Summary record of the 1st meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 3 May 2010, at 10.30 a.m.

Acting President: Mr. Yelchenko. ......................................................... (Ukraine)
President: Mr. Cabactulan. ......................................................... (Philippines)

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Any corrections to the record of this meeting and of other meetings will be issued in a corrigendum.
The meeting was called to order at 10.40 a.m.

Opening of the Conference by the Chairman of the second session of the Preparatory Committee

1. The Acting President, introducing the final report of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2010/1), recalled that the Treaty had played a crucial role in promoting nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy since its entry into force. The current Review Conference provided an opportunity for States parties to reaffirm their full commitment to the Treaty to ensure that it remained the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.

2. The Preparatory Committee had held three sessions between April 2007 and May 2009; 135 States parties to the Treaty had participated in one or more of those sessions, together with States not parties to the Treaty, specialized agencies, international and regional intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations and members of academia who had participated in accordance with the agreed modalities. At each session, one meeting had been set aside for presentations by non-governmental organizations.

3. The Preparatory Committee had reached agreement on all main issues related to the organization of the Conference, including: the election of the President; the date and venue of the Conference; the draft rules of procedure; the financial arrangements; the provisional agenda; and the allocation of items to the Main Committees. The recommendations on those issues were reflected in the report. However, it had decided to defer consideration of a final document or documents of the Conference to the 2010 Review Conference.

4. Most of the Preparatory Committee’s meetings had been devoted to a substantive discussion of all aspects of the Treaty and of three clusters of issues based on the allocation of items to the Main Committees of the 2005 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2005/DEC.1). The Committee had also considered the following three specific blocks of issues: nuclear disarmament and security assurances; regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East; and other provisions of the Treaty, including article X.

5. The Chairmen of the first and second sessions of the Preparatory Committee had prepared factual summaries contained in working papers of those sessions (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.78 and NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.43, respectively); at its third session, however, the Preparatory Committee had been unable to produce a consensus report containing substantive recommendations to the Review Conference.

Election of the President of the Conference

6. The Acting President announced that the Preparatory Committee, at its third session, had unanimously recommended the election of Mr. Libran Nuevas Cabactulan of the Philippines as President.

7. Mr. Cabactulan (Philippines) was elected President of the Conference by acclamation.

8. Mr. Cabactulan (Philippines) took the Chair.

Statement by the President of the Conference

9. The President said that, in order for the Review Conference to achieve a meaningful outcome for the common good, all those present would need to show maximum flexibility and avoid intractable positions and obdurate attitudes. In that respect, he was comforted by the fact that, during his year-long consultations, delegations had all stressed their strong and urgent desire to have a successful Review Conference. Such an outcome was indeed sorely needed.

10. He urged delegations to maintain the positive atmosphere engendered by the Chairman of the third session of the Preparatory Committee, Mr. Boniface Guwa Chidyausiku of Zimbabwe. As President of the Review Conference, he intended to continue the latter’s good work. To that end, he vowed to act impartially in an open, transparent and all-inclusive manner to help delegations make progress on all three pillars of the Treaty.

11. Full advantage must now be taken of the rare opportunity provided by the current Review Conference, particularly in the light of recent positive developments. The world expected a positive outcome which would ensure that the Treaty continued to be an effective instrument. Those present had a duty to work
together to meet that expectation. He called upon them
to do so.

Address by the Secretary-General of the
United Nations

12. The Secretary-General said that the work being
undertaken by the Review Conference was of immense
importance to humankind. Hopes and expectations
were running high: the world’s people were looking to
the States parties to the Treaty for action to protect
them from the destructive power of nuclear weapons,
to curb rising spending on nuclear weapons and to
build a safer and more secure world.

13. Disarmament and non-proliferation ranked among
his top priorities. While the achievement of those goals
still remained possible, the disarmament and
non-proliferation agenda had been dormant for too
long. Convinced that the time to act had now arrived,
he had put forward a concrete action plan. He had also
sought to strengthen international laws and instruments
and was committed to serving as a bridge among
peoples and nations with different views, sometimes
deply held.

14. Chilling memories from his recent visit to
Semipalatinsk, the former nuclear test site in
Kazakhstan, were still fresh in his mind. On 6 August
2010, the sixty-fifth anniversary of the day the first
atomic bomb was dropped, he intended to visit
Hiroshima and to advocate once more for a world free
of nuclear weapons. However, the world still lived
under a nuclear shadow. How long would it take
eliminate that threat? How long would humanity
continue to pass that problem on to succeeding
generations?

15. The 2005 Review Conference had, quite plainly
and simply, been a failure. The 2010 Review
Conference could, and must, do better. There was a
choice: to leave a legacy of fear and inaction, or to act
with vision, courage and leadership.

16. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons was one of the most important multilateral
accords in history. Though not perfect, it was the
cornerstone of the world’s nuclear non-proliferation
regime and enjoyed near-universal membership. The
world needed that regime as much as ever.

17. While the nuclear threat remained real, it had
evolved into new and varied forms that must now be
addressed. The world’s people therefore expected
more: more progress on disarmament, more arms cuts
and more transparency.

18. Some of the multiple challenges to be faced
included doubts about compliance; resentments
between the nuclear “haves” and “have-nots”; a grave
and growing concern over nuclear terrorism and the
black market in nuclear technology and materials; and
the danger that a regional conflict might “go nuclear”.
Solutions did not lie in elevating one of the three
pillars over another: progress on disarmament could
not await a world free of war, nuclear proliferation or
terrorism; progress on non-proliferation could not
await the elimination of the last nuclear weapon; and
advancing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy could
not be held hostage to either disarmament or
non-proliferation. From the earliest days of the Treaty,
the international community had understood that those
goals were interdependent and mutually reinforcing,
and must therefore be pursued simultaneously.

19. There had been some encouraging signs of
progress prior to the eighth Review Conference: the
signature of the new Treaty between the United States
of America and the Russian Federation on Measures
for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms; the Nuclear Security Summit held
recently in Washington, D.C., to be followed by a
further Summit in Seoul two years later; a variety of
Government initiatives, including from other nuclear-
weapon States; and mobilization by civil society. The
international community must build on that
momentum. He therefore wished to propose the
following five benchmarks for success.

20. The first benchmark was real progress towards
disarmament. To that end, he urged the nuclear-weapon
States to reaffirm their “unequivocal undertaking” to
eliminate nuclear weapons. The time had come to
translate that commitment into action. Failure to do so
would constitute a step backwards. In that connection,
he encouraged States parties to the Treaty to update
and expand on the 13 practical steps adopted at the
2000 Review Conference. The steps provided a solid
platform on which to build and there was no need to
start from scratch. What had been lacking hitherto was
the political will to translate words into action.

21. The second benchmark for success was
movement towards universality of the Treaty. He
therefore urged those States that had not yet acceded to
it to do so as soon as possible. Pending their accession, there was a need for measures to ensure the safety and security of those countries’ arsenals and technology. Nuclear material must not be acquired by non-State actors and terrorists. Additional measures should include a moratorium on nuclear tests, tight export controls on fissile materials and related technologies, and stringent command and control systems for countries’ arsenals. There was also a need to ensure that the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes did not have unintended consequences. It should be unacceptable for countries to use the Treaty as cover to develop nuclear weapons, only to withdraw afterwards. Moreover, nuclear energy must be developed under agreed safeguards, especially given predictions of a nuclear energy renaissance as energy demands grew and pressure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions increased.

22. The third benchmark entailed strengthening the rule of law. In that connection, he noted that the quest for a nuclear-weapon-free world also included a framework of legal instruments that complemented the Treaty. Since 1999, when he had served as Chairman of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, he had strongly advocated the early entry into force of that key instrument. The time had come to think very seriously about setting a time frame for ratification. The current mechanism for entry into force dated from a time when there had been questions about that Treaty’s monitoring and verification system. However, times had changed. The system had proven its effectiveness.

23. Moreover, it had been 15 years since the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty had been opened for signature. Once again, how long must the international community wait? Serious consideration must therefore be given to an alternative mechanism for bringing that Treaty into effect. In that context, he warmly welcomed the announcement of Indonesia that it would soon ratify that Treaty and urged others to follow suit. As the Treaty’s depository, he stood ready to visit the capitals of the remaining countries whose ratification was essential, and to talk to the respective leaders about their concerns.

24. Another vital instrument was the landmark International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. He had therefore called for a conference to be held in either 2010 or 2011 to review its implementation.

25. He had also called on the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations immediately on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes. If the Conference on Disarmament could not agree on its programme of work, it might need a stronger impetus from a higher political level. To that end, the members of the Conference on Disarmament might consider holding a ministerial meeting on the margins of the forthcoming General Assembly session to be held in New York in September 2010.

26. He also urged all States to accept additional protocols to their International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreements. At the Nuclear Security Summit, he had been encouraged by the overwhelming support for improving the Agency’s capacity and system of safeguards.

27. The fourth benchmark for success was progress towards a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and progress on other regional concerns. Such zones made significant contributions to disarmament and non-proliferation. They also helped to build confidence, which could lead to progress in other areas. He therefore strongly supported efforts to create such a zone in the Middle East and urged the relevant stakeholders to engage in a robust discussion of the matter.

28. With respect to the Iranian nuclear programme, he called on the Islamic Republic of Iran to fully comply with Security Council resolutions and to fully cooperate with IAEA. He also encouraged it to accept the nuclear fuel supply proposal put forward by the Agency as an important confidence-building measure and stressed that the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran should engage constructively in ongoing efforts to clarify doubts and concerns about his country’s programme.

29. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea should also make every effort to return to the Six-Party Talks as soon as possible, without preconditions, in order to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

30. His fifth and final benchmark for success was a strengthened review process for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including through more active engagement by the relevant United Nations bodies. Implementation of the Treaty would benefit from more systematic national reporting and
the provision of substantive and organizational support. States parties to the Treaty might wish to consider ways in which a small, permanent structure could help.

31. The Treaty’s lack of an effective tool to address non-compliance was a significant institutional deficit. The Security Council had a special and crucial role to play in filling that gap, including through regular ministerial meetings to follow up on the historic 2009 Security Council summit on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. He also recognized the importance of initiatives by the General Assembly, as set out in his action plan. His Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters had also put forward sound proposals that deserved consideration.

32. He recalled that the purpose of the Review Conference was not simply to avoid a nuclear nightmare, but also to build a safer world for all. Many countries had shown great leadership: those that had abolished nuclear weapons; those that had established nuclear-weapon-free zones; and those that had reduced their arsenals.

33. However, he challenged them all to go further still: to take the steps now to set the stage for a breakthrough tomorrow. What was needed were more examples of what could be achieved, not more excuses for why it was not possible. Now was the time to deliver on one of the deepest aspirations of humankind, and on one of the founding resolutions of the Organization. He therefore looked to the States parties to the Treaty to show the leadership required.

Address by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency

34. Mr. Amano (Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)) said that all the activities of IAEA were relevant to the work of the Review Conference. The Agency’s action to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy was particularly important in view of the growing acceptance of nuclear power as a stable and clean source of energy that could help to mitigate the impact of climate change. More than 60 countries were considering introducing nuclear power to generate electricity and it was expected that by 2030 between 10 and 25 countries would be operating their first nuclear power plants. While the decision to use nuclear power rested with each sovereign State, the Agency could assist interested countries, developed and developing alike, in establishing a reliable nuclear infrastructure. Such power must be efficient, sustainable and profitable and any expansion in its use must be safe and secure and not increase the proliferation risk. He drew attention to the agreement he had signed with the Russian Federation, with the approval of the IAEA Board of Governors, to help ensure supplies of nuclear fuel to Member States. Other such supply mechanisms were currently under study.

35. Nuclear technology provided unique tools to meet basic human needs, in the fields of medicine and radiotherapy for the diagnosis and treatment of cancer, as well as in plant breeding, food irradiation, animal health, pest control, water management and environmental monitoring. In any such use, safety and security must always be ensured: the Agency had an important role in that regard, while recognizing the primary responsibility of Member States. It was true that, since the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, nuclear safety had improved considerably, but vigilance still needed to exercised. IAEA was the custodian of the relevant international safety conventions and standards and provided Member States with practical assistance in implementing them, in particular through its peer review missions.

36. Great progress had also been made in making nuclear and radioactive materials more secure, thereby helping to counter the risk of nuclear terrorism. IAEA was widely recognized as the focal point for strengthening efforts in that area. It was also active in promoting technical cooperation through its Technical Cooperation Programme, which had grown, as recommended by the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and was able to draw on more than $100 million in annual resources, for projects in more than 120 countries and territories. Further efforts were needed, however, to ensure sufficient and predictable funding for the programme.

37. As had been recognized in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, IAEA safeguards were a fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, played an indispensable role in the implementation of the Treaty and helped to create an environment conducive to nuclear disarmament and nuclear cooperation.

38. IAEA was currently working to resolve important safeguards implementation issues in three States. Since 2002, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had
not allowed the Agency to implement safeguards and in 2009 that country had ceased all cooperation with the Agency in the implementation of the ad hoc monitoring and verification agreement arrangement pursuant to the Six-Party Talks process. The second State giving concern was the Islamic Republic of Iran, which was not cooperating sufficiently with the Agency for it to be able to confirm that all that country’s nuclear material was being used for peaceful purposes. He called once again on Iran to take steps towards the full implementation of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the relevant resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council and to clarify activities with a military dimension. Lastly, since 2008 Syria had not been cooperating with the Agency in throwing light on the nature of the Dair Alzour site destroyed by Israel and other sites. He once again requested that country to engage with the Agency on all outstanding issues.

39. He urged all States that had not yet done so to bring into force IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. The additional protocols were of vital importance to the Agency in that they provided a credible assurance not only that declared nuclear material was not being diverted from peaceful uses but also that there were no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in any given State. He noted that nuclear-weapon-free zones were an important factor in achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world and welcomed the entry into force since the previous Review Conference of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. The IAEA General Conference had in recent years adopted resolutions on the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East, including one the previous year on Israel’s nuclear capabilities; he would be following up on those resolutions.

40. Progress in nuclear disarmament had a positive effect on non-proliferation efforts and vice versa and was being promoted by the Agency through its verification activities. He therefore welcomed the 2010 treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on strategic arms reduction, which marked a step towards nuclear disarmament. Enhanced confidence in the non-proliferation regime, through a successful Review Conference, would provide the Agency with a stronger basis for its work in all areas.

Adoption of the rules of procedure

41. The President recalled that, at its third session, the Preparatory Committee had agreed to recommend to the Conference the draft rules of procedure contained in annex III of its final report (NPT/CONF.2010/1). He took it that the Conference wished to adopt the draft rules of procedure.

42. It was so decided.

Requests for observer status

43. The President, speaking with reference to rule 44 of the rules of procedure, said that a request for observer status had been received from Palestine. He took it that the Conference wished to accede to that request.

44. It was so decided.

45. The President said that, with reference to rule 44, paragraph 3, of the rules of procedure, requests for observer status had been received from the African Union, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the European Union, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the International Science and Technology Center, the League of Arab States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Pacific Islands Forum. He took it that the Conference wished to accede to those requests.

46. It was so decided.

47. The President, referring to rule 44, paragraph 4, of the rules of procedure, said that requests to attend meetings of the plenary or the Main Committee had been received from the 121 non-governmental organizations listed in document NPT/CONF.2010/INF/4. Furthermore, the Preparatory Committee had agreed to recommend to the Conference, in accordance with the rules of procedure, that representatives of non-governmental organizations should be allowed to attend meetings, other than those designated closed, and to receive documents of the Conference, and that, in accordance with past practice, non-governmental organizations should be allowed to make written material available, at their own expense, to the
participants in the Conference and to address the Conference, consistent with the final document of the 2000 Review Conference. He took it that the Conference wished to accede to those requests and to proceed in accordance with the recommendation of its Preparatory Committee.

48. *It was so decided.*

**Election of Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee**

49. **The President** recalled that, at its third session, the Preparatory Committee had agreed to recommend that Main Committee I should be chaired by a representative of Zimbabwe, Main Committee II should be chaired by a representative of Ukraine and Main Committee III should be chaired by a representative of Japan. It had also agreed to recommend that the post of Chairman of the Drafting Committee should be assumed by a representative of the Group of Eastern European States, and the post of Chairman of the Credentials Committee by a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States. The following candidates for the posts of Chairman had been endorsed by the respective Groups of States: for Main Committee I, Mr. Chidyausiku (Zimbabwe); for Main Committee II, Mr. Yelchenko (Ukraine); for Main Committee III, Mr. Nakane (Japan); for the Drafting Committee, Mr. Towpik (Poland); for the Credentials Committee, Mr. Momen (Bangladesh).

50. *Mr. Chidyausiku (Zimbabwe), Mr. Yelchenko (Ukraine), Mr. Nakane (Japan), Mr. Towpik (Poland)* and *Mr. Momen (Bangladesh)* were elected Chairmen of Main Committee I, Main Committee II, Main Committee III, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee, respectively.

51. **The President** said that, in accordance with rule 5 of the rules of procedure, the Conference should elect two Vice-Chairmen for each of the three Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee. The following nominations for the posts of Vice-Chairmen had been received: for Main Committee I, Ms. Barbulescu (Romania) and Ms. Higgie (New Zealand); for Main Committee II, Mr. Abdelaziz (Egypt) and Mr. Grinius (Canada); for Main Committee III, Mr. Zimonyi (Hungary) and Mr. Labbe (Chile); for the Drafting Committee, Mr. Soltanieh (Islamic Republic of Iran) and Mr. Ahlström (Sweden); and for the Credentials Committee, Mr. Ismayilizada (Azerbaijan) and Mr. Kongstad (Norway).

52. *Ms. Barbulescu (Romania) and Ms. Higgie (New Zealand), Mr. Abdelaziz (Egypt) and Mr. Grinius (Canada), Mr. Zimonyi (Hungary) and Mr. Labbe (Chile), Mr. Soltanieh (Islamic Republic of Iran) and Mr. Ahlström (Sweden), and Mr. Ismayilizada (Azerbaijan) and Mr. Kongstad (Norway) were elected Vice-Chairmen of Main Committee I, Main Committee II, Main Committee III, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee, respectively.*

**Election of Vice-Presidents**

53. **The President** said that, in accordance with rule 5 of the rules of procedure, the Committee should elect 34 Vice-Presidents of the Conference. The following nominations had been received for the posts of Vice-President: from the Group of Eastern European States: Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; from the Western Group, Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Republic of Korea, Spain and Switzerland; from the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States: Algeria, Brazil, China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, Jamaica, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Uruguay and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

54. *Albania, Algeria, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Egypt, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Jamaica, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Uruguay and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela were elected Vice-Presidents of the Conference.*

**Appointment of the Credentials Committee**

55. **The President** said that, in accordance with rule 3 of the rules of procedure, the Conference should appoint six members of the Credentials Committee on the proposal of the President of the Conference, in addition to the Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen elected. Accordingly, he proposed the following members of the Credentials Committee, while noting
that two further members remained to be proposed: Czech Republic, Mauritius, Republic of Moldova and Uganda.

56. Czech Republic, Mauritius, Republic of Moldova and Uganda were elected members of the Credentials Committee.

Confirmation of the nomination of the Secretary-General of the Conference

57. The President said that, at its second session, the Preparatory Committee had decided to invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in consultation with members of the Preparatory Committee, to nominate an official to act as provisional Secretary-General of the 2010 Review Conference. At its third session, the Secretary-General had nominated Mr. Thomas Markram, Department for Disarmament Affairs, to serve in that capacity.

58. Mr. Markram was confirmed as Secretary-General of the 2010 Review Conference.

Adoption of the agenda

59. The President said that he took it that the Conference wished to adopt the provisional agenda contained in annex IV of the final report of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.2010/1), including the recommendation of the Preparatory Committee in annex V on the allocation of items to the Main Committees of the Conference.

60. It was so decided.

Programme of work

61. The President drew attention to the draft programme of work (NPT/CONF.2010/INF/3), which remained open to modifications, pending consideration by the Conference, should circumstances require and in order to ensure that time was utilized in as efficient a manner as possible. On that understanding, he took it that the Conference wished to take note of the draft programme of work.

62. It was so decided.

63. The President further noted that an updated version of the draft programme of work for the first week of the Conference, contained in document NPT/CONF.2010/INF/5, had been circulated.

General debate

64. Mr. Natalegawa (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, expressed the hope that the Conference would produce a clear and balanced road map for strengthening implementation of the Treaty and of commitments undertaken at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and at the 2000 Review Conference. For their part, the non-aligned States parties pledged their full cooperation in both areas.

65. Forty years after the entry into force of the Treaty and 20 years after the end of the cold war, much remained to be done to achieve complete nuclear disarmament. A peaceful world devoid of nuclear arms was the Movement’s highest priority. Full implementation of the Treaty, the cornerstone of global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, would safeguard the world from the potential devastation by nuclear weapons. Global adherence to the Treaty should be promoted through a balanced and non-discriminatory approach to its three pillars, namely, nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and the inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

66. While the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the United States and the Russian Federation in April 2010 was a positive development, the reductions it stipulated did not meet the international community’s expectation of more concrete and systematic disarmament efforts on the part of nuclear-weapon States. As global nuclear disarmament would require the sustained engagement of all States parties, nuclear-weapon States must demonstrate greater political will in the discharge of their multilaterally agreed obligations. Implementation of the 13 practical steps, in particular the nuclear-weapon States’ commitment to eliminating their nuclear arsenals, were crucial to the credibility of the Treaty.

67. The disappointing failure of the 2005 Review Conference to yield a final outcome must not deter States parties from taking advantage of existing international goodwill and ensuring the success of the current Conference, as failure was not an option.

68. He underscored the Movement’s concern at the grave threat to humanity posed by nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence doctrines. The non-aligned States parties reaffirmed their long-established positions on nuclear disarmament and remained fully committed to their Treaty obligations and the agreements reached in
1995 and 2000. It would be important to establish subsidiary bodies to the relevant Main Committees of the Conference in order to take up specific matters.

69. It was unacceptable for nuclear-weapon States, in violation of article VI of the Treaty, and States not party to the Treaty to retain and modernize their nuclear arsenals, imperilling regional and international peace and security, in particular in the Middle East. The Movement urged the Conference to reject the doctrine of nuclear deterrence — an effective obstacle to disarmament, rather than a means of bringing about international peace and security — and to ban all forms of nuclear weapons testing. To that end, the Conference should call for a time frame for the implementation of article VI and establish a mechanism to verify the compliance of nuclear-weapon States with their obligations.

70. The non-aligned States parties regarded the Treaty as a key instrument with regard to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It would be necessary to ensure a balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States in implementing the Treaty. Its indefinite extension did not imply indefinite possession of nuclear arsenals, nor did it foresee the indefinite preservation of non-State party status, which would undermine the Treaty's universality. Consideration of a convention banning all nuclear weapons should be an integral part of any plan of action to be adopted by the Conference. Pending the total elimination of nuclear arsenals, efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority.

71. The non-aligned States parties underscored the inalienable right of States parties to research, produce and use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes without discrimination, a right explicitly enshrined in article IV of the Treaty. The unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes must be ensured, and nothing in the current discussion should be interpreted as affecting the Treaty’s protection of that right. Furthermore, as the Treaty itself left no room to set conditions for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the undue and unfortunate restrictions currently being imposed on many developing countries that were parties to the Treaty should be lifted.

72. Nuclear-weapon States must refrain from nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements. There should also be a total ban on transferring nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and on extending nuclear, scientific or technological assistance to States that were not parties to the Treaty. In that connection, non-aligned States parties viewed with concern any nuclear cooperation agreement allowing the transfer of nuclear materials to unsafeguarded facilities, in violation of article III of the Treaty.

73. With regard to the right of withdrawal from treaties, as explicitly defined in article X, he reiterated the position taken by the Movement at the 2005 Review Conference, namely, that the right of withdrawal of parties was governed by international treaty law.

74. He reiterated the Movement’s support for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, as called for by the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and expressed regret that the resolution had not yet been implemented.

75. The fact that Israel was the only Middle Eastern State not party to the Treaty posed an ongoing threat to the non-nuclear-weapon States of the region, given the operation of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities of unknown safety standards and the potentially catastrophic regional nuclear arms race that might ensue. The current Conference must therefore address that unsustainable situation by renewing its unequivocal commitment to implementation of the 1995 resolution. Recalling that the 2000 Review Conference had reaffirmed the necessity of Israel’s accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, the Movement reiterated its request to establish a subsidiary body to Main Committee II to consider proposals for the implementation of the 1995 resolution.

76. Mr. Ahmadinejad (Islamic Republic of Iran), responding to the Secretary-General’s comments, said that his country had agreed to the fuel exchange from the outset and that it was now up to the countries that should cooperate with Iran to make the next move.

77. The pursuit of sustainable security was an inherent human drive. No country could afford to ignore its security. Based on their faith in God, the
divine prophets had sought to provide guidelines for harmonious and secure coexistence in a global society. Development efforts would be doomed to failure in the absence of security. However, the vast resources currently being allocated to national security in many countries had failed to mitigate perceived threats. Furthermore, some States, estranged from the teachings of the divine prophets, committed the gross and shameful mistake of relying on possession of such weapons to guarantee their security, thereby exposing themselves to the hazards associated with production and stockpiling. The perpetrators of the first atomic bombardment, a crime of staggering proportions, were among the most loathed in history.

78. For over 60 years, the Security Council had failed to maintain international peace and security. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation remained equally elusive, given IAEA’s inability to fulfil its mandate. The current international climate posed particularly daunting challenges, including wars, the threat of nuclear strikes, and worst of all, the unjust policies adopted by a select group of expansionist States. During the previous four decades, some countries, including the Zionist regime, had acquired nuclear arms.

79. The policies of certain States and the inefficacy of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had contributed to the current situation of nuclear insecurity. Some States threatened and suppressed others in order to demonstrate their dominance and, in so doing, sowed the seeds of hatred and promoted the arms race internationally. Similarly, the production, stockpiling and qualitative improvement of nuclear armaments by any State justified the development of others’ arsenals. Because treating nuclear weapons as a deterrent necessarily involved increasing their quantity and improving their quality, such a policy, as practised by the United States and others, was the main cause of the escalation of the arms race and constituted a violation of States’ obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

80. It was regrettable that the Government of the United States and the Zionist regime, among others, not only had already used nuclear weapons, but continued to make threats involving their use against other countries, including his own. Certain nuclear-weapon States that enjoyed special privileges in the highest global decision-making bodies, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), repeatedly exploited those platforms to the detriment of non-nuclear-weapon States, and in a way that was contrary to the spirit of the Treaty. Non-nuclear-weapon States had been unable to exercise their inalienable right to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy without facing pressure or threats. Despite the clear provisions of article IV of the Treaty and of the Statute of IAEA, not a single report had been issued by IAEA inspectors on the nuclear weapons facilities of the United States and its allies, nor was there a plan for their disarmament. On the other hand, numerous resolutions had been adopted against non-nuclear-weapon States under false pretexts, with the clear intention of denying them their recognized rights. The Zionist regime, despite its stockpiling of nuclear warheads and continued threats to the people of the region, enjoyed the unconditional support of the United States Government and its allies and received the assistance necessary to develop its nuclear weapons programme. The same States that supported the Zionist regime put pressure on IAEA members, using the false pretext of probable diversions from peaceful nuclear activities, without producing any evidence whatsoever.

81. Nuclear technology, which was both clean and cheap, could be applied effectively in the medical, industrial and agricultural fields, yet nuclear-weapon States unjustly equated nuclear energy with nuclear arms. In fact, those States sought to monopolize both nuclear weapons and peaceful uses of nuclear energy in order to impose their will on the international community; that, too, ran counter to the spirit of the Treaty and was in flagrant violation of its provisions.

82. While its key mandates included facilitating the inalienable right of States parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, the mechanisms and regulations established by the Treaty made it very difficult for countries seeking to develop such peaceful uses to do so. Furthermore, no effective mechanism had been devised to address the threat of nuclear weapons — another key mandate of the Treaty. Indeed, efforts in that regard had been limited to talks whose guarantees were not binding. While IAEA continued to put significant pressure on non-nuclear-weapon States on the pretext of the risk of proliferation, those that had nuclear bombs continued to enjoy full immunity.

83. It was questionable whether granting extraordinary authority to nuclear-weapon States within IAEA and entrusting them with the critical issue of nuclear disarmament was appropriate. Expecting
such States to propose effective, voluntary initiatives for disarmament and non-proliferation was naive and irrational. In that regard, it was difficult to believe the United States Government’s Nuclear Posture Review, which ruled out the development of new nuclear weapons and attacks on non-nuclear-weapon States using such weapons, especially since that Government had never respected any of its commitments. In fact, some States that were both members of IAEA and committed parties to the NPT had been threatened with a pre-emptive nuclear strike. The United States Government regularly tried to divert attention from its non-compliance and unlawful actions; most recently, it had used the issue of nuclear terrorism as a basis for maintaining and upgrading its own nuclear arsenals. In its Nuclear Posture Review, the United States had kept silent regarding possible nuclear strikes against certain nuclear-weapon States in order to concentrate pressure on certain independent nations. Meanwhile, United States intelligence agencies and the Zionist regime continued to support major terrorist networks, credible evidence of which would be publicized, if necessary, at the upcoming conference on the global fight against terrorism to be held in Tehran. The qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons as set out in the Nuclear Posture Review was tantamount to vertical proliferation. While the Nuclear Security Summit, held in Washington, D.C., was an effort by the United States to preserve its monopoly over discussions on nuclear weapons and its superiority over other countries, the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation conference, held in Tehran, was a joint initiative by all participants to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the motto, “Nuclear energy for all, nuclear weapons for no one”.

84. A number of measures were necessary to achieve nuclear disarmament, to ensure non-proliferation and to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy. One such proposal was the comprehensive review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which should result in a nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation treaty with nuclear disarmament as a core mandate, to be achieved through transparent, binding and effective mechanisms supported by solid international guarantees. The Review Conference must establish an independent international group for the purpose of creating guidelines to enforce the provisions of article VI of the Treaty. The group, which should involve the participation of all independent countries, should set a specific timetable for the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons. Legally binding, comprehensive security guarantees without discrimination or preconditions should be introduced and maintained until complete nuclear disarmament was achieved by nuclear-weapon States.

85. It was imperative to terminate all research, development and improvement of nuclear weapons and related facilities immediately, and for the aforementioned independent international group to create a verification mechanism for that purpose. A legally binding instrument must be adopted to prohibit the production, stockpiling, improvement, proliferation, maintaining and use of nuclear weapons. States that used or threatened to use nuclear weapons should see their membership on the IAEA Board of Governors suspended, as their political influence prevented IAEA from carrying out its mandates.

86. In addition, nuclear cooperation with States that were not parties to the Treaty should cease and effective punitive measures should be adopted against States that continued such cooperation. It was crucial that any threat of the use of nuclear weapons or attack against peaceful nuclear facilities should be considered as a breach of international peace and security and should result in the termination of all cooperation of States parties to the Treaty with the threatening or aggressor State. Other necessary measures included the immediate and unconditional implementation of the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review Conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East; the dismantling of nuclear weapons on the military bases of the United States and its allies in other countries; and a collective effort to reform the structure of the Security Council, which currently served the interests of the nuclear-weapon States. The Islamic Republic of Iran, which did not need nuclear bombs for its development and did not regard them as a source of honour or dignity, was prepared to do its part in carrying out such initiatives.

87. The production, stockpiling and threats involving the use of nuclear weapons were no longer viable practices in the modern world. He therefore enjoined States that continued to conduct such activities to change their ways and realize that the current era belonged to nations that sought security, peace and justice through logical reasoning, rather than bullying and arrogance.

88. Mr. Asselborn (Luxembourg) said that the 2010 Review Conference came at a key juncture for the
nuclear non-proliferation regime. There had been hopeful signs in the preceding year in the areas of disarmament and non-proliferation, while major challenges remained, including proliferation, the threat that nuclear materials could fall into the hands of terrorists, and that the international community would not react forcefully enough to actions that undermined the non-proliferation regime.

89. The vision of a world without nuclear weapons, recently stated by the President of the United States, was shared by all who wished to guarantee security with the lowest possible level of arms, whether conventional or nuclear. The September 2009 summit convened by the Security Council had given cause for optimism as well. The United States and the Russian Federation were to be commended for the recent conclusion of their agreement on further reductions in their nuclear arsenals, opening the way to substantial arms reductions on both sides, but it was only the beginning of a process; nuclear disarmament under article VI of the Treaty must be pursued. Such disarmament efforts could free enormous financial resources that could be put to better use, for example, in the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals.

90. Seeking security at the lowest possible level of arms represented an essential contribution to world stability, and along with Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and Norway, his country had begun a debate within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to adapt its strategies to the new security environment. The recent Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C., had emphasized the need for the international community to work together to promote and reinforce nuclear security. Substantial progress must also be made towards the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and towards the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty.

91. Unfortunately, the Review Conference was taking place in a context marked by serious crises relating to proliferation, in particular in Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Those States’ violation of their obligations under the Treaty had shaken the confidence of the international community and undermined the Treaty regime.

92. Iran was pursuing its nuclear programme in violation of five Security Council resolutions and refused to be transparent about its past and present nuclear activities. He appealed urgently to the Iranian authorities not to miss the opportunity for dialogue. Numerous proposals had been made to meet the concerns expressed by Iran; if possessing nuclear weapons was not a point of honour to that country, then cooperation with those proposals should not be a problem. He also appealed to all States in the region to advance the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and to refrain from measures that would prevent the achievement of that goal.

93. The efforts of IAEA to ensure that its safeguards regime remained effective and credible must be supported. He appealed to all States which had not yet done so to enter into safeguards agreements. It was also essential to begin consideration of measures to be taken in the event of a withdrawal from the Treaty. Article IV enshrined the right of States parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Responsible development of nuclear energy for civilian use must take place under the best possible conditions of safety, security and non-proliferation.

94. Luxembourg viewed the Treaty as a major tool for collective security. It was in the interests of all to support it, preserve its integrity and strengthen its three pillars. More than ever, there was a need for a strong Treaty in order to ensure the common good through international peace, security and stability. The Review Conference would be successful if it was able to strengthen collective security, stability and prosperity for all.

95. Mr. Martin (Ireland) said that his country had a long and close association with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and in fact had introduced the first in a series of United Nations resolutions calling for the adoption of the Treaty, which had paved the way for its adoption. In recognition of that pioneering role, when the Treaty had been opened for signature in 1968, Ireland had been invited to be the first country to sign; it was also the first country to ratify the Treaty.

96. The horrors which nuclear weaponry could unleash on mankind and the planet defied description. In addition to death and destruction on a massive scale, the environmental costs would be profound and long-lasting. During the cold war era, the world regularly stood on the brink of nuclear catastrophe, but with the Treaty, the international community had taken a decisive step back from the abyss. In the intervening
years, the Treaty had become the most powerful bulwark available against the dangers posed by nuclear weapons. Support for the Treaty was a cornerstone of Irish foreign policy. Ensuring its universality remained of crucial importance, and he called on the small number of States who had not yet done so to adhere to it.

97. The Treaty regime was currently facing unprecedented challenges, among the most serious being the proliferation risks posed by Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. It also risked being undermined by the reluctance of some States to implement its provisions fully. Selective approaches which stressed the urgency of non-proliferation while downplaying the need for progress in disarmament served merely to weaken the Treaty. There had been some encouraging developments in recent months, however, including the new agreement on the reduction of nuclear arms signed by the United States and the Russian Federation. The Nuclear Posture Review recently conducted by the United States was another positive development.

98. In terms of the desired achievements of the 2010 Review Conference, first and foremost was the re-establishment of the authority of the Treaty after the setbacks of recent years. States parties should reaffirm the undertakings given at previous conferences if further progress was to be made on a balanced, consensual and forward-looking package of decisions on all three pillars of the Treaty and on the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. For the great majority of States parties, the Review Conference would not be seen as a success unless agreement was reached on specific measures to advance disarmament. Implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East was another important priority, as was the entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty. Similarly, negotiations on a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty should begin at the earliest opportunity.

99. Ireland pursued its disarmament and non-proliferation objectives both nationally and through its membership in the European Union, the New Agenda Coalition and the Vienna Group of Ten. Each of those groups would table working papers, which Ireland fully endorsed.

100. Circumstances were more propitious for a reaffirmation and strengthening of the Treaty regime than they had been for a decade. However, the Review Conference would not succeed without leadership, the political will to find the necessary compromises and hard work. All must play a part: the international community could not afford a further inconclusive Review Conference.

101. Mr. Romulo (Philippines) said that since 1968, the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been the reason that the nightmare vision of 15 to 20 nuclear States had been avoided, but it remained imperative to close the loopholes in the Treaty that made it possible for countries to acquire the skills to make nuclear weapons under the guise of a civilian nuclear programme.

102. A danger to one country was a danger to all — no nation could remain unaffected by the events in another country or region. For a country like the Philippines, with its nationals spread around the globe, the dangers posed by nuclear weapons were particularly stark. It firmly believed that the 1995 resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East must be implemented. Fulfilling that promise could help to usher in peace and stability in a region that had known neither.

103. Efforts towards nuclear disarmament could not be sustained unless fundamental changes were made in how some nations addressed security concerns. Finding comfort in deterrence had hindered nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and for lasting peace and security, deterrence must be replaced with diplomacy. The Philippines called on the five nuclear-weapon States to carry out existing commitments on irreversible cuts in their nuclear arsenals, in a transparent and time-bound manner, and on other States possessing those weapons to abandon them immediately.

104. The international community had reached a turning point. On the multilateral front, nuclear disarmament once again was taking centre stage on the agenda of the United Nations. The Secretary-General had pointed out that spending on weapons worldwide had reached over $1 trillion per year. The General Assembly had recently held a thematic debate on disarmament, which had helped to build momentum towards the 2010 Review Conference. The Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C., had also reaffirmed the commitment to nuclear disarmament. The arms reduction agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation was also a major step towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
105. Article VI of the Treaty called on the nuclear-weapon States to pursue disarmament, yet it did not set timelines or benchmarks. It was up to the States parties through the Review Conference, therefore, to determine realistic and clearly defined benchmarks and specific timelines for those States to accomplish what they had promised. The Philippines believed that the Test-Ban Treaty provided a crucial complement to the NPT, and that its early entry into force would boost global efforts to rid the world of nuclear weapons. Progress made at the Review Conference would also bolster the work of the Conference on Disarmament and help it to start work on a fissile material cut-off treaty, a vital element of an overall nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

106. The International Atomic Energy Agency must be strengthened and its safeguards fully respected. Impartiality and the avoidance of double standards were essential. Nuclear-weapon-free zones further strengthened the non-proliferation and disarmament regime: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) had established such a zone in its region as a contribution to peace and stability.

107. The Philippines reaffirmed the inalienable right of States parties to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but adequate checks and safeguards were required. Accordingly, it supported the IAEA technical cooperation programme, which assisted developing countries in particular in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Some 60 countries having indicated an interest in pursuing national nuclear power programmes, safety and security considerations must be addressed. Equal access to nuclear fuel should also be guaranteed and no monopoly of the nuclear fuel supply permitted.

108. Unlike other important international conventions, the Treaty did not have dedicated institutional support of its own. Although it was ultimately the strength of the commitment of States parties to the Treaty and not its institutional support that would decide whether it succeeded or failed, even the most basic institutional support could help States parties. Several proposals on how to strengthen the review process by adopting institutional mechanisms should be seriously considered during the Review Conference.

109. The Treaty regime would be stronger and more resilient when it had achieved universality. He called on States that had not yet done so to become party to that crucial agreement, and encouraged those who might be considering withdrawal to remain and to make every effort to work out their differences over the Treaty and its interpretation.

110. Every year, billions of dollars were spent on nuclear weapons research and arsenal maintenance, as much as $30 billion by some estimates. For 2010, the World Food Programme had projected a shortfall of 75 per cent of its requirements. A fraction of what was spent on nuclear weapons could easily erase that shortfall. When countries continued to spend lavishly on weapons of mass destruction, mortgaging their children’s future and letting people die of disease and hunger, there was clearly much still to be done to achieve a free and peaceful world.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.