

**Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review  
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on  
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/SR.2  
16 June 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

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Third session

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 2nd MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,  
on Monday, 10 May 1999, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. REYES RODRÍGUEZ (Colombia)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

GENERAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS (continued)

1. Mr. WIBISONO (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned Countries and other States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), introduced the working paper presented by the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries parties to the Treaty (NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/1, annex), which addressed various aspects related to the NPT that were of paramount importance to the meetings of the Preparatory Committee and to the 2000 Review Conference. The paper took the form of draft recommendations to be considered by the Preparatory Committee.

2. Ms. ESHMAMBETOVA (Kyrgyzstan) said that it was important to bear in mind the three decisions and the resolution on the Middle East adopted by consensus at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and to remember that the review process involved not only retrospective examination of NPT implementation, but also the identification of practical measures for achieving full implementation in the future. Her delegation regretted the confusion caused by delaying the current session of the Preparatory Committee and reaffirmed its support for the venue and dates of the Sixth Review Conference agreed to during the first session of the Preparatory Committee. She hoped that the current session would result in consensus on a set of substantive recommendations to the Review Conference which would make possible a discussion of the full range of critical disarmament and non-proliferation issues, including the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.

3. Regrettably, the high expectations that had followed the 1995 Conference had been only partially fulfilled. The nuclear tests held in South Asia in May 1998 had demonstrated the importance of universal ratification of the NPT, and she hoped that States which had not yet signed the Treaty would do so in order to facilitate its entry into force. She welcomed the progress in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and South-East Asia. The geographical expansion of such zones had made them stronger and more widely recognized instruments of non-proliferation and disarmament and had strengthened the security of States members. She also welcomed the significant progress towards the establishment of such a zone in Central Asia and, in that regard, she attached particular importance to the General Assembly's adoption of resolution 53/77 A. Regional approaches were particularly important at a time when the non-proliferation regime faced serious challenges.

4. She drew attention to the continued efforts, under United Nations auspices, of the working group on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. The group, which included representatives of the five Central Asian States, the five nuclear weapon States, the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), had met in Bishkek in July 1998 and had made significant progress towards the drafting of such a treaty. It would welcome the continued assistance of States and international organizations and hoped that the treaty would be ready for signature before the Review Conference to be held in 2000.

5. However, those encouraging steps were insufficient to guarantee the continued integrity of the NPT. Regrettably, the slow pace of arms reductions suggested that the nuclear-weapon States were not pursuing their disarmament obligations in good faith. In order to eliminate that perception, those States should reaffirm and fulfil their commitment to nuclear disarmament as specified in article VI of the NPT. In particular, they should further reduce and then eliminate their stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons, increase transparency with respect to such weapons, negotiate further strategic arms reductions, take all ballistic missiles off alert, negotiate a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive purposes and ensure further reductions in and improved safeguarding of stockpiles of weapons-usable fissile material.

6. Her Government strongly endorsed the IAEA strengthened safeguards system. It had signed a safeguards agreement with the Agency on 18 March 1998 and hoped to negotiate an additional protocol to that agreement in the future. The process of disarmament required strict procedures for the safe handling, transport, storage and disposal of sensitive nuclear material. Attention must also be given to strengthening export controls and mitigating the environmental consequences of past and present nuclear weapons programmes. There had been exceptional instances in which environmental consequences had resulted from uranium mining and associated nuclear fuel-cycle activities in the production of nuclear weapons. That often-overlooked environmental problem, caused by nuclear weapons production and borne by Kyrgyzstan and other States, was another reason why her Government attached such importance to the work of the Preparatory Committee. She called on all Governments and international organizations with expertise in the field of clean-up and disposal of radioactive contaminants to consider giving appropriate assistance, when requested, in affected areas.

7. If the NPT regime was to meet the challenges of the coming century, States parties to the Treaty must lay aside suspicion and fear and use the decisions taken at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference as the basis for concrete action to ensure implementation of the Treaty. The events of the past year showed that unless that opportunity was seized, the effectiveness and the integrity of the NPT regime would be placed at risk.

8. Mr. WULF (United States of America) said that although there was no consensus on what the strengthened review process meant, what it should achieve and whether it had been a success, those different interpretations were not mutually exclusive and it was neither useful nor necessary to seek to identify a single common vision. Rather, it should be recognized that the process had been, and would continue to be, defined not by drafting exercises but through concrete actions. For example, the strengthened review had resulted in an unprecedented, in-depth consideration of substantive issues, proposals and recommendations. That process had been productive, and the prospects for the 2000 Review Conference remained good.

9. His delegation would work to ensure that efforts to implement the NPT since 1995 were recorded by consensus at the Review Conference in both a traditional review document and a forward-looking document. However, it would not measure the success of the Conference by whether such consensus was reached; rather, it

hoped for a healthy debate on past implementation and future strengthening of the Treaty.

10. He hoped that the Preparatory Committee would come to an agreement on how the Review Conference should be organized. In his delegation's view, the President of the Review Conference should undertake wide-ranging consultations in order to gain a sense of priorities and ascertain perspectives of the parties; draw on the work done by the Main Committees; and keep all participants informed of his findings through informal plenary meetings or General Committee sessions. There were also procedural questions to be addressed regarding, inter alia, the rules of procedure, agenda, background documentation and leadership of the Review Conference and the allocation of items to the Main Committees. The Preparatory Committee should also endeavour to prepare substantive recommendations for consideration at the Review Conference. His delegation supported the use of the Chairman's working paper (NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/35) as the basis for the Preparatory Committee's work and hoped that greater consensus on substantive issues could be reached; however, even the parts of the working paper on which there was no agreement would provide a useful compendium of substantive ideas for the work of the Review Conference.

11. It had been almost a year since the nuclear weapons tests carried out by India and Pakistan. In the weeks following those tests, nearly all of the world's Governments had expressed their strong condemnation thereof and their commitment to the global non-proliferation regime, and he encouraged delegations to continue to do so during the current session of the Preparatory Committee.

12. Lastly, he said that the Treaty review process must focus on all issues in a balanced manner, but that delegations must approach their work with a healthy dose of realism and avoid assuming that the NPT process could achieve what had not been achievable elsewhere.

13. Ms. SCHICK (Australia) said that her Government considered the NPT to be the single most important multilateral agreement underpinning global peace and security. Her delegation believed that the nature of the product or outcome of the 2000 Review Conference must be determined before its content or substance could be considered.

14. Decision 1 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference provided sound guidance on what the 2000 Review Conference outcomes should be: "... Review Conferences should look forward as well as back. They should evaluate the results of the period they are reviewing, including the implementation of undertakings of the States parties under the Treaty, and identify the areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future. Review Conferences should also address specifically what might be done to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and to achieve its universality" (NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.1, para. 7). Thus, it would be appropriate for the Preparatory Committee and the Review Conference to focus on two documents: a review document examining implementation of the Treaty for the period 1995-2000, and a forward-looking document identifying ways to achieve further progress in that implementation.

15. Since the end of the cold war, nuclear disarmament had proceeded at an impressive rate. Her Government encouraged all nuclear-weapon States to continue that trend and, in particular, looked forward to the Russian Federation's early ratification of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) and the commencement of detailed negotiations on START III. During the current year, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands and South Africa had ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), bringing to 17 the number of specific States on the list of 44 whose ratification was required in order for the Treaty to enter into force. Her Government welcomed those ratifications and the decisions by the Governments of the Republic of Korea and Poland to ratify that Treaty in the near future and urged other countries to do so as quickly as possible. However, it was extremely disappointing that the Conference on Disarmament had made so little progress towards the development of a fissile material cut-off treaty which would ban any further production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons use. She hoped that the Conference would begin substantive negotiations to that end in the near future.

16. The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan and the developments in Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea over the past five years had cast a shadow on the international community's progress in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and working towards their elimination. She suggested that the Preparatory Committee should consider making an appropriate recommendation to the Review Conference on those issues. She hoped that the Review Conference would also consider further steps to be taken with a view to universal ratification of the NPT; the conclusion of additional comprehensive safeguards agreements, the entry into force of a significant number of additional protocols thereto and continued support for the work of IAEA in strengthening the safeguards system; further progress towards the consolidation of existing nuclear-weapons-free zones and the establishment of new zones; significant progress towards universal acceptance of the nuclear export control regimes as a necessary and legitimate mechanism for effective implementation of Treaty obligations; and a strong reaffirmation of support for IAEA and its role as the agency responsible for verifying the fulfilment of States parties' obligations under the Treaty and for facilitating the further development of applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

17. Mr. HAYASHI (Japan) said that the 2000 Review Conference would provide the first opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of the strengthened review process introduced at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference on the indefinite extension of the NPT. The results of that evaluation and the Conference's response to it would largely determine the credibility and effectiveness of the NPT as a mechanism for achieving nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Despite the accession by 187 countries to the NPT regime, the Treaty could not claim total universality. Indeed, the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan the previous year had clearly demonstrated that shortcoming. The 2000 Review Conference was expected to respond unequivocally to the challenge posed by those tests; failure to do so could seriously weaken cohesion among the States parties and threaten the regime's viability. Thus, the Conference would to a great extent determine the future of the Treaty and all States parties should respond to the challenges with a sense of urgency and do their utmost to make the Conference a success.

18. Drawing attention to paragraph 7 of the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty, he welcomed the consensus that seemed to be emerging on producing a forward-looking document containing new principles and objectives, and a document reviewing the implementation of the NPT regime over the past five years. Referring to a working paper submitted by his delegation at the first session of the Preparatory Committee, he said that the document on new principles and objectives should present fresh goals to be achieved in the subsequent five or more years. The results of reviews conducted by previous conferences had not been encouraging owing to the failure to achieve consensus of views on the evaluation of the Treaty's implementation. However, with the introduction in 1995 of new tools for measuring progress in the implementation of the Treaty, deliberations in 2000 were expected to be conducted in a smoother and more objective manner than had been the case in past reviews. It would be preferable if the review document was adopted by consensus. However, should consensus not be possible, divergent views could be presented in the document as a compromise. On the other hand, it was essential that the document on new principles and objectives should be adopted by consensus. In his delegation's judgement, the 2000 Review Conference must produce three documents: a new set of principles and objectives, a review of the implementation of the Treaty over the past five years and an agreement on the future review process.

19. The results of efforts during the two previous sessions to produce agreed documents on substantive issues for submission to the 2000 Review Conference had not been commensurate with the time and energy invested. Attempts to come up with consensus language almost inevitably ended up reproducing more or less the same language as in previous texts. Even if consensus language was achieved at the current session, it might be necessary at the Review Conference to review such language to ensure that it reflected any new developments in the international situation. Furthermore, a number of delegations, including his own, might wish to reconsider a consensus text from a broader political perspective. His delegation therefore questioned the advisability of spending most of the Committee's time in trying to achieve a consensus text on substantive issues to be submitted to the Review Conference as recommendations. In view of the limited time available to the Committee, document NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/35, together with the proposals made at the current session, should be sent to the Conference as a reference paper.

20. The relevance of the proposal made at the second session of the Preparatory Committee by the Canadian delegation to the effect that preparatory committees should also be able to address urgent issues of high priority had been underscored by the previous year's nuclear tests. The current session of the Preparatory Committee provided the first opportunity for the community of States parties to the NPT to express their views on the nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan. Delegations must not remain silent on that issue; to do so would be to send the wrong signal to the international community in general and to India and Pakistan in particular. It was important to send a clear message in response to the challenges presented by the nuclear tests. In his delegation's view, the relevant points to be included in that message were contained in Security Council resolution 1172 (1998). Other issues which the current Preparatory Committee might address included the early entry into force of the CTBT, the early commencement and conclusion of negotiations on a fissile

material cut-off treaty, the immediate entry into force of START II and the early commencement of START III negotiations.

21. Mr. ZARIF (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that the nuclear tests in South Asia and the ongoing arms race in the Indian subcontinent were seriously challenging the effectiveness of the NPT regime, demonstrating the need for collective efforts to salvage its credibility. It was therefore all the more urgent for the Preparatory Committee to finalize a wide range of unresolved substantive and procedural issues. That required frank and straightforward deliberations and flexibility on the part of delegations. The key ingredient for success was the ability to remain faithful to the basic framework, agreed upon after painstaking negotiations in 1995, which formed the basis for the indefinite extension of the Treaty. All Member States should abide by all provisions of the Treaty as well as the agreements reached in 1995, which were reflected in the decision on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty, and the resolution on the Middle East. Indeed, all efforts at the current session should be concentrated on strengthening the principles embodied in those three basic documents and elaborating further the measures which had been or needed to be taken to implement those principles. In his delegation's view, a substantial portion of the Preparatory Committee's time should be devoted to drafting substantive recommendations on promoting the implementation and universality of the Treaty within the framework of the 1995 principles and objectives.

22. The resolution on the Middle East, the product of intensive negotiations in 1995, should also be a main focus at the current session. For a long time, the international community had expressed grave concern over the nuclear weapons programme of Israel. Israeli clandestine nuclear activities had endangered peace and security and had undermined the credibility of the Treaty in the region. The current session should, pursuant to the principles envisaged in 1995, send a strong message to Israel that its belligerent policy would not be tolerated and that it should submit to the international community's demand to accede to the Treaty and place all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.

23. Referring to paragraph 6 of the decision on strengthening the review process, he expressed the hope that the request of the Twelfth Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries in 1998 for the establishment of subsidiary bodies to the Main Committees to deal with the elimination of nuclear weapons and the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East would positively elicit a response. Because of its political importance and sensitivity, the resolution on the Middle East needed to be discussed within a separate mechanism to permit better structured deliberations on an issue which was related to the universality of the Treaty. Consequently, the suggestion that background documentation should be prepared on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East could make a very positive contribution to the substantive discussions in the subsidiary body.

24. In view of the limited time available to the Conference and given its substantive agenda, the Committee should concentrate on the final drafts of its recommendations to the 2000 Review Conference and formulate proper decisions for

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other agenda items. In his delegation's view, the final declaration should consist of two main sections. The first section should review the implementation of the Treaty on an article-by-article basis, and the second section should update the principles and objectives on the basis of new developments in relation to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In a nutshell, a different approach was needed in order to ensure the successful completion of the tasks before the session.

25. Mr. TUDELA (Peru) said that the end of the cold war and of the East-West confrontation had created the appropriate conditions for making decisive progress towards the non-proliferation and elimination of nuclear weapons. The considerable increase in the number of States acceding to the NPT prior to the 1995 Conference had underscored that fact. The decision taken at the Conference to extend the Treaty indefinitely had been the result of the political will of all Member States. Positive developments in the world such as the establishment of two new nuclear-weapon-free zones in South-East Asia and Africa, the conclusion and opening for signature of the CTBT and the major bilateral agreements reached between the nuclear Powers, especially the START process, were the manifestations of such political will. However, in recent years, far from abating, the risks of unintentional or accidental use of nuclear weapons had increased. The potential for loss of control over weapons production technology and material had also augmented.

26. The agreement reached in 1995 to begin a process geared towards nuclear disarmament was currently beset by serious doubts as to the genuine willingness of the nuclear-weapon States chiefly responsible for making progress towards that goal. There was a perceived resistance to any kind of mechanism that might be used to achieve more effective progress towards nuclear disarmament. The 2000 Review Conference must serve as an opportunity to evaluate, and, where necessary, to revise or establish measures designed to ensure that the provisions of the NPT and the decisions adopted in 1995 were fully implemented. The Preparatory Committee must submit specific recommendations to the Conference for consideration and adoption.

27. In order for the NPT to be really effective, it had to be universal. It was particularly urgent to ensure that States with nuclear capability should accede to the Treaty as soon as possible. In that connection, his delegation was particularly gratified by the recent decision of Brazil to become a party to the Treaty.

28. Notwithstanding its indefinite extension, the NPT was not intended to be permanent. Rather, it was designed to achieve the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and lead to a system of strict and effective international control capable of ensuring that such weapons would not be manufactured again. In his delegation's view the Conference must clearly stipulate that there was no legal justification for the position that nuclear weapons could be retained in perpetuity. The third millennium must begin with a clear-cut commitment to the eradication of such weapons for all time. His delegation assigned special importance to the early entry into force of the CTBT, and it urged all States that had not yet done so to accede to and ratify the CTBT at the earliest possible date, without conditions.



29. Although the final goal was the total elimination of nuclear weapons, immediate practical steps needed to be taken to reduce the nuclear threat and create a climate of mutual confidence. Nuclear-weapon States must consider taking steps at the earliest possible date to deactivate all strategic delivery systems by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other steps to remove them from alert status.

30. His Government wholeheartedly encouraged the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the regions concerned and firmly believed in the importance of such zones as a means of enhancing global and regional peace. At the same time, it reaffirmed its undertaking under the Tlatelolco Treaty and committed itself to promoting new efforts to achieve cooperation with the nuclear-weapon-free zones established by the Treaties of Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba, in order to free the southern hemisphere of nuclear weapons as a first step towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free world. With that objective in mind, the 2000 Review Conference must ensure that the functions of IAEA were strengthened to enable the Agency to adequately discharge its responsibilities under the NPT in the areas of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety. In that context, it was important that more States parties to the NPT should accede to the Vienna Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, which should also be further strengthened.

31. Full advantage must be taken of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes for the well-being and development of all the States parties to the NPT. The transfer of nuclear technology to non-nuclear-weapon States for use in civilian programmes with relevant guarantees must be promoted. In addition, appropriate steps must be taken to regulate the international maritime transport of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel.

32. Mr. AHMAD (Bangladesh) said that his country's unequivocal support of the NPT and its implementation in all its aspects was in keeping with the commitment in the Constitution of Bangladesh to strive for general and complete disarmament. The regime established by the Treaty and supplemented by the CTBT was essential in working towards total nuclear disarmament. By becoming a party to the Treaty, Bangladesh had deliberately given up the nuclear option.

33. The Treaty was clearly premised on an inequality among States parties, which had accepted markedly differing sets of obligations and responsibilities. The objective, however, was not to codify or legitimize that inequality, as was clear not only from article VI but also from the ninth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty. His delegation concurred that article VI, in conjunction with relevant preambular paragraphs, obligated the nuclear-weapon States to pursue negotiations in all earnestness towards a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, and a fissile material cut-off treaty. The CTBT having been adopted, the time was ripe for the early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

34. Bangladesh's approach to the Treaty was comprehensive. Horizontal proliferation should continue to receive due attention. For the NPT regime to

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be meaningful, it was necessary to proceed from horizontal to vertical proliferation and then to actual disarmament. All steps towards that end were welcome. At the same time, his delegation wished to emphasize the process of negotiations in good faith to halt and reverse the arms race and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons globally. In that spirit, it had worked together with other delegations in favour of achieving a consensus on the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. It urged those States that had not yet done so to accede unconditionally and without delay to the Treaty and to take all the necessary measures connected with accession to that instrument.

35. It was the duty of the nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate an unequivocal commitment to the speedy and total elimination of their respective nuclear weapons and to fulfil their obligation under the Treaty by pursuing without delay, and in good faith, negotiations leading to the elimination of such weapons. In that connection, his Government welcomed the commitment of the United States of America and the Russian Federation to deep cuts in their strategic, non-strategic, tactical and theatre inventories and the progress made to reduce vertical proliferation in recent years through bilateral negotiations. It supported regional approaches to nuclear disarmament in the Middle East and elsewhere, and it commended the decision taken by India and Pakistan to join the CTBT as a positive step towards ensuring peace and security in the South Asian region.

36. One of the major incentives for non-nuclear-weapon States to accede to the NPT was article IV, which provided for cooperation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Thirty-one years after the entry into force of the NPT, the access of developing States parties to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes still remained something of an illusion. Nuclear-weapon States had yet to meet their special responsibilities and obligations under article IV. The Nuclear Suppliers Group established for that purpose should be transparent in its operations and refrain from imposing arbitrary and discriminatory restraints on peaceful nuclear trade.

37. Bangladesh had voted in favour of the CTBT at the fifty-first session of the General Assembly, despite its concerns about the heavy financial obligations that would devolve on States parties in connection with the implementation of the Treaty. The international community had arrived at a critical moment in the history of its efforts to reduce the danger posed by nuclear weapons. Any increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States would have serious implications for international peace and security. It was therefore of the utmost importance that the CTBT, together with the objectives agreed to at the 1995 Review Conference, should be universally accepted. His delegation was confident that the 2000 Review Conference would be able to harness its full potential for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free world for the benefit of mankind.

38. Mr. ESENLI (Turkey) said that the NPT was the cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation and had also accelerated international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. With its ratification by Brazil, it had become the most widely accepted arms control treaty in existence. There were still a few States, however, which chose not to join the non-proliferation regime, and the international community should increase its efforts to convince them that universal adherence would bring about international peace and security.

39. The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998 had also highlighted the importance of the CTBT and its early entry into force. Turkey had signed the treaty on the day it had opened for signature, and it was currently before the National Assembly for ratification. The negotiations on a universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices was also essential.

40. There had been few positive developments since the previous session of the Preparatory Committee. As a country situated in a region at high risk for proliferation, Turkey had followed the new missile tests in various parts of the world with deep concern. It welcomed and supported the initiative of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, as well as efforts to establish such a zone in the Middle East.

41. In order to strengthen measures to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, all States must implement the IAEA recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and should undertake a review of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material with the aim of strengthening and broadening its scope. Export and import control regimes continued to play a crucial role in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as the dual-use goods and materials used in their production. Turkey, which was about to become a full member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, had established the necessary export control systems at the national level.

42. Mr. SKOGMO (Norway) said that an agreement had been reached at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference to discuss substantive issues between review conferences, with the principles and objectives as the basis. Four years after the Conference, however, the review process had not fulfilled its potential as an instrument to prevent proliferation and promote disarmament. The lack of a formal decision on recommendations at the second session of the Preparatory Committee had been disappointing. The current challenge was to lay the groundwork for a continuous and constructive dialogue to bring the process leading up to the 2000 Review Conference to a successful conclusion.

43. The NPT was the major channel through which to address nuclear issues, but all forums and measures must be viewed as mutually reinforcing parts of the whole if the desired results were to be achieved. Although the Conference on Disarmament should not be mandated to negotiate nuclear weapons reductions, it had a clear role to play in nuclear disarmament and arms control. One of its priorities must be to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. The entire question of fissile material, including the issue of stockpiling and highly enriched uranium for non-explosive purposes, must be dealt with in a comprehensive manner. Treaty provisions regarding production must include a credible verification regime that would provide the same degree of assurance as other non-proliferation and arms control agreements. It was also important to find a way to address fissile material that had become military surplus, which represented an increasing danger in terms of proliferation. Such inventory should gradually be made subject to a transparent civilian regime subject to international verification. Serious consideration should be given to developing and establishing international norms for dealing with stockpiles of surplus

material so as to ensure that none of the stocks could be returned or diverted to weapons programmes. National control of such stocks would be strengthened by establishing an effective international standard for material accounting and self-auditing. The joint statement of principles for the management and disposition of plutonium by the United States and the Russian Federation demonstrated what could be achieved through a voluntary process.

44. The value of non-proliferation efforts would be limited unless they were accompanied by progress in reducing the political and strategic significance of nuclear weapons. That implied full implementation of existing arms control and disarmament agreements, reduction of nuclear stocks and the political will to contemplate further steps. It was a paradox that an indefinite extension of the NPT had been achieved and yet the problem of nuclear proliferation had grown considerably, demonstrating the seriousness of the task ahead and the importance of finding viable solutions.

45. Mr. ARCAYA (Venezuela) said that four years after the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the loss of momentum in the disarmament process, the nuclear tests in South Asia and the conflict in the Balkans were concrete examples of a volatile international system of norms and principles governing peaceful relations among States. Although the indefinite extension of the NPT had strengthened that regime, the review process begun in 1995 had revealed serious problems resulting from different emphases among States parties in its observance. Good-faith negotiations among nuclear-weapon States were also essential. The entry into force of START II would lead the way to future agreements between the United States of America and the Russian Federation and would strengthen the confidence of the international community in the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

46. In a broader context, the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament within the Conference on Disarmament was a positive step. The nuclear tests in South Asia had highlighted the need for States to sign and ratify the CTBT, which complemented the NPT. His delegation welcomed the fact that Brazil had become a State party to the NPT and called on those States which had not yet done so to accede to that instrument.

47. His Government supported the proposals by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries on the establishment of a legally binding regime of security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States. Either a separate agreement or a protocol to the NPT would be an appropriate format. It also supported the conclusion of a treaty on fissile materials which, although not a disarmament measure in the strictest sense, could help to curb the arms race from a qualitative viewpoint. The negotiations must preserve a balance and avoid conceding privileges to a few to the detriment of the majority.

48. Finally, his delegation favoured the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and Central Asia, which would help to create a climate of confidence among States and establish the political conditions necessary to overcome regional tension or conflict.

49. Mr. HASAN (Iraq) said that the Government and people of Iraq wished to convey their sincere condolences to the Government and people of the People's

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Republic of China on the casualties sustained as a result of the barbaric act of aggression carried out against the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade by the United States of America. The bombardment was the more disturbing as the United States claimed that it was the result of an error in the identification of the building. When a nuclear Power claimed to have made such an unforgivable mistake, it meant that the world was ever further from finding peace and security.

50. The NPT was central to the international community's disarmament endeavours. It was clear that the non-nuclear-weapon States parties, in contrast to some of the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, had honoured the undertakings they had made in 1995. The goal of complete nuclear disarmament was still far from being realized, and there was no clear timetable for reaching that goal. The Treaty was still far from universally ratified, and no steps had been taken to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. While no progress had been made with regard to ensuring that all States parties could research and develop the peaceful uses of nuclear power, it was clear that certain nuclear-weapon States parties were providing technical cooperation to non-signatories in the military uses of nuclear power.

51. There seemed to be no genuine movement towards the establishment of nuclear-free zones, least of all in the Middle East. All the Arab countries had ratified the Treaty, leaving Israel as the only regional State defying the will of the international community, including Security Council resolution 487 (1981), which called on Israel to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. The nuclear-weapon States allies of Israel, namely, the United States and the United Kingdom, both continued to provide it with nuclear cooperation, as had been proved by the fact that the El Al aircraft which had crashed in Amsterdam in 1992 had been carrying chemical and nuclear materials from the United States to Israel. Furthermore, a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty had recently sold a uranium-treatment plant to an Israeli company.

52. In agreeing to the indefinite extension of the Treaty, the non-nuclear-weapon States parties had agreed to promote the most rapid possible elimination of all nuclear weapons, rather than to allow a minority to possess such weapons. The nuclear-weapon States, and, in particular, the United States and the United Kingdom, had a responsibility to put forward suggestions as to how the gap between the goals of the Treaty and implementation of its provisions could be narrowed.

53. Mr. GAMBARI (Nigeria), noted the disturbing revival of the cold-war nuclear-deterrent mentality and said that nuclear disarmament was the concern of not only the nuclear-weapon States but also the entire international community. The lack of consensus in the negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, the slow progress in providing negative security assurances and the failure to achieve a realistic plan of action for nuclear disarmament were all regrettable. On the positive side, his delegation welcomed the entry into force of the CTBT and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, together with the enhanced efforts to establish and consolidate nuclear-weapon-free zones in Latin America, the South Pacific, South-East Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Central

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Asia. At the same time, his delegation attached the utmost importance to the question of unconditional security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States and urged the Preparatory Committee to consider the draft protocol on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States proposed by Kenya, Myanmar, Sudan and Nigeria at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

54. His delegation welcomed the progress achieved thus far by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to nuclear disarmament, particularly the sharp reduction in the nuclear arsenals of the United States of America and the Russian Federation under START I and II. It urged ratification of START II by the Russian Federation in order to pave the way for further nuclear arms reductions under START III. Lastly, noting that the developing countries had entered into safeguards agreements with IAEA, he said that the system of assistance to developing countries for the peaceful use of nuclear technology needed to be completely overhauled.

55. Mr. VOHIDOV (Uzbekistan) said that, on the threshold of the new millennium, the international community must intensify its efforts to consolidate its achievements and make further progress in the area of disarmament. His delegation fully supported the principles and objectives resulting from the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and believed that the Preparatory Committee should be looking for ways and means to carry them out.

56. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was an integral part of the non-proliferation regime. Such zones currently encompassed over half of Earth's land mass; over 100 States belonged to a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Uzbekistan was part of an initiative to declare Central Asia a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Significant progress had been made since the previous session of the Preparatory Committee in consultations with representatives of the States involved and experts from international organizations and nuclear-weapon States. At their meeting in April in Geneva, the respective States had agreed to continue their consultations and dialogue towards the early conclusion of an agreement. After emphasizing the need for a reliable system for the ecological safety of manufacturing involving fissionable materials and the prevention of outflow, he drew attention to General Assembly resolution 53/77 A, which reaffirmed nuclear-weapon-free zones as a means of promoting general and complete disarmament and called on all States to support the Central Asian initiative.

57. Uzbekistan, which had been among the first States to ratify the CTBT, welcomed the convening of a conference of the parties to the Treaty in order to strengthen its regime. Furthermore, as one of the States which had initiated the efforts towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, Uzbekistan felt a responsibility to work for further progress in general and complete disarmament.

58. Mr. CORDEIRO (Brazil) said that his country, which was a party to all relevant international instruments on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, would do its utmost to contribute to the strengthened review process and believed that the current lack of clarity with regard to its expected products should be addressed. In that connection, strict adherence to the letter and spirit of the agreements reached in 1995 and a display of the necessary political will would be necessary. His delegation hoped that the controversy

which had characterized the first two sessions of the Preparatory Committee would be resolved. It acknowledged the nuclear disarmament efforts made by the nuclear-weapon States and called for a renewed commitment by those States, particularly the two major possessors. It also welcomed the importance attached by the international community to the extension and establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, particularly the General Assembly's support for the establishment of such a zone in the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas. Warning that vigorous action and multilateral diplomacy were necessary in order to counter the revival of a dangerous mentality, he stressed the importance of strengthening the START process; improving the balance in other initiatives, such as the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems; complying with the letter and spirit of the CTBT; and negotiating a fissile material cut-off treaty. Given that nuclear weapons did not enhance national security, his delegation was concerned at the "minimum credible deterrence" rationale, which should be addressed by the Preparatory Committee during its current session. That would require unilateral, bilateral and multilateral action and good-faith and fruitful deliberations in accordance with both article VI of the NPT and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, issued in 1996.

59. The step-by-step process of nuclear disarmament should not be determined by the nuclear-weapon States alone. Rather, the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 should serve as the basis for agreement on measures to be undertaken by the international community as a whole and by the nuclear-weapon States in particular. Steps to eliminate nuclear weapons, pursuant to article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, should be taken parallel to the negotiations on the fissile materials cut-off treaty. His delegation also hoped that the Preparatory Committee, at its current session, would lay the groundwork for the negotiation of a nuclear weapons convention and that the necessary political will and flexibility would be shown to that end. It advocated practical steps to accompany the START process, including the de-alerting of nuclear weapons; the removal of nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles; a no-first-use agreement; an agreement not to increase or modernize nuclear arsenals; the removal of non-strategic nuclear weapons from deployed sites; and greater transparency with regard to fissile material stocks.

60. The parallel pursuit of a series of mutually reinforcing measures at the bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral levels was the basis of the joint declaration entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda" and issued in June 1998 by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden. It had been followed by General Assembly resolution 53/77 Y, which had been sponsored by other like-minded States. His delegation firmly believed that that resolution and a number of other proposals should be incorporated in the NPT programme of action for 2000-05.

61. Mr. ABOU-HADID (Syria) said that the world was still as far as ever from achieving the purposes and principles of the NPT, which had been in force for nearly 30 years. States parties had believed that the Treaty constituted a means of halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and would distribute responsibility for the complete elimination of such weapons equitably between

nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States. However, the hopes and aspirations of the majority of States would remain unfulfilled as long as the arsenals of the five nuclear-weapon States were still intact. The failure of those States to honour their undertakings with respect to disarmament had provided the excuse or even the incentive for certain States to carry out nuclear tests and continue to produce nuclear weapons.

62. In 1995, when the Treaty had been indefinitely extended, there had been near-unanimity that it must be universally ratified if it were to have the credibility and authority necessary for the achievement of its goals. His country's position had always been that failure to achieve such universality should not be meekly accepted, or that universal ratification should not be dependent on good will, since that would mean leaving nuclear weapons and programmes outside the IAEA safeguards system. Such an omission was especially undesirable in the sensitive region of the Middle East, the security and stability of which was integral to the security and peace of the world.

63. Israel had ignored the rare opportunity offered by the 1995 Conference, choosing to remain excluded from the Treaty and to continue to defy the international community. It had not joined the States of the region in taking steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Syria, one of the earliest signatories, had announced that it could not support the indefinite extension of the Treaty while Israel refused to become a party to that Treaty or to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. Such a situation could not continue, given that it was widely known that Israel possessed an arsenal of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Israel continued to occupy significant tracts of the land of neighbouring States, to defy the resolutions of international legitimacy, and to behave as if it were above conventions and international law. The Arab States on the other hand had, without exception, become parties to the Treaty.

64. His delegation reiterated its support for the principles contained in the working paper submitted by non-aligned countries parties to the Treaty (NPT/CONF.2000/PC/III/1) and for the statement made by the President of the Arab Group for May 1999.

65. He wished to emphasize the importance of a number of points. The Treaty must be universally ratified, and all States must take measures to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war and ensure the security of peoples. Nuclear-weapon States, in particular, must make every endeavour to halt the nuclear arms race. They must refrain from threatening the political independence of any State with the use of such weapons and exercise transparency with regard to their stocks of nuclear weapons and fissile materials. All States, and, in particular, developing countries, must be assured of their right to research and develop the peaceful uses of nuclear power, and world public opinion must be alerted to the fact that all States in the Middle East were parties to the Treaty, with the sole exception of Israel. Pressure must be brought to bear on Israel if the Middle East was to become a zone free of all nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. In view of the importance of that goal, his delegation was highly appreciative of the support shown for the 1995 resolution on the Middle East that had been incorporated into the final report of the second session of the

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Preparatory Committee in 1998, and it urged those States that had opposed its incorporation to reconsider their positions.

66. Mr. JAYANAMA (Thailand) said that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, within the context of the NPT principles and objectives, should complement each other and be treated equally. The incidents in South Asia had highlighted the importance of nuclear disarmament to the non-proliferation regime. In that context, his delegation fully supported the remarks of the representative of Indonesia, on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, on the strengthening of the review process. Noting the crucial role of nuclear-weapon-free zones in enhancing the effectiveness of the NPT, he said that the countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations had signed the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in 1995 and that it had entered into force in March 1997.

67. Stressing, however, that nuclear-weapon-free zones were not sufficient, he urged the nuclear-weapon States to pursue negotiations on nuclear disarmament in good faith with a view to formulating specific commitments and to eliminating their nuclear arsenals within an appropriate time-frame under internationally verifiable mechanisms. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, credible, unconditional and legally binding negative security assurances should be provided to the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, preferably in the form of a protocol to the NPT. Non-party States might then be encouraged to accede to the NPT. In that connection, his delegation welcomed the establishment by the Conference on Disarmament of an Ad Hoc Committee on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The issue should be addressed in the contexts of both the Conference on Disarmament and the Conference of the Parties to the NPT. It was to be hoped that both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States would show the necessary flexibility in the negotiation of an instrument on negative security assurances for adoption by the 2000 Review Conference. Citing article IV of the NPT, he urged those States with nuclear weaponry to ensure the flow to non-nuclear-weapon States of technology and technical cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The transfer of technology, together with increased financial assistance, would be an incentive for nuclear non-proliferation and non-testing and a disincentive for the secret development of defensive nuclear technology and dual-use equipment. The question of scientific and technical cooperation in the field of nuclear energy for peaceful uses should be considered at the 2000 Review Conference.

68. Mr. LEE See-young (Republic of Korea) said that his delegation had consistently supported the NPT and remained firmly committed to its full and effective implementation. At the same time, it was concerned at the serious challenges posed by recent developments and believed that it was crucial to reach consensus on all outstanding issues during the current session of the Preparatory Committee. To that end, he appealed to all delegations to display political will, flexibility and a spirit of compromise.

69. His delegation shared the view that the final product of the 2000 Review Conference should both assess the past and contain forward-looking elements, in keeping with the 1995 decision on strengthening the review process for the

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treaty. It also believed that a new set of principles and objectives adapted to changing circumstances should be incorporated in the final document of the Review Conference. It looked forward to balanced, focused and substantive discussions of key issues pertaining to the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in line with the Preparatory Committee's mandate under the strengthened review process, and to the inclusion of their outcome in the report of the Preparatory Committee.

70. The Preparatory Committee must address the challenges posed by nuclear testing in South Asia and the continuing non-compliance of some States parties, including the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with the provisions of the NPT. His delegation hoped that the States concerned would fully implement the provisions of Security Council resolution 1172 (1998), and that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would honour its obligations under the NPT by cooperating with IAEA and complying with the IAEA safeguards agreement.

71. He stressed the special responsibilities and obligations of the five nuclear-weapon States, which were all permanent members of the Security Council, under article I of the NPT and voiced concern at the erosion of the authority and credibility of the Security Council with regard to the global non-proliferation regime. The Preparatory Committee and the 2000 Review Conference should address that issue with a view to ensuring that an effective enforcement mechanism was in place.

72. The three pillars of the NPT - non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear disarmament - must remain mutually complementary and reinforcing. The nuclear-weapon States should make greater efforts to reduce nuclear weapons, consistent with article VI of the NPT and the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. In particular, his delegation hoped for the earliest possible entry into force of START II and the conclusion of the START III negotiations. Recognizing that nuclear disarmament was linked to other areas of disarmament, his delegation advocated a result-oriented, step-by-step approach over time-bound total elimination or the adoption of a nuclear-weapons convention. It nonetheless concurred that there was a need for multilateral discussions on facilitating nuclear disarmament in the context of the Conference on Disarmament.

73. His delegation urged the three States whose ratification was required to ensure entry into force of the CTBT to sign the Treaty at the earliest possible date. The Republic of Korea, an original signatory of the Treaty, would deposit its instrument of ratification shortly, upon its approval by the National Assembly. In the meantime, it recognized the need for the forthcoming conference provided for by article XIV to facilitate the Treaty's entry into force and believed that all States should contribute to the work of the Preparatory Committee of the Treaty, particularly to its efforts to establish a verification regime. He expressed disappointment that crucial negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty had not begun and the hope that they would commence at the earliest possible date. At the same time, he called for greater transparency with regard to existing stockpiles of fissile material and, pending the conclusion of a treaty, a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

74. His delegation supported the extension of nuclear-weapon-free zones to regions of tension and welcomed the recent adoption by consensus in the Disarmament Commission of a document containing guidelines and principles relating to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. In that connection, he reiterated the need for swift implementation of the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. He expressed his delegation's strong support for strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of the vital IAEA safeguards system and hailed the adoption of the IAEA Model Protocol. The Republic of Korea was completing the formalities for the signing of an additional protocol with IAEA and hoped that other States would do likewise.

75. Mr. STAEHELIN (Observer for Switzerland) said that diverging views on the nature and goals of the strengthened review process, on the scope of the 1995 decisions and on the Treaty itself must be reconciled in order to facilitate agreement on the expected products of the 2000 Review Conference. Similarly, clarification of the relationships between non-proliferation, arms control and nuclear disarmament would remove stumbling blocks in the deliberations of the Conference on Disarmament.

76. With regard to the 1995 decisions, his delegation believed that the stability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime depended on nuclear disarmament. The Treaty was the key instrument in that connection; the documents adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the expanded mandate of the Preparatory Committee should further strengthen its role. The 1995 decisions - indefinite extension of the Treaty, adoption of the principles and objectives, the strengthened review process and the resolution on the Middle East - comprised a package which must not be dismantled. His delegation had always maintained that the extension decided in 1995 must not be construed as an indefinite extension of the status quo, particularly with regard to the prerogatives of the nuclear Powers and that the implementation of all the provisions of the NPT, particularly article VI, remained crucial. Under the new review process, mechanisms for increasing the responsibility of the States concerned and effectively implementing the Treaty must be put in place.

77. With a view to the rapid elaboration of specific recommendations for the 2000 Review Conference, the Preparatory Committee should reconsider its working methods. To that end, it was important not to waste time on statements of national position, which were already well known. In that context, his delegation welcomed the Chairman's initiative to devote the first day of the current session to a discussion of the expected products of the Review Conference and the second week to the formulation of draft recommendations. It was equally important not to be entrapped by what might be an outdated sequence of the three clusters but rather to focus on controversial clauses of the Treaty. Coordinators could be appointed for each theme or each article of the Treaty and the relevant clauses of the preamble and the principles and objectives. The informal consultations conducted by the coordinators should be open to all delegations.

78. The documents elaborated by the Preparatory Committee for adoption at the 2000 Review Conference should assess the past and, at the same time, be forward-looking. In particular, he proposed the preparation of a final document on the implementation of the Treaty since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference,

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which, depending on circumstances, would not necessarily have to be adopted by consensus, and a document reaffirming the 1995 principles and objectives and proposing new principles and objectives for adoption in 2000. The latter document should be adopted by consensus. The working papers of the Chairmen and the proposals put forward during the first and second sessions of the Preparatory Committee, including those made by his own delegation (NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/7) and those of Canada and South Africa, could form the basis for the preparation of the Review Conference documents.

79. Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) after expressing deep condolences to the Chinese delegation in connection with the NATO air strike against the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, which had been perpetrated in violation of international law, said that the policy of NATO towards certain sovereign States undermined strategic stability both in the world as a whole and in some of its regions and must be abandoned immediately. That policy could undermine the entire disarmament process, including nuclear non-proliferation; efforts to abrogate the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems could have similar consequences. All the incidents involving NATO weapons raised legitimate questions about ensuring the security of numerous nuclear locations and other dangerous sites in the area of the conflict and its vicinity; any damage to or destruction of those sites could lead to an environmental disaster.

80. As a State party to the NPT and one of its depositaries, the Russian Federation believed that the NPT had stood the test of time and had become one of the main pillars of the international security system. The spread of nuclear weapons could lead to strategic chaos and increased the risk of regional conflicts involving nuclear weapons, which was not in the interests of any country. The NPT was the main deterrent in that respect, while ensuring the development of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Russian Federation therefore attached great importance to conducting a comprehensive and objective review of the implementation of the NPT.

81. It remained vitally important to ensure the universality of the NPT; further efforts must be made to draw into the nuclear non-proliferation regime those States which had not yet acceded to the Treaty. The main result of the preparatory work for the Conference should be recommendations on the further strengthening of the NPT; the Preparatory Committee should be able to achieve that goal without creating any additional bodies or duplicating the functions of other international mechanisms. Progress was already being made in achieving the central goals of NPT and carrying out the priority tasks agreed upon at the 1995 Conference, confirming the validity of the decisions taken then, especially with regard to the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

82. The conclusion of the CTBT was an important step towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The Russian Federation had signed that Treaty, and, in its approach towards ratification, it took into account the ratification processes in the 44 countries whose adherence to the Treaty was necessary for its entry into force. The Russian Federation hoped that all countries that possessed the relevant capabilities and whose ratification instruments were crucial to the entry into force of the CTBT would accede to it. In that connection, his delegation welcomed the statements made by the leaders of India and Pakistan about the willingness of those countries to sign the

Treaty. On the whole, it was satisfied with the work which was being carried out to establish the CTBT verification regime.

83. Bearing in mind its obligations under article VI of the NPT, the Russian Federation was taking steps to achieve the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. Currently, the nuclear weapons reduction process was being carried out mainly within the framework of bilateral agreements between the Russian Federation and the United States of America. A key prerequisite for such reductions was strict compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems; the security of the international community as a whole depended on the viability of that Treaty.

84. His Government remained committed to the ratification of START II. The ratification process was under way in the Russian Parliament but had already been interrupted twice through no fault of the Russian Federation. Ratification by the United States of America was also pending. In March 1997, the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States of America had reached agreement on further radical arms reductions within the framework of START III. The Russian Federation was prepared to consider the possibility of reducing the nuclear potential of the parties to 1,500 units within the framework of that Treaty. As to tactical nuclear weapons, in accordance with the statements by the President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of 5 October 1991 and the President of the Russian Federation of 29 February 1992, the Russian Federation was fully and consistently carrying out its unilateral initiatives. All Soviet nuclear weapons located beyond the borders of the Russian Federation had been brought back to its territory and were being eliminated. In that connection, his delegation once again drew attention to the Russian proposal that all nuclear weapons should be brought back to the territories of the nuclear States to which they belonged.

85. For several years, the Russian Federation had not produced fissile materials for nuclear weapons. At the same time, it should be noted that the reduction of nuclear weapons required enormous financial outlays, and that factor would prevent any acceleration of the process. His delegation felt that it was premature to start negotiations on a nuclear disarmament programme in the Conference on Disarmament under a specific timetable. It would be much better to concentrate on the pressing issue of formulating a multilateral agreement on the prohibition of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

86. His delegation welcomed the growing momentum of the process of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world. On the question of negative security assurances, it believed that the Conference on Disarmament, as a unique multilateral forum in the area of disarmament, was the most appropriate place for such work.

87. Effective measures must be formulated and adopted for the further strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime without prejudice to the peaceful use of atomic energy by all States. That objective should be achieved through improvement of national legislation on export control and the development of multilateral export control mechanisms in the nuclear sphere such as the Zanger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. There was a need to increase

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the number of countries participating in the Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Materials adopted at the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit in April 1996. His Government actively supported the work of IAEA, and welcomed IAEA efforts to establish an integrated safeguards system. It had reached agreement with IAEA on verification measures for its territory provided for in the Additional Protocol.

88. His delegation felt that the Committee should concentrate on resolving all procedural and organizational issues, drawing on the experience gained at the first and second sessions. The Chairman's working paper could become the draft final document of the Conference.

89. Mr. YELCHENKO (Ukraine) said that the international community as a whole was deeply concerned about the risk of further proliferation of nuclear weapons as a result of the tests conducted by India and Pakistan the previous year and the possession by 38 States of ballistic missile technologies. His Government was all the more concerned since it had voluntarily renounced its nuclear arsenal, the world's third largest, hoping that its example would be emulated by other States. In that regard, Ukraine endorsed the view that reasons of national security were no justification for the start of a new nuclear-arms race. The international community should consolidate its efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Security Council resolution 1172 (1998) remained the basis for further work in that regard.

90. Disarmament and non-proliferation should be part of a wider system of instruments for the maintenance of international peace and security. His delegation therefore called upon all members of the international community, especially the five permanent members of the Security Council, to take concrete steps designed to achieve rapid progress in the process of genuine disarmament and thus to usher in a more secure international environment.

91. The Preparatory Committee at the current session should focus on achieving further progress on the basis of the documents approved during its two previous sessions and at the 1995 Conference. The recommendations on measures at the multilateral, regional and other levels constituted a comprehensive programme of joint efforts of States parties designed to further enhance the effectiveness of the NPT regime. At the same time, the Preparatory Committee should not only prepare universal recommendations for the further strengthening of the review process but also focus on additional measures to ensure full implementation of the Treaty. Not too much time should be devoted to deliberations on procedural matters. Rather, the focus should be on substantive work, including the consideration of ways of achieving the universality of the Treaty.

92. Decisive steps should be taken towards the creation of reliable mechanisms for verifying and monitoring the effective implementation of international agreements on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The signing by Ukraine of the CTBT amply demonstrated its support of efforts designed to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and the priority it attached to comprehensive nuclear disarmament. Ukraine's system of control over nuclear weapons-related exports was constantly being upgraded.

93. His delegation welcomed the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia and the decision of Mongolia to declare its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone. As a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe, Ukraine was particularly sensitive to problems of nuclear safety. In that regard, it was strongly committed to cooperation with IAEA and the donor States that had contributed to the establishment of its national safeguards system. In his delegation's view, the IAEA 93+2 programme would improve the Agency's safeguards system; however, the success of the programme depended on the full and comprehensive participation of all States in those activities.

94. States parties to the Treaty had the sovereign right to conduct research and to produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, provided that they strictly abided by the relevant intentional standards with respect to the verification of nuclear technologies and full transparency of national programmes.

95. Mr. JOKONYA (Zimbabwe) said it was his delegation's view that, unless the nuclear-weapon States made significant progress towards meeting their obligations under article VI of the Treaty by the time of the 2000 Review Conference, the NPT regime, which had been jeopardized by recent events in South Asia, would be further threatened. Since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, it had been clear that there was no political will to ensure the success of the 2000 Review Conference. It appeared that, having gained the desired indefinite extension, the nuclear-weapon States simply wanted to preserve their special privileges.

96. The Preparatory Committee should focus on producing a document on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, including a detailed programme of action. All States parties must demonstrate the necessary political will in order to lay the foundation for a successful 2000 Review Conference. The recent experience in the Conference on Disarmament clearly demonstrated the futility of engaging in negotiations unless such will existed. There had been sharp disagreements between the Group of 21 and the Western Group. The former Group had insisted that nuclear disarmament remained the first priority and that any meaningful programme of work should address the question of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. The Western Group, on the other hand, had maintained that nuclear disarmament should be left to those countries possessing nuclear weapons, as manifested in the existing bilateral agreements between the United States of America and the Russian Federation. However, history had shown that bilateral agreements could easily be held hostage to national interests, as shown by the refusal of the Russian Duma to ratify START II.

97. In the view of his delegation safeguards was one area of the 1995 principles and objectives which required a closer look in preparation for the Review 2000 Conference. The understandably sensitive section on security assurances also needed close scrutiny, especially in the light of the bad faith demonstrated by some nuclear-weapon States at the previous session of the Preparatory Committee. Developments in South Asia in recent months had shown that the question of universality needed further consideration, and the impasse over the resolution concerning the Middle East should be revisited.

98. In the final analysis, the success of the entire exercise depended on the commitment of States parties to disarmament. The programme of action on disarmament and such agreements as the proposed fissile material cut-off treaty needed reaffirmation. At its current session, the Preparatory Committee must at least outline the specific steps needed to reduce nuclear arsenals. The work of the new agenda coalition which had led to General Assembly resolution 53/77 Y charted the way forward. All non-nuclear States except one had endorsed that work, and only three nuclear States parties had opposed it. The International Court of Justice having concluded in 1996 that there must be time-frame for negotiations on nuclear disarmament, the time had surely come to rid succeeding generations of the scourge of nuclear proliferation.

99. Mr. REZNIKOV (Belarus) said that the unprecedented military action of NATO carried out without the approval of the Security Council against the sovereign Republic of Yugoslavia, including the recent barbaric bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, complicated the entry into force of START II, and was bound to affect the further progress of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. His delegation expressed sincere condolences to the families of the victims and to all the Chinese people.

100. The NPT was one of the key instruments of the international community for curbing and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. His delegation considered the holding of review conferences to be one of the most important components of the international disarmament process but emphasized that only a full-fledged review of the implementation of the NPT by the States parties, together with the implementation of the decisions of the 1995 Conference, would make it possible to achieve significant progress in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and determining the programme of action for the future.

101. The principles agreed upon at previous sessions of the Preparatory Committee should form the basis of the recommendations of the Review Conference. There had been general agreement on the need to achieve the universality of the Treaty, in particular through the earliest possible accession to it of States with nuclear facilities not covered by IAEA guarantees; and on the importance of safeguarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while making comprehensive efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosives. At the same time, his delegation believed that the Preparatory Committee should give more detailed consideration to the question of enhancing the effectiveness and universality of IAEA guarantees, including the conclusion of new agreements ensuring mandatory IAEA guarantees for the supply of fissile materials.

102. With regard to the question of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, his Government had consistently advocated the conclusion of effective agreements to provide guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons and was in favour of further universal guarantees of that security. States which had voluntarily renounced the possibility of possessing nuclear weapons should not see their national security prejudiced as a result.

103. The Preparatory Committee should take up issues related to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, taking into account the guiding principles for the establishment of such zones approved by the Conference on



Disarmament. His delegation believed that further consideration of the problem of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, would help achieve better understanding in the area of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The practical steps taken by Belarus in the area of nuclear disarmament created important foundations for the gradual formation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in central Europe. Such a zone represented one of the most promising ways of reducing the nuclear threat in Europe, especially in the light of the tragic events in the Balkans. That idea in no way conflicted with the right of self-defence, including self-defence within alliances, especially in view of the range of nuclear-weapon delivery systems.

104. Mr. THAN (Myanmar) said that the performance of the NPT regime over the past year had not been satisfactory. Nuclear weapons had spread further, with two countries conducting nuclear tests in May 1998. Moreover, nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty were unwilling to make firm commitments to fulfil their obligations under the principles and objectives laid down by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

105. In his delegation's view, nuclear non-proliferation without adequate nuclear disarmament measures was meaningless and could not be sustainable or effective. For that reason, nuclear disarmament measures should be given priority in the Committee's preparatory work for the 2000 Review Conference. The questions of nuclear disarmament, in both the bilateral and multilateral contexts, the CTBT, a ban on fissile materials, security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones should be fully addressed at the current session of the Preparatory Committee and at the 2000 Review Conference. Given the existing differences of opinion on substantive issues between the nuclear-weapon States parties and the non-nuclear-weapon States parties, his delegation favoured the adoption by the Review Conference of a resolution on the Middle East, a decision on the further strengthened review process, and a decision on principles and objectives and a programme of action on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

106. In that regard, his delegation wished to propose some elements for inclusion in the latter decision. States parties should welcome the nine recent accessions to the Treaty and reaffirm their view that effective measures for nuclear disarmament would contribute towards the realization of the goal of universality. They should recognize that nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament were mutually complementary and that effective nuclear disarmament measures would contribute to the maintenance of an effective regime of nuclear non-proliferation. They should recognize that the continuing existence of nuclear weapons posed the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of human civilization and that the best and the only genuinely effective defence against a nuclear catastrophe was the total elimination of those weapons. They should call for the early establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament and the commencement of multilateral negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament leading to the total elimination of those weapons. They should reaffirm that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only genuine guarantee for non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. They should repeat their firm commitment to further steps, which could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States

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parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. They should note that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones under the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba had gone a long way to limiting the geographical proliferation of nuclear weapons and enhancing global and regional peace and security.

107. Mr. PEARSON (New Zealand) said that the process initiated at the first session of the Preparatory Committee appeared to be faltering; some delegations were interpreting the review mandate in the most minimalist terms, others appeared to be changing tack, and still others seemed unsure of the current session's objectives. It was, therefore, both timely and essential to address at the current session the issues of product and process as they related to the 2000 Review Conference.

108. The Preparatory Committee was mandated to consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty and to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference, which in turn was required to look forward as well as back and to evaluate the results of the period they were reviewing. Thus, the Preparatory Committee should not merely consider procedural issues; it should also play a substantive role by discussing important issues of accountability and by making recommendations and commenting on those substantive issues. For example, the implications of the nuclear tests carried out during the past year should be confronted in a forthright, transparent manner. It would also be timely to address issues such as nuclear disarmament, progress with START, the CTBT, fissile materials negotiations, security assurances, safeguards and the resolution on the Middle East. That might be done through a draft statement which could be prepared by the Chairman, submitted to the Preparatory Committee for approval and then released to the media.

109. The Preparatory Committee's discussion of agreed or possible outcomes for the 2000 Review Conference should be recorded in a framework paper. His delegation was opposed to the idea of amending the principles and objectives established in 1995; any new forward-looking document on that topic should reflect and retain the currency of the earlier principles and objectives. Furthermore, there was growing support for a document that would review NPT implementation over the past five years.

110. There would also be a need for a third document that would deal with procedural matters, including recommendations on any amendments to the rules of procedure and such issues as documentation; it might also deal with the allocation of time at the Review Conference.

111. His delegation would not oppose any decision to deal with some issues in separate documents or resolutions, but it was strongly in favour of a comprehensive forward-looking document.

112. The controversial Chairman's working paper (NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/35) had been negotiated by delegations in good faith. However, the status of the portions of the document on which consensus had been reached remained uncertain, not least because it had not been considered in plenary meeting. That text posed problems for some delegations, including his own, and it was important to

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take a rapid decision as to whether the negotiation of additional consensus language should be pursued at the current session, bearing in mind that any such language would need to be reviewed and updated at the Review Conference and that its form and structure would have to be changed if it was to be used as a resource for new principles and objectives. For that reason, his delegation wondered whether it was productive to negotiate a text that would be of questionable relevance in 2000. Moreover, much of the working paper was dated, repetitive and overburdened. He suggested that delegations should consider updating or deleting their submissions and work with other delegations to determine whether there was any possibility of blending texts in order to make the working paper a more useful resource for the Review Conference.

113. Lastly, the Preparatory Committee should discuss the organization of work of the Review Conference. While acknowledging that the decision to establish three Main Committees had already been made, it might be better, particularly for small delegations, to review the Treaty on an article-by-article basis, as the representative of Canada had suggested, in order to reduce confusion and proceed in a more structured, focused and transparent manner.

114. Mr. de la FORTELLE (France) said that formulation of the product of the Review Conference should not result in a redrafting of the 1995 principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament (NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.2), which were part of a package that included the other decisions and the resolution on the Middle East. Neither should that product involve artificial documents unrelated to the structure of the debate or depart from the fundamental principle of consensus on the outcome of the Review Conference, which was an essential element for the legitimacy of the document in question.

115. His delegation would prefer the outcome of the Review Conference to take the form of three reports, one from each of the three Main Committees, all of which would deal with both past and future. A further "umbrella" document could be prepared by the Chairman on the basis of those reports. All those documents should be adopted by consensus.

116. Mr. GUANI (Uruguay) reaffirmed Uruguay's commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, which it had first expressed in 1967 with the signing of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), and said that the NPT must provide the framework for the establishment of a treaty on the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons; the four States which had not yet acceded to it could make an invaluable contribution by doing so. Stressing that the Treaty was the international community's sole broad-ranging instrument on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, he said that his delegation attributed particular importance to the work of the Preparatory Committee and hoped that the current session would witness the adoption of effective, specific and realistic proposals.

117. His delegation strongly supported the conversion of the Preparatory Committee into an active body that could formulate specific proposals for the 2000 Review Conference and appealed to States parties which did not share that view to reconsider it. The draft recommendations to be submitted to the 2000 Review Conference should focus, inter alia, on: the inclusion of a reference to

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article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; the question of non-deployment of new missile alert systems while nuclear arsenals were being reduced; the issuance of a special appeal to those States which did not view NPT as the cornerstone of universal disarmament; the requirement that States should de-alert systems which might be subject to computer programming errors in the year 2000 (Y2K) and should provide the necessary international security guarantees to other States at risk; and the necessity of establishing an adequate system of protection against the risks inherent in the transport of plutonium and other highly radioactive substances. Those risks had been highlighted by the Common Market of the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR).

118. Mr. ENKHSAIKHAN (Mongolia) said that recent developments having a negative impact on the objectives of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament included the nuclear tests recently conducted in South Asia, which could affect the security environment in that region and lead to a nuclear arms race. The recently renewed Atlantic Strategic Concept had reaffirmed the adherence of NATO to the concept of nuclear deterrence, which could provoke other nuclear-weapon States to adopt similar policies and lead many non-nuclear-weapon States to question the utility of the non-proliferation regime. Furthermore, the deterrence doctrine would not help to persuade non-parties to adhere to the non-proliferation regime or the CTBT. Judging from the reaction of some nuclear-weapon States, the revision of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the introduction of missile defence systems could also adversely affect existing strategic stability. In that context, his delegation attached great importance to the 2000 Review Conference, whose success depended to a large extent on the work completed at the current session.

119. His delegation attached great importance to the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones and welcomed the establishment of such a zone in Central Asia, which would promote stability and predictability in the region. His Government had unequivocally declared that it would not allow the stationing of nuclear weapons and parts thereof in Mongolian territory at any time, a policy which the General Assembly had welcomed in its resolution 53/77 D. His Government had thereby demonstrated that non-proliferation could also be strengthened by unilateral action, supported by immediate neighbours and the international community.

120. Mr. SHOBOKSHI (Saudi Arabia) said that the principal aim of international and regional disarmament conventions was to promote a climate of peace and security throughout the world. It was not possible for such instruments to be fully effective if they were not universally ratified and enforceable. Countries that were not parties to the instruments, such as Israel, were able to develop the military applications of nuclear power unchecked by any of the international safeguards, thereby threatening international security and peace. Accession to the relevant instruments required the development of a system of guarantees in order to ensure full compliance with their provisions.

121. The fact that the goals of the NPT were still far from being achieved, even though it had been in force for some 30 years, raised questions as to the effectiveness of that instrument and the extent to which the nuclear-weapon States were responsible for the failure to halt the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

122. While a number of regions throughout the world had been successful in achieving nuclear-weapon-free status, thanks to international cooperation and an awareness of the need for peaceful coexistence, the Middle East was unable to meet the requirements for that status because of the intransigence of a single State, namely, Israel, which had made no attempt to implement any of the relevant resolutions that had been adopted on a regular basis ever since 1974 by the General Assembly and the Security Council.

123. Israel continued to refuse to adhere to the NPT or to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. It was therefore the only State in the region that operated a nuclear programme outside that system of safeguards, thereby threatening regional and international security, stability and peace. It was greatly to be deplored that Israel should thus obstruct international consensus and the regional desire to make the Middle East a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and to protect its peoples from the nuclear threat.

124. Mr. SOUTAR (United Kingdom), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that his delegation had listened with incredulity to the statement made by the representative of Iraq. The United Kingdom took exception to the accusation that it was in breach of its commitments under article I of the NPT. Those accusations were totally untrue and without foundation. Iraq, over a number of years, had deliberately and cynically ignored its legal undertaking under the Treaty to refrain from developing nuclear weapons. Even when IAEA, acting pursuant to the mandate given to it in Security Council resolution 687 (1991), had uncovered evidence of Iraq's clandestine and illegal nuclear programme, the Government of Iraq had contrived to deny the extent of that programme. Only through the perseverance of IAEA had the facts been gradually revealed, although they were still incomplete.

125. Iraq had yet to take all the measures required of it by the international community in Security Council resolution 687 (1991), including, the adoption of national legislation outlawing any efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. His delegation supported that objective, which could be achieved only when all the States of the region rid themselves of such weapons and negotiated a regime freely among themselves. Iraq bore a special responsibility in that respect. It should comply immediately with its obligations under Security Council resolution 687 (1991) instead of continuing to weave its web of falsehoods and obfuscations.

126. Mr. HASAN (Iraq), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the manner and language used by the representative of the United Kingdom was appropriate neither to the Preparatory Committee nor to international diplomacy. The statement made by his delegation had been intended as a contribution to achieving the goals of the NPT. If any country failed to carry out its undertakings in full, it had a duty to face up to that situation honestly, not to shirk its responsibilities and make accusations against other parties. There was plentiful evidence of the nuclear cooperation between the United Kingdom and Israel, which could be made available to the States parties to the Treaty. The issue of Iraq's compliance with its obligations was immaterial: Iraq had carried out all its undertakings, and the Security Council should lift the sanctions imposed on his country. However, that measure was opposed by the United Kingdom and the United States, which applied double standards in their policies.

The meeting rose at 8.35 p.m.