscore the importance of IAEA assistance in particular to its developing member States in planning for and using nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, and the need for strengthening this role of the Agency, and, in this regard, to call on IAEA to ensure a balance between technical cooperation and its other activities.</li> <li>• (Page 16, Recommendation 79) To stress that the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, as the main vehicle for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, should continue to be formulated and implemented in accordance with the statute of IAEA and the agreed guiding principles as contained in INFCIRC/267 and the decisions of IAEA policymaking organs, as well as under preferential and concessional terms; and to underline that the current guidelines and criteria for the selection of technical cooperation projects are robust and effective, and that no additional criteria should be imposed for fulfilling the above-mentioned objectives.</li> <li>• (Page 16, Recommendation 80) To strongly reject any attempt by any State to politicize the work of IAEA, including the use of its Technical Cooperation Programme as a tool for political purposes, which would be in violation of the statute of the Agency.</li> <li>• (Page 17, Recommendation 82) To recognize that the primary responsibility for nuclear safety rests with individual States, to reaffirm the central role of IAEA in nuclear safety-related matters, including through the establishment of nuclear safety standards, owing to its mandatory functions and longstanding expertise; and to stress that any possible review of nuclear safety standards at the global level must be carried out within IAEA in an inclusive, gradual and transparent manner, with the guidance and participation of and in consultation with all member States, that shall incorporate the views of all member States.</li> <li>• (Page 17, Recommendation 83) To recognize that the primary responsibility for nuclear security rests with individual States and that IAEA has the mandate, the authority and the central role in the area of nuclear security; and to reaffirm that any process to develop multilateral norms, guidelines or rules on nuclear security should be pursued within the framework of IAEA, should be driven by Member States, should be negotiated multilaterally in a gradual, inclusive and transparent manner incorporating the views of all Member States and should not encroach upon the mandate, competence and central role of IAEA in the area of nuclear security.</li> <li>• (Page 17, Recommendation 85) To strongly emphasize that any decision in the context of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle must be consistent with the IAEA statute and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, without any prejudice to the inalienable right of each State party to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy and sciences, in all their aspects, for peaceful purposes, and, if it so decides, to develop a full national nuclear fuel cycle, according to article IV of the Treaty; to underscore that such decisions shall be made by consensus following wide, integral, comprehensive and transparent multilateral consultations, with the participation, and taking into account the interests of all IAEA member States, as well as all technical, legal, political and economic implications and complexities surrounding this sensitive matter; and to underline that every effort should be made to ensure that any related mechanism is sustainable, non-discriminatory, predictable, transparent and economically viable, under the auspices of IAEA.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Assurance of</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 14, Recommendation 69) To underscore that nothing in the Non-</li> </ul>

<p><b>Supply/Multilateral Approach to Nuclear Fuel Supply</b></p>	<p>Proliferation Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination, including the development of a full national nuclear fuel cycle.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 15, Recommendation 71) To reaffirm the sovereign right of each State party to define its national energy and fuel-cycle policies that, inter alia, includes an inalienable right to develop, for peaceful purposes, a full national nuclear fuel cycle, and that such rights of State parties, including expanding their own production capacity in the nuclear fuel cycle, shall not, in any way, be compromised or diminished, including as a result of any possible decision in the context of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.</li> <li>• (Page 17, Recommendation 85) To strongly emphasize that any decision in the context of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle must be consistent with the IAEA statute and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, without any prejudice to the inalienable right of each State party to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy and sciences, in all their aspects, for peaceful purposes, and, if it so decides, to develop a full national nuclear fuel cycle, according to article IV of the Treaty; to underscore that such decisions shall be made by consensus following wide, integral, comprehensive and transparent multilateral consultations, with the participation, and taking into account the interests of all IAEA member States, as well as all technical, legal, political and economic implications and complexities surrounding this sensitive matter; and to underline that every effort should be made to ensure that any related mechanism is sustainable, non-discriminatory, predictable, transparent and economically viable, under the auspices of IAEA.</li> <li>• (Page 17, Recommendation 86) To reiterate a need for caution in thoroughly addressing the associated technical, legal and economic aspects, as well as the underlying political dimensions of the issue of assurances of nuclear fuel supply, and to stress the necessity to ensure that any further consideration of this issue is based on a coherent and comprehensive conceptual framework that adequately addresses the views and concerns of all States parties and that any proposal that eventually emerges in this NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.17 18/18 14-28544 regard is in full accordance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and takes into account the respective legal obligations of States parties and the principle of non-discrimination.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Nuclear safety and security</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, Recommendation 7) To strongly call on all States that are not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to accede, without any further delay and precondition, to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.</li> <li>• (Page 17, Recommendation 82) To recognize that the primary responsibility for nuclear safety rests with individual States, to reaffirm the central role of IAEA in nuclear safety-related matters, including through the establishment of nuclear safety standards, owing to its mandatory functions and longstanding expertise; and to stress that any possible review of nuclear safety standards at the global level must be carried out within IAEA in an inclusive, gradual and transparent manner, with the guidance and participation of and in consultation with all member States, that shall incorporate the views of all member States.</li> <li>• (Page 17, Recommendation 83) To recognize that the primary responsibility for nuclear security rests with individual States and that IAEA has the mandate, the authority and the central role in the area of nuclear security; and to reaffirm that any process to develop multilateral norms, guidelines or rules on nuclear security should be pursued within the framework of IAEA, should be driven by Member States, should be negotiated multilaterally in a gradual, inclusive and transparent manner incorporating the views of all Member States and should not encroach upon the mandate, competence and central role of IAEA in the</li> </ul>

	<p>area of nuclear security.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 17, Recommendation 84) To emphasize that measures and initiatives aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and nuclear security must not be used as a pretext or leverage to violate, deny or restrict the inalienable right of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.</li> <li>• (Page 18, Recommendation 85) To reaffirm the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities — operational or under construction — poses a great danger to human lives and the environment, and constitutes a grave violation of international law, the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and resolutions of IAEA; to recognize the need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument prohibiting attacks and the threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and, pending the conclusion of such an instrument, to strongly urge all States to refrain from attacks or the threat of attacks on such facilities.</li> </ul>
<b>Other Fora</b>	
<b>Conference on Disarmament</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Page 3, Recommendation 11) To express deep concern at the continued lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, which could undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty, as well as at the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament.</li> <li>• (Page 4, Recommendation 17) To support the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, including all practical measures to eliminate the past production and existing stockpiles of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, in an irreversible and verifiable manner, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives, without prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including their past production, existing stockpiles and future production of fissile materials under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comprehensive safeguards.</li> </ul>