

2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Main Committee I

Summary record of the 1st meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 19 May 2005, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Parnohadiningrat (Indonesia)

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The meeting was called to order at 10 a.m.

Organization of work

1. **The Chairman** drew attention to the proposed programme of work contained in document NPT/CONF.2005/MC.I/INF.1 and made an oral revision to it.

2. *The programme of work, as orally revised, was adopted.*

General exchange of views

3. **Mr. Kayser** (Luxembourg), speaking on behalf of the European Union; the acceding countries Bulgaria and Romania; the candidate countries Croatia and Turkey; the stabilization and association process countries Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro; and, in addition, Norway, introduced working paper NPT/CONF.2005/WP.43, entitled "Working paper based on the European Union statement for Main Committee I".

4. **Mr. Rivasseau** (France) said that his Government had greatly contributed to the global efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament and had reaffirmed its commitments under article VI of the Treaty. His Government was guided, in particular, by the programme of action adopted at the 1995 Review Conference, including with respect to the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and negotiations on the fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT).

5. His Government had renounced nuclear testing and had acceded to the CTBT. France had dismantled its testing centre in the Pacific, and no longer had any nuclear testing facilities. His Government regretted that the CTBT had still not entered into force. France had also abandoned the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Following its announcement that it had ceased to produce plutonium and highly enriched uranium for use in nuclear weapons, his Government had decided in February 1996 to close and dismantle its Pierrelatte and Marcoule facilities. The ongoing dismantling of the facilities was a long, complex and costly process, which would stretch over many years. France was alone among the nuclear Powers to have taken such steps.

6. France had advocated launching negotiations on an FMCT at the Conference on Disarmament. Pending signature of such a treaty, his delegation called on all States concerned to declare a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons.

7. France had also contributed greatly to the reduction of nuclear weapons in general. His Government based its nuclear deterrence policy on the principle of strict sufficiency. It had reduced the number of its delivery systems by two thirds since 1985. Further details on other disarmament efforts could be found in the brochure entitled "Lutte contre la prolifération, maîtrise des armements, et désarmement: l'action de la France".

8. France supported the ongoing efforts to bring about a global reduction in nuclear arsenals, especially the process launched by the United States of America and the Russian Federation. France had always underlined the considerable imbalance between the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation and the United States of America and its own such force. If the imbalance was redressed by successive reductions, his Government could envisage responding accordingly. In addition, France planned to contribute technically and financially to the Russian plutonium disposal programme within the framework of the agreement currently being negotiated within the multilateral plutonium disposition group.

9. In accordance with article VI of the NPT, his Government made efforts in all areas of general and complete disarmament, including with respect to biological and chemical weapons, small arms and light weapons and mines.

10. With respect to negative security assurances, his Government's doctrine of deterrence strictly linked its nuclear weapons to the safeguard of the vital interests of the nation while ruling out their use as combat weapons to advance a military strategy. Furthermore, the French President had stated that currently no French nuclear deterrent forces were aimed at a specific target. France had also given negative security assurances to all States parties to the NPT in a unilateral declaration of 6 April 1995.

11. Finally, one important path to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation lay in the regional approach. Therefore, his Government had supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and

given security assurances to more than 100 States. France was thus a party to the Protocols to the Tlatelolco, Rarotonga and Pelindaba Treaties, respectively. It stood ready to make further efforts to support the establishment of more such nuclear-weapon-free zones.

12. In view of the progress achieved to date by nuclear-weapon States since the end of the cold war, thorough discussions on the issue of negative security assurances would be appropriate within the Conference on Disarmament and, above all, the United Nations Disarmament Commission, where States which were not parties to the NPT were represented.

13. During the past two decades, States parties in sufficient numbers to undermine the Treaty had violated their obligations, developed illegal nuclear programmes and made false statements before the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. Their actions and those of the networks that had helped them would have continued had it not been for the common determination to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. For its part, France remained determined to pursue the application of all NPT provisions.

14. **Ms. Sanders** (United States of America) said that on 7 March 2005 President Bush had urged all parties to the NPT to take strong action to confront the threat of non-compliance with the NPT. States parties should work together at the Conference and in the Committee to recognize the amplitude of the problem and to agree on the main principles of their response.

15. The consistent violations by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea before the announcement of its intention to withdraw from the NPT, and its 10 February 2005 assertion that it had manufactured nuclear weapons, had created great instability in North-East Asia and had threatened the NPT regime. States in the region were confronted by a country with a history of provocation and belligerency. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea should return expeditiously and without preconditions to the six-party talks and commit to the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear programme.

16. Her delegation applauded the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for deciding to meet its NPT obligations. By doing so, it had set an important standard for how countries in violation of their non-proliferation

undertakings could voluntarily return to compliance and strengthen global confidence and security.

17. Regrettably, the Iranian regime's long-term secret effort to acquire a fissile material production capability could give the Islamic Republic of Iran nuclear weapons, in violation of its NPT and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards undertakings. The security consequences for the Middle East of that development were grave. Her Government encouraged the Islamic Republic of Iran to respond positively to the call by Germany, France and the United Kingdom to fully suspend and permanently cease all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, to dismantle equipment and facilities related to such activities, to bring into force and implement the Additional Protocol to the NPT, and to cooperate fully with the IAEA to resolve outstanding questions and meet all IAEA Board of Governors requests. The Islamic Republic of Iran should provide objective and verifiable guarantees in order to demonstrate that it was not using a purportedly peaceful programme to hide a nuclear weapons programme or to conduct additional clandestine nuclear work elsewhere in the country. Her Government shared the desire of European Governments to secure the Islamic Republic of Iran's adherence to its NPT obligations through peaceful and diplomatic means.

18. To fulfil the obligations under article I of the Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States must establish and implement comprehensive and effective export controls, including on dual-use items. The nuclear-weapon States had a special responsibility as they had had nuclear weapons infrastructures for decades. Given the interest of certain non-nuclear-weapon States and non-State actors in seeking the means to build nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States must effectively protect against theft or unauthorized transfer of technology, equipment and material useful in the development and manufacture of nuclear weapons.

19. Fulfilment of the obligations under article II required non-nuclear-weapon States to refrain from activities designed to develop nuclear weapons capability. Further, they should provide sufficient transparency in their activities to demonstrate their peaceful purpose and should have in place the necessary laws and regulations to enforce their article II obligations.

20. NPT supplier States, both nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States, should not authorize the export of any nuclear-related item unless they were satisfied that the transfer would not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. When in doubt about a possible diversion risk, it was best to forgo the export. By doing so, NPT supplier States could avoid inadvertently assisting a possible future NPT violator to acquire capabilities useful for a nuclear weapons programme. If a State had violated the NPT's non-proliferation obligations, then all nuclear cooperation with that State should terminate.

21. The revelations associated with the Abdul Qadeer Khan nuclear procurement network had made clear that all States must be vigilant to prevent their territories from being used to further nuclear weapons acquisition. In accordance with Security Council resolution 1540 (2005), all States must establish effective national legal and regulatory measures to criminalize the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials. Full implementation of the resolution by all States would strengthen enforcement of articles I and II of the NPT.

22. Another activity that could help to ensure that parties to the NPT did not inadvertently assist a State to acquire nuclear weapons was to take action against an illegal export during the transport phase. States should take cooperative action to prevent illicit nuclear trafficking. The Proliferation Security Initiative could play an important role in preventing nuclear items from reaching State or non-State actors of nuclear proliferation concern.

23. The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism would help to strengthen the international legal framework to combat nuclear terrorism upon its entry into force. Her Government strongly supported the ongoing effort to include non-proliferation transport offences and a shipboarding regime which complemented the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation. That effort would significantly expand the international legal basis to impede, prosecute and punish persons or entities involved in the maritime transport of proliferation-related shipments.

24. To strengthen the article II ban on the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons, States parties must have strong declaratory policies that

established the necessity of compliance with the NPT. They should also seek to halt the use of nuclear material or equipment acquired or produced by a State party as a result of a material violation of NPT undertakings. Such items should be eliminated or returned to the original supplier. States parties should affirm their willingness to report cases of non-compliance with article II to the Security Council. The Council should act promptly in such circumstances to determine a response, particularly where international peace and security were threatened.

25. Any lifting of punitive measures must be strictly linked to verifiable actions and be phased in over a period of time. Among the actions that must be taken by the non-compliant party was the full implementation of the IAEA Additional Protocol. Moreover, States parties were fully justified in insisting on certain limits in the offender's future nuclear programme, even after it had returned to full compliance.

26. Finally, States parties should understand that the prohibition in article II against the manufacture or acquisition of a nuclear weapon could apply to more than just an assembled nuclear weapon. In an extreme case, a State party might have manufactured an entire mock-up of the non-nuclear shell of a nuclear explosive while continuing to observe its safeguards obligations on all nuclear material. It would be folly for States parties to fail to act in such circumstances. Whether or not there had been a safeguards violation under article III, it was also important to determine whether all the facts of a case pointed towards an intent to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons. Examples of activities of concern included: seeking certain fuel cycle facilities of direct relevance to nuclear weapons, such as enrichment or reprocessing, with no clear economic or peaceful justification; clandestine facilities and procurements; committing safeguards violations and failing to cooperate with the IAEA to remedy them; and using denial and deception tactics to conceal nuclear-related activities.

27. The Islamic Republic of Iran had sought to acquire an enrichment programme in secret and in violation of its safeguards obligations under the NPT. In the light of the willingness of another State to provide fuel for the Bushehr reactor and any future reactor, the Islamic Republic of Iran's enrichment programme had no conceivable civil purpose. Moreover, its uranium reserves were too small to

provide an independent fuel supply for its nuclear power programme, but large enough to support a weapons programme. It was painfully clear that the Islamic Republic of Iran was determined to acquire an enrichment plant to give itself the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons, which it could pursue either through further violation of or withdrawal from the NPT. The intent of those activities was therefore the manufacture of nuclear weapons, in violation of article II.

28. The NPT should be an essential element of international efforts to create a global environment hostile to the spread of weapons of mass destruction. It would lose much of its effectiveness if States parties were not strongly committed to compliance with non-proliferation undertakings under the NPT and to strong action against those who were not.

29. **Mr. Aboul-Einein** (Egypt) said that Egypt had adopted the working papers on the substantive issues to be considered by Main Committee I (WP.18) and on nuclear disarmament (WP.27). In order to reaffirm the place of NPT as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament regime, strong political will was needed from all parties. Negative regional and international developments affected the credibility and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Treaty had entered into force 35 years previously and had been extended indefinitely in 1995, but its goals were still far from being achieved.

30. Nuclear-weapon States were still delaying the full implementation of their obligations. NPT was merely an intermediate step towards the higher goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons under effective and stringent international monitoring within a short, clearly stated time frame. The 2000 Review Conference had recommended a number of practical steps to implement the provisions of article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Nuclear-weapon States must fully implement those measures, since failure to do so affected the credibility of the Treaty and reinforced the widespread notion that it strengthened the status of the nuclear-weapon States while placing more constraints on the non-nuclear-weapon States, which violated both the letter and spirit of the Treaty.

31. While NPT was one of the most successful disarmament and non-proliferation regimes, two key elements prevented the achievement of the Treaty's goals. The first was that three States, namely, Israel, India and Pakistan, remained outside of the Treaty, thereby preventing the achievement of the goals of disarmament and non-proliferation and posing an obstacle to the universalization of the regime. The second was the failure of the nuclear-weapon States to disarm in accordance with article VI of the Treaty, despite the end of the cold war and the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice and the decisions of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences.

32. The continuation of strategic policies that relied on nuclear weapons and offered new justifications for their continued possession and development was a matter of concern, since to continue along that path would undermine the credibility of the Treaty. Efforts aimed at concluding an international convention that contained clear and binding commitments on the negative security guarantees that nuclear-weapon States must make to non-nuclear-weapon States must also be supported and accorded the highest priority in the work of the Committee.

33. Regional and international nuclear disarmament were essential, since genuine regional and international security and stability were impossible to achieve as long as there were nuclear weapons. Egypt was disappointed at the failure of the Conference on Disarmament to establish an appropriate subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament and to begin negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Conference should adopt a programme of action providing for immediate negotiations on such a treaty.

34. Egypt was concerned at efforts to limit the scope of negotiations on the drafting of a treaty to prohibit the manufacture of fissile materials. The Conference should clearly and objectively review the extent to which nuclear-weapon States were fulfilling their NPT obligations and promptly begin multilateral negotiations on disarmament that included both the five nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States.

35. Nuclear-weapon States should implement the principles of irreversibility, transparency, and

accountability with regard to their nuclear arsenals as well as measures to reduce their arsenals of nuclear weapons, including the creation of additional investigatory capabilities.

36. The issue of complete compliance with the provisions of the Treaty posed major challenges. Egypt had repeatedly emphasized that all of the Treaty's provisions were binding on all parties, in all conditions, and at all times. True compliance meant the reciprocal implementation of obligations by all States parties, whether nuclear or non-nuclear. Questions remained about the so-called "nuclear sharing" in the context of existing military alliances to determine the extent to which it was in violation of or in compliance with articles I and II of the Treaty.

37. Egypt attached great importance to awareness-raising and education in the fields of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and, together with a number of other States, it had participated in the preparation of the working paper on disarmament and non-proliferation education (WP.30).

38. **Mr. Hu Xiaodi** (China) said that preservation and strengthening of the NPT through the faithful implementation of all of its articles by all States parties were vital for meeting common security challenges. Over the years, China had strictly implemented its nuclear disarmament obligations under the NPT.

39. China stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and the conclusion of relevant international legal instruments to that end. It had pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States under any circumstances. It had signed and ratified relevant protocols to the Tlatelolco, Rarotonga and Pelindaba Treaties and hoped that the parties concerned could reach an early agreement on the outstanding questions related to the Bangkok Treaty and the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. China stood ready to sign the relevant protocols to those Treaties. It called upon all nuclear-weapon States to renounce the policy of nuclear deterrence based on the first use of nuclear weapons, to pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security policies. China had never taken part in the nuclear arms race nor deployed nuclear weapons abroad. Instead, it had contributed to the international nuclear disarmament

process by unilaterally assuming the above-mentioned international obligations.

40. The key to international arms control and disarmament lay in breaking the deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament. China supported the Conference's efforts to reach consensus on the programme of work based on the "Five Ambassadors' Proposal" so as to begin substantive work at an early date on nuclear disarmament, a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, prevention of an arms race in outer space, and security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. It called upon the parties concerned to demonstrate the necessary political will.

41. China supported the early entry into force of the CTBT and was committed to ratifying the Treaty at an early date. It actively supported and participated in the work of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization.

42. Efforts to prevent the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space and to advance nuclear disarmament were mutually reinforcing. The deployment of weapons systems in outer space would disrupt the global strategic balance and stability and provoke arms races, including nuclear ones. Such a scenario should not be allowed to become a reality. To that end, China, the Russian Federation, and other countries had consistently supported the negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament of an international legal agreement on the prohibition of deployment of weapons in outer space, and of the threat or use of force against objects in outer space.

43. The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference outlined a number of principles and measures concerning nuclear disarmament. The reduction of nuclear weapons should be effectively verifiable, irreversible and legally binding. Nuclear disarmament measures, including intermediate measures, should promote international strategic stability, preserve security for all, and foster the promotion of international peace and security. Those principles should be reflected in the Final Document of the 2005 Review Conference.

44. Nuclear disarmament should be a just and reasonable process of gradual reduction towards a lowered balance. States possessing the largest and most advanced nuclear arsenals bore special and primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and should

therefore take the lead in drastically reducing their nuclear arsenals and in making their reduction commitments legally binding. All nuclear weapons removed from their arsenals should be destroyed rather than stored.

45. China favoured intermediate measures towards the goal of nuclear disarmament and was ready to consider implementing relevant measures at the appropriate time and under the appropriate conditions.

46. In order to promote nuclear disarmament, reduce the danger of nuclear war and diminish the role of nuclear weapons in national security policy, nuclear-weapon States should abandon policies of nuclear deterrence based on the first use of nuclear weapons and on lowering the threshold for their use. They should also honour their commitment not to target their nuclear weapons against any countries, nor to list any countries as targets of a nuclear strike. All nuclear-weapon States should pledge that at no time and under no circumstances would they be the first to use nuclear weapons, or to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and should conclude appropriate international legal instruments to that end. States should withdraw and repatriate all nuclear weapons deployed outside their own territories, abandon “nuclear umbrella” and “nuclear sharing” policies and practices, and refrain from developing easy-to-use low-yield nuclear weapons. Nuclear-weapon States should take all necessary steps to avoid accidental or unauthorized launches of nuclear weapons.

47. The Chinese delegation hoped that the ideas contained in the working paper on nuclear disarmament and reduction of the danger of nuclear war (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.2) could be reflected in the report of the Committee and in the final document of the Conference.

48. China believed that fostering a security concept based on mutual trust and benefit, equality and cooperation and on the creation of a favourable international environment were conducive to nuclear disarmament. It would continue to work with the international community towards the lofty goal of eliminating the threat of nuclear weapons and ridding the world of such weapons.

49. **Mr. Mine** (Japan) said that the NPT was a key instrument for achieving global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. To bolster the

regime, nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike must fulfil their obligations and commitments under the Treaty and promote both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

50. His delegation recalled States parties’ obligations under article VI to pursue negotiations in good faith on disarmament measures; their commitment to the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament; and the unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons, one of the 13 practical steps agreed upon at the 2000 Conference.

51. Japan commended the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) and encouraged both the Russian Federation and the United States of America to work towards its full implementation. His delegation called upon all nuclear-weapon States to take further steps towards nuclear disarmament in a transparent and irreversible manner, including deeper reductions in all types of nuclear weapons.

52. Japan attached great significance to the early entry into force of the CTBT, which had been an integral part of the package of decisions adopted at the 1995 Review Conference to allow for the indefinite extension of the NPT. Japan called upon the remaining 11 countries whose ratification was necessary for the Treaty’s entry into force to sign and ratify it without delay. Moratoriums on nuclear weapons testing should be continued pending the entry into force of the Treaty. Efforts to develop the CTBT verification regime, including the international monitoring system, should also be continued.

53. The conclusion of an FMCT would be a crucial element in efforts aimed at the total elimination of nuclear arsenals and contribute to the prevention of nuclear proliferation. It would also serve as an effective tool in dealing with the terrorist threat. His delegation noted with regret the ongoing impasse at the Conference on Disarmament and failure to begin negotiations on an FMCT, despite the commitments made at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. The current Review Conference must send a clear message underlining the importance of beginning negotiations immediately. Japan called upon all nuclear-weapon States and States which were not parties to the NPT to declare moratoriums on the production of fissile

material for any nuclear weapons pending the entry into force of an FMCT.

54. The failure of India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the NPT was a matter of serious concern. They should be urged to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States without delay, to refrain from acts that violated the Treaty, and to implement practical measures towards disarmament and non-proliferation. His delegation drew attention to the working paper entitled “Further measures to be taken for strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.21).

55. Japan attached the utmost importance to disarmament and non-proliferation education and had submitted a working paper entitled “Japan’s Efforts in Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education” (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.31). Furthermore, Japan, jointly with Egypt, Hungary, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Poland and Sweden, had submitted to the current Review Conference a working paper which contained concrete recommendations for promoting disarmament and non-proliferation education (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.30).

56. The international community should be fully aware of the inhumane nature of nuclear weapons. All States parties should undertake concrete activities to implement the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General on disarmament and non-proliferation education (A/59/178 and Add.1 and 2) and to share information on the efforts they had been undertaking to that end.

57. 2005 marked the sixtieth anniversary of the tragedies in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. There were strong voices among the citizens of Japan and the international community affirming that such devastation should never be repeated and that nuclear weapons should be abolished. His delegation called on all States parties to renew their commitment to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

58. **Mr. Agam** (Malaysia), speaking on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the NPT, said that the Group remained fully committed to its obligations undertaken under the Treaty and to the agreements reached at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. He introduced working paper NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, entitled “Substantive issues to be considered by Main Committee I of the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, which reaffirmed the Group’s position on three issues within the purview of the Committee: nuclear disarmament; nuclear testing; and security assurances. It also contained recommendations for consideration by the Committee, which would help greatly to achieve the objectives of the Treaty.

59. The Group of Non-Aligned States had called for the establishment of two subsidiary bodies, one on nuclear disarmament, to focus on fulfilment of the obligations under article VI, and the other on security assurances, to consider legally binding security assurances by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States. The Group had nevertheless joined the consensus, in the spirit of compromise, on the proposals put forward by the President to establish a single subsidiary body, on nuclear disarmament and security assurances. It was the understanding of the Group that the subsidiary body would focus on the fulfilment of the obligation under article VI of the Treaty and the 13 practical steps agreed upon at the 2000 NPT Review Conference and consider legally binding security assurances by nuclear-weapon States.

60. **Mr. Minty** (South Africa) said that the Committee had the opportunity to make a significant contribution to the strengthening of nuclear disarmament. The 2000 NPT Review Conference had made it clear that, as in the case of other weapons of mass destruction, the elimination of nuclear weapons was a milestone on the road to general and complete disarmament.

61. The commitment made by nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 NPT Review Conference to the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals had confirmed his delegation’s long-held view that the possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States was only temporary. Those States had agreed to 13 practical steps for nuclear disarmament, which constituted a solemn reaffirmation of their obligations under article VI of the Treaty.

62. The international community was increasingly concerned that nuclear-weapon States were not doing enough to achieve nuclear disarmament and, in some areas, were reversing the gains made by the Treaty regime. That situation was exacerbated by a tendency to reinterpret, negate or withdraw from the obligations undertaken at previous conferences. The NPT was a credible multilateral framework for enhancing nuclear

disarmament. The concept of multilateralism should inform the international community's approaches to the Treaty.

63. The lack of political will had been a serious impediment to nuclear disarmament. Nuclear-weapon States continued to reject any proposed language within multilateral forums calling on them to implement their nuclear disarmament obligations. In general, nuclear-weapon States had systematically opposed all attempts to be involved in a substantive engagement on nuclear disarmament in the NPT preparatory process, the First Committee and the Conference on Disarmament.

64. Any presumption of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States was incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and with the broader goal of the maintenance of international peace and security. Continuous and irreversible progress in nuclear disarmament and other related nuclear arms control measures remained fundamental to the promotion of nuclear non-proliferation. The complete elimination of nuclear weapons and the guarantee that they would never be produced again therefore remained the only assurance against their use.

65. The lack of progress on security assurances was yet another cause of great concern to his delegation. South Africa would continue to reiterate its call for negotiations on a legally binding instrument on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT which could be in the form either of a separate agreement reached in the context of the NPT or of a protocol to the Treaty. Nuclear-weapon States must fully respect their existing commitments on security assurances pending the conclusion of multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances for all non-nuclear-weapon States.

66. The development of new types of nuclear weapons or rationalizations for their use contradicted the spirit of the NPT and went against the agreement reached at the 2000 NPT Review Conference for a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies. The modernization of nuclear weapons raised concerns that nuclear testing might be resumed, which would have a negative impact on international peace and security. His delegation therefore favoured maintaining the moratorium on nuclear weapon test

explosions or any other nuclear explosions, pending the early entry into force of the CTBT.

67. His delegation regretted that the emphasis by some States on non-proliferation appeared to be an attempt to curtail the inalienable right of States parties to use nuclear technology for verifiable peaceful purposes. It would be unfair to place more restrictions on non-nuclear-weapon States' access to nuclear technology without genuine movement towards nuclear disarmament.

68. The crisis threatening the NPT could be avoided if nuclear-weapon States acknowledged the necessity of accelerating implementation of the 13 practical steps. All States parties must fully comply with their commitments on the subjects of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation and must refrain from acting in any way that might lead to a new nuclear arms race.

69. **Mr. Sardenberg** (Brazil) said that global security depended on the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the assurance that they would never be produced or used again. In 2000, his delegation had welcomed the reiteration by nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. It noted with regret, however, that progress by nuclear-weapon States on the path to nuclear disarmament had fallen short of expectations.

70. Brazil, which welcomed both unilateral and bilateral disarmament measures, regarded the Treaty of Moscow as a positive step. Nevertheless, his Government remained concerned about the overall modest progress in reducing nuclear arsenals and considered that the principles of transparency, international verification and irreversibility must be applied.

71. The reaffirmation of security doctrines that continued to rely on nuclear weapons, and the ongoing reluctance of nuclear-weapon States to extend unconditional, legally binding negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States, were disturbing, while indications of interest in the development of new kinds of nuclear weapons were of even greater concern. The aforementioned situation had eroded confidence in the NPT-based regime.

72. The pursuit of nuclear disarmament was also necessary to alleviate the international community's

concern about proliferation. Disarmament and non-proliferation were mutually reinforcing processes requiring progress on both fronts. Progress in nuclear disarmament was all the more important in a world in which non-State actors might seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, the international community's focus must be on systematic, continuous and progressive efforts to implement the obligations contained in article VI.

73. The following points, which would facilitate the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, should be given due consideration. First, the Conference should undertake a thorough review of the implementation of the 2000 NPT Final Document, in particular the 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament, and reaffirm the need for their further implementation. Secondly, the Conference should call for the prompt entry into force of the CTBT and the expeditious negotiation, in the Conference of Disarmament, of a verifiable fissile material treaty. Thirdly, the Conference should send a strong message that the development of new kinds of nuclear weapons was incompatible with the commitments to nuclear disarmament. Fourthly, the Conference should recommend that nuclear-weapon States review their military doctrines in order to reduce the importance and role of nuclear weapons. Fifthly, the Conference should secure a commitment from nuclear-weapon States not to use nuclear weapons as a first step in a process leading to the negotiation of a convention banning their production and use. Sixthly, the Conference should ask the nuclear-weapon States to carry out, within an agreed time frame and in transparent and internationally verifiable conditions, additional measures aimed at the destruction of their nuclear arsenals. Lastly, the Conference should reiterate the need for comprehensive, systematic and regular reports to be submitted as official documents of the Conference by the nuclear-weapon States regarding their implementation of article VI.

74. **Mr. Kharazi** (Islamic Republic of Iran), introducing working paper NPT/CONF.2005/WP.47, entitled, "Working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran for Main Committee I", drew attention to a paragraph in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)) which reaffirmed that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the

only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The 2000 Review had also agreed that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It had called upon the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on that subject, but unfortunately the Preparatory Committee had not been able to do so. His delegation therefore proposed the establishment of an ad hoc committee to draft a legally binding instrument on the provision of negative security assurances by the nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. The Committee would submit a report on that instrument to the next Review Conference for consideration. As suggested by the NGO community, the present Conference should adopt a decision to prohibit the threat of use or use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States.

75. His delegation was disappointed and dismayed that the United States of America, rather than focusing on the efforts of his Government to fulfil the obligations undertaken under the Treaty, had levelled false accusations against it which completely contradicted the reports and decisions of the IAEA and its Board of Governors. No IAEA document referred to non-compliance with the NPT. On the contrary, the IAEA had concluded in one of its main documents that, following extensive inspections of all relevant nuclear facilities in the country, it had found no trace of the diversion of nuclear material to non-peaceful uses. His delegation regretted that the representative of the United States had denied that it had any obligations under article VI of the Treaty and had used every possible forum during the Conference to make politically motivated accusations against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.