80. Recent regional conflicts that had taken place in different areas of the world, and the use in some cases of weapons of mass destruction with indiscriminate effects, had shown the need for the international community to take steps to prevent such things from happening again. Co-operating with a group of countries that had also expressed concern at the proliferation of missiles with multiple capacities, Spain had in 1989 joined the Missile Technology Control Régime (MTCR) set up in 1987 by the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan and Canada. The régime, which did not hamper technology transfer for peaceful uses, was an irreplaceable instrument for preventing the proliferation of missiles. The Government of Spain was satisfied with the operation of those control mechanisms and hoped that a growing number of countries would join; in its view the MTCR was an adequate instrument for completing a rigorous nuclear non-proliferation policy.

81. Discussions would also focus on the problem of the renewal of the Treaty, which would be decided at the 1995 Conference. Neither article X nor any weighty reason whatsoever militated in favour of ending the NPT. In five years, when the States parties were called upon to decide how to extend the Treaty, a fresh review of the status of nuclear proliferation would probably reveal compelling reasons to extend an instrument whose usefulness had been amply demonstrated. A large number of organizational aspects would have to be taken into consideration at the present Conference and up to 1995, but that should be done without casting any doubt on the need for maintaining the Treaty in force. For the Government of Spain, 1995 would be the year not of the Treaty's expiry, but of its extension by the Conference for an indefinite period or for the longest possible period.

82. The survival of mankind depended on the rational use of the new force represented by nuclear energy, and its possible non-peaceful use was a grave concern for which the international community must find an adequate solution. The continuation of nuclear disarmament, improvement of the Treaty control mechanisms and safeguards and better systems of transfer and co-operation for the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes were reasons for which the Spanish Government would like to see the NPT not only maintained, but also strengthened and enlarged. The accession of new parties with a view to making the Treaty universal would be desirable. His delegation, for its part, would spare no effort to ensure the success of the Fourth Review Conference, which would also mean success for all peace-loving countries.

83. <u>Mr. KOSIN</u> (Yugoslavia), speaking on behalf of the non-aligned and other States parties to the NPT not taking part in the East European or Western groups, said that the NPT was a legally binding multilateral instrument that had confirmed the urgency of putting an end to the nuclear arms race. Its full implementation was an important step towards nuclear disarmament, world peace and regional security. Yet implementation was not an end in itself, since the aim of the Treaty was also to achieve general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. The number of signatory countries had increased significantly since the Treaty's entry into force, and the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had established

an international norm of non-acquisition and non-possession of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices by fulfilling their obligations under the Treaty.

84. Recent political developments further underscored the importance of strict and faithful compliance with the NPT in its entirety. It had become evident that the enhancement of peace and international security could be achieved by political means and through the widest possible international co-operation in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Attempts to justify nuclear deterrence and the nuclear arms race ran contrary to those positive developments and the spirit of the NPT.

85. Although they recognized the positive elements and effects brought about by recent agreements and ongoing negotiations in the nuclear disarmament field, the countries he represented regretted that the modernization and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons continued. Vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States continued contrary to the provisions of the preamble and the articles of the Treaty. As for horizontal proliferation, the spread of nuclear weapons capability among certain States not parties to the NPT posed a serious threat to the non-proliferation régime and underlined the gravity of the problem.

86. In the circumstances, the non-aligned and other States parties underlined the importance of the basic goals of and the commitments undertaken under the NPT towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, namely, to avert the danger of nuclear war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples; to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race by taking effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, and hence to achieve the discontinuance of all nuclear testing for all time by undertaking negotiations to that end without further delay; to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and, finally, to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States, in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and their vectors.

87. The possibility of a significant extension of the NPT would be enhanced by the effective implementation of the Treaty by 1995 and in particular that of the obligations relating to nuclear disarmament. Consequently, it was urgent to take the necessary steps to consolidate the effectiveness of the NPT by reaffirming its authority, and to ensure its universality and the implementation of its provisions, especially by the depository States. Such steps included instituting an immediate moratorium on all nuclear testing, as a provisional measure pending the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty; fully supporting the PTBT amendment Conference and undertaking full-scope negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty in the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee established in 1990 by the Conference on Disarmament; starting negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on items 2 and 3 of its agenda with the active participation of all nuclear-weapon States; declaring an immediate moratorium on and an immediate cessation of production of

weapons-grade fissionable material and, finally, beginning immediate negotiations within the context of the NPT with a view to the early conclusion of a legally binding multilateral instrument of guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

88. At the same time, negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament should be intensified with a view to concluding an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In addition, the deployment of nuclear weapons in the non-nuclear-weapon States should be stopped and the nuclear weapons already deployed there withdrawn, existing agreements on nuclear-weapon-free zones should be respected and regional efforts aimed at establishing such zones supported; negotiations with a view to the further reduction and elimination of all types of nuclear weapons and their vectors should be intensified, with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States; the arms race in outer space should be prevented and immediate negotiations undertaken to that end and the commitment not to supply with nuclear-weapons-related material, technology and services the States not parties to the Treaty which had nuclear facilities not safeguarded by IAEA should be strictly respected.

89. For the non-aligned and other States parties to the Treaty, peaceful nuclear co-operation including technology transfer was a commitment laid down in article IV of the NPT, and they regretted the unsatisfactory realization of that commitment and the many unjustified restrictions and constraints imposed on developing non-nuclear-weapon States parties. They believed that those States parties that were in a position to do so should promote co-operation between States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; reaffirm their acceptance that all States parties were entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information and to contribute to the further development of applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes; facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with the right of all States parties to participate in it; enhance the role of IAEA and provide better assistance through IAEA to developing countries, and favourable financing by international institutions to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and other nuclear technology applications. The States parties to the NPT should also provide adequate IAEA funding for both its assistance and safeguards functions. In addition, they should offer economic incentives to the developing countries parties to the NPT, not only in respect of nuclear energy but also other energy sources and accord special attention to the least developed countries. Finally, they should give priority to the NPT member developing countries in nuclear energy applications to food and agriculture, health, industry, physical and chemical sciences, nuclear safety, etc.

90. Non-proliferation measures should not jeopardize the full exercise of the inalienable right of all States parties to apply their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development, in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs.

91. Finally, the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty should have access to and be free to acquire technology, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries.

92. Mr. MADHOUR (Iraq), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the representative of the United Kingdom had referred to the illegal annexation of Kuwait and certain aspects of the Gulf crisis. However, reflection on the events of recent days or even those of the past century led to the conclusion that the problems raised in the Gulf, as in other regions, were the result of British colonialism. The peoples that had suffered from it in the past were aware of the nature of the relations that the United Kingdom had allowed to persist in the colonial countries after having been forced to leave them when they became liberated. The United Kingdom's colonial history in Kuwait and its establishment of dispersed entities whose purpose was to continue to divide the region were primarily responsible for that situation. The United Kingdom was not a policeman responsible for restoring order and enforcing international law, which it persisted in violating daily by its military presence in the Gulf. The embargo that had been imposed to starve the populations of those countries was in itself a breach of international law. The Gulf problem could only be solved after the withdrawal of United Kingdom and other foreign forces from the region; that course of action offered the sole possibility of a peaceful settlement of the crisis in those countries.

93. He also reminded the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany that the Security Council resolutions in question had been adopted under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations and that their implementation in no way required the use of armed force. The military measures that had been taken had absolutely no justification under international law.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.