current negotiations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United Kingdom, France and Germany, which he hoped would allay concerns and lay the foundations for new long-term arrangements acceptable to all. As for the black market in nuclear materials and technology operated by the Pakistani scientist, Dr. A. Q. Khan, the international community must do all it could to tackle illicit trafficking and procurement networks, and address non-State-actor involvement in them.

44. The Conference must also acknowledge and reinforce the vital role played by the IAEA safeguards system and accept that the Additional Protocol was an essential part of an effective safeguards regime. Indeed, the IAEA Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol should together be the verification standard for all States parties.

45. To uphold the authority and integrity of the NPT, the current Conference must address all its provisions equally. His delegation attached particular importance to article VI and remained convinced that disarmament and non-proliferation were mutually reinforcing processes. The continued retention, or unsatisfactory rate of elimination, of nuclear weapons could never justify proliferation by other States. However, States’ respective obligations to eliminate or refrain from developing nuclear weapons were legally binding too. His delegation was therefore concerned that such weapons were still central to strategic concepts, particularly in the light of plans to develop new nuclear weapons or modify existing ones for new uses. He welcomed progress that had been made — such as the 2002 Moscow Treaty — but emphasized the importance of irreversible and transparent arms control measures. In the light of the Secretary-General’s recent call for nuclear-weapon States to further reduce their arsenals and pursue arms control agreements that entailed disarmament and irreversibility (A/59/2005), he urged the Security Council to seize the opportunity for leadership and help strengthen the NPT. The adoption by consensus of the Final Document of the 2000 Conference (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)) had demonstrated that progress could be achieved if there was sufficient political will.

46. His Government attached special importance to the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI, particularly the nuclear-weapon States’ unequivocal undertaking to totally eliminate their nuclear arsenals and was disappointed that some parties now seemed to be calling into question those commitments. Given the fundamental link between the NPT objectives and the CTBT, he urged those States whose ratification was required for the latter’s entry into force to review their positions and move towards ratification. In the meantime, all States should continue to abide by a moratorium on testing. Other crucial steps, which had been delayed because the Conference on Disarmament had still been unable to agree on a programme of work, were the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty and the establishment of a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament. Lastly, he expressed the hope that the current Conference would examine its working methods and consider whether the current review process was the most effective. In Ireland’s view, the process did not respond adequately to the needs of the Treaty. He therefore welcomed the proposal for annual meetings of States parties, as it would enable issues requiring an early response to be dealt with more effectively.

47. **Mr. Syed** (Malaysia), speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, said that today’s one-sided emphasis on proliferation, rather than disarmament in good faith, threatened to unravel the whole NPT regime. His Government’s concerns in 1995 that indefinite extension was a carte blanche to the nuclear-weapon States had not been assuaged. The nuclear-weapon States and those States outside the NPT continued to develop and modernize their nuclear arsenals. The current Conference must call for an end to such madness and seek the elimination of all nuclear weapons, a ban on testing and the rejection of the nuclear deterrence doctrine. In 2000, the nuclear-weapon States had unequivocally undertaken to totally eliminate their nuclear arsenals, while world leaders gathered at the Millennium Summit had declared their resolve to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers (General Assembly resolution 55/2, para. 9). Much had happened since then. Fears about weapons of mass destruction, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear terrorism were shared by all States. The nightmares would continue as long as nuclear weapons continued to exist. At the same time, there was a desire to preserve the inherent right to use nuclear technology, including energy, for peaceful purposes. The
Conference should address fears and seize the opportunity of making the Treaty and its review process more effective.

48. The non-aligned countries that were parties to the Treaty would be guided by the decisions taken at the XIII Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement (Kuala Lumpur, 2003) and the XIV Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement (Durban, 2004), both of which had affirmed that a multilateral approach was the only way of dealing with the multiplicity of disarmament and international security issues. The non-aligned States parties reaffirmed their long-established positions on nuclear disarmament and remained fully committed to their NPT obligations and the agreements reached in 1995 and 2000. The Movement had submitted a number of working papers outlining its views on various fundamental questions and making a number of key recommendations. He called on all States to recognize the importance of the full and non-selective implementation of all three pillars of the NPT. The non-aligned States parties remained fully convinced that the NPT was a key instrument with regard to both non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, as it sought to ensure a balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. Its indefinite extension did not imply indefinite possession of nuclear arsenals. The only way to curtail proliferation was to accept that total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use thereof. Pending such total elimination, efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority. The Non-Aligned Movement reaffirmed the importance of achieving the total elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons. It remained convinced that nuclear weapons posed the greatest danger to mankind and reaffirmed the need for all States to fulfil their arms control and disarmament obligations and to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. General and complete disarmament should remain the ultimate objective. While recognizing recent moves by nuclear-weapon States towards disarmament, he reiterated the Movement’s deep concern over the slow pace of progress.

49. The non-aligned States parties reaffirmed the inalienable right of States parties to engage in research, production and use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes without discrimination. The free, unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes must be fully ensured and nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting that right. Nuclear-weapon States must refrain from nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements. There should also be a total ban on transferring nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and on extending nuclear, scientific or technological assistance to States that were not parties to the Treaty, without exception. Any effort to stem proliferation should be transparent and open to participation by all States, access to material, equipment and technology for civilian purposes should not be unduly restricted and efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones should be supported. In that regard, he welcomed the convening in Mexico City in April 2005 of the Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones.

50. The international community should continue to seek ways of ensuring that the NPT remained a true cornerstone for global peace and security. In that connection, collective efforts towards the accession of the remaining three non-parties which possessed nuclear weapons should be renewed with vigour. Lastly, he hoped that the views and recommendations contained in the working papers submitted by the Movement would be given serious consideration by all States parties. The Movement was determined not to miss the current opportunity to create a better and safer world for future generations and expected all States to show the same constructive attitude.

51. **Mr. Fischer** (Germany) said that the adoption of a common position by the European Union was an important contribution to achieving a successful outcome. His Government fully endorsed the statement made by the representative of Luxembourg on behalf of the European Union. The sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War was an opportunity once again to recall the lessons that the international community had drawn from its horror, namely the need for an international order and effective multilateral cooperation based on common rules. Such lessons remained as relevant today as they had ever been, given the many examples of international terrorism in